IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHAD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000400530001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 31, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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FORM
1 FEB N550- 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
31 August 1983
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligenc
Acting Nationa Intelligence Officer
for Africa
US is seeking.
possibly in ways that do not fit the goals that the
Attached is a short speculative paper on Chad
that Harry Rowen asked us to do. It has been
circulated to selected members of our intelligence
and policymaking "constituency" in the hope that
it offers insights into what we believe is a
problem that will take some time to sort out,
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81 AUG 1983
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHAD SITUATION
Introduction
Now that the French have intervened in force, the conflict in Chad is
entering a new phase that is likely to prove particularly vexing to US
policymakers. Given the relative balance between the opposing forces in Chad,
the most likely scenario is for a protracted stand-off during which the French
and the Libyans try to work out an agreement that leaves the country
temporarily partitioned, provides for the pull-back of some of the foreign
forces and leaves for later a political solution within the context of the OAU
or--less likely--under international auspices.
A much less likely scenario is a dramatic escalation of the fighting,
resulting in a decisive victory for the Libyan-backed Goukouni forces.* Such
a development could be set into motion by a serious military miscalculation on
the part of the French or, more likely, by a quixotic counteroffensive by
Habre, against the advice and without the support of the French.
Even under the best of situations, Chad will be a long-term problem for
US policymakers for several reasons. First, short of a sound military defeat
at the hands of the French or a major loss of political control at home,
Qadhafi will not give up his goal of ousting Habre and installing a regime in
N'Djamena that will accede to his claim to the Aouzou Strip and permit him the
use of eastern Chad as a springboard for subversion into Sudan. Second,
Chad's history of civil war and failed alliances strongly suggests that there
is virtually no chance of a lasting reconciliation between Habre and
Goukouni. A government of national unity led by those men would only become a
new arena in their long-standing power struggle. A Habre government in
N'Djamena will be a continuing target for subversion by Qadhafi and whatever
Chadian dissidents he can muster. Third, France and the US have different
interests in Chad and different perceptions of the role of Western military
power in that country. Finally, the Africans (and to a lesser extent the
Arabs) are divided over Chad and unlikely to be of much assistance either
individually or collectively through the OAU in furthering US objectives
regarding Chad.
* Obviously a Habre/French victory would be a positive solution from a US
standpoint and thus is not discussed in this paper.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe National Intelligence
Council's Analytic Group under the auspices of the Acting National
Intelligence Officer for Africa and the National Intelligence Officer for
Near East and South Asia. It was coordinated within the National
Intelligence Council.
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A Protracted Stand-Off
Over the short term, neither Qadhafi nor Goukouni will feel bound by a
cease-fire agreement or the outcome of any political negotiations that appear
to be going against Goukouni's quest for international legitimacy as president
of Chad. Qadhafi will try to make the most of the limited success he has
achieved in northern Chad by strengthening Goukouni's military posture and by
portraying Libya's role as an attempt to help a rightful ruler regain his
capital against neo-colonialist intervention.
If the current crisis ends in a de facto partition of Chad, the Africans
will welcome the respite but will do all they can to ensure that the partition
does not become permanent. All Africans agree to the inviolability of
national boundaries but not all agree on the question of who should govern
Chad. Although last year's OAU summit recognized Habre as Chad's legitimate
leader, the present conflict has prompted enough African governments to
reconsider their positions that efforts at an African solution through the OAU
could become protracted and rancorous. OAU chairman Mengistu already has
slanted his approach to the problem in favor of Goukouni and Qadhafi and will
be a serious impediment to an African consensus. Thus, the Chad question
could become as intractable and as long-running as the Western Sahara problem.
Most Arab states will be pleased by any outcome in Chad that leaves
Qadhafi frustrated and Habre in power. The Sudanese, who rightly feel most
threatened by Libya, will hope that any step up in Libyan aid to dissidents
opposed to President Nimeiri will be postponed by Qadhafi's need to focus
resources on Chad. Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be pleased by the belated
French intervention and may credit the US for encouraging it. The Maghreb
states, which Qadhafi is currently courting, will also be privately pleased to
see him bogged down in Chad. Only Syria and possibly South Yemen will back
Libya actively in diplomatic maneuvers over Chad and neither will offer any
meaningful military support.
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If Goukouni were to gain control of Chad, the problems of restoring order
and subduing local warlords, perhaps including a rebellious Habre as well,
would require a Libyan occupation force for some time. The financial,
logistical, and manpower demands would be formidable and might limit somewhat
Qadhafi's capabilities to cause trouble elsewhere. Qadhafi probably would not
wait for Goukouni to become firmly established before turning his attentions
elsewhere, however.
Qadhafi certainly will be tempted to renew his efforts to destabilize
Sudan at an early stage. With a dependent Goukouni in N'Djamena, his access
to eastern Chad would be improved. Some of Goukouni's forces are Sudanese
dissidents trained in Libya for the express purpose of subverting Nimeiri.
The Sudanese inhabitants of Darfur province, adjoining Chad, have long been
neglected by Khartoum. Their grievances could readily be exploited by Libyan-
trained agents and armed bands from Chad at a time when Nimeiri is beset by
internal problems.
Considering the weakness of the Sudanese military, the vast distances in
Sudan and the lack of modern infrastructure or military access facilities in
western Sudan, a Chadian-based insurgency will be difficult to counter. It is
virtually certain that in such circumstances Nimeiri will make,impassioned
appeals for US help in addition to whatever assistance Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
who would both be concerned over the projection of Libyan power into Sudan,
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U
A Chadian Chronology .
Late Nineteenth and France conquers the area; political and
Early Twentieth Centuries economic power is centered in the south, based
on new cotton farming.
1960
1964
1966
1968
1969
1971
1972
1973
1975
1976
1978
1979
1980
1981
Formal independence, with the north remaining
under French military control.
France withdraws from the north.
.Frolinat, a northern-based liberation movement,
is formed to resist repressive measures by
President Tombalbaye.
France sends in air force units against
Frolinat, under 1964 defense agreement.
France sends in 1,600 man ground force.
Libya recognizes Frolinat.
Libyan-French agreement, by which Libya ends
support of Frolinat.
Tombalbaye agrees to Libyan "annexation" of
Aozou Strip of northern Chad.
Tobalbaye killed in a coup; General Malloum
seeks reconciliation with Frolinat.
Frolinat splits between pro-Western Habre and
nationalist Goukouni; Chad and France sign a
military agreement.
Habre joins Malloum in the government; Habre
and Goukouni are reconciled and Frolinat
advances on N'Djamena; France sends
2,500 troops to support the government.
Habre, Malloum and Goukouni are reconciled, but
split; OAU names Goukouni as transitional
president.
Habre-Goukouni civil war; Goukouni calls in
Libyan troops; Libya-Chad merger announced.
Libyans withdraw and OAU sends in peacekeeping
force.
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1982
1983
Habre, backed by Egypt and Sudan, advances on
N'Djamena; OAU force takes no action; France at
first backs Goukouni; Habre chases Goukouni out
of N'Djamena, and is recognized by OAU as
President.
Border clashes between Nigeria and Chad in
April - June Goukouni advances into Chad from
the north with Libyan backing. Zaire sends
troops to support Habre. France sends military
equipment, and eventually, troops and planes.
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