USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Directorate Of A A A Top Secret
USSR Monthly Review
Top Secret
SOV R 84- 7
June 1984
COPY 3 2 8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Directorate of Top Secret
USSR Monthly Review
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome.
Top Secret
SOV UR 84-007CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Contents
The Soviet-East European
Perspective: East European Military Modernization Fal
ters Despite
1
Military and Defense-
Increased Soviet Control
Industrial Relationship
Since 1955 the USSR h
military planning and de
Pact. Nonetheless, the se
posed on the Pact by Mo
European economic perf
ing gap between the mili
as greatly tig
fense-indust
lf-defeating
scow during
ormance hav
tary capabil
htened its control
rial institutions of
defense-industrial
the 1970s and the
e combined to crea
ities of Soviet force
over the
the Warsaw
policies im-
poor East
te a widen-
s and those
of their Pact allies.
.
Soviet Dominance of the Warsaw Pact:
7
Implications for Peacetime Policies and Wartime Contr
ol
Soviet control over Warsaw Pact
affairs is likely to increase as Moscow delves ever deeper into
defense-related matters formerly considered to be of concern only to
the individual East European nations.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Integration of Defense-Industrial Planning in the Warsaw Pact 11 25X1
The Soviets have gradually increased their control over the planning
of armaments acquisition by non-Soviet members of the Warsaw
Pact. J
elaborate mechanisms, however, the Soviets still have difficulty
obtaining the full cooperation of their allies.
Top Secret
SOV UR 84-007CX
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Integration of Warsaw Pact Weapons Production
As the USSR has expanded its control over weapons production by
other Pact members, their defense industries have generally become
more specialized, emphasizing production of support equipment,
parts, and a few weapon systems. Soviet designs generally have
replaced indigenous designs. Increased industrial integration, tech-
nical dependence on the Soviets, and standardization in Pact
military forces have enhanced Soviet military and economic control.
.Integration of Warsaw Pact High-Technology Industry:
The Bulgarian Role in the Ryad Computer Program
Participation in CEMA's program for developing a standard series
of computers has fostered growth in the Bulgarian computer
industry but limited it mainly to magnetic memory devices. Special-
ization has" made the Bulgarians dependent on the Soviet Union for
related equipment, while the Soviets depend on them for reliable
memory devices. This degree of integration means that Bulgaria's
difficulties in meeting obligations-or the difficulties of any other
I
participating country-disrupt the entire progra
Lagging Modernization of East European Ground Forces: 29
Implications for Warsaw Pact Operations
The modernization of East European ground forces is lagging
considerably behind that of Soviet forces, and there is little prospect
for significant improvements without a broad, sustained economic
recovery to underwrite weapons acquisition programs. The growing
disparities between the Soviet and East European forces probably
would result in uneven Warsaw Pact rates of advance and compli-
cate logistics, and thus could present NATO with tactical opportuni-
Top Secret iv
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Soviet and East European Air Forces:
Comparisons in Combat Potential
Trends in the strength and composition of Warsaw Pact air forces
opposite NATO reveal a growing disparity between the Soviets and
the East Europeans. The weakness of non-Soviet air forces, especial-
ly the Polish and Czech, probably raises doubts among Soviet
planners about the capability of their European allies to support
wartime operations
Other Topics The Soviet Cement Industry: Problems and Prospects
The Soviet cement industry in recent years has been unable to
maintain its historical rate of growth, despite its importance to
investment and defense programs. Unless the industry can overcome
mounting difficulties with the availability of raw materials and
energy, an aging and unbalanced stock of plant and equipment, and
labor shortages, production growth will remain slow, and output
may decrease in some years
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
37 25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
The Grain Crop: Foreign Exchange 43
and Morale Implication
The 1984 grain crop is likely to lead to grain imports larger than
those of calendar 1983 and could prevent the Soviets from matching
last year's record meat production. Even so, upward pressure on
world grain prices will probably be slight, unless the US or
Canadian grain harvest is unusually poor.
Soviets Dismiss Western MBFR Proposal
Soviet-Jordanian Arms. Negotiations
USSR Ends, Legal Minicomputer Imports
Soviet Grain Crop Outlook
USSR Continues To Limit Hard Currency Trade
Too Secret vi
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
The Soviet-East European Military and
Defense-Industrial Relationship
Perspective: East ]European Military Modernization Falters Despite
Increased Soviet Controls 25X1
Since 1955 the USSR has greatly tightened its control over the military
planning and the defense-industrial institutions of the Warsaw Pact.
Nonetheless, the self-defeating defense-industrial policies that it imposed
on the Pact during the 1970s and the poor East European economic
performance in general have combined to create a widening gap between
the military capabilities of Soviet forces and those of their Pact allies
Increasing Soviet Control 25X1
Since the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the USSR has manipulated
the military and defense-industrial planning institutions of the alliance
Increasing Soviet control in the late 1960s coincided with a marked change
in the missions of NSWP forces, which began to be assigned key offensive
roles against frontline NATO forces. Previously these forces had been little
more than internal defense forces with almost no direct responsibility for
offensive operations.
The more demanding offensive missions of the NSWP countries highlight-
ed serious deficiencies in their capabilities, however, prompting a Soviet-
inspired program to modernize armaments and to ease maintenance and
logistics by standardizing major systems in all Pact forces. The Technical
Committee of the. Soviet-controlled Combined Armed Forces (CAF) was
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
created in 1969 to spearhead this drive, and Soviet-style planning proce-
dures-centered on five-year defense plans-were instituted in all Pact
countries. Coordination of industrial plans to meet this defense goal was
centralized in a Soviet-chaired Permanent Commission on the Defense
Industry of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). (See 25X1
"Integration of Defense-Industrial Planning in the Warsaw Pact.")
Integration of CEMA defense industries was increased substantially in the
1970s to support the Pact-wide modernization drive. The generally superior
Soviet weapons were made the Pact standard, and NSWP countries (except
Romania) cut back their indigenous weapon development efforts. NSWP
forces began procuring newer systems manufactured in the USSR-such
as aircraft-or older systems made in their own plants under Soviet
license-notably armored vehicles and artillery. The licensing arrange-
ments have shifted the production of older systems to the NSWP countries,
enabling Soviet industry to move on to newer generations of weapons, while
Moscow retains control of NSWP developments in military technology.
The Soviets also retain considerable control over the terms of weapons
trade within the Pact and over NSWP exports to the Third World. (See
"Integration of Warsaw Pact Weapons Production.")
As a consequence of Soviet policies, the indigenous weapon design and
fabrication capabilities of the East European countries have stagnated and
their arms industries are tending to concentrate on producing support
systems,. small arms, ammunition, and components. This specialization
stems in part from Soviet war plans, which call for sources of spares and
ammunition to be located close to deployed forces, while critical weapon
assembly facilities are kept in the less vulnerable Soviet interior. Special-
ization also satisfied the Soviet desire to realize economies from long
production runs and to increase Pact interdependence through expanded
trade. The benefits, however, have been offset somewhat by disruptions in
certain major weapon production programs due to the Soviets' cumbersome
management procedures and to frequent shortages of weapon components.
The East Europeans also have been enlisted in Soviet efforts to advance the
Pact's capabilities in critical emerging technologies that have a wide
variety of military and industrial applications. The specialization engen-
dered by these programs is illustrated by Bulgaria's role in the CEMA
program to develop an indigenous computer series-the Ryad. The pro-
gram has advanced national development rapidly and has served as a
conduit for the inflow of Western technology but has also created
interdependence and attendant program disruptions. Moreover, the Soviets
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
rely more on the East Europeans in basic supporting industries like
computers than they do in armaments. (See "Integration of Warsaw Pact
"igh-Technology Industry: The Bulgarian Role in the Ryad Computer
Program.")
On the whole, the Soviets probably judge that they have reaped important
benefits from their increased control over defense planning in the NSWP
countries. Clearly, the other Pact countries' military capabilities have
advanced since the modernization program began in the late 1960s.
Moreover, the Soviets have been able to shift the NSWP military posture
toward offensive operations against NATO and away from development of
Diverging Capabilities
The core problem for the Soviets is that, despite their success in extending
control over NSWP armaments procurement and production establish-
ments, the gap in military capabilities between their own and the NSWP
forces has widened. During the preparation of each five-year plan, the East
Europeans succeeded in scaling down Moscow's initial ambitious plans to
modernize their forces; and later, for the most part, they failed to meet
even the reduced objectives. Economic problems have prevented most Pact
countries from buying the agreed quantities of increasingly expensive
Soviet weapons. Economic problems have also contributed to political and
social strains, which have further disrupted the defense industries in some
East European countries. Poland is a prime example. Indeed, the interde-
pendence urged by the Soviets since 1969 has exacerbated the core
problem, as disruptions in one country's industry ripple throughout the
In ground and air forces, the gap in capabilities between Soviet and NSWP
units has widened dramatically as Soviet forces receive the more effective
new weapons long before the NSWP forces do. In the late 1970s the East
Europeans agreed to a goal. of achieving then-current Soviet levels of
ground forces organization and equipment-by the mid-1980s. Their
capabilities have in fact improved since then, but no NSWP country will
meet those levels by 1985 and few will do so by 1990.
The difference in the air forces' capabilities is being exacerbated by the
East Europeans' recent tendency-mainly for economic reasons-to buy
modernized versions of 20-year-old aircraft rather than the more capable
models that are entering service with Soviet forces. The growing disparity
between Soviet and East European forces, as well as disparities among the
East Europeans themselves, will frustrate Soviet efforts to achieve common
Pact standards for logistics, training, and tactics-efforts intended particu-
larly to support the more complex combined arms operations that the
3 Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret 25X1
Soviets expect to employ during a conflict with NATO. (See "Lagging
Modernization of East European Ground Forces: Implications for Warsaw
Pact Operations" and "Soviet and East European Air Forces: Comparisons
in Combat Potential.")
Overall, chronic NSWP failure to meet Pact armaments objectives must be
a source of continuing concern to Soviet military leaders. They may even
consider that it could be undermining the impressive gains they have made
in modernizing their own forces over the past decade. As most NATO
forces continue to modernize, Soviet concerns may grow through the 1980s.
We do not know how the Soviets weigh the benefits and the shortcomings
of their control of the Pact's defense programs. The benefits were mainly
achieved between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, when Moscow was
increasing the planned NSWP contribution to Pact military operations.
With this accomplished, the Soviets then focused their efforts on achieving
force improvements through modernization. In this, their approach appears
to have fundamental flaws that have prevented attainment of their long-
term objectives
The Soviets seem to have only three clear-cut alternatives for remedying
the situation:
To foot much more of the East European defense bill, either directly or
through highly subsidized procurement arrangements. We believe this
would be economically unattractive and would run counter to recent
Soviet initiatives in civilian trade (where they have been shifting the
terms in their favor).
o To give the East Europeans a larger stake in the production of the
sophisticated weapons required to meet the modernization goals. This
would reverse Soviet efforts to monopolize production of the most
advanced weapons. It would also oblige Moscow to invest heavily in
upgrading NSWP weapon manufacturing technology and industrial
plants and eventually to license sensitive weapon designs. Even if the
decision were made today, at least five years would probably elapse
before NSWP countries could begin production of the more advanced
systems.
To relieve the NSWP forces of responsibility for significant portions of
their wartime missions. The Soviets would be unlikely to.do this without
increasing their own military presence in Eastern Europe, however; and
that would entail military and political costs as well as increased
economic costs.
Top Secret - 4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Too Secret
None of these alternatives is likely, to be attractive.
On balance, we believe the Soviets will continue their course of making
piecemeal ad hoc arrangements to compensate only for the most glaring
NSWP deficiencies. They already have substantially increased their,
logistics base in East Germany, thereby lessening their dependence on
Polish lines of communications from the USSR. In addition, they might
adjust their war plans to allow for a larger, earlier commitment of USSR-
based forces to operations against Greece and Turkey in place of Roma-
nian and some Bulgarian forces. If Moscow pursues the piecemeal course;
we judge that the disparity between Soviet and East European capabilities
is likely to continue widening.) 25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Soviet Dominance of the
Warsaw Pact: Implications
for Peacetime Policies
and Wartime Control
The Warsaw Pact's public posture is that of a military
alliance of sovereign nations, joined together for
common defense. In fact, it is an instrument of Soviet
control over East European defense policies and
armed forces.' In the Soviets' view, all political, social,
and economic aspects of preparing each of the War-
saw Pact states for war fall under the category of
defense or armaments planning and thus are subject
to direction by the coalition-which they dominate.
War plans, drawn up by the Soviets for all Warsaw
Pact forces, define the strength and structure of those
forces, direct production of weapons and military
equipment, guide development of transportation and
communication networks within the member states,
and influence general economic strategy-especially
for defense industries.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Outlook
With the wartime structure defined to their liking, the
Soviets probably are satisfied with their legal author-
ity over the Warsaw Pact. Because the adoption of the
new statute affected only the control of wartime
operations, we also can infer that Moscow feels its
influence already is so strong that no major revisions
to the 1969 Peacetime Statute are needed. Even
without revising their legal authority, however, the
Soviets have consistently worked to expand their
involvement in areas that had been strictly national
defense matters. We expect the trend of increasing
control to continue-particularly regarding communi-
cations and logistics-while the East Europeans resist
Soviet inroads with varying degrees of success. The
Soviets have shown no inclination to, activate the
Western and Southwestern Theater High Commands
in peacetime, but the permanent establishment of
these bodies remains an option that could further
tighten Soviet dominance
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Integration "of
Defense-Industrial Planning
in the Warsaw Pact
Since 1969 the Soviets have gradually increased their
control over the armaments acquisition planning proc-
ess of their Warsaw Pact allies. One of their principal
instruments of control has been the five-year defense
plan, drafted by the Staff and Technical Committee
of the Warsaw Pact Combined Command and coordi-
nated by the Permanent Commission on the Defense
Industry of the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CEMA). Despite the elaborate mechanism for
Warsaw Pact weapons planning, however, the Soviets
still have difficulty obtaining the full cooperation of
Evolution of Soviet Control
After World War II the Soviets guided the restoration
of the East European industrial infrastructure, em-
phasizing the creation of production capabilities for
small arms and other military equipment. To increase
their control over military production, they estab-
lished procurement and industrial bureaucracies that
closely resembled their own in each of the East
European nations. The formula was apparently suc-
cessful. According to a Western author, a Polish
military attache to the United States reported that in
the late I950s the Soviet General Staff decided such
questions as how many tanks the Czechs would
produce, how many guns and planes the Poles would
build, how many trucks the Hungarians had to pro-
vide, and which army would get them.
Despite the USSR's high degree of control over the
armaments production of its allies, agreements were
handled primarily on an informal bilateral basis. This
continued despite the creation of CEMA in 1949 and
even after the formal establishment of the Warsaw
Pact in May 1955.
The ambiguous lines of authority for armaments
planning initially provided the Pact with a semblance
of equality and equanimity, but in time the Soviets
found that this ambiguity did not meet their needs.
Specialization of production responsibility, standard-
ization of weapons, and an integrated armaments base
were difficult to plan without a multilateral negotiat-
ing arrangement. 25X1
The military developmental planning system in effect
today was established in the early 1970s, primarily on
the basis of the March 1969 Peacetime Statute.' This
system is highly centralized and is modeled after the
Soviets' own organization for military developmental
planning. Organization and procedures for weapons
procurement within CEMA were also developed in
the early 1970s and made an integral part of the
overall armaments planning process.
25X1
25X1
25X1
' Ratified by the Warsaw Pact nations at a meeting of the Political
Consultative Commission on 17 March 1969, the document known
as the Peacetime Statute formally created the administrative 25X1
structure of the Warsaw Pact.F____1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
CEMA decisions appear to parallel and substantiate
those of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, in 1969, the year the
Peacetime Statute was adopted, the CEMA Council
meeting in Moscow agreed to draw up a "Complex
Program for the Further Deepening and Improvement
of Cooperation and the Development of Socialist
Economic Integration Among CEMA Countries."
This program was adopted in Bucharest in 1971.
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
extend Soviet control throughout the defense indus-
tries of its East European allies. Such control is
intended to facilitate Soviet efforts to force the up-
grading of NSWP armed forces. It also serves as part
of a broader attempt to enhance the USSR's political
and economic control over Eastern Europe.
In the economic sphere, the armaments planning
process has facilitated Soviet influence over the direc-
tions of development and operations of the NSWP
defense-related industries. Coordinated planning has
made it possible to achieve a more efficient specializa-
tion of production responsibility among the different
nations and to implement numerous cooperative pro-
duction arrangements. Such arrangements are repre-
sentative of the overall Soviet drive toward "socialist
economic integration." The interdependence engen-
dered by CEMA economic integration has the added
effect of limiting the independence of NSWP deci-
sionmakers regarding the level of defense spending,
types of arms production, and the development of
their industrial base.
Their central role in the planning process has also
made it easier for the Soviets to implement what they
call a "unified military-technical policy." This policy,
which involves the standardization of the Warsaw
Pact weapons base in terms of inventory, logistics, and
technical specifications, allows the Soviets to
Implications
Since 1969 the USSR has used the centralized War-
saw Pact armaments planning process as a means to
Top Secret 14 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
influence both the size and the quality of NSWP
arsenals. The policy also creates an interdependence
of Pact members in terms of supply and logistics that
could act as a restraint upon independent military
endeavors.
Despite the Soviets' success in developing instruments
of control, economic conditions have tempered the
achievement of desired results. Soviet control has
failed to guarantee the fulfillment of armaments
procurement plans, and this failure has retarded. the
rate of improvement in NSWP'forces. Soviet-con-
trolled planning'has not overcome problems of coordi-
nation on the ministerial and enterprise levels. Nor
has it alleviated shortages of spare parts, skilled labor,
and productivity incentives, which still plague NSWP
defense-industrial production.
15 Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Integration of Warsaw Pact
Weapons Production
Introduction
Since the 1950s the defense industries of the non-
Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP)-
except Romania-have generally become more spe-
cialized, emphasizing production of support systems,
parts, and a narrow range of weapons. Soviet designs
generally have replaced indigenous designs for weap-
ons in NSWP defense plants, often long after the
weapon first entered production in the USSR. These
practices have increased industrial integration in the
Pact, technical dependence on the Soviets, and stand-
ardization in Pact military forces. These, in turn, have
enhanced Soviet military and economic control. =
Production Patterns
Defense industries in the other Pact countries vary
considerably in size, and collectively they are smaller
than the Soviet defense industry. The largest weapon
system producers are Czechoslovakia and Poland,
which have decades of experience in weapons engi-
neering and production. The Czechoslovaks concen-
trate on land arms and some aircraft, while the Poles
manufacture an array of land, air, and naval systems.
Hungary and Bulgaria produce smaller amounts of
predominantly land arms, but both have growing
industries. East Germany produces only a few major
weapon systems, in part because of Soviet reluctance
to see a major defense industry develop in that
country. The rapidly growing Romanian defense in-
dustry is characterized by a streak of independence.
In addition to maintaining Soviet ties, the Romanians
have secured Chinese and West European designs,
produced Western helicopters under license, and be-
gun construction of surface combatants of their own
design. The table illustrates selected NSWP produc-
tion of major weapon systems.
NSWP defense industries produce a variety of major
support systems, including vehicles, naval auxiliary
ships, trainer aircraft, and ammunition and small
arms. In addition, NSWP electronics and machine-
building industries produce an array of weapon com-
ponents and assemblies ranging from electronic sys-
tems to tank tracks. In such areas as optics and
microelectronic production equipment and devices,
NSWP capabilities-though not on a scale compara-
ble to those of the Soviets or the West-are among
the best in the world. NSWP countries are more
important sources of support systems and components
than of complete weapon systems.
25X1
Within the Pact, trade in major weapon systems is'
mostly one way. NSWP forces increasingly supple-
ment the products of domestic industry with large-
scale procurement from Soviet sources, mainly sophis-
ticated weapons like advanced fighter aircraft, surface
]combatants, missiles, and radar. Only in recent years 25X1
has the NSWP supplied the Soviets with major
combat systems-the BMP infantry fighting vehicle
(IFV), the MTLB prime mover
The active Third World arms market provides a ready 25X1
source of hard currency for both Soviet and NSWP
producers. Estimated East European gray arms sales
(mostly small arms and ammunition) in 1983 totaled
about $100 million.' The low technical requirements
of some Third World countries are particularly ad-
vantageous for NSWP producers. For example, an
NSWP export item popular with world arms dealers
is the SA-7 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile-an
advanced weapon in Third World inventories. Exports
of the 1950s-vintage T-55 tank have earned consider-25X1
able hard currenc particularly in the Middle East.
The
NSWP would probably sell more arms to Third
World countries if not constrained by Soviet licensing 25X1
restrictions and by intra-Pact commitments to im-
prove forces.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5 25X1
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Land Arms. Land arms dominate NSWP weapons
production. The NSWP has 20 assembly plants for
major land arms weapon systems, 14 of them in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania; for producing
the same types of systems, the Soviet Union has 20
plants, most with greater capacity. Land arms pro-
duced in the NSWP tend to be relatively less sophisti-
cated and easy to manufacture, often licensed out by
Moscow near the end of their production runs in the
USSR. This releases production capacity the Soviets
require for their newest systems, while providing a
continued source of spare parts for fielded systems.
The recent introduction of a large number of Soviet
systems into NSWP production, combined with his-
torically long production runs in all these countries,
suggests that the current models of land arms will
generally continue in production through much of the
1980s.
Land arms production illustrates both the major
changeover to Soviet systems and the technical defi-
ciencies in the NSWP industrial base:
? NSWP countries have produced Soviet-designed
tanks since the 1950s, using facilities partly
equipped and supported by the Soviets. While Soviet
tank technology progressed from the T-55 to the
T-62, T-72, T-64, and T-80 (and a modernization of
the T-55s and T-62s), the Poles and Czechoslovaks
continued production of the T-55. The NSWP
countries can be expected to modernize their T-55s
even as they begin to produce the T-72. The limita-
tions of NSWP manufacturing technology are evi-
dent in the difficult Polish and Czechoslovak transi-
tion from the T-55 to the T-72
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
APCs and IFVs offer the best illustration of the
changeover from locally designed to Soviet-designed
systems. The only indigenous systems still in pro-
duction are small reconnaissance vehicles.
probably be encouraging one or more other Pact
countries to produce the Soviet self-propelled howit-
zer. Should they succeed, the competition will prob-
ably be too great for Czechoslovakia.
related support equipment.
The NSWP support equipment industry has a fully
developed production base and qualitatively is com-
petitive with the Soviet industry. All NSWP countries
produce trucks for the military except Hungary
(which maintains the capability of doing so). Czecho-
slovakia is the leading producer of heavy trucks and a
major producer of engineering and construction
equipment. Romania, East Germany, and Poland
similarly are important producers of vehicles and
Aircraft. NSWP aircraft production is concentrated
in two Polish, one Czechoslovak, and three Romanian
plants, none of which produce advanced combat sys-
tems. (The USSR has 22 airframe production facili-
ties, many of which build high-performance aircraft.)
Of those built for military service, the 1940s-vintage
AN-2 transport and the 1960s-vintage MI-2 helicop-
ter and L-39 trainer are produced in the largest
numbers. The Soviets claim that the Soviet-designed
AN-28 transport and the Soviet-derived W-3 helicop-
ter will enter production in Eastern Europe in the late
1980s, replacing the AN-2 and augmenting MI-2
production. This suggests that there will be little
change in the size, basic orientation, and output of the
NSWP military aircraft industry at least through
NSWP artillery producers converted from towed to
self-propelled systems about seven years after the
Soviets did, and they generally adopted Soviet de-
signs. The Czechoslovak-designed DANA 152-mm
self-propelled wheeled howitzer is the only indige-
nous major weapon system in production. Manufac-
turing problems delayed its entry into serial produc-
tion, and it still has nagging technical problems. As
the Czechoslovaks look for buyers, the Soviets will
The aircraft industry is a particularly pointed exam-
ple of the decline in NSWP competitiveness in major
weapon systems. Until the early 1960s, Poland and
Czechoslovakia built Mikoyan fighters-more than
3,500. By the 1970s, however, the USSR had become
the sole producer of the fighters being used to mod-
ernize NSWP air forces-the MIG-23, MIG-25, and
SU-20. This change probably reflects a combination
k)f the limitations of NSWP manufacturing technol-
ogy, the substantial investment in plant and equip-
ment that would have been required, and Soviet
reluctance to license the advanced technology.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
NSWP difficulty in remaining competitive in military
aircraft is illustrated by an ill-fated project undertak-
en by Romania and Yugoslavia to develop and pro-
duce a new ground attack aircraft.
NSWP military aircraft industries have in effect
become an adjunct to the Soviet industry. The lever-
age afforded the Soviets is illustrated by the history of
the Soviet-designed MI-2 helicopter (see inset).
Ships. One shipyard in Romania and one in East
Germany manufacture major naval combatants, and
several other NSWP yards produce minor warships
and auxiliary ships. (The Soviets have 11 shipyards
producing major surface combatants or submarines
and 10 producing other naval ships.) Except for the
East German Parchim-class corvette, all major com-
batants supplied to NSWP navies are designed and
built in the USSR. The Romanians, however, are
building a destroyer and frigate of their own design.
Soviet Control of the NSWP Aircraft
Industry: The Swidnik Case
The Polish WSK-Swidnik factory, currently the only
NSWPfacility manufacturing a Soviet-designed heli-
copter, has been producing the MI-2 for almost 20
years.
The Soviets have been able to give up MI-2 produc-
tion, modernize their plants for newer helicopters,
and rely on the increasingly antiquated Polish plant
to supply their requirements for this simple system.
Inadequate investment in the Polish production base
also strengthens the Soviet hand by frustrating devel-
opment of Western commercial relations. During the
1970s the Poles wanted to export the MI-2 to earn
hard currency
2525X1
The Poles produce a relatively large number of auxil-
iary ships, particularly large amphibious ships, like
the Ropucha LSTs and Polnocny LSMs built at
Gdansk. By ordering these types of ships from Polish
yards, the Soviets free their own to produce more
sophisticated warships. They ensure compliance to
Soviet specifications by closely monitoring Polish
performance
Financial
losses and Soviet construction controls impair the
Poles' ability to fund the capital'improvements needed
if they are to be competitive in world markets-or
even to fully meet Soviet design and manufacturing
specifications. In fact, some ships built in Poland for
the Soviets are outfitted elsewhere.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Consequences
Since the 1950s the Soviets have increased their
control-official and de facto-over NSWP defense
industry. Supervised by the Pact's Technical Commit-
tee and CEMA's Permanent Commission on Defense
Industry, the reshaping of NSWP industry proceeded
especially rapidly in the 1970s in accordance with
plans to modernize and standardize Pact forces.
Soviet-designed weapons-generally superior in quali-
ty to and more numerous than NSWP weapons-
typically have become the standard.
Consequently, individual NSWP defense industries
have tended to become more specialized and more
dependent on other Pact countries as suppliers and as
markets for finished products. Additionally:
e The industries' weapon system development capabil-
ities probably have declined as NSWP designs have
been phased out in favor of obsolescent Soviet
weapons. Moreover, Soviet and Soviet-controlled
Pact organizations closely monitor NSWP military
research and development and (except for selected
land arms systems) maintain a generally unbalanced
flow of technical information from the NSWP to
NSWP defense industry has increased its concen-
tration on support systems, small arms, munitions,
and weapon components. The Soviets decline to
license sophisticated systems. This eases the de-
mands on NSWP industry and lessens the opportu-
nity for leakage of sensitive Soviet technology.
NSWP component production, in turn, can benefit
from the inflow of Western technology. NSWP
concentration on support systems also reduces Sovi-
et dependence on militarily vulnerable NSWP
plants for critical weapons and enables Pact rear
services to draw on local sources for parts.
Specialization in components probably has contrib-
uted to wider participation in production programs
for major weapons like the T-72. This affords
opportunities for realizing economies with long pro-
duction runs. It also renders programs more vulner-
able to disruption and stresses cumbersome Pact
and CEMA procedures for. establishing mutual
obligations.
Specialization has increased individual country de-
pendency on intra-Pact trade. The Soviets' domi-
nance over this trade-as the sole supplier of many
systems and subsystems the NSWP requires to meet
modernization goals and the major consumer of the
production of several NSWP plants-affords them
considerable leverage over prices and investment.
Whether the growing Soviet control over NSWP
defense industry has been to the overall advantage or
disadvantage of NSWP countries is not clear. Mili-
tarily, standardization on Soviet armaments probably
has increased NSWP military capabilities, although it
probably has increased Soviet ability to control opera-
tions. Economically, Pact countries probably benefit
from the efficiencies associated with specialization 25X1
and the opportunities to earn hard currency through
arms exports. Technical dependence on the Soviets
may impair development of NSWP industries, howev-
er, and NSWP economies remain vulnerable to Soviet
influence over the terms of trade, as the Soviets
charge heavily for licensing and export rights. 25X1
Outlook
We believe the integration of Warsaw Pact defense
industries will continue. NSWP specialization in sub-
system and component production and reliance on
Soviet designs will probably intensify in the 1980s. In
open-source literature, CEMA industrial planners ex-
tol the 1970s as a period of coproduction and the
1980s as a period of perfecting the mutual advantage.
This trend will increase the interdependence of all
Pact countries, and it may increasingly involve Roma-
nia, which strove for greater industrial independence
in the 1970s. The high cost of independence, com-
bined with limited results, may induce the Romanians
to turn more to the Soviets for military technology
and markets; for example, they have recently pro-
duced APCs for the Soviets. 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
The gap between the USSR and the NSWP countries
in military systems technology will probably increase,
as the Soviets retain production rights to their most
sophisticated systems and the NSWP cuts back on
indigenous designs. This probably will increase Pact
difficulty in assimilating the rapidly advancing mili-
tary technologies of Soviet and Western origin into
weapon systems. However, the high-quality NSWP
development and production of microelectronic com-
ponents and production equipment, limited though it
is, probably will aid NSWP efforts to produce some
state-of-the-art technology
Soviet control over NSWP weapons production proba-
bly will increase steadily. Open literature
indicate that the Soviets have imposed corn-
mon technical standards and a uniform classification
system for military products
the~Soviets will more closely
monitor NSWP export activities to guard against
technological leakage and to ensure compliance with
license agreements and production standards.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Top Secret 24
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5 -
Ton Secret
Integration of Warsaw Pact
High-Technology Industry:
The Bulgarian Role in the
Ryad Computer Program
The Ryad Project
In December 1967 the Soviets announced a major
effort to develop a family of advanced general purpose
computers. Although the initial announcement im-
plied it was an exclusively Soviet project, by mid-1968
Moscow had initiated steps to draw in its East
European CEMA partners.' Soviet writers described
the benefits of enlisting technical skills and industrial
resources throughout the Bloc and stressed the effi-
ciencies associated with specialization and long pro-
duction runs. Moscow probably also saw the project as
an opportunity to solidify industrial ties through
technical interdependence and to exploit the East
Europeans' easier access to Western technology..
In 1969 the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Poland, and Hungary officially launched
the Ryad (Unified Series) program to develop a family
of mainframe computers and associated peripheral
equipment and software. The Soviet Union produces
the entire range of computers and computer equip-
ment both for the Ryad program and for CEMA's
cooperative minicomputer project, but devotes most of
its resources to developing large, high-performance
mainframe systems. The countries of Eastern Europe
concentrate mainly on smaller mainframes and pe-
ripheral equipment:
Bulgaria: External memory devices (disk and tape
drives) and small mainframes.
? Czechoslovakia: Small mainframes, minicomputers,
and floppy disks.
? East Germany: Midrange mainframes, tape drives,
and integrated circuits.
? Hungary: Small mainframes, display terminals,
minicomputers, and applications software.
? Poland: Printers and limited numbers of midrange
mainframes.
Each CEMA member has some responsibility for
software. development and the production of electronic
components. All Ryad hardware and software is
heavily based on IBM technology
'The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), formed in
1949, includes the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germa-
The Ryad program; like other Bloc computer industry
projects, is coordinated by CEMA's Intergovernmen-
tal Commission for Cooperation of the Socialist
Countries in the Field of Computer Technology. It
has subdivisions for mainframes, minicomputers, peri-
pherals, standards, services, software, certification,
and production assignments. The commission is head-
ed by Yuriy Maslyukov, the first deputy chairman of
the. Soviet State Planning Committee (Gosplan).0
Maslyukov also oversees
defense industrial planning within Gosplan-a good
indication of the importance the Soviets attach to th-
potential contributions of computer technology to 25X1
defense-industrial capabilities.
Bulgaria's Contribution to Ryad
The. CEMA integration program has done much to
foster growth and raise the technical level of the
Bulgarian computer industry. In 1969 Bulgaria had
the least developed computer industry in all of East
European CEMA. Over the last 15 years, it has
become a manufacturer of small computers and com-
puter systems, magnetic disk and tape drives, and
associated electronic components and circuits.
Bulgarians have drawn heavily on Western technol25X1
ogy to become Eastern Europe's leading producers of
magnetic disk memory devices. For example, they use
IBM disk units as models to reverse engineer their
own drives. In fact, they still have .to rely on imports
of Western disk drives to supplement their own
production. Bulgaria also has been dependent on the
West for magnetic heads, although it now has some
indigenous production capability in this area. The
Soviets produce many comparable magnetic disk
drives, but their products appear to be inferior in
quality to the Bulgarians'. Hungary produces some
flexible disk units, but otherwise Bulgaria is the only
East European country. supplying magnetic disk. 25X1
equipment in significant quantities to the Soviet
Union and other CEMA countries. 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Bulgaria's leadership in this production is also attrib-
utable to Soviet pressures for specialization. Czecho-
slovakia and East Germany developed prototype disk
units intended for use in Ryad-series equipment, but
these units appear to have been dropped, except
possibly for some local use
Implications
We believe participation in CEMA projects has en-
abled the computer industry in Bulgaria to grow more
rapidly than it would have under an independent
development strategy. Growth has been highly con-
centrated in one segment of the industry, however,
making Bulgarian computer exports and internal
computer applications dependent on developments in
other CEMA countries-especially the Soviet Union.
We believe these conclusions probably apply in gener-
al to the computer industries of all the East European
The Bulgarian Memory Devices Plant
The Memory Devices Plant in Stara Zagora is
CEMA's leading producer of magnetic disk units for
the Ryad project.
It appears to be
the sole East European source of magnetic disk units
for Ryad computer systems. It is also a major supplier
countries.
CEMA countries rely on the Soviets for supply of 25X1
mainframe computers, and this reliance locks them
into associated peripherals and software. East Europe-
an countries have not yet achieved the level of sophis-
tication necessary to compete for Western markets
and do not have the internal demand necessary to
support an active computer industry. This enhances
the Soviet ability to influence technical and industrial
development within CEMA. On the other hand,
CEMA computer integration can also lead to Soviet 25X1
dependence on its East European suppliers, as illus-
trated by the Bulgarian example 25X1
We believe Bulgarian problems in producing suffi-
cient quantities of reliable disk drives are an impedi-
ment to technological progress in CEMA computer
capabilities. Currently, the lack.of reliable, high-
performance disk drives is one of the most significant
deficiencies of computing capability in the Soviet Bloc
countries, with ramifications in both industrial and
military activities. Reliable, high-capacity disk drives
are needed to support the design and use of data base
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
management systems, which will be vital to Soviet
efforts to introduce into the economy automated
control systems for industrial management. On the
military side, where large data stores need to be
quickly accessed and processed, high-performance
disk units could have a significant impact in the areas
of troop control, logistics, and communications.
More generally, cumbersome procedures in CEMA
coordination and in national central planning hamper
responsiveness to a fast-changing technology base.2
Despite almost 10 years of production experience,
Bulgaria has serious quality control and delivery
problems, and, at least in disk drives, is slow to move
on to new devices. The entire Ryad program reflects
this sluggishness-the latest Ryad models are based
on IBM 370 designs, introduced in the United States
in the early 1970s.
2 The Intelligence Community has judged that Soviet Bloc informa-
tion-processing technologies are not likely to keep pace with
Western advances over the next decade.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Lagging Modernization of
East European Ground Forces:
Implications for
Warsaw Pact Operations
The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries as-
sumed significant offensive missions in the Pact's
military planning only in the late 1960s and early
1970s. These new missions prompted a rapid buildup
in the NSWP ground and air forces, and today 55 of
the Pact's 85 ground divisions in Eastern Europe are
non-Soviet. These new forces were initially equipped
with older-often World War II-vintage-Soviet
weapons provided on concessionary terms, and by the
early 1970s the NSWP ground forces were already
five to 10 years behind the best equipped Soviet
Since the mid-1970s, the NSWP countries have intro-
duced new ground weapons at very slow rates. For
example, although all of the NSWP ground forces
had acquired some air defense missiles by the late
1970s, only the East Germans have equipped their
divisions completely. Antiaircraft artillery (AAA) is
still the principal air defense weapon in most NSWP
ground units. Also, almost 40 percent of the NSWP
motorized rifle regiments (MRRs) are still equipped
with trucks rather than armored personnel carriers
(APCs) or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and some
tank units, particularly in Bulgaria and Romania, are
still equipped with World War II-vintage T-34 tanks.
The Soviets have had varying degrees of success in
getting their allies to procure new weapons. The East
Germans and Czechoslovaks and, more recently, the
Hungarians have made major efforts to meet Soviet
goals but have still fallen short of them. The Poles,
Bulgarians, and Romanians have consistently lagged
further behind. The Soviets initially concentrated on
upgrading ground forces equipment in East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia. More recently, the em-
phasis has shifted to encouraging a general modern-
ization of air defense systems in both ground and air
Current Objectives
The Pact's current, Soviet-designed aims are to re-
duce the disparities in organization and equipment
25X1
among ground units and to develop common offensive
tactics.
25X1
None of the NSWP countries are likely to achieve all
of these objectives by 1985, and most are unlikely to
meet them by 1990. Economic constraints and pro-
duction problems will limit modernization in most
countries to modest changes. For example, as a result
of production problems in Poland and Czechoslovakia,
none of the NSWP countries are likely to convert
more than two tank regiments to T-72 or modernized
T-55 tanks by 1985, and the worst equipped countries,
Bulgaria and Romania, are expected to have large
numbers of T-34 tanks in their units through the rest
of this decade. Similarly, only modest success is
expected in replacing trucks in MRRs with APCs or
IFVs, and the Poles project that in the mid-1990s
most of their artillery will still be of World War II
vintage.
Modernization Rates
NSWP ground divisions usually acquire modern
weapons about five years or more after their initial
introduction into Soviet forces. Rates of moderniza-
tion typically involve the introduction of new weapons
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Figure 1
Motorized Rifle Regiments, by Type
of Troop Carrier
Figure 2
Regiment-Level Artillery a
MRR
TR
!? MRRs equipped with APCs or IFVs
M MRRs equipped with trucks
Poland'
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Bulgariab
Romaniab
a Poland's airborne and amphibious landing divisions are not included.
b Reflects equivalent number of APC-equipped MRRs; Bulgaria and
Romania distribute small numbers of APCs in all MRRs rather than
concentrate them in a few units.
Regiments without artillery
E'er Regiments with six-gun battery
Um Regiments with 18-gun battalion
0 5 10
Poland b
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Bulgaria'
Romania
a Pact goals are to equip all regiments-tank as well as motorized rifle-with
a battalion of 18 guns.
b Polish airborne and amphibious landing divisions are not included.
c Bulgaria's five tank brigades, which are equipped with artillery battalions,
are not included.
into one to two regiments annually in most countries.
(Figures 1 through 4 indicate the extent of moderniza-
tion and the continuing requirements for new weapons
in the NSWP ground forces.) The East European
countries apparently have abandoned any hope of
meeting current Soviet goals in all weapon categories
in the short run and instead are concentrating on
correcting the most critical deficiencies-inadequate
artillery and obsolete air defenses
The East Europeans show considerably more enthusi-
asm for rapid modernization when they produce or
coproduce weapons themselves, often under Soviet
license. Thus, a combination of economic self-interest
and increasing military concern has led to impressive
improvements in artillery, where needs can be met
primarily from domestic production. Four NSWP
countries-Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Romania-produce artillery. New production and the
redistribution of existing artillery have permitted
these countries to expand artillery batteries to battal-
ions in their MRRs. The lack of domestic production
in East Germany and Poland, on the other hand, has
limited the expansion of artillery units in those coun-
tries because of the high costs of acquiring weapons
from other Pact suppliers
All of the NSWP countries are concentrating on
improving their air defenses as the Soviets push for an
integrated air defense system covering Central Eu-
rope. In the past year all have acquired new SAMs for
some ground units or begun construction of new SAM
sites for their national air defense forces. The modern-
ization of NSWP air defenses, in ground units as well
as in the national air and air defense forces, probably
will continue to receive high priority for the rest of
this decade. Even the most economically strapped
NSWP countries are correcting shortcomings in this
area. Ironically, however, the Soviets are about to
introduce a new generation of tactical fighters, inter-
ceptors, and SAM air defense systems in the next
several years that the East Europeans-despite their
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Figure 3
Regiment-Level Air Defenses'
MRR
TR
AAA equipped
IBIttu SAM equipped
Poland b
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Bulgariac
Romania
a Does not include hand-held SAMs such as the SA-7.
b Poland's airborne and amphibious landing divisions are not included.
Bulgaria's five tank brigades are not included.
best efforts-will be unable to match. Thus, large
disparities will continue to exist in these areas be-
tween the best equipped Soviet forces and their East
European counterparts.
Other Shortcomings
The East Europeans are also falling short in man-
power, training, and general combat readiness. Some
of these shortcomings include:
? Increasing Reliance on Reservists. The impact of
demographic crises varies among the NSWP coun-
tries, but none of them are capable of any major
expansion in their ground forces. Those that have
expanded the wartime size of their ground units to
meet Pact goals have not increased peacetime man-
ning but have increased their dependence on reserv-
ists to mobilize.
? Insufficient Training. Despite Soviet pressure for
common standards, considerable variations still ex-
ist in the frequency and intensity of training in
NSWP ground forces. None of these forces train as
Figure 4
Division-Level Air Defenses
O Divisions with AAA regiment
0 Divisions with SAM regiment
Poland
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Bulgaria
Romania
25X1
25X1
intensively as their Soviet counterparts in Eastern
Europe. The differences range from minor deficien-
cies in East German units to major shortcomings in
the tactical capabilities of Bulgarian and Romanian
units. 25X1
? Short Terms of Service. East Germany, Hungary,
and Romania have shorter terms of active service
for conscripts than the other Pact countries. As a
result, East German and Hungarian units typically
have one-third and Romanian units one-half of their
conscripts untrained at any point, whereas Soviet
and other NSWP units have roughly one-quarter of
their conscripts undergoing their initial training.
? Longer Mobilization Times. The increasing depend-
ence on reservists in most NSWP ground units will
increase the time required to prepare for war and
the need for training after mobilization to prepare
for offensive operations.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
? Lower Reliability. The commitment of the NSWP
ground forces to Pact goals in a war with NATO
probably would vary but undoubtedly would be
lower than that of Soviet units. As a result, most
NSWP units probably would be less capable of
sustaining major losses.than their Soviet counter-
Implications and Prospects
Slow progress on the overall Pact goals for moderniza-
tion is likely for the rest of this decade. East German
and some Hungarian and Czechoslovak ground divi-
sions probably will meet the Pact's current goals by
the late 1980s; however, Polish, Bulgarian, and Roma-
nian ground units probably will improve only in the
most critical areas. In contrast to the other NSWP
countries, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania have large
inventories of obsolescent equipment in virtually all
units and categories of weapons. Without major im-
provement in economic performance, these countries
could not afford the massive increases in military
procurement needed to modernize their ground forces
in all categories of weapons before the mid-1990s.F-
The increasing disparity in the NSWP ground forces
will make it difficult for the Soviets to maintain
common standards of training and increase mobility
and firepower throughout the Pact. In particular, the
shortcomings in these forces will inhibit their capabili-
ties to adopt the new Soviet tactics to counter the
proliferation of antitank weapons and modern tactical
aircraft in NATO. Since the mid-1970s the Soviets
have expanded their ground forces in Eastern Europe
and the western USSR, increased firepower and air
defenses within these units, and tested new tactics,
such as the integration of air and ground-firepower
and the use of helicopters. These tactics are beyond
the capabilities of most of the NSWP ground divisions
as currently organized and equipped.
The differences in capabilities between allied forces in
a joint front would also reduce the effectiveness of
Pact operations. The weaker NSWP ground forces
would be:
? Less capable of executing Pact tactics for break-
through and exploitation during an attack.
? Less capable of protecting the front's flanks.
? More vulnerable to airstrikes and counterattacks.
The Soviets probably calculate that in joint-force
operations the strengths of the better equipped
forces-which are usually Soviet-will offset the defi-
ciencies of the weaker allies. Nonetheless, the more
poorly equipped force in a joint operation would
present potential vulnerabilities to counterattacking
NATO forces and, at the very least, would slow the
pace and momentum of the attack achieved by the
stronger forces. In the worst cases we have identified.
the Soviets might need to use some of their own units
to reinforce those of less adequate and/or less reliable
allies, thus diverting some of their own second-echelon
forces to frontline duty.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Soviet and East European
Air Forces: Comparisons
in Combat Potential
Analysis of trends in the strength and composition of
Warsaw Pact air forces opposite NATO reveals a
growing disparity between the overall Soviet and East
European air forces in terms of combat potential.
Only in ground attack capability have the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) air forces shown substantial
improvement in recent years. Even this is due mainly
to an increase in aircraft numbers rather than'to the
Strength of Forces
The NSWP air forces have a combined strength of
about 2,400 fixed-wing combat aircraft-36 percent
of the 6,600 combat aircraft opposite NATO.'
Force Modernization
The recent large increases in the potential of Soviet
aircraft reflect the large-scale deployment of late-
model aircraft. As of mid-1983, 80 percent of the
aircraft in the Soviet forces but only about 40 percent
of those in the NSWP forces were models introduced
since about 1970. Aircraft introduced prior to about
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
1960 have almost disappeared from active service in
Soviet combat units but still constitute more than 20
percent of the NSWP forces.
Mission Contrasts
Figure 2
Mission Emphasis of Soviet and
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Air Forces, 1983
The traditional role of the NSWP air forces has been 5
air defense. In 1983 about 1,600 of their aircraft were
air defense fighters. Although this represents a de-
cline of about 200 since 1970, fighters still constitute
nearly two-thirds of the total NSWP fixed-wing
combat force. By contrast, only 40 percent of the
Soviet aircraft opposite NATO in 1983 were fighters
(figure 2)
While NSWP fighter strength has decreased, the
number of aircraft with a ground attack role has
grown. In 1983 about 640 aircraft were in NSWP
ground attack units-an increase of 180, or 40 per-
cent, over the number 10 years earlier. Nearly half
this increase resulted from the establishment of a
ground attack force in Romania, which now has 80
aircraft-about 25 percent of its air force-assigned
this role.
The growth in the NSWP ground attack forces has
paralleled a similar trend in the Soviet forces opposite
NATO. Since 1970 the number of aircraft in Soviet
fighter-bomber units has increased nearly 25 percent
to more than 2,000, while there has been little growth
in the number of aircraft assigned to defensive units.
The increases in ground attack aircraft reflect Soviet
stress on the need to provide air support to convention-
al operations and to achieve air supremacy by attacks
on airfields. East European air, forces probably were
first included in Pact plans for such operations in.the
early 1970s.
Despite the increased emphasis on ground attack,
however, half the NSWP ground attack forces still
consist of pre-1960 aircraft. Trends in aggregate
combat potential, while indicating substantial growth
in force effectiveness, are due primarily to the in-
crease in the number of NSWP aircraft in a ground
attack role rather than to improved aircraft capabili-
ty. Recent deliveries of new aircraft have increased
the capability of NSWP ground attack forces, but the
large number of older aircraft with low combat
potential scores gives these forces
Reconnaissance
Ej Medium
bombers
Fighter-bombers/
light bombers
^ Fighters
approximately equal to that of the Soviet ground
attack forces in the early 1970s
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Soviets a strong argument in pressing their allies to
make larger expenditures for new aircraft. For eco-
nomic reasons, however, the East Europeans probably
will continue to resist such pressures. Moreover, the
NSWP forces have a large number of recently manu-
factured variants of older, less capable aircraft-
which have a useful life well into the 1990s-and this
will prevent them from making major purchases of .
new aircraft in the near term. 25X1
We expect the NSWP air forces to remain at about
their present numerical strengths through the end of
the decade, with only marginal improvement in com-
bat effectiveness. Consequently, we expect the gap in
relative combat potential between the non-Soviet
forces and those of the Soviet Union will continue to
widen as the Soviets deploy large numbers of more
modern aircraft into their own units opposite NATO.
The relative weakness of the NSWP air forces proba-
bly raises doubts among Soviet planners about their
.allies' capability to support wartime operations in the
Western Theater. Pact planning calls for NSWP
forces to play a major air defense role and to support
the advance of ground forces into Western Europe,
particularly the Polish and Czech-Soviet fronts. Fail-
ure of the NSWP national forces to provide adequate
support in these areas, where Soviet forces are rela-
tively weak, could compromise Pact operations
throughout the theater
If the Soviets cannot induce the more important Pact
members to undertake a substantial modernization of
their air forces, they may be forced to provide aircraft
at subsidized prices-which they have been reluctant
to do in the past-or increase their own military
presence in Eastern Europe. Either alternative would
increase the cost to the Soviets of Warsaw Pact
defenses. An expanded Soviet presence also could
have political repercussions and might erode support
by the East Europeans for Pact objectives.
Implications
The wide differences in combat potential between the
NSWP and Soviet air forces opposite NATO give the
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Ton Secret
Other Topics
The Soviet Cement Industry:
Problems and Prospects
The USSR's emergence as the world's largest cement
producer stems from several decades of emphasis on
massive new construction in support of both civilian
and defense programs. To conserve scarce and more
expensive ferrous and nonferrous metals, cement is
used where feasible in construction. In addition, short
construction seasons encourage factory prefabrication
of components, for which cement is suitable.
Despite this industry's importance to investment ac-
tivity, it has experienced the same growth slowdown
that has occurred in most of the other Soviet indus-
tries. Growth virtually halted from 1976 to 1982,
averaging only 0.3 percent per year (figure 1). Output
declined by 3 percent in 1979 and again in 1982. The
increase of about 3 percent in 1983 did little more
than recoup the decline in 1982.
Raw Material Constraints
Dwindling supplies of raw materials-including quar-
ry minerals, industrial byproducts, and special addi-
tives-and a deterioration in their quality have been
the principal causes of the slowdown in the cement
industry. Because cement technology offers few op-
portunities for reducing material intensity, it is diffi-
cult to expand production without nearly proportional
increases in raw material supplies. As with other
extractive industries, Soviet planners have neglected
to develop new raw material deposits. The use of
quarry materials has outstripped the development of
new deposits, creating a bottleneck. In selecting sites
for new plants, the planners frequently have failed to
provide for sufficient mineral reserves. This problem
Figure 1
USSR: Cement Production, 1950-83
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I.1 I
0 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80
is compounded by the Soviet practice of expanding
the size of existing plants, thereby depleting quarry
reserves more quickly.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Industrial byproducts are a potential substitute for
some quarry materials, but they cannot be used to
produce the high-grade cements in growing demand.
The slag of the ferrous metals industry, waste prod-
ucts of the nonferrous metals industries, and the fly
ash of electric power plants can be used in cement
production. In fact, 17 cement plants are located near
steel plants for this purpose, and most new plants are
being located similarly. However, shortfalls in metals
production in the last few years and the decline in the
importance of coal as a source for generating electric
power have limited the availability of these raw
materials.
Erratic Energy Deliveries
Cement production is one of the most energy-intensive
activities in the USSR. Interruptions in deliveries of
fuel and electric power-especially during winter-
have had a severe impact on the cement industry,
shortening equipment life, increasing consumption of
refractory materials, and reducing fuel efficiency
Fuel efficiency growth slowed a few years before the
output slowdown. Historically, improvements in fuel
efficiency in this industry had been obtained by
shifting from coal to gas and oil. The gains would
have been larger if a simultaneous program to up-
grade product quality had not required more energy-
intensive production.
Future gains in energy efficiency depend primarily on
greater use of the dry process of production.' Unlike
the industrialized West, which dramatically increased
its use of the dry process when faced with sharp
increases in energy prices in the 1970s (figure 2), the
USSR has made a slow transition to this process. The
share of this more energy-efficient process in total
Soviet cement capacity has increased by only 4 per-
centage points, from 11 to 15 percent, in 20 years.
Soviet raw materials are not as, well suited to the dry
process, but the main reasons for the slow transition
are constraints on investment and technological diffi-
culties. Furthermore, conversion of existing plants
requires a lengthy unproductive period, which laces
already scarce cement in even tighter supply.
' The main difference between the wet and dry processes for
producing cement is the moisture content of the raw materials as
they pass through the kiln. The dry process is more energy efficient,
using about one-third less fuel than the wet process. The wet
process is the older technology, but has an advantage of less
stringent requirements regarding the quality of raw materials.
Figure 2
Shares of Total Cement Production by
Process, 1970 and 1980
? Dry process
W Wet process
0 ' 20 40
Percent
Decline in Capital Productivity
A decline in capital productivity has hurt output
growth. Investment has been unbalanced-focusing
on large rotary kilns-and has led to bottlenecks
elsewhere. Moreover, the priority devoted to kiln
construction has-hindered development of machinery
that could automate production and stabilize product
quality. Another problem is. the obsolesence of the
industry's. capital stock. A large portion of the plant
and machinery was commissioned during the postwar
building boom of the 1950s and is nearing the end of
its productive life. Because this equipment remains in
use, productivity drops while repair costs and down-
. me mount.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Ton Secret
Labor Shortages
Cement production is considerably more labor inten-
sive in the USSR than in other industrialized coun-
tries, because the Soviets have failed to mechanize
auxiliary work, intraplant and extraplant transport,
materials handling, maintenance, and repair. The
cement industry-like most of the economy-is suf-
fering from shortages of labor, especially skilled work-
ers, and excessive labor turnover. These shortages
have most severely affected repair work; inadequate
repair has been cited as the main reason that plants
have operated below capacity in recent years.
The number of repair workers has increased in recent
years, but not enough to allow for new capacity and
the growing repair requirements of older machines..
When combined with shortages of spare parts, the
lack of repair workers has prolonged downtime and
increased the frequency of machine-damaging acci-
dents. To compensate for labor shortages elsewhere in
the plant, managers have diverted their repair workers
to other tasks and have subcontracted repair work
with centralized repair trusts despite the reputation of
these trusts for notoriously poor and slow service.
Slow Technical Progress
Research and development have been pursued in an
uncoordinated fashion, as in most Soviet industries.
For example, research on concrete and cement is
performed by different organizations-the equivalent
of studying bread while ignoring flour. Also, some
pilot plants develop new types of cement with little or
no consideration of their commercial application. No
institutions exist to bridge this gap between research
and application. Quick-hardening cements introduced
10 years ago are still produced in negligible quanti-
ties. Although new dry-process techniques were
worked out in the late 1960s, only one plant had
successfully introduced these techniques by 1982.
Changing Composition of Demand
The demand for special types of cement that are
difficult to produce has grown in recent years and has
limited growth in overall cement output. In particular,
increased requirements by the defense, nuclear power,
and oil and gas industries have contributed to this
problem. The defense sector is a major consumer of
high-strength cements for missile silos, silo cores, and
many other projects. The growth of military construc-
tion has exceeded the growth of cement production in
Figure 3
Trends in Cement Production and
Military Construction, 1970-82
recent years (figure 3), increasing the burden on the
industry. To satisfy these demands, cement producers
in some cases have had to reduce their overall output.
25X1
The nuclear power industry uses high-quality cement
to build containment buildings and other heavy-duty
structures at nuclear plants. Special polymer cements
are particularly important to reduce the possibilities
of cracks and leaks, especially where temperatures are
low or volatile. Nuclear construction accelerated after
1975; investment in 1976-80 was about two and a half
times the level in the previous five years. Meanwhile, 25X1
the increase in oil prospecting and drilling since the
mid-1970s has accelerated the demand for special oil
well cements. Periodic shortages of these types of
cement have hampered oil and gas exploration.
25X1
With demand for high-quality cement by the defense
construction, nuclear power, and oil and gas sectors
growing more rapidly than total cement production,
75
Military
construction
Cement
construction
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
the cement available to other parts of the economy is
in tight supply. Moreover, a failure to improve the
average quality from 19.76 to 1982 suggests the
residual users have had to cope with lower quality
cement.
Prospects
Official statements by Soviet planners suggest the
following policies will be used to relieve the strains on
this industry:
? Energy savings will be obtained by promoting con-
version to more energy-efficient production tech-
niques and attempting to discover new types of
cement. There will be a campaign to promote the
.use of industrial byproducts, even though this will
lower the quality.
? Raw material supplies are to be increased by provid-
ing more investment to open new quarries and
expand old ones and by seeking to share quarries
with other industries.
? Investment funds will be spent to modernize plant
and equipment and to build new, technologically
advanced facilities.
? Labor productivity is to be raised by mechanizing
repair work, transport loading and unloading, and
materials handling. More funds are to be spent to
provide amenities for workers to induce, them to
remain on the job.
Completing these tasks would require a large invest-
ment program, but Soviet planners have allocated
only 1 billion rubles of investment to the cement
industry in the 1981-85 five-year plan. Sharing limit-
ed funds among many projects is likely to reduce the
effectiveness of this investment.
Foreign trade is not a feasible alternative. Importing
raw materials for cement production, or cement itself,
is too costly and strains the transportation system.
Moreover, East European countries, the logical sup-
pliers, probably do not have the surplus capacity to
provide these materials. Therefore, cement production
will probably not return to earlier growth trends, and
output may decrease in some years, especially when
Top Secret
This slow growth of production will constrain the
nation's ability to accelerate new construction. Ce-
ment and concrete products account for about one-
fifth of material inputs to construction. With possible
substitute materials also in short supply, the impor-
tance of cement is unlikely to decrease. If the demand
for hard-to-produce specialty cements by the defense,
nuclear power, and oil and gas industries continues to
grow, the burden of reduced growth will fall more
heavily on other users of cement.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
The Grain Crop:
Foreign Exchange and
Morale Implications
This year's grain crop is likely to lead to grain imports
larger than those of calendar year 1983 and could
jeopardize the Soviets' effort to match last year's
record meat production.' Even so, upward pressure on
world grain prices will probably be slight, unless the
US or Canadian harvest is unusually poor.
The meat program has been the centerpiece of the
Soviet consumer program since the mid-1960s, and
improvement of supplies is an integral part of the
high-priority Food Program promulgated by Brezhnev
in May 1982. But any estimate made in June of meat
production for the year can only be tentative. The
effect of weather on grain and nongrain feed crops
and the volume of animal feed needed will be the key
variables, although a number of other factors come
into play. As in the past, grain imports can help offset
the vagaries of the weather. It is already clear,
however, that this year's crop will fall considerably
below the 1978 record harvest of 237 million metric
tons (mmt). A harvest better than last year's is
possible, but the downside risk is increasing.
Even in poor harvest years the Soviet Union produces
more than enough grain to meet its people's needs for
bread and other grain products. The problem is to also
grow enough feed to maintain livestock herds and
thereby expand meat production. The recent run of
bad weather has presumably raised concerns about
future meat supplies and may have caused the flurry
of new grain purchases in recent weeks. If the crop is
sharply reduced, the Soviet leaders will have to decide
whether to incur the additional hard currency cost of
larger grain imports or to accept an increase in
Good Weather
The Soviets will need much better-than-average
weather for-the rest of the 1984 crop season to even
approach the 205-mmt annual average harvest of the
1976-80 period. With a crop of this size, and, should
nongrain feed supplies approach last year's estimated
'See brief "Soviet Grain Crop Outlook."
USSR: Linkages in the
Feed Supply-Grain Imports-
Meat Production Cycle
To get some growth in meat production in 1984, a 25X1
smaller supply of grain and nongrain feeds need not
be offset by increased grain imports on a 1 to 1 basis,
because:
The major impact of one year's grain crop is on the
next year's feed availability.
Some shifting of feed from nonmeat to meat prod-
ucts could occur.
Nongrain feeds, which account for two-thirds of
high level, past experience suggests the Soviets would
still need to import nearly 40 mint of grain this
calendar year-5 mint more than last year-to in-
crease meat production modestly over last year's 25X1
record level of 16 mmt.F__~ 25X1
Moscow needs a growth in meat supplies of I to 2
percent per capita to keep shopper queues from
increasing substantially and to hold meat prices in
free markets relatively stable for a second year.
(During 1979-82, consumers endured lengthening
queues, the spread of informal rationing, and surges in
free market prices.) Even so, it would take several
years of marked growth in meat supplies to diminish 25X1
effectively the pent-up demand caused by the stagna-
tion in per capita meat supplies during 1975-82 when
disposable money incomes were growing.~ 25X1
Average Weather
This is both more likely and less favorable for the
Soviets. With another crop like last year's-estimated
at 195 mint, about 10 mint less than the 1976-80
Top Secret
total livestock feed, vary somewhat with the grain
crop, but are generally less volatile. 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
average-the Soviets would have to import at least 45
mmt to achieve the same modest growth in meat
output. To import this much grain by the end of the
year, however, would require a level of imports during
July-December that might exceed the capacity of the
Soviet port and rail system.
Past monthly trade data show that the Soviet ports
and rail system can transport at least 50 mmt of
imported grain annually. As only 15 mint had been
shipped through May, 45 mmt is probably the abso-
lute upper limit that could be imported by year's end.
Bad Weather
The transportation constraint on import capacity indi-
cates that, if the grain crop falls much below 1982's
poor performance (estimated at about 180 mmt) and
the supply of nongrain feed also declines, Moscow
probably will be physically unable to import enough
grain.to achieve any growth in domestic meat produc-
tion. Under such circumstances, meat output, at best,
would remain around the 16-mmt level posted last
year; a reduction in herd size would be the primary
way to raise meat production.
The Soviets would be unlikely to reduce herds sharp-
ly, however, unless the harvest were disastrous-on a
par with the 140-mmt crop in 1975. They have
invested heavily in rebuilding herds since the marked
reduction in 1975 and understand fully the problems
involved. They would see the consumer dissatisfaction
problem and the price pressure difficulty as less
damaging in terms of domestic stability than exces-
sive slaughtering. The rise in consumer frustration
would probably be manageable.
Impact Upon World Grain Prices
Should the Soviets decide to import up to 45 mmt of
grain, they probably would have little trouble acquir-
ing this amount, in light of current projections of
record world grain production. If the stepped-up
tempo in monthly deliveries to-the USSR-which is
likely in the last half of this year-were continued for
the balance of the 1984-85 marketing year (1 July-30
June), imports for that period would be over 50 mmt.
Record wheat stocks and bumper crops expected in
the West probably would offset most of any upward
Top Secret
USSR: Some Scenarios for the
Calendar Year 1984
Feed Supply-
Grain Imports-Meat Production Cycle
Possible 1984 Consequences
Grain Crop .
In Import
Requirements
Around the 2 to 3 percent
1976-80 average over 1983
(205 mmt)
Like the estimated 2 to 3 percent
1983 crop over 1983
(195 mmt)
Like the estimated No better than 1983
1982 crop (180 mmt)
Near 40 mmt-
about 5 mmt more
than 1983
At least 45 mmt
upper limit for im-
ports for 1984
45 mmt-upper limit
for imports for 1984
Note: The supply of nongrain feed is assumed to be, at best, a little
below the 1983 estimated high level. It is also assumed to vary
somewhat with the size of the grain crop.
pressure on prices caused by the larger Soviet pur-
chases. However, unfavorable weather in the USSR
and another major growing region (especially the
United States or Canada) and heavy Soviet grain
buying-especially of US corn-could push up prices
substantially over the next six to 12 months.
the USSR
has bought as much as 7.5 mmt of grain from
Canada, Argentina, and the European Community in
recent weeks and is negotiating for 1.2 mmt of US
wheat and 300,000 to 500,000 tons of US corn.
Deteriorating crop prospects may have prompted
these initiatives. Grain imports in calendar year 1983
cost Moscow an estimated $5 billion in hard currency
and accounted for almost 20 percent of all Soviet hard
currency imports. Grain imports of 45 mint in 1984
would raise the grain bill by over $1.5 billion.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
riefs
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Soviets Dismiss The Soviet Ambassador to the MBFR talks recently criticized the new Western
Western MBFR proposal for making reductions of forces to parity levels contingent on East-West 25X1
Proposal agreement on data about existing forces and for introducing additional categories
of data exchange. After the Ambassador made these remarks in a plenary session,
a Soviet press spokesman in Vienna announced publicly that the East had "turned 25X1
down" the Western proposal.
The Soviets recognize that some NATO allies view the data issue as a fundamen-
tal barrier to progress in the talks, and they probably hope that their strong
negative reaction will lead some allies-particularly West Germany, which
endorsed the latest Western initiative reluctantly-to push for a more flexible
NATO position on the data issue. The Eastern position in MBFR is that
agreement on reductions should be reached without agreement on data.
In private, Soviet representatives have said that they see little prospect for
movement in MBFR until after the US elections but that "events" may permit
progress at some later point. They have indicated that their near-term strategy will
be to dismiss the Western proposal as not constituting a satisfactory response to
Top Secret 46 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Soviet-Jordanian Senior Jordanian officials have been hinting in public that Amman is planning to
Arms Negotiations expand its arms relationship with Moscow. 25X1
In late 1981 Jordan purchased SA-8 surface-to-surface missiles and ZSU-23/4
self-propelled artillery from the USSR-its first acquisition of Soviet weaponry.
Since then, Moscow has sent approximately 25 military advisers to Jordan to train
the Jordanian military on the use of the weapons, and a small number of
Jordanians have undergone training in the USSR. The Jordanian Government,
wary of Soviet intentions, has kept the arms relationship limited. Although
unhappiness with US policy apparently has convinced the Jordanians to purchase
additional Soviet weapons, they are likely to maintain limits on the military
relationship with Moscow.
USSR Ends Legal A Soviet decision to discontinue legal imports of minicomputers from the West is
Minicomputer unlikely to lead to any reduction in efforts to acquire advanced Western
Imports minicomputers through illegal channels. The State Committee for Supply has 25X1
informed Soviet institutions that they no longer will be permitted to purchase
Western minicomputers, according to sources of the US Embassy in Moscow. The
new Soviet policy will not have any appreciable impact on minicomputer imports
from the West, however, which declined dramatically after the United States
imposed strict controls following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soviet
purchases fell from more than $50 million in 1979 to about $5 million in 1982.
Soviet-made minicomputers are significantly inferior to their Western counter-
parts, and Soviet customers tended to resist using them as long as Western
equipment was available. For higher priority military research and development
applications where more capability, versatility, and reliability are crucial, the
Soviets can be expected to try to acquire export-controlled US minicomputers
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
25X1
Soviet Crop Conditions, Mid-June 1984
The United States G-mmmt has not recognized
the incorporation W Eatonia,Let w and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necasurily suthoritatiw.
Good to excellent ?
a
Fair _~p fl
Poor cis o dJp - a .
Very poor
0 500 4
Kilometers
Barents r o
Sea Kara
Sea
Norway Sweden
Finlander
Limit of major grain Soviet Union
e Baltic Sea growing region
Vo
Poland Moscow
Winter grains
rech' ' a.~' Spring grains
Hun. Romania
Bulgaria
Black Sea Ol
China
Caspian
Turkey Sea
Indian claim
cypr45 ceeinde Fir.
China- rnd
Mediterranean Sea Syria 7 /connni
Lebano Iraq Iran Afghanistan Pakistan India
25X1
702624 6-84
Top Secret .48 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Soviet Grain Drought in the lower and middle Volga Valley and parts of the Central Black
Crop Outlook Earth, North Caucasus, Volga Vyatka, and western Kazakhstan regions has 25X1
greatly reduced Moscow's chances for a grain crop as large as the 205-million-ton
average produced during 1976-80. However, moisture is adequate in other major
grain-growing areas. We believe that Western press predictions of another
disastrous crop shortfall for the country as a whole are premature. The high-
pressure ridge that intensified the drought has dissipated, and the affected area re-
ceived widespread rain during the third week of June. 25X1
In our judgment, most of the winter and spring grain production in the lower
Volga Valley (about 5 million tons in an average year) has been lost. Much of the
damage done by the drought to grains in the remainder of the affected area is irre-
versible, but it will be several weeks before we can accurately assess the extent of
that loss. On the other hand, prospects for about two-thirds of the crop-
particularly in the Ukraine and much of Kazakhstan-have improved in recent
weeks. We continue to believe that a grain crop as high as 200 million tons is possi-
ble if ideal growing conditions prevail through the summer. 25X1
Soviet Educators To A decree issued in late May will raise wages and bonuses for teachers and other ` Get Pay Raise education workers by 30 to 35 percent over the next few years. Teachers in grades 25X1
one through four and boarding school workers will receive pay boosts on 1
September. Increases for the rest of the education work force will be phased in
over several years, starting in the northern and eastern regions of the USSR. The
pay hikes are one of several steps taken under last April's educational reforms to
attract more and better people into teaching, particularly for primary grades
at
,
the secondary vocational level, and in rural areas. Teachers are among the lowest
paid workers in the USSR and received their last pay raise'in 1975. Low pay and
lack of prestige have kept the number of applicants to teachers' colleges low; since
1970 the number of teachers in grades one to 10 has declined. F__1 25X1
USSR Continues Data for Japan and West Germany, two of the USSR's major'trading partners, in-
To Limit Hard Currency dicate that Soviet imports of Western equipment and semimanufactures were
Trade lower in the first quarter of 1984 than in first quarter 1983. This decline in
technology trade continues a trend begun in 1976, when the USSR-concerned
over a rapidly rising debt caused by a surge in machinery and equipment
purchases-began to limit its imports from the West. Although real hard currency
imports of machinery and equipment rose sharply in 1982-83 (reflecting Soviet
orders for the Siberia-to-Western Europe natural gas pipeline), they did not fully
recover from the 40-percent drop in 1977-81. The volume of large-diameter pipe
imports-which stagnated in 1977-81-also rose in 1982 but has since declined.
Real Soviet hard currency imports of nontubular steel, chemicals, and manufac-
tured consumer goods have stagnated or declined over the past eight years.
49 Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Moscow is expected to continue its attempt to hold the line on hard currency
imports. The foreign trade plan for 1984 implies an intention to reduce imports
from the West. Orders for Western equipment in 1983 were only four-fifths of
both the 1982 level and the 1977-82 average, and in the first quarter of 1984 such
orders were less than half the first-quarter 1983 level. The USSR probably will
continue to rely on the West for development of its energy sector-and, to a much
smaller extent, for food-processing equipment-but we believe it is unlikely to
boost its imports of Western manufactures and semimanufactures sharply in the
near future. The outlook for Soviet exports remains poor, and there are no signs
that the USSR intends to alter its conservative approach to borrowing in the West.
Top Secret 50
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/29: CIA-RDP86T00443R000200350004-5