REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBJECTS COVERED IN SECTIONS 728(D) AND (E) OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT OF 1981 AS AMENDED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 94
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 20, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

? -- Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
(_)c-j 11,4-
-efflifIDENTIAL 0.6'496--6' ?
REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR
WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBJECTS COVERED
IN SECTIONS 728(D) AND (E) OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION ACT
OF 198/
AS AMENDED
P.L. 97-1/3
JULY 20. 1983
-77017110fltitidAr
DECL: OADR
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
(L'
CONFIDENTIAL
I.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary
Summary and Introduction
Specific Elements of Certification
1
3
12
A.
Human Rights
12
- Judicial Reform
18
B.
Control of the Armed Forces
23
C.
Economic and Political Reforms
31
1. Agrarian Reform
31
2. Marketing Reforms
39
3. Financial Reforms
40
4. Political Reforms
42
D.
Political Solution
47
1. Amnesty
47
2. Elections
50
E.
Investigations into the Murders and
Disappearances of U.S. Citizens
53
1. Churchwomen
53
2. AIFLD
56
3. John Sullivan
58
4. Michael Kline
60
5. Patricia Cuellar
61
6. LCDR Albert A. Schaufelberger
62
IV.
Appendices
63
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
? c. Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
El Salvador is in its fourth year under governments
committed to building a lasting democratic order. Despite
major handicaps, including a long history of military rule,
dominance by a small elite, and more recently Communist support
for armed guerrillas, a hard-fought democratic process is
underway.
Direct presidential elections have been announced for this
year, to continue the process begun with last year's election
for a Constituent Assembly. The Assembly has become a forum in
which competition among political factions occurs in the
democratic spirit of compromise and consensus;, important
legislative decisions have been reached there in such areas as
the land reform program and passage of a new amnesty law during
a time of intense efforts by extremists of the left and the
right to undo this progress. The Assembly recently published
the draft of a new constitution which provides for enhanced
personal liberties and individual security against government
abuse and for a clearer separation of powers and increased
judicial review of legislation. The economic and political
reforms instituted since 1980 have been strengthened and remain
in full force.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
? D. Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
J CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
To broaden the developing democratic process, a Peace
Commission has been formed with a mandate to bring all factions
into the "Salvadoran family" through the electoral process, an
amnesty program authored by the Peace Commission has been
implemented successfully, and the Peace Commission has made
several public appeals to members of the Revolutionary
Democratic Front (FDR) and those that have taken up arms
against the government to find mutually acceptable ways for
them to participate in the democratic process, including this
year's presidential elections.
Progress toward ending violence against non-combatants and
controlling all elements of the armed forces has been less
clear. The Salvadoran Government is intensifying steps to
increase respect for human rights and to reduce human rights
abuse, especially among the security and armed forces.
Nevertheless, bitter civil strife and a virtual breakdown in
criminal justice continue to hamper development and
implementation of a firm program to identify and punish those
responsible for abuses. El Salvador has now begun, with U.S...
assistance, a major effort to reform its judicial system,
designed to address many of these problems. In the cases of
murdered American citizens, there has been uneven progress due
in large measure to the long-standing and more recent problems
associated with the judicial system.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-3-
II. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
Section 728 of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-113 ) establishes a
framework for U.S. assistance to El Salvador. This statutory
framework is premised on a congressional finding, set out in
section 728(a)(1) as follows:
The Congress finds that peaceful and democratic development
in Central America is in the interest of the United States
and of the community of American states generally, that the
recent civil strife in El Salvador has caused great human
suffering and disruption to the economy of that country,
and that substantial assistance to El Salvador is
necessary to help alleviate that suffering and to promote
economic recovery within a peaceful and democratic
process. Moreover, the Congress recognizes that the
efforts of the Government of El Salvador to achieve these
goals are affected by the activities of forces beyond its
control.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-4-
In order to assure that U.S. assistance to El Salvador
remains consistent with the foregoing policies, section 728(d)
requires certification to the Congress, at 180-day intervals
beginning in January 1982, that the Government of El Salvador --
(1) is making a concerted and significant effort to comply
with internationally recognized human rights;
(2) is achieving substantial control over all elements of
its own armed forces, so as to bring to an end the
indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens by
these forces;
(3) is making continued progress in implementing essential
economic and political reforms, including the land reform
program;
(4) is committed to the holding of free elections at an
early date and to that end has demonstrated its good faith
efforts to begin discussions with all major political factions
in El Salvador which have declared their willingness to find
and implement an equitable political solution to the conflict,
with such solution to involve a commitment to:
(A) A renouncement of further military or paramilitary
activity; and
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-5-
(B) The electoral process with internationally recognized
observers.
The July 1983 amendment to section 728(e) of the Act
requires a determination in the fourth certification that the
Government of El Salvador:
(1) has made good faith efforts both to investigate the murders
of the seven United States citizens in El Salvador in December
1980 and in January 1981, and to bring to justice all those
responsible for those murders, and
(2) has taken all reasonable steps to investigate the killing
of Michael Kline in El Salvador in October 1982.
We have included the disappearance of Patricia Cuellar and
the murder of LCDR Albert A. Shaufelberger because their cases
?are of concern both to the Executive Branch and the Congress.
The Government of El Salvador is committed to goals fully
compatible with the criteria specified in section 728 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1981. Despite great obstacles, many still beyond its immediate
control, the Government of El Salvador is taking steps which
address each of the certification criteria.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
? Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-6-
The Salvadoran Government is taking steps to reduce abuses
of human rights by its security forces. \ It has strengthened
institutions, repeatedly and forcefully emphasized the
importance of human rights at all levels, and generally
followed a democratic, reformist policy. This strategy has
produced the significant decline in abuses evident since the
certification process was initiated in January 1982, although
there has been a slight increase in press reports of civilian
deaths attributable to political violence in the past six
months.
The Salvadoran Government has failed, however, to accompany
this positive effort with a clear program to identify and
punish those responsible for abuses that still take place. As
a result, those elements of the society which operate outside
the legal and stated policy restrictions of the government,
including some members of the security forces, generally act
without fear of official reprisal.
In recent months, however, the Salvadoran Government has -
begun reform of its judicial system. This long-term program
will seek to upgrade the capacity and independence of the
system at the investigatory, prosecutorial, and judicial
levels. Passage of a new constitution, expected within the
next few months, will be a key step. Revision of Decree 507,
the state of seige law, is also expected soon. The U.S.
Government will assist reforms in the legal system with
financial support, technical assistance and training, both
directly and in cooperation with regional institutions.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
) CONFIDENTIAL
-7-
This effort will take time. Years of neglect and
disrespect for the legal system in El Salvador, aggravated by
the cruelty of the present civil conflict, make the task a
difficult one. But El Salvador already has achieved
significant progress in reforming other basic political and
economic institutions under the severely adverse circumstances
of the past three years.
President Magana, himself a lawyer, is personally committed
to this effort. In a report on the record of his
administration since its formation 14 months ago, President
Magana stated:
Regarding human rights, in the Apaneca Pact we committed
ourselves to respect them fully. This is a determination
that stems from our fundamental moral convictions and the
respect we have for ourselves. As an affirmation of this
purpose, on December 2 of last year the Commission for
Human Rights was installed. This Commission has promoted
the enactment of the amnesty law. In the same way, we ar-e
determined to reform our judicial system. To that end, a
commission of Salvadoran lawyers has concluded a report
recommending the guidelines for the reforms. In addition,
the draft constitution establishes the independence of the
judiciary and of the Office of the Attorney General with
authority and powers for a better public administration.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
J CONFIDENTIAL (
-8-
Political violence against civilians and disappearance of
civilians remain key problems. Press reports of civilian
deaths indicate that such violence is far below the levels of
1981 or 1982, but rose somewhat in comparison to the preceding
six months. Press reports of civilian disappearances have
stabilized at the relatively lower but still unacceptable level
noted in the last certification. Both trends are generally
confirmed by the information of Salvadoran organizations which
monitor human rights.
Success in achieving control over the armed forces has not
been realized, despite government efforts towards that goal.
Efforts to increase discipline and professionalism especially
in the treatment of non-combatants were complicated by the
aftermath of the January 1983 Cabanas mutiny, reassignment of
several high-level military officers, and escalation of the
civil conflict on both sides. The role President Magana as
commander-in-chief played in helping to quell the Cabanas
mutiny was positive, and the new minister of defense has issued
extensive oral and written instructions on armed forces
behavior toward civilians. Specific instruction on human
rights is incorporated in U.S. military training and is
provided by the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission. These
educational efforts, combined with the armed forces' own
instructional programs and the experience in civic action
projects which demonstrate the benefits of cooperation with the
civilian population, will contribute to increased sensitivity
within the armed forces and improved respect for human rights.
Approved For Release 2011/02/1.6 :. CIA:RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-9-
The most serious failure by the Salvadoran Government to
control the security forces has been lack of a clear response
to past abuses at La Florida and Santa Elena in late 1982, and
most recently at Las Hojas in February 1983. The initiative of
the new official Human Rights Commission in pursuing an
investigation of the incident at Las Hojas and delivering its
findings to President Magana is a positive step. Further
investigation is under way, and the government has appointed
special prosecutors to handle the case. But, as yet, concrete
disciplinary measures have not been taken.
The major economic reforms of 1980 -- redistribution of
farmland, nationalization of the banking system, and government
control of coffee and sugar marketing -- are progressing.
Under Phase III of the land reform, the "Land to the Tiller"
program, the high efficiency rate noted in the last
certification in awarding land to new claimants has accelerated
and protection from illegal eviction has been improved.
Progress made in the development of democratic institutians
is evidenced by the completion of the draft constitution, the
preparations for direct presidential elections before the end
of the year, repeated invitations to guerrilla-associated
parties to participate in the elections, increased activity by
political parties and labor unions, improved civilian control
over the regular armed forces, and the continued functioning of
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
(_)
CONFIDENTIAL
-10-
the Government of National Unity which emerged from the March
1982 elections and the Pact of Apaneca, signed by major party
leaders in August 1982. The Constituent Assembly has become a
forum in which
conducted in a
effectively as
extended Phase
competition among political factions is
democratic
a national
III of the
manner. It also functions
legislature. For instance, it
agrarian reform, enacted the amnesty
law, and adopted tax measures in a self-help effort to
strengthen the economy.
To broaden and add momentum to the developing democratic
process in El Salvador, the government has taken concrete steps
towards reintegration into the political process ofdissident
elements, including violent factions of the far left. These
steps have included formation of a Peace Commission with a
mandate to bring all sectors into the electoral process,
implementation of an amnesty program authored by the Peace
Commission, and authorization by the nation's multi-party
Political Commission for the Peace Commission to meet with
members of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) to find
mutually acceptable ways for them to participate in the
democratic process, including specifically the presidential
elections due to be held before the end of the year. The Peace
Commission itself has repeatedly issued a blanket invitation to
all dissident political factions to enter into these
discussions. This invitation has been repeated by President
Magana, most recently in his July 1 State of the Nation address.
CONF IDENT IAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-11-
The Salvadoran Government is making good faith efforts in
bringing to justice those responsible for the deaths of U.S.
citizens. Progress continues, albeit slowly, in the
prosecution of security force personnel accused of murdering
four U.S. citizen churchwomen in December 1980. The Salvadoran
Government has informed us that the case is ready to be
elevated to trial. There has been no progress in the case
against Lt. Lopez Sibrian for involvement in the murder of two
American labor consultants in January 1981, but the case
against two accused National Guardsmen has been raised to the
trial stage. In the case of John Sullivan, who disappeared in
December 1980 and whose body was not recovered until more than
eighteen months later, positive identification and medical
evidence gathered by U.S. forensic experts with the cooperation
of the Government of El Salvador will assist the investigation
in El Salvador. Three members of the Salvadoran army are under
detention for the murder of Michael Kline, and the case is
before the courts. There has been no progress in locating
missing U.S. citizen Patricia Cuellar or in resolving her
disappearance. The Salvadoran government is pursuing all leads
in the terrorist murder of LCDR Albert A. Schaufelberger.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-12-
III. SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF CERTIFICATION
A. Human Rights
Violations of human rights, including most importantly the
right to life, continued to occur during the past six months.
Armed rightist terrorists, including some members of the
government's security forces, bear responsibility for many
deaths attributable to political violence. The guerrillas also
bear responsibility for numerous violations (as witness their
execution of 18 unarmed soldiers and civil defense members on
May 8, 1983, and 27 unarmed soldiers on May 251 1983, in both
cases after they had surrendered).
The number of press-reported civilian deaths attributed to
political violence rose since the last certification. The
average rose from 160 per month during the last six months of
1982 to 177 per month during the first six months of 1983.
This compares to over 300 per month in late 1981 and early _
1982. Private Salvadoran human rights groups agree that the
level of violence has continued to decline from earlier levels
although their figures are consistently higher than those
compiled from press reports. (See appendices A.1 and 2 for
statistics on violence and discussion of methodology.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
LuNriuLNTIAL
-13-
850
800
700
800
500
400
300
200
100
0
clinuAN DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO POL VIOLENCE
(BASED ON REPORTS IN THE SALVADORAN PRESS)
?
% "4 1* lb 4, 4?0 "4 -6* 14, "et, t7, 44$ 11?,, w
%et, ? P
ti ,
,? ? ?e Ita 12 13 ? 13 12 0 4 4 &tt,
t
Civilian disappearances reported in the press during the
first half of 1983 continued at about the same rate as during
the last six months of 1982, about 39 per month. Elements of
the government
involved in or
In some cases,
security forces are believed to have been
responsible for many of these disappearances.
the individuals were later found to be in
rightist and leftist
government custody; in other cases,
terrorist groups are believed to have been responsible. (See
Appendix A.3.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
(,)
CONFIDENTIAL q_
-14-
The most prominent recent disappearance case involved two
Lutheran church officials, Rev. Medardo Gomez and Dr. Angel
Ibarra, who were detained on April 27 and held for 36 hours
before being remanded to National Police headquarters. Rev.
Gomez was released unharmed. Dr. Ibarra was reportedly
tortured before being remanded to Mariona prison and charged
with assisting the guerrillas. An American physician chosen by
the Mennonite Central Committee examined him on May 6 and
determined that, although Dr. Ibarra suffers from a congenital
bone disorder, he was not in need of immediate medical
assistance. Dr. Ibarra remains under detention and is in
satisfactory condition.
The level of violence against non-combatants and the
Government of El Salvador's failure to identify and prosecute
those responsible, including the perpetrators of two cases of
mass abuse from fall 1982 at Santa Elena and La Florida, and
most recently at the Las Hojas farm cooperative in February
1983 demonstrate a need for continuing efforts to achieve
compliance with internationally recognized human rights
standards and for implementation of a sweeping judicial reform.
In its 1982 human rights report on El Salvador, the
Department of State observed that some elements of the security
forces use psychological and physical coercion, including
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL (L)
-15-
torture, to extract information from suspected guerrillas or
their supporters. Conditions at Mariona and Ilopango prisons,
where Decree 507 prisoners serve their detention, are good.
Regular visits to these facilities by Embassy and Department of
State officials as well as by representatives of private human
rights organizations and members of Congress confirm that both
facilities are clean and well-administered, as measured by
commonly accepted prison standards in the U.S. and elsewhere.
There have been no allegations from prisoners that they have
been subject to inhumane treatment once confined at these
facilities. In contrast, prisoners now at these prisons claim
that when captured they were taken to clandestine detention
facilities or police barracks and subjected to electric shocks
and beatings in an effort to coerce confessions or extract
information.
The Human Rights Commission established by the Government
began operating officially on January 3, 1983. As of June 27
the Commission had received 540 inquiries or complaints. The
Commission has no way to obtain information on disappearances_
carried out by terrorist groups of either the right or the
left. But in 92 of these cases the subject of the inquiry was
located in the custody of government authorities and was either
released or placed in prison.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-16-
The Commission has established regular lines of
communication with the military and the security forces and
initiates investigations within 24 hours after receipt of an
inquiry. Commission President Monsignor Delgado gives frequent
lectures on human rights to military and security force units
and to the public. The Commission played an important part in
denouncing and then investigating the massacre of 18 farmers at
the Las Hojas Cooperative in February, and the Commission has
sent a copy of their investigation report to President Magana.
The Commission is currently hiring additional staff and
investigators to work in the field and opening regional offices
in Santa Ana, San Miguel, and San Vicente. This expansion
should enhance the Commission's impact. The number of requests
for assistance has risen recently in response to a radio and
publicity campaign that has created increased public awareness
of the Commission's activities.
Even Constituent Assembly deputies are not immune from
political violence. Mauricio Mazier, a Christian Democratic _
delegate who made a speech on May 4 attacking rightwing
terrorist groups and the "many abuses of the uniformed
services" was threatened by name by a group calling itself the
Secret Anti-Communist Army in a "communique" attached to the
body of a supposed-guerrilla found in Sal Salvador on May 6.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-17-
On June 28, Rene Barrios Amaya, former labor leader and deputy
from the ARENA party, was murdered. The Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL), a far left guerrilla faction, claimed
responsibility the next day. Although a conservative, Barrios
Amaya at the time of his death was a leading advocate of
liberalized labor provisions in the new constitution.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-18-
Judicial Reform
The Government of El Salvador faces severe constraints in
prosecuting crimes, because the Salvadoran legal system is in a
state of virtual collapse. Convictions in serious criminal
cases, in particular those with political overtones of any
kind, are virtually unobtainable because of intimidation
(usually only implicit) and corruption of judges, lawyers,
witnesses and jurors.
El Salvador's codes of criminal law and procedure date from
1972-74 and are comparatively modern, although rules of
evidence remain inflexible and outmoded. The fundamental
problem, however, is historical and institutional: a
fundamental lack of faith in legal institutions and chronic
lack of attention to the resource and other needs of the legal
system. This has been aggravated by the hatreds exacerbated by
the present civil conflict, by the willingness of both sides to
resolve disputes by extra-legal means, and by the general
climate of violence in El Salvador. In addition, budgetary -
constraints imposed by the war effort have further reduced the
judicial system's effectiveness.
The judicial career in El Salvador, except Supreme Court
service, is not prestigious. The court system's small budget
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-19-
allows only part-time operation and forces judges to practice
law outside, giving rise to conflicts of interest. The legal
system is plagued by the unavailability of basic legal
materials and lack of training.
The Fiscal, or Attorney General, lacks budgetary and
personnel resources to discharge his duties effectively. Like
the courts, the Fiscalia works half-days at low salaries.
There are only 30 lawyers on the staff; most of the work is
done by approximately 60 law students.
El Salvador has little capacity to conduct sophisticated
criminal investigations. The incapacity of police to prepare a
cogent case, the Fiscalia to prosecute it effectively, and the
courts to remedy investigative defects or produce convictions
have contributed to the adoption of extra-legal means of action
by elements of the security forces and others.
The dysfunction of the system is demonstrated most acutely
in politically sensitive cases, including abuses of authority
by members of the security forces, the murders of U.S.
citizens, and cases falling under Decree 507. Few cases in the
.past three years have resulted in a trial, conviction, and
sentencing. Even in less politically sensitive cases of murder
and other felonies, the rate of conviction is only
approximately 10-20 percent.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-20-
President Magana, himself a lawyer, is strongly committed
to legal reforms, as reflected in his State of the Nation
speech. He has appointed and shown personal interest in a
Judicial Reform Study Commission composed of the Attorney
General, the Minister of Justice, the Chief of the Justice
Department of the Armed Forces and representatives of the
Supreme Court and the Constituent Assembly legislative and
constitutional committees. This group has submitted a revision
of Decree 507 to the President and is preparing a program of
legal reform projects to be conducted by a new, expanded
commission which would include members of the private bar and
the law faculties.
Several substantive and procedural initiatives to improve
the administration of justice are now under way:
-- Revisions are contemplated for Decree 507 to spell out
in detail the sequence of events following an arrest for crimes
subject to military jurisdiction in a state of emergency such
as treason, espionage, membership in a subversive organizatian,
and sedition. The purpose is to eliminate prolonged detention
and afford a greater measure of due process.
-- A new constitution. This key step is discussed in
Section D.4.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
?
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-21-
-- Measures to provide physical protection to participants
in the legal process, particularly in sensitive cases.
-- Improved investigative and forensic capabilities,
possibly including the creation of a new criminal
investigations institute.
The United States Government has conveyed to the Government
of El Salvador its interest and willingness to help. In his
April 14-16 visit to El Salvador, Attorney General Smith
stressed the importance of legal reform to U.S. policy. In
April an inter-agency team was sent to El Salvador, as well as
Honduras and Costa Rica in order to provide greater insights
into problems affecting the administration of justice and to
review possible assistance projects. Senator Arlen Specter
visited in May, underlining congressional interest in broad
reform issues as
cases concerning
sensitive cases.
Deputy Assistant
Michel met twice
Commission.
well as concern about the slow progress
the murder of U.S. citizens and other
During a week-long visit in early June,
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs James _
with the Salvadoran Judicial Reform Study
in the
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL (r
-22-
In Washington, an inter-agency working group is developing
bilateral and complementary regional assistance projects to
follow up on our support for legal reform. We are developing
projects to assist in the training and management of the
Attorney General's office and the court system. Other projects
would assist legal education and the availability of legal
information. As details of possible program projects are
developed, funding needs will be assessed as will U.S.
statutory limitations, notably section 660 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1981, as amended, precluding foreign
assistance to "law enforcement forces."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
fl CONFIDENTIAL
-23-
B. Control of the Armed Forces
The Salvadoran armed forces must provide security for the
people and the economic infrastructure of the country against
guerrilla attacks. To accomplish this two-pronged mission, the
regular armed forces have grown from 9,000 in 1979 to 24,000 at
present. Additionally, there are approximately 9,000 persons
in the security forces. This necessary and rapid expansion has
taxed the armed forces' already weak command and control system.
The January 1983 certification reported that the government
had just resolved the crisis caused by the rebellion of the
garrison commander in Cabanas Department. The general order
precipitating the rebellion was modified by presidential
authority. Although signed by the Defense Minister, the change
was announced by the President and accepted by both the
military and civilian sectors of the country. These events
served to strengthen civilian control of the military
institution. However, the mutiny itself and the subsequent
high level transfers temporarily disrupted the armed forces'
effort to achieve control over its various elements.
The guerrillas began an offensive starting last October
which continued through January. Inhibiting the armed forces'
ability to counter the offensive was concern over the continued
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-24-
level of U.S. military assistance, which at that point was only
one-third the level of that received the previous year. Except
for a major operation in war-torn Morazan Department during
January, the armed forces tended to husband on-hand supplies
which they feared would not be replaced, allowing the
initiative to fall to the guerrillas. The capstone of the
guerrilla offensive was the sacking of the city of Berlin on
January 29, designed to coincide with congressional debate on
the last certification.
Increased civil-military cooperation is evident in the
government's National Combined Campaign Plan, which initially
will concentrate on the agriculturally important departments of
San Vicente and Usulutan. Violence is not endemic to all
regions of El Salvador, and the Campaign Plan is focussed on
two departments where guerrilla activity is widespread. The
plan has two phases -- first, to clear the guerrillas from the
operational area and establish popularly-based civil defense
'units to prevent the guerrillas from returning after regular
army units leave; second, and more importantly, to institute _
civic action projects that address the endemic social,
political, and economic problems which are both exacerbated and
exploited by the guerrillas. This second phase is under the
overall control of the National Commission of Reconstruction
(CONARA) of the Ministry of Planning.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
,) CONFIDENTIAL
? -25-
CONARA is charged with coordinating the civilian aspects of
the plan, including implementation of labor-intensive public
works, restoration of basic services, and expanding the
agrarian reform, which has been least successful in areas of
high guerrilla activity. In the current San Vincente campaign,
CONARA has administered the distribution of 86,000 pounds of
food to over 10,000 people. Twenty scholls have been reopened
by the Ministry of Education. Eight road projects are under
way, and two city halls destroyed by the guerrillas are being
rebuilt. The Ministry of Health has vaccinated 1200 people and
refurbished seven health centers and opened one new one.
In May shortly after assuming his post of defense minister,
Brigadier General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova circulated
"Human Rights Standard Operating Procedures" to all
commanders. The 31-page document covers such subjects as the
prudent use of force, respect for the civilian population and
property, correct treatment of prisoners, investigations of
human rights violations, and cooperation with the International
Committee of the Red Cross. (See Appendix B.1 for synopsis.)_
In the cover letter to this document the new Minister said that
"soldiers are not just to protect, but to promote human
rights." He added that only by "changing and improving
attitudes" will the armed forces help itself in the "struggle
against Marxist-Leninist aggression." He emphasized that
violations of human rights will be investigated and that
violators will be punished. He has emphasized the importance
he places on this document in visits to various headquarters
and units.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
) CONFIDENTIAL 1,1
-26-
In addition to the printed guidelines, in all operations
the high command now routinely includes orders on how the unit
is to conduct itself with the civilian population and the
procedures for handling captured guerrillas and defectors.
The armed forces, in general, are becoming more sensitive
to the treatment of both civilians and prisoners. Several
departmental commanders, most notably those of the three
immediate reaction battalions which carry the bulk of the
fighting, have initiated civic action programs intended to
generate or solidify civilian support for their forces. The
immediate reaction battalions, for example, regularly provide
limited medical care to the rural population wherever they
operate, and also endeavor to publicize their civic action
efforts with the domestic and international press. The
Atlacatl Battalion has significantly improved its relationship
with the civilian population while operating in Morazan
Department over the past two months.
In the past the army has been severely constrained in its_
efforts to exert control and discipline by a lack of junior
officers at the company and platoon level, a direct result of
its rapid expansion. The Salvadoran Military Academy
previously graduated about 15-20 new lieutenants per year, a
sufficient number for a small military that was not confronting
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
,
-27-
a sophisticated, well-supported guerrilla movement. To address
this shortage, the U.S. trained, at Salvadoran request,
approximately 500 officer candidates in the U.S. in 1982.
These cadet officers have acquitted themselves extremely well
since returning to El Salvador. The shortage continues,
however, and an additional 487 cadets now are attending similar
courses at Ft. Benning.
This program of instruction, although similar to officer
candidate training for U.S. personnel, is specifically geared
to conditions in El Salvador. Formal lectures in human rights
and the importance of gaining the support of the people are
reinforced by practical exercises. In simulated field
exercises, Spanish-speaking personnel role play as Salvadoran
peasants, and the cadets are required to react to changing
situations designed to test and increase their sensitivity to
proper treatment of non-combatants and captured guerrillas.
A basic tenet of all U.S. military instruction to
Salvadoran units and individuals is that a counterinsurgency_
can be successfully conducted when government forces are able
to deny the guerrillas the support of population. An integral
part of this training is that respect for indivdual human
rights is essential in gaining the willing support of the
people.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
,
CONFIDENTIAL
-28-
Only about 10 percent of presently active armed forces
personnel have received U.S. training. This problem is
aggravated by the attrition of those who have been trained.
The introduction of a higher pay scale for reenlistees is
helping to address this problem. Since the program was
initiated on March 1, over 2000 soldiers have reenlisted. The
Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) recently established
by Honduras will also help. The RMTC will initially permit the
U.S. to train a fourth 1200-man quick reaction battalion and
four 350-man cazador ("hunter") battalions. After completing
training, these troops will return to El Salvador to provide
security during this year's presidential elections. Through
formal instruction and field exercises the training program
will emphasize that respect for the rights of non-combatants is
necessary for defeating the guerrillas. This U.S. training is
a vital component of effective promotion of the objectives of
the certification process.
Although the High Command is mindful of the need to curtail
excesses by its troops, abuses occurred during the last six
months. There are also credible reports of the involvement of
some members of the security forces in right wing paramilitary
activity.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL (1'
-29-
The most serious incident was at the Las Hojas farm
cooperative, Sonsonate Department, where 18 farmers were slain
on February 22, apparently by elements of a Salvadoran unit.
In concert with the official Human Rights Commission, the High
Command initiated an investigation. The case is now before a
civilian judge, who is reviewing the evidence before
determining whether to raise the case to trial or "plenario."
The Government has appointed special prosecutors to handle the
case. Although the commander of the unit involved was
initially placed under house arrest, he has recently been
released.
?
The Salvadoran Ministry of Defense reports that since the
beginning of the year, six officers and 139 enlisted men in the
armed forces have been disciplined for abuse of authority and
for a variety of infractions and crimes. In all cases
involving common crimes, the accused were discharged from the
armed forces and turned over to civilian courts for
prosecution. The military does not follow these cases once
they are out of their jurisdiction. The accused are tried in.
local courts, and there is no centralized record of their
disposition.
Because of the difficulty in obtaining statistics, an
Embassy officer visited a particular San Miguel Department
twice since December 1982 in order to obtain data on security
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL (1
-30-
and armed forces personnel who have been disciplined in
civilian courts. The results provide some rough idea of
disciplinary actions in other departments as well. During the
initial visit in December 1982, the officer obtained
information on 17 cases involving civil defense, military and
police personnel who had been charged with serious offenses
ranging from theft to murder during the previous six months.
While most cases were still being processed at the time, five
cases had ended in convictions for the crimes of assault,
theft, rape, and murder. By May of this year an additional
three of the 17 defendants had been convicted of assault and
murder. Nine new cases had been brought against army or
national police personnel for charges ranging from assault to
rape to murder. All these cases were either still under
investigation or in the trial stage except for one case under
appeal. None of these cases, however, involved crimes
committed for political reasons.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-31-
C. Economic and Political Reforms
In his July 1 report to the Constituent Assembly on the
progress of his administration during its first fourteen months
in office, President Magana stated:
The reforms must not be evaluated only in terms of economic
efficiency alone, but also in terms of social participation
which, by decreasing the seriousness of the (social)
conflict, will avoid the tensions exploited to create a
climate of violence.
1. Agrarian Reform
El Salvador's agrarian reform -- one of the most
comprehensive ever attempted in Latin America -- remains on
track and is moving forward. The titling process has
accelerated, and protection against illegal evictions has been
increased. Agricultural production is being maintained;
training, extension, and credit services are being furnished to
new owner-operators; and the government is making determined
efforts to deal with the problems affecting the program and its
implementation.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
LuNriumia-1-1AIJ
-32-
Lack of access to land coupled with high population density
have been major sources of unrest in El Salvador for the past
several decades. Ownership of land was highly skewed. Before
the country's agrarian reform program began in 1980, 40 percent
of all farmland was held by only 0.2 percent of the population.
Over the past three years, much has been accomplished
through agrarian reform despite efforts of extremists on both
the left and the right to obstruct the program. Under the
program's two active phases, landless farm laborers and tenant
farmers are purchasing the land they tilled through
government-backed mortgages, with payment being made to former
owners by the Salvadoran government. More than 20 percent of
the country's farmland has now been redistributed. As of the
end of June 1983, some 83,183 farmers had received land through
the agrarian reform program. Including their families, more
than 500,000 people (some 18 percent of the rural population)
are now benefitting from the reform. (See Appendix IV.A for
statistics relating to the agrarian reform.)
The agrarian reform program is divided into three phases,
two of which are active. Under Phase I, cumulative holdings of
1,235 acres or larger (500 hectares) and some smaller
properties voluntarily offered for sale have been taken by the
government and turned into cooperatives of former workers and
tenants. About 15 percent of the country's farmland has been
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
UUNrIDLNTIAL
-33-
affected by Phase I. Some 317 cooperatives have been formed,
and most are beginning their fourth year of operation. These
cooperatives have 32,317 members, or about 194,000 people when
family members are included. However, 42 cooperatives located
in areas with strong guerrilla concentrations no longer
function or operate only sporadically. As part of the current
combined campaign in San Vicente and Usulutan, 29 of these
cooperatives will be reactivated.
Productivity, measured in terms of yield, on Phase I
agrarian reform cooperatives is comparable or superior in the
case of some commodities to that of properties unaffected by
the reform. Current production estimates indicate that Phase I
cooperatives are approaching levels comparable to average
recorded yields for the five-year period prior to the reform's
initiation. Estimates of the harvest just completed indicate
that the Phase I cooperatives, with 15 percent of the country's
farmland, accounted for 28 percent of export crops and six
percent of the basic grains produced.
There can be little doubt that the credit and technical
assistance extended to Phase I cooperatives on a priority basis
have enabled them to maintain area planted, total production,
and yields, under difficult growing conditions. Despite the
serious financial constraints, the Salvadoran Government
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
-34-
budgeted 118 million colones ($47.2 million) for its
agricultural research, training, and extension program during
FY-1983, of which the cooperatives and Phase III farms have
been primary beneficiaries. Production and investment credit
for agrarian reform beneficiaries has also been a priority for
the Government.
Since the last certification, the Salvadoran government
agency responsible for the implementation of Phase I has
inaugurated a program to strengthen the managerial capacity of
the agrarian reform cooperatives. To date 14 cooperatives have
benefitted. The program is bringing managers and accountants
to the cooperatives to explain the technical support services
available, describe the continued role of the government as it
relates to the cooperative, and discuss the procedures for the
managerial accounting system. By the end of 1984, the goal is
to select, orient, and place managers and accountants hired by
the cooperatives on approximately 280 cooperatives, and to
install uniform management and accounting systems on all 342
cooperatives by the end of 1984.
Under the decree establishing the agrarian reform,
definitive title for Phase I and Phase III properties cannot be
issued until final compensation is paid to former owners.
Funding for compensation would be a problem under the best of
circumstances. In a country where real GDP has declined 25
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
-35-
percent in three years, due in large part to the economic
sabotage of the guerrillas, compensation payments are an
especially heavy burden and have been delayed. Also, payments
have not yet begun on some properties where there is dispute
over compensation issues. assistance Under section 620(g) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, U.S. cannot be
used for the purpose of compensation.
The government recently substantially improved the payment
rate to former owners of Phase I land. Payment was in the form
of long-term interest bearing bonds for land, and a mix of cash
and short-term bonds for livestock, machinery, and equipment.
In the past six months, payments to 13 former owners totalled
$518,306 in cash and $14,7121680 in bonds. The government also
took steps to make the bonds a more attractive instrument of
payment. All interest payments on bonds have been brought up
to date. For most bond holders, these payments were the first
they had received and were up to three years overdue. Interest
coupons can be used to pay some taxes and are therefore traded
at a discount on a secondary market. The government is
studying ways in which the bonds could be traded in exchange
for shares in businesses now publicly owned.
Phase II of the reform was planned to encompass properties
between 247 and 1,235 acres (100-500 hectares), but has been
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
?
-36-
postponed indefinitely for lack of money, personnel, and
organizational resources. In the meantime land sales remain
frozen, and uncertainty over the timing of Phase II has
substantially curtailed investment in these farms.
Phase III allows
the land they worked
acres
(7 hectares).
former renters and sharecroppers to buy
as of May 7, 1980, up to a maximum of 17
In practice, the applications average
about four acres per farmer. Based on a Salvadoran government
study, 117,000 farmers are eligible for land under the terms of
Phase III. Progress on Phase III of the agrarian reform has
been substantial during this reporting period.
Appendix C.1 shows that, in comparison to the last six
months of 1982, increases in every category were greater than
those of the last period except for the amount of
compensation. Even so compensation to farmer owners increased
by some 70 percent. Over 2,000 definitive titles were
delivered this period compared to only 157 last period. The
number of property owners compensated now stands at 271, an _
increase of 135 in 1983. As of June, 1983, some 50,866 persons
had filed petitions for land, or 43 percent of those estimated
to be eligible. Including family members, more than 300,000
Salvadorans are now moving toward ownership of the land they
work under Phase III.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-37-
An extensive mobile campaign to increase the number of
beneficiaries was completed on February 28, 1983, just prior to
the expected expiration date of Decree 207. The campaign
brought 21,537 new applications. As expected, the monthly rate
of new applications dropped considerably after the campaign,
but a new mobile campaign is scheduled to begin this month.
In addition to promoting applications for land, the new
campaign will also work to speed up the entire process, from
application to definitive title. The campaign will recruit new
beneficiaries, collect proof of eligibility, and prepare field
inspections and financial plans with the goal of speeding up
the compensation and titling process. Some 500 new employees
will be hired for the campaign, and support has been promised
by farmer organizations.
In March, Decree 171 extended until December 31, 1983 the
benefits of Decree 207. It also gave departmental governors
the right to establish fines of 500-10,000 colones ($200-$4000)
for property owners illegally evicting a beneficiary. In
extending the Phase III, Decree 171 also clarified the
definition of those who could claim benefits under the
program.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL \
-38-
As had been expected, evictions did occur during planting
season, but apparently not nearly so many as during the same
period last year. An intensive government sponsored media
campaign and reinstallation of evicted farmers with support
from the armed forces arrested what might have become a serious
problem. According to Salvadoran government figures, there are
V
still 995 beneficiaries presently evicted, and reinstallations
are continuing. Some 692 evictions are in the east, however,
where reinstallation is more difficult due to guerrilla
activity. There are also likely to be some evicted
beneficiaries who have not reported their status. A study now
being conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture should give a
better indication of the scope of the problem.
The Salvadoran Government has established a system to
adjudicate disputed claims for land under Phase III. Disputes
are first heard at the departmental office of FINATA, the
Salvadoran agency which manages Phase III. Cases decided in
favor of the landowner are reviewed by the president of FINATA
in hearings at which both sides are present. As of April 30,_
oppositions have been filed by landowners in 1222 cases and
decisions rendered in 322. Of these cases, 213 were resolved
in favor of the landowner and 109 in favor of the beneficiary.
Of 88 reviews made by the president of FINATA 25 were resolved
in favor of the landowner and 28 in favor of the beneficiary;
the others were still pending.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-39-
2. Marketing Reforms
Early in 1980, the Salvadoran government nationalized the
marketing of two of the three major export crops -- coffee and
sugar. The government formed two state-owned companies, INCAFE
and INAZUCAR, to promote the marketing of coffee and sugar
abroad and domestically, to administer El Salvador's
obligations under international commodity agreements, to
purchase the raw production from the farmers, and in some cases
to manage crop. processing.
Coffee growers continue to seek to regain control of the
export market, arguing that government control has led to
inefficiency, low producer prices, and low export volume.
While a large part of these ills derive from a weak
international coffee market, there also appears to have been a
rupture in long established commercial relations which has
resulted in a loss of quality premiums formerly earned by
private exporters. Supporters of nationalized marketing argue '
that a continued government role in the export of this critical
resource is needed to control critically short foreign exchange
earnings.
Relations between INAZUCAR and the sugar growers appear to
be good. There is little serious movement at present to return
control over nationalized mills or marketing to private hands.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
,
CONFIDENTIAL
-40-
3. Financial Reforms
On March 71 1980 El Salvador's domestic commercial banks
and saving and loans associations were nationalized. The bank
nationalization law provided for the monetary authorities to
take over the management and control of the nationalized
institutions, carry out financial audits to determine their net
worth, compensate the former stock-owners, and return to the
private sector 49 percent of the total shares of the banks.
Prior to the 1980 reforms, ownership of the banks was
concentrated in the hands of a small group of individuals and
families, almost invariably identical with the families who
owned the large farms. Allocation of credit was largely
restricted to the landowners with large holdings. Thus,
nationalization of the banks was believed necessary not only to
further democratize the economy, but also to permit agrarian
reform to succeed.
Former bank owners have to date received 152 million
colones ($60.8 million) in compensation in the form of
five-year bonds bearing nine percent interest. All interest
and amortization payments on these bonds are now current. The
final audit determined the new worth of the nationalized banks
and saving and loans associations to be 232.8 million colones
($93.1 million).
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-41-
The Central Bank announced sale of bank shares to the
public on March 17, 1983. The monetary board established the
price of the shares according to the book value of the
institutions as of December 31, 1982. The central bank offered
to sell 20 percent of the shares to the employees of the banks
and savings and loans associations, and 29 percent to
general public, with preference given to the previous
But no one can hold shares of more than one financial
institution nor own more than one percent of the shares
single bank.
the
owners.
of a
The public has not responded as enthusiastically as
originally expected, with the result that funds the government
had hoped to use to finance payment of the bonds have not
materialized.
Nationalization did not significantly alter commercial
operations. The two foreign banks, whose charter extensions
until December 1985 were reported in the last certification
report, continue to operate in El Salvador.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-42- ?
4. Political Reforms
Following the March 1982 elections, the Christian
Democrat-Armed Forces junta dissolved and peacefully
transferred its authority to a provisional executive body,
named by the newly elected Constituent Assembly.
The government is composed of members of the major parties
that participated in the elections, including political
independents. The president, Alvaro Magana, is a political
independent, selected as a consensus candidate after no single
party received a majority of seats in the Constituent
Assembly. There are also three vice-presidents, each
representing one of the three major democratic parties, i.e.,
the PDC, ARENA and the PCN.
The Constituent Assembly is charged with writing a new
national constitution and acting as a legislative body until a
new one can be elected under the new constitution. It is
composed of sixty seats: twenty-four representatives from the
Christian Democrat Party (PDC), nineteen from the National
Republican Alliance (ARENA), ten from the Salvadoran Authentic
Institutional Party (PAISA), four from the Party of National
Conciliation (PCN), two from the Democratic Action Party (AD),
and one from the Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS). Political
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-43-
parties representing interests that previously tended to
express their opposition through violence are now competing in
domocratic form in the Assembly. Political debate is often
divisive, but the parties have shown themselves capable of
reaching important compromises.
Until a new constitution is approved by the Constituent
Assembly, the 1962 constitution remains in effect, subject to
the requirements of Decree 507 (state of seige), Decree 544
(wage and price freeze), and the agrarian reform.
El Salvador made clear progress in strengthening democratic
institutions. Despite problems, the process of political
reform continued. The process was and continues to be
characterized by consistent movement toward the creation of a
democratic state ruled by law. This year another important
milestone will be reached -- direct election of a
constitutional president.
The government's amnesty program, designed peacefully to
dissident elements to reintegrate in Salvadoran
society, is discussed in section D.1. An important part of
this effort is the goal of broadening the developing political
process to include the full range of national political
thought. The Peace Commission has issued an open invitation to
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
J CONFIDENTIAL
-44-
far left parties to participate in elections and is willing to
meet with them to find ways to ensure their security and access
to the media. The Salvadoran government recognizes that a
pluralistic, democratic system will require active opposition
parties, with a fair chance to gain power through institutional
means.
This report has also discussed in detail the direct
presidential elections called for before the end of the year.
The elections themselves are important, but the political
activity already under way by the parties to gain support, to
debate the platforms, and to select candidates, is also a
healthy sign of an emerging, dynamic political process.
The first draft of a new constitution is now being
published in Salvadoran newspapers, so that constituents can
communicate their views to their representatives in the
Constituent Assembly. Formal debate of the draft is scheduled
to begin soon in the full assembly. The drafting process has
had the added salutary effect of forcing an organized public _
discussion of major issues in the country.
The draft constitution strengthens the rights of private
citizens. Presumption of innocence until proven guilty is
codified in the constitution for the first time. Safeguards
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL (r
-45-
against excessive provisional detention and searches of the
home without a warrant have been expanded. Workers made some
important gains, including no fault severance pay, the right to
strike without previous approval by the Labor Ministry, and
social security coverage for rural workers and domestic
servants. Politically, the draft constitution would establish
a pluralistic form of government, and specifically notes that
the existence of an official party is incompatible with such a
system. Finally, some measures, although not as many as some
Salvadoran legal experts would have preferred, have been taken
to strengthen the judiciary. For example, the executive is
obligated to incorporate the Supreme Court's proposed budget
into the government's general budget without change, and the
attorney general will be appointed by the legislature, rather
than the executive. The constitution also delegates new
investigative powers to the prosecutor general and provides for
enhanced judicial review of legislation.
In addition to its responsibilities for drafting the
constitution, the Constituent Assembly 'also functions as a
national legislature. As such, it has taken difficult
decisions on extension of land reform, the amnesty program, and
a series of economic austerity measures, such as tax increases,
designed to strengthen the Salvadoran economy. Most
importantly, the assembly has become the primary organ for
political decision and debate.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
, ) CONFIDENTIAL
-46-
The Constituent Assembly has also provided an effective
forum in which sectoral interests, such as the labor movement,
can lobby in pursuit of their interests. Campesino pressure,
culminating in a demonstration several thousand strong by the
Popular Democratic Unity umbrella labor organization aided the
successful effort to extend Decree 207, the basis for Phase III
of the agrarian reform. In addition, labor representatives are
working with private sector and government representatives in a
tripartite commission to draft a new labor code based on the
new constitution. Organized labor is also actively cooperating
with the government to assist beneficiaries of the Phase III of
the land reform and is directly assisting many Phase I
cooperatives with advice and other support.
Although not a reform in the sense of a new law or the
creation of a new institution, the change of defense ministers
on April 18, 1983, is an indication of the growing cooperation
among segments within the democratic political system as well
as an increasing recognition of the authority of the country's
civilian leadership. This orderly transition, together with _
the role of President Magana, who announced the order ending
the Cabanas mutiny in January 1983 (see Section B), indicate
movement toward civilian control over the armed forces. This
is an important element in the development of democracy in El
Salvador, continuing to reverse the 50 year dominance of the
military over the political life of the country.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-47-
D. Political Solution
On February 23 President Magana announced that the
Political Commission had agreed upon the creation of the third
of the commissions envisioned in the Pact of Apaneca, the Peace
Commission. At the same time the Political Commission issued a
Plan for National Reconciliation based on amnesty, promotion of
"adequate social and political conditions," and "encouraging
all political and social sectors to join in the political
process." (See Appendix D.1 for text.)
1. Amnesty
On May 4 the Constituent Assembly unanimously passed an
amnesty law drafted by the Peace Commission. (See Appendix
D.2. for text.) Under this program which went into effect May
16, the Government offered amnesty to (1) Salvadorans in armed
rebellion against the government, including those in exile; (2)
prisoners detained under Decree 507 charged with crimes whose
penalties do not exceed four years and who have spent at least
six months in prison; and (3) prisoners already sentenced under
Decree 507 whose sentences do not exceed four years. Due to
terminate on July 16, the amnesty program was extended until
August 15 for those in armed rebellion.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
I.
)
CONFIDENTIAL
-48-
The bill established a three-member Amnesty Board with
representatives from the Peace Commission, the Human Rights
Commission and the Ministry of the Interior. The Amnesty Board
reviews amnesty petitions, issues identification cards to
provide legal protection to beneficiaries, and publicizes the
amnesty. A military judge is responsible for granting amnesty
to those held under Decree 507 and other laws included under
the program. An amnesty rehabilitation committee assists
beneficiaries in resettling inside the country or abroad.
The Government of El Salvador has officially asked the
Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to assist in
this resettlement activity. Canada and Australfa have begun
interviewing amnesty beneficiaries seeking to emigrate there;
the first group departed for Canada June 28. Belgium, Sweden,
France and the United States have informed ICM that they may
consider individual applications under the ICM program.
Out of approximately 730 Decree 507 prisoners in both
Mariona and Ilopango prisons as of May 15, a total of 535 have
been released. This includes all of the FDR/MNR (National
Revolutionary Movement) leaders arrested in October 1982 and
all of the ANDES (teachers union) members. The willingness of
the government to relea
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
r"\
CONFIDENTIAL
-49-
It appears that many former political prisoners, especially
those with the necessary economic resources, are leaving the
country. Only 128 of the former prisoners have officially
registered themselves as amnesty beneficiaries, but former
prisoners who have not registered are also availing themselves
of the Canadian and Australian immigration programs. There is
little information on the activities of former prisoners who
choose to remain in the country. To date, there have been no
substantiated reports that political prisoners released under
the amnesty have been physically harmed or rearrested, although
a week prior to the day the amnesty program went into effect
the bodies of two recently released Decree 507 prisoners were
found near Mariona Prison.
Between May 16 when the amnesty started and July 5, an
additional 121 new detainees were remanded to prison under
Decree 507. Only detainees who have served six months'
imprisonment are eligible for amnesty.
As of July 5, 152 former guerrillas, their supporters and
camp followers ("masas") had turned themselves in and were
processed as amnesty beneficiaries. Members of the Amnesty
Board state that 60 to 70 percent of these beneficiaries were
active combatants. The program has accelerated recently, due
to the program's gradually increasing credibility and to
increased military operations against the guerrillas.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-50-
2. Elections
During the visit of the Pope to El Salvador in March,
President Magana announced that presidential elections would be
held before year end, earlier than the March 1984 schedule
announced last year.
The coming elections will provide for the election of a
president and vice president by direct popular, vote. This is
another major step beyond the March 1982 elections in which
only the Constituent Assembly was directly elected; it then
named the interim president and vice presidents and approved
the Cabinet of Ministers.
A number of questions remain to be resolved regarding the
precise date and levels of government to be contested in the
elections; there are also technical and logistical problems.
The draft constitution addresses some of these questions while
the Central Elections Council (CCE) is tasked with resolving
the others, including writing a new electoral code. At this -
point it is probable that if no presidential candidate wins an
absolute majority, the winner will be chosen in a runoff
between the two leading candidates.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
r
CONFIDENTIAL
-51-
On May 30, the Peace Commission issued a statement to "all
Salvadorans, including the members of the FDR" to work for
national reconciliation. On June 6, Peace Commission President
Francisco Quinonez offered to "dialogue with FDR and FMLN
leaders about their participation in the next elections." In a
June 11 press conference Quinonez repeated the Peace
Commission's invitation to all Salvadorans to seek, by all
available means, the opportunity to live in peace. He went on
to say:
in particular, we reiterate our position [of] inviting the
FDR, if it is disposed and interested in participating in
the democratic process....to make this [desire] known. As
you all know, the Peace Commission last month made an
official declaration with regard to this invitation.
....[O]n June 3...the Commission reiterated this invitation
and clearly directed itself to the FDR, with the express
objective of demonstrating the political decision of the
Peace Commission, backed by the the Pact of Apaneca and its
Political Commission, to carry out conversations with the
objective of including or taking the FDR into consideration
in the democratic process, and I repeat, specifically in
the upcoming electoral event.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-52-
On July 12 the Peace Commission repeated the invitation and
expressed its regret at the FDR's apparent unwillingness to
enter into dialogue.
In his July 1 report to the Constituent Assembly, President
Magana stated:
...to negotiate the distribution of power would be to rob
and betray the mandate of the electors who are the great
majority of all Salvadorans, which my government cannot do
for peace.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-53-
E. Investigations of the Murders and Disappearance
of American Citizens'
1. Churchwomen
Since the January certification, the case against the
National Guardsmen for the December 1981 murder of four U.S.
citizen churchwomen has continued to wend its way through the
Salvadoran judicial system. The guardsmen remain in detention.
At the end of the last certification period the Salvadoran
investigating judge had just elevated the case against the five
ex-national guardsmen to the "plenarie or final stage of the
trial. The defense attorneys for the guardsmen promptly
appealed the judge's ruling. On March 11 an appellate court
confirmed that the judge had properly elevated the case to the
plenario, but returned the case to him for further
clarification concerning other crimes such as theft, ancillary
to the murder of the churchwomen. (Under Salvadoran law a
defendant must be tried simultaneously for all crimes committed
'We have included the disappearance of Patricia Cuellar and
the murder of LCDR Albert A. Schaufelberger because their cases
are of concern both to the Executive Branch and to the Congress.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
?
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-54-
during a criminal act.) This remand also created the
opportunity to admit into the record certain evidence analyzed
by the FBI, such as ballistics tests, that had not been
previously admissable because of the requirement of Salvadoran
law that all such tests be conducted in El Salvador. With the
help of an FBI ballistics expert, the National Police have now
confirmed earlier evidence linking one of the defendants
directly to the crime. The National Police were also able to
link a second defendant directly to the crime through
examination of a rifle not available to the FBI during its
initial tests. This evidence is legally admissible in
Salvadoran courts and considerably strengthens the case against
the defendants.
President Magana announced in Washington that the case
would go to trial within eight weeks -- or the middle of
August. Realistically, the defense attorneys will avail
themselves of every benefit available under Salvadoran law and
practice, and further delays cannot be ruled out. Given the
opporunities for delay afforded defense counsel under the
Salvadoran system, in particular liberal interlocutory appeals,
this case has moved toward trial at a sustained, if slow,
pace. The Government of El Salvador appears to have made a
conscientious effort to prosecute these murders, and the
criminal law and procedure of El Salvador are being respected
and applied.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-55-
In response to Congressional suggestions, the Secretary of
State invited Judge Harold G. Tyler, former Deputy Attorney
General, to conduct a review of all materials available to the
United States Government concerning this case and to recommend
any further actions that the United States Government might
take to be helpful in these prosecutions.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-56-
2. The American Institute for Free Labor Development
(AIFLD) Consultants
The attorney general is continuing to pursue the
prosecution of the murders of Michael Hammer and Mark Pearlman,
but the prosecution has been stymied by adverse rulings by the
Salvadoran courts. On April 29 the appellate court in San
Vicente denied the attorney general's appeal of the
investigating judge's decision not to bring charges against Lt.
Rodolfo Lopez Sibrian and to dismiss the charges against
Ricardo Sol Meza and Hans Christ. This decision definitively
closes judicial proceedings against Sol Meza and Christ and
provisionally closes proceedings against Lt. Lopez Sibrian, if
no new evidence is found.
Though charges were dismissed against Sol Meza and Christ
for lack of evidence, a number of questions remain unanswered
concerning the extent of their involvement in the murders.
The dismissal of charges against Lopez Sibrian, as well as
the others, was a major setback, particularly because of the
substantial body of evidence indicating that Lopez Sibrian
ordered two guardsmen to commit the murders. Given the
substance of the available information, we believe that the
extent of the alleged participation of Lopez Sibrian, Sol Meza
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-57-
and Christ in the murders should be determined by a full trial
on the merits. In an effort to reverse the appellate court
decision, the attorney general has appealed that decision to
the Supreme Court. The grounds for obtaining Supreme Court
review, however, are narrow and procedural in nature and
generally do not go to the merits of the case. We expect the
Supreme Court to reach a decision soon.
In a companion case, the appellate court affirmed the lower
court decision to commence full trial proceedings against the
two confessed guardsmen who were directly responsible for
carrying out the murders. As of this writing, the Department
has not been advised of a trial date for those two defendants.
In spite of threats, intimidation, and adverse judicial
rulings that have hampered prosecution of the AIFLD murder
case, the Salvadoran executive branch continues to make a good
faith effort to bring to justice those responsible.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-58-
3. John Sullivan
On February 25, 1983, the Sullivan family announced that
the body of John J. Sullivan, Jr., had been located in El
Salvador and brought to the United States where it was
positively identified. Mr. Sullivan was killed apparently
during the night of December 28/29, 1980. His body, which had
been mutilated to the extent that identification was impossible
by normal means, was found near Nuevo Cuscatlan, El Salvador,
on the morning of December 29, 1980, and buried the following
day. In June 1982, ?an anonymous note directed the American
Embassy's attention to the burial of the as yet unidentified
remains. The body was first exhumed in July 1982 and examined
by a Salvadoran medical examiner, who reported that the body
was not that of Mr. Sullivan. However, subsequent review of
x-rays of the remains called into question the accuracy of the
Salvadoran examiner's findings. The remains were re-exhumed
with the full cooperation of the Salvadoran Government and
brought to the United States for further examination in
February 1983, when identification was made.
Despite the identification of Mr. Sullivan's remains, very
little progress has been made toward learning the identity of
his killers. The American medical examiner was unable to
determine the exact cause of Mr. Sullivan's death, nor was he
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-59-
able to find any forensic evidence that might assist in finding
the killers. The author of the anonymous note directing the
Embassy to Sullivan's grave turned out to be a person who,
passing through Nuevo Cuscatlan, heard local gossip which he
reported to the Embassy. He could add nothing further. The
medical examiner's report has been forwarded to the appropriate
Salvadoran authorities and will provide the formal legal basis
for the continuing investigation into Mr. Sullivan's death.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
%?\
\- CONFIDENTIAL
-60-
4. Michael Kline
Since the last certification, the Salvadoran military has
completed its investigation of the October 13, 1982, shooting
of an American traveler, Michael Kline, by Salvadoran
soldiers. Mr. Kline was traveling through El Salvador by
public bus en route to Costa Rica when the bus was stopped at a
checkpoint by Salvadoran soldiers. The soldiers apparently
decided Mr. Kline was acting suspiciously and that they would
take him to their headquarters at San Francisco Gotera. Mr.
Kline was killed by the soldiers on the way. Although the
soldiers originally stated that they shot Mr. Kline at a
distance while he was attempting to escape, an autopsy
indicated that the shots were fired from close range. An
investigation of the incident was begun by the military.
On March 11, the Salvadoran Minister of Defense announced
that the three soldiers present at the shooting had been
detained and would be turned over to civilian courts. The
three soldiers are in prison while the judge of first instance
in San Francisco Gotera conducts his own investigation of the
killing.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
n 1,
CONFIDENTIAL
-61-
5. Patricia Cuellar
The disappearance of dual Salvadoran-American citizen,
Patricia Cuellar, remains unsolved. Ms. Cuellar disappeared
from her residence in San Salvador on July 18, 1982. Within 24
hours, her father, a Salvadoran citizen who was executive
director of a major businessmen's association, and his maid
also disappeared. Upon learning of her disappearance, the
Embassy immediately sought the assistance of senior Salvadoran
officials in attempting to locate these individuals. President
Magana and then Defense Minister Garcia assured the Embassy
that the agencies and personnel of the Government of El
Salvador, including the armed forces, were not involved in the
abductions. An eyewitness who was interviewed by the National
Police and polygraphed by the FBI was unable to offer any new
evidence. Salvadoran government investigators are continuing
their investigation of this case.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
6. Lieutenant Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger
On May 25, 1983, Lieutenant Commander Albert A.
Schaufelberger, U.S. Navy, Deputy Commander of the U.S.
Military Assistance Group in El Salvador, was shot and killed
in a parked car on the grounds of University of Central
America in San Salvador. The gunman was assisted by two
accomplices, another armed person and a driver. Composite
drawings of the suspects have been made by the National Police
but no suspects have been apprehended. The Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL) and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front,
the umbrella organization to which the FPL belongs, have
claimed responsibility for LCDR Schaufelberger's murder.
Available evidence confirms their claim to culpability in this
terrorist action.
The Government of El Salvador has set up a working group to
investigate this crime, and it is pursuing all leads. U.S.
Government investigative personnel are assisting in this effort.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-63-
IV. APPENDICES
Table of Contents
A. Human Rights
1. Statistical Methodology
2. Civilian Deaths Attributable to Political Violence
3. Civilian Disappearances
B. Control of the Armed Forces
1. Human Rights Standard Operating Procedures
C. Economic and Political Reforms
1. Agrarian Reform Statistics
D. Political Solution
1. Plan for National Reconciliation
2. Text of Amnesty Law
3. Statement by Peace Commission, May 30, 1983
4. Statement by Peace Commission, July 12, 1983
E. Miscellaneous
1. Remarks by President Magana in Washington,
June 17, 1983
2. President Magana's State of the Nation Address,
July 1, 1983
3. Historical Setting
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
(12'
APPENDIX A.1.
STATISTICAL METHODOLOGIES USED IN REPORTING
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED DEATHS
The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador has kept systematic records on public
reports of political violence in El Salvador since September 16, 1980. A
weekly violence report is prepared using data derived from the four San
Salvadoran dailies; Prensa Grafica, Diario de Hoy, Diario Latino, and El
Mundo. For consistency's sake, these statistics are culled only from
information in the Salvadoran press. The newspapers are reviewed daily
and articles crosschecked to avoid duplication. The reports of deaths
and violent incidents are then listed.
The Embassy recognizes that this method does not record every death
resulting from political violence. The actual totals are certainly higher.
But for all its faults this system has the benefit of consistency and allows
trends and patterns to be discerned from the data thus accumulated.
The primary source for newspapers reporting on civilian deaths are the
justices of the peace located in municipalities throughout the country. One
of the primary tasks of the justice is the identification and registration of
bodies. Except for the areas with the greatest incidence of armed conflict,
justices file regular reports with the courts. To the extent that reporters
check with the courts, the figures are an accurate reflection of reported
deaths. Not all deaths are reported, and not all areas are covered by
reporters or justices. The figures are subject to a degree of under-
reporting, but they do accurately reflect trends. Disappearances are
reported directly to the press by family members or are taken from court
records.
Casualties resulting from military operations are not included in the
Embassy figures. The Embassy figures distinguish between press reports of
guerrillas killed in action and civilian deaths attributed to political
violence. This is in contrast to the methodology employed by the groups
compiling figures on political violence in El Salvador. Immediately fol-
lowing the July 28, 1982 certification, all the human rights organizations
that follow violence changed their methodology. These groups now include all
deaths, except armed forces casualities, as civilian political deaths. Press
reports of guerrillas killed in action and civilian deaths attributed to
political violence are combined into a single category, deaths attributed to
security forces and paramilitary squads. If the guerrillas admit, presumably
by means of Radio Venceremos, that they suffered losses during military
operations, this number is subtracted from those announced by the military.
However, guerrillas do not regularly admit to losses.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
- 2 -
Organizations compiling figures on political violence in El Salvador and
their methodologies are as follows:
-- The Legal Aid Office (Officina Tutela Legal) of the Archdiocese
Commission of Justice and Peace replaced the Socorro Juridico. The
Commission began reporting on disappearances in May 1982. In mid-July,
1982, the Commission began issuing violence statistics, derived primarily
from press reports. The Commission also monitors figures on deaths from
Radio Venceremos (the guerrillas' clandestine radio station), denunciations
by family members, and other human rights groups' statistics. These figures
. may be subject to duplication of reporting from other sources. They may also
be inflated since there is no distinction made between press reports of
guerrillas killed in action and civilian deaths attributed to political
violence.
-- The Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES). CDHES collects
information and issues reports on human rights from its office in the
Archbishopric. Its figures on deaths and disappearances are taken from
newspapers, other human rights organizations, and, on occasion, personal
observation. The figures may be subject to inflation through duplication of
reporting by other sources, and to inflation by not distinguishing between
press reports of guerrillas killed in action and civilian deaths attributed
to political violence.
-- The University of Central America (UCA). The UCA acts as a human rights
information clearing house, taking its information from newspapers and other
human rights organizations. The UCA also fails to distinguish between press
reports of guerrillas killed in action and civilian deaths attributed to
political violence.
-- Socorro Juridico Cristiano. When the Socorro Juridico was removed from
the Archbishopric in May, it changed its name to Socorro Juridico Cristiano.
Its statistics and methods of compiling statistics correspond almost exactly
to those issued by the Archdiocese Commission of Justice and Peace. The
Socorro Juridico Cristiano's figures may also be subject to duplication of
reporting from other sources, and to inflation by not distinguishing between
press reports of guerrillas killed in action and civilian deaths attributed
to political violence.
Because of the inaccuracies inherent in violence reporting and the pos-
sibility of duplication, the reliability of the figures cannot be estab-
lished. Nevertheless, both the statistics compiled by the Embassy from
press reports and those issued by the various human rights organizations
do demonstrate trends, despite the differences in their data base and their
methodology.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
APPRMTY A.2
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
CIVILIAN DEATHS ATTRIBUTABLE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE
1980
Press
11.4=1IL
October
819-
November
779
December
575
Total:
2,173
1981.
January
565
February
481
March
599
April
493
May
454
June
392
July
534
August
479
September
296
October
345
November
244
December
349
Socorrol CDNES2 UCA3 CDJP4
mum
1,383 1,038
718 962
700 687
2,801 2,687
2,644 2,293 2,333
903 1,402 1,402
1,922 1,704 1,622
2,311 3,048 2,341
536 712 547
744 730 685
586 819 667
582 654 592
472 498 486
438 975 1,038
820 1,295 216
1,395 2.146 4?1???
Total:
1982
5,331
4=MMEIMMIM.
13,353
.1=MIMIIIM.
16,276
;11,929)
January.
279
466
626
539
February
361
530
405
387
March
438
526
905
483
April
170
805
235
353
May
233
375
269
334
Jima
188
355
433
487
355'
July
163
199
125
316
109
August
196
702
457
681
584
September
162
473
143
233
185
October
145
618
480
156
48.2
November
/38
620
142
200
217
December
157
296
520
131
380
Total:
2,630
5,965
4,740
4,300
2,322
1983
January
228
378
672
279
437
February
237
657
350
317
550
March
122
471
184
142
335
April
158
455
326
201
392
May
183
485
343
158
510
June
126
377
396
134
346
Total:
1,054
2,823
2271
1.231
2570
4-Socorro Jurtdico became the Socorro Juridico Cristtano tn May 1.982 after
Lt was replaced tn the archdiocese by the COMP.
2The Suman lights Commission of El Salvador (CDNES); not associated with
the Government of El Salvador's Rumen Rights Commission.
3The University of Central America ;UCA)
4Archbtshoprtc Cammission of Justice and Peace (CD.!?)
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
(
850
SOO
100
600
SOO
400
300
200
100
0
CIVILIAN DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO POL VIOLENCE
RASED ON REPORTS IN THE SALVADORAN MSS)
db.
PRESS
REPORTS 3800
2800
2600
soccona
2400
Amoco
2280
2800
coHES
1800
1608
uc4 1400
1200
1000
808
608
408
200
tt, %). "ez, '44 let 1+ 1**
%?Q, , ?, ? *, ? .tta ?00 .12 IP .44 .etp
CIVILIAN DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO POL VIOL.
(ACcoROMO TO VAPED SOURcES)
N.
A
_/
/1/4
_
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101 1121314151617181920212223242526272829303 13233
OCr, 80
Aft 81
44$1.
.bui.83
JUN
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
AFLNDIX A.3
CIVILIAN DISAPPEARANCES
PRESS 1 2 3
1981 REPORTS CDHES UCA CDJP
August 61
September 51+
October 40
November 11
December 33
Total I?T
1982
January
44
91
102
?=1.
February
33
15
86
-
March
46
23
57
AMM
April
52
.15
16
May
23
-
35
68
June
27
26
52
54
July
57
14
67
61
August
54.
17
129
82
September
-34
15
90
49
October
26
31
68
47
November
36
23
88
54
December -
25
11
60
37
Total
457
281
850
452
1983
January
39
41
56
56
February
25
44
60
32
March
34
27
28
33
April
33
25
100
48
May
53
44
73
90
June
48
23
145
67
Total
232
204
462
326
1. The Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDS); not
associated with the Government of El Salvador's Human Rights
Commission.
2 University of Central America (IICA)
3. Archbishopric Commission of Justice and Peace (CDJP)
Note: Data on civilian disappearances is subject to the same
inaccuracies as that on deaths. Reports for the most part come
from urban areas. They are not corrected for errors, releases of
detainees, reappearances, etc.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
APPENDIX B.1
SYNOPSIS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EL SALVADOR STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES (SOP) IN COUNTER SUBVERSIVE OPERATION
Forwarding Letter
.Dated May 13, 1983, and signed by Minister of Defense Brigadier General
Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, this covering letter directs recipients to
distribute the attached SOP so that existing attitudes and conduct can be
adjusted to those procedures contained in the SOP. The letter also makes
clear that violations will be investigated immediately and appropriate
sanctions will be impOsed where warranted. The letter makes it manifestly
clear that the SOP applies to all officers, non?commissioned officers,
soldiers, and to the security forces as well as the regular armed forces.
The SOP
The document is divided into two parts. The first is a sumary of armed
forces counter subversive operations, while the second part outlines
procedures for the handling of individuals detained by the armed forces.
Highlights of Part I
The Code of Conduct
(1) I am a representative of the government of El Salvador.
(2) I will always act in a military manner.
(3) It is my duty to support and defend the constitution and
the rights which it guarantees to the people.
(4) It is my duty to protect the lives and property of all
Salvadorans.
(5) It is my duty to report, and if necessary arrest anyone who
violates the law or constitution.
(6) In action, I must respect the constitution and keep in mind
peoples' human rights. I will not mistreat anyone, nor
deny medical treatment.
(7) I will use minimum force necessary to accomplish my mission.
(8) If it is necessary to shoot, I will not shoot to kill, but
?to wound.
(9) When necessary, I have the obligation and authority to
arrest those who violate laws.
(10) At all times my conduct during and after duty hours will be
in accordance with the laws of the country and the orders
of my superior officers.
A section of "Standards of Conduct" stresses use minimum force
necessary, and proper treatment of civilians.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Eight principles of courtesy for members of the Armed Forces.
(1) Be pleasant and courteous.
(2) Private and public behavior should be excellent.
(3) Serve efficiently.
(4) Project a good image of the armed forces.
(5) Show respect and understanding.
(6) Be just, humane, and equitable.
(7) Be even tempered.
(8) Remember that you are a public servant.
The remainder of Part I provides examples of applying the forgoing to
specific situations. The all-pervasive tone is that the minimum force
necessary should be applied, and that respect for human rights if
fundamental.
Highlights of Part II
- The arrest of all suspects will be made by personnel in uniform. Only
when specifically authorized can military or security personnel make arrests
while in civilian clothes.
- 'Prisoners are to be treated humanely and given needed medical attention,
adequate food, and visitation by the Red Cross and the Human Rights
Commission.
- A special section is devoted to the procedures for handling members of
the armed forces who are arrested for criminal activities or human rights
violations. Commanders of such personnel are required to notify the General
Staff immediately and to conduct a thorough investigation. Results of the
investigation are then to be furnished to the General Staff and to the
Ministry of Defense. During the investigation, commanders are authorized to
place the suspected service member under arrest. If sufficient proof of
guilt is available, the suspects are to be turned over to proper judicial
authority.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
APYLVV. U.I.
PHASE III AGRARIAN REFORM STATUS (DECREE 207)
As of
As of
Change
Last
12/31/82
6/30/83
Change
Period
Number of Farmers who
have Filed Title
Applications for Land
(direct beneficiaries)
39,344
50,866
+11,522
+9,638
Total Beneficiaries
(estimated at 6 members
per family)
236,064
305,196
+69,132
+57,828
Land Area Affected
(acres)
155,237
199,023
+43,786
+34,137
Title Petitions Filed
50,409
64,687
+14,278
+13,174
Provisional Titles
Issued
34,674
42,415
+7,741
+2,325
Property Owners
Compensated
136
271
+135
+123
Amount of Compensation
Paid (US Dollars)
3,584,199
6,022,412
+2,438,213
+2,970,069
Definitive Titles
408
2,453
+2,045
+157
Reinstallation of
Evicted Beneficiaries
2,532
3,656
+1,124
+394
Total Government
Credit to Credit to Phase I
Agricultural Sector
($ Millions)
Cooperatives
($ Millions)
1980/81
322.70
105.60
1981/82
382.40
74.00
1982/83
414.20
127.30
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
PLAN FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
Issued by Political Commission
February 23, 1983
The Political Commission reaffirms that the solution to the problem of
violence must be an essentially political and democratic one. It is therefore
essential to carry out, in a continuous and permanent fashion, the necessary
efforts to achieve the goals of the democratic process, which is the only road
to peace. The Commission therefore categorically rejects the recourse to
arms, imposed and supported by forces from abroad, because it is odious to
Salvadoran aspirations. The Salvadorans have repeatedly expressed their
inclination for peace and democracy as well as their confidence in the process
already begun. This process will be fulfilled, according to the government's
political calendar, in next year's elections, where the people will freely
choose its representatives.
The Political Commission unanimously reaffirms its unwavering decision to
maintain peace and its firm determination to establish respect and tolerance
for different ideologies in order to achieve a pluralistic, democratic, and
just society. A society which will promote social progress through a strict
respect for human rights.
In order for peace to exist in El Salvador, it is essential that groups
opposed to the present democratic process, whatever their ideology, desist in
their radicalized sectarian acts and abandon the irrational strategy of
violence, destruction and revenge. Only thus may peace indiscriminately
embrace.all sectors and tendencies.
Our democratic process, confirmed in the elections of 28 March 1982, is,
in itself, a peace process. It is supported, strengthened and energized by
the programs of human rights, economic recovery, and social reform, all of
which make up the peace program of the Government of National Unity. This
integrated program is designed to deal with the causes and effects of the
conflict, through the accomplishment of those objectives.
Our program is the only available means to establish those necessary
conditions for peace which dialogue, by itself, is unable to accomplish. The
simplistically outlined plan for a proposed dialogue will not serve as an
adequate means for the attainment of peace. Since it is motivated by
propagandistic aims and is used as a tactical tool, it has in fact become a
stumbling block to the real possibilities for peace.
The Political Commission urges and coordinates the integral implementation
of the peace program as a Salvadoran solution to the Salvadoran problems,
creating the instruments and mechanisms for the national reconciliation.
The National Commission will therefore have the following objectives:
A) To carry out immediately the revision of the bill for an amnesty law
and oversee its correct enforcement, with the purpose of having the
members of the armed rebellion lay down their arms and join the
democratic process;
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
(
B) To promote adequ.te social and political condit.I
ons for an effective
and lasting peace; by improving the tools of democratic
participation, such as the electoral process; access to the media and
the freedoms of association and expression; and
C) In general, to develop all those activities which tend to strengthen
the bases for the achievement of peace in the country, encouraging
all political and social sectors to join the democratic process.
The Peace Commission will work jointly and in close collaboration with the
Human Rights Commission. It will dedicate itself to the following tasks:
-- Enforce the implementation of the amnesty law.
-- Revise the laws on political crimes, and its procedures, in order to
propose adequate changes.
-- Recommend solutions to the problems of civilians living in the war
zones, in order to help bring their lives back to normal.
--Recommend measures which will strengthen the judicial branch, so it may
become the proper recourse for solving conflicts and the best guarantee of the
rights of the individual and of society.
The strengthening of El Salvador's image internationally will produce a
better understanding of our situation and help reject, in all its guises,
aggression and intervention from abroad. It will help us achieve our purpose
for peace, which is affected by conflicting hegemonic interests and which make
more difficult our efforts towards peace.
The Constitutional Government of the Republic is committed to the defense
of our republican and democratic institutions, presently threatened by
subversion.
The Political Commission of the Pact of Apaneca, with the purpose of
achieving the most important of all national objectives, duly presents its
peace program, designed to overcome social conflict and to make democracy and
human rights a reality. It therefore faithfully interprets the will of the
Salvadorans who voted on 28 March 1982.
The Commission calls upon the people of El Salvador to support this peace
program and to join what is a veritable national crusade in favor of the
objectives described in the present document.
Signatures:
Doctor Alvaro Magana Borja, President
Sr. Raul Molina Martinez, First Vice President
Dr. Gabriel Mauricio Gutierrez, Second Vice President
Dr. Pablo Mauricio Alvergue, Third Vice President
Dr. Fidel Chavez Mena, Minister of Foreign Relations
General Jose Guillermo Garcia, Minister of Defense
Mr. Hugo Barrera, Arena Representative
Mr. Benjamin W. Navarrette, PCN Representative
Mr. Francisco Quinonez, PPS Representative
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
APPENDIX D.2
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
SALVADORAN AMNESTY LAW
The Constituent Assembly of the Republic of El Salvador,
Whereas:
I. In the election of March 28, 1982, the Salvadoran
people declared their total repudiation of violence and all its forms and
their determination to achieve peace for their country;
II. Al]. inhabitants of El Salvador have the right to life,
honor and liberty, rights that are established in the Constitution, the
American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties, and the American
Convention on Human Rights;
It is the duty of the Government of National Unity to
establish fundamental bases so that we Salvadorans and those of other
nationalities who reside in our country can enjoy peace and tranquility
in an atmosphere of confidence, work and harmony;
IV. Numerous members of the various illegal armed groups.
have stated on several occasions their desire to withdraw from such
groups and live in peace in the Salvadoran community;
V. The Government of National Unity, composed of members
of various political parties, offers in its peace program the necessary
guaranties for all Salvadorans to exercise their civic rights within the
law, and, as a positive measure under that program, it is appropriate to
decree the following amnesty and civic rehabilitation law for persons
belonging to groups or political. organizations of any ideology who are
being prosecuted, have been convicted, are being held for.investigation,
or who have not been the subject of any criminal proceeding for the
offenses referred to herein;
VI. The Salvadoran Government 'must ensure that those who
avail themselves of the benefits of this law are peacefully integrated
into society as useful citizens, and to that end the state should provide
the necessary means for their rehabilitation, providing moral and
material assistance so that they may reorganize their personal situation
and that of their family,
Therefore (The Constituent Assembly), exercising its legislative
powers and on the initiative of the President of the Republic, through
the Minister of Justice, having heard the opinon issued by the
Vice?President of the Republic and that of the Supreme Court of Justice,
hereby decrees the following Law on Amnesty and Civic Rehabilitation.
Article 1. Within the conditions and requirements established
herein, amnesty is granted to any Salvadoran civilian who, before this
date, has particpated as principal or accomplice in the commission of
offenses of a political nature or offenses under ordinary law connected
with such political offenses, whether or not prosecution has been
initiated.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
?
Article 2. For the purposes of this law, political offenses
shall be those included in Title I, Chapter 1, Articles 373-380 and
Articles 392-394 of the Penal Code; and Chapter IV, Articles 400-411 of
Book II, Part 4, of the Penal Code; Title II, Chapter I of Book II of the
Code of Military Justice; and, in general, those offenses included in
Decrees 507 and 943, dated December 3, 1980, and January 15, 1982, of the
Revolutionary Junta of Government, published in Diario Oficial No. 228,
Vol. 269, of December 3, 1980, and No. 10, Vol. 274, of January 15, 1982,
respectively.
Article 3. Amnesty shall be granted to:
(A) Those who have taken up arms against the Government or
have participated in other offenses of a political nature, or offenses
under ordinary law related to such political offenses, and who avail
themselves of the benefits of this law, provided that they are not under
detention;
(B) Those who are being prosecuted for one or more
offenses, the maximum penalty for which does not exceed four years for
each offense, and who complete or have completed six months' detention.
(C) Those who have been sentenced under a final judgment
for an offense included in (B) above.
With respect to paragraph (A) above, the certification referred to
in Article 7 herein may be used as evidence in a plea for dismissal of
criminal charges in any case in which charges are brought or have been
brought for the offense included in the certification.
With respect to paragraph (B) above, the Military Judge of First
Instance, acting ex officio or at the request of the interested person or
any other person, shall dismiss the charges and order the release of the
person without bail.
With respect to paragraph (C) above, the Military Judge of First
Instance, acting ex officio or at the request of the interested person
and after granting the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic
three days to submit arguments, shall revoke the penalty imposed and
order immediate release of the person without bail.
Release orders issued by the Military Judge of First Instance
shall be forwarded directly to the Detention Center with a copy to the
Amnesty Board.
Article 4. An Amnesty Board is hereby established. Its
Headquarters shall be in San Salvador and it shall be composed of three
members, one appointed by the Peace Commission, one by the Human Rights
Commission, and one by the Ministry of Interior. The member appointed by
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
the Peace Peace Commission shall be the Chairman, and the member appointed by
the Ministry of Interior shall be the Secretary. The Board may appoint
such delegates as it deems appropriate throughout the territory of the
Republic.
Article 5. The Amnesty Board shall receive, directly or through
its delegates, the applications of persons who desire to avail themselves
of the amnesty provisions, or shall hear the oral petitions of such
persons, and shall ensure compliance with this law. The Board may order
all State communications media, and request other communications media,
to publish and disseminate without charge the rules and provisions of
this law and any other information the Board may wish to publicize for
the purpose of achieving the objectives of this law.
Article 6. Persons covered by Art. 3 (A) who reside abroad and
who wish to enjoy the benefits of amnesty may apply in person or through
a third person to the Amnesty Board or to its delegates.
Article 7. A Memorandum of Record shall be made of any oral or
written application to the Amnesty Board or its delegates and shall
include: the personal data of the applicant and a specific statement
that he or she wishes to avail himself or herself of the benefits of this
law. A copy shall be delivered to the applicant.
When application is made to the delegates of the Amnesty Board,
the delegates shall send the original copy of the memorandum of record to
the Board headquarters within the following three days, shall retain one
duly signed and stamped copy of the memorandum, and shall give the
applicant a copy.
A certificate to the effect that the applicant has stated
voluntarily that he wishes to avail himself of the benefits of the law
and that the offenses with which he is charged are included in the
amnesty shall be given to the applicant after being signed and stamped by
the Amnesty Board. .
The Board shall issue amnesty papers or an amnesty card to persons
who are granted amnesty.
Article 8. If the person who is granted amnesty wishes to leave
the country, the Board shall apply to the Ministerio del Interior
(Minstry of the Interior) or the Direccion General de Migracion
(Emigration/Immigration Service) for a special passport which shall be
issued without charge.
Article 9. A Committee for the Rehabilitation of Amnestied
Persons is established. It shall be formed by the Ministries of Defense
and Public Security and Public Health and Welfare, the General
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
(
Coordinator of the National Commission on Assistance for Displaced
Persons (CONADES), and the President of the Salvadoran Institute of
Agrarian Reform (ISTA), or their representatives. The objective of the
Committee shall be to take the urgent and necessary steps to guarantee
those granted amnesty under this law life, health, food and work in
conformity with the guidelines provided by the Amnesty Board.
Article 10. The Committee for the Rehabilitation of Amnestied
Persons shall have the primary function of returning amnestied persons to
normal life in society; to that end, it shall adopt such measures as it
deems necesary.
Article 11. All trials and proceedings for the offenses referred
to in Article 2 of this law which are being heard by courts or officials
other than the Military Judge of First Instance when this law enters into
force shall be turned over to the Military Judge of First Instance within
a preemptory period of 72 hours.
If it is considered that the acts with which the applicant is
charged are not covered by this law, the Judge shall return the cases or
proceedings to the appropriate court or official as soon as possible.
For the purposes of this Article a period of 15 days from the date
of application for amnesty is established for the Judge concerned to
classify the offense.
Article 12. No authority or official may oppose compliance with
this law or with orders issued by the Amnesty Board in the performance of
its duties.
Article 13. The persons referred to in Article 3(A) of Part 1 of
this law who wish to avail themselves of the benefits of this law must do
so within 60 days from the date the law enters into force.
, The Amnesty Board may accept all types of donations from national
or international organizations or individuals.
Article 15. This Decree shall enter into force on the date of
its publication in the Diana Oficial.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
/Th
APPENDIX 0.3
STATEMENT BY THE PEACE COMMISSION
May 30, 1983
To all the Salvadoran People:
The Peace Commission created to implement the Apaneca Pact Peace
Program reaffirms that the solution to the problem of violence should be
an essentially political and democratic solution and, to that end, it
makes the following statement:
I. One of the objectives of the aforementioned Peace Program is to
initiate activities tending to strengthen the bases for the achievement
of peace in El Salvador and to encourage all political groups and all
segments of society to participate in the democratic process and in the
pursuit of peace.
II. Within the framework of the foregoing proposition, and with the
firm determination of achieving peace, the most important of all the
national objectives, the Peace Commission introduced an amnesty bill that
has already begun to produce the results expected from it. Such
determination and clarity of purpose in the pursuit of peace reflect the
firm resolve of the Salvadoran people to find Salvadoran solutions to the
Salvadoran problems.
III. In that spirit, which fosters national reconciliation, the
Peace Commission reaffirms its inevasible responsibility to seek a peace
that will pervade all segments of society. Therefore, it calls on all
Salvadorans, including the members of the F.D.R., to give this matter
constructive consideration as soon as possible. Such consideration will
enable us to restore, through reason and understanding, a (peaceful]
coexistance in which all (Salvadorans] may participate in political life,
employing democratic mechanisms through which the Salvadoran people may
express their sovereign will.
IV. Accordingly, the forthcoming elections, besides representing the
return to the full institutionalization of the Republic, will provide an
opportunity for integration and participation by all Salvadoran political
groups, including those who have risen in arms, in a peaceful democratic
contest that may lead to national reconciliation.
V. Lastly, the Peace Commission calls on those Salvadorans who still
maintain a hostile and manifestly intransigent attitude to seek peace
with firm determination and to change their attitude for the sake of
achieving the most important of all the national objectives: The
reconciliation of the Salvadoran family.
San Salvador, May 30, 1983
The Peace Commission
Dr. Jose Guillermo Trabantno
Bishop Marco Rene Revelo
Francisco Quinones Avila
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
APPENDIX D.4.
STATEMENT ISSUED BY PEACE COMMISSION OF EL SALVADOR
July 12, 1983
Based on the peace program signed by the Political
Commission of the Apaneca Pact, it behooves the Peace-
Commission to promote the incorporation of all political and
social sectors into the Democratic and peace process.
On May 30, 1983, this Commission publicly issued a call to
all sectors, and particularly to the group called FDR, to begin
a dialogue and to make participation in El Salvador's
democratic political life possible, a call which is now broadly
reiterated.
The only path for finding a solution to the problem of the
violence imposed on El Salvador is the political and democratic
path. In this sense, the supreme judge is the Salvadoran
people through the democratic and, particularly, the electoral
mechanisms.
The dialogue to which we have referred must not be used as
a means of propaganda or a tactical resource because it runs a
serious risk of becoming futile and useless.
This Commission has maintained and will continue to
maintain a serious, firm, calm, and evenhanded position to
achieve, through its actions, its major objective: Peace.
The Commission regrets the (FDR's) action and apparent
reasons for supporting the initiation of the dialogue,
particularly as the Commission has used intermediaries to
convey clear messages about its position.
The Peace Commission again calls on those who insist' on
maintaining a hostile attitude and open intransigence to
abandon such attitudes for the sake of reuniting the Salvadoran
family.
San Salvador, July 12, 1983.
(Signed):Jose Guillermo Travanino
Monsignor Marco Rene Revelo
Francisco Quinonez Avila, Coordinator.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
APPENDIX E.1
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
STATEMENT OF SALVADORAN PRESIDENT ALVARO MAGANA
THE WHITE HOUSE
JUNE 17, 1983
My visit to the United States of America is made in order to strengthen
the ties that have historically united us with this country.
It is a propitious opportunity to present to the people of the United
States of America a true picture of my country and of the goals we have set
within the context of the difficult conditions which confront us. These
goals sustain our conviction that President Reagan is giving his support to
a legitimate government, and to the just cause of the Salvadoran people for
maintaining and consolidating a democratic system in accordance with the
tradition of liberty and human solidarity which have constituted the basis
for the birth and the greatness of the United States of America.
. The situation in El Salvador is part of a world situation of economic
crisis and ideological conflict. However, our problems are not solely the
result of external factors. For a long time, social and economic
inequalities have been obstacles to the full development of democracy. They
have provided the opportunity for extra?hemispheric interests, most
particularly those of the Soviet Union and her satellites working through
two Latin American countries to make us victims of their expansionistic
policy.
Our Government is the outcome of the electoral decision of the
Salvadoran people, who on March 28, 1982, risked their lives in order to
choose overwhelmingly and without doubt the democratic system as a preferred
form of political organization. Consequently, my Government is not the
result of one or another ideological faction having prevailed: rather it is
the clear and constitutional expression of the sovereign will of the people
expressed in the most multitudinous free election known in our entire
history.
With this legitimate mandate of the vast majority of Salvadorans, the
Government of National Unity was formed. On August 3, 1982, we adopted the
basic platform, now known as the "Apaneca Pact." This pact includes the
common objectives of the political parties expressed during the electoral
campaign. These objectives included progress toward peace, democracy, full
respect for human rights, consolidation of social reforms and economic
recovery: all of which are being carried out in spite of the adverse
circumstances, national and international, that we face.
In order to ensure the accomplishment of these objectives put forth by
the platform, a Political Commission was set up. This Commission being
composed of the Constitutional President of El Salvador, the Foreign
Minister, the Defense Minister and representatives of the political
parties. The Commission is assisted by other organizations which are
responsible for each of the specific objectives.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
-?\
-2-
Respect for human life and the physical integrity, along with the dignity
of all Salvadorans is the responsibility of the Commission on Human Rights
and the constant concern of my government. I am pleased to say that in order
to safeguard those human rights, we have adopted concrete and pragmatic
measures, such as the granting of amnesty, accelerated consideration of cases
involving political crimes, plans to reform legal procedures applicable to
such crimes, cooperation with the International Red Cross, ministerial
directives to the security forces to ensure strict compliance to legal
procedures, and other similar measures. One important step toward
guaranteeing respect for human rights will be the judicial reform which is
envisioned in the new constitution: an independent judicial authority and an
independent Attorney General, with sufficient authority and sufficient means
to improve the administration of justice. Furthermore, the Attorney General
will have the technical capability for the scientific investigation of crime.
The reduction in the gravity of conflicts resulting from the economic and
social reforms has contributed to the strengthening of the democratic process
which the Government of National Unity has committed itself to maintain and
consolidate: well aware that they are important conditions for social
stability, created in an atmosphere of confidence, and a determining factor
in the exercise of democracy.
Convinced of the importance of the private sector to economic recovery,
the Government of National Unity has sought to create a favorable climate for
the growth of private enterprise. The private sector has joined the public
sector in forming a committee charged with economic recovery in El Salvador.
These efforts at recovery face difficult obstacles caused primarily by low
prices paid for our basic exports, increased prices of imports, and the
problems of the Central American Common Market. To these I must add violence
and the destruction of the infrastructure. Nonetheless, based on the spirit
of diligence and sacrifice of the Salvadoran people, the economic cooperation
of the United States of America, and a financial discipline of austerity
which has permitted us to maintain tolerable rates of inflation and
reasonable currency stability, my government has succeeded in reverting the
declining trend of the economy.
? The peace program of the Government of National Unity rests fundamentally
upon the electoral process and on behalf of this government I reaffirm that
the solution to the problem of violence should be essentially democratic.
Accordingly, elections with participation by all Salvadorans without
distinction, constitute the only means to obtain a definitive and permanent
peace in order to establish a pluralist system that ensures democracy.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
In view of the importance of the participation of all Salvadorans in the
coming elections, in a spirit of good will and in order to create conditions
favorable to this full participation, we have enacted a generous amnesty
law. To date 500 political prisoners who were subject to the legal process,
have been freed under this law.
In order to better achieve our objectives, the Peace Commission on May .
31 of this year appealed to the political sector of the subversive elements
for the establishment of a dialogue to determine conditions and guarantees
for their participation in the next elections. This appeal has been
repeated twice in recent days.
Just as the essence of democracy consists of the right of the citizens
to elect their leaders and to confer political power on their
representatives, negotiating away a portion of this political power would be
a divestment and betrayal of the electorate. This my government would never
commit.
Our program of peace is the genuine democratic alternative. In this
way, peace will be the logical consequence of the democratic process which
will be assured in the next electoral events. It will also result from
respect for human rights, consolidation of the social reforms, and economic
recovery. In summary, it will result from the combined efforts of all
Salvadorans.
Foreign military intervention in domestic affairs constitutes the main
obstacle to our efforts to attain peace. The interference of
extracontinental communist countries by way of Cuba and Nicaragua in support
of armed groups against a legitimate, constitutionally elected government,
is a form of aggression which violates the essence of international law,
specifically the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
other states. ?
Faced with this situation, our armed forces have the constitutional
obligation to defend the nation's sovereignty and to repel, in legitimate
self-defense, the armed subversion that has been imposed upon us from abroad.
This external aggession has destroyed villages, forcing hundreds of
thousands of humble Salvadorans to abandon their homes. It has subjected
our productive facilities, our crops, our bridges and roads, our
communication and transportation systems and the infrastructure of all
public services to systematic destruction.
To alleviate this situation,.integrated programs have been commended to
the "Commission for the Reconstruction of Specific Areas," coordinated by
the armed forces and tending to bring normalcy of activities to the
inhabitants of areas affected by violence through the reestablishing of
public services and the reconstruction of the infrastructure.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
-4
No one can dispute a nation's right to defend itself against external
aggression and against the destruction of the scarce assets which in a
developing country are produced at great sacrifice. For this reason, we
have the right to the understanding and solidarity of all free nations of
the world. For these reasons we have the right to the understanding and
solidarity from all other free nations; as we have had from our Central
American brothers, those with whom we share democratic ideals, and for whom
I wish to express our gratitude.
El Salvador has not responded to aggression with aggression, nor to
intervention with intervention. Last year, with a peace loving spirit we
proposed a regional dialogue to strengthen democratic institutions, to end
the arms race and the arms traffic, and to improve commercial and economic
relations. With the same spirit we accepted the initiative of the "Grupo
Contadora," whose invitations we have always responded to positively...
With the future of democracy in our country in great peril, we do know
how to appreciate and be grateful for the solidarity and sympathy that
President Reagan has clearly expressed for our cause, both in public and in
private, and has responded with concrete and significant action.
El Salvador fights not only for the survival of its own democratic
.system; we also defend western democracy. For this reason I want to appeal
to the honorable members of the United States of America's Congress to
support the efforts of President Reagan to aid El Salvador. This assistance
strengthens the cause of democracy in the Central American region. A weak,
vacilating commitment endangers peace and hemispheric security. For this
reason the people of the United States must fully understand that we face a
common threat.
Our aspirations have been incorporated into the draft of the political
constitution that the Constituent Assembly of El Salvador will debate and
vote upon in the next days. Therein will be established the constitutional
guarantees for the great objectives of the Government of National Unity
first embodied in the NApaneca Pact," and which will become a permanent
reality.
Mr. President: El Salvador, my small country, is an example of a
newborn democracy defending with its blood the democratic system of the
western world against a totalitarian communist regime.
El Salvador reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the defense of peace,
democracy and liberty with the understanding and solidarity of all free
nations.
Thank you.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
IX E . 2
PRESIDENT MAGANA'S STATE OF THE NATION SPEECH
July 1, 1983
Mr. President of the Honorable Constituent Assembly, Mr. President of the
Honorable Supreme Court of Justice, Vice Presidents of the Republic, your
excellencies ambassadors and honorable charge d'affaires accredited in the
country, Ministers and Under Secretaries of State, Deputies of the Honorable
Constituent Assembly and Magistrates of the honorable Supreme Court of
Justice, honorable representatives of international organizations, members of
the armed forces, ladies and gentlemen:
In order to fulfill the obligation of appearing before the Legislative
Assembly to report on the executive branch's activities and on the country's
general situation, I have come before the august representatives of the
Salvadoran people to present my report and to reiterate my faith in democracy
and in the Government of National Unity.
During an exceptional period, a detailed report on the government's
activities is best suited for the heads of the State Secretariats, and it is
up to the President to present a general review of the country's situation.
By reviewing the objectives of the Government of National Unity and the
progress made in achieving them, we give a general overview of the year
covered by this report, which constitutes a frank, objective and honest
outline of the government's program. Despite the skepticism, and to the
surprise of many, 14 months after being implemented, it has fulfilled its
historic responsibility thanks to the patriotic will of its members.
Concerning the executive branch's activities, I must also indicate that
despite the difficult economic situation, which causes financial limitations,
we have been able to maintain efficiency levels in the public services and
state investment programs, under adverse circumstances.
At the outset of my Administration, I said that although in its short time
few things could be done, great things could be initiated. Today I can say
with satisfaction that we have begun great things; that what was begun has
grown stronger and, in certain cases, has even been completed.
On 1 July 1982, my message set forth the desire that our government would
be an expression of national unity. For this reason, we tried to reach a
patriotic commitment marked by a unity of purpose to achieve common
objectives. Those efforts culminated in the adoption of the basic platform of
the Apaneca Pact on 3 August 1982, which is the program of the Government of
National Unity and constitutes a commitment that has worked surprisingly well
with regard to the essential aspects of its philosophy and contents.
My recent visit to Washington constituted an extraordinary opportunity to
present to the U.S. people and to the world the Government platform of a
democracy that is currently struggling to consolidate the objectives to which
I will now refer:
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
?
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
-2--
Representatives: On 2 May 1982, I told you that would devote each day of
my mandate to the Government's major goal: peace. And we have done it,
because our efforts on behalf of human rights, economic recovery, the
democratization process, the consolidation of the reform and, in short, all of
the objectives sought by our government program lead us toward peace, which
will result from the effort made by all Salvadorans.
The Peace Commission has reiterated its invitation to all political
-sectors to participate in the next election. With the draft political
-constitution, you make it possible to have a pluralist government that will
enable us to live in peace.
Concerning this important objective, I said in Washington: The Government
of National Unity's peace program is mainly based on the electoral process.
Through me, it reaffirms that the solution to the problem of violence must be
essentially democratic. Within this context, the elections, with the
participation of all Salvadorans without distinctions, constitute the only
efficient means of obtaining a definitive and permanent peace in order to
establish a pluralist system that will strengthen democracy.
On that occasion I also indicated that since the very essence of democracy
consists of the citizens' right to elect their leaders, conferring on them the
representation of political power, to negotiate the distribution of that power
would be to rob and betray the mandate of the electors who are the great
majority of all Salvadorans, something which my government cannot do for
peace. This cannot be ignored because the people's will is a national
patrimony that must be defended to the very last consequences. It is not only
a matter of negotiating power, but of consciously opening the doors to chaos .
through an action marked by unjustified weakness. That is why we clearly said
in Washington that any negotiation to distribute power would run contrary to
the mandate of the voters, who were the large majority of the Salvadoran
people. This is the only thing, definitely the only thing, that my government
cannot do for peace.
As regards the democratization process, our firmest purpose is to enforce
fully the Apaneca Pact commitments and to obtain the effective participation
of. all social sectors in the government activities. Democracy is being fully
experienced in El Salvador. You, Messrs Deputies, constitute the first -
legitimately elected state branch, from which other branches spring. The
political forces that obtained the people's support on 28 March are
represented in these branches.
On another occasion, we described our regime as a government that is
reflective, open to progress, understanding, and an advocate of moderation in
exercising power. I am very pleased to say that, amid the worst crisis of
our history, we have put aside the policy of full power to the President (El
Presidencialismo) and have rejected the cult of personality.
The characteristics of our government -- because they are new and we are
not used to them -- result in confusion and perhaps even bewilderment for many
who believed in democracy. This explains talks about a power vacuum, a power
crisis, or a weak government.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
-3-
Our nascent democracy, which is fully complying with the priciple of the
separation of branches and thus excludes the strongman idea, will always be
better. It is all right that other latitudes associate this strongman idea .
with tropical regimes, but we must forget this idea forever. It is not only a
matter of personal pride but our firm intention to eliminate the policy of
full power to the President, and this has been the tone we have tried to give
to our administration, which respects the spheres of action of the other
branches. This can never be called a power vacuum or a weakness; it is simply
a democracy.
In a democracy, a ruler must have an open disposition to leave it up to
the people to decide, through the popular vote, the continuation of the
democratic process in order to turn over power to the person chosen by them.
The continuation of our democratic process, through the next elections, is
our historical commitment in order to reaffirm and consolidate the political
system our people have chosen.
The President of the Republic will have the privilege of abiding by the
decision of this honorable assembly and the satisfaction of making free and
honest elections a reality in order to take the greatest personal pride in
turning over power to whoever succeeds me, thus carrying out my people's
orders.
The upcoming elections, late this year, are another test for our people.
I am sure that we will repeat the historic experience of 28 March. However,
this responsibility also falls on the leaders of the political parties, who
have the valuable chance of maintaining the honesty, serenity, and maturity
our people deserve.
Regarding human rights, in the Apaneca Pact we committed ourselves to
respect them fully. This is a determination that stems from our fundamental
moral convictions and the respect that we have for ourselves. As an
affirmation of this purpose, on December 2 of last year the Human Rights
Commission was installed. This commission has promoted the enactment of the
amnesty law.
. In the same way, we are determined to reform our judicial system. To that
end, a commission of Salvadoran lawyers has concluded a report recommending
guidelines for the reforms. In addition, the draft constitution establishes
the independence of the judiciary and of the Office of the Attorney General,
with authority and powers for a better public administration.
However, it must be recalled that one of our best achievements is that the
judicial branch presently enjoys complete independence from Executive Branch
pressures. The Salvadorans must know that their rights, currently under
discussion, are in the hands of an independent judicial branch.
The economic problem is very important. It must be admitted that we
cannot advance in our recovery without a climate of trust that permits a
normal development of productive activities. Therefore, we have tried to
provide security, and to incorporate managerial ability into the efforts of
the public sector. This managerial ability is now an important facet of the
Committee for Economic Recovery.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/16 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
-4-
It is also necessary for our economic recovery that we maintain tolerable
inflation levels and a relatively stable currency. We have achieved this to a
great extent thanks to our financial discipline, which we know very well has
imposed sacrifices on us in an effort to promote the reactivation of the
economy.
For this reason I have proposed bills on salary policy and tax increases.
I am. aware that there are opponents to these decisions, but I must meet my
responsibilities by taking the necessary measures to strengthen our economic
and financial situation. I am facing the opposition, to these measures because
I want the best for my country. I am also facing this opposition because a
calm and impartial judgment made afterward will show that there was a need
for sacrifices to guarantee the best fruits of Salvadoran efforts in the
future.
Despite the scarcity of foreign exchange and the destruction of our means
of production and the public services infrastructure because of the violence, .
we have maintained the level of economic activity since late 1982.
There are encouraging signs showing that the downward trend of our economy
has reversed itself.
The importance of consolidating social reforms was stressed in the Apaneca
Pact in order to achieve a level of economic and political participation from
the various social sectors and a peaceful coexistence with less social
tensions.
, The honorable Constituent Assembly ratified the reforms at the beginning
of its term in a clear demonstration of its intentions to seek solutions for
our country's grave social problems.
The reforms must not be evaluated only in terms of economic efficiency,
but also in terms of social participation which, by decreasing.the seriousness
of the conflict, will avoid the tensions that are exploited to create a
climate of violence.
In the international arena, our purpose has been to obtain greater respect
for our rights in order to strengthen self-determination so as to exclude
intervention in our domestic problems. Disinformation had placed both El -
Salvador and its government in the dock. Aware of this, we have been intent
on a constant task of explaining our distorted national reality. The world's
attention has been focused on El Salvador, but, for some time now, our voice
has begun being heard in the international arena. Gone are the days when some
country dared say that subversion might be a representative political force.
Since the beginning, we have sought closer relations with our Central
American brothers. Those objectives have materialized in the Central American
Democratic Community, which links the countries committed to democratic
processes, which in the meetings of the Contadora Group have presented their
proposals within a regional context. It is important on ,this occasion to
express our recognitionsof the repeated signs of solidarity that we have
received from ourneighbors.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Last Christmas I said that in the face of the crisis, destruction, and
murder the Salvadoran people have turned their eyes to God, and that aware
that efforts are being made to impose an atheistic philosophy on the
battlefield that is the human soul, the Salvadorans have chosen God. Less
than 3 months after making that statement, His Holiness John Paul II visited
us. We received from him the most valuable encouragement to continue our work
of peace and national reconciliation. His Holiness' visit presented to the
world the real image of the Salvadoran people. The world was able to witness
the demonstrations of joy of a devout people united in adversity. There was
no discordant note, and all Salvadorans showed their best sentiments.
In December I met in San Jose, Costa Rica, with the U.S. President to whom
we explained our situation and intentions. Six months later, I visited
President Reagan in Washington in response to his invitation. On that
occasion, there were many opportunities to explain our situation. We held
working meetings with the President and his closest aides, members of the
Senate and House of Representatives, as well as news conferences. In all
those events, we responded to the concerns of the U.S. people regarding Our
problem, and we reiterated our government's position on the foreign
aggression. On behalf of my country, and at all times thinking about it, *I
appeared before the U.S. Government and people and the OAS Council to deliver
the message of my people, who have now acquired a continental dimension. I
was received everywhere not only with courtesy and attention but also with
respect. The Salvadoran people are the ones who received those expressions of
respect that they well deserve, and that I now convey to the representatives
of the people in this assembly. In many places I found words of encouragement
for our cause. I can state that the world knows our situation. I can state
that misinformation has been defeated. We went to the United States to
achieve understanding. We sought to strengthen the cooperation that a partner
defending democracy deserves.
On 3 June when I came before you to reiterate my request for authorization
for my trip, I gave you assurances that I would represent the country with
dignity; we have done so. We made the categorical statement that we would
reject aid if in exchange it would be demanded that we adopt a specific
position that would harm our republican principles.
I fulfill my duty by also informing this illustrious assembly that in -
America's highest political forum, the OAS, I denounced the aggression we are
experiencing from the Soviet Bloc countries through Cuba and Nicaragua. I
reaffirmed there that one cannot question a people's right to defend
themselves from foreign aggression and from the destruction of the few assets
they have been able to achieve with great sacrifice. That is why I also said
that in the face of this situation our Armed Forces have the constitutional
duty to defend sovereignty and to reject, in an act of legitimate defense, the
armed subversion that has been imposed on us from abroad.
I feel I am duty bound to express to this illustrious assembly our
recognition and gratitude to the members of the Armed Forces who are the
strong barrier that has saved and protects our people's lives and property.
Those Armed Forces, an arm of their people, make it possible for us to have
our budding democracy. Our people, who are aware of the sacrifice of their
soldiers, must express their recognition.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
-6-
We cannot forget that violence has brought destruction and suffering to
our people. My government is aware of the condidtions in the areas affected
by violence and destruction, expecially in the eastern region. It is
unquestionalble that there is a contrast between the sufferings in that region
and the rest of the country. I issue a call to the Salvadoran people to
express by all means their fraternal support and solidarity with the heroic
residents of the affected areas.
Messrs Representatives: That violence very recently claimed the life of a
worthy member of this honorable constituent assembly to whose members I
reiterate our strongest condemnation of this unspeakable action.
Messrs Representatives: It is highly satisfying to express the
recognition you deserve due to your dedication and efforts to conclude the
fundamental bill that will establish constitutional guarantees so that the
great objectives of the National Unity Government will be a permanent
reality. Likewise, the executive branch must express thanks for this?
illustrious assembly's support for our bills, since difficult times have
forced those in Charge of the government administration to take initiatives in
laws whose scope and benefits are not always clearly seen.
I am pleased to express to you my recognition for the high honor you gave
me by giving me an unanimous vote of confidence on the occasion of my recent
visit.
Messrs Representatives: In this difficult hour of our history we must
listen to the call of the homeland in danger. All, absolutely all,
Salvadorans who have faith in the democratic system must contribute our best
efforts to guarantee the future of the republic. With the help of God, with
deep confidence and unyielding faith in our destiny, I am sure that we have
found the path and that we are advancing on our march to give our people the
peace that we all desire. Thank you very much.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470.0_0?-1. jix E.3
HISTORICAL SETTING
In the late 1970's, El Salvador began to experience increasingly intense
civil disturbances and violent political protest. The proximate cause of
these disturbances was El Salvador's long legacy of underdevelopment, social
inequity, and misrule, aggravated by destabilizing activities and events
authored in Cuba and Nicaragua.
On October 15, 1979 a group of reformist military officers overthrew the
government of ex-General Romero. Although Romero had been elected president
in 1977, through a form of elections, there was widespread agreement inside and
outside El Salvador that, as in previous Salvadoran elections, his accession
to power was achieved through manipulation of the electoral system.
Several attempts to form a broadly representative junta of government
followed the coup. Al]. were shortlived. In January 1980, the armed forces
combined with the Christian Democratic Party to form a government which, with
some reshuffling, held power until elections for a Constitutent Assembly took
place on March, 1982. This period saw the implementation of several major
reform efforts, including a land reform, a banking reform, nationalization of
foreign marketing of coffee and sugar, development of stronger peasant '-
organizations in farming areas and most importantly, reactivation of political
parties and the holding of free and honest elections.
During 1980 and 1981, Cuban and Soviet bloc assistance, channelled through
Nicaragua where the far left guerrillas maintained their command and control
headquarters, their international relations center, and some training
facilities, permitted the guerrillas to escalate and intensify their war
effort. During 1980, the guerrillas emphasized consolidation and coordination
of their forces and tactics, which had been brought together under the
auspices of Fidel Castro the previous year. At that time, their operations
were limited to relatively, small skirmishes and hit-and-run attacks, both
inside the major population centers and in the rural districts, especially in
the north and east.
The capstone of this consolidation effort was the so-called "final
offensive" of January 1981, in which the guerrillas, hoping to seize power or
at least substantially better their position, combined a major military
operation with a call for a popular uprising. Their appeal for popular
support was generally ignored and, as a result, the Salvadoran armed forces
beat back their military initiative with relatively little effort. Following
this setback, the guerrillas returned to their previous tactics of skirmishing
and night-time bombing (the American Embassy was strafed or rocketed seven
times in thiry-one days in March and April).
In May 1981, the guerrillas implemented their present strategy of "guerra
prolongada" (prolonged war), which included a gradual build-up of strength and
material supplied through Nicaragua, concentration of action in rural
districts punctuated by high-profile sabotage operations, and increased
targeting of economic targets such as factories, bridges, agricultural
installations, the transportation system, the electrical system and water
pumping stations. This strategy continues today, abetted by continued supply
of war material through Nicaragua and complemented by a diplomatic effort
which emphasizes power sharing negotiations with the Salvadoran government.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
- 2 -
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
.4 During 1980, violence against civilians, already on the increase,
crested. This was a period in which Government was at its weakest because of
the repeated failure to form juntas which spanned the political horizon or
because the new armed forces -- Christian Democrat Government had just gotten
underway. At the same time, the growing political and military strength of
the guerrillas, expressed in terrorism, provoked a strong reaction. And the
implementation of the sweeping reforms of March 1980 led some formerly
moderate conservatives to respond with violence against both the government
and the left.
From that point, however, El Salvador began a new consolidation of the
political center. The government gained in confidence and ability. The
Salvadoran military demonstrated its capacity to respond to the military
challenge of the far left, and the reforms settled into institutional
development. The hallmark of this consolidation was the March 1982 elections.
On March 28, 1982, some 1.5 million Salvadorans went to the polls to elect
deputies to represent them in the country's legislative body, the Constituent
Assembly. This massive popular turnout followed a four-month electoral
campaign in which six parties ranging from the center-left to the far-right
participated. The Central Elections Council and over 200 international
observers agreed that the elections, also witnessed by over 700 members of the
international press, were fair and honest, the first such elections in over
fifty years. The political front of the guerrilla movement was invited to
field candidates in the elections, but claimed that conducive conditions did
not exist. Instead, the political parties and groups affiliated with the
insurgents supported their attempt to violently disrupt the elections.
The newly-elected Constituent Assembly named an interim government and now
is charged with writing a new national constitution and acting as a
legislative body until another one can be elected under the new constitution.
It is composed of sixty seats: twenty-four representatives from the Christian
Democrat Party (PDC), nineteen from the National Republican Alliance (ARENA),
ten from the Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party (PAISA), four from the
Party of National Conciliation (PCN), two from the Democratic Action Party
(AD), and one from the Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS). The 1962 constitution
remains in effect in the interim, subject to the requirements of Decree 507
(state of seige), Decree 544 (wage and price freeze), and the agrarian
reform. Political parties representing interests that previously tended to
express their opposition through violence are now competing in democratic form
in the Assembly. Political debate is often divisive, but the parties have
shown themselves capable of reaching important compromises.
Following the March elections, the Christian Democrat-Armed Forces Junta
dissolved and peacefully transferred its authority to a provisional executive
body, named by the Constitutent Assembly. The government is composed of
members of the major parties that participated in the March 28 elections,
including political independents. The president, Alvaro Magana, is a
political independent, selected as a consensus candidate after no single party
received a majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly. There are also
three vice-presidents, each representing one of the three major democratic
parties, i.e., ARENA, the PDC and PCN.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
Approved ForRelease2011/02/1-6. II-A-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7
The then existing political parties, with the exception of the minor
Democratic Action Party, signed the Pact of Apaneca of the "Government of
National Unity" on August 2. The Pact establishes goals for the government
under the headings: pacification, human rights, economic recuperation,
reforms, confidence and security, and strengthening El Salvador's
international position. The Pact also called for the formation of three
commissions: Political, Peace, and Human Rights. Subsequently, a joint
government -- Private Sector Commission for Economic Reactivations was
established. All commissions are now operating.
Approved For Release 2011/02/16: CIA-RDP86T00303R000400470002-7