PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE MOVEMENT THIS FALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000400560001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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MILTUN KU\INER L
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Vi : UDI REGISTRY
ROOM 7E47, HOS.
Prospects for the Peace
Movement This Fall
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Secret
NIC M 83-10018
September 1983
COPY 315
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NIC M 83-10018
PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE
MOVEMENT THIS FALL
Information available as of 19 September 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................................................................................1
DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................................3
Mood of the Movement ..........................................................................................3
Tactics and Targets .................................................................................................4
The Soviet Perspective ...........................................................................................5
After Initial Deployment .......................................................................................6
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The December 1983 deployment date has provided the peace
movement with a target on which to focus, and we anticipate a major,
last-ditch effort to stop the initial installation of INF. The largest
demonstrations are planned for Bonn, Hamburg, Stuttgart, London,
Rome, Brussels, and The Hague during the week of 22-29 October.
Moreover, countless local actions throughout the fall are aimed at
blocking military facilities, creating work stoppages, and confronting
local authorities. The diversity of groups and tactics will confront
governments with the difficult task of anticipating antinuclear events in
many different localities and responding in ways that maintain law and
order but avoid charges of political repression.
These fall activities, however, will mask the movement's interne-
cine quarrels over strategy and tactics as well as the growing resignation
of protest leaders that deployment is all but inevitable. Divisions
between Communist and non-Communist groups and between those
factions supporting and opposing violent action will probably grow
wider as the deployment date nears, making it unlikely that protesters
will be able to present a united front this fall.
The stage is also set for a shift in tactics and targets. While the
mainstream peace organizations-church groups, environmentalists,
leftists, and trade unionists-will concentrate on essentially nonviolent
mass demonstrations, their inability to alter government policies on INF
will encourage other groups to shift the focus to attempted disruptions
of US military operations, a wide variety of headline-grabbing "symbol-
ic" actions, and more violent acts. Small but militant groups are almost
certain to take more aggressive actions in West Germany and to a lesser
extent in Italy and the Netherlands.
On balance, NATO governments appear confident but not compla-
cent about their ability to forestall widespread incidents of civil
disorder. They are well aware of the implications of possible overreac-
Note: This Memorandum was coordinated within the National Intelligence Council and with the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the authors
Analytic Group, National Intelligence CouncilF----Iand F-----]Office of European Analysis,
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tions to such incidents which could become an issue of government
suppression of civil liberties, engaging others not currently involved in
the movement and thereby increasing the political costs of deployment.
This will be particularly true in West Germany, where the protection of
civil liberties remains an extremely sensitive issue in light of the
historical past.
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DISCUSSION
1. The peace movement is now moving into a broad
and well-orchestrated buildup phase that will climax
in hundreds of separate "peace" actions this fall in the
five INF basing countries. The December 1983 de-
ployment date has provided the movement with a
target on which to focus its protest activities. Over the
past year contacts among peace groups in most of the
INF basing countries have become more frequent and
more systematized; and financing for the fall cam-
paign, funneled through the churches and from those
Communist parties and fronts that are subsidized from
the East, seems assured. Thus, the movement will be
able to muster large demonstrations in major cities
during the week of 22-29 October and countless local
actions throughout the fall aimed at blocking military
facilities, creating work stoppages, and confronting
local authorities. Surveys show that while participants
in peace activities are in the millions, their number
does not appear to be growing and there are wide-
ranging estimates of the size of this fall's planned
demonstrations. West German officials, for example,
estimate that between 1.5 million and 3.0 million
demofistrators will take to the streets, 10,000 of them
with violent intentions, during the period before de-
ployment. We estimate that the movement in West
Germany may be able to call upon about 1.5 million
activists through the fall. Some militants predict that
the "high point" demonstration in Bonn on 22 October
will draw some 500,000 participants, compared with
the previous record of 300,000 two years ago.
2. Publicity devoted to the large marches has par-
tially obscured the movement's continuing internecine
quarrels and its inability to draw greater numbers into
its fold. It remains a complex mosaic of groups with
disparate political leanings, and protesters are unlikely
to present a united front this fall. We believe local
actions by individual groups will become more preva-
lent as the divisions between Communist and non-
Communist groups and between those factions sup-
porting and opposing violent action come to the
surface. Mainstream peace organizations-including
church groups, environmentalists, leftists, and trade
unions-probably will continue to concentrate on mass
demonstrations as a way to influence moderate opin-
ion, while radical groups believe that the October
demonstrations will discredit peaceful tactics and per-
mit them to take more aggressive steps against INF.
This split within the movement could become more
pronounced after deployment begins and create the
potential for greater violence.
3. The ambitious plans of protest leaders disguise
growing resignation that they cannot stop deployment
and that public involvement in anti-INF actions may
be leveling off. Some protest leaders have become
frustrated and concerned over their inability to affect
government policy or substantially to increase the
movement's strength as a pressure group over the past
year. Their efforts to mobilize other political and
social groups during the past year have encountered
only mixed success:
- Staunchly conservative governments have been
elected in West Germany and Britain, eliminat-
ing the possibility of ruling parties adopting some
of the movement's goals. The Francophone So-
cialists in Belgium now intend to participate in
protests this fall, but the Dutch Christian Demo-
crats, despite substantial antinuclear sentiment
within their party, have refused to cosponsor the
major peace demonstration in The Hague on 29
October.
European labor unions and Socialist parties-
especially those in West Germany-have become
more sympathetic to the movement's goals and
have cooperated with it, but have refused to
endorse national strikes, civil disobedience, or
violent actions.
Church leaderships in the key basing countries of
West Germany and Italy have refused to de-
nounce INF deployment as peace movement
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leaders had hoped; they have condemned violent
protest and have declared that nuclear weapon de-
ployments could be justified under certain circum-
stances. Also, while the Church of England's leader-
ship has approved a policy of "no first use," it has
rejected unilateral disarmament.
4. In the face of the movement's lagging momen-
tum, protest leaders continue to see public opinion and
the media as their strongest instruments in forcing
governments to change their INF policies. Sizable
parts of European publics remain opposed to deploy-
ment despite their governments' public relations ef-
forts to explain NATO's dual-track decision, and this
sentiment has, if anything, grown over the past year.
USIA-sponsored polls in June 1983 show that opposi-
tion to INF has dropped only in Britain; opposition has
increased slightly in West Germany and Italy; and
anti-INF attitudes remain stable but strong in Belgium
and the Netherlands (see table).
5. Protest leaders, while unhappy with their lack of
impact on government policies, take comfort in the
public opinion polls, and many probably hope that
lurid media coverage of peaceful demonstrators being
mishandled by local police or US military personnel
will boost their cause. The massive media coverage
that is expected-particularly during the October
demonstrations-may add incrementally to the public
opinion problems of the governments. We believe,
however, that governments see INF deployment as a
policy problem that can be managed despite its obvi-
ous unpopularity.
West European Unconditional Percent
Opposition to INF
July July June
1981 1982 1983
Tactics and Targets
6. The broad cooperation for large-scale demonstra-
tions in major cities-the largest demonstrations will
occur in Bonn, Hamburg, Stuttgart, London, Rome,
Brussels, and The Hague during the week of 22-29
October-will increasingly be overshadowed by a trend
toward more local and factional activities this fall.
Planned activities fall into three general categories:
- Large-scale demonstrations in a few key cities
will be led predominantly by leftist party lead-
ers, church groups, Communists and their front
groups.
- Widespread passive resistance campaigns (per-
manent peace camps, "human chains," fasts, and
so forth) will be attempted mainly by ecologists,
feminists, some church-related groups, and left-
fringe and autonomous groups.
- Direct, and possibly violent, actions will be led
by very small militant groups, possibly aided by
terrorist sympathizers, against military bases and
other government facilities.
7. The diversity of groups and tactics will confront
governments with the difficult task of anticipating
antinuclear events in many different localities and
responding in ways that will maintain law and order
while avoiding public charges of brutality and political
repression. On the whole, national and local authori-
ties appear equal to the task. Some officials, however,
will continue to worry that the political climate will
become "hot," because they cannot be totally confi-
dent that they have effectively planned for every
possible contingency.
8. More direct actions are likely to occur as deploy-
ment approaches and as radical leaders try to bring on
confrontations with US personnel in the hopes of
creating an image of US "brutality." Some radicals
may hope to create "martyrs" who can be used to
strengthen the movement's resolve to continue the
struggle and cast government leaders as reactionaries.
Some of these groups have already succeeded in
penetrating security perimeters around airfields in the
United Kingdom, Italy, and the Netherlands.
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9. There is a real possibility that terrorist groups on
the fringe of the peace movement might use the fall
anti-INF campaign to conduct attacks against US and
RAF sympathizers were able to incite rioting during
Vice President Bush's visit to Krefeld. Also, the West
German Government is taking seriously the possibility
that hardcore RAF members-who want to exploit the
INF and "peace" issues-may attack munitions trains
or other military and government targets.
10. The effect of terrorist actions linked to protests
or, more likely, of a major demonstration turning
violent would probably be to damage the movement's
credibility. Surveys indicate that civil disobedience
could reduce public approval of the movement by half
or more and that outright violence would eliminate
most of the movement's remaining support. Thus, such
intentional and unprovoked violence by small groups
would probably eliminate public sympathy for the
movement and generate greater factional disagree-
ments among peace groups about whether to condone
such behavior; this factionalism could also diminish
the movement's future effectiveness.
11. A less likely but more dangerous scenario would
involve an overreaction by local authorities to planned
anti-INF actions in anticipation of possible violence.
There is the potential danger-exacerbated by the
media's coverage of protesters' plans for obstructing
military installations and confronting police-that
state and local authorities might crack down prema-
turely or use excessive force. In that event, the issue of
violent protest could be transformed into one of civil
liberties, thereby engaging many not currently in-
volved in the movement and increasing the political
costs of deployment to NATO governments. This is
especially true in West Germany, where the protection
of civil liberties remains a very sensitive subject in
light of the historical record.
12. On balance, however, we believe that most anti-
INF activities will remain free of violence. The vast
majority of citizens-including many peace activists-
are opposed to civil disorder, and many protest leaders
believe that direct resistance tactics such as clashes
with police will damage the high level of support for
the movement found among moderate, trade union,
and socialist groups. Neveretheless, while protest activ-
ity this fall is not likely to live up to the most dire
forecasts in the media, the problems faced by govern-
ments could become more difficult if:
- Large and more moderate peace groups affiliat-
ed with churches, unions, or political parties
decide to support direct action against INF.
- Substantially greater public opposition to deploy-
ment becomes evident over the next few months.
- Terrorists become more heavily involved in
planned protest actions.
The Soviets give substantial support to militant
groups or the terrorist fringe.
The Soviet Perspective
13. The Soviets appear to be well aware that the
peace movement is unlikely to coerce NATO govern-
ments into rejecting INF deployment. Nonetheless,
they continue to court non-Communist groups on INF,
especially the West German Social Democrats and the
Greens and to subsidize local Communist parties and
front groups in order to push their own peace cam-
paign.
The Soviets are likely, however, to
keep a low profile toward the movement itself, in
order to deflect publicized accusations that Moscow is
manipulating protest activities. Thus far, orthodox
Communist groups in the peace movement have fa-
vored demonstrations over civil disobedience and have
argued against violence. We have no evidence that
Moscow will actively support violent opposition to
deployment. It may share the view of moderate peace
groups that violence would provoke a public backlash.
However, it is plausible that Moscow might come to
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view violent. protest-in the face of almost certain
deployment-as a way to delay or prevent full deploy-
ment, to raise obstacles against future NATO pro-
grams, and to promote further polarization of West
European societies.
After Initial Deployment
14. After a tense period this fall, the overall volume
of antinuclear protest activity in Western Europe is
likely to diminish unless there is another major contro-
versy involving US nuclear weapons. Over the last two
years, protest leaders have focused their antinuclear
campaign almost exclusively on the goal of stopping
INF deployment, so that passing the important mile-
stone of initial deployments is likely to produce a
psychological letdown among both leaders and com-
mitted followers. Trying to avert this setback, leaders
have redoubled their efforts to organize national and
grass-roots actions. Nevertheless, the more moderate
elements are likely to become resigned to deployments
and less actively involved in demonstrations. The most
militant activists, on the other hand, probably will be
the last to abandon their efforts. Thus, while demon-
strations in urban areas may become smaller, harass-
ment at US facilities probably will diminish more
slowly over the next year. Blockades, vigils, and
similar activities are likely to crop up periodically,
while sporadic attempts at illegal entry or sabotage
will pose a constant threat, especially in West
Germany.
15. Over the longer term, the peace movement is
likely to have difficulty maintaining the present level
of public interest and commitment to "peace" issues.
The movement has already begun to repeat itself and
become predictable-always a dangerous situation for
groups seeking publicity-and there is a strong possi-
bility that by mid-1984 the press may begin to under-
mine the movement by putting it on the back pages.
The movement's lack of new ideas, combined with
strong public disapproval of disorder and the psycho-
logical letdown that many, militants in the emotion-
filled movement may suffer after December, seems
likely to reduce the size of protest events in 1984 to a
fraction of that occurring during earlier peak periods.
As it becomes evident that deployments are continu-
ing, many protest leaders could begin to change their
goals and tactics. They will look first for specific
weapons issues of current appeal-such as the sensitive
question of chemical weapons in West Germany. At
the same time they probably will put greater emphasis
on more general disarmament issues like nuclear-
weapon-free zones and no-first-use proposals.
16. Thus, the possibility of increasingly violent and
uncontrollable peace demonstrations remains small,
but NATO governments are not complacent about the
task of managing protest actions. Despite their out-
ward assurances of confidence, West European offi-
cials remain anxious about the actions of extremist
groups, which are the most difficult to anticipate and
to counter. Also, NATO governments cannot rule out
the possibility that confrontations between protesters
and US military personnel could substantially fuel
anti-American sentiment. Accordingly, West Europe-
an officials can be expected to ask that the United
States keep a low military profile throughout the fall.
Moreover, NATO governments will strive to project an
image of confidence that progress in the Geneva talks
can still be made, in the hopes of dampening public
anxiety about deployment and thereby undermining
the efforts of the peace movement.
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