EMPLOYMENT OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AGAINST NATO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000100070003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
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NI IIM 83-10002
EMPLOYMENT OF WARSAW PACT
FORCES AGAINST NATO
Information available as of 1 April 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ................................................................................................................. 1
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PREFACE
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was commissioned by
the Director of Central Intelligence. It was drafted originally as a third
volume to NIE 11-14-81, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, and
was intended to elaborate on the assessment in volume II of the estimate
of Warsaw Pact theater operations against NATO. Because the discus-
sion incorporates new evidence and assessments of Soviet concepts for
frontal operations, it is being issued as an Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum.
This Memorandum provides a detailed discussion of general Soviet
concepts for front-level operations and Soviet planning for theater
nuclear operations. It also discusses Warsaw Pact options for campaigns
against NATO in the Western, Southwestern, and Northwestern The-
aters of Military Operations and their associated naval campaigns. This
Memorandum reviews a spectrum of options for the structurin and
employment of Pact forces It
recognizes, however, that actual choices made would be governed
largely by the circumstances leading to war, the condition and readiness
of NATO and Pact theater forces, and other scenario-related factors
This Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the
National Intelli%zence Office, General Purpose Forces. It was drafted
by Directorate of Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, and was coordinated within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security
Agency; the Bureau of Intelligence Research, Department of State; and
the intelligence components of the military services.
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SUMMARY
EMPLOYMENT OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AGAINST NATO
The USSR's geographic position as a major continental power in
Europe and Asia and the Soviet perception that hostile neighbors
confront the USSR and its allies on virtually every side have led the
Warsaw Pact to develop contingency plans for military operations on all
its land and maritime frontiers. The Soviets clearly expect Central
Europe to be the decisive arena in a war with NATO and assign it the
highest priority in the allocation of military manpower and equipment.
The Soviets also have plans for offensive action in other NATO
regions flanking Central Europe, but we have little direct evidence on
the Pact's view of the timing of these flank offensives in relation to an
offensive in Central Europe. Nonetheless, even if they did not begin
major ground offensives immediately in some flank areas, the Pact
would conduct secondary offensives to keep NATO from shifting forces
to Central Europe, to compel commitment of NATO reserves, and to
weaken NATO forces on the flanks in anticipation of further operations.
The Pact's success in achieving its wartime objectives would
depend on the Soviets' ability to control and coordinate multinational,
joint-service operations of great complexity. All Pact member nations
have command and control elements intended to help extend the
Soviets' wartime control structure. These organs could be integrated
easily into a Pact command structure. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict, the Soviet Supreme High Command (Verkhovnoye Glavnoko-
mandovaniye-VGK) would function, in effect, as the Supreme High
Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. This
wartime command would provide the military-strategic leadership for
all Pact military operations against NATO.
We believe that, should a war occur between the Warsaw Pact and
NATO, intermediate commands would be established in Europe be-
tween the General Staff in Moscow and most operating forces (fronts
and fleets). These commands would exercise direct, operational control
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over Soviet and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces and at least
would coordinate the operations of those strategic assets allocated to
support operations in a specific area. The Soviets refer to these
headquarters as High Commands of Forces in a designated area or
strategic axis. Two such commands, the High Command of Forces in
the Western Theater of Military Operation (teatr voyennykh deystviy-
TVD) and the High Command of Forces in the Southwestern TVD
since the late 1970s.
We believe that these high commands would be established in the event
of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
Soviet strategists envision at least five European TVDs in which
military operations against NATO would be undertaken:
- The Western TVD, which would include Soviet and NSWP
forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and Soviet
forces in the western USSR as well as the Combined Baltic
Fleet.
The Southwestern TVD, which would include Soviet forces in
Hungary and the southwestern USSR; Bulgarian, Romanian,
and Hungarian forces; and the Combined Black Sea Fleet.
The Northwestern TVD, which would include Soviet forces in
the Leningrad Military District and elements of the Soviet
Northern Fleet.
The Atlantic and Arctic TVDs, which would encompass the
North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea and would include
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forces primarily from the Soviet Northern Fleet
Frontal Operations
Within a land TVD, the largest field force would be a front.
Although not directly comparable to any Western organization, a front
would be similar to a NATO army group and its associated air forces in
size, level of command, and function. There is no standard organization
for a front. It usually is composed of three to five ground armies, each
including three to five tank or motorized rifle divisions, and air forces
with as many as several hundred tactical aircraft. A front operating in a
maritime sector also might include those naval elements that were
chiefly devoted to that front's mission, that is, for protection of the
front's sea lines of communication and for amphibious landings.
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The front is the basic combat force and level of command below
the commander of forces in a TVD. The front commander controls the
ground armies and supporting air forces that will fight the war. The
main focus of the front is on the offensive; the defense is seen as only a
temporary phase and not an end in itself.
The Pact's main attacks probably would be directed into sectors
where NATO was perceived to be relatively weak and extended. The
Pact would prefer to attack on several axes rather than across a broad
front-moving to penetrate through gaps, weak points, and open
flanks-and to rely on speed and maneuver. In areas where the Pact
was confronted by strong, continuous NATO defenses, however, it
would attempt to achieve a breakthrough.
An element since the
late 1970s has been the operational maneuver group: an armor-heavy
combined-arms force-from corps (two divisions) to army (three to four
divisions) size-that would operate separately from the main force. Its
mission would be to advance rapidly into the NATO rear area-
avoiding combat with main forces-to seize or destroy key military-
geographic objectives such as airfields, river crossings, nuclear depots,
and nuclear delivery units and possibly to disrupt command and control
and lines of communication and to interfere with mobilization and the
movement of reserves.
The Soviets are paying increasing attention to-and enhancing
their capability for mounting-large-scale airmobile and air assault
operations in support of the ground campaign. Airborne, airmobile, and
air assault operations of varying scale would have an important role in
Soviet efforts to disrupt the operations of NATO formations and to seize
river-crossing sites and other targets deeper in the theater in the later
stages of the offensive.
Another unique force operating in support of the front would be
Soviet SPETSNAZ or special purpose forces, which have a behind-the-
lines mission of reconnoitering and reporting on NATO nuclear storage
sites, nuclear weapons delivery locations, airbases housing nuclear-
capable aircraft, and command and control facilities. The Intelligence
Community is divided over the question of whether these forces also
have a direct combat mission-such as sabotage-against these targets.
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 Theater Nuclear Operations
The Soviets clearly believe a war with NATO eventually could
escalate to nuclear war, and generally
F ] the introduction of nuclear weapons precipitated by
espite a move toward more exi e,
selective nuclear options, almost always
a massed nuclear exchange at some point, regardless of how the
useonuclear weapons is initiated
A priority mission of Pact nuclear-capable forces (the bulk of
which are Soviet) would be to destroy NATO nuclear assets in order to
gain and hold nuclear superiority. The following points highlight key
factors in Pact frontal nuclear operations:
- Nuclear targets generally would be divided by a line of
demarcation between those to be struck by strategic assets and
those by front-level assets.
- Detailed front-level nuclear strike plans, based at least initially
on peacetime NATO force deployments, almost certainly have
been prepared and could be ready for execution with minimal
preparation.
- An energetic nuclear target reconnaissance effort would be
initiated during a period of tension and would be continued or
intensified during a nonnuclear combat phase to provide
continual updating of the nuclear strike plans. Once nuclear
weapons employment had begun, follow-on strikes would be
made as suitable targets were located.
- With two days' preparation, probably taking place during the
prehostilities phase, a front's nuclear strike assets could achieve
states of readiness that would permit the launching of a
maximum number of strikes in a mini-
mum amount of time after receiving the
order.
- Striking NATO's nuclear delivery systems would have first
priority. Other targets of high value, for example, maneuver
divisions, also would be struck on a major scale.
- Planning and execution of the fire plan would stress destruction
of targets of military significance, with little apparent concern
for collateral damage. Important West European cities, howev-
er, probably also would be struck.
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- High priority would be placed on resuming the offensive
rapidly following the initial massive nuclear strikes.
Initial Campaign in the Western TVD
Soviet planning calls for a massive and coordinated effort by air,
ground, and naval forces to seize the initiative in Central Europe. It en-
visions a rapid ground offensive into NATO territory-supported by a
large-scale air operation to destroy NATO's air forces and nuclear
delivery capability-to defeat NATO nuclear and conventional forces,
disrupt mobilization, seize or destroy ports and airfields, prevent
reinforcement, and prevent a prolonged positional war. First-echelon
forces would be organized into three fronts, made up of forces stationed
in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and, time permitting,
reinforced by fronts or elements of fronts stationed in the western
USSR. About half of the first echelon would be composed of East
European forces:
- The Soviet-East German Front would be the largest and
would carry out the main effort. It would have the task of
attacking NATO forces in central West Germany-engaging as
many as six of NATO's eight corps areas-between Hannover
in the north and Mannheim in the south. It could be made up
of five to six armies formed from Soviet forces in East Germany
and Poland and two armies formed from East Germany's
ground force divisions. Major reinforcements would be provid-
ed by the Soviet Belorussian Front.
The Polish Front in the
northern part of West Germany.
however, Polish armies
have been used as exploitation forces in the central part of West
Germany. In its more common role, this front most likely
would consist at least of two-and probably three-Polish
armies plus an East German army. It would be responsible for
moving along the northern coast, up the Jutland Peninsula, and
west toward the Netherlands. This front most likely would be
reinforced by the Soviet Baltic Front.
The Czechoslovak-Soviet Front would conduct operations on
the southern flank of the Soviet-East German Front and would
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have the mission of attacking NATO forces in the southern part
of West Germany. It would consist at least of an army made up
of the five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia and two Czecho-
slovak armies (eight divisions). The Soviet-Carpathian Front
would reinforce this front for operations in West Germany and
then into southern France.
The Air Operation in Central Europe
Pact planners regard NATO's tactical air forces in Central Europe
as a formidable threat. They believe that airpower would be NATO's
principal means for delivering nuclear strikes. Thus, they consider air
superiority critical to the success of their European campaign. The Pact
plans to achieve air superiority and neutralize much of NATO's nuclear
delivery capability by conducting a large-scale, theaterwide nonnuclear
air operation during the first several days of hostilities. This air
offensive would be characterized by a series of massed airstrikes,
designed to achieve tactical surprise, penetrating through corridors in
Western air defenses.
Of the 3,100 tactical aircraft and 400 medium bombers available
for use in Central Europe, the Pact would commit between 1,200 and
2,700 tactical aircraft and some 350 bombers for the air operation. The
remaining aircraft would be used, along with the interceptor forces, to
defend Pact territory and to provide direct support to the ground forces.
Operations in the North Sea and Baltic
Operations in the North Sea and Baltic would be designed to
destroy NATO naval and maritime targets, especially carrier and
amphibious forces. Principal objectives would be to deny the area as a
launch point for carrier aircraft against the Soviet-East German Front,
to prevent naval reinforcements from entering the Baltic, and to sever
lines of communication through the North Sea to the European
Continent. The Combined Baltic Fleet also would support amphibious
assault operations in support of ground force operations against Den-
mark and West Germany.
Initial Campaign in the Southwestern TVD
The Southwestern TVD would include Pact forces in Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria; the Odessa Military District (MD) in the USSR;
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and naval forces in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.
Soviet forces from the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus also opera e
in this TVD, although some forces from these districts would be likely to
support thrusts on a major axis in the Southeastern or Southern TVD ori-
ented against Iran and the Persian Gulf if operations were undertaken
in that TVD
A Warsaw Pact campaign in the Southwestern TVD would be
secondary to an offensive against Central Europe and would focus
primarily on securing the Turkish straits and blocking NATO access to
the Black Sea. Forces also would operate in Austria and northern Italy
to secure the southern flank of the forces in Central Europe and to pre-
vent pressure by Italian forces on Pact flanks in Austria. Movement of
forces into Greece and western Turkey would give the Pact access to
ports on the northern Aegean Sea. An offensive against eastern Turkey
would prevent Turkish forces from being shifted to the straits and could
open the way to movement by Soviet forces to the eastern Mediterra-
nean through Syria or to the Persian Gulf through Iraq. A move into
Iran in the context of a NATO-Pact war would be possible but could ab-
sorb resources needed to combat NATO forces. We do not believe the
Soviets would have the resources to launch a major campaign into
eastern Turkey and into Syria, Iraq, or Iran at the same time the Pact
was engaged against NATO in Europe.
It is not clear what role Romanian forces would have in wartime.
Generally, the Romanians have balked at any participation F_
other than homeland defense.
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role depicted for Romanian forces is t at of a
second-echelon front responsible for rear area security behind the Soviet
and Bulgarian fronts that would prosecute the major offensive
Naval Operations
The Soviets probably would view American carrier battle groups in
the Mediterranean as the primary naval threat to the southwestern
USSR, and anticarrier warfare probably would be highest priority
mission for the Black Sea Fleet. The nature of any surface ship
augmentation from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean would depend
on such factors as: the size of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron when
tension began to build, the nature of the Western naval presence-
particularly carrier battle groups-and the degree of emphasis placed
by the Soviets on a covert transition to a war footing.
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Initial Campaign in the Northwestern TVD
This TVD would encompass the Scandinavian Peninsula and
immediately adjacent waters. Forces in this TVD would come primarily
from the Leningrad MD in the USSR, with reinforcements likely to be
drawn from the Moscow, Ural, or, possibly, Baltic MDs. A principal
ground objective would be to protect the flanks of the Soviet Northern
Fleet while it was attempting to achieve control over the Norwegian
and Barents Seas. These forces also would have the mission of denying
NATO use of its bases in northern Norway. To accomplish these
missions, Soviet forces could be expected to attempt to seize the bases
along the northern coast of Norway either by direct assault across the
Soviet-Norwegian border or through Finland. Amphibious or airborne
landings also could be anticipated. In the southern part of the TVD, the
Soviets would defend the Leningrad and Vyborg areas. Attacks into
southern Finland toward Helsinki would be conducted if necessary to
meet or preclude NATO advances in this region. Air operations would
consist primarily of flights in support of ground operations in northern
Norway or Finland and in southern Finland. Counterair flights, primar-
ily over Soviet territory, would be flown by air defense interceptor
Initial Operations in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans
units.
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The Soviet Northern Fleet is the most powerful of the Soviet fleets
and would carry out the major part of combat operations against NATO
naval forces. Its initial tasks would be to achieve control in the Barents,
Kara, and northern Greenland and Norwegian Seas in order to protect
the Soviet SSBN force and to prevent NATO from staging attacks
against the Soviet homeland from those areas. The Soviets probably
would establish successive lines of defense in this region with the
intention of destroying NATO forces before they approached SSBN
operating areas and were within range of Soviet territory. The main
functions of Northern Fleet forces in their operating areas would be
antisubmarine and antiship warfare as well as amphibious warfare,
mine warfare, and coastal defense.
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