THE SOVIETS IN INDIA: MOSCOW'S MAJOR PENETRATION PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00586R000400490007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
The Soviets in India; Moscow's
Major Penetration Program
GI 85-10315
December 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
The Soviets in India: Moscow's
Major Penetration Program
This paper was prepared by Office
of Global Issues, with a contribution by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion
and Instability Center, OGI,
Secret
GI 85-10315
December 1985
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 1 November 1985
was used in this report.
Major Penetration Program
The Soviets in India: Moscow's
less receptive political climate
The Soviet Union has exploited its close ties to India, its official presence
there, and Indian concerns about US policies in the region in a far-
reaching campaign to bind India closer to the USSR and drive a wedge be-
tween India and the United States. While the Soviets have encountered a
they continue to manipulate and exploit selected issues and 25X1
politicians. More important, through a wide range of overt and covert
activities conducted during the last three decades, the Soviets have built up
substantial influence capabilities in India. 25X1
we believe that Moscow has 25X1
undertaken activities to penetrate virtually every sector of Indian society:
? Moscow provides substantial financial support to the ruling Congress-I
Party, the two Indian Communist parties, and individual politicians of
various parties, according to US Embassy This 25X1
funding has helped to ensure significant Soviet access to Indian Govern-
ment and political leaders.
? The Soviets enjoy nearly unfettered access to the pages of Indian
newspapers, lar ely through the efforts of the Soviet Information Depart-
ment Moscow overtly and 25X1
covertly placed more than 160,000 items (original articles plus replays) in
the Indian press, widely regarded as the freest in the Third World.
Access to Press Trust of India, the largest English language news service,
has become so automatic that some Soviet officials have come to call it
"Press TASS of India."
? The Press Section of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi is a KGB
operation that specializes in fast-breaking disinformation campaigns,
principally targeted against the United States. In recent years, this KGB
operation has taken the lead in efforts to implicate the United States in
the assassination of Indira Gandhi, to prevent the posting of a US
Foreign Service officer to India, and to link former US Ambassador to
the United Nations Kirkpatrick to a bogus US plan to balkanize India.
? In addition to placements in Indian newspapers, the Soviet Information
Department in New Delhi covertly finances the publishing of books in
India and distributes some 25 million magazines, books, and pamphlets a
year.
Secret
GI 85-10315
December 1985
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? The Soviets orchestrate the political activities of at least a dozen front
groups in India-including the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, the local
affiliate of the World Peace Council, and a professional journalists'
organization.
These Soviet activities constitute a massive assault on the Indian political
process and, in our view, have yielded several benefits to Moscow:
? Ready access to many Indian Government and political leaders has
helped Moscow influence some of these leaders to criticize US foreign
policy and undertake actions supportive of Soviet foreign policy.
? The substantial Soviet propaganda effort in India, which has capitalized
on significant Indian gains from close Indo-Soviet ties and Indian fears
about US foreign policy, has helped to persuade educated Indians-
including the political elite-of Moscow's attractiveness as an interna-
tional partner. In a turnabout from favorable attitudes toward the United
States just after Indian independence, the urban, educated public has
rated the Soviet Union more favorably than the United States in the
large majority of opinion polls during the last 11 years.
? Soviet disinformation activities have had considerable success in putting
the United States on the defensive in its diplomatic and commercial
dealings with India. US diplomats and information officers in New Delhi
and elsewhere devote much time and effort to rebutting Soviet-placed
articles in the Indian press, and one Soviet campaign jeopardized
completion of a trade deal between the Indian Government and a US
firm.
? The substantial apparatus that they have built up in India provides the
Soviets with a credible nonaligned base for their influence activities
throughout the Third World.
Despite Soviet inroads into Indian political life, most Indians are neither
ideologically inclined toward Marxism-Leninism nor sympathetic to Mos-
cow's political system. We believe that Moscow's public standing in India
could be vulnerable on such issues as Soviet manipulation of the United
Nations, the woeful performance of the Soviet economic system, and
Moscow's poor track record on human rights domestically and abroad.
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The success of Soviet activities in India depends largely on the attitude of
the Indian Government. Although India, under Indira Gandhi, quietly
expelled some Soviet Bloc intelligence officers and, under Rajiv, has
recently placed some minor restrictions on access, New Delhi continues to
permit the Soviets a fairly free rein. Many Indians apparently believe that
these activities merely reflect superpower competition and are of no
concern to India. Rajiv Gandhi's current campaign to combat corruption
and streamline the Indian bureaucracy could lead him to limit Soviet
activities should he calculate that such restrictions would not endanger the
substantial Indian gains from Soviet economic and military ties. Nonethe-
less, given his preoccupation with domestic and regional affairs, he is
unlikely to expend the necessary political capital to curtail Soviet activities
substantially. Thus, we expect Soviet efforts to continue for the foreseeable
future, and, in the event of a serious crisis or political instability, we have
little doubt that the Soviets would make a full court press to draw India
even closer to Moscow 25X1
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Key Judgments
Exploiting Government and Military Ties
2
Funding Political Parties and Politicians
3
The Congress-I Party
3
Campaign Themes
7
Soviet Placement Agencies
10
The Soviet Information Department
10
Soviet Embassy Press Section: A KGB Operation
10
Cultivating Journalists To Place Articles
13
Dissemination of Books and Magazines
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Figure 1
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(India)
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not necessarily aumoruauve.
Maldives
0 300 Kilometers
0 300 Miles
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Major Penetration Program
The Soviet Union has spent substantial economic and
diplomatic resources over the past three decades to
cultivate and maintain a "special relationship" with
India. For Moscow, India's appeal lies in its geograph-
ic proximity, its position as the dominant power in
South Asia, its potential as-an Asian counterweight to
China, and its leadership role in various Third World
forums. The Indo-Soviet relationship-one of the
Soviets' strongest with a non-Communist country-
has been cemented at the government level by:
c Soviet support for India during the 1965 Pakistan
war, the 1971 Bangladesh war, and Mrs. Gandhi's
Emergency Rule (1975-77).
e Soviet reliability in providing sophisticated military
equipment ($7 billion since 1980) at concessional
rates and with dependable supplies of spare parts,
even during wartime.
e Moscow's position as one of India's major trading
partners, based on special arrangements that allow
India to purchase Soviet goods without hard curren-
cy, and its responsiveness to Indian aid requests.
e Soviet public support for India in such international
bodies as the United Nations and the Nonaligned
Movement and for India's "independent foreign
policy."
Indian receptivity to Soviet initiatives has been rein-
forced by Indo-US discord over Washington's support
for Pakistan in the 1965 and 1971 wars, its provision
of large amounts of weapons to Pakistan, and its
presumed failure to restrain Pakistan's nuclear weap-
ons program.
Nonetheless, Moscow has not been content to rely
solely on governmental ties to ensure a continuing
close relationship with New Delhi. In fact, the Soviet
Union has capitalized on these ties, and on Indo-US
discord, to undertake a variety of overt and covert
activities to try to increase its political leverage within
India. These activities are extensive and include:
exploitation of a broad network of contacts among
Indian politicians, government officials, and the mili-
tary; substantial funding of Indian political parties
Figure 2. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and
CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.
and numerous individual politicians; the manipulation
of front groups to promote pro-Soviet views among the
Indian elite; and a massive program to place Soviet-
prepared articles in the Indian press. These activities
seek not only to bolster already strong Indo-Soviet ties
but also to undermine US diplomatic initiatives in
India and subtly ensure continued distrust between
India and Pakistan. 25X1
Moscow has exploited close Indo-Soviet governmental
ties to establish a substantial presence in India and to
develop an extensive network of personal contacts
throughout Indian Government and society.
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more than 800 Soviets are in
India in some official capacity, including diplomats,
information and cultural officers, trade mission repre-
sentatives, staff employees, TASS and Novosti jour-
nalists, and Aeroflot representatives. The Indian
Government estimates that at any one time another
1,100 Soviet economic and military technicians work
at various locations throughout India. In addition,
about 10,000 Soviet tourists visit India annually
through Soviet-sponsored package tours.
Soviet intelligence officers make up a significant
portion of the official presence.
the known Soviet intelligence pres-
ence among Soviet officials in India exceeds 50
officers (both KGB and GRU), and an additional 30
are suspected of being intelligence officers. Given
what we know of Soviet intelligence presence else-
where, we believe that the intelligence presence is
substantially larger than these figures suggest.
oviet ante igence o icers ca
upon other oviet overnment officials in India-
such as those in the Soviet Information Department
(SID), the Soviet Trade Mission, and the Soviet
Cultural Center-for assistance in conducting covert
activities.
Exploiting Government and Military Ties
Soviet diplomats have extensive contacts with both
cabinet-level officials and the middle and upper levels
of the various ministries of the central government in
New Delhi. Although evidence is sparse, the Soviets,
at a minimum, use this access to reinforce close Indo-
Soviet governmental ties. To help maintain access, the
Soviets offer Indian Government officials induce-
ments, such as all-expense-paid trips to the USSR.
One Congress-I member of Parliament (MP) estimat-
ed that about 150 MPs had made subsidized visits to
the USSR since 1980. He told a US Embassy officer
that, once an MP accepts a trip, he receives offers for
additional trips and invitations to attend numerous
functions in New Delhi sponsored by Soviet Bloc
countries.
Although the Soviets currently appear to have some-
what less than the nearly unfettered access to politi-
cians and government officials they enjoyed under
Indira Gandhi, they have retained entree within the
Rajiv Gandhi government. Several key officials, in-
cluding cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and promi-
nent Congress-I politicians, have been active in pro-
Soviet activities and have often promoted close Indo-
Soviet ties. For example, H. K. L. Bhagat and
Margaret Alva, MPs and cabinet ministers, have
frequently taken pro-Soviet positions and advocated
closer Indo-Soviet ties. The de facto foreign minister
under Indira Gandhi, G. Parthasarathi, has consis-
tently advocated close Indo-Soviet ties and frequently
shown hostility toward the United States. Although
his influence has declined under Rajiv Gandhi, he still
holds a high-level foreign policy position.
The Soviets have also developed substantial contacts
with Indian military officers as a natural consequence
of close Indo-Soviet military ties.
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foreigners. Nonetheless, some Indian officers are will-
ing to meet discreetly with foreigners, including Sovi-
ets, without obtaining official permission. Discontent
in the military-stemming from its recent use in
maintaining domestic order, low pay levels, and a
recent reduction in the status of officers relative to
their civil service colleagues-provides conditions that
the Soviets may be able to exploit for their own
Soviets provide fund- 25X1
ing to Congress-I Party coffers through kickback
arrangements with Indian businesses.
advantage.
Although precise estimates of total Soviet
funding are not available,
Soviet contributions are substantial.
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the Soviets are deeply
involved in the Indian political process through covert
contributions to the treasuries of political parties as
well as to individual politicians. The Soviets direct
most of their funds to the ruling Congress-I Party, the
one truly national party in India and the party that
has held power for 35 of India's 38 years of indepen-
dence.' Moscow also funds several opposition parties,
including the Communist Party of India (CPI)-
which formerly was slavishly pro-Soviet but is becom-
ing increasingly independent-and the more indepen-
dent Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPI/M).
The Two Communist Parties
Soviet funding reaches the two Communist parties,
the CPI and the CPI/M, through a combination of
kickback schemes, normal business transactions, and
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' The Soviets also increased their own spending for high-level Soviet
visitors to India and for Soviet propaganda in India to bolster Mrs.
Gandhi's 1984 electoral chances. 25X1
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' Today the Congress Party is known as the Congress-I (I for Indira
Gandhi who split the party in an effort to gain control of it,
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direct cash payments.' The Soviets have also devised
several special methods to fund the CPI and its
associated organizations.
? Publishing house subsidies. The USSR sells Soviet
books and publications at a 60- to 65-percent dis-
count to Peoples Publishing House (PPH), an Indian
company wholly owned by CPI. These Soviet-
supplied materials account for three-fourths of
PPH's annual sales, which exceed 10 million rupees
(about $1 million) annually. In addition, the Soviets
make interest-free loans to PPH with lengthy repay-
ment schedules. Similar arrangements have been
made with other CPI publishing houses.
? Soviet advertisements. The Soviets place advertise-
ments in CPI journals. The amount, approximately
$60,000 in 1984, is fixed annually by Moscow, but
additional fees are sometimes paid for special adver-
tisement programs.
? Visitors' expenses. The Soviets provide both cash
and airline tickets for visitors to the Soviet Union
sponsored by the CPI or CPI front groups.
Buying Individual Politicians
In addition to party funding, the Soviets channel
money to individual Congress-I and opposition politi-
cians through kickback arrangements and cash pay-
ments. For example,
the Soviet Embassy maintains a large reserve of
rupees for various uses-including clandestine pay-
ments to Congress-I politicians. Soviet officials also
' The CPI and CPI/M are two of several minor opposition parties in
India. Both are in near total agreement with Moscow on interna-
tional issues, but-despite their Soviet funding-both parties have
major differences with Moscow on Indian domestic political issues.
Moscow's ties to the CPI have been and remain more significant
than its ties to the CPI/M. The CPI/M, once strongly pro-Chinese,
exercises greater independence in its relations with Moscow. The
CPI/M is more independent in part because it also receives funds
from Beijing and because it dominates the West Bengal Left Front
government, one of only two Communist-ruled state governments in
trade balance.
pass cash payments to Indian Communist Party politi-
cians, as well as smaller amounts to a few politicians
in several non-Communist opposition parties. This
cash reportedly is obtained from the favorable Soviet
Although the Soviets search broadly for potentially
vulnerable and cooperative politicians, they appear to
target those more likely to have major political influ-
ence-such as sitting members of Parliament and MP
candidates.
as many as 40 percent of the Congress-I
MPs in Mrs. Gandhi's last government had received
Soviet political contributions.
politicians are also businessmen who trade with the
USSR; the Soviets reportedly seek out these individ-
uals as trading partners because they know money
from business transactions will be siphoned off for
political purposes.
There is also evidence that the Soviets focus on
politicians whom they expect to be rising stars in
Indian politics. a former
Congress-I politician-who was highly ambitious and
capable and who had been a possible challenger to
Mrs. Gandhi-is popularly believed to have received
Soviet funds and, at least for a time, took positions
While not all Indian politicians accede to Soviet
financial inducements, individuals are free to "cut
their own deals" with the Soviets and East Europeans.
For example, a Congress-I politician noted that Mrs.
Subhandra Joshi, a Congress-I candidate in 1977, lost
the election that year despite 500,000 rupees (about
$50,000) in financial backing from East German
(GDR) diplomats. She later became head of the GDR-
Indian Friendship Society.
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to fund political parties
and individual politicians, the Soviets-usually using
Indian trading companies as intermediaries-enter
into arrangements with Indian businessmen wishing
to trade with the USSR. When these businessmen sell
to the Soviet Union, the Soviets agree to purchase
their goods for an inflated price. The Indian business-
man is instructed to deliver only a portion perhaps
as little as half-of the products.speciled in the sales
contract, but receives payment from the Soviets for
tions. The Soviets channel contributions to the
Congress-I Party or make payments to individuals in
return for approval of oil and natural gas contracts
and to import such items as Soviet defense equipment
and crude oil. Although we have no direct evidence,
the Indian officials and businessmen involved in these
deals probably also profit. Similar kickback arrange-
ments are also used in trade deals with East Europe-
an countries.
the full order. He then keeps payment only for the These kickback schemes are facilitated by the Indo-
goods he actually delivered, plus a small fee, and Soviet rupee trade, a bilateral arrangement eliminat-
passes the balance to a designated individual or ing the need for hard currency. Paper credit and debit
makes a contribution to a specked political party or slips are charged against a rupee trade balance held
other organization. The Soviets channel money in by the Reserve Bank of India. Such paper transac-
this fashion by importing Indian grain (especially tions can disguise Soviet kickback payments to Indi-
rice), woolen and leather garments, tobacco, coffee, an political parties or individuals. Despite exposes in
silk, handicrafts, mica, and electronics. the press and Parliament in 1982 and 1983 that the
When the Soviets sell to Indian businessmen or to the
Indian Government, they routinely take advantage of
the common practice among Congress-I government
officials of granting business contracts and business
or import licenses! in exchange for party contribu-
Complementing their efforts to cultivate Indian Gov-
ernment officials and politicians, the Soviets orches-
trate the political activities of at least a dozen organi-
zations in India. According to the US Embassy, the
Soviets fund and openly work with the CPI-controlled
Indo-Soviet Cultural Society (ISCUS), with 2,500
branches and a claimed membership of 200,000, and
the All India Peace and Solidarity Organization
(AIPSO), the Indian affiliate of the World Peace
Council (WPC), the largest Soviet international front."
' Upon Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980, the Congress-I,
with Mrs. Gandhi's blessing, made an effort to disassociate itself
from the CPI-controlled Indo-Soviet Cultural Society by forming a
new parallel organization called the Friends of the Soviet Union
(FSU). FSU was to channel Indo-Soviet activities in ways that
would be easier for the Congress-I party to control. Attendance by
Congress-I members at ISCUS functions was forbidden. Eventually
this and other restrictions proved difficult to enforce, and Mrs.
Gandhi's alternative friendship society became more of a skeleton
Soviets use the Indo-Soviet rupee trade to finance
their covert activities, the Soviets have been able to
prevent substantial reform largely because of the
economic importance to India of this trade and the
support of several senior Indian politicians with well-
known, close ties to the Soviets.
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The Soviets and other Bloc countries provide large
sums of money to at least five Indian trade unions,
including one of the three major unions in India, the
CPI-controlled All India Trade Union Congress 25X1
(AITUC).
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work with organizations that are not generally known 25X1
to have a Soviet connection, such as the recently
created Institute for Regional Studies, run by long-
time Indian friends of the Soviets, and the Institute
for South Asian Studies.
Soviet front groups in India frequently issue public
statements and conduct conferences and other events
in support of Soviet propaganda and disinformation.
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The Soviets also use them to extend their own con-
tacts and their formal links to non-Soviet-controlled
organizations:
? In 1984, the Soviets engineered the affiliation of the
Indian Federation of Working Journalists (IFWJ),
the larger and more left-oriented of the two major
associations of Indian journalists, with the Interna-
tional Organization of Journalists (IOJ), a Soviet
international front based in. Prague. According to a
defector, the fact that a journalists' association from
a leading nonaligned country is a member of the
IOJ allows the Soviets to showcase the IOJ as a
broad-based organization.
? At the annual Indian Science Conference in Luck-
now, India, in January 1985, the CPI and the WPC
solicited the participation of pro-Communist Indian
scientists and professors to form a new WPC group
to mobilize public opinion in support of nuclear
disarmament and peace.
a meeting held by this group in early
1985 was attended by Soviet, East German,
Czechoslovak, and Greek diplomats, as well as
Indian scientists, at least half a dozen of whom hold
high-ranking administrative positions at Indian uni-
versities and research institutes.
? In February 1985 in New Delhi, the World Federa-
tion of Trade Unions (WFTU), a Soviet internation-
al front also based in Prague, staged the Asian and
Oceanic Trade Union Conference. According to the
US Labor Counselor in New Delhi, working
through the CPI-controlled Indian union, the All
India Trade Union Congress, the Soviets were able
to establish formal, ongoing links in New Delhi
between the Soviet-controlled WFTU and one of the
two free international trade union organizations, the
Brussels-based International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions.
The Soviets continually use front groups to mobilize
support for Soviet-backed positions. At a minimum,
these activities, which are for the most part unhin-
dered by the Indian Government, help to create an
aura of "grassroots" activism on a diverse set of issues
even when the issues are not supported by the Indian
public.
Over the last three decades the Soviet Union has
developed a substantial capacity to plan and orches-
trate large-scale propaganda and disinformation cam-
paigns involving the placement of articles with the
major Indian wire services and a wide range of Indian
newspapers. The Soviets support these campaigns
through wide distribution of magazines and books and
through the orchestration of front groups. According
to a defector, these Soviet propaganda and disinfor-
mation activities in India are aimed at creating a
favorable image of the USSR in the mind of the
Indian public, countering ostensibly anti-Soviet pro-
paganda, and driving a wedge between the United
States and India by undercutting US interests and
policy initiatives in India.'
To this end, the Soviets openly and covertly place
materials in Indian newspapers on selected themes to
generate press campaigns. The CPSU Central Com-
mittee and Novosti, the Soviet press agency, develop
an annual propaganda plan for India, which identifies
approximately 20 propaganda and disinformation
campaigns to be conducted on worldwide and regional
issues. A defector reports that, while most of these
planned campaigns are on global issues, such as the
Strategic Defense Initiative and the 40th Anniversary
of the Victory Over Fascism, several are on issues
specific to India. In addition to these long-term
campaigns, the Soviets initiate timely campaigns in
response to changing events. Moreoever, Moscow
media, including Radio Moscow, cite Soviet-placed
articles as if they were Indian news stories and
opinion in news items aimed at both their domestic
and international audiences.
Soviet propaganda and disinformation campaigns
play skillfully on Indian fears and aspirations. These
articles mix factual information-often drawn from
the Western media-with innuendo and provocative
interpretation. Except in the more blatant placements,
even the astute newspaper reader has difficulty dis-
cerning a Soviet hand.
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Campaign Themes
The major Soviet press campaigns during the last
several years have concentrated on charges that the
United States, other Western powers, and Pakistan
encourage and support separatist movements in India.
These campaigns not only play on historical Indian
fears of separatism but also, according to several
Embassy officials, take advantage of the Indian pen-
chant for blaming their country's problems on foreign
involvement. For example, a major theme of many
Soviet placements in the Indian press is that the
United States has devised a plan to balkanize India
into several smaller, independent states. Some of these
articles allege that the United States dislikes India's
"independent foreign policy" and that it wishes to
exploit the country economically.
To this end, the Soviets have, over the past year or so,
orchestrated a major campaign alleging that the
United States and Pakistan support, finance, and
train Sikh separatists and terrorists in India and that
the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States
harbor Sikh terrorist leaders and financial contribu-
tors.b
the following articles were part of this
? The 12 May 1984 edition of the Hindustan Times
carried an article alleging the existence of Canadian
training camps for Sikh terrorists, citing as evidence
a two-year-old Vancouver newspaper article. When
asked about the story by his editor, the journalist
was unable to produce his source.
? In early August 1984, the Hindustan Times report-
ed that Sikh separatist leaders in exile in the West,
Ganga Singh Dhillon and Jagjit Singh Chauhan,
were on the payroll of the US Defense Intelligence
Agency.
? The 14 September 1984 edition of The Times of
India ran an item entitled "Pakistan is CIA Base
For Recruiting Guerrillas." The story had been
given to the author by a Soviet Information Depart-
ment Indian employee.
' Soviet propaganda campaigns also charged China with supporting
separatism in India until the Soviets ceased targeting the Chinese in
1982
? In early November 1984, the prestigious Calcutta
dailies, the Statesman and Amrit Bazar Patrika,
and the Madras edition of The Hindu ran stories
based on the Czechoslovak news agency Cetak's
report that the CIA had set up centers in Pakistan
to train agents for subverting the Afghan and
Indian Governments. The story was carried by
Reuters, which labeled it part of a Soviet disinfor-
mation campaign, and by the Indian news service
PTI, which did not. The Indian papers carried the
story uncritically as a news item.
According to Embassy reporting and our own analy-
sis, other Soviet campaigns of the last several years
include:
? Promotion of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as
a Zone of Peace and charges that the United States
violates this principle by establishing military bases
in the region.
? Exploiting US arms sales to Pakistan, charging
Pakistani aggressive intentions toward India.
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? Charging the United States with failing to restrain
the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. 25X1
? Reiteration of Soviet worldwide campaigns on arms
control and the US Strategic Defense Initiative.
? Charging the United States with putting undue
economic pressure on India, and alleging that multi-
national corporations seek profits in the Third
World at the expense of,human life and welfare.
? Charging the United States with responsibility for
the downing of Korean Airliner 007, and most
recently using that campaign to try to link the
United States to the Air India crash off Ireland in
the summer of 1985.
Much Soviet propaganda is designed to be supportive
of the Indian Government and to reflect Indian
sensitivities. Many Soviet-placed articles laud Indo-
Soviet ties and portray Soviet respect for Indian
heroes Nehru and Gandhi. The Soviets also publicize
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an 100 CIA
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The Soviets reacted quickly to Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's assassination on 31 October 1984, immedi-
ately initiating a massive propaganda campaign to
implicate the United States. Within hours of her
death, Radio Moscow declared that the persons
responsible for Prime Minister Gandhi's assassina-
tion "received their ideological inspiration "from the
CIA and accused it of involvement in the assassina-
tions of such other Third World leaders as Congolese
leader Patrice Lumumba, Chilean President Salva-
dor Allende, and President Torrijos of Panama. It
claimed that US motives in those cases were to
"destabilize the situation" and "clear the way for
reactionaries, " and charged that this US policy
toward independent states was one of "state terror-
ism. "
The day after the assassination, two pro-Soviet Indi-
an papers, the Bombay daily and the Patriot in New
Delhi joined in the campaign. The Daily noted that
President Reagan's condolence message came a half
hour after Mrs. Gandhi's death was officially an-
nounced, implying US foreknowledge; the Patriot ran
a major story referring to a frequently alleged US
plan for the balkanization of India, noting that the
United States wanted to dislodge Mrs. Gandhi from
power and that "since this appeared to be a very
difficult task, someone has now done their job by
killing her. " Playing to its Bengali audience, the CPI
Hindi paper Janayug alleged a CIA role in the killing
offormer Bangladesh leader Mujibar Rahman and
contended that "CIA and CIA-organized extremist
forces" were also involved in Mrs. Gandhi's assassi-
nation.
Also on the day after Mrs. Gandhi's killing, a large
English language daily in New Delhi, the Hindustan
Times, reported that "an overwhelming majority of
Supreme Court advocates" belonging to the
Congress-I believed the United States had a role in
the assassination. The story implied belief among
some other Congress-I leaders of US involvement. E
By the third day, two major English language papers
stated that no evidence of a conspiracy existed and
reported US denials of the charges. Yet, five days
after the assassination, the respected daily The Times
of India and the National Herald, a small govern-
ment-controlled New Delhi paper, ran the Soviet
accusations. On the sixth day, the Hindustan Times,
in an editorial, acknowledged that the Soviets had
used the event as a "golden opportunity to mount
cold war propaganda against the US ... " and
questioned the timing of the Soviet accusation. The
editorial went on to say, however, that the United
States could not disclaim knowledge of the secession-
ist activities of Sikh militants in the United States.
Beyond the Indian press coverage, these conspiracy
charges appeared in media worldwide, both as legiti-
mate reporting and as placements, receiving coverage
in East European countries, as well as in Greece,
Malta, Spain, Tunisia, Argentina, and Colombia.
The campaign eventually forced the US Secretary of
State personally to issue a denial.
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visits of Soviet officials and scholars, such as visits by
Soviet or Czechoslovak scholars who have conducted
extensive studies of Hindu literature and the Hindi
language and have allegedly found close cultural ties
between India and Soviet Central Asia.
Soviet Placement Agencies
Two major Soviet agencies in India conduct propa-
ganda and disinformation campaigns by placing ma-
terials in the Indian press: the Soviet Information
Department in New Delhi, with branches in Madras,
Bombay, and Calcutta; and the Press Section of the
Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, which is run by the
KGB. SID and the KGB-run Embassy Press Section
together provide Moscow with a substantial ability to
place pro-Soviet material-propaganda and disinfor-
mation articles, editorials, phony letters to the editor,
full texts of official speeches of Soviet leaders, and
newspaper supplements on special topics-in the Indi-
an press.
The Soviet Information Department. According to a
defector, the SID, which is physically separate from
the Soviet Embassy, directs and coordinates most
Soviet propaganda activities in India, including the
placement of most Soviet-originated articles in the
Indian press. SID is staffed principally by Novosti
information and propaganda officers and is under the
authority of Novosti headquarters in Moscow-the
Soviet news agency that staffs information depart-
ments in foreign countries-and the Soviet Ambassa-
dor. SID in India has an annual operating budget of
approximately $20 million. (See inset and figure 5.)
According to a defector report, the head of the SID in
New Delhi and several other high-ranking SID Soviet
officials believe that the Soviets have a "free hand" in
placing propaganda materials in India. Further, they
believe that India permits greater freedom for Soviet
propaganda activity than any other place in the non-
Communist world. In 1984, according to a recent
defector, the SID achieved approximately 160,000
reproductions (that is, initial placements of articles
plus all replays) in India. This estimate-a substantial
increase from an estimated 100,000 reproductions in
1980-does not include the much smaller number of
KGB placements.
These figures probably underestimate Soviet success
in gaining access to the pages of Indian newspapers.
The same defector reported that the New Delhi SID
often lowers its reproduction totals to avoid an unreal-
istically high goal from Moscow in the succeeding
year. This practice, and the general difficulty in
monitoring and accurately counting placements and
replays in India, leads to an acrimonious debate
annually between SID New Delhi and Novosti head-
quarters in Moscow over the actual number of repro-
ductions in India. Nonetheless, according to a defec-
tor, SID New Delhi in 1984 accounted for nearly 70
percent of all Novosti reproductions (placements plus
replays) worldwide; it is the largest Novosti operation
in any country outside the Soviet Union and is
regarded by the Soviets as one of the best, if not the
best, Novosti outlet in the world.
With the more evenhanded tone toward the superpow-
ers set by Rajiv Gandhi and the impact of the Indian
spy scandal, the Soviets reportedly encountered some
difficulties in placing materials in early 1985. Jour-
nalists were more reluctant to take the risk of placing
stories, fearing unfavorable repercussions, and the
number of placements appears to have dropped during
the spring and summer of 1985. The Soviets, however,
have continued their efforts to place materials widely
and in large volume. The US Embassy in New Delhi
expects the reported reluctance of some journalists
and newspapers to publish Soviet-produced materials
to be temporary and the high volume of placements to
resume.
Soviet Embassy Press Section: A KGB Operation.
The Press Section of the Soviet Embassy in New
Delhi is the central point for KGB press placement
operations in India. Although we know little about its
internal workings, this group initiates press campaigns
independently of Novosti's annual plan, often in re-
sponse to changing events. According to a recent
defector, the KGB initiated the following operations:
? The campaign to implicate the United States in the
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
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Evolving from a one person TASS office in the late
1940s, SID in India, according to a defector, has
become the largest Soviet propaganda office outside
the USSR. The head of SID, Nikolay Fedin, is a
senior information officer who has served more than
10 years in India. Fedin and most of his Soviet staff
are Novosti employees. He coordinates SID activities
in India closely with the Embassy-with both the
Soviet Ambassador and a Minister Counselor in the
Nikolay Fedin, Head of the
Soviet Information Department
branches together employ an additional 200 Indian
nationals; Madras is the largest with almost 100
Indian employees. The defector estimates that about
half ofSID's $20 million budget goes to the operating
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Embassy-and reports to Moscow as well.
Fedin runs SID in New Delhi with 23 Soviet propa-
ganda, information, and administrative officers, in-
cluding at least two KGB officers, and employs
approximately 200 Indian nationals. The New Delhi
office is divided into a Press Section (which includes
a special Counterpropaganda Group), a Magazine
Section, a Distribution Section, and several adminis-
trative units (figure 5).
In addition to the main SID office in New Delhi,
Fedin directs the activities of three smaller branch
offices in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta. These
branches are each staffed by three Soviet officers,
usually two of whom are KGB officers. The three
budgets of the three branches.
Probably the most important section in the New
Delhi SID is the Press Section, which either places
directly or edits and rewrites materials sent from
Moscow for placement in Indian newspapers in En-
glish, Hindi, Urdu, and Punjabi. The Counterpropa-
ganda Group also adapts Moscow prepared materials
for press placement, focusing on countering "anti-
Soviet" propaganda. In addition, both units prepare
their own locally written materials for placement.
For Indian nationals, getting a job at SID is highly
competitive; applicants usually must have personal
contacts in one of India's two Communist parties.
Once Indians secure employment, however, they use
their political contacts to protect their jobs and
thereby reduce the managerial discretion of Soviet
officers and the level of competence in certain sections
of SID. Discipline for failure to perform adequately
is rare because such attempts usually provoke a great
outcry from the employees' Indian Communist con-
tacts. A defector reported that one complaint letter
even went to Brezhnev, much to the consternation of
Soviet officers in New Delhi. According to the defec-
tor, some Soviet officers in SID decry the incompe-
tence of many of the Indian employees and their own
inability to manage them effectively.a
a Soviet propagandists in India also have problems in their deal-
ings with Moscow. According to a defector, Soviet SID officials in
New Delhi complain about delays in receiving materials from
Moscow and the poor quality of those materials. They also
complain about the lack of response from Novosti headquarters to
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Figure 5
Organization of the Soviet Information Department in New Dehli
? English
0 Hindi
0 Urdu
0 Punjabi
Deputy Head for
Distribution
Counterpropaganda Communist
Section publications
First Deputy in
Charge of the Press
Research and
Analysis Section
Deputy Head of
Finance
Deputy Head for
Personnel
Deputy Head for
Administration
Soviet Review
? 0 0 ?
Soviet Panorama
0 40
Soviet Land
????
LSputnik Junior
00
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? Charges following the Bhopal tragedy that the
United States had previously tested chemical and
biological weapons at the Union Carbide plant and
that, under the guise of relief efforts, it used victims
of the tragic leak as guinea pigs for biological-
weapons-related testing.
? Accusations that former US Ambassador to the
United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick had helped de-
vise a plan to balkanize India and other Third
World countries.
? The disinformation campaign that led the Govern-
ment of India to block the posting of US Foreign
Service officer George Griffin to New Delhi.
? Charges that the United States was breeding "killer
mosquitos" in Pakistan for use in the region. F_
The Embassy Press Section often uses Indian employ-
ees of the Soviet Information Department to plant
KGB materials. The KGB, which also has several
officers within SID, tasks SID to participate in KGB-
initiated press campaigns and uses at least one senior
SID Indian employee to collect political information
on Indian journalists
According to a defector, KGB officers in the Press
Section do not have the SID officers' professional
propaganda and information training and have less
experience working in India. In general, their cam-
paigns are based primarily on disinformation, are
directly and blatantly targeted against the United
States and Western intelligence services, and are less
carefully adapted to Indian sensitivities.
Cultivating Journalists To Place Articles
Although all Soviet placements in Indian newspapers
and news services are made by Indian employees of
SID or its branch offices, Soviet officers regularly
entertain and cultivate Indian journalists.
although Indian
journalists often are initially offended by the Soviets'
transparent efforts to influence them, many eventual-
ly succumb to the repeated invitations.
most Soviet and East European journalists in New
Delhi are bright and personable, and a substantial
proportion of them speak either Hindi, Urdu, or
Bengali. the Soviets and 25X1
their East European colleagues have considerable
success in developing strong personal and professional
ties to Indian journalists.
A defector estimated that the Soviets use 40 or 50
journalists annually to place materials and that, dur-
ing the last several years, they have used between 200
and 300. Most journalists, however, agree to place
materials only periodically so as to not attract atten-
tion and to preserve their reputations.
Placement Techniques
According to a recent defector, the Soviets' goal in
most of their propaganda and disinformation cam-
paigns is to place materials in the larger, prestigious
English language press. Placement of an article in the
blatant pro-Soviet press (for example, the Patriot in
New Delhi or Blitz or the Daily in Bombay) is
insufficient to establish the credibility of a story with
most Indian audiences. The defector reported that
SID considers six or seven English language papers to
be the most influential in the country. These papers
carry more international news than most others, and
their stories are more likely to be replayed than those
of smaller, less prestigious papers outside New Delhi.
The defector reports that, although the Soviets make
some effort to place materials in the Indian language
press, stories in an Indian language paper will proba-
bly be replayed only in that particular language. The
English language press in New Delhi is more likely to
be a source for replays in smaller Indian language
papers.
Many Indian papers, especially the more prestigious
English language press, are reluctant or unwilling to
publish an article without a source. Consequently,
according to a defector, the Soviets use at least two
different techniques to develop a bogus source for the
anonymous articles produced by Novosti headquarters
in Moscow and the SID in New Delhi.
The Soviets sometimes get a source attached to an
article by placing it in the pro-Soviet or Indian
Communist press. The Soviets then try to get a
journalist to place it or a spinoff article in one or more
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Secret
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Figure 6. Soviet disinformation campaign in Indian press against
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both the pro-Soviet and the establishment press in New Delhi in
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of the prestigious English language papers, which
establishes the credibility of a story with most Indian
audiences and increases the chances that other papers
will pick up the story.
A second technique for attaching sourcing and plant-
ing articles is to place materials with an Indian news
service, which then attributes its name to the story
and telegraphically distributes the story to the wire
services' newspaper subscribers. The Soviets have had
immense success using this technique with the Press
Trust of India (PTI), India's largest English language
news service, and have several key PTI managers on
the Soviet payroll. Depending on the type of story,
PTI-at the Soviets' option-runs an article either
with a dateline of PTI New Delhi or PTI Moscow
(ostensibly meaning from PTI's Moscow correspon-
dent) or as PTI only with no dateline. The Soviets also
regularly place stories with the second-largest English
language service, the United News Service of India;
with the major Hindi service, Samacher; and with two
much smaller Communist-owned or -controlled news
services, India Press Agency and Central News Ser-
vices.
According to a recent defector, these techniques are
sometimes used in tandem. The Soviets have such
automatic access to PTI that when they pass an
article to, for example, a prestigious English language
paper, they also often place it with PTI to ensure that
it gets published. A US information officer who
served in India reported that it was impossible to go to
PTI without seeing a car with a Soviet diplomatic
license plate parked outside. Two Soviet defectors
independently reported that among some Soviet offi-
cials the Press Trust of India was now jokingly
referred to as "Press TASS of India."
Dissemination of Books and Magazines
The Soviets have also developed a substantial appara-
tus to distribute Soviet-prepared and -sponsored books
and magazines in India. Defector reports indicate that
this material is distributed primarily by two agencies:
the Soviet Information Department and V/O Mezh-
dunarodnaya Kniga, the Soviet agency that organizes
bookfairs in India and distributes books at cut-rate
prices through USSR Bookstores and Indian book-
stalls.
The SID distributes approximately 25 million propa-
ganda items each year,'including its own magazines,
pamphlets, and books. The Magazine Section of SID
publishes at least five magazines in India, targeted at
various Indian audiences. Two of these-Soviet Land,
a family-oriented magazine, and Soviet Review,
geared to Communist and leftist intellectuals-are
published in 13 languages. Soviet Land is published
twice monthly with a circulation of 550,000; Soviet
Review is a weekly publication with a circulation of
75,000. The Soviets also publish a magazine for teens,
Youth Review; one for children, Sputnik Junior; and
a photo magazine, Soviet Panorama. A defector
reports that a proportion of each magazine's circula-
tion must be paid subscriptions but that, in a few
cases, 50 to 60 percent of a magazine's edition is given
away.
The Distribution Section of SID maintains a distribu-
tion list of 100,000 addressees divided into categories,
such as doctors, lawyers, universities, and libraries.
According to a defector, the Distribution Section
recently began a pilot effort to assess whether several
Soviet magazines were reaching their intended target
groups. On the basis of responses to a mailed ques-
tionnaire, about one-third of the subscribers of the
Hindi edition of Soviet Land were small businessmen
(for example, shopowners), a far higher proportion of
businessmen than SID intended to target. Presum-
ably, such surveys will help the Soviets better direct
their circulation efforts.
SID openly distributes books in India, but it also
secretly initiates and sponsors preparation and publi-
cation of approximately 20 books in India each year
through Indian publishers, such as Sterling, Allied,
and Pulse. Most recently, a portion of SID's covert
book publishing was shifted to a publishing section of
the newspaper, the Patriot. According to the defector,
this covert book publishing costs the Soviets about
$200,000 a year. These books are usually printed
under the names of Indian authors with no ostensible
connection to SID or to the USSR. According to a
defector, SID recently informed Novosti headquarters
in Moscow that it has the capacity to double the
number of books it covertly publishes each year.
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in commemoration of he
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The other distributor of Soviet books, V/O Mezhdun-
arodnaya Kniga, hosts several bookfairs in India each
year. These 10-day to two-week exhibits are held in
several major cities and attract sizable crowds. The
Soviets use these exhibits, USSR Bookstores, and
Indian bookstalls to disseminate Soviet-produced text-
books-approved by the Joint Indo-Soviet Textbook
Board, a body set up under bilateral agreement. The
Soviets also distribute politically oriented volumes
supportive of Soviet propaganda campaigns and criti-
cal of US policy through this network.
Impact of Soviet Influence Activities
In our view, Moscow's massive political influence
campaign has reaped handsome benefits for its for-
eign policy objectives in India and elsewhere in the
Third World. It has:
? Influenced Indian political processes and public
opinion, binding tighter the ties between the two
countries.
? Created a reliable conduit for Soviet propaganda to
the rest of the Third World.
? Undermined US interests in India and elsewhere.
? Built an infrastructure that helps to ensure contin-
ued Soviet influence in India.
The broad range and sophistication of Soviet political
influence efforts in India are unparalleled in the non-
Communist Third World. Taken individually, each of
the techniques employed-exploitation of government
and military ties, funding of political parties and
politicians, use of front organizations, and, especially,
the huge volume of propaganda and disinformation-
yields both tangible and intangible advantages to the
Soviets. Together, they constitute a massive assault on
Indian Government and political leaders and on the
substantial Indian urban and educated public. During
the last decade and a half, they have had the cumula-
tive effect of creating a climate in India that is
receptive to and uncritical of many Soviet policy
initiatives, and suspicious of Western-and particu-
larly US-initiatives.
Covert funding of political parties and politicians has
helped the Soviets develop an extensive influence
network of close contacts and gain the cooperation of
individuals whose political favor can be used to Soviet
advantage. We believe that the funding benefits Mos-
cow in several ways. Specifically, it:
? Helps maintain a pro-Soviet lobby within the Con-
gress-I Party. According to the majority of MPs
interviewed by a US Embassy officer, the pro-Soviet
lobby in the last days of Mrs. Gandhi's government
consisted of some 10 to 25 MPs of the 346 Con-
gress-I seats in Parliament, as well as other officials
who have consistently promoted closer Indo-Soviet
relations. The Soviets use party connections to get
endorsement of their disinformation campaigns. For
example, several months after the storming of the
Golden Temple by the Indian Army to remove Sikh
terrorists, the Congress-I published an official party
pamphlet entitled "Conspiracy Exposed" in which it
charged that the United States actively assisted
Sikh separatists and terrorists in an effort to balkan-
ize India.
? Fosters access to government officials. Because the
Congress Party has governed India for all but three
years since independence, Soviet access and influ-
ence within the party often translates into access
and influence within the government. Politicians
who have benefited from Soviet funding during
their rise are naturally more likely than others to be
accessible to Soviet diplomats when they reach
positions of power, and some may even be willing to
act as "agents of influence" on behalf of Moscow.
? Induces favorable public statements. Some Indian
politicians accept Soviet money in exchange for
making public statements favorable to Soviet policy
and hostile to the United States. Such statements
often carry little cost to an Indian politician since he
can appear to be strongly nationalistic while criticiz-
ing the United States. On many occasions, often
coinciding with a Soviet disinformation or propa-
ganda campaign, Indian MPs have spoken out
publicly in support of the USSR or critically of the
United States. For example, in January 1983, the
Soviets initiated a campaign charging former US
Ambassador to the United Nations Kirkpatrick
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with devising a plan to balkanize India. Although this
charge was quickly discredited by several major Indi-
an newspapers, six MPs made strident charges in
Parliament supportive of the Soviet-placed article.
? Helps promote Indian Government endorsement of
Soviet activities. While not solely attributable to
covert funding, the Soviets have a track record of
success in getting leading Indian Government offi-
cials to endorse Soviet-sponsored activities in India
and elsewhere. Official greetings from the Indian
Prime Minister are commonly read at Soviet-
sponsored events in India, such as the Indian Vice
President's address at Soviet Land's recent annual
Nehru awards ceremony. Similarly, Rajiv Gandhi
sent a brief videotaped message of greeting to youth
delegates at the recent 12th International Youth
Festival in Moscow.
? Aids in the collection of political intelligence.
Through informal conversations, the Soviets rou-
tinely elicit information on developments in Indian
politics. Soviet funding, gifts, and other induce-
ments increase the responsiveness of politicians to
Soviet requests.
? Wins greater cooperation from the Indian Commu-
nist parties. We believe the Communist Party of
India and, to a lesser extent, the Communist Party
of India/Marxist are more compliant and coopera-
tive because of Soviet funding. CPI publications
frequently print Soviet propaganda, and CPI offi-
cials work closely with the Soviets in orchestrating
front group activities to mobilize public opinion.
Nonetheless, both Communist parties steadfastly
ignore Moscow's instructions to support the Indian
Government on policy and not to compete electoral-
ly with the Congress-I Party.
Use of front groups has allowed the Soviets to extend
their links to organizations not popularly branded as
Soviet or Indian Communist controlled. It enables
them to function behind the scenes, manipulating a
group's activities and mobilizing public opinion on
specific issues. The dozen or more organizations
whose activities are orchestrated by Moscow touch
many facets of Indian life: business, academia, cul-
ture, science, and several specialized interests.-
By their own standards, Soviet propaganda and disin-
formation activities in India have been enormously
successful: tens of thousands of placements each year,
with substantial numbers of items placed in such
prestigious Indian newspapers as the Hindustan
Times, the Statesman, The Times of India, and The
Hindu (figure 9). Their success, however, is reflected
in more than just these numbers alone. Recent Soviet
charges of US involvement in the assassination of
Indira Gandhi constitute only one example of how
Soviet media campaigns have put the United States
on the defensive in India. Others include:
? A Soviet disinformation campaign against US For-
eign Service officer George Griffin several years ago
ultimately led the Indian Government to refuse to
allow him to be posted to New Delhi.
? Within the past year, a Soviet campaign against
Indian purchase of high technology from a US
company seriously endangered completion of the
deal. The Soviet campaign-which asserted that
similar technology could be purchased much more
cheaply from East Germany-along with protests
from Indian scientists that India should develop the
technology, forced Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to
review the decision. Although New Delhi ultimately
decided to proceed with the purchase, the Soviet
campaign helped to delay the deal for several
months and contributed to distrust of India by US
businessmen just when efforts were being initiated
to improve US-Indian relations through trade in
high technology.
? The US Ambassador in New Delhi, the public
information officer, and the Director of the US
Information Service (USIS) in New Delhi must
frequently respond to false charges about the United
States in the Indian press. These US officials
expend much time and effort in meeting with Indian
Government officials to rebut these charges and
writing or visiting newspaper editors and journalists
to rebut and protest false or misleading stories.
We believe that Soviet propaganda and disinforma-
25X1
tion activities-in conjunction with other Soviet
political influence activities-have helped shape the 25X1 i
I
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Figure 9
Some Examples of Soviet Placements in Indian Press and
Coverage in USSR Media by Theme, 1984-85a
Sample of propaganda and disinformation themes
Indian
Pro-Soviet
Major
USSR media
Communist
press in
establishment
pressb
Indiab
Indian pressb
Separatism Kirkpatrick plan
40 0 0 0
0
Separatism as US policy
? ? ? ?
?
US, the West, and Pakistan
0 00
0
train, finance Sikh
separatists, terrorists
US, UK, Canada encourage,
0 190
harbor Sikh terrorists
overseas
State terrorism State terrorism as US policy
0
Gandhi assassination US link implied or charged
0
? 0 0
0 10190
0
US played active role
0 ?
0 ?
Was part of US plan of
?
? 0 40 0
? ?
separatism, intervention, or
espionage activities in India
Hardgrave book proves
? 000
US role
000
US involved in other
assassinations
a Selective monitoring of Indian media permitted identification of Soviet
propaganda and disinformation themes and a sampling of Soviet placements in
the Indian press. Each dot represents a single placement monitored on that
theme.
b Indian Communist press includes Dainik, Basumati, New Age, Saryajug, and
Janajug. Pro-Soviet press in India includes Link, Patriot, and Daily. Major Indian
establishment papers include Hindustan Times, Indian Express, Statesman, The
Times of India, Telegraph, Chandigarh Tribune, Amrit Bazar Patrika, and The
Hindu.
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attitudes of the urban, educated Indian public` as well
as the political elite. In the view of a USIS officer
formerly stationed in India, Indian readers may not
believe a story if they read it in the pro-Soviet Blitz,
but, when the Congress-I MP from Uttar Pradesh
repeats it, the story becomes credible. The constant
reiteration of anti-US disinformation appears, at a
minimum, to have exacerbated doubts among many
Indians about the United States and its policies,
doubts that Indian politicians are willing to exploit.
Public opinion polls also point up the success of Soviet
propaganda and disinformation activities, particularly
in playing on Indian concerns about US foreign policy
and in developing a large reservoir of favorable public
attitudes toward the USSR. In five public opinion
polls conducted from 1981 through 1984 by a highly
respected Indian affiliate of the Gallup organization,
a large proportion of the educated urban population
consistently ranked the Soviet Union higher than the
United States in:
? Its perceived ability to act wisely in world affairs.
? Convergence of its interests with India's.
? The generosity of its assistance and trade.
Moreover, in 18 of 22 public opinion polls during the
last 11 years, those surveyed indicated that they have
a more favorable image of the USSR than of the
United States, frequently by a wide margin. This
prevailing attitude is a major turnabout of the favor-
able opinion toward the United States that existed in
India in the immediate postindependence period.F_
Soviet use of India as a credible conduit for their
worldwide disinformation efforts probably helps to
shape attitudes outside India as well. Soviet place-
ments in the Indian press are often replayed in the
press of other countries and in Moscow's own media.
Although gauging the impact of these replays world-
wide is difficult, news sourced to India, rather than
Moscow, is likely to have greater credibility in the
Third World-particularly in view of India's position
as a spokesman for the nonaligned countries
The success of Soviet activities in India largely de-
pends on the acquiescence of the Indian Government.
For example, despite gaining easy access to the pages
of Indian newspapers, Soviet information officers
have, according to a defector, failed to gain access to
Indian radio and television, which remain under close
government control. Moreover, according to a US
official recently stationed in New Delhi, the Indian
Government is currently investigating PTI, and a
replacement for the long-suspected agent of influence
who chairs the PTI board will be appointed by Rajiv
Gandhi. Although several other PTI board members
and employees are on the Soviet payroll, Gandhi's
choice of a PTI chairman could be critical in deter-
mining whether the Soviets continue to enjoy unfet-
tered access to the Indian press through PTI.
Over the years, the strength of Soviet influence in the
Congress-I Party has fluctuated with the political
tone set by the top Indian leadership. Under Indira
Gandhi, Soviet fortunes prospered. To date, Rajiv
Gandhi has set a different tone, marked by the
noticeable absence of statements hostile to the United
States in his first 11 months, the government's refusal
to prevent public disclosure of Soviet and East Euro-
pean involvement in the Indian spy scandal, and
restrictions on the access of Soviet officials to
Congress-I offices and leadership. The Soviets' reac-
tion, has been to
redouble their efforts to wine and dine new MPs in
the most extensive campaign yet to
Although we believe that Gandhi will be unwilling to
use the political capital necessary to restrict Soviet
activities substantially, he has proceeded with an
anticorruption campaign that has included public
statements, personnel changes throughout the bureau-
cracy, and legislation. Legislation passed this spring
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
made open contributions to political parties legal,
thereby undercutting somewhat the need for secret
contributions. Although this measure will not restrict
the major means of Soviet covert funding-kickbacks
through the Indo-Soviet rupee trade-it could make 25X1
the general practice of covert funding less acceptable.
25X1:
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The Soviets also see their position as vulnerable to
Western political influence activities. According to a
defector, Soviet propagandists in India are concerned
about what they perceive as a large amount of
Western-produced material flowing into India. For
example, Soviet Information Department officials
viewed US food assistance to Ethiopia and the public-
ity surrounding it not as a humanitarian effort but as
a propaganda tactic to embarrass that Marxist gov-
ernment and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, they felt
powerless to counter the favorable publicity the Unit-
ed States received since they believed Indian readers
would not be well disposed toward a campaign attack-
ing the United States for giving food to starving
people. Similarly, SID officials in New Delhi saw the
US human rights policy of the late 1970s as a
propaganda campaign: they feared US attention to
what they considered an area of Soviet vulnerability
and believed that the human rights theme was appeal-
ing to Indian audiences.
We believe that these sorts of concerns among Soviet
strategists in India have some basis in fact. Soviet
publications and radiobroadcasts must compete with
other publications and broadcasts, including many
from the West; moreover, the Soviets are just now
getting into the television and cinema markets. De-
spite the popularity of the USSR in opinion polls,
appreciation of Soviet economic and military assis-
tance, and gratefulness for Soviet support in times of
crisis, most Indians-according to knowledgeable ob-
servers-are neither ideologically inclined toward
Marxism-Leninism nor sympathetic to Moscow's po-
litical system. Our reading of Indian opinion suggests
that the Soviets could indeed be vulnerable on certain
issues:
? Soviet efforts to manipulate such international orga-
nizations as the United Nations and the Nonaligned
Movement, institutions held in high regard by the
Indian public.
? The "foreign hand" of Moscow and its allies in
manipulating Indian internal politics for Soviet or
Bloc benefit.
? Continuing Soviet economic failures-particularly
in agriculture, a sector of India's economy that has
received considerable assistance from the United
States.
? Moscow's poor performance in providing disaster
and relief assistance-even to such political allies as
Ethiopia.
? Moscow's record on human rights, which the edu-
cated Indian public recognizes to be poor.
We believe that efforts to woo Rajiv Gandhi and to
limit his room to maneuver away from the USSR will
dominate Soviet political influence activities in the
near term. Moscow-striving to demonstrate its sup-
port and friendship-is making a determined bid to
get Gandhi to affirm publicly that the strong Indo-
Soviet ties that prevailed under his mother will remain 25X1
unchanged.
Even if, as we anticipate, Gandhi continues efforts to
steer India toward a more genuinely nonaligned
course, he is not likely to move India significantly
closer to the United States. Despite his generally pro-
Western orientation and his desire for Western tech-
nology, he will probably continue to seek a position
midway between the two superpowers and to play an
active, but selective, role on issues of contention
between them. We believe that, at least in the near
term, he will be unwilling to expend the political
capital necessary to turn off Soviet activities in India,
and the Soviets are likely, therefore, to continue to
operate in a permissive environment not greatly dif-
ferent from the one they enjoyed under Indira
Gandhi.
Should something happen to Rajiv Gandhi, a succes-
sor seeking to establish legitimacy would probably be
more vulnerable to Soviet influence activities. With
their existing propaganda m? :hinery and network of
contacts and friends, the Soviets would have many
opportunities for influence in an unstable political
situation in India. The size and momentum of Mos-
cow's political apparatus in India is such that it is
unlikely to be easily derailed. The large Soviet pres-
ence, the extensive network of Indian political con-
tacts and cash payoffs, the number of Soviet front
groups, and the enormous investment in propaganda
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machinery assure the Soviets of a continuing voice in
Indian political life. In light of Moscow's reaction to
Rajiv Gandhi's government, we expect that the Soviet
Union-in the event of any future regime change-
would make extensive use of its assets to maintain,
and, if possible, strengthen its special relationship
with India.
Because Moscow is bent on influencing Gandhi, the
United States can expect an increasing challenge
from Soviet activities in India:
? We believe Moscow is now mounting an effort to
augment the number of its "old friends" in key
positions, some of whom have lost influence in the
new administration. Although we cannot identify
specific younger leaders recruited by the Soviets, we
have little doubt that the Soviets are making vigor-
ous efforts.
? A recent shakeup in personnel at the Soviet Infor-
mation Department in India probably indicates a
reassessment and possible reorientation of the pro-
paganda and disinformation effort. We expect Sovi-
et activities to become more sophisticated-with
renewed efforts to gain access to Indian electronic
media and more emphasis on the key issues con-
fronting Gandhi, such as the Punjab, Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program, and the motives of the
United States in India.
mum propaganda effect.
? In addition to the standard anti-US themes, we
expect Moscow to continue to exploit Indira Gand-
hi's assassination and the Bhopal tragedy for maxi-
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