JAMAICA: DRUG INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00586R000500540006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Transition
Jamaica:
Drug Industry in
Seeret
GI 85-10268
November 1985
Copy 4 4 4
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Transition
Jamaica:
Drug Industry in
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by
Division
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Terrorism /Narcotics Analysis
Secret
GI 85-10268
November1985
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Jamaica:
Drug Industry in
Transition
Key Judgments Responding to a rapidly expanding North American market, Jamaican
Information available marijuana production has evolved from a cottage industry to a large-scale,
as of 30 September 1985 consolidated criminal enterprise. Jamaicans also are moving beyond their
was used in this report.
customary role as marijuana cultivators into international trafficking, and
several of the island's leading drug traders have developed distribution
networks in the US retail market. Further, some Jamaican drug traffickers
have taken advantage of the skills and connections acquired in marijuana
smuggling to diversify into the more lucrative traffic in cocaine.
The changing nature of Jamaica's drug industry will make it more difficult
to suppress. These changes have created a class of criminals with better or-
ganization and greater resources than Jamaican security forces have ever
faced. This new and more dangerous group of criminal entrepreneurs
threatens to derail drug control efforts chiefly through their power to
corrupt law enforcement and judicial administration. We conclude that
corruption now reaches the highest levels of the Seaga government and
that through payoffs and political contributions the traffickers are gaining
more influence over Jamaica's political process.
Paralleling the growing drug industry are rising levels of drug abuse and
domestic violence. Jamaican drug traders have been importing illegal
weapons to protect their greater economic stake in drug operations.
Jamaica's growth as a transit area for cocaine from South America has
stimulated the development of a cocaine market on the island, leading to
increased cocaine abuse among Jamaicans. Concerned about the increasing
drug abuse and violence that has accompanied rising cocaine trafficking,
many Jamaicans are changing their formerly tolerant attitude toward drug
trafficking.
The Government of Jamaica has taken positive steps since late 1984 to
improve the island's drug enforcement, increasing the pace of marijuana
eradication and tightening control of Jamaica's many airfields. Prime
Minister Seaga had previously been reluctant to enforce Jamaican drug
laws aggressively, despite steady US pressure. Although his new approach
may be an attempt to mollify US officials critical of Jamaican performance
in drug control, in our opinion it is more likely a response to a perceptible
shift in public attitudes and a growing realization that drug production and
trafficking in Jamaica have changed from a small-scale operation to a well-
organized business.
Secret
G! 85-10268
November 1985
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continued strong enforcement.
Improved counternarcotics measures, particularly manual eradication of
marijuana, have forced growers and traffickers to adjust and made them
vulnerable, but these measures also have taxed Jamaica's limited resources.
To sustain its program, Jamaica will need additional outside assistance-
not only funds but also equipment and training for its security forces.
Prosecutors also need additional legal power, such as asset seizure laws,
and the government needs to reinforce growing public opinion in favor of
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Key Judgments
The Evolution of Marijuana Cultivation in Jamaica 1
Drug Trafficking: A Changing Jamaican Role
Growing Participation in Cocaine Trafficking
Prospects for Narcotics Control in Jamaica
Seaga's Political Calculation
Signs of Progress in Drug Control
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United
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Jamaica: Marijuana Cultivation Areas, Spring 1985
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Jamaica:
Drug Industry in
Transition
Introduction
Increasingly effective drug suppression programs in
Jamaica since late 1984 have forced narcotics traf-
fickers to reduce their operations and provoked defen-
sive responses. Jamaican security forces have de-
stroyed more marijuana in the first five months of
1985 than in all of 1984, and total marijuana produc-
tion for 1985 will probably fall below the 2,000 to
3,000 metric tons estimated for 1984. The Jamaican
Government also has moved against the island's many
unregistered airstrips used by traffickers both for
shipping local marijuana and for transshipping
Colombian cocaine to the United States.
The government's willingness to act after years of
relative disinterest reflects a growing appreciation
that the nature of the local narcotics industry is
changing in ways that have serious implications for
public security. At the same time, the changes in
Jamaica's drug industry will make it easier for the
major traffickers who now control it to weather the
immediate impact of the government's counternarco-
tics campaign. These large-scale traffickers evidently
expect that the government will be unable to sustain
the present high level of activity and believe that time
favors their side
The Evolution of Marijuana
Cultivation in Jamaica
The growth and profitability of the North American
market lie behind the transformation of Jamaican
marijuana cultivation. According to the US Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), as recently as
the mid-1970s, Jamaican farmers produced only a few
hundred metric tons of marijuana per year, enough to
satisfy domestic consumption and tourists visiting the
island. Jamaican marijuana cultivation was dominat-
ed by independent subsistence farmers, with the larg-
est among them producing no more than a few
hundred plants. When the success of Mexico's eradi-
cation program created an opening in the US and
Canadian marijuana markets in the late 1970s, these
small-scale Jamaican producers, who lacked access to
capital and distribution channels, were unable to
expand their production. Instead, a relatively few
large-scale professional growers, who were able to
expand production quickly, seized the opportunity to
meet the new market demand. As a result of the
productivity of these professional growers and the
rapid boost in output from their fields, Jamaica was
producing an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 metric tons of 25X1
marijuana per year by late 1984. Many of the small-
scale producers still exist, but they are limited chiefly
to supplying the domestic market.
We conclude that large producers have been able to
dominate the export market because they offer sub-
stantial advantages to buyers. Successful marijuana
export requires efficiency in the production and mar- 25X1
keting of the crop and security all along the traffick-
ing chain. Large-scale growers provide safety, speed,
and reliability in delivery to buyers, who prefer
contact with a few trusted sources to contact with
several dozen small, widely dispersed, and often un-
known farmers. Moreover, professional producers of-
ten work on contract for major traffickers or brokers
who supply them directly with capital in advance of a
harvest; such financial backers have little interest in
small-scale growers.
Professional marijuana farmers are proving to be
highly proficient managers, and they are using their
access to capital and political connections to develop
large-scale marijuana cultivation. Using modern agri-
cultural techniques and spreading his crops over
numerous fields, a successful big-time marijuana
farmer can produce some nine to 10 metric tons of
cured commercial grade marijuana during the two
growing seasons each year, compared with the 100 or
so kilograms typically produced by a small farmer:
major 25X1
growers employ several production foremen called
gangsmen, each of whom supervises a half dozen or
so field workers. Sizable work details move from one
field to another during planting, leaving behind a
small group of maintenance workers to irrigate,
fertilize, and prune the growing marijuana. When
the crop matures, the resident field hands are
rejoined by the larger work groups, and the gangs-
men supervise the harvest.
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Known in Jamaica by its Hindi name ganja, marijua-
na is firmly established in Jamaican culture. Mari-
juana was introduced to the island in the 19th
century, probably by indentured laborers from India.
Although the drug has been illegal in Jamaica since
1913, Jamaicans are generally tolerant of its use, and
about half the working-class population smoke mari-
juana regularly while many others use it in some
other form. The use of marijuana is a ritual among
the Rastafarians, a minority religious cult native to
Jamaica.
Marijuana is grown all over Jamaica, but, according
to an aerial survey conducted at the peak of Jamai-
can cultivation in summer 1984, growing areas are
concentrated mostly on government-owned land in the
north-central and western parts of the island. Mari-
juana farmers use the mountainous areas of the
interior as well as low-lying wetlands. Fields in the
mountains are usually small, generally around two-
tenths of a hectare. The rugged terrain of Jamaica's
highlands precludes the use of mechanized agricul-
tural equipment, and marijuana fields in these areas
are often inaccessible except by mule or on foot.
Growers in the lower areas or in the marshlands
normally cultivate larger plots, sometimes up to two
hectares or more, and can use small tractors or other
modern equipment. These areas were the hardest hit
durin the eradication cam ai n in the first half of
1985.
marijuana, but planting is concentrated in two grow-
ing seasons each year,
The larger of these is the summer crop, planted in
April or May for harvest in the late summer or early
fall. The winter crop is planted in the fall and
harvested in January through March. Farmers are
not bound by rigid schedules, however, and, accord-
ing to US Drug Enforcement Administration officials
in Kingston, marijuana is always in some stage of
cultivation in Jamaica.
Most of the marijuana cultivated in Jamaica is
standard or commercial-grade marijuana, grown for
both domestic consumption and for export. To grow
their crops, Jamaican farmers first plant seeds in
small peat pots and nurture the seedlings for about a
month in primitive greenhouses or nurseries. When
the seedlings are hardy enough, farmers transplant
them to fields. Marijuana reaches its peak maturity
within four to six months after germination, depend-
ing on soil conditions, rainfall, and other environment
variables. Potency is highest at peak maturity, and
farmers try to time their planting so that harvesting
is stretched out over six weeks or more. After trans-
planting, commercial-grade marijuana must be irri-
gated and protected against pests.
about 5 percent of the commercial-
grade crop is lost by natural causes before it can be
harvested.
Jamaican growers also produce sinsemilla (meaning
without seeds), a type of marijuana made from
female plants whose flowers have not been pollinated.
Sinsemilla commands far higher prices than commer-
cial-grade marijuana because many users believe it is
much more potent. Sinsemilla cultivation occurs
mostly in the western parts of Jamaica,
Although sinsemilla is produced
throughout the year, it is reported to grow best during
the reduced daylight hours of the winter season. This
form of marijuana comes from the same seed stock
as commercial grade, but shortly after germination,
all the male plants are destroyed. Farmers then
transplant the female seedlings, keeping them away
from commercial-grade plants to avoid accidental
fertilization. Growers watch the female plants care-
fully over the next three or four months to assure
that no male plants have survived.
A third marijuana product from Jamaica is called
"hash oil, " a dark, viscous fluid made by percolating
hexane, ether, or acetone through marijuana. Hash
oil is often made from waste material, such as stems,
leaves, or decayed marijuana.
hash oil production rises whenever trans-
portation channels are disrupted because growers
prefer to sell to hash oil producers (or make hash oil
themselves) rather than let their harvested marijuana
rot. Jamaica is the only major producer of hash oil in
the Western Hemisphere. According to the DEA,
most of the island's hash oil is smuggled to Canada.
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that in late 1984 there were between 20,000 and
25,000 farmers and field workers involved in the
island's marijuana industry. Many of these workers
used to be independent, small-scale marijuana grow-
ers who now serve as agricultural laborers for the big
producers. Other workers specialize in packaging
marijuana for shipment, in concealing it in commer-
cial goods, in carrying it to clandestine airstrips, and
in loading the boats and airplanes in which the illicit
cargoes are smuggled.
Drug Trafficking:
A Changing Jamaican Role
Jamaican drug dealers also are transforming the
nature of trafficking on the island. American and
Canadian buyers created the export market by pur-
chasing marijuana directly from Jamaican farmers or
retailers, and by maintaining exclusive control of
distribution from the island to the point of sale in
North America. Because the biggest profits in the
drug trafficking industry are in distribution, Jamai-
cans had strong incentives to move into trafficking.
They are now taking over specialized functions such
as brokering, concealment, and transportation. Some
are expanding into retail distribution by developing
networks in US cities, and others are diversifying into
the even more profitable transshipment of cocaine
from Colombia to the United States.
Brokering. As the Jamaican export industry grew,
local marijuana dealers first took over the brokering
function, chiefly because they could develop better
connections with the Jamaican growers than could
North American buyers operating alone. Jamaican
brokers or their agents now buy loose marijuana from
farmers and do their own packaging and loading
Concealment. Concealing loads of smuggled marijua-
na is a trafficking function at which Jamaicans excel,
and the major organizations are rapidly developing a
reputation for skill and innovation that rivals that of
the sophisticated Colombian smuggling groups:
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Assembling and Packaging Bulk Loads
The old model of marijuana production in Jamaica
has not been completely displaced by the "corporate"
Farmers receive
model, and even major Jamaican traffickers still
count on obtaining some of their export shipments
from small independent farmers
In the traditional, small-scale production model,
Jamaican marijuana buyers circulate in the main
cultivation regions before. the harvest, contacting
farmers to negotiate the amounts of marijuana that
each can supply. The buyers also specify the time and
place for collecting the drugs but normally do not
guarantee a price or even a sale. Before the agreed
date of delivery, buyers or their agents often contact
local police to arrange for protection during the
inspection and sale of the crops.
When the marijuana is ready for harvest, field hands
cut and dry it, usually by hanging the approximately
six-foot-high plants on poles or by laying them out on
plastic sheets. Farmers then carry their cured mari-
juana down from remote hillsides by mule or on foot.
The buyers return to the pickup point, usually at
night, and meet with groups of growers. Buyers
examine the marijuana for color, freshness, and resin
content, frequently dickering with each farmer over
the price. A buying session can last all night, and
often involves many individual farmers, each of
whom sells a small amount rarely exceeding 100 kilo-
grams and often much less.
Transportation. Most of the pilots who fly marijuana
out of Jamaica are US citizens, according to the US
between $2.50 and $11.00 per kilogram for commer-
cial-grade marijuana, depending on the conditions of
the market and the quality of their harvest. Sinse-
milla prices are much higher, up to $45 per kilogram.
Buyers from the United States and Canada also take
part in this process but usually pay higher prices than
Jamaican buyers.
Marijuana buyers truck their bulk loads to ware-
houses for packaging. .(f the local police have not been
paid, buyers' assistants often scout ahead on the route
to the warehouse, where packaging specialists prepare
the load for delivery.
a major packag-
ing specialist uses several pressing machines and may
handle up to 3,000 kilograms of marijuana per week
during the height of a good harvest. Packagers com-
press the dried marijuana into rectangular blocks
weighing about 15 kilograms each. Sinsemilla is not
compressed because it is too delicate.
Methods of packaging vary according to the intended
mode of delivery. Packers usually tape the blocks of
marijuana carefully in waterproof plastic for an
airdrop, the most common delivery technique. They
may also use brightly colored vinyl bags or bright
fluorescent markers to make the bales of marijuana
easier to spot after they are dropped in the water
from smuggling aircraft.
Customs Service, but an increasing number of them
are Jamaican. Many of the major Jamaican traffick-
ers now own their aircraft, hire their own pilots, and
are no longer dependent on US traffickers to finance 25X1
this critical stage in the smuggling pipeline:
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The low-lying marshlands of
western Jamaica offer ideal
conditions for the cultivation of
marijuana. The crop is normal-
ly germinated in seedbeds like
this one before being trans-
planted tofelds, where it ma-
tures in about 20 weeks.]
Before the transition to large-
scale marijuana cultivation,
Jamaica's drug industry was
dominated by small, subsis-
tence farmers who grew their
marijuana in the same fields
with legitimate crops, such as
yams or beans. The marijuana
in this photo is in the center
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Marijuana is in varying stages
of growth in this large, approxi-
mately 2-hectarefield in the
central highlands of Jamaica.
This field is about 10 times the
size of a typical small-scale
from maturity.
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Retail Distribution. Jamaican drug traffickers now
are seeking control of street-level distribution in the
United States, and evidence indicates that major
Jamaican narcotics organizations are moving toward
that goal. alleged that major
Jamaican drug traffickers maintain regular and ex-
tensive contacts in the United States, especially in
Florida. Between January and August 1984, the US
Government revoked the visas of at least 29 known or
suspected Jamaican drug traffickers. The narcotics
traders responded by hiring US and Jamaican citizens
with no criminal records to travel between the two
countries carrying drugs, money, and information.
Growing Participation in Cocaine Trafficking. We
believe Jamaicans are becoming increasingly involved
in the lucrative cocaine trade. Until recently, the
cocaine found in Jamaica was usually small amounts
used by tourists. Over the past two years, the island
has become an important transit area for cocaine
being shipped from Colombia to the United States. To
satisfy an expanding US market for cocaine, Colom-
bian suppliers needed to ship larger loads than could
be handled by couriers on commercial flights, so they
turned to boats and general aviation aircraft. Smug-
glers needed a place to refuel and resupply, and
Jamaica was ideally located. Seizures of cocaine by
Jamaican security forces totaled about 370 kilograms
in 1984, the first year in which bulk seizures were
recorded in Jamaica. The 1984 total was equaled in
the first seven months of 1985. According to a DEA
estimate, about 2,700 kilograms of cocaine passed
through Jamaica between August 1984 and August
1985. Some was undoubtedly siphoned off for the
Jamaican market, but we conclude most was bound
for the United States.
Some Jamaican drug dealers have been attracted by
the higher profits and ease of handling of cocaine, and
they have taken advantage of skills and connections
acquired in marijuana smuggling to develop their own
Jamaica's role as a transshipment point for cocaine is
likely to expand, and as it does cocaine abuse by
Jamaicans will almost certainly increase. Some co-
caine is already skimmed to supply tourists and a
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growing number of domestic users, and there are signs
of greater public concern and support for efforts to
combat drug use. Numerous health professionals have
expressed alarm at the noticeable increase in cocaine
abuse, and the relationship between robbery and
cocaine addiction has not gone unnoticed in Jamaican
society. Under largely voluntary leadership, Jamai-
cans from the fields of health, public education, and
law enforcement have periodically held community
meetings and "workshops" to increase public aware-
ness of drug abuse. Jamaica's National Council on
Drug Abuse (NCDA), appointed by Prime Minister
Seaga in October 1983, now meets quarterly.
The New Narcotics Threat
As Jamaica's major drug traders have expanded
beyond cultivating marijuana for the local market,
they have become more wealthy, more powerful, and
more dangerous. Consolidation of export production
of marijuana, expansion by Jamaican drug dealers
into retail distribution, and a growing Jamaican in-
volvement in the lucrative cocaine trade have concen-
trated wealth in the hands of major traffickers on a
scale unknown in Jamaican experience. These
changes have created a class of criminals with better
organization and greater resources than Jamaican
security forces have ever faced.
Jamaica's leading traffickers threaten to derail offi-
cial Jamaican drug control efforts chiefly through
their power to corrupt law enforcement and judicial
administration. Drug-related corruption, long a prob-
lem among the island's low-ranking rural constables,
is penetrating the highest levels of the Seaga govern-
ment. It is not too late to reverse these trends, but
unless the Seaga government can sustain efforts to
counter narcotics smuggling, the influence of major
traffickers could spread and damage US and Jamai-
can efforts to suppress their trade.
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Moving Marijuana to the US Market
Most of the marijuana smuggled from Jamaica to the
United States leaves the island in small general
aviation aircraft and is dropped over Bahamian wa-
ters to boats waiting to take it into south Florida.
Many of the smuggling pilots are Americans, but
Jamaicans are increasingly taking over this function,
according to the US Customs Service. Pressure from
both Jamaican and US authorities on smugglers
using small aircraft is likely to lead to greater use of
commercial air cargo and maritime routes.
Air Routes and Methods. The "airdrop" method is
the dominant air smuggling technique from Jamaica
to the United States. It begins when an aircraft leaves
a registered Jamaican airfield on a short flight to a
clandestine strip near the warehouse, where the drugs
have been processed. A Jamaican loading crew meets
the pilot, who leaves his engine running for the three
or four minutes required to get the bales of marijua-
na aboard his Piper-Aztec or Cessna airplane. Taking
off with a load of 500 to 1,000 kilograms, the pilot
heads north, crossing over Cuba. Using prearranged
signals over the rendezvous point in Bahamian wa-
ters, the pilot picks out the vessel waiting below for
the marijuana, and his companion-called a kick-
er-pushes the bales out of the airplane. His mission
completed, either the pilot flies to The Bahamas to
refuel or returns to Jamaica, if he has enough fuel to
Maritime Routes and Methods. According to the
DEA, the US Coast Guard, the US Customs Service,
enforcement pressure
on air smuggling also has caused greater use of
maritime routes from Jamaica to the United States.
Shipments of marijuana by sea have been concealed
in commercial goods, in sealed compartments aboard
many types of vessels, and in large commercial
shipping containers.
The use of ocean routes allows smugglers to ship
larger loads of marijuana than can be moved by
aircraft. This technique may also increase their risk;
however, a single seizure results in a larger loss than if
the shipment were dispersed. For example, major
Jamaican trafficker Trevor Dunkley lost a 20-ton
containerized shipment of marijuana in Kingston Har-
bor on 29 October 1984, and another five-ton load in a
joint JDF/JCF operation in Montego Bay in early
the Cuban role in marijuana smuggling
is changing and that the Cubans now permit Jamai-
can pilots to pass over Cuba unhampered. During late
1983 and early 1984, most smuggling pilots leaving
expend resources to halt the traffic
of the drugs is the United States and not Cuba,
Cuban authorities probably have little incentive to
Jamaica chose to fly around the eastern end of Cuba
rather than risk detection by Cuban authorities. By
early 1985, a steady
stream of Jamaican smuggling flights over Cuba had
become routine and that Cuban authorities were
aware of the cargoes but did nothing to stop them.
Although it is not possible to prove Cuban awareness,
we believe that Cubans are in fact passively cooperat-
ing with marijuana smugglers. Since the destination
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Increase in Drug-Related Violence. The shift in
Jamaican drug production and trafficking from a
cottage industry to a sophisticated criminal enterprise
is stimulating higher levels of domestic violence. As
Jamaican drug smugglers have extended their reach
to the United States, they have developed greater
access to illegal arms, many of which enter Jamaica
from Miami. With their growing wealth, Jamaican
drug traders are better able to purchase weapons and
to hire professional gunmen than ever before, and
their greater economic stake in drug operations pro-
vides a strong incentive to use weapons and gunmen.
Drug trafficking often brings with it increased vio-
lence because the potential economic returns are so
high, and drug dealers everywhere arm themselves
and hire armed men for protection against rival 25X1
dealers. Fights over segments of a market are often
bloody, and the firepower used by rival trafficking
groups in Jamaica has been spiraling upward since
last year. According to an officer of the US Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
drug traf-
fickers in Jamaica now are armed with AR-15s and
MAC-10s, both convertible to fully automatic fire.
Jamaican security forces also have seized US M-16
military rifles from narcotics traffickers. The evidence
is growing that Jamaican drug smugglers are now
using established trafficking routes and methods to
import illegal arms and ammunition:
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The connection between drugs and firearms is con-
tributing to Jamaica's already endemic political vio-
lence. Many of the fatal shootings in Jamaica result
from clashes among Kingston's tough street gangs
(often identified with rival political parties), and
greater access to high-powered weapons by politically
motivated gunmen is likely to heighten the level of
violence still further. Even more ominous is an appar-
ent shift in loyalty by some of the gangs from the
Jamaican drug traffickers so far have not retaliated
against the island's security forces in spite of increas-
ingly effective enforcement operations, but both Ja-
maican and US personnel have been threatened.
Continued progress in the marijuana eradication pro-
gram and heightened interdiction efforts could soon
provoke a violent response from growers and traffick-
ers who may soon be competing for dwindling supplies
of marijuana to fill their orders.
Four Jamaicans cutting down marijuana plants
with brush cutters. Three of the men are uni-
formed JCF officers, the other is a laborer. Using
equipment supplied by the US Government, Ja-
maican security forces stepped up marijuana
eradication operations in 1985, destroying an
estimated three-quarters of the summer harvest.
The eradication teams are made up of JCF
officers and laborers hired by the police. Helicop-
ter mobility improves the field workers' produc-
tivity dramatically and is the key to a successful
manual eradication campaign. US officials in
Kingston have called for more US support of the
JDF Air Wing in the form of UH-IN helicopters
Prospects for Narcotics Control in Jamaica
Changes in Jamaica's drug industry have affected
public perceptions and official policies toward narcot-
ics control. In the past, most Jamaicans considered
marijuana production and trafficking as problems
mainly for foreigners. Many Jamaicans-if they
thought about drug operations at all-believed that
marijuana was a net economic benefit to Jamaica.
The lax public attitude toward drug enforcement was
reflected in a set of Jamaican Government policies
aimed chiefly at foreign smugglers. Jamaican authori-
ties avoided the political costs of cracking down on
Jamaican citizens because, by the time the marijuana
had been processed and loaded, most of the Jamaicans
involved had already been paid. Prime Minister Seaga
argued until recently that he could not afford to
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rural poverty in Jamaica as a constraint on aggressive
ers because many were JLP supporters.
Public attitudes now appear to be shifting in Jamaica
in favor of stricter drug enforcement. Rising cocaine
abuse, police corruption, the connection between drug
trafficking and the import of illegal weapons, and
threats to the tourist industry have heightened public
concern. In late February 1985, both of Jamaica's
major newspapers carried editorials condemning drug
trafficking. Both editorials stressed the strong US
position on the issue and warned that continued
Jamaican lenience in drug enforcement risked grave
economic consequences for the nation. The more
significant of the editorials was by Dr. Carl Stone,
Jamaica's leading political columnist. Stone claimed
that he had once taken a relaxed view of marijuana
and believed it was a net benefit to Jamaica, but that
he had changed his mind. In June, a senior official in
Jamaica's Ministry of Health told a US official in
Kingston that the level of public tolerance for drug
production and trafficking was decreasing rapidly.
Cocaine was appearing in Jamaican high schools, the
official added, and it had been linked to a rise in
crime, which the official believed was committed to
finance drug habits.
Seaga's Political Calculation. Until recently, Jamai-
ca's Prime Minister had been unwilling to push drug
control programs aggressively, but since late 1984 he
has taken several steps that indicate a change in
attitude. Before 1985, Jamaican drug enforcement
programs consisted largely of an ineffective attempt
to dynamite illegal airfields and a half-hearted cam-
paign to tax drug traffickers' illegal incomes. Under
US pressure to improve Jamaican drug enforcement,
Seaga responded by asking for resources-such as
sophisticated radar systems and aircraft-that he
probably knew Washington would not provide.
The apparent change in Seaga's political calculation
was signaled in September 1984, in a speech review-
ing the social and economic damage inflicted on
Jamaica by drug production and trafficking. Seaga
pointed out that the illicit trade threatened Jamaica's
relations with the United States, the United King-
dom, and Canada. He acknowledged for the first time
publicly that increasing consolidation of the island's
drug industry had eroded the "small farmer" argu-
ment he had often used in the past, when he portrayed
drug enforcement.
Seaga's change of position could be an attempt to
mollify US officials critical of Jamaican performance
on drug control, but we consider it more likely a
response to the perceptible shift in public attitudes
and a growing realization that drug production and
trafficking in Jamaica have changed from a "mom
and pop" operation to a well-organized criminal en-
terprise. In view of Jamaica's continuing economic
constraints, it is also likely that Seaga now takes
seriously US threats to cut back economic aid or take
other measures-such as seizing Air Jamaica air-
craft-that would damage Jamaican interests.
We expect Seaga to remain cautious in exploring how
far he can push an expanded drug control program in
Jamaica and to move ahead slowly until resistance
develops. In a late March conversation with US
officials, Seaga said that, in spite of Cabinet opposi-
tion, he intended to go ahead with an investigation of
aerial spraying, emphasizing that the inquiry must be
made without publicity because the topic was ex-
tremely sensitive in Jamaica. Although Senator Os-
wald Harding, chairman of the island's National
Council on Drug Abuse, stated in March that Jamai-
ca would not use paraquat to eradicate marijuana, he
did not rule out other methods of chemical eradica-
tion. Manual eradication operations in the first half of 25X1
1985 are well ahead of the pace set in 1984, and the
expected political backlash has not occurred.
Signs of Progress in Drug Control. Since Seaga's
September 1984 speech, the Jamaican Government
has made substantial progress in drug control, partic-
destroyed more than 600 hectares of marijuana,
exceeding the total of about 440 hectares reported for
1984.
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This rural coastline road (left) was used as an airstrip by cut trenches across it at several points. The JDF also has used
ing in an unusually high number of airplane crashes
while targeting others for future destruction. Al-
though traffickers were able to repair a few of these
damaged strips within a few days, destruction of
heavily used clandestine fields forced smuggling pilots
to use unfamiliar airstrips for their operations, result-
during April, May, and June
This year Seaga has turned increasingly to Jamaica's
military forces to strengthen the island's counternar-
cotics operations. In late February, he shifted respon-
sibility for security at Jamaica's four major domestic
airfields from the Civil Aviation Department to the
JDF in an attempt to better control smuggling. In
addition, JDF engineer units were ordered to use
heavy equipment to destroy clandestine airstrips used
by traffickers. In April, the JDF identified some 40
illegal airfields as major outlets for marijuana traf-
fickers, and demolished 29 by the middle of June,
The JDF is now participating in joint counternarcotics
operations with the police force, and a JDF/JCF task
force under military command has been formed to
better coordinate joint operations. The island's mili-
tary forces appear to be far less affected by the
corruption that impairs JCF performance and are
more disciplined than the heavily politicized police
force. The JDF also is the only government agency in
Jamaica with access to helicopters, and it is more
mobile than the police. A joint JDF/JCF narcotics
operation in mid-May resulted in the seizure of about
320 kilograms of cocaine and the arrest of five
brothers from a prominent Jamaican family with
political connections. These arrests probably could not
have occurred without the participation of the
Defense Forces.
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Despite considerable strides in drug enforcement, the
present downturn in production and trafficking may 25X1
be only temporary. Major drug dealers are deeply
entrenched in Jamaica and, unlike small-scale pro-
ducers, have the financial resources to curtail their 25X1
activities for a while in anticipation of an eventual
leading drug traffickers may have re-
carry out these varied missions.
them on drug enforcement requires reductions in
other areas. One of the JDF's few helicopters was
badly damaged in a drug raid in May and, according
to US officials in Kingston, will require about $1
million to repair. The JDF Coast Guard, which has
played an important role in the island's drug enforce-
ment campaign, is also responsible for coastal securi-
ty, search-and-rescue operations, and fisheries regula-
tion but has only four aging patrol boats with which to
tary resources are already very limited, and expending
Tricker Reactions and Future Prospects. Increas-
ingly effective drug suppression programs in Jamaica
have forced marijuana growers and traders to reduce
their operations and to develop countermeasures to
protect their lucrative business. The military takeover
of airport security in February and the airstrip demo-
lition program between April and June restricted air
smugglers' options.
strained their operations this spring and summer
while waiting to see if current drug enforcement
pressure can be maintained:
Improvement in Jamaican drug enforcement since 25X1
last year has taxed Kingston's limited resources and
will require sustained external aid to maintain the 25X1
pace set since September 1984. US Embassy officials
have warned repeatedly that funds for the eradication 25X1
The
marijuana eradication campaign probably discour-
aged many farmers from planting a 1985 summer
crop.
increasing risks.
US marijuana buyers are becoming reluc-
tant to deal in the Jamaican market because of
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program are running low, and more aid has been
requested. For example, by late September the JDF
was down to only one operational helicopter, and US
officials in Kingston urgently requested more helicop-
ters and spare parts to deal with the upcoming fall
harvest. Further, the JDF Coast Guard lacks the
spare parts and fuel to keep its patrol boats operating
at full capacity, and it is not prepared to counter the
surge in maritime drug trafficking expected as air
routes are squeezed.
marijuana stocks were up as a result of a bumper
crop last year. If so, these stocks will be sharply
reduced because of the small spring crop, and a push
by the traffickers to reestablish fields and trafficking
officers could request additional training from US
and other enforcement agencies in areas in which
Jamaican law enforcement is weak, such as undercov-
er techniques. Police experts of other Commonwealth
nations whose legal systems resemble Jamaica's could
help the island's prosecutors develop a stronger legal
arsenal. Canadian authorities in particular could be
helpful, and, since Canada is a major market for
Jamaican drugs, the Canadians have an incentive to
assist Jamaican drug enforcement officials. Most
important, the nagging problem of high-level corrup-
routes could occur late this summer and fall.
At present Jamaica's drug traffickers probably feel
little threatened by a Seaga government beleaguered
with debt, unemployment, and civil strife. They are
vulnerable, however, and there are a number of
measures Kingston could take to achieve the Prime
Minister's stated goals to eliminate large-scale mari-
juana cultivation on the island and to discourage the
traffickers from becoming more firmly established in
Jamaica. Despite the inefficiencies of manual mari-
juana eradication, compared with the aerial spraying
technique, manual eradication did cut back on the
spring 1985 crop and discouraged many of the island's
farmers from participating in the harvest
If the US-assisted program is
continued, and particularly if more helicopter mobil-
ity is provided to boost eradication workers' produc-
tivity, manual eradication will remain a substantial
disincentive to large-scale marijuana cultivation.
The Government of Jamaica could strengthen its drug
enforcement program significantly by developing pro-
cedures to seize traffickers' assets. Asset seizure has
proved a useful enforcement technique in the United
States and elsewhere because it attacks the economic
benefits of drug trafficking.
Although US officials in
Kingston anticipate elays in moving the proposal
through the Jamaican bureaucracy, Jamaican securi-
ty officers have expressed strong interest in the tech-
nique and have sought US help in adapting it to the
Jamaican legal system. The cooperation of the US
Department of Justice would almost certainly be
required because many leading Jamaican drug traders
have substantial economic assets located in the United
States.
The Jamaican Government could introduce legislation
to strengthen its drug laws and could prosecute a
prominent trafficker to lend further credibility to
Seaga's pronouncements about a crackdown. Jamai-
can prosecutors still lack many of the powerful tools
available to their US counterparts to attack complex
criminal organizations, but there are signs Jamaica is
beginning to liberalize its court system to better deal
with drug traffickers. According to US Embassy
reporting, tape recordings of incriminating evidence
recently were accepted for the first time by a Jamai-
can court in a major drug case. Jamaican judicial
For the long term, the Jamaican Government can
begin to marshal opposition to drugs through public
education, thus encouraging public support for future
law enforcement initiatives. Because Jamaicans are
far more sensitive to cocaine abuse than they are to
their familiar marijuana, a program emphasizing
cocaine is likely to be most effective. Opposition to
drugs in Jamaica has lacked focus while prodrug
forces have been better organized. Recent seizures by
the US Customs Service of Air Jamaica aircraft and
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fines against the airline for carrying drugs could
threaten the tourism sector of the economy,
Prime Minister Seaga could
use such incidents to gain further support for his
antinarcotics measures. In addition, a grant in April
of $380,000 from the United Nations Fund for Drug
Abuse Control may also help shape the antidrug
effort by lending structure to the drug abuse educa-
tion program.
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