SOVIET WARTIME MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000200250003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence
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Soviet Wartime Management:
The Role of Civil Defense in
Leadership Continuity
I.tenoaey I.ce c MUMMAM
VVI?e I-Key Jteit mob
NI MM 83.10003
DMMwbw1903
G" 358
Director of
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l
 SOVIET WARTIME MANAGEMENT:
THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN
LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY
Information awilable as of 25 October 1983
was used in the preparation of this Memorandum
 National intelligence issuances on Soviet civil defense have ad-
dressed the objectives, scope, and pace of the program and its likely ef-
fectiveness in reducing damage from a nuclear attack.' While these
estimates concluded that a large percentage of the leadership would
survive a large-scale US nuclear attack on the USSR, they did not
address in detail the specific role of civil defense in Soviet plans to en-
sure continuity of their leadership.
In this Memorandum we assess the Soviet civil defense infrastruc-
ture and measures for leadership protection and relocation as an
integral part of a broader national command and control system. This
national system would provide strategic direction of theater and
intercontinental forces and for the defense of the USSR from nuclear at-
tack. We have assessed the Soviets' progress in making the necessary
preparations that would enable their management structure to function
according to the USSR's strategy for nuclear war.
Volume I of this Memorandum contains the Key judgments
derived from the detailed analysis in Volume II, distributed separately.
The Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. It was drafted by the
Defense Intelligence Agency with the participation of representatives
from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,
the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air
Force, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This Memo-
randum was coordinated by the Interagency Working Group on Soviet
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 The Soviets' confidence in their capabilities for global conflict is
probably critically dependent on their assessment of the survivability
and continuing effectiveness of their leadership during and following a
nuclear attack. To this end, the Soviets have been making the prepara-
tions required to facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime and
to give their leadership the potential for effective performance in a
nuclear conflict. These preparations are intended to provide for:
- Continuity of party, government, military, and economic lead-
ership at all levels.
- Mobilization of human and material resources.
- Support of military operations.
- Continuity of essential economic activity.
- Conduct of postattack recovery operations.
The Soviets have made considerable progress in:
- Delineating the wartime management system and the responsi-
bilities of Soviet leaders at all levels.
- Preparing the civilian leadership to make a rapid transition to
their wartime roles through the use of special organizations that
plan, train, and exercise during peacetime.
- Providing their leadership with hardened urban command
posts, exurban relocation facilities, and redundant, hardened
communications. (Relocation facilities are those exurban com-
mand posts to which military and civilian leaders and their
staffs will relocate in wartime for the purpose of exercising
command and management functions.)
Concept and Organization
The Soviet wartime management organization
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would consist of:
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- The National Command Authority and other national-level
leaders who would direct the military, political, and economic
activities of the nation.
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 - The leaders of the 16 military districts who would have the key
role in wartime territorial administration, management of re-
covery operations, and in providing continuing support of
military operations following a large-scale nuclear attack.
- The leaders of those regional organizations responsible for vital
services such as transportation, communications, and electric
power.
- The leaders of the 15 Soviet republics who would be responsible
for supporting the war effort and maintaining the integrity of
the multinational Soviet state. the Soviet
republics would not be in the chain of command from the
National Command Authority to key territorial organizations.
- The leaders of oblasts, the basic territorial elements, who would
be responsible under military district supervision for directing
rescue and recovery operations and for military support tasks.
The leaders in cities, rural areas, and at individual installations
who would operate under oblast control.
constitute the leadership that would be responsible for the continuity
and survival of the nation in a nuclear war. The key elements of Soviet
leadership would be primarily those at the national, military district,
republic, and Oblast levels-about 100,000 individuals, including about
60,000 full-time civil defense staff personnel.
The USSR Civil Defense organization is intended to provide the
wartime management system with a command structure staffed by
military personnel with the professional expertise necessary for civilian
leaders to carry out their assigned wartime roles. The legal basis for this
largely military structure to perform its wartime mission would derive
under Soviet statutes from declaration of a "special period," compara-
ble to martial law in World War II.
The Communist Party would continue to function in wartime as it
does in peacetime, with primary responsibility for the formulation and
implementation of policy. Its parallel structure with the state adminis-
tration facilitates party control of administrative functions. In wartime,
party officials would also be present on the military councils of the
military districts, the highest regional politicomilitary authority in
The Soviets do not expect the entire national leadership to be
destroyed in wartime. Should national-level control be temporarily
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 interrupted, however, the military district would have the means and,
we believe, the authority for decentralized operations. Moreover, the
highly structured, bureaucratic, and authoritarian nature of the Soviet
system, which is widely perceived as hindering peacetime performance,
would greatly facilitate the management of the nation under the
catastrophic circumstances of nuclear war.
Transition to Wartime
The Soviets believe that a nuclear war would be preceded by a pe-
riod of international tension and probably conventional conflict. Previ-
ously, we concluded that a large percentage of the leadership on which
the Soviets would rely for wartime management would probably
survive a large-scale US nuclear attack with as little as a few hours'
warning. Under these circumstances the Soviets are probably confident
that they could make the transition from a peacetime to a wartime
management posture prior to a nuclear attack on the USSR. That
transition would be governed by changes in Soviet armed forces
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 ower levels, such as the for which we have located
heir estimated facilities.
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 Costs. We are unable to estimate the total costs of Soviet prepara-
tions for wartime management. One measure of the magnitude of the
Soviet investment in their program is the cost of relocation facilities:
- We calculate the total cost of construction and equipment at the
single- and dual-purpose facilities we have identified to date to
be at least 1.5 billion (1970) rubles. If these facilities were built
in the United States, the cost would be some US $5 billion
(1981).
costs would be $28-56 billion if the sites were duplicated in the
United States. This estimate does not include the costs of civil
defense personnel, supporting communications networks, or
hardened urban facilities. We believe, therefore, that the overall
cost of the program would be significantly greater than the at
least $28 billion we have estimated for relocation sites alone. fl
Vulnerability. Despite the extent of their preparations, the effec-
tiveness of the Soviets' wartime management will depend heavily on the
vulnerability of their leadership facilities to a US nuclear attack. Most of
their urban and exurban facilities would be vulnerable to destruction if
they could be located and were attacked by US weapons (see table 4).
Hardened urban command posts for the leadership have not been
emphasized in our analysis because they would largely be vacated
during the period prior to nuclear attack. Thus, locating exurban
command and control sites and supporting communications is key to the
potential vulnerability of the Soviets' wartime management structure. F
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 Trends and Implications
We expect the Soviets will continue to improve the facilities
required to give the leadership the potential for effective performance
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in vcautinu- incrcasine both the numher and lau-duess of filed sites and
nrprrnintt c)III III III IicatlIns support ell all Icvcls. "I'hc5 vc ill prohabls
c"Ilk ent Idte on further ill] procemenls in llre capabilities of nnilitarc
districts to integrate aclivc and pussiye mtastrres for defense against
nuclear attack- to assure nuurpoNsrr and logistic support reeluired In the
near cfiorL and to direct poststrike recovery operations. "flit rniIitaI\
district veill reruain the key element of Soviet Xvartimt territorial
"I1re Soviets max Iwlieye that deep underground structures such as
those near o\% Neill assure the surcisabiIity of the top leadership-a
priority ohiective of their vcurtirne management plans. AV e have not \et
assessed the implications of such a perception hm Soviet leaders
\onetheless, their confidence in the efitcliceness of their overall
'wartime nr:uiugerneit structure is almost certainly tempered ho the
heliel that civilian as cell as military leadership facilities scould he high
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 In sum, the scope of the USSR's program for leadership continuity
in nuclear war and the investment it has received over the past 25 years
indicate that the Soviets are serious in their efforts to achieve a
survivable and effective wartime management structure. This structure
is intended to exercise control over whatever national assets survive a
nuclear attack. Such a capability would be vital to their plans for
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