TRENDS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R001001630002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 27, 1983
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Trends in the
Horn of Africa
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
Secret
Secret
SNIE 76-81
27 September 198
Copy 389
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
SNIE 76-81
TRENDS IN THE
HORN OF AFRICA
Information available as of 27 September 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 3
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 9
US Interests and Involvement in the Horn of Africa ........................................... 9
Pro-Western States of the Horn ............................................................................. 11
Somalia ................................................................................................................ 11
Sudan ................................................................................................................... 12
Djibouti ................................................................................................................ 13
Kenya ................................................................................................................... 14
Current Status of the Conflicts in the Horn of Africa ......................................... 15
Ogaden ................................................................................................................ 15
The Eritrean and Tigrean Insurgencies ............................................................ 16
Internal Ethiopian Developments ......................................................................... 16
West European and Moderate Arab Interests in the Horn ................................. 18
Libya ........................................................................................................................ 19
Soviet Activities and Prospects in the Horn of Africa ......................................... 20
ANNEX: TABLES ...................................................................................................... A-1
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SCOPE NOTE
The purpose of this Memorandum to Holders is to assess develop-
ments in the Horn of Africa since the publication of SNIE 76-81,
Conflicts in the Horn of Africa, in June 1981, and to estimate the
trends likely to affect the interests of the United States in that area over
the next two years.
SNIE 76-81 dealt primarily with the conflicts in the Horn: Somali
efforts to wrest the Ogaden from Ethiopia; Somali irredentist claims on
territory in Kenya and Djibouti; and separatist insurgencies in northern
Ethiopia. That Estimate also assessed in some detail the roles of the
USSR and Cuba in support of Marxist Ethiopia and the relationship
between Soviet activities and objectives in Ethiopia and broader Soviet
strategic policies and goals.
At the time of the 1981 Estimate, the involvement of the United
States in the area was modest and was largely keyed to the new military
access agreements with Somalia and Kenya and to the preservation of
other pro-Western governments in the states bordering on Ethiopia.
Sudan and Kenya were judged at that time to be relatively stable. The
most dramatic changes since the publication of SNIE 76-81 have been
the political and economic deterioration of the pro-Western countries of
the area, and the much greater-and still growing-US involvement in
support of these regimes that in turn support US goals in the region. US
military and economic aid to Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya has almost
tripled since 1981. The United States is also improving port and airfield
facilities in Kenya and Somalia, largely to facilitate CENTCOM
planning for contingency operations in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula
and Persian Gulf areas. Joint military exercises are held with Sudanese,
Kenyan, and Somali personnel.
Soviet support of Ethiopia remains substantial and a sizable Cuban
military force is still in Ethiopia. The Soviet military advisory presence
has grown since the last Estimate, and Soviet efforts to promote the po-
litical and ideological indoctrination of Ethiopians have increased. The
Soviets continue to use Ethiopian facilities to support their Indian
Ocean naval squadron, and apparently are asking for more. The Libyan
role in the Horn has also increased in the past two years, in part because
of the Tripartite Pact (Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen). In addition
to focusing on the growing and more complex role of the United States,
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this Memorandum updates the assessment of the activities of the Soviets,
Libyans, and Cubans in the Horn area, and the probable impact of their
presence on US interests there. It also addresses Soviet objectives in the
Horn area and the likelihood of further Soviet successes.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The principal developments in the Horn of Africa of concern to the
United States since the publication in 1981 of SNIE 76-81, Conflicts in
the Horn of Africa, are:
- Increasing signs of instability in pro-Western states (Sudan,
Somalia, and Kenya) where the United States has pre-position-
ing and military access arrangements.
- A much greater US involvement in attempting to shore up the
economies and the military establishments of the pro-Western
states that support our regional objectives.
- The continuing strong Soviet and Cuban presence and influ-
ence in Ethiopia.
All of Ethiopia's neighbors-Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibou-
ti-are looking to the West, especially to the United States but also to
moderate Arabs, for military and economic support. They are nervous
about the strong Soviet and Cuban presence in the Horn; they seek help
in meeting massive foreign debts; and they need considerable military
aid to defend their borders and-in Sudan and Somalia-counter
internal discontent.
The national rulers preside over troubled tribal and clan societies,
and rely upon relatively weak and poorly armed military establish-
ments. Discontent is rising in Sudan, particularly in the south; tradition-
al clan and subclan warfare in Somalia is intensifying; tribal tensions
and discontent with President Moi have become more pronounced in
Kenya; and the reduced French budgetary support to Djibouti is adding
to the frictions among the tribal elements of that fragile society.
All of these states provide military access or pre-positioning
facilities to the United States with little or no formal quid pro quo. The
United States, however, has had to take a leading role in the debt
rescheduling program for Sudan and in the economic support of Kenya
and Somalia. The United States has also become a principal military
supplier to Kenya and Somalia and is a major source of arms to Sudan.
US economic and military aid to Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya has risen
from $230 million in FY 1981 to a projected $644 million in FY 1984.
The pro-Western leaders in the region will ask for larger amounts
of military aid to curb internal dissidents and, in the case of Sudan and
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Somalia, to satisfy their restless military establishments as well as to
defend their borders against Ethiopian or Libyan threats. They will also
require much more financial help for their sagging economies and may
tend to link this aid to the continued US use of the facilities. They are
likely to do less to resolve their own problems, and to rely more on the
United States.
In sum, the costs to the United States of maintaining the facilities
and access rights in the pro-Western Horn countries are certain to rise-
whether or not the present governments remain in power. Some of these
leaders are already forming an exaggerated perception of the value of
their countries to the United States and of the willingness of the United
States to bail them out. Over the short term, the United States will be
pressed to provide increasing amounts of economic and military
assistance and to be more aggressive in encouraging international
institutions and private concerns to provide aid and investment. Over
the longer term, perhaps even within the next several years, the pro-
Western states in the Horn may attempt to extract rental payments for
use of their facilities.
The dangers of large-scale invasions by Ethiopia or Libya to the
pro-Western countries are considerably less than the threats to the
existing regimes from internal discontent and disorders, stimulated in
some cases by Ethiopians and/or Libyans. Given the rising instability in
these countries, the positions of the current leaders are likely to become
more tenuous in the next two years. In most cases the likely successors to
the current leaders would be inclined to pursue a pro-Western policy.
There is little likelihood of a pro-Soviet government coming to power in
any of these countries, but a successor regime might seek a more
nonaligned posture, and thus create new problems for US military
planners.
The perennial conflicts in the Horn of Africa are no nearer to
resolution than they were two years ago, and continue to tie the
Ethiopians closely to the Soviets. Chairman Mengistu needs a continuing
flow of Soviet arms for his repeated, unsuccessful assaults on Eritrean
and Tigrean guerrillas and for maintaining control over the recon-
quered Ogaden. The combined forces of the Ethiopian Army and
Somali dissidents continue to enjoy superiority over Somali forces along
the disputed Ethiopian-Somali border. But, despite the discouraging
military situation and US counsels of restraint, hope of regaining the
Ogaden is still a key factor in Somali national policy. Mengistu will
maintain pressure along the border and order limited cross-border
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strikes, but is not likely to undertake a large-scale invasion in the next
year or two.
The Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents in northern Ethiopia are well
organized and strongly motivated. They can probably hold their
mountainous strongholds and inflict casualties on the Ethiopian Army
for the next several years. Mengistu, by refusing to negotiate in good
faith with the rebels, leaves himself with no choice but to continue a
costly conflict.
Mengistu is in firm control over the Ethiopian Government, but
depends upon Soviet arms and advisers, a force of some 9,000 Cubans,
and several thousand Soviet, Cuban, and East European military,
political, and economic advisers in his efforts to consolidate power and
transform Haile Selassie's feudal empire into a centralized Marxist-
Leninist state. Mengistu has chosen the Soviet model, rather than had it
imposed upon him. He has set a timetable for the establishment of an
Ethiopian Communist Party (September 1984) and intends to dominate
it through a clique of trusted aides, mostly military officers.
Mengistu seeks drought and refugee relief and specific aid projects
from the West, but is willing to make only minor concessions in return.
Ethiopia's pressing need for much greater economic assistance (which it
is not getting from the Soviets) suggests that there might be an
opportunity for the United States to affect the pace-but not the
direction-of leftward trends in Ethiopia over the next two years. Yet
even substantial US or Western economic aid would have little influ-
ence upon Mengistu so long as the northern insurgencies drag on,
tensions remain high along the Somali border, and the United States
continues to back Somalia militarily.
There appears to be no significant threat to Mengistu's position. His
sudden demise, however, would bring prolonged confusion and a power
struggle within the armed forces, probably along ideological lines. The
successor regime would probably be equally dependent on the Soviets
and Cubans, but not necessarily their choice.
Libyan involvement in affairs in the Horn has increased since the
1981 signing of the Tripartite Pact (Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen).
The Pact has afforded Qadhafi enhanced opportunities for pursuing his
goals of overthrowing the Sudanese and Somali Governments and for
thwarting US regional objectives. The Pact was never fully implement-
ed, but it has brought to Ethiopia some $320 million in financial aid
from Libya. The current problems between Mengistu and Qadhafi,
stemming from the recent contentious meeting of the Organization of
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African Unity (OAU), the Libyan invasion of Chad, and the currently
strained relations between Libya and South Yemen illustrate the
differences in the respective national and personal goals of Pact
members, and the great difficulty for even a radical regime to sustain
any kind of close relationship with Qadhafi. Ethiopia and Libya are still
likely to collaborate on limited programs where there is a convergence
of interest. Mengistu and Qadhafi have long been in agreement on using
Somali dissidents to promote the downfall of Siad, but Qadhafi is far
more intent than is Mengistu about subverting Sudan.
Some 9,000 Cuban troops and advisers remain in Ethiopia, mostly
in the Ogaden. At the present time, the Cuban presence constitutes a
strategic reserve against the possibility of a new Somali invasion, but
there is little military need for it. While the Cubans have not been en-
gaged in combat for five years, they retain their original operational
capabilities. It is unlikely that all of them will return to Cuba within the
next two years, primarily because of the Mengistu regime's concern for
the overall security situation in Ethiopia. There is also the possibility
they could be used in Angola and perhaps even Mozambique.
Soviet activity in the Horn, which began when the Soviets seized on
Somalia's need for arms some 20 years ago, suggests the following policy
objectives:
- Exploitation of Ethiopian military needs to establish a firmer
patron-client relationship and to consolidate Soviet influence in
the Ethiopian Government.
- Use of Ethiopian territory to facilitate the projection of Soviet
naval and naval air power into the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean
region and the oil-rich Persian Gulf area.
- Use of military and political influence in the Horn to under-
mine perceived US strategic policies.
- Expansion of Soviet influence by encouraging leftist change
and weakening pro-Western governments in black Africa and
in the Red Sea area.
The seriousness of Soviet interest and involvement in the Horn is
underscored by the large Soviet, East European, and Cuban advisory
presence in Ethiopia and by Moscow's provision of some $4 billion in
military assistance to be delivered by 1985. While Moscow's current
position hinges on Ethiopia's military needs and Mengistu's ideological
preferences, the Soviets are also trying to institutionalize their relation-
ship and influence to prevent a future setback similar to those suffered
in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia in the 1970s. A key Soviet goal has been
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the establishment of a Communist party in Ethiopia through which
Moscow could cultivate a reliable cadre of civilian supporters.
Soviet and East European economic advisers are increasing in
numbers and influence in the Ethiopian Government and some 5,600
Ethiopian students are being trained in the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Soviet ideologues are indoctrinating potential Ethiopian Communist
party members, and the Soviet military advisory presence has expanded
in the past two years from some 1,400 to roughly 1,700. Despite these
Soviet inroads, Mengistu has proved to be a less-than-pliant client,
whose version of a Marxist-Leninist state will probably fall short of
Soviet expectations. He has thwarted the Soviets on issues of interest to
Moscow, and the Ethiopians complain about deficiencies in Soviet
economic assistance, spare parts problems, and Moscow's refusal to
grant various types of military and technical training.
These frictions may be exacerbated over the next few years, as
Ethiopia is scheduled to begin in 1984 major military debt repayments
to the USSR of $200 million a year-an amount it. almost certainly
cannot meet. There will be some hard bargaining, squabbling, and
increased tensions, including some venting of Ethiopian nationalistic
and xenophobic feelings. Nonetheless, we believe the Soviet-Ethiopian
relationship will remain solid, because each side needs the other.
Ethiopia is the USSR's key client in the important Horn of Africa and
Moscow is the only source for Ethiopia's continuing military require-
ments. Hence, while the Soviets may be only partially successful in
further consolidating their influence in Addis Ababa, they will retain a
strong position with little likelihood of any real setback in the next few
years.
The USSR has made mixed progress on its second objective, the
improvement of access to Ethiopian facilities to enhance the projection
of Soviet power into the Arabian Sea-Red Sea-Indian Ocean areas.
Facilities now available appear to be adequate for current Soviet needs.
But, according to a source with good access, the Soviets now seem intent
on expanding their access. Since the visit of Admiral Gorshkov to
Ethiopia and South Yemen in March 1983, the Soviets have apparently
requested of both governments permission to expand or develop new
facilities. Mengistu has rejected or postponed several Soviet proposals,
but has agreed to the addition of some 70 Soviet technicians to the sev-
eral hundred already at Dahlak Island.
It seems likely that the Soviet efforts to enhance their naval support
facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen apparently are designed to
advance the overall strategic aims of projecting military power into
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distant areas and to counter CENTCOM activities in the Horn area-
the third major objective of Soviet policy. The Soviets probably believe
that the United States has extensive plans for future access and
deployment in the Horn area and that a key US objective is to
neutralize the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa. Mengistu
almost certainly sees US policies in the Horn as an effort to encircle and
eventually threaten his emerging Marxist state in Ethiopia. The Soviets
will keep a close eye on any port and airfield improvements in Somalia
and Kenya carried out by US contractors, and will keep the pressure on
Mengistu for permission to expand present facilities and perhaps to
develop new ones.
On the Soviets' fourth objective-the expansion of Soviet influence
in black Africa and the Red Sea area-they are not likely to make much
headway in the next two years. They will expect Mengistu to use his po-
sition as Chairman of the OAU to advance Soviet causes and denounce
the United States. Mengistu is likely to please them on occasion, but
may find it convenient for his own purposes to appear evenhanded at
other times.
The Soviets probably realize that their best chance to expand
influence in the Horn is to exploit the instability of the pro-Western
countries there. The previous experience of Sudan and Somalia with the
USSR has left unpleasant memories, and Soviet military backing of
Ethiopia and Libya virtually rules out a closer connection with the
USSR. Other moderate black African states have severe security and
economic problems, and are aware of the inability of the USSR to
deliver on promises of economic aid. These governments are shaky and
some may not survive the next couple of years, but the successor
regimes in the currently pro-US Horn countries are not likely to be pro-
Soviet or pro-Libyan.
Mengistu's dependence on Soviet military assistance, the debt owed
to Moscow, and his concern over US intentions are likely to lead him to
yield to Moscow's desires for continued and perhaps more extensive use
of military facilities in Ethiopia. On balance, however, the Soviets are
unlikely to achieve all of the above objectives over the next two years.
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DISCUSSION
US Interests and Involvement in the Horn of
Africa
1. The countries of the Horn of Africa have very
little intrinsic value to the United States. They have
few natural resources and are too poor to constitute a
significant market for US exports. Nonetheless, they
are of major and increasing importance to US strategic
planners for three reasons:
- The Horn of Africa is a key choke point on a
major East-West naval and trade passage (the
Suez-Red Sea-Indian Ocean route) and is adja-
cent to the oil-rich and potentially turbulent
states of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian
Gulf.
- Ethiopia's pro-Western neighbors have agreed to
provide the United States with access to certain
ports and airfields, and in the case of Sudan, to
allow the United States to pre-position military
equipment for contingency planning. The United
States is spending over $100 million on military
construction to improve facilities in Kenya and
Somalia. Access rights in the Horn of Africa are
an essential part of the larger CENTCOM re-
sponsibility for rapid deployment in response to
security threats to Saudi Arabia and the moder-
ate Arab oil-producing states in the Gulf.
- The USSR is exploiting both its considerable arms
aid to Ethiopia and the Ethiopian regime's affini-
ty for Marxism-Leninism in order to consolidate
the preeminent Soviet influence in that country,
and to'maintain and improve its naval support
facilities in the area.
2. Because of these broader concerns, the United
States is supplying modest but increasing amounts of
military aid and is acting both unilaterally and with
international consortia to shore up the faltering econo-
mies of the friendly states. US military and economic
aid to Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya has soared from
$230 million in FY 1981 to $644 million projected for
FY 1984. (See table 1.) The United States is also trying
to bolster the self-confidence of the military and
Table 1
US Economic and Military Assistance,
FY 1981-84
Military Assistance
Program
0
15.0
15.0
40.0
Foreign Military Sales
(credit)
20.0
10.0
12.5
0
International Military
Education and Training
0.3
0.4
0.6
1.0
Economic Support
Funds
0
20.0
21.0
35.0
32.0
87.7
109.9
158.7
20.0
39.0
60.0
80.0
6.5
38.0
19.9
36.7
Military Assistance
Program
0
15.0
8.5
23.0
Foreign Military Sales
(credit)
6.0
22.0
10.0
12.0
International Military
Education and Training
0.5
1.0
1.4
1.7
Economic Support
Funds
5.5
10.7
30.0
42.0
Total
157.3
276.2
261.5
329.5
Economic
75.0
125.0
135.0
148.0
Military
32.3
51.2
44.3
61.5
Military Assistance
Program
1.7
0
43.0
60.0
Foreign Military Sales
(credit)
30.0
50.0
0
0
International Military
Education and Training
0.6
1.2
1.3
1.5
Economic Support
Funds
50.0
100.0
82.2
120.0
a Actual disbursements.
b Proposed commitments.
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Figure 1
The Horn of Africa
Lak?
Alber
Zaire/
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Red
Sea
Dehalak' Deset
,Dahlak Island)
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ti aeo
4 DJIBOUTI
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Socotra
(P.D.R.Y.)
0 200 400 Kilometers
0 200 400 Miles
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civilian elites of these countries and sustain their pro-
Western attitudes through a variety of tangible and
intangible gestures of US support.
3. As the domestic political, security, and financial
problems of the friendly governments have worsened
in the past year or two, these governments have come
to depend on the United States as their primary source
of support. The risks of misunderstanding are rising,
and our friends may assume a far greater willingness
and ability on the part of the US Government to come
to their aid in extreme circumstances than might
prove warranted given the current constraints on US
military and economic assistance.
Pro-Western States of the Horn
4. All of the states bordering on Ethiopia-Sudan,
Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia-have cast their lot with
the West. The United States has military access agree-
ments with Kenya and Somalia, a pre-positioning
accord with Sudan, and an informal understanding
with Djibouti on military use of the port and airfield.
In return for use of these facilities, the United States
has undertaken some specific obligations, for example,
port and airfield improvements at Berbera and Mom-
basa. Also, in order to preserve political stability and
the pro-Western alignment of these states, the United
States in the past two years has agreed to provide
larger amounts of military, economic, and financial
aid. In less tangible aid, the United States is giving
political support to these friendly governments, and
private reassurances to beleaguered rulers.
5. All of the pro-Western states are in serious
financial trouble. Most of them are obliged by agree-
ments with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or
foreign creditors to undertake domestic reforms and
austerity programs which are difficult to carry out,
highly unpopular, and politically risky. Ethnic-based
discontent, never far beneath the surface in any of the
Horn countries, has been rising in Kenya, Somalia, and
Sudan, and could threaten the tenure of the current
national leaders. Changes of government in countries
now friendly to the United States or the eruption of
new civil conflicts could threaten US interests in this
area more profoundly than was the case two years ago.
Pro-Western states in the Horn area do not trust each
other, and frictions are especially pronounced between
Kenya and Somalia and between Somalia and Djibou-
ti. There is also a potential for serious friction between
these countries and the United States, because of their
greater dependency on the United States, their height-
ened expectations of receiving US largesse, and grow-
ing internal pressures on national leaders.
6. President Siad has held power in Somalia for 14
years, despite an attempted coup, a major defeat of his
forces in the Ogaden in 1978 and subsequent military
reverses, serious internal tribal fighting, and continu-
ing economic difficulties. He has survived by applying
his shrewd political instincts, manipulating the tribal
balance in his favor, and crushing any sign of internal
political opposition.
7. In the past few years Siad has distributed arms to
favored tribes and clans for political support. These
arms are often used by the tribesmen to contest
grazing lands and water rights, or to settle old scores.
With automatic weapons, the traditional feuds have
bloodier results than they used to have, and tend to get
out of control. Consequently, Siad has recently had to
divert regular units of the Somali Army to intervene in
tribal conflicts.
8. As a result of Siad's political reliance on individ-
uals and tribes he regards as personally loyal, political
favorites fill most key government, military, and
economic positions. Corruption. and inefficency ad-,
versely affect the economy, but sweeping reforms are
unlikely for political reasons. The economy is sus-
tained by loans and grants from Italy, West Germany,
moderate Arab states, and the United States.
9. Although we estimate the chances of full-scale
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia as low, such an event
would have serious consequences for the US position in
the Horn region, and would reduce the overall US
capability to respond to CENTCOM contingencies.
Even if the United States were to increase greatly its
military aid to Somalia, it* would be years before
Somali capabilities would be sufficient for reasonable
defense of the country. At the present time Somalia
has expressed dissatisfaction with the level of US aid.
An increase in US assistance, however, could be
counterproductive, given the longstanding Somali de-
sire to regain control of the Ogaden. Should the Somali
Army actively pursue its irredentist aims with US
arms, the United States would be perceived as backing
a territorial aggressor, a label pinned on the Somalis
over the years.
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10. Probably a more serious threat to the US posi-
tion in Somalia than an Ethiopian invasion would be a
collapse of public security in the northern area where
US contractors are starting to improve the airfield and
expand the port at Berbera. The major northern clan,
which has long been at odds with the Siad regime, is
increasingly restive. The Ethiopian-backed Somali Na-
tional Movement (SNM) insurgents have fostered the
dissidence, and an oppressive military commander in
the north has further antagonized the populace. Siad
visited the region in early 1983 and managed to
restore temporarily some confidence in his govern-
ment by conciliatory gestures. Since then tribal fight-
ing has continued, partly because Siad has failed to
fulfill his commitments. In addition, tribal conflict has
intensified along the central border area in the last
year.
11. If Siad does not survive the next two years in
office, the most likely cause of his downfall would be a
coup by members of the armed forces, perhaps includ-
ing some in his inner circle. They would consider
removing Siad if the internal tribal conflicts get out of
hand, if successful Ethiopian and dissident raids along
the border continue, or if the military conclude that
Siad is not likely to get the amounts of military aid
from the United States that they deem as vital.
12. Any replacement of Siad would be either an
Army officer or a civilian with strong Army backing.
The successor would, of necessity, seek to maintain the
flow of external aid, which would mean at least at the
outset maintaining good relations with the United
States, Western Europe, and the moderate Arabs. Most
senior and middle-grade military officers have un-
pleasant memories of the earlier Soviet presence and
would be reluctant to take that route. Less is known
about the political orientation of more junior officers.
We believe, however, that the replacement of Siad
would not necessarily endanger the US position or US
interests in Somalia, at least over the near term, but
would lead to increased pressure for sophisticated
arms.
13. President Nimeiri has governed for as long as
Siad, and has survived challenges from political foes
and rivals in the Army and Libyan efforts to remove
him. Like Siad, Nimeiri relies on his political instincts,
the loyalties of a circle of trusted advisers, and the
support of the Army. In fact, the armed forces present
the primary threat to Nimeiri.
14. Since the last estimate, the Sudanese economy
has continued to decline. The enormous foreign debt
(about $8 billion), the worldwide recession, and persis-
tent drought have stymied efforts to revive the econo-
my. The debt service ratio is well over 100 percent.
Sudan's economic woes stem from years of govern-
ment mismanagement and are not likely to improve
over the next two to three years. Oil, discovered by
Chevron exploratory teams in southern Sudan, will not
help the economy until the pipeline to the Red Sea is
completed in the late 1980s. The IMF is providing
assistance in debt rescheduling, but the currency
devaluations and austerity measures that the IMF
requires may generate additional discontent. In the
past, Sudanese have taken to the streets to demonstrate
displeasure with governmental performance, and they
may do so again without forewarning. Such demon-
strations, if persistent, could bring about the downfall
of Nimeiri if the Army concluded that the President
had lost his political touch.
15. Nimeiri has long contended with an array of
domestic political foes, ranging from the conservative
Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood to the secular
National Unionist Party and the Sudan Communist
Party. The Communists are rebounding from losses
caused by government repression in the 1970s, and are
gaining members among students and trade unionists.
They are not a significant threat to Nimeiri and party
leaders do not now advocate his overthrow. Nimeiri
tolerates a certain level of political opposition, so long
as the factions do not unite, but is quick to repress
groups that appear to constitute a threat to his regime.
16. The recent invasion of Chad by Libya and
Libyan-sponsored Chadian rebels is threatening to
Nimeiri. He is particularly concerned that the Abeche
area of eastern Chad, near the Sudanese border, might
come under Libyan influence. On the Sudan side of
the border the tribal groups of Darfur Province have
long been neglected by Khartoum. Nimeiri fears that
the accumulated grievances of the Darfur populace
could be exploited by Qadhafi's agents, and that the
Darfur inhabitants might form dissident bands to
oppose the Sudanese Government. Bands of Sudanese
dissidents, trained and armed in Libya, form part of
the rebel force in Chad. Some of these dissidents may
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be Darfur tribesmen. Nimeiri's armed forces and
police are thinly scattered around Sudan, and would
be hard pressed to cope with discontent in western
Sudan at the same time that internal security problems
are increasing in the south. In the event of an overt
Libyan attack or a Libyan-directed insurgency in
Darfur, Egypt would almost certainly come to the aid
of Sudan, in accordance with the Sudan-Egypt mili-
tary pact and traditional Egyptian concern over keep-
ing Sudan out of unfriendly hands.
17. Although Nimeiri ended the prolonged north-
south Sudanese civil war 10 years ago, the less advan-
taged southerners feel discriminated against by the
Muslim north. Nimeiri has vacillated over policy
towards the southerners for years, but in the spring of
1983 he took a tougher approach, implementing a plan
to divide the south into three regions and deciding to
rotate southern military units to the north. Some of the
southern tribes view these as hostile acts and a betrayal
by Nimeiri. Dissidence is clearly rising in the south.
This has been sparked by a series of mutinies by
southern Army units against orders transferring them
to the north; while these mutinies were not a reaction
to political issues, they have added to the ranks of the
dissidents. Both Libya and Ethiopia support the train-
ing of small bands of Sudanese dissidents in Ethiopia.
Some of these groups may be involved in the anti-
northern activities in southern Sudan.
18. The unrest in the south is unfocused and con-
fused and may not reach the dimensions of civil war.
Nonetheless, the deterioration of central government
authority in southern Sudan, if unchecked, would
caused severe strains in the Sudanese military. North-
ern officers and troops do not relish the idea of
becoming an army of occupation in the south. If such
a policy were implemented, some would question the
wisdom of Nimeiri's policies. Indeed, such a move
could unite southern dissidents and would worsen the
security situation. The - chances of a coup against
Nimeiri by factions within the Army would grow
considerably if the southern situation got out of con-
trol, requiring many more northern troops in the
south, or if the economic decline in the country
worsened noticeably. Nimeiri recognizes that the
Army is the arbiter of power and he has kept the
military well paid and well housed, but this may not
guarantee their loyalty under more adverse
circumstances.
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19. If Nimeiri were displaced by an Army coup, his
successor would almost certainly be either a military
officer or a ranking member of the present Cabinet.
The Vice President is the constitutional successor but
he is not popular with the Army. Most senior officers
share Nimeiri's pro-Western and pro-American views.
They might, however, seek to redefine the relationship
with the United States in order to gain more benefits
in return for the pre-positioning rights.
20. If discontented junior officers were to over-
throw Nimeiri, there is less assurance that the succes-
sor regime would be as friendly to the United States.
The attitudes of junior officers are not clear, and US
military observers believe they are vulnerable to re-
cruitment by opposition groups. Those junior officers
with Ansar or Brotherhood links might seek to distance
Sudan from both Egypt and the United States, and
would take a more nonaligned posture with closer ties
to Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. Some
junior officers who adhere to fundamentalist Muslim
beliefs might even seek closer relations with Libya and
other radical Islamic states. There is little likelihood of
a pro-Soviet government coming to power in Sudan in
the next couple of years, but a successor government
with strong nonaligned views would seek a more
balanced role between the United States and the
USSR, and this would create major problems for US
strategic planners.
Djibouti
21. Djibouti, independent only since 1977, is still in
many respects a French dependency. The French own
and operate most of the economy, manage the govern-
ment ministries, and exert a strong cultural influence.
France provides budget subsidies, including nearly
half of the Djiboutian military budget, and trains and
supplies the tiny Djiboutian Army. France also main-
tains its own forces-some 3,700 Army, Navy, and Air
Force personnel-which are committed to the defense
of Djiboutian territory.
22. Djibouti has a strategic value to France as the
main base of the French Indian Ocean fleet and as a
sea and air link between metropolitan France and the
French islands and interests in the Indian Ocean.
Hence, despite budgetary stringencies, the French are
likely to maintain their military and political presence
in Djibouti for the next several years, and perhaps
longer. The French hope that their presence in Dji-
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bouti will keep the area from becoming part of the
worldwide confrontation between the superpowers.
France, however, is already trimming the annual
budget subventions to Djibouti (by 10 percent in 1983).
23. The French and Djiboutians welcome US naval
port calls and fueling stops and permit the United
States to use Djibouti's military airfield for reconnais-
sance and surveillance missions. These arrangements
are ad hoc and informal and no payment is involved.
The Djiboutians, however, are now looking for in-
creased aid from the United States to offset the
reductions in French subsidies. If they do not receive
what they think is a proper level of US aid, they are
likely to charge for the use of their facilities. Although
the French realize they cannot provide all the aid the
Djiboutians desire, they will be wary of opening the
door to an increase in US influence. Paris would prefer
some arrangement in which the United States provides
assistance while still recognizing that France has the
predominant interest in Djibouti.
24. The Djiboutian population is mainly Issas (eth-
nic Somalis) and Afars (a nomadic tribe living mostly
in Ethiopia). There is no indication yet that the Afar-
Issa political balance, now weighted in favor of the
Issas, is in danger. But there is likely to be considerably
more tribal squabbling as the government comes to
grips with financial reality. Djiboutian officials are
often irritated and embarrassed by the dominant
French presence, but they know that they cannot get
along without it. They are not likely to turn to the
Soviets or to Libya for aid because of their own
political conservatism and because the French and
moderate Arab states would oppose it.
Kenya
25. Since the last estimate, Kenya's political and
economic stability has eroded considerably. The abor-
tive coup of August 1982, in which junior-ranking
personnel of the Kenyan Air Force attempted to
overthrow President Moi, has left political scars. Moi
lacks the self-confidence and political skills of his
predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, and since the attempted
coup has focused unduly on imagined plots and
conspiracies. He is attempting to fashion a new ruling
elite based on a coalition of leaders of some of the
previously underrepresented tribes (Kamba, Luhya,
and Kalenjin). By systematically excluding key politi-
cians of the larger tribes (Kikuyu and Luo) from the
centers of power, he risks alienating the best educated
and most politically sophisticated segments of the
population. The Kikuyu have dominated Kenyan poli-
tics since independence and are not likely to accept
the role of outsiders without mounting some kind of
challenge. Thus, the outlook is for an increasingly
troubled political and security scene in Nairobi.
26. The growing political malaise is fed by the
deterioration of the Kenyan economy. In the past few
years the combination of depressed world prices for
coffee and tea, higher imported fuel costs, mismanage-
ment of parastatal corporations, mounting current
account deficits, and increasing foreign debts have
plunged Kenya's once-promising economy into a state
of continuing crisis. IMF programs and emergency
funding from Western donors have helped stave off a
collapse, but related austerity measures have aggravat-
ed Moi's political problems.
27. Even if the temporary financial crises are
weathered, the long-range outlook is bleak. The mod-
ern sector of the economy is declining, and restrictions
on imports are severely affecting industrial produc-
tion. Moreover, the rate of population increase in
Kenya is among the world's highest (about 4.1 percent
a year), and arable land is already in short supply.
Population pressures are intensifying the political and
economic unrest and are manifested in the rising
urban unemployment and crime rates.
28. Keeping the Kenyan economy afloat will be-
come an increasingly costly burden for the Western
donors, mainly the United Kingdom and the United
States. The main benefit to the United States will be
the continued Kenyan support for US regional security
objectives, particularly the use of Mombasa port and
airfield facilities by the US military. The Kenyans will
also expect a continuation of the modest military grant
program now in effect, and will almost certainly ask
for a great deal more. The Kenyans are slowly rebuild-
ing their air defense system and will look primarily to
the United States as the supplier to help rebuild the
Air Force, which was placed under Army control after
the attempted coup in 1982.
29. Kenya is not seriously threatened by any exter-
nal power but feels isolated in East Africa. Moi's
.relations with President Obote of Uganda and Presi-
dent Nyerere of Tanzania have been troubled in the
past, but the three leaders are now seeking better
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rapport. The Somalis are in no position to renew their
old claims on Kenya's Northeast Province. Moi and
other Kenyans are uneasy about US military aid to
Somalia, despite recent US-sponsored movements to-
ward a rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia.
Kenyans are also uneasy about the long-term threat
posed by Ethiopian military power and the Ethiopian-
Soviet alliance.
30. Moi will continue to follow a generally pro-
Western foreign policy, but he is erratic and insecure.
Hence, US relations with Kenya are likely to be subject
to occasional misunderstandings and Moi will need
periodic reassurance and gestures of US support. He'is
likely to face continued domestic political turbulence
and some hard economic decisions. If the military
were to believe that he was not ruling effectively, or
that popular discontent arising from tribal strife or
economic deterioration were getting out of hand, it
would consider seizing power. If Kenya were governed
by senior military figures or by some factional leader
supported by the military, the basic pro-Western
orientation would be unchanged.
Current Status of the Conflicts in the Horn of
Africa
Ogaden
31. The combined forces of the Ethiopian Army
and Somali dissidents continue to demonstrate superi-
ority over Somali forces along the disputed Ethiopian-
Somali border. In the summer of 1982 the Ethiopians
and Somali dissidents conducted a successful limited
offensive and seized two border towns which they still
hold. Mengistu believed at that time that the Siad
regime would collapse if dealt a military defeat.
Ethiopian operations in the area are also aimed at
discouraging forays by Somali regular forces and
ethnic Somali guerrillas into Ethiopian territory. Ethi-
opian forces continue to be deployed throughout the
Ogaden, remain sufficiently strong to deter a major
Somali offensive, and can attack Somalia at will.
32. Siad is embarrassed by the inability of his forces
to retaliate effectively. Despite his public pronounce-
ments in early 1983 when he appeared to disclaim any
territorial designs upon his neighbors, Siad still holds
the view shared by most Somalis that a prime national
goal of the Somali Republic is eventually to bring
together under one flag all Somalis and all Somali-
inhabited territory. This Greater Somalia concept im-
plies the absorption of the Ogaden, as well as the
Northeast Province of Kenya and most of Djibouti. In
practice, however, Somali objectives are now restricted
to the Ogaden. Even if Siad wanted to abandon the
historical claim to Ethiopian territory, political consid-
erations would dictate otherwise. Siad and his ruling
circle are unwilling to drop the issue because they
depend too heavily upon the political support of the
Somali clans that inhabit or spill over into the Ogaden.
Thus, despite the discouraging military situation and
US counsels of restraint, the hope of regaining the
Ogaden is still a key factor in Somali policy.
33. The Ogaden dispute is complicated by the
activities of Somali insurgents sponsored by both Ethi-
opia and Somalia. The Western Somali Liberation
Front (WSLF), suffering from factionalism and re-
duced support from Mogadishu, has declined in effec-
tiveness and morale in the past two years, but still
sporadically harasses Ethiopian convoys and patrols
inside the Ogaden. If the Somali Government contin-
ues its present efforts to bolster the effectiveness of the
WSLF, the Ethiopians are likely to be provoked into
retaliation.
34. On the other side, two guerrilla groups are
attacking targets in Somalia. The Somali Democratic
Salvation Front (SDSF), composed mostly of Majertain
clansmen, who are political enemies of Siad, played a
major role in the Ethiopian offensive of 1982. The
SDSF is strongly anti-American as well as anti-Siad, is
trained and funded by Ethiopia and Libya, but is
regarded by most other Somalis as a self-serving tribal
interest group. It is likely to cause further localized
disruption by its raids into Somalia, but does not have
the military power or the popular support to topple
the Siad regime by its own efforts.
35. A newer, and perhaps greater, threat to Siad is
the Somali National Movement (SNM), drawn from
major clans in northern Somalia. The SNM is smaller
than the SDSF and has resisted the urgings of Libya
and Ethiopia to merge with its rival. Operating inside
northern Somalia with Ethiopian arms, funds, and
logistic support, the SNM successfully exploits tradi-
tional northern distrust of Siad and his mainly south-
ern ruling circle.
36. Mengistu probably expects Siad's internal trou-
bles to mount and either bring about his downfall or at
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the least keep him from any further adventures in the
Ogaden. Mengistu realizes that an Ethiopian invasion
would rally the Somali clans to Siad. Also, he is aware
of the resupply operation by the United States and its
allies to Somalia last summer, and may believe that the
United States would take even stronger measures in
the event of a major Ethiopian offensive. Neither
Mengistu nor the Soviets would want to precipitate an
extensive major conflict, possibly involving the United
States directly, particularly when the counterinsur-
gency campaigns in northern Ethiopia are not going
well. Moreover, in his new role as Chairman of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), Mengistu sees
an opportunity to gain acceptance as a senior African
leader. A blatant invasion of a neighboring state would
tarnish his new image and violate one of the guiding
principles of the OAU charter (inviolability of bor-
ders). None of these considerations will deter Mengistu
from launching limited border strikes by the Ethiopian
Army or dispatching bands . of dissident Somalis into
Somalia to stir up dissension and embarrass the Siad
regime, but we estimate that Ethiopia will not under-
take an overt invasion in the next year or two.
The Eritrean and Tigrean Insurgencies
37. Over the past two years, the Ethiopians have
made virtually no headway against the northern insur-
gencies. A lengthy campaign in 1982, involving some
120,000 Ethiopian troops and scores of high-level
Soviet advisers, failed to dislodge a far smaller Eritre-
an People's Liberation Front (EPLF) force from its
mountain stronghold. A renewal of major offensive
operations in 1983 was delayed because of the need
for Ethiopian forces to contain guerrillas of the Ti-
grean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in neighbor-
ing Tigray Province. Ethiopian tactics against both
insurgent groups have been based on extensive sweep
operations and massed attacks on rebel strong points.
The insurgents have responded by falling back into
rough terrain and ambushing the pursuers. Reports of
Ethiopian use of lethal chemical warfare agents have
not been substantiated.
38. Both insurgent groups are well led, well orga-
nized, and well motivated. They support each other in
the field to some extent, but their motives and aims
differ. Both insurgent groups style themselves Marxist-
Leninist, but they get no help from any external
Communist source, primarily because they are bat-
tling a Marxist-Leninist government in Addis Ababa
that has the blessing of Moscow. The EPLF is not only
the largest of three competing Eritrean liberation
groups, but is the only effective force. Sporadic efforts
by Sudan and Saudi Arabia to coordinate the activities
of the Eritrean groups have failed. After 20 years of
struggle, the Eritrean rebels of all groups are not likely
to settle for anything less than independence for
Eritrea. The most that Mengistu would offer would be
some sort of semiautonomy in an Ethiopia still domi-
nated by Amharas. There is, therefore, virtually no
chance for a negotiated settlement.
39. The motives and organization of the TPLF are
somewhat murkier. Tigreans have historically consid-
ered themselves the core grouping of the multiethnic
Ethiopian Empire and entitled to at least coequal
status with the Amhara. The TPLF; unlike the EPLF,
might settle for some sort of autonomy in a federated
Ethiopia. But Mengistu has already ruled out federa-
tion and refuses to compromise.
40. Mengistu is frustrated by the failure of his
campaigns in the north. He is dissatisfied with some
aspects of Soviet assistance, but finds it more conve-
nient to blame neighboring Sudan for its aid to the
insurgents. Sudan has actually provided only limited
cross-border help to the rebels, not wanting to antago-
nize the militarily stronger Ethiopians and fearing that
Ethiopia might promote further dissident activity by
Sudanese now training in camps in Ethiopia.
41. The Tigreans and Eritreans probably can hold
their positions in rugged terrain and defy the regime
for the next several years. Meanwhile they are exact-
ing a heavy toll on Ethiopian forces. The high casualty
rates and frequent logistic breakdowns are affecting
Army morale, as shown by the rising desertion rate
(especially from the militia) and the unpopularity of
the new national conscription. By refusing to negotiate
in good faith with the rebels, Mengistu leaves himself
with no choice but to continue the costly conflict.
Internal Ethiopian Developments
42. Internal developments in Ethiopia are central to
nearly all of the issues and conflicts in the Horn.
Ethiopia, despite its poverty and backwardness, is by
far the most important country in the area in terms of
population, military power, and ability to destabilize
its neighbors. It is at the same time the most stable
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politically. Chairman Mengistu has consolidated deci-
sionmaking power in his own hands, having outma-
neuvered, intimidated, or eliminated all significant
internal rivals. While the remnants of former political
opposition groups-which are primarily Marxist-no
doubt continue to harbor great animosity toward
Mengistu and the military regime, they appear to have
been effectively suppressed by the regime's security
apparatus. Mengistu is feared and hated, but is unop-
posed in Addis Ababa.
43. Mengistu dominates a patchwork collection of
commissars, councils, committees, and Cabinet that
make up the Provisional Military Government of
Socialist Ethiopia. In the spring of 1983 he reshuffled
the Cabinet and announced a series of steps designed
to establish by September 1984 a People's Democratic
Republic to be ruled by a Communist Party of
Ethiopia. Mengistu has also decreed a national con-
scription to mobilize the population for military ser-
vice, and established an Institute of Nationalities,
charged with drafting a constitution that would ac-
commodate the disparate tribal groupings, some of
which are now in armed revolt.
44. The Soviets play an important advisory role in
the Mengistu regime, but the recent pronouncements
are in full accord with Mengistu's known aspirations.
He has chosen the Soviet model, rather than had it
imposed upon him. There is a considerable confluence
of his aims and the Soviets' for the structure of the
Ethiopian state.
45. Soviet and East European civilian advisers are
assuming a larger role in the economic planning
process and in the ideological indoctrination of pro-
spective Ethiopian party officials. As a measure of the
importance Moscow places on this aspect of the bilat-
eral relationship, the Chairman of the State Planning
Committee (GOSPLAN) and a Central Committee
member each spent several weeks in Ethiopia earlier
in 1983. Soviet suggestions, which often tend to be
more advantageous to Soviet interests than those of
Ethiopia, are not always accepted, but Ethiopia is so
short of management skills, economic expertise, and
experience in planning that the Communist advisers
fill a void. Foreign Communists are also providing
academic, technical, and political training to thou-
sands of Ethiopian students in Ethiopia, the USSR, and
Eastern Europe. Not all of these youth will be ideolog-
ically committed to the Soviet world view when they
fill the ranks of the Ethiopian bureaucracy, but they
will ? be more familiar with Soviet procedures and
presumably more aineriable to building a collective
society in the Soviet model.
46. The Ethiopian economy is in disarray, the result
of political purges, on-going insurgencies, heavy mili-
tary expenditures, and attempts to institute a collective
system in agriculture. Hard currency reserves would
be even more depleted by now were it not for Libyan
funding. Mengistu recognizes the economic plight of
the country, as well as the inefficiencies and corrup-
tion of the bureaucracy that add to the turmoil. His
response is to exhort the bureaucracy to reform itself,
to turn to, his foreign Communist advisers, and to seek
non-Communist foreign assistance. The Soviet Chair-
man of GOSPLAN, on his recent visit, counseled
Mengistu to steer clear of Western loans or aid offers.
Mengistu seeks drought and refugee relief and specific
aid projects from the West, but is willing to make only
minor concessions in return.
47. Since the last estimate the Soviet military pres-
ence in Ethiopia has risen from some 1,400 to about
1,700 personnel. Soviet advisers perform training,
ideological indoctrination, logistical and maintenance
functions, administer the still substantial military aid
program, and' accompany some Army units in field
operations in the north. Roughly 9,000 Cuban troops
and advisers remain in Ethiopia, mostly in the north-
ern part of the Ogaden, where they constitute a
strategic reserve against the remote possibility of a
renewed Somali attack.' A Cuban unit near Addis
Ababa could come to Mengistu's aid in case of an
internal revolt. About a thousand Cuban civilians are
assigned to diverse agricultural, medical, and small
industrial projects. The Cuban military presence in its
garrison status provides a measure of political support
to the regime, but there is little military need for it.
The Cubans have not been engaged in combat for five
years but retain their operational capabilities. They
are unlikely to return to Cuba any time soon, however,
because of the Mengistu regime's fear of another
Somali invasion and the possibility that they may be
needed against the insurgencies in Angola, and per-
haps even in Mozambique.
48. Mengistu's prime concerns for the next couple
of years will be gaining control over the insurgent-
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controlled areas in the north and maintaining his hold
on the Somali-inhabited Ogaden. Secondarily, Men-
gistu wants to impose his own version of a centralized
Marxist regime throughout an Ethiopia in which he is
the dominant figure. Hence, we see virtually no
chance in the next couple of years of reversing the.
leftward course of Ethiopia.
49. Despite Mengistu's military dependence upon
the Soviets and his personal commitment to the cre-
ation of a Soviet-style state, Ethiopia's pressing need
for economic assistance suggests that there might be an
opportunity for the United States to affect the pace-
but not the direction-of leftward trends in Ethiopia
over the next two years. Yet even substantial US
economic aid, which many technocrats in Addis Aba-
ba desire, would have little political influence upon
Mengistu so long as the northern insurgencies drag on,
tensions remain high along the Somali border, and the
United States continues to back Somalia militarily.
50. Mengistu generally moves swiftly and some-
times ruthlessly to suppress incipient discontent within
the armed forces. The chances of a coup from within
the military establishment are not very great. Never-
theless, continued failure of the counterinsurgency
campaigns might lead one or more military figures to
conclude that Mengistu should be replaced, although
we have not detected any signs of plotting. The sudden
demise of Mengistu, by, accident or assassination,
would bring considerable, and perhaps prolonged,
confusion. There is no apparent successor nor any
influential personality with a substantial power base. A
power struggle within the armed forces would almost
certainly result, probably along ideological lines. The
eventual successor regime would probably be equally
dependent on the Soviets and Cubans, but not neces-
sarily their choice.
West European and Moderate Arab Interests in
the Horn
51. Both West European and moderate Arab states
have a stake in developments in the Horn of Africa.
They would like to rid the area of Soviet, Cuban, and
Libyan influence, but they have other interests-some
at variance with those of the United States-and their
tactical approaches are not always in harmony with
US policies.
52. The Italians, former colonial rulers in the Horn,
still have substantial investment and trade connections
.in the area and normally take the lead in EC economic
aid negotiations with Ethiopia and Somalia. West
Germany, grateful to Somalia for help in resolving a
Lufthansa hijacking a few years ago, provides unilater-
al aid to Mogadishu, and also maintains a technical aid
program in Ethiopia. The United Kingdom leads
multilateral financial rescue efforts on behalf of Kenya
and provides limited economic and military aid to
Nairobi. In addition to the international consortium
that handles Sudan's massive debt problem, a number
of European states maintain bilateral aid programs in
Sudan. Aid from France and the French presence are
essential to Djibouti. In most respects, these activities
complement the efforts of the United States to main-
tain a firm Western presence and commitment to the
area.
53. West European policies toward Ethiopia, how-
ever, are based on premises that are at odds with US
policies. Europeans believe that they can wean Men-
gistu away from his heavy reliance on the USSR by
offering increased aid in return for some political
gestures. of nonalignment. In 1982 Mengistu seemed
interested in establishing a dialogue with the West,
and even met with the US Charge earlier this year, but
remains highly suspicious of US intentions in the area.
Anti-Western themes are featured in the propaganda
from Addis Ababa, and there is no reason to expect
that any Western overtures will accomplish much in
the next couple of years.
54. Like the Europeans, the moderate Arabs want
to reduce the Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan influences in
the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are
uneasy about the Soviet military presence in Ethiopia,
but are unwilling and unable to do much about it. The
Saudis and the Gulf Cooperation Council states are
usually willing to provide oil on advantageous terms to
Sudan and Somalia, as they do to many other impover-
ished Islamic states. The Saudis and Kuwaitis also fund
the purchase of some military items from Egypt on
behalf of Sudan and Somalia. Egypt takes a historical
and strategic interest in Sudan and would probably
come to its aid if it were seriously threatened by
Libyan forces or other elements hostile to Egyptian
interests. But Arab aid to Somalia is often given
grudgingly, especially since the decline in Arab oil
revenues.
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55. Under these circumstances, the United States
cannot expect more vigorous support by the Arabs for
US policies in the Horn of Africa. Egypt and Oman,
for reasons of their own, are supportive of CENTCOM
goals. But they would not want to get directly involved
in the conflicts of the Horn in support of US policy
initiatives, particularly if this exposed them to retalia-
tion by their adversaries.
Libya Y
56. Libyan involvement in affairs in the Horn has
increased since the 1981 signing of the Tripartite (or
Aden) Pact among Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen.
The Pact has provided Libya with opportunities to act
against Western (especially US) interests and against
pro-Western governments, although the relationships
among the three countries have been anything but
smooth and currently the agreement is all but
moribund.
57. Some of the more grandiose features of the
Pact, such as the formation of a large military reserve
force to be funded by Libya and available to fend off
imperialist attacks on any member state, were never
implemented. Nor has Libya provided , all of the
promised funds to Ethiopia and South Yemen. None-
theless, each member state has gained something from
the Pact. The Libyans gained the support and coopera-
tion of Ethiopia in their efforts to topple Siad and, to a
lesser' extent, Nimeiri. Ethiopia received over $320
million in financial aid from Libya, and South Yemen
got some $30 million from Libya for housing projects.
58. The Pact has become less tripartite in nature;
and more a series of bilateral relationships. South
Yemen's contacts with Ethiopia are close and mutually
beneficial. Aden loaned Ethiopia a landing craft for
operations against Eritreans, and sent prospective pi-
lots to Ethiopia in an aborted training program. South
Yemen also takes in a small number of Somali dissi-
dents for training at the behest of Ethiopia. But Aden's
relations with Libya are strained, and it is seeking
external aid from the Gulf Cooperation Council states
rather than from Libya. Qadhafi's rebuff at the OAU
Summit in Addis Ababa, which he blames in part on
Mengistu, could further weaken the Tripartite Pact.
Ethiopians are concerned that Libya might cease its
financial aid to them and are trying to avoid any
further damage to the relationship. Current problems
between Qadhafi and Mengistu illustrate the differ-
ences in the respective national and personal goals of
the leaders and the great difficulty for even a radical
regime to sustain any kind of close relationship with
Qadhafi.
59. Ethiopia and Libya are still likely to collaborate
on limited programs where there is a convergence of
interest. Mengistu and Qadhafi have long been in
agreement on using Somali dissidents to promote the
downfall of Siad. But Qadhafi is far more intent than
is Mengistu about subverting Sudan. The fact that
Sudan could, if it chose, provide much more aid to the
EPLF and the TPLF has had a partial restraining
influence on Mengistu. Qadhafi has no such con-
straints, and harbors an intense hatred of Nimeiri
because of the latter's support of Egypt, the Camp
David accords, and the Lebanese-Israeli agreement.
Also, even though both Mengistu and Qadhafi would
like to eliminate the US presence and influence in
Africa, Mengistu is more wary of taking actions that
would draw an unwelcome US response.
60. Although Qadhafi left the OAU Summit in a
huff and tried to retrieve his credibility by plunging
into Middle Eastern Arab affairs, he is not likely to
ignore any new opportunities in Africa to advance his
revolutionary goals. His intervention in Chad testifies
to his continuing ambition to upset regimes not to his
liking. Many of his ventures fail because of erratic
direction from Tripoli, inept performances by his
operatives, lack of followthrough, and misreading of
local situations. However inept and erratic some of his
activities may appear, Qadhafi is not deterred by his
own failings and will continue to meddle in the Horn
countries, with or without Ethiopian collaboration.
61. Qadhafi has no particular quarrel with Kenya
or Djibouti, but the expanded US military use of
facilities there will increasingly attract his attention.
Libya currently has little access to Kenya because
there are few Libyan sympathizers in the country and
Kenyan security forces pay close attention to Libyan
activities. The Libyans could renew earlier attempts to
influence the Djiboutian Government, but the Djibou-
tian President is wary of Qadhafi and French and
local services are vigilant about attempted Libyan
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Figure 2
Aden Pact and US-Allied Countries
subversion there. Hence, the chances of Libyan or
Libyan-inspired incidents against the Americans in
Kenya or Djibouti are not great.
Soviet Activities and Prospects in the Horn of
Africa
62. The Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa
began 20 years ago as an opportunistic response to
Chad
Abichee
N'DJAMENA
Saudi
Arabia
Niger
,d
Mediterranean Sea
Aden Pact member
Military access or pre-positioning
.agreement with the United States
0 500 1000 Kilometers
0 500
NICOSIA
Cyprus ('
Leban
BEIRUT)
Soviet
Union
Gull of Oman
HABI
MUSCAT
Unclassified
Nemec and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
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Somalia's need for military aid. When the USSR
supported Ethiopia during the Ogaden war in 1977,
Somalia ousted the Soviets, who by that time had
developed a close relationship with the Mengistu
regime. For Moscow, Ethiopia is of particular impor-
tance because it is the dominant state in the Horn and
because of its proximity to the oil-rich Persian Gulf
and Arabian Peninsula. Analysis of Soviet activities in
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the Horn area suggests the following Soviet policy
objectives:
- Exploitation of Ethiopian military needs to estab-
lish a firmer patron-client relationship and to
consolidate Soviet influence in the Ethiopian
Government.
- Use of Ethiopian territory to facilitate the projec-
tion of Soviet naval and naval air power into the
Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean region, and the oil-
rich Persian Gulf area.
- Use of military and political influence in the
Horn to undermine perceived US 'strategic
policies.
- Expansion of Soviet influence by encouraging
leftist change and weakening pro-Western gov-
ernments in black Africa and in the Red Sea
area.
63. On the first of these points, the Soviets are
successfully employing their preferred instruments for
exerting influence-military assistance and ideological
indoctrination. The USSR has already delivered about
$2.6 billion of the $4 billion in military aid that it has
agreed to provide. Annual arms shipments in the 1981-
85 period are expected to be about a third lower than
the average of 1976-80. This is mainly because the
Ethiopian armed forces, which grew from some
45,000 to over 240,000 during the earlier period, have
now leveled off at around 200,000, and the replace-
ment of US arms by Soviet weaponry in the Ethiopian
military inventory has been largely completed. In the
renewed campaigns against the northern insurgents
during 1982 and 1983, General Petrov, chief of Soviet
Ground Forces, helped plan Ethiopian operations for a
two-month period at the beginning of each offensive.
Ethiopia will still need Soviet arms for some years to
come because of its inability to crush the insurgencies
in the northern provinces, because it views Somalia
and-to a lesser degree-Sudan as continued threats to
its security, and because it believes that the United
States will help to arm all of its neighbors.
64. The Soviets would like to see Ethiopia as a
secure and consolidated state, fully committed to
developing along Marxist-Leninist lines. While Mos-
cow's current position hinges on Ethiopia's military
needs and Mengistu's ideological preferences, the Sovi-
ets are also trying to institutionalize their relationship
and influence to prevent a future setback similar to
those suffered in Egypt and Somalia in the 1970s.
Toward this end, a key, Soviet goal has been the
establishment of a Communist party in Ethiopia,
through which Moscow could cultivate a reliable cadre
of supporters.
65. Recent developments reflect other Soviet efforts
to strengthen their position. Soviet and East European
advisers will be attached to the proposed regional
economic centers. The Soviets have also been pressing
Mengistu to replace Western-educated government
officials with more ideologically compatible or East-
ern-trained individuals. Mengistu typically has hedged
on his response, selecting officials more on a basis of
persona? loyalty and competence than on ideological
purity. Nonetheless, the large numbers of Ethiopians
undergoing academic, technical, and political training
in the USSR (3,680) and in Eastern Europe (1,905) will
provide a reservoir of future officials, some of whom
may be more ideologically attuned to Soviet aims.
Many other Ethiopian youths are being trained in
Ethiopia by Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans.
66. Despite these apparent inroads, the Soviets
probably are still wary of the crafty Mengistu. He has
proved to be a less-than-pliant client whose version of
a Marxist-Lenipist state will probably fall short of
Soviet expectations. Mengistu, for example, has fore-
stalled Moscow on the party issue for over five years
and could do so again; even when it is established, the
party will probably be dominated by the same mili-
tary clique that Mengistu has perpetuated over the
years. His most recent Cabinet shakeup brought some
pro-Soviet officials into key positions, but several
newly promoted, US-educated ministers could propose
financial and foreign policy programs that would
make Moscow uneasy. Moreover, he continues to
check the Soviets on other issues, refusing to establish a
joint military academy in Ethiopia or to grant greater
established access to Ethiopian facilities.
67. Frictions stem from cultural misunderstandings,
the clash of Ethiopian nationalism and xenophobia
with Soviet ideological preconceptions, and Ethiopian
resentment of Soviet arrogance. Ethiopians also com-
plain about the lack of Soviet economic assistance, the
poor quality of some Soviet equipment, the lack of
spare parts, Moscow's reluctance to grant various types
of military training, and its refusal to help Ethiopians
develop maintenance and repair capabilities.
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68. These perennial frictions may be exacerbated
over the next few years, as Ethiopia is scheduled to
begin major military debt repayments to the USSR in
1984 of some $200 million a year-an amount it
almost certainly cannot meet. During this time, there
will probably be some squabbling, hard bargaining,
and increased tensions. Nonetheless, we believe the
Soviet-Ethiopian relationship will remain solid, pri-
marily because each side needs the other. Ethiopia
remains the USSR's key client in the important Horn
area and Moscow is the only superpower prepared to
meet Addis's continued military needs. Hence, while
the Soviets might be only partially successful in fulfill-
ing their first objective-expanding and consolidating
their influence in Ethiopia-they will nevertheless
retain a strong position, with little likelihood of any
real setback in the next few years.
69. On the second objective-the improvement of
Soviet access to bases in Ethiopia to project the Soviet
presence into the Arabian Sea-Red Sea-Indian Ocean
areas-progress is mixed. Soviet patrol and ASW
aircraft continue to operate from Asmara airfield to
monitor US naval activity in the Gulf of Aden and the
Arabian Sea. Dahlak Island, though a small support
facility, is useful to the Soviets for repairs of ships and
submarines of their Indian Ocean Squadron. Further-
more, its location on an island some 20 miles from the
Ethiopian mainland provides some protection from
Ethiopian interference and possible Eritrean attack.
These facilities, considered in conjunction with Soviet
use of port and air facilities in nearby South Yemen,
contribute to the Soviets' ability to keep naval forces
on station in the Indian Ocean, far from the borders of
the Soviet Union.
70. The Soviets are apparently
these arrangements,
and are seeking to expand their access to
facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Mengistu,
after ignoring or denying several Soviet requests for
expanded naval access, recently has given permission
to the Soviets to add about 70 technicians to the
several hundred at the Dahlak Island repair facility.
The Soviets claim that the additional personnel are
needed because of planned delivery of new equipment
and some expansion of the facility. The Soviets have
chosen to keep the investment at Dahlak at a low level,
partly because it is not a felicitious site for a larger
Soviet community. Also, Soviet naval activities and
presence in the Indian Ocean area have diminished in
the past two years. Yet, increased use of Dahlak in the
first half of 1983 and the revival of earlier Soviet
requests for increased military access suggest that
Moscow may be planning to expand its shore-based
facilities in order to support a somewhat higher level
of activity in the area in the next few years.
71. The renewed Soviet interest in expanding its
naval capabilities in the Horn area is also suggested by
the efforts of Admiral Gorshkov to obtain new air and
naval facilities in South Yemen. During his visit to
Aden in March, Gorshkov apparently asked for such
facilities and was turned down by the South Yemenis.
The USSR may have again evinced interest in a
proposed reconstruction of naval facilities near Assab
to Soviet military specifications. The Ethiopians have
previously turned down projects submitted by foreign-
ers to reconstruct the facilities near Assab. Mengistu
appears cold to the idea of a permanent foreign naval
presence or substantial access in mainland Ethiopian
ports. But the USSR will probably raise the issue again,
either in conjunction with the visit of the Chief of the
Soviet Navy next year, or perhaps in connection with
the repayment of the arms debt.
72. It seems likely that the apparent Soviet efforts
to enhance their naval support facilities in Ethiopia
and South Yemen are designed to advance the overall
strategic aims of projecting military power into distant
areas and to counter CENTCOM activities-the third
major objective of Soviet policy in the Horn. The
Soviets will keep a close eye on the port and airfield
improvements in Somalia and Kenya carried out by
US contractors, and will keep the pressure on Mengistu
for permission to expand present facilities and perhaps
to develop new ones. They probably believe that the
United States has extensive plans for future access and
deployment in the Horn area and that the US aim is to
neutralize the Soviet military presence in the Horn of
Africa. Mengistu almost certainly sees US policies in
the Horn as an effort to encircle and eventually
threaten his emerging Marxist state in Ethiopia. It is
likely, therefore, that Mengistu and the Soviets are
reinforcing each other's worst-case views of the Ameri-
can presence in the Horn of Africa, and the Soviets
probably exaggerate American intentions in order to
play upon Mengistu's fears.
73. As for the fourth objective-the expansion of
Soviet influence in black Africa and the Red Sea
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area-the Soviets are not likely to make much head-
way in the next two years. Mengistu as Chairman of
the OAU will need little encouragement to strike a
heavy note of anti-American, pro-Soviet propaganda.
Mengistu sees nothing incongruous about decrying the
presence of US "bases" in Africa while ignoring the
use of Ethiopian military facilities by Soviet ships and
naval aircraft. Nonetheless, Mengistu may feel that the
position of Chairman of the OAU requires at least
some gestures of evenhandedness. The joint communi-
que issued at the conclusion of Romanian President
Ceausescu's recent visit to Addis Ababa contained no
anti-American material. The Soviets may gain only
marginal propaganda advantages from Mengistu's ten-
ure as OAU Chief. Moderate black African states in
the area show no inclination to turn to the Soviets,
despite their security and economic deficiencies. The
inability of the USSR to provide meaningful economic
aid is widely recognized in the countries of the Horn.
Soviet propaganda appeals to Africans to turn against
the "neocolonialist West" fall on deaf ears, because
most Africans know that their only hope for economic
survival lies in access to Western aid and markets.
Similarly, the Soviets are unlikely to be able to exploit
security weaknesses of Ethiopia's neighbors. In Sudan
and Somalia, anti-Soviet attitudes are strong because of
unpleasant memories of earlier close association with
the USSR and because of current Soviet support of
their main adversaries-Libya and Ethiopia.
74. The Soviets probably realize that their best.
chance to expand influence in the Horn is to exploit
the instability of the pro-Western countries there.
Nonetheless, there is little evidence that the Soviets are
directly sponsoring dissident elements in the pro-
Western states of the Horn. Indeed, the Ethiopians
allow the Soviets only limited access to the various
Sudanese and Somali dissident camps in Ethiopia.
Presumably, the Soviets are encouraging Libyan and
Ethiopian funding and training of Sudanese and So-
mali factions which have the capability of stirring up
trouble in their homelands. Despite such efforts, the
Soviets have at times urged Mengistu to reduce ten-
sions on the Somali border, reflecting Moscow's desire
to minimize the possibility of a major new Ethiopian-
Somali conflict. All pro-Western governments in the
Horn of Africa are so beset with severe internal
problems that the additional trouble caused by cross-
border insurgents may not be the determining factor
in their possible downfall. Furthermore, as assessed in
other sections of this Estimate, the successor regimes
are not likely to be pro-Soviet or pro-Libyan, though
they might. opt for a more nonaligned policy, less
supportive of US interests.
75. Mengistu's dependence on Soviet military assist-
ance, the debt owed to Moscow, and his concern over
US intentions are likely to lead him to yield to
Moscow's requests for continued and perhaps more
extensive use of military facilities in Ethiopia. On
balance, however, the Soviets are unlikely to achieve
all of their objectives over the next two years.
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Table A-1
Military Balance in the Horn of Africa
(Estimated Personnel Strengths and Major Equipment)
Personnel
180,000+
39,500 13,000
2,500
51,000
Tanks
907-
290 60+
33
285
Armored personnel carriers
715 a
490 to 525 4
-
209
Armored cars/vehicles
240 a
41 107
11
100
Field artillery
1,020 a
440
15
100
Air defense artillery
920 a
450
8
200 to 340
Surface-to-air missile battalions
8
10
3
3,500
2,000 650
120
1,500
Personnel
4,000
2,500 1,850
850
3,000
Jet fighters
152
47 25
10
45 to 50
Helicopters
49
4 10
8
22
Transports
19
9 11
3
11
a Figures include approximately 200 tanks, about 135 field artillery
pieces, nearly 200 armored vehicles, and some 40 air defense guns
purchased by Ethiopia and assigned to Cuban forces.
b All forces shown in Djibouti are French.The embryonic Djibou-
tian Army has about 2,700 men and is equipped with 40 armored
vehicles and 10 APCs.
c The equipment in both Somalia's and Sudan's inventories general-
ly have low operational rates.
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Table A-2
Estimated Insurgent Personnel Strengths
in Eritrea and Tigre
Table A-4
Soviet Naval Visits
to Dahlak Island
Ethiopian armed forces 100,000
Guerrilla forces 27,000 to 33,000
Eritrean Liberation Front 5,000
Eritrean People's Liberation Front 15,000 to 20,000
Tigrean People's Liberation Front 7,000 to 8,000
Table A-3
Estimated Ethiopian and Somali Personnel
in and Near the Ogaden
Government forces
60,000
Somali Democratic Salvation Front
guerrillas
2,500
Somali National Movement combat
force
500 to 1,000
Government forces
39,500
Western Somali Liberation Front
guerrillas
3,000 to 5,000
Total ships 40 50 93 101 87 Averaging
serviced 15 per month
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