WHITHER THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000400570002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
12 December 1983
MASTER FILE COPY
QO NdT GBVE OUT
Q
~ MARK ON
Whither the Soviet Leadership
S mary
The appearance of business-as-usual that Soviet officials
initially maintained during Andropov's lengthy absence fran public
view has broken doi4n. Signs of increased political maneuvering in
the Kremlin raise the possibility that significant changes in the
leadership could take place soon.
Andropov's ability to maintain or strengthen his political
position will depend heavily on whether or not he is physically
able to play an active leadership role. If he recovers his health
it is conceivable that he could score a political breakthrough
then the Central Cannittee meets later this month. Since the
leadership appears to be fairly evenly divided, the nvvement or
even one or two Andropov supporters into the Politburo could be
quite significant in power terms.
In an attempt to place before the policy and intelligence communities
provocative analyses by experienced observers, the National Intelligence
Council occasionally will publish uncoordinated essays of particular merit on
important subjects. This is such an essay and Soviet leadership politics is
such a subject. The interpretations and conclusions are the author's own.
Comments are welcome and should be addressed to
National Intelligence Council's Analytic Group
available as of 12 December has been used in preparation o this paper.
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If he only partially recovers his health, Andropov could
remain in office for same time with reduced power, but it is
unlikely that his colleagues would allow him to linger
indefinitely. His danestic policy preferences have encountered
significant opposition, and his foreign policy record is not above
reproach. In these circumstances, a weakened Andropov would be
vulnerable to forcible removal or pressure to retire voluntarily.
As things stand now, the leaders best placed to succeed
Andropov are Gorbachev and Ramnov--the two relatively young and
apparently healthy men who are members of both the Secretariat and
the Politburo. Gorbachev's chances of victory would be best if
Andropov becane so seriously ill that the leadership decided his
condition necessitated his replacement. currently far ahead of
other contenders in terms of visible indicators of status,
Gorbachev would probably be supported by a nuinber of leaders who
place a relatively high priority on danestic econanic developrnent
carQared to foreign policy issues. He would probably benefit fran
an arranged succession in which all Politburo members participated
actively in the selection process.
Andropov.'s sudden death would increase the chances of a
victory by secretary Rarrnov. In a "crisis" situation caused by
the leader's death, especially at a time of heightened tension in
US-Soviet relations, the preferences of Defense Minister Ustinov
and the military in general would probably count for more than
might otherwise be the case. Ramnov, by virtue of career
background, hard-line orientation toward the US, and
identification with repressive internal policies, appears to enjoy
Ustinov's backing.
Recent signs of struggle
The appearance of business-as-usual that Soviet officials initially
maintained during Andropov's lengthy absence from public view (since
18 August) has broken down. Following Andropov's failure to attend the
Bolshevik Revolution ceremonies on 7 November, evidence of intensified
political conflict in Moscow has surfaced:
-- on 10 November, the first anniversary of Brezhnev's death, Pravda
published an article lauding Brezhnev's achievements, which have been
largely ignored by the media since Andropov's accession. Despite the
article's favorable treatment of Andropov, its appearance suggested that
Brezhnev cronies such as Secretary Chernenko and Premier Tikhonov who
opposed Andropov's ascendancy were taking political advantage of the
General Secretary's disability to argue in favor of continuing
Brezhnev's policies rather than embarking on a new course.
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-- On 12 November, Soviet negotiator Kvitsinsky informally floated a new
Soviet offer on INF. The same day Soviet media announced that Defense
Minister Ustinov had addressed a meeting of top military officers in
Moscow on 11 November. The conclave appeared to be an affair concocted
by Ustinov to display the military's political support for a
28 September statement on US policy put out under Andropov's name.
Ustinov reiterated Andropov's hardline position in dealing with
Washington, invoking Andropov's name repeatedly. The chief military
newspaper Red Star, however, dropped positive references to Andropov at
the end of Ustinov's speech that were included in the radio version. On-
16 November, the Soviets officially denied that Kvitsinsky had made the
proposal, on 19 November an Ustinov article in Pravda reiterated the
Soviet demand that British and French systems be counted in any INF
agreement, and on 23 November the Soviets pulled out of the INF
negotiations. Just as it is possible that the Soviet reversal on
Kvitsinsky's walk-in-the-woods proposal last year represented a
political, defeat for Brezhnev, it is possible that the sequence of
events in INF this month could be explained in terms of Soviet internal
politics. In his discussion with Nitze, Kvitsinsky seemed concerned
about word of their talk being spread to the full American delegation
and indicated that he had to protect some higher Soviet official.
Conceivably, Foreign Minister Gromyko or another leader acted without
Politburo clearance to arrange for Kvitsinsky to solicit a US offer that
he hoped would create pressure on hardliners within the Politburo.*
-- Since the 7 November parade rumors have circulated in Moscow of an
assassination attempt on Andropov. The appearance of these rumors
suggests a breakdown in party discipline and an erosion of control at
the top reminiscent of Brezhnev's last months in office.
-- In this atmosphere, on 15 November Izvestiya printed a review of a book
about the 1918 assassination attempt on Lenin. The review stated that
the terrorist attack on Lenin was "highly topical even today" and
contained passages that could be read to apply to the current Soviet
scene (e.g., "the general situation in the country was unbelievably
difficult... The revolution was less than a_year old"). The timing of
the article's appearance was assuredly not coincidental. Conceivably,
it was planted by Andropov's opponents as grist for the rumor mill.
More likely, since the article stated that the 1918 attempt on Lenin
showed that a "counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet underground... existed
and was-active in the country," it represented a political attack on
Andropov's critics.
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* Other explanations for Kvitsinsky's behavior are possible, however. For
example, the Soviets may have. instructed him to float the new proposal in
an effort to increase tensions between the US and its NATO allies. Moscow
may have hoped the West Germans would buy the Soviet claim that the US team
rather than Kvitsinsky initiated the proposal, without consulting Bonn
beforehand.
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-- During the Syrian Foreign Minister's 10-11 November visit to Moscow, the
Soviets--and Gromyko in particular--for the first time unambiguously and
vigorously pressured Syria to moderate its attacks on Arafat. Although
other explanations are possible, it is conceivable that this move was
prompted by concern on the part of Andropov's critics that he had gone
too far toward giving Syria a "blank check," thereby increasing the
chances of confrontation with the US. Soviet media coverage of
high-level Moscow meetings with PLO officials on 22 November, however,
suggested that Moscow had shifted back to reacknowledge the primacy of
the Soviet relationship with Syria and to pressure Arafat to reconcile
his political objectives with those of Syria.
-- On 12 November the abridgment and location of a TASS release appearing
in Leningradskaya Pravda suggested the possibility of an attempt to
promote Secretary Romanov at the expense of Andropov.
-- On 23 November, Literary Gazette published an article by Fedor Burlatsky,
an associate of Andropov's, which appeared to be a thinly veiled attack
on the Soviet military and hawkish elements within the civilian
leadership who opposed the efforts of Andropov and other leaders to
negotiate with the US. In the guise of a discussion of President
Kennedy's struggle against hawks in the US administration during the
Cuban missile crisis, the article generally criticized the malevolent
consequences of military meddling in policymaking and specifically could
be read as criticism of the military for creating an international crisis
by shooting down the Korean airliner. It seemed to portray Andropov as
an embattled figure attempting to fend off military influence and reach
an understanding with the US through secret diplomacy. It is
conceivable, however, that the article was intended to encourage American
observers to believe that unless compromises were offered to the USSR in
arms control negotiations, a war party would triumph in the USSR.
-- Soviet media delayed by three days announcing the date for the year-end
Supreme Soviet session. Supreme Soviet meetings are routinely announced
30 days in advance, but this time the meeting scheduled for 28 December
was not announced until 1 December. The delay could have been due
either to controversy within the leadership or to uncertainty about
whether Andropov's health would permit his participation in a Central
Committee plenary meeting, which routinely precedes the Supreme Soviet
gathering.
Each of these anomalies in Soviet behavior, viewed in isolation, could
perhaps be explained by factors other than leadership politics. Taken
together, they suggest political maneuvering at the top. A variety of
interpretations could be advanced to account for the recent sequence of
events, but the overall impression conveyed is one of factional struggle.
Andropov's vulnerabilities
From the outset, Andropov's precarious health has evidently imposed
severe limitations on his ability to actualize the vast power that potentially
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attaches to the office of General Secretary. Official Soviet statements have
cited a respiratory illness as the cause of Andropov's prolonged absence;
unofficial statements by various Soviet officials
have centered mainly on a kidney disease. Basing themselves on this
information and on Andropov's known past medical record,
believe that Andropov is suffering from at least one of three acute
illnesses: an upper respiratory infection, a relatively minor kidney disease
such as kidney stones, and possibly phlebitis. None of these diseases is
life-threatening and even the three in combination could not prevent Andropov
from resuming his pre-August level of activity within a few months.
do
not rule out the possibility of a more serious disorder that would constitute
an immediate danger to his life.
Beyond his physical problems, Andropov is probably vulnerable to attack
on political grounds. He can point to slightly improved economic growth rates
'as a vindication of the tentative steps he has taken to shape a new economic
strategy--his top policy priority. But there are indications that his attempt
to move away from the Brezhnev status quo in domestic policy have encountered
opposition:
-- Andropov has apparently favored a fundamental revision of Brezhnev's
indulgent cadres policies, which gave party workers virtual tenure. He
has probably been supported in his effort to apply higher performance
standards by many younger technocrats frustrated by the slow rate of
promotions under Brezhnev, but the drive to curtail imcompetence has
created a degree of insecurity among many elites. The vast number of
rural-based cadres may feel especially vulnerable to the increased
emphasis on scientific-technical know-how as a criterion for
advancement,' and Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitsky has implicitly
criticized placing too high a priority on technical expertise.
-- Support for Andropov's anti-corruption campaign has probably been strong
in the military and KGB, where concern about an erosion of official
discipline has been especially keen. But many leaders have probably
been apprehensive about the broader implications of the campaign.
Probably already uneasy about Andropov's ties to the KGB, the
appointment of a career KGB officer as First Deputy Premier, and the
purge and virtual takeover of the MVD (militia) by the KGB, they would
probably view a concerted campaign to purify the party as a move to
enhance the KGB's role at the expense of the party apparatus. Chernenko
has warned implicitly against taking the anti-corruption campaign too
far, and Moscow party boss Grishin has emphasized the.need to keep
cadres work firmly in party hands.
-- Chernenko's speeches have indicated that he disagrees with Andropov
about how to keep the labor force in line. He has openly criticized the
frequent use of repressive measures against workers, and Trade Union
chief Shalayev--a Chernenko protege--has apparently dragged his feet in
the labor discipline campaign. Chernenko probably fears, as Brezhnev
evidently did,. that Andropov's advocacy of greater wage differentiation
and tighter control over labor mobility runs the risk of provoking
serious popular unrest. I
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-- Andropov's advocacy of a greater decentralization of economic
decisionmaking and hints that the economic bureaucracy needs
reorganizing have almost certainly been controversial. Such steps might
reduce the power of Tikhonov and the Council of Ministers. Andropov's
efforts to advance discussion of reforming the economic mechanism have
met resistance from such key economic officials as Gosplan chief
Baybakov.
-- In nationality policy, Andropov has revived theoretical formulations
associated in the past with efforts to increase cultural and political
restrictions on non-Russians. By doing so, he may have provoked the
opposition of party leaders in non-Russian republics such as
Shcherbitsky and Kazakh party head Kunayev, who are full members of the
Politburo.
Andropov's record in implementing Soviet foreign policy is not above
reproach. Should any detractor choose to make the case, he could argue that
the USSR during Andropov's brief tenure has lost ground vis-a-vis the US
around the globe, and that foreign policy initiatives with which Andropov has
personally associated himself have backfired or produced negligible results.
-- The campaign to derail INF deployments--the foreign policy effort in
which Andropov has most visibly involved himself--has failed, although
the Soviets doubtless take heart at the spectacle of West Germany torn
by greater internal dissension over national security policy than at any
time in the post-war era.
-- It is unlikely that Andropov made the decision to down the Korean
airliner, but "objectively," as the Soviets say, he may be seen as
ultimately responsible, especially for the public relations debacle that
ensued (unless he was ill at the time). Some leaders are also said to
be uncomfortable about the growing prominence of the military hierarchy
during Andropov's tenure, a prominence highlighted by the handling of
the KAL incident.
-- Whatever the character and dimensions of Soviet involvement in Grenada,
Andropov may be held at least indirectly accountable for not preventing
the chain of events that led to the US action, which Andropov's
colleagues probably believe has damaged their reputation among-Third
World clients, while boosting the electoral prospects of their bete
noire, President Reagan. If the Soviets were involved in plotting the
coup, Andropov could be vulnerable to charges of "left adventurism." If
the Soviet "sin" was in failing to provide enough aid to shore up the
Bishop regime, Andropov--who in his June plenum speech made an unusual
explicit acknowledgement of limits to the amount of economic aid the
Soviets were willing to provide Third World supplicants--could be
criticized for making a major miscalculation.
-- Although the Soviets almost certainly see the Middle East as a "plus" on
the Andropov scorecard, signs of heightened US resolve to defend
American interests overseas may have given some leaders misgivings about
the extent of their commitment to Syria.
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-- The increased pressure Andropov has placed on East European regimes to
submit to a greater measure of economic, political, and military
"integration" doubtless has met with the visceral approval of his peers,
but some of them may be disturbed by the resulting high state of tension
between Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies.
-- Despite the fanfare surrounding the Soviet opening to China, which
Andropov appears to have promoted, the Chinese have not moved on the
major issues and have patched things up with the US somewhat.
The alignment of forces on the Politburo
Until now, the Politburo has appeared to be fairly evenly divided into
two groupings. Andropov has apparently drawn support from leaders who have
been associated with the foreign policy-security-military-defense industry
apparatus. These have seemed to include Ustinov, Romanov, First Deputy
Premier Aliyev (a former KGB official) and perhaps Gromyko. Additionally,
Andropov appears to have enjoyed the support of Secretary Gorbachev, whose
speeches indicate that he shares Andropov's technocratic orientation and his
desire to effect within-system reforms to make the economic mechanism more
efficient.
Evidently ranged against these leaders has been a group of party and
government-based leaders closely associated in the past with Brezhnev. These
have included Chernenko, Tikhonov, Kunayev and Shcherbitsky. Shcherbitsky may
have supported Andropov initially; there were several reports to that
effect. Conceivably, he began to move away following the promotion of Romanov
in June to the secretariat seat both men had probably coveted for years. Some
reporting suggests that Moscow party boss Grishin may also-be associated with
this grouping.
Chernenko has been particularly vocal in publicly resisting Andropov's
ascendancy (e.g., his June plenum remarks concerning "conditions for free
discussion" and "comradely exchange of opinion " at meetings of the Politburo
and Secretariat), as has Shcherbitsky (e.g., his extremely unusual public
references to statements of Politburo members other than Andropov--Gromyko,
Gorbachev, and Chernenko). But all of these leaders have evidently believed
that the basic thrust of Andropov's policies posed a threat to the
institutional and political interests they represent.
Although this breakdown suggests that a healthy and active Andropov would
possibily command a bare majority on the Politburo, in reality his support has
probably been issue-dependent in many cases, and cross currents have been
discernible within the leadership. Given the strong emphasis on collectivity
in leadership pronouncements since Brezhnev's death, as well as the slow
progress Andropov has made in promoting clients to key positions and
implementing policies he professes to favor, it seems clear that he has not
been able to count on the backing of his putative supporters across the board.
In any event, leadership groupings are inherently unstable. Based as
they are on each leader's perception at a given point in time of how he can
best protect his power base, further his political career, and advance the
policies he favors, they tend to shift as circumstances change. Andropov's
death or.incapacitation would create a fluid situation from which new
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groupings would emerge. In fact, such groupings appear to be taking shape
already.
The two main succession contenders
In one important respect the leadership is better prepared for a
succession today than when Brezhnev died. There are now two relatively young
and apparently healthy men who are members of both the Secretariat and
Politburo--Romanov and Gorbachev. During Andropov's absence Gorbachev and
Romanov are said to have taken turns chairing Politburo meetings, and there is
no reason to expect the leadership to defy precedent by reaching outside the
Secretariat to choose the next successor.
Although Romanov and Gorbachev appear to be allies of Andropov, if the
leader is seriously ill his coalition will probably fall apart. In fact,
already there are indications of policy differences between the two men that
could constitute the basis for divergent political platforms designed to
appeal to different interests within the leadership.
Gorbachev
In terms of visible indicators of political status, Gorbachev is far
ahead of Romanov. His position has improved dramatically since Andropov took
office and his responsibilities now extend far beyond his original portfolio
of agriculture. He is involved in other areas of the economy, has a hand in
foreign policy, and appears to be overseeing cadres--traditionally the
responsibilit that has offered the best opportunity for building a power
base. observers of the 7 November Bolshevik Revolution ceremonies
reported that other leaders seemed to defer to Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's speeches and activities provide basis for speculating that he
is advocating a domestic policy that combines an emphasis on agriculture and
heavy industry. Although Gorbachev is a strong champion of the Food Program,
in his major Lenin Anniversary speech in April he made clear that he regards
heavy industry as the first priority of economic development. Gorbachev's
stress on heavy industry would probably have special appeal for Tikhonov, a
"metal-eater" by virtue of background and experience, and for Shcherbitsky,
whose republic is a major center of metallurgy and energy development. The
Ukrainian leader, like Gorbachev, has urged "utmost attention to developing
the basic industrial branches, especially fuel, electric energy and metals."
At the same time, Gorbachev's identification with the Food Program would help
him in cultivating Kunayev, whose republic combines agriculture and heavy
industry, and Chernenko, an early supporter of the Food Program.
In foreign policy, it is a good bet that Gorbachev would urge a more
conciliatory posture toward the US. Gorbachev's statements during his recent
trip to Canada, and his Lenin Anniversary speech, suggest that he takes a
somewhat less malign view of the US than do some other leaders. His emphasis
in April on the fact that "a more realistic, sober tendency" exists in the
West along with the hardliners, and recognition of "considerable areas of
converging interests" contrasted with Romanov's 7 November characterization of
the interna-tional situation as "white hot, thoroughly white hot," and his
charge that the US was using arms controls talks as a smokescreen for war
preparations. The worsen-ing of US-Soviet relations between April and
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November doubtless accounted in part for the differences in the two leaders'
treatment of the US. But as recently as 17 November TASS reported that
Gorbachev had met with US businessmen John Crystal and that "Mikhail Gorbachev
and John Crystal expressed the opinion that there are vast potentialities for
mutually beneficial cooperation" and that "realization of these potentialities
largely depends on the state of Soviet-American relations as a whole."
Chernenko and possibly Gromyko and some other leaders would support Gorbachev
if he advocated a greater effort to reach a modus vivendi with the US.
Such a Gorbachev program, then, might be backed by Chernenko, Gromyko,
Tikhonov, Kunayev and Shcherbitsky--all but four of the ten Politburo members
(not counting Andropov). It is entirely possible, however, that leaders who
agreed with Gorbachev's apparent preferences in domestic policy would not
support his inclinations in foreign policy, and vice versa.
The chief danger for Gorbachev, if this assessment is correct, would
appear to be that some leaders count for more than others. In a succession
taking place now, Ustinov would probably have more influence than anyone else
and he would probably support Romanov.
Romanov
Romanov has maintained a much lower profile than Gorbachev since moving
into the Secretariat. In this respect, Romanov's status vis-a-vis Gorbachev
is similar to Andropov's status vis-a-vis Chernenko during the last months of
Brezhnev's life. As happened in the last succession, however, the removal of
the General Secretary as a political actor could change the picture
completely.
A Romanov accession would have a number of drawbacks from the standpoint
of other leaders. As early as 1972 Romanov implicitly criticized Brezhnev's
policy of "stability of cadres," and he has recently urged personnel
reductions for some institutions. His reputation for riding herd on
subordinates in Leningrad, which had an unusually high turnover of party
officials during his tenure there, could feed apprehension that his succession
would portend a more precipitate change in personnel policy than Andropov has
been able to effect.
Romanov also has the liability of an unsavory personal reputation. He
has occasionally appeared to be inebriated at official functions, and his use
of his official position to feather his nest is notorious. At a time of
considerable apprehension that corruption is undermining the population's
respect for the regime, Romanov's public reputation for abusing power, if not
the fact of the abuses, could work against him. Shcherbitsky's recent
admonition that public opinion should be taken into account in making official
appointments could be relevant in this context..
Romanov appears to have one major asset, however, that could outweigh his
liabilities: Ustinov's favor. Like fellow Leningrader Ustinov, Romanov is
part of an influential and tightly knit network of officials with backgrounds
in defense industry--a coterie that has received more promotions since
Andropov's accession than any other grouping. Romanov is a graduate of a
shipbuilding institute and for ten years served as party boss of Leningrad--a
major center for high-technology defense industries. Not surprisingly, he
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evidently has responsibility within the Secretariat for defense industry,
Ustinov's portfolio for many'years. At a minimum, Ustinov had a veto power
over Romanov's appointment to this position, and it is likely that he rather
than Andropov instigated Romanov's move. Romanov is also said to have good
relations with'some professional military officers, including naval chief
Admiral Gorshkov.
Romanov's policy views appear to be compatible with those of Ustinov. He
has taken a consistently hard line toward the US over the years, and he stands
out as a strong advocate of law and order at home. His record in repressing
dissent in Leningrad and the strong emphasis on labor discipline in his
speeches are probably in line with the preferences of Ustinov, not to mention
Aliyev.
Potential role of the military
Although there is no persuasive evidence that the military has intervened
directly to determine the outcome of any previous succession, there are
grounds for questioning whether this historical pattern will hold. The
military's influence appears to have expanded over the past several years and
especially since the advent of Andropov:
-- At home, the waning of ideology, the deepening of economic problems, and
the trend toward ossification within the party have increased the
importance of the military as a symbol of national unity.
-- Globally, the USSR is no longer a model for economic development or
ideological inspiration for modernizing nations, and depends to a
greater degree than ever before on military power to further its
objectives. The growing role of military assistance as an instrument of
policy in the Third World and the increased reliance on the threat of
military force to bolster Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, as well as
the central importance of technical arms control issues in Soviet
strategy toward the West, have necessarily entailed greater military
participation in foreign policymaking.
-- Under Andropov, the heightened visibility of military figures as regime
spokesmen, the promotion to marshal of several members of the high
command whose positions would not seem to merit this rank, and several
clandestine reports have suggested a further rise in the military's
prestige and influence over policy.
At the same time, there have been indications that some of the
professional military may have misgivings about the party's capacity to
provide effective leadership consistent with military interests.
-- Before Brezhnev's death some generals seemed apprehensive that the
country's economic problems could lead civilian leaders to question the
military priority in resource allocations.
-- Some reporting suggests that some military officers believe the party
has become too "flabby" and corrupt to tighten popular discipline and
get the country moving again..
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-- The Jaruzelski "solution" to Poland's problems is said to have aroused
keen interest in Soviet military circles.
Nevertheless, it seems improbable that the military would attempt to
dictate the succession through the threat of physical force:
-- Throughout Soviet history military officers have been indoctrinated to
stand aloof from politics.
-- Party bodies with oversight and control functions permeate the military
at all levels.
-- There is a substantial congruence of outlook among many top military and
civilian leaders. The military probably would not see a need for
decisive action to ensure the selection of an acceptable candidate, if
not their preferred choice.
-- Ustinov's primary loyalty is presumably to the party'and he most likely
would refrain from heavy-handed intimidation of his colleagues along
Polish lines.
Under certain circumstances, however, military influence over the,
selection process could be brought to bear in a less direct fashion. If one
or another candidate were to urge changes that would lower military Priorities
in Soviet policy, for example, Ustinov would be in a position to challenge his
program on national security grounds. Since many Politburo members lack
technical expertise and access to classified military information, they might
defer to Ustinov's judgment. The KGB and the GRU could conceivably play a
supporting role by selectively releasing intelligence reports portraying the
national security threat in dire terms.
Possible developments
(1) The possibility that there actually was an assassination attempt on
Andropov cannot be excluded out of hand. If an attempt did take place and
wounded Andropov but not seriously, as the rumors have it, he might be able to
use the attack as a justification for purging some 'of his opponets--say,
Chernenko and Tikhonov. Such a strategy was suggested by the Izvestiya
article of 15 November. Andropov's ability to capitalize on an assassination
attempt would be'enhanced if the perpetrator were an individual associated in
some way with any of his opponents.
(2) In the absence of an assassination attempt, it is still possible
that Andropov could score a political breakthrough at the plenum. Assuming
that during his illness one or more leaders made a move to subvert-his
policies, Andropov might be able to charge his opponents with violation of
Politburo discipline and use this as a rationale for changes in the
leadership. This outcome would be dependent, of course, on his recovering his
health.
Although Andropov has not yet been able to make major changes in the
Politburo, changes at the level just below the Politburo have set the stage
for shifts at the top. For instance, six men now hold positions that have at
various times in the past merited full membership on the Politburo: Party
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Control Commission Chairman Solomentsev, RSFSR Premier Vorotnikov, Leningrad
party boss Zaykov, KGB chief Chebrikov, Trade Union chief Shalayev, and
Belorussian party boss Slyunkov. All but one of these men were promoted to
their current positions since Andropov's accession and are indebted to him
politically. The movement of one or two of these or possibly other
individuals could be quite significant for Andropov in power terms, since the
Politburo appears to be fairly evenly divided.
(3) If Andropov partially recovers his health, he could remain in office
for some time but with reduced political power. To the extent that other
leaders viewed him as a transitional figure, he would be unable to marshall
the resources to effect significant personnel changes or to push through any
comprehensive program to redress the country's accumulated problems. Under
these circumstances, Soviet policy probably would be characterized by
continuity at best, and immobilism at worst. Conceivably, however, Andropov's
debility would produce not greater collectivity but greater compartmentation
of power and division of responsibilities within the leadership, which could
lead to shifts in particular policy areas.
If Andropov is unable to provide full-time leadership, however, it seems
unlikely that his colleagues will allow him to linger on indefinitely. It is
true that Brezhnev's infirmities did not lead to his retirement but he had
been party chief for years and was well entrenched in his position by the time
his physical decline began.
(4) Andropov's sudden death would increase the chances of a Romanov
victory. Two of Gorbachev's likely supporters, Shcherbitsky and Kunayev, are
provincial figures who probably would not be drawn into the initial
deliberations about a successor if Andropov died suddenly. Moreover, in a
"crisis" situation caused by the leader's death, especially at a time of,
heightened tension in US-Soviet relations, military preferences would probably
count for more than might otherwise be the case.
(5) If Andropov had become so seriously ill that the leadership decided
his condition necessitated his replacement, Gorbachev's chances of victory
would increase. Under these circumstances, Andropov himself might play a role
in the decision, and he appears to favor Gorbachev--perhaps because he regards
an innovative approach toward the economy as the most vital qualification for
a party leader at this juncture. Moreover, in an arranged succession of this
sort all Politburo members would probably participate in the selection
process.
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