(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Directorate of
in Developing Countries
Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
A Research Paper
Sec- -
GI 85-10076
March 1985
555
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
in Developing Countries
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared b Office
of Global Issues, with the assistance of Donna
Goble, Office of Central Reference. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Instability and Insurgency Center, OGIF--~
1:7eR.
GI 85-10076
March 1985
225X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 1 March 1985
was used in this report.
Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
in Developing Countries F_
to 70 percent of all TASS correspondents are KGB.
key Third World countries.
? Placing KGB operatives overseas as "correspondents
Soviet success in establishing relationships with Third World media has
yielded substantial payoffs including:
? Significantly influencing the editorial line or placing its own stories in
more than 50 major Third World newspapers.
? Recruiting important editors, publishers, and information ministers in
veloping country media.
Media relationships are developed through one or more of the following
techniques:
? Extensive development assistance to fledgling wire services, print media,
and government information ministries.
? Journalism training for veteran and apprentice newsmen.
? Cultivating individual newsmen with cash, entertainment, scholarships,
duty-free goods, and free vacations.
? Supporting the expansion of regional wire services in South Asia, Africa,
East Asia, and Latin America.
? Maintaining visibility at UNESCO as an advocate of a larger role for de-
the Western media.
These approaches are working. The Soviet overseas media has over 260
correspondents in 71 developing countries; TASS alone has acquired 18
new clients since 1982. The Soviets' international front for journalists, in
turn, claims to have trained over 300 newspersons in recent years. Working
through UNESCO, Moscow has sponsored new regional wire services and
shifted the debate on a "new world information order" to alleged abuses of
newspaper to use TASS news items in each edition.
Soviet ability to use this influence is evidenced, in turn, by the success of
specific media placement efforts:
? The spate of reporting of US involvement in Indira Gandhi's assassina-
tion required the State Department to publicly deny any US role.
? Nigerian press reports in 1983 that the United States was intervening in
the Nigerian elections prompted the US Ambassador to protest directly
to the Soviet Ambassador in Lagos.
? Reports of alleged coup plotting by the United States in Ghana in 1984
compelled the US Embassy to issue a denial.
? The Guyanese Information Minister recently instructed the state-owned
Secret
GI 85-10076
March 1985
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Moscow's efforts have been unsuccessful in Cameroon, Colombia, Djibouti,
Liberia, Nigeria, and Zambia-countries reportedly more sensitive to
Soviet abuses of press access or concerned over Soviet media serving as ha-
vens for KGB operations.
We expect Moscow's effort to build an overseas media presence to continue
expanding. Novosti inaugurated a special wire service for developing-
country news agencies just last year. The Soviet Central Committee
considers Novosti's grant program for foreign journalists to visit the USSR
a success and plans to expand it with a larger budget. A Soviet front has
built a new school to train Latin American journalists, reflecting the high
priority Moscow has placed on Soviet media objectives in this region.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Contents
Summary
? Pattern of Coverage
Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media 3
Media Development Assistance 3
Cultivation of Journalists 6
Support for Independent Regional News Services 6
UNESCO Visibility 7
Program Effectiveness 8
Public Perceptions 10
Constraints 14
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Figure 1
TASS and Novosti News Services in Developing Countries
Afghanistan
Guinea-Bissau
Nigeria
Algeria
Guyana
Pakistan
Angola
India
Panama
Argentina
Indonesia
P.D.R.Y. (S. Yemen)
Bangladesh
I ran
Peru
Benin
Iraq
Philippines
Bolivia
Jordan
Senegal
Botswana
Kenya
Sierra Leone
Brazil
Kuwait
?I
?
Singapore
Burma
Lebanon
07
-
Sri Lanka
Cameroon
Liberia
Sudan
C.A.R. (Central Afr. Rep.)
Libya
Suriname
Colombia
Madagascar
Syria
Congo
Malaysia
Tanzania
Costa Rica
Mali
Thailand
Cyprus
Mauritania
Togo
Dominican Republic
Mauritius
Tunisia
Ecuador
Mexico
Uganda
Egypt
Morocco
Venezuela
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Y.A.R. (N. Yemen)
Gabon
Nepal
Zambia
Ghana
Nicaragua
Zimbabwe
Guinea
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
in Developing Countries
The USSR is undertaking a sustained effort to gain
access to the media of developing countries and
expects significant payoffs at relatively little cost.
Specifically, the Soviets hope their efforts will:
? Help place Soviet propaganda in host-country
media.
? Encourage anti-West coverage.
? Provide cover for KGB operations.
Pattern of Coverage
The Soviets have a substantial media presence in the
Third World-over 260 Soviet correspondents in 71
developing countries (table 1). TASS, the government
news agency, and Novosti, the Central Committee
news and features agency, have the largest represen-
tation. Eight other Soviet media organizations have
limited but direct representation in developing
country capitals (table 2).
Moscow has posted the largest number of Soviet
correspondents to Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, India,
and Peru-which together account for over one-
fourth of Soviet media representation in developing
countries:
? Eight Soviet news organizations have a total of 15
correspondents in Afghanistan. They not only pro-
vide Soviet domestic audiences with war news, but
also service Afghan media, all of which are govern-
ment controlled, with foreign news and feature
materials, according to US embassy reporting.
15 correspondents in Cairo. Within broad con-
straints, Novosti and TASS can issue press releases,
disseminate feature materials, and cultivate Egyp-
tian journalists, civic leaders, and government
officials.
? India accommodates the Soviets' largest overseas
press contingent: 18 correspondents representing at
least four news organizations. Soviet media have
developed close working relationships with Indian
wire services, urban dailies, and the vernacular
press.
? Twelve Soviet correspondents from six news agen-
cies are in Peru, a disproportionately large contin-
gent for a small country. The contingent's size is a
legacy from the period of leftist military rule (1968-
80) when friendly diplomatic relations prevailed
between Peru and the USSR, according to US
embassy reporting.
Soviet media representation in developing countries
has expanded significantly in the last 15 years. The
number of news bureaus operated by TASS in devel-
oping countries has risen from 46 in 1970 to 66 in
1985. Novosti has 47 news bureaus in those countries
compared with 16 in 1970. The Soviets now have
TASS or Novosti bureaus in 67 developing countries
altogether, 24 more than in 1970. More bureaus have
been added in Africa than in any other region,
increasing the number from 16 in 1970 to 31 in 1985.
The Soviets have added five news bureaus in Latin
America in the same period.
? Six Soviet press agencies with 15 correspondents are
resident in Algeria. Although the Algerian Govern-
ment departs substantively from Soviet views on
many international political issues, the US embassy
accounts for the large Soviet media presence by
suggesting that compatible ideologies and common
rhetoric facilitate media exchanges.
? Mubarak has allowed a sizable Soviet press contin-
gent to return-six Soviet media agencies maintain
Soviet media personnel in developing countries are
directed not only by their Moscow offices, but also by
Central Committee advisers at Soviet embassies.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Table 1
Soviet Correspondents Posted to
Developing Countries (10 Soviet Media) a
Afghanistan
15
Algeria
15
Angola
4
Argentina
1
Central African Republic
1
Chad
1
Colombia
1
Congo
2
Egypt
15
Equatorial Guinea
1
Ethiopia
6
Fiji
1
Lebanon
10
Liberia
2
Libya
2
Madagascar
4
Nicaragua
5
Nigeria
7
Pakistan
10
Panama
1
Singapore
3
Sri Lanka
2
Sudan
3
Suriname
1
Yemen, Arab Republic
2
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of
2
Zambia
4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Table 2
Soviet Overseas Media
TASS, government news
agency
90
Novosti, Central Committee's
news and features agency
55
Izvestiya, government daily
10
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star),
armed forces' daily
2
Moscow TV
6
Novoye Vremya (New Times),
Central Committee's world af-
fairs weekly
3
Pravda, Party daily
21
Radio Moscow, all union radio 14
Trud, Soviet trade unions' daily 2
Zhurnalist, Soviet journalists' 1
monthly
Unidentified media organiza- 62
tion
Developing
Countries
Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media
The Soviets are using five principal approaches to
nurture their relations with the media of developing
countries:
? Development assistance.
? Journalism training and recruitment.
? Cultivation of Soviet-friendly journalists.
? Support for independent, regional news services.
? UNESCO visibility
Media Development Assistance
The Soviets are vigorously competing with Western
media services by providing the print and broadcast
media of developing countries with services and equip-
ment at little or no cost.' In Liberia, for example, the
In addition to developing direct ties with Third
World media, the USSR publishes and broadcasts
extensively in developing countries. Novosti, by its
own account, produces 60 journals in 45 languages
along with foreign-language books and films. Over 70
percent of Soviet international radiobroadcasts, con-
ducted in 38 languages, are directed toward develop-
ing countries, principally toward East and South
Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, according
to USIA. Radio Moscow's world service in English
broadcasts 24 hours a day on all shortwave bands.
Radio stations of the Soviet Asian republics broad-
cast to the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast
Asia. Radio Peace and Progress, sponsored by the
Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace, broadcasts to
developing countries on Radio Moscow frequencies.
national news agency can subscribe to TASS for
$1,000 per year as compared with Agence France
Presse for $23,000 per year, according to USIS.
TASS pronouncements and US embassy reporting
indicate that the standard TASS aid package for
developing-country news agencies currently includes:
? A subscription to TASS world or regional news
service.
? Installation of radio receivers and radio
photocopiers.
? Maintenance and spare parts provided by TASS
engineers.
? Journalism training for news agency personnel. F
underwritten by Moscow.
The Soviets subsidize the entire package, and negoti-
ate a formal aid agreement with the client, either
through TASS representatives or the Soviet Ambas-
sador. The agreement usually leads to an exchange of
correspondents between capitals, with the cost of a
client news agency's Moscow bureau, in some cases,
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
The KGB has co-opted Soviet overseas media offices
either by placing its own people with journalist cover
or by requiring the cooperation of legitimate Soviet
journalists.
KGB officials use their journalist cover to access
political leaders in developing countries, recruit
agents in the government and media, and promote
Soviet perspectives of international political issues. A
veteran journalist observes that many legitimate So-
viet journalists are posted to obscure capitals of little
news value to service KGB disinformation require-
ments.
Most commonly, the KGB uses TASS, Novosti, and
Novoye Vremya (New Times).
portedly is a preferred KGB cover, possibly because
TASS does not require correspondents to byline
stories, a practice enabling the lack of journalistic
productivity by KGB "correspondents" to go unob-
served.
KGB both at the managerial level in Moscow and at
foreign news bureaus in the field.
TASS has negotiated news exchange agreements with
71 developing countries, 18 just since 1982, the UK
Foreign Office reports. The July 1984 agreement with
Sierra Leone is typical. According to US embassy
reporting, TASS agreed to provide its English-
language African news service to the Ministry of
Information in Freetown and to furnish free radio
receiving equipment. The Soviet State Committee for
Vocational Training will train an unspecified number
of Sierra Leone journalists in the USSR.
All Novosti
personnel in a news bureau, if not KGB themselves,
are expected to facilitate KGB recruitment efforts,
The KGB originally staffed Novoye Vremya overseas
bureaus in their entirety. In the 1970s the Central
Committee posted some legitimate journalists to
The KGB also uses the foreign news bureau of
Izvestiya, Trud, and Soviet radio for cover, although
not as extensively as it uses TASS and Novosti. It
does not use Soviet TV because Soviet TV correspon-
dents'faces are well known by television audiences in
the USSR, and these correspondents must be techni-
cally proficient in electronics. It rarely uses Pravda to
avoid embarrassment to the party in the event of
exposure
Journalism Training and Recruitment
Extensive training programs for developing-country
journalists teach the Soviet model of journalism-
serving state interests, politicizing the news, and
expecting an ideological commitment from journal-
ists. One program is administered by Soviet embas-
sies, which offer scholarships for journalism studies in
the USSR. Nominations are made by Ministries of
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Figure 2. IOJ training forjour-
nalists of developing countries
attending the Werner Lamberz
Institute in East Berlin
Education. The Soviet Government pays all expenses
except transportation, which the Ministries are ex-
pected to sponsor, according to US embassy reporting.
Another program is contained in the TASS media aid
package. US embassies also report a third program of
short-term training in developing countries for jour-
nalists in print media and electronic journalism. F_
The Soviets also use the International Organization of
Journalists (IOJ) to train developing-country journal-
ists. The IOJ has five schools in the Eastern Bloc and
Cuba:
? The IOJ Center of Professional Education of Jour-
nalists in Budapest for radio and television
journalists.
? The Werner Lamberz Institute in East Berlin for
print media journalists.
? The Georji Dimitrov International Institute of Jour-
nalists in Sofia for journalists in economic and
agricultural reporting.
? The Julius Fucik School of Solidarity in Prague for
newscasters.
? The Jose Marti International Institute of Journal-
ism in Havana for apprentice journalists.
The IOJ also operates a cooperative program with a
journalism school in Bucharest and a training center
for Arab journalists in Baghdad.
The IOJ further attempts to cultivate media organiza-
tions and Ministries of Information directly through
"world conferences" attended by editors, publishers,
heads of news agencies, radio station managers, and
ministers of information. These meetings publicize
Soviet policies on world issues and promote the Soviet
model of journalism with an elite media audience.
The conferences also help the IOJ Secretariat make
contacts, possibly leading to TASS development assis-
tance, Novosti influence in the local media, or candi-
date students for IOJ schools.
Nationals of 90 developing countries responded to IOJ
invitations to the most recent conference cosponsored
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
How the IOJ Attempts To Influence
Third World Journalists
Geza Rybka, Director of the IOJ Center in Budapest,
describes the Center's methodfor posing Soviet news
stories as alternatives to Western news reports, in
e, fect placing propaganda on a par with news:
Every student knows that there are four or five big
news agencies that have monopolized the news flow
all over the world. The students are usually aware
of the fact that, until now, especially in foreign
matters, they used to think the way UPI or Reuters
thought. We simply try to open their eyes to the
fact that there is another side to the story, there are
other parts of the world, and that there are also
other sources of information in the world that one
can use for journalistic work.
The teacher tries to suggest ideas like this:
Did you hear a week ago what BBC said? And do
you know what TASS wrote then? Try to compare
it all-and you will get a basis for writing a good
article.
We introduced a new practice recently that every
day the students listen alternately to Radio Mos-
cow and BBC news. They compare the two, draw
their own conclusions, and then report on some
internationally important subject.
So we try very tactfully, if I may say so, but very
honestly to explain to students that a new informa-
tion order is necessary and that it means also not
accepting one agency exclusively as a source of
information.
The Democratic Journalist
April 1984
with the North Korean Journalists' Union in 1983,
the "World Conference of Journalists Against Imperi-
alism and for Friendship and Peace" in P'yongyang,
North Korea. The Pyongyang Times reported a large
attendance from developing countries represented by:
? Thirty-one dailies and weeklies.
? Nine news agencies.
? Twenty-two Ministries of Information.
? Twenty-eight radio stations, publishing houses, in-
stitutes of journalism, and universities.
Cultivation of Journalists
The Soviets take pains to follow up the ties developed
in training programs and otherwise ensure that
Soviet-supplied news is actually placed in the print
media of developing countries and, where possible, in
the broadcast media.
Novosti correspondents pay salaries or subsidize vaca-
tions, cars, or duty-free goods to induce reporters,
editors, or publishers to print unattributed stories and
features favorable to Soviet points of view. The
Soviets also attempt to dissuade news agency editors
from using Western wire service releases.
The Novosti grant program for foreign journalists
subsidizes two- or three-week visits to the USSR. The
Novosti overseas correspondents who administer the
program invite relatively young influential journalists,
politicians, and artists who could not be considered
While in the USSR, grantees meet selected
Soviet Government officials and are entertained lav-
ishly. They travel to Moscow, Leningrad, and another
Soviet republic. Not extracting any firm commit-
ments, Novosti nevertheless reportedly expects grant
recipients to take away a more favorable impression of
the USSR.
Support for Independent Regional News Services
Moscow has also supported regional news agencies in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America for displacing the
Western press. Soviet media endorsed the appearance
of the nonaligned news agency pool in 1976 (now
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Figure 3. Opening of the IOJ
Forum for Peace in Paris on
thefifth anniversary of the
UNESCO Declaration on Mass
Media. From left to right,
Kaarle Nordenstreng, IOJ pres-
ident; Jiri Kubka, Secretary
General; and Gerard Gatinot,
called NAMEDIA), the Pan African News Agency
(PANA) in 1979, the Organization of Asian News
Agencies (OANA) in 1981, and the Latin American
Agency for Special Information Services (ALASEI) in
1983. The IOJ endorsed the Association of ASEAN
News Agencies as well. Moscow News, a Novosti
publication, alleges that these regional news services
are "breaking the monopoly" of the "big four" West-
ern wire services.
The Soviets offer substantial material aid to the
nonaligned news agencies. TASS provides communi-
cation links to NAMEDIA and OANA. The PANA
director general, having heard of TASS aid deliveries
to other African news agencies, probably neighboring
Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, reportedly hopes
that TASS will provide news services and office
equipment to his agency,
Soviet fronts are directly involved in establishing some
of these agencies. For example, the Federation of
Latin American Newsmen (FELAP), regional affili-
ate of the IOJ
Mexico City. ALASEI currently has contracted with
19 Latin American newspapers and news agencies to
provide news services and information.
UNESCO Visibility
The Soviets have used UNESCO to demonstrate their
support for the aspirations of developing countries in
the media field.' Specifically, the Soviets have pro-
moted their model of journalism at UNESCO, at- 25X1
tempted to discredit Western media, and cultivated
the caucuses of developing countries that parallel
their views, according to US embassy reporting[ 25X1
Moscow regards UNESCO as one of its most impor-
tant ideological targets,
The Soviet delegation, in observing an
exponential growth of the UNESCO publications
mation services as a vehicle for disseminating Soviet 25X1
budget in recent years, targeted the UNESCO infor-
2 UNESCO sets standards and guidelines for the development of
new media organizations in developing countries, funds confer-
ences, and publishes studies and reports, several of which recently
have encouraged realignment of world news production and dissem-
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
propaganda to developing countries
In 1972 the Soviets were the first to propose a so-
called New World Information and Communication
Order (NWICO) in a UNESCO General Conference.
NWICO, as defined in UNESCO studies, would
require governments to take responsibility for news
printed or broadcast on their territory which, in turn,
would lead to licensing journalists working in their
countries. Under NWICO, journalists would be guid-
ed by codes of conduct prohibiting stories offensive to
host governments.
UNESCO's International Program for Development
of Communications (IPDC) is particularly important
to the Soviets. TASS Deputy Director Geperal Krasi-
kov, in a 1983 Pravda article, stated that the IPDC is
useful to them for monitoring mass media in develop-
ing countries as well as the alleged intrusion of the
Western press in those countries, for helping to shape
developing countries' information policies, influencing
the allocation of multilateral aid, and creating a "new
world media order" on an "anti-imperialistic founda-
tion." IPDC provides seed money for developing news
agencies at the regional level. Both NAMEDIA and
PANA are partially funded by UNESCO. USIS
reporting indicates that, aside from subscribers
UNESCO currently is PANA's only patron
Program Effectiveness
The Soviets' methods and approaches for acquiring
access to local media in the developing world have
proved effective. In the formal aid agreements of
1984, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau agreed to
restrict Western wire service reporting on the Soviet
Union in favor of TASS reporting on the subject.
Guyana and Suriname, additional aid recipients, have
experienced a noticeable increase in the volume of
Soviet press material appearing in local print and
broadcast media, according to US embassy reporting.
TASS's offers of a world news service at little or no
cost have been particularly successful in Africa in
cases where media cannot afford the cost or do not
have the foreign exchange for a Western wire service.
USIS reporting indicates that a considerable portion
of African print media, as well as a few radio stations,
use TASS in combination with Western services. F_
State Department and USIS
post observers suggest the Soviets can place stories in
more than 50 non-Communist dailies and weeklies in
developing countries. These outlets range from leftist
newspapers in Mexico City, El Dia (circulation
75,000) and Uno Mas Uno (circulation 70,000), used
occasionally, to the pro-Soviet, Indian newspaper
Blitz (circulation 350,000) and the magazine Link
(circulation 12,000), used frequently (see table 3).
Some are published by national liberation fronts.
Several print Eastern Bloc and Cuban material as
well as Soviet. The Soviets have access to all of these
by having cultivated individual journalists who usual-
ly print what is asked of them
Soviet recruitment of individual senior journalists has
enlisted some important people:
? Bargis Hamud Bargis, Director General of the
Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), works closely with
the KGB resident in Kuwait, the US embassy
reports. He supported the Soviet position in the
international debate over the US embargo of the
1980 Moscow Olympics, arguing, for example, that
the Soviets, by contrast with the United States,
never mix politics with sports. His agency is influen-
tial in the Gulf states as a news source: USIS
reporting from Bahrain indicates that KUNA's
Moscow bureau often carries Soviet stories that
circulate in the Gulf.
? Yvonne Harewood-Benn, Minister of Public Service
and Information in Guyana, has instructed editors
of the state-owned Guyana Chronicle, the country's
only daily, to use at least three or four TASS and
Cuban Prensa Latina news items in each edition,
allegedly to balance AP reports. She has apparently
also urged the editors to use AP for "disaster news"
or for quoting critics of US foreign policy, according
to US embassy reporting.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Table 3
Pro-Soviet Print Media in Developing Countries
and Estimated Circulation a
Bahrain
Al-Faqir
Malaysia
Chung Kuo Pao
Al-Jamahir
Al-Shabiba
Al-Sharara
Mali
L'Essor
Bangladesh
Mauritius
Horizons Nouveaux
4
500
Gonokantha
5
000
,
,
Nouveau Militant
10
000 to 15
000
Sangbad
30,000
,
,
Brazil
Mexico
El Dia
75
000
Correio Brasilense
El Nacional
,
80,000
Cameroon
El Sol de Mexico
95,000
Cameroon Tribune
El Universal
200,000
Cyprus
Excelsior
184,000
Ta Nea
Uno Mas Uno
70,000
Dominican Republic
La Noticia
Nepal
Naya Samaf
3,000
Samaya
18
000
Ecuador
The Commoner
,
7
000
Periodico Del Mediodia
Siempre Nueva
Nicaragua
,
Ghana
Barricada
Ghanaian Times
150,000
Peru
Independent Echo
30,000
El Diario de Marka
90,000
People's Evening News
40,000
El Observador
100,000
La Republica
200
000
Guyana
Chronicle
Cartel
,
10,000 initially
India
Philippines
Business Day
31
000
Blitz
350,000
Evening Post
,
70
000
Bombay Daily
140,000
,
Business Standard
21,000
Seychelles
Hindustan Times
250,000
Nation
Link
12,000
Sierra Leone
News Today
Patriot
NA
34,000
For Di People
New Times
RaJasthagPatrika
120,000
Syria
Statesman
220,000
Al Ba'th
25
000
Indonesia
Tishrin
,
35,000
Merdeka
Tanzania
Jordan
Daily News
39,000
Ad-Dustur
Uhuru
100,000
a Excluding pro-Soviet Communist Party and "vanguard" ruling
revolutionary party publications.
Source: The Europa Yearbook, 1983.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Figure 4. Bargis Hamud
Bargis, Director General, Ku-
? Aruna Asaf Ali, editorial board chairman of the
Indian newspaper, Patriot, is closely associated with
the Soviets in New Delhi. In December 1984 she
reportedly collaborated with them in publishing
articles on the Hardgrave Study, allegedly a "se-
cret" study by a US academic on the future of India
without Indira Gandhi, completed eight weeks be-
fore the assassination. Publication of the articles is
part of recent Soviet disinformation efforts to impli-
cate the United States in Gandhi's death.
? Ahmedul Kabir, owner and editor of the Bangla-
desh daily, Sangbad, reportedly has acquired a
fortune through lucrative business contracts with
the USSR. He follows Moscow's media line includ-
ing the Gandhi assassination disinformation. Sang-
bad is a daily supporting the political left in
Bangladesh.
? Junius Lubis, the pro-Soviet managing editor of
Merdeka (circulation 130,000), an Indonesian daily,
recently reacquired this position after being relieved
of it in the early 1980s when he was accused of
accepting fees for placing Soviet stories in the paper.
The paper itself has a history of financial problems,
relieved in the 1970s by a loan from the Moscow
Narodny bank in Singapore.
The Soviets have helped to shape the UNESCO
debate over realignment of international news services
to focus almost exclusively on the alleged "colonial
mentality" and "disaster news" orientation of the
Western media and diverted attention from their own
politicized, censored press. Successive Soviet draft
resolutions at UNESCO General Conferences appeal
Figure 5. Yvonne Harewood-
Benn, Minister of Public Ser-
vice and Information, Guyana
to the pride of developing countries in establishing
independent news agencies. Since several delegations
represent governments that exercise political control
over their domestic media, the Soviet resolutions,
coupled with active lobbying in the corridors, win
support, according to US embassy sources.
25X1
Public Perceptions
In terms of effectiveness with respect to a particular
country, one of the clearest payoffs for the Soviets is
Peru. US embassy reporting indicates noticeable Sovi-
et access to the Peruvian media. The Soviets have
invested heavily in Peru; they have 12 correspondents
from Soviet print media, radio, and television in Lima
in addition to a large Novosti bureau, said to be their
best in Latin America. They entertain local journal-
ists regularly and offer them "fees" to use Soviet
stories and features. They are particularly influential
in three Lima dailies and a weekly, all of which are
financed by a Peruvian construction entrepreneur
friendly to the Soviets:
? El Diario de Marka. Although editorially indepen-
dent as a leftist paper, it is the most outspoken and
effective anti-US element in the Peruvian news
media and consistently supports Soviet propaganda
themes in its news coverage.
the paper is not doing well financially
? El Observador. The Novosti bureau gave it special
attention during a period of financial difficulty in
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
1983, providing free East German newsprint and
cash channeled through Bulgarian intermediaries
the paper reciprocated with blatantly pro-Soviet
stories. The director of the paper previously worked
at IOJ headquarters in Prague.
? La Republica. It frequently publishes pro-Soviet
stories and is the most widely read daily in Peru, the
US embassy reports. The same Peruvian magnate
reportedly asked the Soviet Ambassador for finan-
cial assistance to purchase additional shares of La
Republica stock, however, to allow him to preserve a
particularly leftist editorial line.
? Cartel. It has a hardline, pro-Soviet orientation and
is intended to answer Caaretas, a popular non-
Communist Peruvian weekly
It draws on Novosti telex services and
specially written stories for weekly publication.
Writers cultivated through the Soviet-Peru Cultural
Association publish anti-US features.
The Soviets have been successful in Congo. During
the 12 years when the United States had no diplomat-
ic relations with Congo, 1965-77, Soviet and Eastern
Bloc access to the Congolese media grew noticeably,
according to the US Embassy. Currently, Congolese
journalists accept IOJ scholarships to the East Berlin
school for print media journalists, East German jour-
nalists conduct seminars for them in Congo, and the
Ministry of Information employs Soviet media advis-
ers. The national news agency subscribes to TASS
and ADN, the East German news service. Coverage
of US social issues and foreign policy is highly
selective and critical. French satellite TV news and
nearby Zairean programing help correct the Soviet
version of world news, but Congolese print media
frequently use Soviet stories.
USIS post observer reporting suggests several other
Soviet successes:
? The Botswana news agency used free TASS stories
to reduce operating costs.
The Soviets have relatively greater access to print
media than to radio and TV in developing countries.
Host governments tend to treat radio and TV as more
valuable political resources and reserve them for
their own use. Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the
United Arab Emirates, for example, ban Soviet me-
dia from using their radio and TV but will allow
them to print stories in local newspapers. African
countries generally have the same attitude. In India,
the Soviets can access the independent print media
more handily than they can access government-
controlled radio and TV. However, a few countries
are exceptions: Syria and North Yemen allow the
Soviets access to all media; both countries take direct
news feed from Soviet TV. Radio Mali and Burundi 25X1
radio also accept stories and features from resident 25X1
Soviet correspondents. 25X1
The Soviets do not seem to try as hard with TV as
with radio. They have more competition on TV from 25X1
American entertainment programing and, in Africa,
from the French overseas news service. TV audiences
are smaller than radio audiences (with the exception
of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Libya, Ma-
laysia, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which have more
TV sets than radios: see table 4). Soviet media
agencies have relatively greater access in a few
countries with radio than with TV, except possibly
Syria and North Yemen.
? TASS provides Shihata, the Tanzanian news
agency, with its world news service at a concession-
ary price, which, together with the political inclina-
tions of editors, produces more news of Soviet origin
than Reuters-origin appearing in the press. 25X1
? Soviet-attributed advertisements in daily papers
have increased both in Costa Rica and Ecuador,
which, in the post observers' judgment, affects
public opinion toward US Central American
policies.
? Radio Mali, the country's only station, takes stories
directly from the resident Radio Moscow correspon-
dent with what observers report is a significant
impact on listeners.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Table 4
Radios and TVs in Developing Countries a
Angola
130
22
Benin
68
13
Botswana
75
NA
Central African Republic
85
NA
Chad
75
NA
Congo
96
5
Djibouti
18
11
Ethiopia
2,000
36
Gabon
100
20
Gambia, The
100
NA
Ghana
2,000
71
Guinea
125
8
Guinea-Bissau
20
NA
Ivory Coast
800
562
Kenya
580
75
Liberia
330
35
Madagascar
910
71
Malawi
500
NA
Mali
102
NA
Mozambique
275
1
Niger
160
11
Nigeria
5,800
457
Senegal
320
50
Sierra Leone
100
21
Somalia
95
NA
Sudan
1,400
109
Tanzania
2,000
9
Togo
190
8
Uganda
280
75
Zaire
500
12
Zambia
150
76
Afghanistan
135
13
Bangladesh
770
252
Bhutan
12
NA
Brunei
50
30
India
22,000 b
2,095
Indonesia
6,550
3,000
Laos
225
NA
Nepal
300
NA
Pakistan
1,500
1,000
Philippines
2,185
955
Singapore
490
421
Sri Lanka
3,000
50
Thailand
7,200
3,000
Caribbean, Mexico, Central and
South America
Argentina
10,000
5,910
Bahamas, The
115
50
Barbados
191
52
Belize
71
NA
Bolivia
480
386
Brazil
17,500
12,425
Chile
3,250
2,643
Colombia
3,025
1,800
Costa Rica
190
450
Dominican Republic
225
388
Ecuador
1,800
135
El Salvador
900
300
French Guiana
40
10
Grenada
50
NA
Guatemala
500
202
Guyana
300
NA
Haiti
120
30
Honduras
1,535
135
Jamaica
857
200
Mexico
21,000
7,550
Netherlands Antilles
175
57
Nicaragua
200
127
Panama
290
227
198
81
2,200
860
90
3
185
3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Table 4 Thousands
Radios and TVs in Developing Countries a (continued)
the Philippine press
The Soviets have excellent access to the non-Commu-
nist print media and news agencies of India. The
Radio TV vernacular-language press is particularly vulnerable
to Soviet influence because many of the papers are
Caribbean, Mexico, Central and resource poor. The Soviets provide them with cash,
South America (continued) entertainment, and paid advertisements from Indian
Trinidad and Tobago 355 300 firms trading with the USSR. Other forms of induce-
Uruguay 1,655 368 ment include scholarships to sons and daughters of
Venezuela 5,000 2,000 low-ranking journalists for study in the USSR, prom-
Middle East and North Africa ises of better paying jobs through Soviet and Commu-
Algeria 3,500 1,325 nist Party contacts in India, and regular supplies of
Egypt 8,000 3,850 The Indian wire service, Press Trust of India (PTI),
Iran 7,500 2,000 has been called Press TASS of India because of
Iraq 2,200 535 closeness with TASS both in Moscow and New Delhi
Israel 1,050 600 as well as frequent association with Soviet disinforma-
Jordan 546 201 tion. US embassy reporting indicates that a number of
Kuwait 710 575 pro-Soviet journalists are present in PTI. Another
Lebanon 1,500 450 wire service, India Press Agency (IPA), specializing in
Libya 165 170 news features, frequently conveys Soviet disinforma-
Oman 250 45 tion. IPA is managed and staffed with journalists
Qatar 75 110 trained at Link and Patriot, two pro-Soviet publica-
Bahrain 140 121 scotch, according to embassy reporting.
Cyprus 400 111
Syria 1,800 405
1,124 291
In part because of the Soviets' co-opting some devel-
United Arab Emirates 100 100 oping country media, US Government agencies as
Yemen Arab Republic 110 27 well as private-sector firms face an increasingly hos-
Yemen, People's Democratic 111 37 tile press in developing countries in which the Soviets
a Estimated by World Radio TV Handbook, 1984.
b Handbook figure may be low because of the absence of an official
Government of India statistic.
? TASS and Novosti have close ties with the Syrian
media which allow prominent play for Soviet stories,
usually attacks on US Middle East policies,
? The pro-Soviet bias of North Yemeni editors,
trained via scholarships to schools in the USSR,
enables TASS to make front page news and
commentary.
have created working relationships with local and
national media. India, particularly, has many newspa-
pers hostile toward the United States editorially. The
Soviet-aided print media of Congo-Brazzaville have
produced distorted reporting about the United States
for several years with the result that the Congolese
public does not have an accurate or balanced under-
standing of US domestic or foreign policies, the US
Embassy reports.
The Western wire services are experiencing rising
competition from TASS in developing countries.
Comparative costs of a subsidized service versus a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
25X1
LOA-1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Moscow's effort to access the media in developing
countries directly competes with the "big jour" West-
ern wire services which, until the 1970s, were the sole
source of foreign news for many such countries. The
Associated Press (AP), in New York; United Press
International (UPI), in Washington; Reuters, in Lon-
don; and Agence France Presse (AFP), in Paris, have
news bureaus in over 100 developing countries and
are highly competitive. All but government-owned
AFP are owned by cooperative press associations.
The Soviets also compete with the Chinese agency,
Xinhua, in several African and Asian countries and
with the Yugoslav news service, Tanjug, which is
influential in nonaligned regional news services.=
service at market prices are a disincentive for develop-
ing news agencies to use the Western wire services.
The differential assures TASS of access to new
clients. The Western wire services usually require
payments in hard currency, which many developing
countries lack
Constraints
The Soviets, however, have not had easy access to all
developing-country media. Some countries have taken
reprisals against the Soviet overseas media for fla-
grant abuses of their trade:
? Zambia initially tolerated a Novosti correspondent's
behavior in Lusaka in the late 1970s. He took a
high-visibility approach in propagandizing Zambi-
ans by mailing Soviet publications to educational
institutions, holding lectures and discussions on
Soviet propaganda themes, and instructing Soviet
teachers in Zambian schools. He gave SWAPO and
African National Congress offices in Lusaka type-
writers, copiers, and editorial assistance for their
monthly newsletters. Finally, Zambian authorities
accused him of instigating student demonstrations
at the University of Zambia, and expelled him,
? Cameroon limits importation of Soviet propaganda
material, but the Novosti office smuggled Soviet
magazines into the country via Aeroflot in disregard
of Cameroonian regulations. In 1978, when Aeroflot
delivered magazines in cartons marked "pharma-
ceuticals," the Cameroon customs service confiscat-
ed them, severely criticized the Soviets, and warned
In addition, policy differences with host governments
may limit Soviet media activity. In 1980, following
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan forced
the Soviets to close their Karachi information office,
the US Embassy reported. Further, the Soviets some-
times impede their own efforts with bureaucratic
inertia. Nigeria recently abrogated a news exchange
agreement with TASS because of Soviet bureaucratic
delays in opening a Nigerian news agency bureau in
Moscow.
The reputation TASS and Novosti have as havens for
KGB operations precedes them in some countries:
the government in May 1984,
? Djibouti studiously ignored the TASS media aid
package when the Soviet Ambassador offered it to
? Jamaica refused to allow TASS to establish an
office in 1979 based on its belief that the designated
chief was KGB,
? Mauritius refused TASS facilities in 1980 when the
Soviet Ambassador requested them, according to
US embassy reporting.
Another limiting factor on the Soviets' ability to
influence developing media is a lack of commitment
by some journalists whom they have attempted to
cultivate. Some of the senior journalists whom IOJ
has entertained at its "world conferences" may have
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
accepted invitations simply to take advantage of the
free airfare and accommodations. The Malian vice
president of IOJ, for example, not only attended the
P'yongyang conference in 1983, but also has accepted
USIA travel grants, the US embassy reports. Similar-
ly, trainees who enroll in IOJ or USSR schools for an
education in journalism may be there because they
lacked other scholarship options.
We fully expect the Soviets to continue to increase
their media presence in developing countries:
? TASS gained four new clients in 1984 for media
development assistance and almost certainly will
solicit additional ones in 1985.
? The Novosti visitor program for developing-country
journalists will expand under the patronage of the
Soviet Central Committee.
? Novosti has a new wire service, dedicated to devel-
oping-country news agencies, inaugurated in 1983.
? IOJ programs appear to be slated for expansion; the
Havana school, in particular, will increase the num-
ber of its Latin American students; IOJ African
members are lobbying for a new IOJ school in
Africa,
The Soviet effort occurs when several governments of
developing countries are independently creating ob-
stacles for Western reporters in their countries. Chad,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda, and Zambia
have denied visas to Western reporters assigned to
cover wars, coups, or economic conditions in their
countries within the last year, according to the West-
ern press. If reporters are allowed entry, they are
closely monitored. For example, Iraqi taxi drivers,
working for the Information Ministry, have prevented
Western press photographers from taking pictures of
economic conditions suggesting poverty or backward-
ness in Iraq. Iraq also has confiscated foreign journa-
lists' typewriters at the airport. Western reporters'
access to several African countries is encumbered
with lengthy visa hassles. Latin American countries
remain relatively open to the Western media, al-
though Brazil, Costa Rica, and Ecuador require for-
eign reporters to register with government-sponsored
journalists' organizations. Under these conditions, the
Soviet effort creates additional obstacles for Western
media access.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
 Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6