THE AFGHAN ARMY: THE SOVIET MILITARY'S POOR STUDENT

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ~-
Intelligence 25X1
The Afghan Army:
The Soviet Military's
Poor Student
met
NESA 85-10006
January 1985
ADO
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Poor Student
The Afghan Army:
The Soviet Military's
Division, NESA,
This paper was prepared by I Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution by Office of Central
Reference. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, South Asia
Secret
NESA 85-10006
January 1985
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Summary
Information available
as of 26 December 1984
was used in this report.
Poor Student
The Afghan Army:
The Soviet Military's
Five years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan army
remains an ineffective military force and an unreliable Soviet ally. The
Afghan army is tactically inept, poorly trained, and commanded by officers
with minimal skills and leadership abilities. It is plagued by poor intelli-
gence, frequent desertions, and a history of battlefield defeats. Regime
forces need substantial Soviet support even to make small gains against the
resistance. We judge the regime's prospects for gaining the loyalty of large
numbers of Afghan soldiers-a key factor if the resistance is to be
defeated-will be low through the next decade.
The army's capability to fight the insurgents is unlikely to improve
significantly over the next few years:
? Desertions, insufficient conscription, and casualties will severely limit
military manpower growth.
? An inability to absorb new equipment and low equipment readiness rates
will continue to impede operations.
? Political indoctrination efforts will probably remain unproductive. Af-
ghan soldiers have shown an increasing tendency to mutiny or not
participate in operations in recent months.
The continued deficiencies of the Afghan army and the growing effective-
ness of the insurgents will oblige the Soviets to assume an even larger share
of the military burden in Afghanistan. As a result, the economic and
military costs of the war to the Soviets probably will increase over the next
few years, but not to a level the Soviets will find unacceptable.
Moscow undoubtedly will continue its efforts to rebuild the Afghan forces.
The Soviets eventually hope to leave the burden of the war and responsibil-
ity for security in the country to the Kabul regime, although they have no
cure for the problems of the Afghan army. The Soviets probably believe
that, as in Eastern Europe, they can use training and propaganda to mold a
new generation of Afghans that will form the backbone of a loyal
Communist force.
Secret
NESA 85-10006
January 1985
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Poor Training 5
Incompetent Leadership 7
Soviet Efforts To Rebuild the Afghan Army 9
Soviet Military Equipment Deliveries 10
The Impact of Soviet Advisers on the Afghan Army 10
The Army as a Counterinsurgent Force 13
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Figure 1
Boundary r,Dreeentetlon Is
not necessarily autnordetme.
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The Afghan Army:
The Soviet Military's
Poor Student' F_
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to assist the
beleaguered Afghan military against the growing
resistance to the Marxist regime in Kabul. Over the
last five years Moscow has increased its efforts to
build the Afghan army into a reliable and effective
fighting force so that Soviet troops can leave the
burden of the war and responsibility for the security
of the country to the Kabul regime. Although Afghan
forces have been subordinate to and directed by the
Afghan Ministry of National Defense through the
General Staff since the Communists seized power in
1978, direct Soviet involvement in all aspects of the
Afghan military has increased substantially. The ba-
sic structure and organization of the Afghan military
now resemble its Soviet counterpart.
The Soviets have restructured the Afghan army, but
their efforts to build a national military force that can
carry out its primary mission of suppressing the
After half a decade and little progress,
Moscow must recognize that rebuilding the Afghan
army and instilling the will to fight for Communism
in large numbers of Afghan troops will be a long
process, possibly requiring more than a generation.'
f
Performance
We believe Soviet commanders are increasingly reluc-
tant to rely on Afghan army units during joint
Soviet commanders distrust Afghan
forces and take extensive precautions to minimize the
chance that Afghan informants will pass operational
information to the insurgents. In some cases, the
Soviets do not tell Afghan unit commanders their
destination until two hours before the units move, or
lie about the target area until the operation is
launched. Soviet troops usually follow Afghan forces
in combat, in part to ensure that the Afghans will not
Afghans on their own have proven generally ineffec-
tive in operations against the insurgents. Major offen-
sive operations without Soviet participation most often
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Figure 3
Afghanistan: Estimated Local
Districts Controlled
Insurgent
controlled
Government
controlled
Disputed
0 1980 81 82 83 84
Liaison O
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Soviet efforts have brought the second and third 25X1
largest cities-Qandahar and Herat-under tenuous
government control.
end after little enemy contact but numerous deser-
tions. In one of the army's worst defeats of the war,
insurgents ambushed and destroyed the elite 38th
Commando Brigade in Paktika Province in May
1983, A relief operation
in August 1984 failed to reduce significantly insur-
gent pressure on regime garrisons in Paktia Province.
Afghan units currently garrisoned in the Panjsher
Valley cannot counter guerrilla attacks and continue
Afghan troops cannot respond effectively to insurgent
ambushes of road convoys,
Their tendency to slow down or stop when
under fire-without returning fire effectively-leads
to high casualties; and a lack of coordination among
convoys, main garrisons, and the Air Force makes
matters worse.
Afghan units also cannot or will not counter insurgent
attacks in the main urban areas. In our view, the
army's unreliability has allowed the insurgents to
increase pressure on Kabul and forced the Soviets to
divert their own troops to tighten security. Only major
We believe the Afghan army's poor capabilities would
allow the resistance, if it chose, to overrun many small
Afghan posts almost at will. Insurgents have besieged
the Afghan garrison at Khowst in Paktia Province for
months but are reluctant to overrun it because they
hope to avoid Soviet reprisals and prefer to continue
attacking resupply convoys in the area. According to
US Embassy sources in Kabul, the situation in Qan-
dahar is so bad that insurgents regularly inform
Afghan soldiers when they plan to attack regime
-facilities, giving the troops the opportunity to join the
guerrillas before the fighting begins.
In some areas, army units exist because garrison
commanders have made arrangements with insurgent
groups to ensure survival. Travelers into the country-
side report that garrisons provide regular supplies of
arms and ammunition to the insurgents in exchange
for noninterference. A large number of nonpolitical
career officers, particularly those in the northeast,
have become collaborators or active supporters of the
unusual for these officers to assist the insurgents. In
Balkh Province officers have arranged for guerrillas
to use army trucks to transport men and equipment.
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Figure 5. Afghan soldiers on duty in front of
Kabul Palace-note the discipline in the ranks.
Table 1
Afghan Armed Forces:
Estimated Assigned Personnel Strengths a
Army
62,000
Air Force
6,000
Border Guards
8,900
Constraints to Effectiveness
The poor performance of the Afghan army reflects
the force's low morale, the difficulties in recruitment,
and problems in training and logistic support. Serious
political factionalism complicates efforts at resuscitat-
ing the army.
Low Morale. The regime has been unable to improve
the morale of its forces. Afghan soldiers are growing
increasingly rebellious and are more likely to mutiny
or refuse to participate in operations than during the
past few years. Many soldiers sympathize with the
resistance and are upset by the continued Soviet
occupation and heavyhanded supervision of the Af-
ghan forces, heavy casualties, and chronic failure in
combat. Many soldiers are reluctant to remain in the
army because of the isolation of many garrisons,
shortages of food and other supplies, the failure of
some commanders to provide regular pay, and poor
medical care. Poor morale influences many Afghan
conscripts to avoid action against the insurgents,
Party
members and regular army personnel fire at the
guerrillas, but conscripts often fire away from them or
over their heads.
Insufficient Manpower. The overall manpower of the
Afghan military, in our judgment, is not increasing at
the rate necessary to improve its combat capability.
the official present-
for-duty strength for all branches of the Afghan
armed forces in mid-July 1983 was about 89,000, with
about 62,000 men in the Afghan army. We believe,
a These figures represent men assigned to units, not actual
(on-hand) strengths.
however, that the official manpower figures are inflat-
ed and mask the continuing high rate of desertions
and casualties.
we believe most divisions are operating at about 50
percent or less of their established strengths.7
the actual strength of
the army-not including border guards and paramili-
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tary units-is about 50,000 men, an increase of some 25X1
10,000 to 20,000 troops since the first two years of the
war when the army nearly disintegrated.
The inability of the government to secure the loyalty
of its troops and to prevent large-scale desertions, in
our judgment, is a primary impediment to increasin
force levels.
we estimate
that over 100,000 Afghan officers and soldiers have
deserted since the invasion.
the barbed wire and minefields
that surround some posts are installed more to keep
recruits in garrison than to exclude insurgents.
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Figure 6
Major Afghan Military Units
7thW
(J9 5th
Qandahar
7t
Zabol
gQ`2O1h
hlan
T8 kt1A
12th
Boundary representation is
not neceeearily authoritative.
Armored division
Infantry division
Mountain division
Province boundary
0 150 Kilometers
0 150 Miles
Even the best Afghan units are troubled by constant
troops killed or wounded each month in operations
and insurgent attacks. We believe the regime has
probably lost at least some 50,000 to 60,000 men-
killed and wounded in action-since 1979. Increasing
insurgent effectiveness in the use of weapons, espe-
cially mines, and improved tactics in attacking con-
voys, in our view, will raise regime casualties over the
next few years.
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The regime's impressment drives have had only limit-
ed success and, because of increasing losses, have
failed to bolster military manpower significantly.
Pressure for additional manpower has led the regime
to intensify its recruiting efforts and to recall a large
number of reservists. we
estimate that there are at least 3 million men between
the ages of 15 and 45 in Afghanistan. Soldiers nearing
the end of their service are pressed to reenlist and
offered monetary inducements, educational opportu-
Poor Training. In our judgment, current Afghan
army tactical military training, which was rudimenta-
ry at the time of the Soviet invasion in 1979, is still
poor and has not appreciably increased military effec-
tiveness. the 25X1
Soviets are becoming more reluctant to join in opera-
tions with unreliable, underage, and untrained Af-
ghan troops who often desert in combat.
nities, and assignment preferences.
Many Afghan soldiers, in our view, are poorly trained
in small and heavy arms because the Soviets and the
regime hesitate to give weapons instruction to unreli-
able soldiers. 25X1
the army sometimes issues weapons to conscripts only
after the men have been in the service two or three 25X1
months or when senior officers are confident the
soldiers will not desert and give their weapons to the
insurgents. Soldiers who are not party members often
are not issued weapons at all during training,
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Table 3
Afghan Armed Forces Permanent
Training Installations and Establishments a
Military High School
Air Force and Air Defense Academy
Technical Academy
Officers Advanced Course
Military Band School
To compensate for severe manpower shortages, Kabul
has reduced training time and, in our judgment, has
thereby lowered the competence of its forces.
Afghan officers train
conscripts for as little as 10 days, with instruction
sometimes interrupted because the new troops are
needed for combat operations.
actual military training for some con-
scripts consists of firing about a dozen rifle rounds or
watching officers demonstrate equipment.
Poor training has also impaired officer effectiveness.
The military academy and high school-the main
training schools for army officers-have enlarged
their enrollments and shortened their curriculums,
military university students graduated, but, by lower-
ing standards, the government now graduates nearly
all the students.
officers who graduated after 1979 were no longer
competent to handle their duties and did not grasp the
development and initiation of Soviet military opera-
tions at battalion or higher levels.
training course in 1980 to increase the number of
officers, but the quality of graduating officers is so
low that they cannot adequately train their subordi-
nates.
Leninism taught in Afghanistan.
Political indoctrination efforts have so far been large-
ly unproductive. Although instilling troops with the
will to fight for the government quite likely would
lead to significant improvements in the development
of the Afghan army as a counterinsurgency force,
many Afghans are unwilling to forsake Afghan tradi-
tions or Islam to embrace the brand of Marxism-
a large number of the Afghan military-
Regime and Soviet attempts to emphasize party mem-
bership and political education have detracted from
army effectiveness by reducing the time available for
practical military training.
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Afghan Military Traditions
Afghan military forces traditionally have been orga-
nized along tribal lines and have tended to emphasize
individual and tribal achievements rather than na-
tional victories. Afghans draw on some 2,000 years of
experience in guerrilla warfare but have little knowl-
edge of and often no desire to serve in a modern army.
During the past century, economic constraints, poor
leadership, limited manpower, and internal and ex-
ternal subversion have also hindered the efforts of
Afghan leaders to create a modern military. F_~
The Afghan army has undergone extensive reorgani-
zation since the late 1950s when the Soviets agreed to
modernize and reequip Afghan forces. Until the 1978
coup, however, the Soviets lacked the influence to
enforce their doctrinal views about training and oper-
ations among Afghan officers. In 1979 the army was
poorly trained, badly supplied, and unable to carry
out either of its basic missions: to defend the coun-
try's borders and to suppress internal dissent. Autho-
rized some 100,000 to 120,000 troops, the army had
only some 80,000 assigned and, we believe, could
muster less than half that number, with desertions
steadily increasing.
reports that many troops are illiterate and do not
understand or are not interested in political education,
but every soldier must attend at least four hours of
political indoctrination each week-considerably
more time than is spent in combat training.
cal ideology courses account for six hours of the
military school week, while only five hours are used
for military instruction. Because the regime views
political indoctrination as the most important part of
military training, the quality of specialty instruction
at the military academy has decreased to the point
that officers are no longer qualified to handle their
Party Factionalism. Tension between members of the
Afghan ruling party's Khalq and Parcham factions
saps the effectiveness even of the regime's supposedly
Khalq faction are reluctant to follow party orders to
participate in operations against the insurgents. 0
in June 1983,
fighting between Khalqi and Parchami officers in the
25th Division raged for at least three days and
resulted in the destruction of a large number of
machineguns, as well as ammunition and petroleum.
Fighting also broke out between Khalqi and Parchami
officers in May after an argument in the Afghan
Revolutionary Council about the conduct and wisdom
of the spring 1984 Panjsher Valley offensive, 0
Parchamis accused Khalqis of
leaking plans for the offensive to insurgent command-
er Masood and causing army units to defect to the
guerrillas.
Incompetent Leadership. During the past five years,
purges, combat losses, defections, and desertions have
reduced the Afghan officer corps to a group of
unreliable, ill-trained, inexperienced junior officers
who cannot fulfill the responsibilities of command.
the reduction
in training time has fostered a new generation of
officers-rapidly promoted men referred to as Ma-
shini (mass produced)-who usually are no more than
21 years old and are promoted to the rank of junior
lieutenant after only six months of training. The most
senior officers are often incompetent, in our view,
because advancement is based on party membership
rather than ability. in
1983 the Ministry of National Defense chose a group
of senior commanders and chiefs of staff of corps,
divisions, and independent brigades to attend a special
five-month course in the Soviet Union after Soviet
advisers noted that senior Afghan officers were out of
their depth.
Logistic Problems. We believe acute logistic difficul-
ties hinder army combat operations. Mountainous
terrain, severe weather, poor roads, and inadequate
communications make resupply a difficult task all
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Party Growth, Parchami Power
The split in the People's Democratic (Communist)
Party began soon after the party's founding in 1965,
and by 1966 Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner)
became separate factions. Each took its name from
party newspapers. In 1977 the two factions united
under Soviet pressure but only papered over their
differences, which reappeared in July 1978, a few
months after the party came to power. In the next few
months, the Khalqis exiled or jailed most important
Parchamis and dominated the Communist movement
until December 1979, when Soviet troops overthrew
the Khalqis and installed a government in which both
factions were represented. The Parchamis, however,
had a clear edge. Since then, the Parchamis have
slowly gained at Khalqi expense.
According to US Embassy sources, the Communists
strengthened their presence throughout the govern-
ment in 1983. Pressure to join the party has intensi-
fied, and party organizers have become more influen-
tial in forcing government personnel to attend
meetings and rallies and to participate in organiza-
tional activities. A strong inducement to join the
party is the perception that the Soviets are not going
to be forced out of Afghanistan and that accommoda-
tion to their presence must be made.
faction, the new member is informally recruited into
one faction or the other depending on his job and
prior association with colleagues who may also be
party members.
An indication of recent growth is the proportion of
youths among party members. Kabul media in July
1983 claimed that 64 percent of party members were
under age 30 and that 20 percent of the armed forces
were party members.
however, approximately 80 percent are un-
der age 30, and about 10 percent of the military
belong to the party.
civil servants are attracted to the party by promises
of good pay, monthly food subsidies, and career
advancement. only 20 to 30
percent of party members are ideologically commit-
ted. Most activists are assigned to KHAD, the re-
gime's intelligence service, and to sensitive ministries.
approximately 80 percent
of the personnel in the Ministries of Interior and
Foreign Affairs are party members, and about half of
the personnel in the Ministry of Finance belong.
Although the size of the party in Kabul and the
degree of commitment to it may have risen, the
regime's inability to deter assassinations has ham-
pered party growth, US
Embassy sources report that a jibe often heard in
Kabul's bazaars is 'join the party and die. " The
party's influence outside the capital is almost nil,
according to US Embassy sources
]pressure to join the
party has been particularly keen on Afghan military
officers because Soviet advisers are reluctant to work
with those who have refused membership. At staff
meetings, officers are left with the impression that
refusal to join may result in early retirement and loss
of pension. Although candidates cannot pick their
The Khalqis remain a majority in the lower ranks of
the Ministry of National Defense and throughout the
Ministry of Interior,
US Embassy officials believe the Parcham faction is
slowly gaining over the Khalqis through recent ap-
pointments to key positions in the army and Air
Force and high-level civilian posts, including four
ambassadorships in the Communist world.
in spring 1983 Parchamis were
installed as commanders of Air Force wings and as
political officers. Appointments at the 12th plenum in
mid-1983 reduced the proportion of Khalqis in the
Politburo and Central Committee to about 25 per-
cent, The
recent appointment of a Khalqi Minister of National
Defense may be designed in part to reduce Khalqi
resentment of Parchami gains.
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year. Insurgent attacks against supply convoys com-
pound these problems and deprive some units of
needed equipment, materiel, and food. Landmines are
Training in the USSR. The Soviets train at least
2,000 Afghan officers, soldiers, and military students
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Most of the logistic support for the Afghan army is
conducted by the Logistics Department of the Minis-
try of National Defense. The Logistic Troop Com-
mand delivers supplies to the army's divisions, which
in turn are responsible for distribution of supplies to
Only a small number of Soviet vehicles are used
to support Afghan forces, and few fixed-wing aircraft
and helicopters are available.
Regime forces suffer from chronic problems of poor
maintenance and low equipment readiness. Most Af-
ghan soldiers generally cannot perform routine main-
tenance or repairs, and the army has few trained
operating crews or repair personnel.
the army also is critically
short of spare parts for trucks, aircraft, weapons, and
other combat equipment. As a result, the equipment
readiness rate of Afghan tanks and other tracked
vehicles is probably only 50 to 75 percent, and the
readiness rate of other large equipment, such as
engineering vehicles, only about 30 to 40 percent of
the total inventory.
The army obtains much of its food and related
supplies and all of its ordnance and petroleum, oil,
and lubricants from the USSR-often a difficult and
time-consuming process. Although the Logistics De-
partment authorizes the local purchase of some food
and other supplies by divisions, the local population
generally fails to cooperate with the regime.
Soviet Efforts To Rebuild the Afghan Army
The Soviets intend to build a reliable and capable
Afghan army through political and military instruc-
tion-an ambitious plan that they probably realize
will be a long-range effort. In our view, Moscow will
be unable to find a reliable Communist cadre that
would be a foundation for a loyal and effective army
until existing training programs have produced a new
generation of officers.
in the Soviet Union each year,
Some political and mili-
tary training for junior officers and cadets lasts from
three to seven years,
Short courses of a few months to two years for officers
of field grade or above cover subjects such as tactics,
command and staff procedures, operations, and spe-
cial staff operations.
Moscow also trains
some troops for special combat units in the Soviet
Union, probably in counterguerrilla tactics. F-1
the Soviets hope that, with time
and proper training, these units will make the Afghan
army more effective by increasing the regime's coun-
terinsurgency capability.
Many Afghan students who study in the Soviet
Union, even some who attend the Soviet General Staff
course and senior military schools, complain about
Soviet political indoctrination and the poor quality of
most courses. courses
on military operations given by Moscow are not well
prepared; attendees are mismatched in military expe-
rience; courses are sometimes geared to slow learners,
causing boredom in other students; and a large
amount of time is used in translation.
students must receive a passing
grade in Communist ideology to graduate, regardless
of performance or technical proficiency in other areas.
Moscow does not require students studying in the
USSR to be party members, but Soviet advisers on
selection committees allow few nonparty members to
be chosen for training in the USSR,
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In many cases, training in the USSR is unproductive
because students become disenchanted with life in the
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ghan military students-even party members-return
from the USSR with anti-Soviet attitudes. Many
returning students frequently are overheard abusing
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Table 4
Estimated Afghan Army Deliveries From
the Soviets and Equipment Losses
Trucks/ miscellaneous vehicles 3,000-3,900
Losses, December 1979-1984 a
Trucks
Armored vehicles
1,500-3,000
575-850
a We believe these numbers represent the minimum figures for
equipment delivered and lost. The Afghans, with Soviet assistance,
most likely have repaired some damaged equipment.
Lenin and the Soviets and stating that the Soviets
consider all Afghans enemies,
(Students
continually complain of unsatisfactory living condi-
tions, low stipends, daily fights between Khalqi and
Parchami students, and harassment by the local popu-
lace.
Soviet Military Equipment Deliveries. So far the
Soviets have been reluctant to increase military train-
ing or equipment deliveries substantially, most likely
because they are wary of Afghan troops turning
against them. Our comparison of Soviet military
deliveries with estimated Afghan equipment losses
indicates that the Soviets have been replacing losses
rather than strengthening the Afghan army. We
estimate that the Soviets have supplied equipment
valued at over $1.5 billion to the Afghan military
since December 1979
the Soviets have not provided the
Afghans with large amounts of new ground force
equipment. Our analysis also suggests that the Soviets
have placed greater emphasis on supplying the Af-
ghans with comparatively inexpensive trucks than
replacing combat losses of armored vehicles.
The Soviets probably have been reluctant to augment
their equipment deliveries to regime forces signifi-
cantly without improvements in manpower and capa-
bilities. Afghan units are unable to absorb large
increases in equipment any vehicles
remain in Afghan garrisons unused.
The Impact of Soviet Advisers on the Afghan Army.
Soviet advisers are present throughout the Afghan
military and directly supervise most of the army's
activities in an effort to improve the performance of
all authority in the Ministry of National Defense.
Some 20 to 30 Soviet officers also are assigned to each
Afghan division and assist units down to the battalion
level. The Soviets make all decisions concerning oper-
ations, organization, and the promotion and transfer
of Afghan officers and provide advice on technical,
financial, and political matters.
Afghan officers at the
division level must even obtain Soviet permission to
hold staff meetings.
Despite the pervasiveness and authority of Soviet
advisers, Afghan units rarely implement Soviet plans
effectively. Junior and noncommissioned officers usu-
ally are not under direct Soviet supervision and, we
suspect, fail to motivate their troops to perform well.
Senior Afghan commanders, under more direct con-
trol by the advisers, often frustrate Soviet plans
deliberately or through incompetence.
Afghan commanders sometimes
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refuse to obey Soviet orders, prompting advisers to
appeal to their superiors to have their orders upheld or
have the Afghan commanders replaced.
Outlook and Implications
High rates of desertion and casualties, combined with
inadequate conscription, will severely limit the size of
the Afghan army over the next few years. The
regime's impressment efforts probably will increase
military manpower only very slowly. The prospects of
gaining the loyalty of large numbers of soldiers, even
in the next decade, are dim because of failures in the
regime's and the Soviets' indoctrination efforts.F_
Without large-scale material and manpower assist-
ance from the Soviets, we judge that the Afghan army
would disintegrate. Moscow apparently is willing to
sustain the military and economic costs of assistance
to the Afghans because it believes that the USSR
eventually can use political and military training and
indoctrination to build a reliable and effective Afghan
army. We believe this process will be long-probably
at least a generation-and difficult because of the
poor quality of the training and the limited effective-
ness demonstrated by even the best trained Afghan
units.
The continuing ineffectiveness of the Afghan army
will reduce Moscow's ability to consolidate control in
Afghanistan and increase the economic and military
costs of the war to the Soviets for at least the next few
years. The Soviets will have to assume an even larger
portion of the military burden in Afghanistan if the
current trend toward increased insurgent effectiveness
continues. Frustrated by the lack of success in Af-
ghanistan, the Soviets have a number of options
ranging from maintaining the status quo to sharply
increasing their troop strength. We believe the Soviets
most likely will choose to increase their forces slightly
to reduce demands on unreliable Afghan forces and
hold territory against possible insurgent gains. Mos-
cow also may rely more heavily on new equipment to
improve the performance of Soviet troops currently in
the country.
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Appendix
The Army as a
Counterinsurgent Force
Command Structure
Afghan armed forces are controlled by the Ministry
of National Defense, a body organized on the Soviet
model. The Minister of Defense, Gen. Nazar Moham-
mad, directs the Ministry and reports to President
Babrak Karmal. The main components of the Minis-
try are the General Staff, the Air Force and Air
Defense Command,' the Border Security Command,
and Military Intelligence.
General Stag. Most Afghan army units are subordi-
nate to the Afghan Ministry of National Defense
through the General Staff-an organization struc-
tured along Soviet lines.
the Chief of the General Staff oversees the
operations of the Afghan army as well as some 17
directorates.
Many of the directorates existed before 1978, but the
Soviets, in an apparent attempt to control Afghan
military planning and programs at all levels, have
prompted the regime to add and restructure director-
ates. All have Soviet advisers.
the reorganized planning and operations
directorate, because it issues orders for military oper-
ations to all Afghan units, has become the most
important component in the Ministry of National
Defense. High-ranking Soviet advisers are always
present, maintain effective control, and issue orders
even to senior Afghan officers. The political director-
ate, newly structured after 1979, also has become an
important addition to the General Staff. Political
directorate representatives, who are responsible to the
General Staff rather than to operational commanders,
serve in almost all Afghan units and have broadly
defined responsibilities not limited to propaganda
work.
separate research paper.
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Figure 10
Afghan Ministry of National Defense Organization
Air Force and Air Military KHAD
Defense Command (Intelligence)
Air Defense
Artillery
Adjutant
General
Armament
Technical
Border Security Chief of Staff
Command
Supreme
Court
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Figure 11. Afghan border
guards at the Khyber Pass.
Organization of Forces
Direct Soviet involvement signaled the reconfigura-
tion of Afghan forces according to the Soviet pattern.
Afghan units are organized along Soviet lines but are
less well equipped, manned, and trained.
Corps. The Afghan army consists of 11 infantry and
three armored divisions-sometimes called bri-
gades-organized into three corps and five indepen-
dent divisions and some smaller units subordinate to
the Ministry of National Defense through the General
Staff. The three corps are responsible for the geo-
graphic area bordering Pakistan and are headquar-
tered in Kabul, Qandahar, and Gardeyz. The inde-
pendent divisions are assigned to areas in northern
and western Afghanistan. The independent 21st
Mechanized Infantry Brigade is stationed in Farah
Province to cover a gap between the 2nd Corps in
Qandahar and the independent 17th Division in He-
rat. The 18th and 20th Divisions, also independent,
are headquartered in Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh Prov-
ince and Nahrin in Baghlan Province, respectively.
the regime considers
the 1st Corps the best of the three and has given it
priority in personnel, equipment, and training. The
commander of the 1st Corps is usually in line to
become Chief of Staff or Minister of National De-
fense and is the government's most trusted officer.
The Corps' 9th Mountain Division serves as an exam-
ple of Soviet efforts to improve the Afghan army.
Although it has been reorganized to respond more
quickly to increasing security and counterinsurgency
requirements in the Konar Valley, its performance
has been poor.
The Afghans have also attempted to augment their
2nd Corps in Qandahar since 1978. Previously the
Corps had only two major units: the 15th Infantry
Division and the 7th Armored Brigade. After the
Soviet invasion, the 7th Infantry Division, formerly
part of the 1st Corps, moved to Moqor from the Kabul
area to strengthen the 2nd Corps. The 466th Com-
mando Battalion is also new to the Corps and has had
an active though largely unsuccessful counterinsur-
gency role.
The regime upgraded the 3rd Corps by incorporating
the formerly independent 14th Infantry Division from
Ghazni into the Corps and adding the 477th Com-
mando Battalion. The 12th and 25th Infantry Divi-
sions continue to serve in Paktia Province.
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Figure 13
Estimated Organization of the Afghan Army
Border
Security
Tank
Transport
Special
Recon
Republican
Guard
Commander
General Staff
Air Force
Air Defense
T
LLB
Chemical
Defense
Mountain
904451 1-85
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Figure 14
Organization of the Afghan Motorized Rifle Division (Infantry)
Division
headquarters
Tank Antiaircraft
battalion battalion
Antitank
battalion
Reconnaissance
battalion
Signal
platoon
Motorized rifle Motorized rifle
regiment regiment
Engineer Medical
battalion battalion
L Service
battalion
Motorized rifle Artillery
regiment regiment
The regime gives them priority on manpower assign-
ment, training, and equipment. Most commando bat-
talions are authorized about 600 men and usually
include three infantry companies, an 82-mm mortar
company, and antitank (RPG), air defense (12.7-mm
DshK), supply, and signal platoons.
commandos undergo rigorous physi-
cal conditioning and receive some jump instruction.
Some special training for commando forces is also
conducted in the Soviet Union. The regime, however,
has only one airborne battalion, the 242nd of the 37th
Commando Regiment.
Commando units probably are more reliable and
effective than other army forces, but their perform-
ance in counterinsurgency operations with only a few
exceptions-usually when units are deployed with
Soviet forces-has been unsatisfactory. The demise of 25X1
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Figure 15
Organization of the Afghan Armored Division
Artillery Engineer
battalion battalion
Signal
battalion
Division
Headquarters
Combat vehicle
battalion
Transport
battalion
Armored Armored
regiment regiment
Antiaircraft Reconnaissance
battalion battalion
Armored
regiment
Equipment
The Afghan army depends on the Soviet Union, which
began supplying it almost exclusively with equipment
and arms in the early 1960s, for replacements and
spare parts. Afghan units currently use poorly main-
tained T-34, T-54/55, and T-62 tanks and BTR-40,
BTR-60PB, BTR-152, BMP, and BRDM-2 armored
vehicles. Most of the army's artillery is towed. Little
of the equipment in the Afghans' inventory is specifi-
cally suited to counterinsurgency warfare.
Paramilitary Forces
In addition to rebuilding the army, the Soviets have
attempted to strengthen Afghanistan's paramilitary
forces, in our view with little success. Most Afghans,
although willing to cooperate temporarily to achieve
financial or other benefits, withdraw support for the
government once perceived gains have stopped, and
many at least tacitly support the insurgents.
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Table 8
Equipment in an Armored Division
Tribal Recruits. The regime occasionally tries to
recruit members of nomadic tribes, mainly for intelli-
gence purposes. Recruits are issued AK-47 rifles and
are deployed independently without army support.
such units have suf-
fered high casualties in all operations. They often
desert or defect to the resistance in critical situations.
The government, not dissuaded by the nomads' poor
performance, has tried to bribe some tribal chiefs with
promises of money, food, clothing, and weapons for all
individuals joining the local militia force. We believe
these efforts are largely unsuccessful, since tribes will
cooperate only as long as it is in their interest to do so.
defense element to supplement police forces.
the civil defense personnel-
called Sarandoi-are under the authority of the Min-
istry of Interior and are organized into small battal-
ions. These units-including some 8,000 men-serve
as police strike forces in Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, and
Jalalabad.
Defense of the Revolution. The Defense of the Revolu-
tion organization-assigned over 4,000 men-is
staffed by party members and carries out propaganda
and civic action to consolidate and extend regime
control in rural areas,
L__--- - - -- ----_-
Figure 16. Afghan forces sometimes use Soviet-
supplied BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers.
Aviation Week and
Space Technology
Occasionally the regime mobilizes party volunteers,
called defenders of the revolution, for special duty.
service is tempo-
rary and usually involves assignment to a police
battalion for combat against insurgents or propagan-
da and agitation. such "volun-
teers" have been reluctant to accept party mobiliza-
tion orders and, if assigned to combat duty, often
become more of a burden than an asset.
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Table 9
Provinces With Militia Regiments
Because many insurgent groups maintain strict secu-
rity to guard against government informers, we sus-
pect the battalions will have only limited success. F_
instigation, decided to reorganize its border militias
based near Pakistan and Iran. The Ministry of Na-
tional Defense established seven new militia regi-
ments-each authorized 1,000 men-in late May
1983, The units' prima-
ry mission, which they fulfill poorly, is to stop insur-
gent movement through border areas and to supple-
ment existing border forces.
there is an extremely high defection rate
from the militias. The major difference between
border and militia forces is mobility; border units are
positioned and operate over a wide area; militias are
tribal forces that serve part-time only in their home
localities. Border forces also have heavier weapons
than militias and are supported by police and regular
army units.
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