SOVIET ARMS: THE THIRD WORLD ATTRACTION AND SOVIET BENEFITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00586R000100110007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Soviet Benefits
Secret
Soviet Arms: The
Third World Attraction and
A Resareb Paper
001 /150/00 A O/OO?999b
CUNIROL BRANCH/CPAy/PUG/IMC
RUUM ?G0? HQS
_ OC -k L u l-it?i~t t tTS --- -
Secret
61 85-10028
February 1985
X485
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Benefits
Soviet Arms: The
Third World Attraction and
Office of Global Issues. Major contributions were
This paper was prepared by
made by
Office of Global Issues, and
of Soviet Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, OGI, on
Secret
GI 85-10028
February 1985
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Summary
Information available
as of 10 January 1985
was used in this report.
Soviet Benefits
Soviet Arms: The
Third World Attraction and
By all estimates Moscow will continue to rely heavily on arms sales and as-
sociated military training programs to expand its influence within the
Third World. The degree to which the USSR will be able to cultivate new
clients remains, however, at issue. To gain additional insight into the
potential for continued Soviet inroads into the Third World on the basis of
its arms sales program, we conducted a detailed survey of the reasons for
Soviet arms sales successes and attendant gains in influence during the past
decade.
The 16 countries we examined developed a dependency on the USSR and
its allies for arms because:
? Moscow was willing to provide the desired hardware and training quickly
and at low cost.
? The recipient had political or ideological ties to the USSR or Cuba.
? The recipient was either rebuffed in its efforts to purchase arms from the
West or assumed Western suppliers would reject an arms request
outright.
Not surprisingly, our survey pointed up several important Soviet gains
resulting from arms sales successes:
? Regimes friendly to the USSR survived in the face of foreign or domestic
military challenges.
? Numerous opportunities to penetrate the LDCs' political and military
establishments developed through Soviet Bloc military advisers and
through the training of large numbers of LDC personnel in Bloc nations.
? Seven of the 16 LDCs granted the Soviets access to their airfields and
port facilities.
? The new arms recipients demonstrated increased support for Soviet
foreign policy positions in international organizations and through other
diplomatic channels.
? Sizable amounts of hard currency flowed into the USSR.
Moscow appears, however, to have established few commercial or ideologi-
cal links to these Third World governments as a result of arms transfers.
The civil aviation and fishing agreements signed with the 16 arms clients
do not differ significantly from agreements signed with other LDCs. In
addition, all of the LDCs for which the Bloc has been the principal arms
supplier continue to trade with and receive economic assistance from
Western governments. Moreover, we are not aware of any instance where a
nonaligned regime has changed its ideological orientation because it
obtained arms from the Soviet Bloc.
Secret
GI 85-10028
February 1985
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Although we believe Third World countries will continue to seek arms for
the same reasons that have motivated them to do so in the past, several fac-
tors are likely to combine to preclude Soviet transfers from matching the
pace and scope of the 1970s:
? Many regimes will prefer the United States or West European govern-
ments as their arms suppliers, based on the mutual interests that have de-
veloped as a result of their political, economic, and ideological ties to the
Western democracies.
? The more aggressive arms sales policies of traditional Western arms
suppliers, China, and new Third World suppliers-such as Brazil-are
also likely to cut into Soviet sales. In the past several years, these
suppliers have become more competitive, primarily by offering more
advanced weapon systems and relaxing political and ideological restric-
tions as well as technology controls on sales to LDCs. The West
European governments, in particular, are providing attractive financing
packages and offset arrangements.
? In addition, the lack of hard currency in an increasing number of Third
World countries probably will dampen the growth of Soviet arms sales.
We believe, nonetheless, that the USSR's perception that it can achieve
strategic and political gains in the Third World through arms transfers
will remain the key determinant in any decision to supply arms. Despite
Moscow's desire to maximize hard currency earnings wherever possible,
we believe it will continue to offer concessionary terms to sustain arms
relationships with favored clients and to develop key new clients in the
Third World.
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Summary
Scope Note
Basic Tenets of Soviet Arms Transfer Policy
1
Rationale for Seeking Arms From the Soviet Bloc
2
Political and Ideological Ties
2
Survival of Pro-Soviet Regimes
6
Foreign Policy Support
10
Ideological and Organizational Ties
12
USSR, Warsaw Pact Members, and Cuba: Major Military Equipment
Deliveries, 1974-83
17
1. Rationale for Acquiring Arms
2. Rationale for Seeking Soviet Bloc Arms
3. Soviet Bloc Gains From Arms Sales, 1974-84
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Scope Note This Research Paper is one in a series that examines various aspects of So-
viet and other Communist country programs that contribute to Communist
penetration of the Third World. By surveying those countries that have
become dependent upon Soviet arms over the past decade, it seeks to
identify and rank the reasons for Soviet arms successes as well as the
nature and degree of influence Moscow has gained as a result.
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Soviet Arms: The
Third World Attraction and
Soviet Benefits
This assessment focuses on 16 non-Communist LDCs,
most of them located in Sub-Saharan Africa, that
have developed major arms relationships with the
Soviet Bloc-the USSR, its East European allies, and
Cuba-since 1974 (figure 4).' In particular, we ana-
lyze the reasons why these countries have looked to
the Soviet Bloc for arms instead of to the United
States and Western Europe. We also discuss how
Moscow has benefited from these arms relationships
and assess its ability to acquire additional clients over
the next decade.
make value judgments, especially in assessing why
LDCs acquired Soviet Bloc arms and what gains the
Soviets have achieved in their role as principal arms
supplier. This analysis is intended to provide a broad,
rather than a comprehensive, evaluation of Soviet
Bloc arms sales to the Third World, and the ultimate
impact of some gains-such as the acquisition of
specific intelligence assets-is not considered. F--~
Basic Tenets of Soviet Arms Transfer Policy
The USSR's arms transfer program is but one of a
broad range of political, economic, and military tools
the Soviets have used to support their foreign policy
objectives in the Third World. While the nature and
' This analysis excludes LDCs--such as Jordan and Kuwait-that
have received Soviet Bloc arms but do not depend on the Bloc as
their principal source of supply; the Soviets have obtained some
gains in those LDCs as well. The USSR has been the dominant
arms supplier to LDCs, but East European governments and Cuba
have played an important role complementing Soviet sales. Viet-
nam's arms relationships with Laos and Cambodia are excluded
from this analysis because Hanoi's domination of these two neigh-
bors provides ample explanation for its position as their principal
arms supplier; arms sales by North Korea also are excluded because
of its lack of coordinated goals with the USSR and its relatively
relative importance of Soviet objectives vary from
region to region, we believe that Moscow generally
perceives the Third World in terms of an East-West
superpower rivalry. The Soviets are interested primar-
ily in developing links to LDCs that will bolster their
position as a global power and pose new threats to US
and West European interests. Specifically, Moscow
wants to acquire:
? Access to military facilities that will serve to pro-
mote Soviet foreign policy goals, especially in crises
or hostilities.
? Political support in international forums for Soviet
foreign policy positions.
? Hard currency earnings.
Arms transfers have been one of the USSR's most
effective tools for expanding Soviet influence in the
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Third World. The Soviets developed their first arms 25X1
clients in the late 1950s and early 1960s by exploiting
Arab-Israeli tension, Yemen's conflict with Britain
over Aden, and the Indo-Pakistani crisis. They offered
arms and other military materiel to almost any LDC
at low prices and with exceptionally generous repay-
ment terms. They also provided rapid delivery and
free training and maintenance. By the mid-1960s, the
annual value of the Soviet program had reached about 25X1
$500 million, with most military assistance going to
Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Afghanistan.
In the early 1970s, Moscow's growing emphasis on
hard currency earnings supplemented its quest for
political and military advantage over the West. The
new oil-based wealth of key clients in the Middle East
and North Africa led the Soviets to toughen the terms
of its military assistance-a policy they could enforce
because comparable Western support invariably was
more expensive. Continuing tensions in those regions,
along with increasingly active nationalist movements
and revolutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, broadened the
opportunities for Moscow to sell arms to the Third
World. Moscow usually was willing and able to
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Two primary factors motivated the 16 LDCs we
examined to seek arms (figure 1). In six of the 16
cases, hostile relations with one or two neighboring
countries was the primary motivation. Fear of a
rebellion by dissidents, exiles supported by other
governments, or mercenaries was the major precipi-
tant in six other instances. Other reasons we noted
were:
? The threatened overthrow of the regime by an
insurgency.
? The postindependence desire to establish a conven-
tional military force.
? The ambition to acquire greater regional influence
and international prestige.
? The desire to increase military aid to national
liberation movements.
Whereas most of the 16 LDCs had several reasons for
seeking armaments, in six cases only one factor was
significant. Benin, Madagascar, and Seychelles
feared unrest from dissidents or exiles. In Cape
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe,
newly independent regimes wanted to establish armed
forces, although they faced no specific external
threat.
than those demanded by non-Communist suppliers,
and the USSR was a dependable supplier: 2
? Moscow replaced China as principal supplier to
Mozambique and Tanzania in the mid-1970s by
providing weapon systems that the Chinese could
not or would not agree to sell.
? The USSR became Libya's principal arms supplier
in 1974 when the Soviets outbid the French with an
arms package that offered more weapons at less
cost.
? The Soviets also agreed, albeit reluctantly at times,
to satisfy Angolan requests for additional advisers
and more equipment to counter the growing military
threat posed by the insurgent National Union for
the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and by
South Africa.
The Soviets also have been quick to offer attractive
arms packages to Third World countries after the
West had refused them arms. For example, when
Peru and Ethiopia were unable to obtain from the
United States weapons that they considered essential
in 1972 and 1975, respectively, the Soviets provided
package deals that included the weapons desired by
the regimes at very favorable rates. Moscow-in
respond rapidly, establishing a reputation as a de-
pendable arms supplier. In recent years, because of
competition from Western suppliers with more sophis-
ticated weapons to sell, the Soviets have begun to
provide some of their most advanced systems to
selected clients.
Rationale for Seeking Arms From the Soviet Bloc
Sales Policies
The Soviet Bloc became the principal arms supplier to
the 16 LDCs we examined primarily because it was
willing to provide the desired hardware and training
rapidly and on affordable terms (figure 2). At times
Moscow offered more advanced weapon systems than
those possessed by other countries in the region. The
Soviets also made arms available at much lower prices
contrast with some Western suppliers-has not re-
fused to sell arms because the buyer acted brutally
toward its people, was seeking to overthrow a neigh-
boring government, or supported international terror-
ists.
Political and Ideological Ties
The existence of political and ideological ties to the
USSR and its allies predisposed eight of the 16 LDCs
to acquire arms from the Soviet Bloc rather than from
the West. In most cases, the LDC leaders developed
ties to the Soviet Bloc when they were directing their
liberation movements, well before they gained power:
? Soviet links to the African Party for the Independ-
ence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde
I Moscow has not offered such prices to all its arms clients; for
example, Libya has paid much higher prices than other LDCs for
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Figure 1
Rationale for Acquiring Arms
? Primary precipitant
O Secondary precipitant
External enemy
?
0
0
?
0
0
0
S
?
0
?
Fear of rebellion
?
?
0
0
0
.
0
0
Insurgency
0
0
40
Establishment of new
armed forces
0
O
0
Power and prestige
5
0
To aid liberation groups
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Figure 2
Rationale for Seeking Soviet Bloc Arms
? Primary precipitant
O Secondary precipitant
Soviet sales policy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
Previous close ties to
Soviet Bloc
0
S
?
0
?
Marxist-Leninist orientation
0
?
?
0
0
0
US refusal
40
0
0
0
West European refusal
0
0
0
Anticipation of US and
West European refusal
0
O
O
0
0
o`er ,c oa
Pct Aso 4?~ ~
o~9t ~O p0~~ y geo~.~oQ~~ .~o~~ 9~
Q Go ~r G? ti~ ~,4 ~o ~~ Cs' 0Qb 5e ,~4 ti9
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(PAIGC) predated the independence of Guinea-
Bissau and Cape Verde by several years.
? Moscow's links to the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) date from 1956, and
to the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
from 1964.
? Cuban ties to Nicaragua's Sandinista National Lib-
eration Front (FSLN) were first established in the
mid-1960s.
The Marxist leaders in Benin and Congo did not have
political or ideological ties to the Soviet Bloc before
gaining power, but both formally proclaimed their
countries to be Marxist-Leninist states before buying
Soviet Bloc arms. The Ethiopian leaders who seized
power in 1974 also were Marxist; the new regime,
however, initially sought arms from the West because
Moscow at that time was principal arms supplier to
Ethiopia's main enemy, Somalia.
US and West European Refusals
Five of the LDCs we examined purchased arms from
the Soviet Bloc only after Western governments had
turned down their requests for weapons. All of them
had developed strong political ties to the West, and all
but Ethiopia have continued to purchase Western
arms. In each instance, the Soviets took advantage of
Western refusals-variously based on political, ideo-
logical, bureaucratic, and economic considerations-
to offer arms packages on favorable terms that usual-
ly were tailored to a regime's specific desires:
? Moscow began shipping arms to Ethiopia in 1977,
after the United States suspended arms supplies to
Ethiopia's new leadership in opposition to the 1974
coup and its radical ideology.
? In 1972 Congress declared Peru ineligible for For-
eign Military Sales credit because of Lima's seizure
of US tuna fishing boats; the specific US tanks
desired by Peru also were unavailable for export
that year. When the sanctions were waived in 1973,
Lima already was finalizing a deal with the USSR.
? France refused to sell arms to Madagascar after the
Ramanantsoa regime drastically cut the French
presence in 1973; two years later Antananarivo
approached the United States, seeking weapons
under the US Foreign Military Sales program, and
turned to the Soviets when told it was eligible only
for cash sales.
Arms Clients That Turned Away From Moscow
Of the 35 non-Communist LDCs that have been
dependent on the Soviet Bloc for arms since 1954,
seven-Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, Grenada, Indone-
sia, Somalia, and Sudan-no longer maintain a
major arms relationship with Moscow or its allies. F_
In four instances-Ghana, Indonesia, Sudan, and
Grenada-the arms relationship ended following a
coup or attempted coup. In 1966, Ghanaian military
leaders overthrew President Nkrumah, citing cc^rup-
tion and his Marxist policies, and kicked out his
Soviet friends as well. Indonesia in 1965 and Sudan
in 1971 turned against Moscow after local Commu-
nists led coup attempts. Both regimes believed that
the Soviets were involved in the plots. Other arms
recipients-such as Benin, Congo, Equatorial Guin-
ea, Afghanistan, and Peru-have also experienced
coups or coup attempts, in some cases involving the
USSR or a Marxist leadership, and have continued
to look to the Soviet Bloc as their major arms
supplier. Grenada experienced a military coup in
October 1983 but did not terminate its Soviet connec-
tion until the US intervention later that month.
Egypt and Somalia turned toward the West in large
part out of displeasure with Moscow's interruption of
arms deliveries to pressure them into changing their
policies. Although the Soviets continued major arms
deliveries to Egypt after President Sadat expelled
their military advisers in 1972-allowing Egypt to
prepare for the October 1973 war with Israel-they
sought in 1975 to influence Sadat to reconsider his
course by curtailing shipments. In 1976-77, Sadat
closed Soviet military facilities, abrogated the friend-
ship treaty, and looked to the West for arms. Moscow
also halted arms to Somalia in the mid-1970s, when
President Siad refused to relax his hold on the
Ogaden region, and offered to supply arms to Soma-
lia's enemy Ethiopia. In 1977, Siad expelled Soviet
advisers, closed Soviet military facilities, and abro-
gated the friendship treaty.
Bangladesh moved away from the USSR after Presi-
dent Zia, who favored closer relations with China
and the United States, assumed power in 1977. In
1978-79, Bangladesh opposed both the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet intrusion into
Afghanistan.
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? After 1973 the Belgians stopped supplying arms to
Burundi because they strongly disapproved of the
Tutsi regime's genocide against the Hutu opposi-
tion, and Moscow stepped in as principal supplier in
1977.
? When the United States and Britain turned down
Zambia's requests for arms that were prompted by
Rhodesia's cross-border operations in the early
1970s, the Zambians signed arms deals with China
and the USSR. The Soviets became the principal
supplier in 1979.
The Soviets have continued to take advantage of
Third World discontent with Western arms sales
policies. In 1981 Jordan bought SA-8 surface-to-air
missiles and ZSU-23-4 air defense artillery from the
USSR when Washington refused to supply requested
weapons or offer concessionary sales. The Jordanians
purchased additional Soviet missiles this past Decem-
ber largely because of US unwillingness in early 1984
to sell Stinger surface-to-air missiles and other air
defense materiel to Amman. King Hussein, however,
still prefers Western and especially US equipment
and training. Similarly, after Washington also refused
a Kuwaiti request for Stinger missiles, Kuwait and
the USSR initialed an arms agreement and Moscow
offered to provide additional military assistance. In
addition, Burkina (formerly Upper Volta) received
small arms and military equipment from the Soviets
following a US denial of military aid in the spring of
1984.
Several Third World countries have been receptive to
Soviet offers of arms packages because they believed
the United States and West European governments
would turn down their requests to purchase arms:
? After independence, Congo turned to China and
then the Soviet Bloc as principal arms supplier,
because it perceived France, its former colonial
ruler, as unfriendly.
? Although Benin has continued to get some arms and
training from France, the Kerekou regime's belief
that the French supported an attempted coup in
early 1977 has strongly reinforced its preference for
the Soviets as principal supplier.
? In Seychelles, President Rene's view that Western
countries have supported dissidents has made him
amenable to offers of Soviet arms.
Survival of Pro-Soviet Regimes
Soviet Bloc arms sales have provided a military
underpinning critical to the survival of the pro-Soviet
leaders of Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and
Nicaragua:
? The Mengistu regime has been able to prevent
Somalia and various insurgent groups from dismem-
bering Ethiopia.
? In Angola the MPLA was able to emerge as the
dominant faction when the country gained
independence in 1975, and it has survived against
the UNITA insurgency and South African
incursions.
? Similarly, the FRELIMO leadership in Mozam-
bique after independence in 1975 was able to com-
bat Rhodesian incursions and continues to struggle
against the South African-backed insurgent Mo-
zambique National Resistance.
? In Nicaragua the Sandinistas have developed a
relatively formidable military structure with a
growing counterinsurgency and conventional capa-
bility.
The presence of large numbers of Cuban military
personnel in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and-to a
lesser extent-Mozambique also has contributed to
the survival of these regimes, but the provision of
armaments probably is a more critical factor. For
example, the Angolan and Ethiopian Governments
have proposed a reduction in the Cuban military
' In assessing Soviet gains, we have focused our analysis on whether
they have been related directly to Bloc arms transfers and not other
factors. Thus we pay special attention to whether the gains
preceded or followed within two years of the year in which the
Soviet Bloc became principal arms supplier by virtue of arms
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Figure 3
Soviet Bloc Gains From Arms Sales, 1974-84
? Gain occurred no more than two years after weapons delivery
a Gain occurred after arms agreement but before weapons delivery
? Gain occurred more than two years after weapons delivery
O Gain preceded arms agreement
? Insufficient trade data
Access and Soviet Bloc military advisers
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Assets in county
LDC military trainees in
?
?
Soviet Bloc
Reciprocal visits by high-
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
level military officials
Soviet Bloc diplomatic
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
representation in country
Reciprocal visits by high-
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
level political officials
LDC students studying in
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Soviet Bloc
Military Planning Use of airfield for
?
?
?
Capabilities naval reconnaissance aircraft
Use of port facilities for
?
?
?
naval vessels
Port of call
?
?
?
Transport aircraft stationed
?
?
in country
Emplacement of signals
?
?
?
? a
?
?
intelligence sites
Emplacement of Cuban
?
?
?
combat troops
Commercial Ties Civil air agreements for
?
O
`
C
?
?
?
Aeroflot
Fishing agreements
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Trade
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Ideological and LCD declaration of
Organizational Communist party
Ties LCD declaration of
?
? b
?b
?
?
vanguard party
Party-to-party
?
?,
?
?
?
?
?
?
agreements
Party-to-party visits
?
?
?
?
G
?
?
?
?
?
?
a Madagascar has dismantled its sites.
b Benin and the Congo declared their parties to be Marxist-Leninist,
but the USSR does not recognize them as such.
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presence, but would not countenance severing their
arms relationships with the USSR. Similarly, the
leadership in Mozambique, despite its recent security
pact with South Africa, continues to believe that
Soviet Bloc arms and other military support are
critical to its survival and hence strongly supports
Soviet positions in the Nonaligned Movement.F_
Access and Assets
In all 16 LDCs, the development of an arms relation-
ship has given the Soviets greater access to the
military and political establishments and the ability to
engage in intelligence activities. We believe, more-
over, that the arms relationships in countries such as
Angola and Ethiopia have provided Moscow opportu-
nities to influence their decisionmaking processes. In
virtually all instances, the number of Soviet Bloc
military advisers in the recipient nations and the
number of LDC students in Soviet Bloc countries
rose-often dramatically-after the Bloc became the
key source of armaments. Similar increases also were
noted in the number of LDC military trainees in Bloc
nations, Bloc diplomats in recipient countries, and
reciprocal military and political visits (figure 3). F_
For example, in 1975-two years before the Soviet
Bloc became the principal arms supplier to Ethiopia-
visits by Soviet officials to Ethiopia were infrequent,
and fewer than 1,000 Ethiopians were studying in
Bloc countries. By 1978 more than 1,700 Soviet
military advisers were in Ethiopia, almost 2,000
Ethiopian students and military trainees were in Bloc
countries, and the number of official military and
political visits had soared.
When Nicaragua entered into its first arms agree-
ment with the Bloc in 1979, the only Bloc military
advisers in country were from Eastern Europe and
Cuba and, at that time, fewer than 300 Nicaraguan
soldiers and students were studying in Bloc countries.
By 1983, however, Nicaragua was host to some 3,000
Cuban, 100 Soviet, and 60 East European military
advisers, while the Nicaraguan presence in Bloc coun-
tries had more than quadrupled.
No less important, during the past decade Soviet Bloc
military advisers have been present only in countries
that have purchased arms from the Soviet Bloc.
Except for Ghana-a former arms client-no LDC
has sent military trainees to Bloc countries unless it
has also purchased arms from them.
Moscow's advisory and training programs have bene-
fited the USSR in several ways. To the extent that the
USSR has expanded its presence abroad and stepped
up its training in the USSR at the expense of the
West, Moscow has realized its goal of denying or
reducing non-Communist initiatives. The Soviets also
have obtained increased influence over some client
states by training persons who now hold positions of
key responsibility in their government. For example,
Col. Henrique "Iko" Carreria of Angola, a former
Minister of Defense, is the presidential adviser on
defense matters and recently was appointed chief of
the Air Force. He received training in the USSR from
late 1979 until mid-1982 and has worked closely with
Soviet advisers in Angola. In addition, Fikre-Selassie
Wogdress, secretary general of Ethiopia's Provisional
Military Administrative Council and one of the most
influential and pro-Soviet members of the regime, had
nine months of political indoctrination in the USSR.
He previously received pilot training in the United
States.
Military Planning and Operational Capabilities
LDC arms relationships with the Soviets and their
allies have led to enhanced Soviet access to Third
World airfields or port facilities in about half the
countries we examined (figure 3). Such access has
significantly benefited Soviet military operations as
well as contingency planning:
? Access to airfields in Angola, Libya, and Ethiopia
over the past decade has allowed the Soviets to
conduct naval reconnaissance in the Atlantic Ocean,
the Mediterranean Sea, and the Red Sea.`
? The use of port facilities in Angola, Ethiopia, Libya,
and Mozambique as well as permission to call at
ports in Benin and Seychelles have increased the
flexibility of Soviet naval operations.
? Moscow has been able to base transport aircraft in
Angola, Madagascar, and Mozambique, giving it
the potential to respond to requests for support by
southern African governments.'
` In the case of Libya, other factors-a perceived threat from the
United States, for example-also account for Soviet military
' The Soviets also have gained access to airfields and port facilities
in LDCs that became arms clients before 1974, including Afghani-
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The Question of Soviet Leverage
The character of Soviet military assistance to ideo-
logically disparate LDCs over the past 30 years
indicates that, once an arms relationship has been
established, Moscow seeks leverage over its clients.
Most often, the Soviets have pursued this objective by
restricting the flow of spare parts and other follow-on
support, citing financial or political reasons. During
the past year, for example, the Soviets have delayed
or threatened to halt arms deliveries to Libya, Peru,
and Tanzania because of nonpayment. In addition,
Moscow restricted arms shipments to Iraq from late
1980 to early 1981 to signal disapproval of its war
with Iran.
Soviet efforts to obtain leverage over LDCs extend to
training as well. The Soviets often provide only
minimal instruction, reflecting their penchant for
secrecy; this approach also helps maintain client
dependency. For example, Mozambican pilot trainees
in the USSR in the late 1970s received only basic
instruction in flying their advanced fighter aircraft.
Moreover, the Soviets have maintained control over
the maintenance and play an important role in the
operation of most of the sophisticated equipment
provided to Peru.
It is difficult to document whether Soviet attempts to
obtain leverage have been successful. The ability of
an LDC to counteract Soviet tactics depends on
various political, economic, and military consider-
ations. In some instances, important Third World
clients-such as Angola, Iraq, and Syria-have tak-
en advantage of crises to force the Soviets to recon-
sider decisions to halt arms deliveries or refusals to
make new arms commitments.
the presence of
Cuban combat troops in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nica-
ragua continues to enhance Moscow's political and
military influence in these countries
We believe that Moscow achieved these gains primar-
ily because of its arms relationships. Most were
obtained shortly after arms deliveries were initiated,
although in some instances five to 10 years elapsed
between the deliveries and the gain. Moreover, with
the exception of occasional Soviet naval visits to
Mauritius, Singapore, and Tunisia, the Soviets have
acquired military gains only in LDCs for which the
Bloc is the principal source of arms. About half the
LDC arms recipients-including Benin, Cape Verde,
Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, eeru, and Sey-
chelles-however, have turned aside overtures by Mos-
cow to grant it basing rights and port access.
Foreign Policy Support
We believe that Soviet arms transfers have been an
important reason why most of the 16 LDCs we
examined have strongly supported Soviet foreign poli-
cy positions in their rhetoric, international organiza-
tions, and other diplomacy, on issues as diverse as
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the Olympics. The prin-
cipal exceptions are Burundi, Peru, Tanzania, and
Zambia:
? Since 1980 Angola, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and
Mozambique have consistently voted with Moscow
in opposing the UN General Assembly's annual
resolution on Afghanistan; Libya and Seychelles
have supported the Soviet position when they have
voted.
? Seven of the 16 LDCs-Angola, Cape Verde, Con-
go, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and
Seychelles-have diplomatic relations with the
Vietnamese- and Soviet-backed Heng Samrin re-
gime in Cambodia; with the exception of the War-
saw Pact nations, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and Guyana,
the only other governments that have recognized
this regime are Soviet Bloc arms clients such as
India, Laos, and South Yemen.
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? In the 1980 Olympics, all 16 of the LDCs partici-
pated, whereas many other LDCs boycotted the
Moscow games. In 1984, however, only Angola and
Ethiopia joined Moscow's boycott of the Los Ange-
rebound to only $7 billion this year. This total largely
depends on commitments already made to Iraq, India,
Angola, Kuwait, and Syria.
les Olympics.
Unlike issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and
South Africa, on which most Third World nations
usually vote together, the issues noted above sharply
distinguish those LDCs that depend on the Soviet
Bloc for arms from other members of the Nonaligned
Movement. If not for their close military relationship
with the Soviets, we believe these regimes would
adopt different positions in those cases where Mos-
cow's and the Nonaligned Movement's interests di-
verge.
Hard Currency Sales
Arms sales have provided the Soviets with a signifi-
cant source of much-needed hard currency. Following
the 1973 oil embargo and ensuing higher oil prices,
Moscow increased its arms prices, eliminated price
discounts to all but a few clients, and toughened
payment terms, especially to LDCs in the Middle
East and North Africa. Increased Soviet sales to old
clients, bolstered by sales to new customers and the
transfer of complex weapon systems, propelled the
USSR during 1974-79 into second place, behind the
United States, in the global arms market with agree-
ments estimated at $35 billion. Soviet military sales
peaked at about $14 billion in 1980, and ensured
surpluses in Moscow's balance of trade with the Third
World.
We believe constraints such as LDC debt, increased
competition, and diversification of suppliers now out-
weigh the factors that led to progressively higher
Soviet sales during the 1970s:
? Growing financial problems, even for well-off clients
like Libya, have limited the LDCs' ability to make
repayments on arms purchases from the USSR.
? Competition from Western and Third World arms
suppliers has cut into Soviet sales.
? Many clients have increasingly tended to upgrade
their inventories selectively with follow-on support
equipment, rather than replace entire weapon
systems.
Thus, we estimate that Soviet arms sales, which
slumped to about $3 billion in 1983, probably will
To redress their deteriorating position, the Soviets
have tried to reestablish a reputation as a reliable
supplier by providing relatively advanced hardware.
Angola has received MIG-23 fighter aircraft as well
as HIND-D helicopters; the helicopters also have
been supplied to Mozambique and Nicaragua. In
addition, Moscow has remained flexible in dealing
with the financial problems of most key clients. For
example, large deliveries to Angola, Ethiopia, and
Mozambique have been made despite their arrearages
in payments. Even Libya, which has failed to make
timely payments, received $600 million worth of
deliveries in 1983. Moscow also has extended gener-
ous terms to clients such as Nicaragua.
Commercial Ties
We believe the Soviets have reaped few nonmilitary
commercial gains as a result of arms relationships
that they established with the 16 LDCs. Moscow
generally has developed similar commercial links with
other non-Communist LDCs that have not been major
arms clients (figure 3):
? While the Soviet airline Aeroflot serves 15 of these
arms recipients, Aeroflot also flies to 34 other LDCs
that have received no Bloc arms or are primarily
Western arms clients.
? Moscow has fishing agreements with eight of the 16
LDCs but also with 31 others.
? Overall Soviet trade-imports and exports-rose
only in Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zam-
bia following Bloc arms sales; although Soviet Bloc
exports generally increased among the arms recipi-
ents, we believe that the higher level usually reflect-
ed little more than the arms sales.
More important, none of the 16 LDCs has lost
interest in developing trade and other economic con-
tacts with the West while acquiring its arms from the
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Soviet Bloc. The growth in Soviet trade has not led to
any redirection of the overall trade patterns among
these 16 arms recipients-the United States and West
European countries generally have remained their
major trading partners. In fact, in most cases, includ-
ing Ethiopia, US trade following Soviet Bloc arms
sales has increased despite tensions caused by other
aspects of their bilateral relations. West European
governments generally have fared better than the
United States in maintaining and increasing their
trade with these countries, most of which are former
colonies.
Ideological and Organizational Ties
We believe Moscow's position as principal arms sup-
plier generally has not led its clients to adopt a more
Communist ideological orientation or closer party ties
with the Bloc. Three possible exceptions are Angola
and Mozambique-which declared their ruling par-
ties Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties shortly after
the Bloc became their principal arms supplier-and
Ethiopia, which recently claimed to have established a
Marxist-Leninist ruling party (figure 3). The LDCs'
pro-Soviet attitudes and party-to-party relationships
that exist with the CPSU generally can be traced to
the strong beliefs of the LDC leaders and to ties
predating major arms agreements with the Bloc:
? Although virtually all the initial exchanges of party
officials followed arms agreements with the Soviet
Bloc, such exchanges began before the Bloc made
major arms deliveries. Soviet party officials formal-
ly visited Ethiopia even before the new regime's first
arms agreement was signed with Moscow.
? The leaders of Benin and Congo declared their
ruling parties Marxist-Leninist before developing a
major arms relationship with the Bloc.
? The leaders of the ruling parties in Angola, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique, and Nicaragua committed
their parties to Marxist principles and developed
close ties with Moscow and its allies before gaining
power.
Over the next decade, we believe that the Soviets and
their allies will have numerous opportunities to ex-
pand their arms transfers to Third World govern-
ments. Most LDCs will continue to seek arms for the
same reasons-external or domestic threats, insurgent
threats, and armed forces modernization-that have
led non-Communist LDCs to acquire weapon systems
during the past 10 years.
The Soviets are likely to acquire some new arms
clients as a result of coups or other regime changes. In
particular, insurgent groups that already have estab-
lished ties to the Soviet Bloc, such as the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Sal-
vador and the South-West Africa People's Organiza-
tion (SWAPO), are almost certain to seek arms from
the Bloc if they gain power. Moreover, leaders who
would be more susceptible to Soviet arms sales poli-
cies could come to power by constitutional means or
by force in countries such as Lebanon, Suriname, and
Nigeria. Other LDCs that are not Soviet clients also
could turn to the Soviet Bloc if their current arms
suppliers cannot or will not sell them new weapon
systems.
Despite such broad opportunities, we believe that the
pace and scope of Soviet Bloc arms transfers will be
more limited in the next decade than has been the
case in the past 10 years. Two major factors will be
stiffer competition among arms suppliers to the Third
World and continuing LDC economic ties and ideo-
logical compatibility with the West. Traditional sup-
pliers such as the United States, West European
countries, and China, as well as new Third World
suppliers like Brazil have adopted more aggressive
production and marketing policies. They now are
offering state-of-the-art weapons, loosening restric-
tions and technology controls on arms exports to
LDCs, providing attractive financing packages and
offset arrangements to ease payments, and establish-
ing maintenance facilities and increasing training for
arms recipients. Brazil already has made some signifi-
cant inroads, selling arms primarily to LDCs in the
Middle East such as Iraq, Egypt, and Libya, but also
to Gabon, Thailand, and Colombia.
In our judgment, the mutual interests that many
LDCs have developed with Western governments as a
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result of political, economic, and ideological ties are
likely to preclude those regimes from acquiring Soviet
arms. Most countries in Latin America and Southeast
Asia prefer dealing with the West and probably will
still be able to obtain arms from the United States or
West European suppliers. In Africa and the Middle
East, many LDCs that at present are not Soviet Bloc
arms clients-such as Kenya, Cameroon, Botswana,
and Morocco-would prefer to continue acquiring
arms from the West, but some could prove more
susceptible to Soviet offers, especially if they are
turned down by the United States and West European
governments.
In addition, the inability of a growing number of
LDCs to pay for arms with hard currency could have
a dampening effect on Soviet arms sales. We judge,
however, that Moscow's perception of the opportunity
to achieve geopolitical gains in the Third World will
remain the paramount factor in any decision to supply
arms. While the Soviets generally will seek to maxi-
mize hard currency earnings, we believe they will
continue to offer concessionary terms as necessary in
order to sustain arms relationships with favored cli-
ents and to establish new ones-particularly in those
instances when the West refuses to sell arms to
traditional clients or other key LDCs.
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Figure 4
Non-Communist Clients for Soviet Bloc Arms in the Third World
Present clientsa
Became client 1974-84
Became client 1955-73
aincludes countries that subsequently
became Communist.
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Appendix
USSR, Warsaw Pact Members, and Cuba:
Major Military Equipment Deliveries, 1974-83
Country
Year Land Equipment Naval Equipment
Aircraft
Surface-
to-Air
Tanks Other Antiaircraft Field Rocket Missile Large Sub- Auxiliary
Armored Guns Artillery Launchers Attack Surface marines
Vehicles Mortars Patrol Vessels Other
Boats Craft
Jet Fighters Heli- Trans- Missile
Trainers copters ports System
Launchers
Angola
1974
1975
1976
97
59
128
24
19
16
1977
45
2
1
22
1978
66
28
67
12
11
37
1979
40
17
10
12
1980
5
46
28
15
2
1981
11
10
4
20
1982
39
4
11
24
20
1983
42
154
63
41
42
4
24
Benin
1974
1975
1976
1977
24
6
1978
1979
2
1
1980
1981
1982
1983
1
Burundi
1914
1975
1976
1977
23
1978
1979
1980
23
1981
1982
1983
Cape Verde
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
10
1980
1981
1982
1983
Congo
1974
1975
1976
10
1977
30
50
18
1978
6
1979
1980
3
4
1981
12
1982
1983
Ethiopia
1974
1975
1976
1977
150
65
110
14
49
5
1978
255
550
190
395
1
1
26
20
8
1979
139
81
36
35
2
2
16
1980
5
43
93
47
1
38
19
1981
25
52
11
2
1982
40
82
54
210
3
1983
60
96
226
30
1
1
27
Guinea-Bissau
1974
1975
1976
25
1977
1978
1979
7
7
1980
1981
1982
1983
Libya
1974
310
35
1975
507
133
31
268
3
1976
408
145
87
l
1
558
5
1977
125
12
15
4
1
99
4
1
1978
192
147
30
110
l
2
1
124
102
1979
186
82
233
337 87
2
154
49
110
1980
72
314
26
144 74
3
45
14
12
1981
54
88
16
46 33
1
3
41
61
10
1982
38
20
50
1
1
16a
78 12
29
1983
132
84
6 35
4
3
1
4
31
26 15
10
USSR, Warsaw Pact Members, and Cuba:
Major Military Equipment Deliveries, 1974-83 (continued)
Country
Year Land Equipment
Naval Equipment
Aircraft
Surface-
t
Ai
Tanks
Other Antiaircraft
Armored Guns
Field Rocket
Artillery Launchers
Missile Large Sub-
Attack Surface marines
Auxiliary
Jet Fighters
Trainers
Heli-
copters
Trans-
ports
o-
r
Missile
System
Vehicles
Mortars
Patrol Vessels
Boats
Other
Craft
Launchers
Madagascar
1974
1975
1916
1
1977
1978
1979 10
38
1980
18
4
3
2
1981
9
2
1982
1983
Mozambique
1974
1975
1976 3
NA b
1977 104
125
84
1978 52
92
78
12
8
8
1979 71
6
87
6
32
198020
10
60
3
2
1981
50
1982 65
42
69
26
1983 9
16
12
3
Nicaragua
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
11
42
36
1982 19
12
1
l
1983
36
NAb
11
3
Peru
1974 135
1975 46
67
30
1976 64
54
1977 45
36
10
1978
10
2
15
NA b
1979
1980
14
1981
2
2
4
1982
4
5
1983
14
Seychelles
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1
1982
Sao Tome/
Principe
1983
Tanzania
1974
1975
141
NA b
1976
4
4
1977
23
36
10
1978
12
1979
12
1980
18
1981 32
1982
2
1
1983
Zambia
1974
1975
1976 8
20
1977
97
1978
45
12
1979 4
13
50
16
1980 NAb
20
67
70
16
5
1981
1982
1983
a Some of these are jet bombers,
b Equipment was delivered, but number is unavailable.
C Includes helicopters and transports.
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