AFGHANISTAN'S EXPANDED OPIUM TRADE: BYPRODUCT OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00586R000400460006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Trade: Byproduct of War
Afghanistan's Expanded Opium
Secret
cre
GI 85-10247
September 1985
Copy 5 1; Q 9 4
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Trade: Byproduct of War
Afghanistan's Expanded Opium
Strategic Narcotics/Eurasia-Africa Branch,
the Strategic Narcotics/Eurasia-
Agency.
Africa Branch, OGI, and by the
Analytic Support Group. It was coordinated with the
Department of State and the Drug Enforcement
Division, OGI,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis
Secret
G! 85-10247
September 1985
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Afghanistan's Expanded Opium
Trade: Byproduct of War
Key Judgments Afghanistan's narcotics industry has expanded since the Soviet invasion,
Information available and we anticipate continued growth. Economic disruptions caused by the
as of 15 August 1985 Soviet invasion and the wartime environment have substantially increased.
was used in this report.
the attractiveness of opium poppy cultivation, heroin refining, and narcot-
ics smuggling. Poppy cultivation is expanding and probably will stimulate
further narcotics trafficking and processing activities. Many Afghans have
long grown and smuggled narcotics, and individuals loosely associated with
insurgent groups probably participate in the trade. Available evidence,
however, does not indicate large-scale, organized exploitation by the
insurgents.
We judge that the Afghan Government is unlikely to crack down on poppy
farmers, laboratory operators, and narcotics traffickers. Indeed, UN
officials believe that much of their financial and technical aid is being used
to fight the insurgents rather than to attack the narcotics trade. Moreover,
Afghan authorities at all levels are willing to
aid traffickers for a price.
Even if the Afghan Government were to institute control programs, the
narcotics trade would be difficult to suppress because most of the activity
takes place in insurgent-controlled areas beyond Kabul's authority. More-
over, the Soviet-backed Karmal regime is preoccupied with combating the
insurgency, and as long as the narcotics trade neither finances the
insurgents' efforts nor seriously affects the Soviet military campaign,
government authorities have little incentive to curtail an activity that helps
to keep the economy afloat. Increased Soviet concern over drug abuse by
troops, however, could encourage interdiction efforts, at least in the cities
where authorities are able to exercise control.
Afghanistan's role as a heroin supplier to international markets probably
will expand as long as the instability and strife continue. In the absence of
any concerted effort at narcotics control within Afghanistan, the ability of
neighboring authorities to intensify their interdiction efforts offers the only
alternative for limiting Afghan narcotics exports. We do not expect Iran to
move decisively against narcotics traffickers; but Pakistan may step up
enforcement, at least in some cities, to stem its rising drug abuse.
iii Secret
GI 85-10247
September 1985
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Key Judgments
The War: Incentives for the Opium Industry
1
Afghanistan's Expanded Opium Trade: The Evidence
2
Smuggling
8
The Role of the Refugees and Insurgents
11
Refugees
11
Insurgents
13
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Afghanistan's Expanded Opium
Trade: Byproduct of War I
Introduction
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979
disrupted incipient government narcotics control pro-
grams and gave rise to insurgent warfare in opium-
producing areas.
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hashish use and at least the start of heroin addiction. 25X1
Drug use among the Soviet troops is a growing
problem. idespread
the Soviets frequently
suggests that the disruptions of tradi-
tional social and economic patterns in the country
have not hampered and may have even stimulated
new growth in the narcotics industry.
The War: Incentives for the Opium Industry
The predominantly agrarian Afghan economy has
been seriously hurt by the Soviet hostilities: irrigation
networks are being neglected, distribution and mar-
keting systems disrupted, and a significant part of the
labor force has taken flight or been displaced. The
small industrial sector also has been plagued by labor
and raw material shortages, frequent power black-
outs, and fuel rationing, severely disrupting trade and
commerce. Such unsettlement does not always have
similar negative effects on illegal economic activi-
ties-black-marketeering or smuggling, for exam-
ple-and, indeed, the evidence suggests that the civil
war environment in Afghanistan has spawned a flour-
ishing opium trade.
sell boots, clothing, and ammunition to shopkeepers 2L X1 ` 1
assaults and robberies of bus passengers
by Soviet soldiers were commonplace before the
drivers started carrying adequate supplies of drugs to
Isolated incidents suggest the Soviets believe that
drug abuse has impaired the performance of their
troops in Afghanistan, but there is no evidence that
drug abuse alone has lessened the overall military
readiness of the forces. The problem probably is not
as severe as the infectious diseases and alcoholism
among both the troops and the officers. Drug usage,
however, could become more of a problem for the
Soviets as troops on rotation out of Afghanistan bring
the narcotics into the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Some East European countries have attrib-
uted an increase in hashish use to Soviet troops
Opium poppies are an ideal cash crop for subsistence
farmers when wartime conditions disrupt commerce
in traditional crops. They are a hearty, multi-purpose
crop that yield a variety of products besides opium
gum. The seeds can be eaten whole or processed into
poppyseed cake or edible oil, the seed pods can be
used for medicines or liquor, the straw for fuel, and
the resulting ash for soap. Since opium does not spoil,
it can be stored or stockpiled indefinitely. Profits from
selling opium are as much as two to three times more
than the next most profitable crop, yet cultivation
costs are low.
reassigned therefrom Afghanistan.
Wartime disruptions, in our view, also make heroin
refining an attractive enterprise. Heroin is more prof-
itable than opium-1 kilogram of heroin is worth
substantially more than the 10 kilograms of opium
used to produce it. It is less bulky to transport and
more easily concealed than opium, and the processing
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laboratories are small, simple to start up, difficult to
locate, and easily moved. War also produces a poten-
tial new source of demand for refined opiates-the
Smugglers and merchants have similar incentives to
move into the opium trade. War disrupts regular
trade patterns and encourages smuggling. Smugglers
regularly operate outside normal distribution and
transportation networks, and the disruptions enhance
their ability to travel surreptitiously and to bribe
officials. Although the war increases demand for
smugglers' services, it also adds to, their risks, which
encourages them to turn to high-profit, illicit contra-
band. Merchants, finding their established markets
adversely affected, also seek alternative commodities,
such as opium and heroin, to trade.
Afghanistan's Expanded Opium Trade: The Evidence
Part of the case 'for Afghanistan's expanded opium
trade depends on circumstantial, uncorroborated, or
secondhand information. The frequency of the report-
ing and the nature and number of allegations, howev-
er, strongly suggest that the opium trade continues
unabate as well as
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and State
Department reporting, indicates that Afghan farmers
are cultivating opium poppies throughout the country,
that heroin is now being refined in Afghan laborato-
ries, and that Afghan smugglers are taking advantage
of the insurgency to increase their involvement in the
drug trade.
Cultivation. A wide variety of evidence indicates
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is becoming more
widespread (figure 1). Reporting from Islamabad,
Pakistan, predicts that the 1985 opium crop in Af-
ghanistan may be 25 percent greater than that for
1984, which by our estimate was 140 to 180 metric
tons.' DEA reporting claims that individual farmers
are devoting a higher percentage of their acreage to
poppies in traditional growing regions, and
sowing poppies.
poppies are even cultivated in nontraditional growing
areas, and nonfarmers, such as
civilian militiamen, are cultivating poppies.
Analysis of satellite imagery substantiates reports of
increased acreage to poppies in traditional growing
areas. Preliminary analysis of imagery over Nangar-
har Province, the major producing region, reveals that
in some areas of the province approximately 50 to 70
percent of the cultivated fields are planted to poppy,
compared to 30 to 40 percent last year (figure 2).
Nangarhar traditionally accounts for about two-thirds
of all poppyfields in the country, and, if opium
production in Nangarhar has more than doubled,
Afghanistan's total production for 1985 may be as
high as 300 metric tons. A count of poppyfields in
other provinces indicates similar increases in the
number of fields of poppy. We are unable to confirm
with imagery the expansion of poppies to nontradi-
tional areas. Nevertheless, we believe that the expan-
sion in traditional areas alone is sufficient to boost
production this year by at least 70 percent.
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Figure 2
Crop Growth in Eastern Afghanistan, Late March 1985
This Landsat scene centers on Nangarhar Province in
eastern Afghanistan where nearly two-thirds of the poppy crop
is cultivated. Snowmelt feeds the irrigation networks here, and
this image, taken shortly before poppy flowering, reveals
ample snowfall in the mountains. Contrary to reports of a
drought during this year's growing season, the deep red color-
ing in the valleys indicates high crop vigor and the prospects
for good yields. Opium is a major cash crop here, and accord-
ing to imagery analysis, about 50 to 70 percent of the cultivat-
ed fields were planted to poppy in some areas this year.
Jalalabad, seen in the middle of the image, is a major market
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Figure 3
Areas of Poppy Cultivation and Major Military Activity
We suspect that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is
unaffected by the war, largely because of the nature
of the fighting. Most of Afghanistan's poppy is culti-
vated in small, scattered fields in remote mountain
valleys away from Soviet and government military
operations, which have been directed mostly against
specific, accessible targets along main roads or near
important towns (figure 3).Z Many operations are
focused attempts to relieve besieged garrisons or halt
Intense poppy cultivation
Scattered or suspected
poppy cultivation
Major military activity
Province boundary
Road
insurgent infiltration along the Afghan-Pakistani bor-
der or the Afghan-Iranian frontier. The use of air-
power also has limited combat on the ground that
could have disrupted poppy planting or opium har-
vesting (figure 4). Government operations in the past
year suggest less interest than before in acquiring
control over remote rural areas and more willingness
to countenance insurgent control there, or at least a
low level of activity.
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Figure 4
The Poppy Season in Afghanistan
Sowing
Eastern, southern, and
western provinces a
a Confirmed for Kabul, Nangarhar, Konarha, Laghman, Lowgar, Kapisa, Helmand and Oruzgan
Provinces. Probably similar in Herat.
b Probable, but not yet confirmed with imagery.
c Spring sowing and summer harvesting is likely characteristic of much of the poppy crop, but
possibly some is grown as a winter crop.
dConfirmed
supports these conclusions
about the likely impact of military operations on
poppy cultivation. Imagery reveals no signs of wide-
spread crop burning or destruction of irrigation sys-
tems; bomb damage and craters are seen most often in
villages and along roadways. We estimate that the
destruction of crops and farms caused by military
operations affects only a small portion of cultivated
land, less than 1 percent of total farm crop areas
observed on satellite imagery.' We judge that the
rugged landscape and numerous irrigation ditches
restrict access to fields in remote areas to foot soldiers 25X1
or heliborne troops, who are more concerned with the
battle at hand than with destroying poppyfields.
The manner in which insurgents conduct their opera-
tions limits the effects of the war on agriculture. At
times it appears the insurgents deliberately divert
their operations from farming areas and from their
sometime supporters. Operating in small mobile
bands, they have engaged Soviet and government
forces in brief, confined battles. Generally, insurgents
attack regime garrisons, Soviet installations, radar 25X1
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The War in the Poppy-Growing Provinces
Analysis of several military operations in poppy-
growing regions during the fall of 1984 and early
spring of 1985 illustrates why the hostilities probably
have little negative effect on poppy planting or har-
vesting:
Valley. Although the heavy airstrikes before the
insurgents' withdrawal could have delayed the
opium harvest, we believe that farmers had ade-
quate time to harvest their opium because the
airstrikes ended in early April.
? Kabul increased its military operations in mid-
October 1984 in Nangarhar Province and continued
at that level of activity through the end of the year.
Major battles during this time of the year could
have limited sowing and damaged seedlings, but
most of the activity was aimed at relieving garri-
sons and interdicting insurgent supply caravans and
occurred near major roadways crossing the Afghan-
Pakistani border rather than in the countryside.
Lowgar Province was the site of similar military
efforts late in 1984, but
the operations were primarily along important sup-
ply routes and did not affect farming areas away
from the roads.
? From the end of 1984 through early 1985 there was
heavy fighting in Herat Province. Although we
know little about the poppy crop in Herat, we doubt
that it was affected if the Soviets used the same
tactics as used in Lowgar and Nangarhar Provinces.
? Qandahar Province was the scene of heavy fighting
in January 1985, but the activity was limited to
insurgent attacks against the airport, Soviet and
government posts, a Soviet military convoy, and
daily skirmishes in the bazaar. The Soviets re-
sponded by bombing nearby villages, but we doubt
major damage was intflicted on the more remotely
located poppyfields.
? In late March 1985 insurgents attacked an Afghan
base northeast of Lashkar Gah in the Helmand
? Konarha Province was the scene offighting in
February 1985. Most military operations in Kon-
arha, however, occurred along the province's main
roads in the valleys of the Darya ye Konar and its
major tributaries, the Landay Sind and the Darya-
ye Pich. Although some airborne forces were used
in the mountains
little destruction of the terraced poppyfields.
? Paktia and Paktika Provinces have been the scene
of constant battles as Soviet and Afghan troops
have attempted to relieve insurgent pressure on
regime outposts. The government conducted a
blockade and sweep operation in Paktia in late
October 1984, but we doubt that the poppy crop was
damaged because many regime units here, hard
pressed to hold their posts against guerrilla as-
saults, have little time to conduct massive field
operations that could destroy crops. These prov-
inces, however, have experienced considerable popu-
lation loss that may have reduced poppy
cultivation.
? Kapisa and Laghman Provinces, often the location
of Soviet offensives, are mountainous with only
scattered poppy cultivation on smaller-than-average
fields in terraced agricultural areas. Farmers prob-
ably had difficulty planting or harvesting their
fields because of the fighting, but we consider it
unlikely that destroyed poppyfields in these areas
will affect total Afghan production.
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outposts, border posts, military supply convoys, air-
ports, and highways. Many insurgents are also part-
time farmers, which tends to reduce hostilities during
planting and harvesting seasons.
We judge that the increase in the number of heroin
refineries reflects the traffickers' belief that Afghanis-
tan's lawless, war-torn environment is ideal for refin-
ing heroin with impunity.
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Processing. Evidence indicates that trafficking orga-
nizations in Afghanistan have had the capability to
process opium into morphine and heroin since the
We doubt that Afghan laboratories manufacture
large amounts of pure heroin or compare in number
with those in Pakistan.'
pect that some laboratories also may be shifting from
Pakistan to Afghanistan because of the increase in
Afghan opium production and decrease in Pakistani
cultivation.
soldiers at checkpoints and border crossings.
drivers in Afghanistan routinely carry heroin to bribe
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' Most heroin laboratories in Southwest Asia process raw opium
into crude heroin base (Number 2 Heroin) or smoking heroin
(Number 3 Heroin), but reporting suggests that more laboratories
are refining pure heroin (Number 4 Heroin), particularly in Paki-
stan. Pure heroin is also referred to as injectable heroin or heroin
hydrochloride.
' Ribat is a village somewhere in the Afghan-Iranian-Pakistani
triborder area.
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frequently traded in the bazaars of Jalalabad, Qanda-
har, and Herat, as well as other cities and towns
(Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Towr Kham, Farah, and
Zaranj), The
distance of some of these locations from Pakistani
laboratories suggests nearby refining in Afghanistan.
DEA reporting also indicates that Pakistani authori-
ties have seized heroin en route from Afghanistan.
items in the Afghan bazaars for heroin. Heroin
powder is readily available in Afghan cities and
major roadways. the laboratories are 25X1
in remote mountain areas where government control
We believe that military operations have little effect
on heroin refining activities in Afghanistan. Few
laboratories are located in areas that are potential
military targets, such as the important villages or
is limited. Like Pakistani operations, most Afghan
heroin laboratories are so-called garage or kitchen
operations-easily established, crudely constructed,
and using existing buildings in outlying villages and
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farm compounds. It is unlikely that the laboratories
would be distinguishable from normal agricultural
buildings, and, if destroyed, they easily could be
borders with Pakistan and Iran. Before the insurgen-
cy, tribal caravans traveled west across northern
Afghanistan carrying opium to the consumers in Iran
and the processing laboratories in eastern Turkey.
Traditionally, opium was brought from almost all the
growing regions to Herat, a commercial center in the
western part of the country. There, arrangements
were made to smuggle the opium across the border
into Iran. Caravans carried some of the opium south
to Qandahar Province and from there west across
Helmand and Nimruz Provinces into Iran or south
into Pakistan and west across Baluchistan-these
routes facilitated diversion of the cargo to the Persian
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reestablished (figure 5).
Smuggling. Smuggling has long been a way of life for
many Afghans, and
Afghan drug smugglers have taken advantage of the
insurgency-related disruption to increase their activi-
ties. drug smuggling
throughout Afghanistan and of bazaars well supplied
with narcotics. Drug smuggling into Pakistan and
Iran is also common, according to numerous DEA
reports.
Afghan smugglers have a large number of well-
established routes, most of which cross unguarded
Gulf area.
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The Opium and Heroin Trade
In Afghanistan, opium is purchased initially by a
local dealer, who may himself be a grower, or by a
dealer from a nearby town. Using a human carrier, an
animal caravan, or a motor vehicle, the dealer takes
the opium from the growing area to a major center or
bazaar, where it is either stockpiled by an opium
broker or sold directly to smugglers. The broker
usually maintains a stock of about 4 tons of opium.
He will sell to refiners or may rune opium himself.
When his opium stocks run low, he orders more from
the dealers in the growing areas. Brokers and refiners
in the Afghan bazaars supply the smugglers. Usually,
the smugglers transport their cargo in vehicles or on
pack animals to villages near the border. These
villages serve as staging areas where the opiates are
transferred to pack animal caravans to begin the
journey across the border trails into Pakistan. Once
inside Pakistan, the opiates are transferred to anoth-
er pack animal caravan, or to small trucks, for
delivery to the brokers and refiners in the North-
West Frontier Province (NWFP) bazaars. The NWFP
brokers and refiners are the major regional wholesal-
ers who move the opium and heroin by car or truck to
major traffickers in Karachi or Lahore, who, in turn,
generally supply the international trafficking net-
works that supply the United States and Europe.
also operates between Quetta and Qandahar.
According to US Embassy reporting, Afghan drug
smugglers take advantage of the traditional money
bazaar between Peshawar and Kabul-a hundi net-
work of partnerships based on family and tribal
relationships-to finance the flourishing narcotics
trade. The hundi-called Hawala in Afghanistan-is
an instrument of credit and exchange in Southwest
Asia that predates and bypasses banking institutions.
The small chit of paper authorizing delivery of a
specific amount of money to the bearer has been
replaced by the telephone. Transactions between the
receiver in Kabul and distributor of hundifunds in
Peshawar are now authorized by phone. The hundi
dealers simply convert rupees to afghanis at whatever
exchange rate the market establishes; a transaction
takes only three days to complete. A separate system
We believe that the Soviet invasion has altered the use
of traditional smuggling routes and added a new
dimension to narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan.' To
avoid contact with roadblocks and other increased
security measures, smugglers began moving their
drugs to the nearest border. Smugglers from the less
important, northern-producing provinces, such as
Balkh, Konduz, and Baghlan, continued their treks
southwest to Herat; but new routes were needed from
the major growing areas on the eastern border to
Pakistan. The need to develop routes leading east was
reinforced further by a crackdown on heroin laborato-
ries in Turkey. As a result, Jalalabad (Nangarhar
Province) became the major marketing center in
Afghanistan for transshipment to Pakistan. Some
changes in routes were made to adjust for the disloca-
tions of the insurgency. For example, smugglers from
the Helmand Valley still travel to Qandahar, but now
are more likely to head east to Pakistan than west to
Iran.
Five years after the Soviet invasion, Afghan smug-
glers have adapted to the fighting and security mea-
sures, and we believe they may be in an even stronger
position than before the hostilities began (figure 6).
They have managed to maintain access to their old
smuggling routes and connections, while developing
new ones with Pakistani organizations. Smuggling
east to villages near the Khyber Pass and into Paki-
stan occurs on a much larger scale, and Pakistani
trafficking organizations in the North-West Frontier
Province have expanded their operations to handle
more narcotics. Afghan smugglers are also crossing
the Afghan-Soviet border near Iran. According to
DEA analysis, the location of several seizures in Iran
at or near the Soviet border suggests that this route is
being used. We doubt that drug smuggling through
the Soviet Union is a regular occurrence, however,
because Soviet security measures along the Afghan
border are quite thorough and movement across this
border is tightly controlled.
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Figure 6
Narcotics Smuggling Routes
?- ,
Sov~; nin
China
Relatively new route
The Role of the Government
Preoccupied with combating the insurgency, the
Soviet-backed Karmal regime is devoting little atten-
tion or resources to the narcotics problem. Most
cultivation occurs in areas beyond its control and is so
widespread-in two-thirds of the provinces,
that eradication would be impos-
sible. The government has not made poppy cultivation
illegal. This lack of government action may be a
simple acknowledgment that to do so would be futile
but also may be an attempt to appease rebellious
farmers, particularly those in areas of significant
opium production adjacent to Pakistan and Iran.
Old route frequently used
5 Old route infrequently used
Road +
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
Publicly, the regime maintains that land reform has
almost eliminated poppy cultivation and that any
narcotics found in Afghanistan originate in Pakistan.
Afghan counternarcotics efforts focus on interdiction
by the Anti-Smuggling Division of the Ministry of
Interior's Criminal Investigations Department.
Staffed with about 40 poorly equipped men, it is not
an effective antinarcotics force. The division has men
assigned to eight provinces in Afghanistan but is
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active only in the major cities, such as Kabul and
Herat, according to a State Department source. Af-
ghan officials try to highlight their successes and
effectiveness and claim that a coordinated drug law
enforcement effort has been implemented that in-
cludes the armed forces. Kabul reported a significant
increase in drug seizures in the first half of 1984,
compared with the first half of 1983. The 1984
seizures netted less than 5 metric tons of opium and
only about 91 kilograms of heroin. Even if these
claims are accurate, such seizures are only a tiny
portion of estimated production, and we judge they
have not appreciably affected the drug trade. The US
Embassy reports that most narcotics seizures proba-
bly result from efforts to intercept illegal arms ship-
ments to insurgents rather than from actual drug
apprehended. Of those taken into custody, most are
either allowed to escape after abandoning the drugs or
freed after bribing the officials.
KHAD, the Soviet-backed
Afghan intelligence network, may be directly involved
in heroin trafficking in Afghanistan.
KHAD officers, at the
direction of the Kabul government, work with Pash-
tun tribesmen in moving heroin to border areas.
Allegedly, KHAD routinely identifies the apprehend-
ed smugglers as mujahideen.e
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enforcement operations.
Kabul has given no sign that it intends to increase the
emphasis given antidrug efforts. To the contrary,
the government misuses the limit-
ed drug enforcement resources available. According
to UN representatives, the Karmal regime has sum-
marily rejected past offers to train qualified Afghan
narcotics officials in drug enforcement.
UN officials believe
their financial and technical aid is being used to fight
the insurgents. These same officials report that vehi-
cles supplied to drug investigative units are being used
by the military for routine security patrols.
Even if the government had a comprehensive antinar-
cotics program, we believe that it would be quickly
subverted by the traffickers.
Afghan authorities at a eves are
corrupt and willingly. abet traffickers for a price.
We suspect, how-
ever, that most of the corruption entails bribing
Afghan border guards and customs officials or offer-
ing heroin to Soviet soldiers at roadblocks and check-
points outside the cities.
drug smugglers routinely bribe customs officials
in advance, but even those who do not are seldom
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journalist, recently in Afghanistan, heard persistent
stories of heroin being transported to the Pakistani 25X1
border under Soviet military protection. He is work-
ing on the story and is convinced of official Afghan
Government collusion in the narcotics trade. We
believe the authorities may use the troop movements
to facilitate the narcotics trade and suspect that the
export of heroin from Afghanistan may serve regime
objectives to increase drug addiction problems in
Pakistan and Iran, earn hard currency, and smear the 25X1
The Role of the Refugees and Insurgents
Afghan and Soviet press statements allege that the 25X1
Afghan refugees and insurgents are largely responsi-
ble for the illegal narcotics trafficking. Refugee and 25X1
insurgent leaders have denied publicly any collusion 25X1
with narcotics traffickers. There is no conclusive
evidence to support either side's contention, but
individuals or small groups of refugees and
insurgents are profiting from the narcotics trade.
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Refugees. Both opium cultivation and narcotics smug-
gling are traditional activities in Afghanistan, and we 25X1
Mujahideen is a term used to refer to the Afghan insurgents or
resistence fighters. Literally, the word translates "fighters in the
holy war." In the Pashtu language, "mu" means fighter, "jihad"
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Figure 7
Afghan Ethnic Groups Involved in Opium Trade
Baluch LU Tajik
Pashtun Ii Turkmen
Boundary representation is
not neceaaarrly authoritative.
assume that refugees continue to pursue these activi-
ties (figure 7). On the basis of reporting from US and
UN officials in Pakistan, we estimate that at least
three-fourths of the Afghan refugees are Pashtun
farmers, some of whom are poppy farmers who regu-
larly cross back into Afghanistan to assist with the
crop.' For centuries, Pashtun tribesmen have routinely
traveled to what is now Pakistan to trade narcotics
and other goods, look for work, visit relatives, and
Groups not associated with
opium trade
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200Miles
move their herds to winter grazing areas. Establish-
ment of national borders has not stopped this move-
ment. According to DEA intelligence sources, some
Pashtun families reside only part-time in the refugee
camps; the older family members remain in Afghani-
stan to look after the farms and the younger men
return periodically to tend and harvest their crops.
Although we have no direct evidence, we suspect
many refugees may migrate between their farms and
refugee camps.
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In most cases, from the producers in the growing
regions to the brokers in the bazaars across the
border, transactions are based on longstanding rela-
tionships. Consequently, most regions are free zones
for opium and heroin smuggling among the Pashtun,
Baluchi, Turkmen, and Tajik ethnic groups who
inhabit the various opium-growing regions and whose
ties span the nearby international borders. The Pash-
tun tribes dominate the narcotics smuggling trade,
inhabiting the southern and eastern slopes of the
Hindu Kush in Afghanistan and Pakistan and con-
trolling the fabled Khyber Pass and the strategic
Khojak Pass through which most of Afghanistan's
opium and heroin move. The Baluchistan Desert-
spanning Qandahar, Helmand, and Nimruz Prov-
inces, as well as parts of Pakistan and Iran-is the
usual area of operation for Baluchi caravans. Turk-
men caravans move across northern Afghanistan-
through Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab,
Badghis, and Herat Provinces-and the Tajiks are
dominant in northeastern Afghanistan, particularly
Badakhshan Province. Turkmens and Tajiks also
inhabit the regions across the Soviet border.
Insurgents. Despite some circumstantial evidence that
individual insurgents or insurgent bands are involved
in smuggling narcotics, we have no information of
organized narcotics smuggling involving the mujahi-
deen. We judge that such involvement is unlikely
under present circumstances because the disadvan-
tages outweigh the potential benefits and will contin-
ue to do so as long as other sources of income are
available. Any publicity regarding insurgent partici-
pation in narcotics smuggling, moreover, would tar-
nish the mujahideen's image and could cost them
support from external sources. It could also cost them
some popular support from the Afghan community
itself; Islamic religious leaders teach strongly against
the use of opium, and many Afghan Muslims are very
conservative. Organized narcotics smuggling also
would divert insurgents' attention and energies from
planning and staging military operations and under-
mine their ability to achieve political and ideological
Several individual Pashtun tribes are particularly
well known for their smuggling activities. The Afridi
and Shinwari tribes have switched from brandishing
rifles on horseback to running profitable trucking
concerns and smuggling narcotics across the Afghan-
Pakistani border. Some tribesmen farm poppyfields,
and others are reported to operate heroin laborato-
ries. They inhabit the region south of the Darya ye
Kabul on both sides of the border and dominate licit
and illicit traffic on the Grand Trunk Highway
between Kabul and Peshawar through the Khyber
Pass. Some of the Ghilzai and Durrani confedera-
tions are nomads, migrating between winter quarters
in the valleys and summer pasture grounds in the
mountains. They also tend to be itinerant merchants
and moneylenders, whose caravans regularly move
opium across Afghanistan. Many of the Durrani and
Ghilzai confederations also have large landholdings
and farm acres of poppies. The Ghilzai live in the
region south of Kabul as far as Chaman, and the
Durrani inhabit a broad arc of territory from the 25X1
lower Darya ye Arghandab and Darya ye Helmand
Valleys eastward toward the Iranian border.
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The major insurgent organizations have repeatedly
denied any involvement and have officially instructed
their supporters not to engage in narcotics smuggling,
The insurgency draws
heavily from groups that historically have been in-
volved in opium growing and smuggling, however, and
these groups maintain considerable autonomy as part
of the insurgent movement. In addition, numerous
other Afghans sometimes follow the mujahideen, and
many of these individuals may well grow or smuggle
opium for their personal benefit.
Outlook
We doubt that the Afghan Government will take any
action to curtail narcotics production and smuggling
given present circumstances. Kabul's preoccupation
will lie with putting down the insurgency, and not
goals.
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with stopping a thriving trade that brings hard cur-
rency and Western goods into Afghanistan. The
attitudes of the Kabul regime and its Soviet advisers
toward drug enforcement could change if they per-
ceive that drug abuse threatens the performance of
Soviet troops in.Afghanistan or that drug sales fi-
nance the insurgent movement.
The government would have difficulty curbing the
narcotics trade even if it decided to implement a
serious control program. Authorities would be able to
crack down on narcotics trafficking in and around
Kabul and the various military outposts, but this
intervention would not significantly reduce the flow of
narcotics out of Afghanistan unless accompanied by
crop eradication. Manual elimination of opium culti-
vation would first require greater government control
of the countryside, which would entail a costly mili-
tary buildup and a commitment of additional re-
sources to narcotics enforcement. Aerial spraying, the
cheapest and most effective control method, would
require planes to fly at such low altitudes that they
would be easy targets. Either method could easily be
thwarted by moving the fields into more remote and
difficult-to-locate areas, a countermeasure used with
a great deal of success in other opium-producing
countries.
In the absence of any concerted effort at narcotics
control within Afghanistan, the ability of neighboring
authorities to intensify their interdiction efforts offers
the only alternative for limiting the amount of opium
and heroin from Southwest Asia that reaches interna-
tional markets. Iran-preoccupied by the war with
Iraq and sharing a rugged, nearly 900-kilometer-long
border with Afghanistan-is not likely to be able to
check the flow of drugs moving west. Effective inter-
diction of opium and heroin moving through Pakistan
could cut Afghanistan's other principal means of
access to the international narcotics traffic. Control of
Pakistan's growing drug abuse problem offers Paki-
stani authorities some incentive to step up interdic-
tion. Although we doubt that Islamabad will move
against narcotics traffickers in the North-West Fron-
tier Province, increased enforcement efforts in Kara-
chi and Lahore could'at least limit some of the
narcotics currently reaching European and US
markets.
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