CHINA'S SECURITY POLICY: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GROWING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000701240003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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CHINA'S SECURITY POL
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
GROWING CAPABILITIES
FOR NUCLEAR CONFLICT
Information available as of 26 July 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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-KC I
')tt
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 3
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 9
China's Past Security Policy ................................................................................... 9
Past Policies and Strategies To Achieve Security Objectives ........................... 9
The Current Security Environment: Perceptions of External Threats ............... 10
Continuing Superpower Rivalry ........................................................................ 10
The United States: A Necessary Collaborator ................................................... 10
The Continuing Soviet Threat ........................................................................... 11
Japan: The Chief Economic Partner ................................................................. 12
Turbulence in South Asia? ................................................................................. 12
The Chinese-Vietnamese Confrontation ........................................................... 12
The Military Establishment-Problems and Achievements ................................ 13
Principles of Defense Modernization ................................................................ 13
Impediments to Military Modernization ........................................................... 13
Concentration on Priority Areas ........................................................................ 14
Need for Foreign Technology ............................................................................ 14
China's Nuclear Force in 1993: A Growing Capability ................................... 14
Modernization of Conventional Forces ............................................................. 16
Policies and Strategies for Exploiting Improved Nuclear Capabilities ............... 17
The Search for Major Power Status: A Seat at the Table? .............................. 17
Advancing Toward Security Goals .................................................................... 17
Strengthening the Nuclear Deterrent ................................................................ 17
Countering Soviet Encirclement ........................................................................ 17
Wrestling With the Vietnam Impasse ................................................. ......... :.... 18
Maneuvering Within the Strategic Triangle ..................................................... 18
Fostering Ties With Japan and Western Europe ............................................. 18
Cultivating the Third World ............................................................................. 18
Recovering Hong Kong and Macau .................................................................. 18
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Implications for the United States of China's Future Security Policies ............. 18
Chinese Nuclear. Force Improvements and the Superpowers ......................... 18
Effect of China"s Nuclear Forces on Nonnuclear States ................................. 19
Maneuvering Between the Superpowers ........................................................... 19
Persisting Need for Access to Western Technology ......................................... 19
China and Arms Control .................................................................................... 20
Effects on Asian States Friendly to the United States ..................................... 20
ANNEXES
A. Indicators Through 1993 .................................................................................. 21
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JCI.RC 1
SCOPE NOTE
Over the past several years, Chinese leaders have changed tack in
dealing with the United States and the Soviet Union while proclaiming
their adherence to an "independent foreign policy." Their perception
of the Soviet Union as the main threat to their security and of the Unit-
ed States as the only strategic counterweight to that threat has not
changed. However, they now judge the Soviets to be more vulnerable at
home and overextended abroad-as in Afghanistan. Moreover, their
relations with the United States continue to be impaired by differences
over Taiwan. Accordingly, the Chinese have made tactical adjustments
in their policy. These adjustments have led them to probe Soviet
willingness to reduce tensions and to distance themselves publicly from
the United States.
Meanwhile, the Chinese are pressing ahead with the gradual,
steady development of their strategic nuclear force begun in the mid-
1960s. For example, they now have two intercontinental ballistic
missiles capable of reaching targets throughout the United States and
the Soviet Union and a sizable number of intermediate- and medium-
range ballistic missiles. By 1987 they will probably have one operational
missile-firing nuclear submarine. By 1993 we estimate a Chinese
nuclear force of 10 to 20 full-range deployed ICBMs.
In the light of adjustments in Chinese foreign policy and taking
account of the steady development of Chinese military forces, particu-
larly strategic nuclear forces, this Special National Intelligence Estimate
assesses China's long-run security policies and the political implications
of these policies for the United States. Will future Chinese leaders
change China's current security policies and orientation? What path
will China's security policy follow over the next 10 years? And what
role will strategic nuclear forces play in these policies?
This Special National Intelligence Estimate is intended to comple-
ment NIE 13-3/8-83, Chinese Capabilities for Nuclear Conflict. That
NIE discusses China's nuclear capabilities and deployments; this SNIE
on China's long-run security policy discusses political implications for
the United States.
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JCI.KC I
KEY JUDGMENTS
What Kind of Long-Run Security Policy Will China Pursue
Over the Next 10 Years? China in the next 10 years will continue to
pursue a foreign policy that enhances its ability to maneuver between
the two superpowers. But it will remain inhibited in attaining a
significant capability for maneuver by the patently greater threat posed
to it by the Soviet Union than by the United States. The size and quality
of Soviet forces opposite China have continued to grow steadily during
the past decade, supporting a Soviet military strategy designed to carry
any future conflict quickly into Chinese territory. Barring any dramatic
changes in relations, Soviet military capabilities probably will improve
gradually through 1990.
Chinese leaders undoubtedly look forward to the time when
China's modernization programs will permit it to deal as an equal with
the superpowers. But they are realistic enough to recognize that, by the
early 1990s, China will still be far behind in industrial production
capability, advanced technology, and modern weapons:
- In the interim, China's leaders will probably be satisfied to
have their country occupy a role analogous to that of France,
relying on strategic nuclear forces to serve deterrence purposes
rather than to constitute a ticket to the superpower club.
- In this situation, China will not in fact occupy a seat at the table
with the superpowers, but China's voice will increasingly be a
factor in international forums on some key issues such as arms
control.
How Does China's Long-Run Security Policy Affect the Unit-
ed States? For a number of years, the Soviets have had to take account
of China's nuclear retaliatory capability; since the deployment of
China's CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile (1980-81), the United
States has also had to take account of possible attacks on its own
territory. Should the United States become engaged in combat with the
Chinese (for example, in Korea or the Taiwan Strait), it could no longer
threaten the use of nuclear weapons against China without taking into
account the possibility of Chinese nuclear retaliation against targets in
the United States.
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China's need for US trade, educational facilities, and technology,
and its common interest with the United States in opposing Soviet
expansionism, will continue to provide some basis for consultation on
these and other matters of shared strategic concern. China will continue
to take positions that diverge from the United States on a range of Third
World issues, but may be more interested in coordination or collabora-
tion on key regional problems where US and Chinese interests coincide:
- The technological gap between the West and China is unlikely
to narrow any time soon. Thus at the end of 10 years China will
still depend heavily on overseas training of its scientific and
technical personnel and on importing technology, particularly
from the United States.
Moreover, China's relationship with the United States will
afford it a degree of leverage in its dealings with the Soviet
Union.
What Nuclear Forces Will China Deploy Over the Decade? I
China has only one nuclear missile system capable of reaching the
continental United States--the CSS-4. Two silos for this ICBM are
operational and at least four additional silos are under construction, but
they will not be operational before 1986. By 1993, however, China's
nuclear forces will approximate the following:
- Ten to 20 full-range CSS-4 ICBMs capable of reaching all of the
USSR and the United States, some possibly equipped with
multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs).
Some 20 CSS-3 limited-range ICBMs capable of reaching
Moscow but only Alaska and Hawaii in the United States.
Fifty to 90 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
capable of reaching the eastern USSR.
- Up to 30 new-generation solid-propellant IRBMs in that sys-
tem's initial deployment.
- Three to five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs), each carrying 12 thermonuclear ballistic missiles with
a range of about 2,400 kilometers.
- Some tactical nuclear weapons.
This section draws on the conclusions of NIE, 13-3/8-83, Chinese Capabilities for Nuclear Conflict.
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Since all of the CSS-2s are configured for mobile deployment,
China will continue throughout the decade to rely on strategic warning
to permit the dispersal of mobile missiles to survivable wartime launch
positions.
Most if not all of China's strategic missile force will continue to be
allocated to targets in the Soviet Union-Moscow being the primary
one. China cannot be certain that Moscow's defenses could be penetrat-
ed. Nor could the Soviets ensure against penetration of Moscow's
defenses by one or more of the Chinese missiles.
How Much Will China's Nuclear Forces Threaten the United
States? China's security strategies over the next 10 years are unlikely to
pose an appreciably increased military threat to US interests, despite the
probable improvements in China's strategic and conventional military
capability over this period. A substantial liberalization of US export
controls on dual-use technologies would allow the Chinese to accelerate
qualitatively their strategic weapons program during the next 10 years,
but this would not markedly increase China's ability to threaten the
United States strategically. The foremost concern for the Chinese will
continue to be the improvement of their capability to deter or defeat a
Soviet attack.
Although Chinese capability for nuclear retaliation will be greater
in 10 years than it is today, and could wreak significant destruction, it
will still be very modest relative to the nuclear capabilities of the
superpowers.
How Will Possession of a More Formidable Nuclear Force
Affect China's Policies Toward the USSR? The Chinese will continue
to see the Soviet Union as the principal threat to China's security and to
regard a strengthened nuclear force as the cheapest, quickest, and most
efficient way of deterring Soviet nuclear attack and, to some extent, of
deterring a large-scale conventional attack as well:
- The improvements in Chinese nuclear forces will not give
China a credible offensive capability against the Soviet Union.
China will continue to rely on a long-term war of attrition,
counting on its nuclear capability to deter Soviet use of nuclear
weapons.
The Chinese will still be compelled to rely on a minimum
retaliatory strategy against population centers, industrial tar-
gets, logistic centers, and rail and sea terminals linking Siberia
with the western USSR.
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- China probably will improve its capability for tactical nuclear
operations, which would give its leaders some new limited
options when countering a Soviet invasion of China involving
Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons.
- China will continue to maintain sizable armed forces, capable
of sustaining a long war of attrition, in order to deter Moscow
from initiating a conflict.
- China will at the same time expand trade and cultural relations
with the USSR and will attempt to normalize political relations
on the basis of Soviet concessions on key issues. It will not,
however, give in to Soviet demands.
Will Possession of a More Formidable Nuclear Force in Itself
Cause Chinese Leaders To Pursue a More Reckless or Assertive
Course in East Asia? The strengthening of China's nuclear capability
will not in itself improve prospects of regaining sovereignty over
Taiwan, and a conventional military attack on the island by Beijing's
forces remains improbable. Beijing will, however, reserve the right to
resort to conventional force and will maintain pressure on the United
States to phase out weapons sales to Taiwan in the hope of convincing
Taiwan leaders that they have no choice but to negotiate a settlement.
Increases in China's nuclear forces will not affect its support for the
US-Japanese security treaty or its interest in stability on the Korean
Peninsula. Nor will expected improvements in China's nuclear forces
significantly increase the direct susceptibility of nonnuclear states to
China's pressures. Whatever additional leverage China may have
gained on such states by becoming a nuclear power it gained long ago
when its successful testing and possession of nuclear devices and missiles
became widely known. However, China's ability to threaten nuclear
retaliation against the superpowers will have some impact on the
nonnuclear Asian states seeking military aid from the superpowers.
What Arms Control Policies Will China Pursue? Given the
great and continuing disparity between Chinese nuclear forces and
those of the superpowers, the Chinese are unlikely to modify their
position on force limitations and reductions. They will not agree to limit
or reduce their own forces until the superpowers have agreed to
reductions in their own:
- On the other hand, the Chinese will pay closer attention to
arms control negotiations between the United States and the
Soviet Union than they have in the past, particularly when, as
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JCI.RC 1
in the case of the current negotiations on intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF), they fear that a US-Soviet agreement
could result in increasing the nuclear threat to China.
- Accordingly, China-like Japan and South Korea-will 'feel
increasingly threatened by Soviet INF deployments and will
want the United States to persist in arms control proposals
based on global limits.
How Important Is It to the Chinese To Avoid Major Warfare
Over the Next Decade? For the remainder of this century the central
aim of China's leaders will be the development of China's economy,
and in particular its industrial. base. Hence, these leaders recognize the
need for a long period of freedom from external pressures and armed
conflict. Thus they will rely heavily on diplomacy, foster their ties with
Japan and Western Europe, cultivate relations with the Third World,
and avoid high-risk strategies that would place them in sharp confronta-
tion with a superpower.
Defense Minister Zhang Aiping has put forward certain principles
which for the next decade probably will govern China's efforts to
develop a modern, self-reliant defense industry:
- Base the strengthening of national defense on the vigorous
development of the economy.
- Do not rely on purchasing weapons from abroad.
- Develop only the most important and urgently needed military
equipment.
- Expand existing plants rather than construct new ones.
- Give high priority to the development of nuclear forces.
Despite serious weaknesses that will slow progress, the implementa-
tion of Zhang Aiping's proposals probably will significantly improve the
industrial base for defense production by the early 1990s.
Nonetheless, shortages of funds and the technological backward-
ness of China's industrial plant and research and defense infrastructure
will prevent across-the-board modernization of Chinese conventional
forces within 10 years. Some of the most glaring deficiencies probably
will be eased, however, notably in antitank and air defense, radar,
mobility, and communications. Progress in improving air force capabili-
ty will be slower than in that for the ground forces, because of the high-
er technology required.
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This Estimate is based on the judgments of NIE 13-10-82, Political
Succession in China, which concluded that, although stable political
succession from Deng Xiaoping to party Chairman Hu Yaobang and
Premier Zhao Ziyang remains a somewhat fragile proposition, the
chances favor a manageable succession and a continuance of pragmatic
policies, both at home and abroad. If, alternatively, the succession does
not proceed as planned and China is engulfed by fairly extensive
political instability, then China could adopt a security policy far more
inimical to US interests.
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DISCUSSION
China's Past Security Policy
1. Chinese leaders for 100 years have aimed at
strengthening their nation in order to end the humilia-
tion inflicted by militarily stronger powers. Since
coming to power the Communist leaders have sought
to establish legitimacy by providing the Chinese peo-
ple with security against foreign and domestic ene-
mies. Their early concerns were directed mainly at the
United States because of American rearming of forces
on Taiwan pledged to recover the mainland, the
advance of US forces to the Chinese border during the
Korean War, and US threats to use nuclear weapons
against China both during the Korean war and in the
1958 offshore island crisis.
2. During the 1950s and 1960s the Chinese saw
their security further threatened by Soviet meddling
in their domestic politics and by the large Soviet
buildup in Siberia and along the common border. Next
came clashes with the Soviets on the border, culminat-
ing in the 1969 Zhenbaodao (Ussuri River) conflict, in
which the Soviets threatened to use nuclear weapons
against China.
3. Since 1949 other Chinese goals have been to
reestablish Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macau; to win acceptance of Chinese
boundary claims along the Soviet and Indian borders;
and to gain control over the Diaoyutai Islands (also
claimed by Japan) and the Spratly Islands (also
claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Taiwan). Other long-term goals have been to increase
China's influence in Asia and the world to a level more
reflective of Chinese perceptions of China's size and
historical importance.
Past Policies and Strategies To Achieve Security
Objectives
4. Develop China Industrially and Militarily,
Strengthen Self-Reliance. This has been China's
fundamental security strategy. Although the Chinese
economy faltered badly during the Great Leap For-
ward and the Cultural Revolution, over the entire
period 1953-83 it achieved an annual growth rate of 5
to 6 percent, thus contributing to modestly building
the industrial base needed for security policy.
5. Promote Revolution. The promotion of Com-
munist-led revolution in Asia was an important early
element in China's strategy. Friendly neighbors were
to be ensured through seizure of power by Communist
parties throughout the region. But it soon became
evident that these Communist revolutionaries would
not succeed, and China gradually shifted to cultivating
relations with governments in power. The Chinese
have reduced but not cut their ties with other Asian
Communist parties, thereby keeping a means of exert-
ing pressure on those governments. But, this has
impaired China's efforts to improve relations with
other Asian governments.
6. Exploit the Superpowers. In 1950, against a
potential US-Japanese threat, Chinese leaders signed a
defense treaty with the Soviet Union which brought
China important benefits in weapons, industrial tech-
nology, and training of scientists and technicians. This
relationship with the Soviet Union ultimately became
intolerable because the Soviets demanded special priv-
ileges and interfered in domestic affairs. Also, the
Chinese were disappointed with Soviet reluctance to
back China's nuclear weapons program or to support
China's confrontation with the United States over
Taiwan. In 1960 the Chinese broke with the Soviets
despite a continuing sense of threat from the United
States.
7. During the 1960s China pursued a policy of
hostility to both superpowers, which attained its great-
est intensity during the Cultural Revolution.
8. During the 1970s, following the Soviet military
buildup on the border and clashes with the Soviets on
the border, China turned toward the United States,
seeking diplomatic collaboration against Soviet expan-
sionism, access to US technology, and training for
Chinese scientists and engineers, as well as progress
toward recovery of Taiwan. Because their experience
with the Soviet Union had turned sour and they were
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uncertain of long-term US intentions concerning Tai-
wan, the Chinese did not seek as close an embrace
with Washington as they previously had with Moscow.
They were determined to maintain a position that
avoided close alignment with either superpower and
showed confidence in being able to do so.
9. Improve Defense Capability. Since its acquisi-
tion of Soviet weapons in the 1950s, China has pro-
gressed slowly in modernizing its military forces.
Nevertheless, against UN forces in Korea, against India
in 1962, against South Vietnam in capturing the
Paracel Islands in 1974, and against Vietnam in 1979,
China demonstrated its determination and willingness
to use military force along its borders.
10. Chinese Communist leaders decided in the first
few years of their rule that China should have a
nuclear capability and carried out their first nuclear
test in 1964, less than five years after the Soviets
withdrew their assistance. The small but growing
Chinese strategic nuclear force presumably has had a
significant deterrent effect on anyone considering a
nuclear strike on China.
11. Strengthen Ties With Neighboring States.
China's relations with its neighbors have been mixed.
China has been most successful in establishing friendly
relations with Japan, Pakistan, and North Korea. It
fought a costly war against UN forces in order to
ensure a friendly North Korean neighbor. China and
Thailand were at odds for years because of China's
backing of the Thai Communist Party and Thailand's
close association with the United States during the
Vietnam war. Since Vietnam's occupation of Kampu-
chea, however, the Chinese have ended active support
for Thai insurgents. This has helped bring Bangkok
and Beijing closer together. The other ASEAN govern-
ments-those of Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines,
and especially Indonesia-have maintained a cool
attitude toward China, in part because of Chinese
refusal to cut all ties with Communist insurgencies and
movements in the area.
12. China's biggest failure occurred in Vietnam.
After years of receiving substantial Chinese aid in the
war against the United States, Vietnamese leaders
allied their country with the Soviet Union. The border
dispute with India, India's close relations with the
Soviet Union, and China's support for Pakistan have
limited improvements in relations with New Delhi. In
the Chinese view, the only serious neighboring mili-
tary menace is the Soviet Union. India is perceived as
unfriendly because of its ties with the USSR. Vietnam
is viewed as unfriendly because, among other things, it
represents a challenge for influence (dominance) in
Southeast Asia.
13. Mobilize International Political Opposition
to China's Enemies. While the Chinese have regard-
ed their own military strength as the primary guaran-
tee of China's security, they have attached great
importance to mobilizing international political and
diplomatic support for China. China's entry into the
United Nations as well as its growing influence in Asia
and the world have improved its capability to mobilize
such support.
The Current Security Environment:
Perceptions of External Threats
Continuing Superpower Rivalry
14. The Chinese see the world of the 1980s as
dominated by superpower rivalry and an unchecked
arms race. They anticipate a confused period, with
gains and losses for each superpower, leading to a
relative decline in the influence of both. Chinese
rhetoric states that such circumstances favor the pur-
suit of a less aligned foreign policy, enabling China to
keep its distance from either superpower. In actuality,
however, as evidenced by China's strategic and con-
ventional force deployment, Chinese leaders recognize
that the principal threat comes from the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the lengths to which they have gone to
preserve the substance of relations with the United
States in trade, training, and technology transfer,
despite serious strains over the Taiwan issue, indicate
the importance they attach to those relations. Accord-
ingly, because China has chosen to define its interests
in these terms, its freedom of maneuver between the
superpowers will remain subject to serious constraints.
The United States: A Necessary Collaborator
15. Chinese leaders value their country's relation-
ship with the United States for the contribution it
makes to China's development and the leverage it
gives them against the Soviet Union. No other relation-
ship currently can take its place in view of China's
development goals. US educational facilities and the
potential US contribution to offshore oil production
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Soviet Active Divisions in the Far East
I I I I I I I I I I I 1 1 1 I 1 1
1966 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82
Note:
One division in the northeastern Soviet Union, two on Sakhalin Island, and
the coastal defense division on the Kuril Islands are included in total
figure but are not counted as opposite China.
Major Combat Equipment of
Soviet Ground Forces Opposite China
I I I I I I I. I I I I I I I 1 I
1966 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82
and other major projects requiring advanced technol-
ogy make the United States difficult to dispense with,
despite Chinese frustration with bilateral irritants such
as defections and limitations on technology transfer.
16. The Taiwan issue remains a thorn in the US-
Chinese relationship. Chinese leaders want to keep the
pressure on in order to ensure that the United States
carries out the agreement of August 1982 on arms sales
reduction. To a considerable extent they can control
the tension and avoid raising it to a level that would be
too damaging to Chinese interests in relations with the
United States. But domestic politics, nationalistic emo-
tions, and the involvement of a leader's "face" some-
times combine to create severe problems. Chinese
leaders fear that the United States will be unable or
unwilling to reduce or end its historical ties with
Taiwan. This would either delay China's goal of
reunification or foster a de facto "two Chinas" situa-
tion. Either of these would be directly counter to the
long-range Chinese goal of unification.
The Continuing Soviet Threat
17. The Chinese see the Soviet Union as the princi-
pal threat to China's security because of the border
disputes that have produced military clashes in the
past and because of the strengthening of the already
superior Soviet forces deployed in the vicinity of the
border. (See charts.) Historical animosity also plays a
significant role. (The Chinese, moreover, feel threat-
ened by the continuing buildup of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet.) Soviet domination of Afghanistan and close
relations with India and Vietnam also add to the
Chinese sense of being "encircled" and threatened.
(See inset at top of next page.)
18. Sino-Soviet talks, while unlikely to alter the
conditions seen by the Chinese as threatening, may
moderate the sense of being menaced by establishing a
more normal relationship between Moscow and Bei-
jing, emphasizing increased trade and exchanges.
Agreement on minor border adjustments or on some
reduction of forces close to the border would contrib-
ute to a decline in tensions. It is unlikely that more
substantial improvements in relations will occur dur-
ing the period.
19. The Soviet alignments that cause the Chinese to
feel encircled are unlikely to change fundamentally.
The Soviets will continue to pay the price to retain the
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The USSR began its recent round of political talks
with China from a position of superior conventional
and strategic military strength. The size and quality of
Soviet forces opposite China have continued to grow
steadily during the past decade, supporting a Soviet
military strategy designed to carry any future conflict
quickly into Chinese territory. Barring any dramatic
change in relations, Soviet ground force manpower
and equipment levels probably will grow gradually
through 1990.
Since the late 1970s, the Soviets have constructed at
least 20 SS-20 IRBM bases-each with facilities for
nine launchers-capable of striking China. The num-
ber of launchers is greater than the earlier number of
SS-4 MRBMs and SS-5 IRBMs deployed within range
of China. The mobile SS-20, moreover, is highly
survivable and has a MIRVed payload as well as
greater accuracy, better reliability, and a shorter
reaction time than did the older missiles.
geopolitical and military advantages they bring. With
strains between the partners in these relationships
likely to increase, China will be quick to try to exploit
any opportunities that arise and thereby erode Soviet
positions in Vietnam, India, Afghanistan, and North
Korea.
Japan: The Chief Economic Partner
20. The Chinese view ambivalently the strengthen-
ing of Japan's armed forces. While they approve of a
strong Japan to help check Soviet expansionism, their
experience of Japanese invasion and their awareness of
Japan's industrial power make them wary of a rapidly
militarizing Japan. The small increase in Japan's mili-
tary capability projected during the period of this
Estimate, however, is unlikely to cause the Chinese
serious concern that Japan might become a military
threat.
21. The Chinese regard Japan as their principal
economic partner, although they will wish to avoid
becoming overly dependent on Japan. They realistical-
ly do not hope for formal military cooperation with
Japan. Moreover, despite occasional criticism of Ja-
pan's gradual defense buildup, they will continue to
rely on strong US-Japanese bilateral ties as the best
guarantee against remilitarization, and as a counter-
weight to growing Soviet military power in Asia.
Turbulence in South Asia?
22. Even though China does not see India as a
credible territorial threat, renewed armed conflict
between India and Pakistan would nevertheless con-
front China with a dilemma, in light of its longstand-
ing security relationship with Pakistan. Soviet capabili-
ty to punish China would serve as a deterrent to
intervention, but failure to act in defense of Pakistan
would damage Beijing's prestige and influence. China
probably would not directly intervene militarily but
would seek to halt the conflict while aiding Pakistan in
other ways.
The Chinese-Vietnamese Confrontation
23. China views Vietnam as its most immediate
potential enemy after the USSR and as the principal
rival to its own goal as leader in the area. There are
700,000 Vietnamese troops deployed near the Chinese
border. These outnumber the Soviet ground forces
deployed on China's northern border, but this Viet-
namese threat remains a local one, not a strategic
threat such as posed by the Soviet troops, aircraft, and
nuclear missiles deployed against China. The Viet-
namese forces, heavily reinforced after the 1979 Chi-
nese incursion and equipped with $2 billion worth of
high-quality Soviet weapons, are deployed in a defen-
sive mode around Hanoi and between Hanoi and the
Chinese border. The Soviet-Vietnamese alliance cre-
ates the danger, however, that under some circum-
stances China might have to fight a two-front war.
24. The Chinese have kept pressure on Vietnam at
a relatively low cost by supplying arms to the Kampu-
chean insurgent forces. By resuming Sino-Soviet nego-
tiations they have also fostered doubts in the minds of
Vietnamese leaders concerning the reliability of the
Soviet connection. They also hope that the extraordi-
nary economic burden of the Vietnamese military
effort will produce further strains with the Soviet
Union, a change in policy toward Kampuchea, and an
improvement in Beijing-Hanoi relations.
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The Military Establishment-Problems and
Achievements
- Give high priority to the development of nuclear
weapons.
Principles of Defense Modernization
25. Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, in an important
article in the party's theoretical journal on 1 March
1983 (see inset), reaffirmed the basic principles cur-
Excerpt From Zhang's Article
Our country is a big country and it is not realistic or
possible for us to buy national defense modernization
from abroad.... At the outset it is necessary to obtain
some technology that can be imported and model
some weaponry on that of others.... Modeling one's
weaponry on that of others is not a way of realizing
defense modernization either . . . only by develop-
ing-through self-reliance and in a realistic light-
sophisticated military equipment that can be adapted
to various conditions can we satisfy our Army's needs
in its wars against aggression.
Defense Minister Zhang Aiping
1 March 1983
rently governing China's defense modernization pro-
gram. These principles, which are likely to continue to
be followed through the period of this Estimate, are:
- Base the strengthening of national defense on
"the vigorous development of economic con-
struction. "
- Avoid excessive diversion of funds to military
development, which would slow economic de-
velopment.
- Increase the interaction between military indus-
try and civilian industry-make each serve the
other.
- Do not rely on the purchase of weapons from
abroad.
- Develop only "the most important and most
urgently needed military equipment."
- Emphasize the expansion of plants in the defense
industry, rather than building new ones.
- Give full play to the role of intellectuals.
- Make good use of "the present relatively peace-
ful international surroundings" to strengthen na-
tional defense rapidly.
26. Zhang's article indicates that China will contin-
ue the policy followed since the break with the Soviet
Union of slow modernization of its defense capability,
emphasizing the development of a modern industrial
base and the acquisition of selected foreign military
technology in order eventually to acquire a self-reliant
defense industry. The article also stresses the correct-
ness of giving priority to the development of strategic
nuclear forces, which give China "a relative advantage
despite our country's weak economy and scientific and
technological strength." (See inset.)
China's Military Modernization Program
- Professionalizing the People's Liberation Army:
- Getting the military out of politics and internal
security affairs.
- Improved training:
- Joint exercises.
- Improved weapons, for example:
- Type 69 tank, with improved capabilities (105-
mm gun).
- Antitank weapons, indigenously produced
"Sagger."
- Increased mechanization, self-propelled artillery,
armored personnel carriers.
- Air defense upgrade, indigenously produced SA-7
and CSA-X-2 (mobile SAM similar to Crotale and
SA-6).
Impediments to Military Modernization
27. Severe impediments will slow progress toward
modernization. These include: industrial technology
10 to 30 years behind the developed countries; short-
ages of scientists, engineers, and technicians; shortfalls
in energy and transportation; a sluggish bureaucracy;
inefficient management; a weakly motivated labor
force; an elderly leadership; and a 10-year gap in the
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ranks of well-educated young leaders, caused by the
poor quality, or total lack, of higher education during
the Cultural Revolution. Weaknesses are serious in
areas important to the defense industry, such as
metallurgy, electronics, machine tools, precision in-
struments, and chemical production. Shortage of funds
is an endemic problem which the government is
attacking by reducing the size of the armed forces,
sharply curtailing the production of obsolescent weap-
on systems, and beginning an arms sales program that
brought in $4 billion in contracts in 1981-82.
Concentration on Priority Areas
28. The Chinese demonstrated in the development
of their strategic nuclear force that by concentrating
scarce resources on a priority area they can make
notable progress. The best scientists, engineers, and
technicians and the most sophisticated equipment
were assembled in this area. Priority funding, access to
advanced foreign technology, strong political support,
and insulation from the damaging effects of the
Cultural Revolution have also contributed. This priori-
ty treatment will continue and probably will enable
the quantitative development of strategic nuclear
weapons to proceed more rapidly than most other
military areas.
Need for Foreign Technology
29. While they stress self-reliance, the Chinese rec-
ognize the importance of "leading edge" foreign tech-
nology to modernize their defense industries. They are
meeting this need by signing major scientific and
technology agreements with most of the developed
nations, by making direct purchases of some military
equipment and technology, and by sending abroad
hundreds of technical delegations and thousands of
students and visiting scholars. Of the more than 13,000
students from China who are now abroad, some 11,000
are studying in the United States. Almost half of these
were sponsored by the Beijing government, primarily
in the physical sciences-physics and chemistry-and
in engineering; the remaining half are privately spon-
sored by relatives, friends, and institutions outside
China. Some 10 to 20 percent are estimated to have
associations with military-related institutions in China.
30. The Chinese are selectively purchasing dual-use
technology, some of which is known to have been put
to military use. Some dual-use technology fills key
gaps in design and manufacturing processes; in other
instances acquisition of technology is important for its
symbolic value in demonstrating that China and its
leaders are accepted on equal terms by the West and
Japan. China also has a small but growing program to
acquire advanced technology and technical data
through covert means, particularly aimed at obtaining
restricted US, West German, and Japanese technol-
ogies having direct military application.
31. The Chinese effort to acquire foreign technol-
ogy holds a potential for sharply upgrading the domes-
tic research and development effort. Nevertheless,
inadequate R&D infrastructure, excessive compart-
mentation of military-related industrial activity, and
quality-control problems with replicating foreign mili-
tary industrial equipment will continue to make Chi-
nese absorption of foreign technology a slow and
gradual process.
China's Nuclear Force in 1993: A Growing
Capability 2
32. China has only one type of strategic missile
system capable of reaching the continental United
States, the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). Two have been deployed and as many as four
additional silos are under construction, which proba-
bly will not be operational before 1986.
the currently deployed CSS-4
missiles are targeted on Moscow. Some 10 to 20 are
likely to be deployed by 1993; some of these could
carry MRVs. 25X1
33. The CSS-3, which can reach only Alaska and _
Hawaii in the United States, is deployed in two silos.
Eleven roll-out sites under construction probably will
be completed during the 1980s. Some 20 could be
deployed by the late 1980s. Additional deployments
are not expected.
34. The bulk of the Chinese nuclear ballistic missile
force consists of the medium-range CSS-1 (MRBM),
with a 1,200-km range, first deployed in 1966, and the
intermediate-range CSS-2 (IRBM), with a 2,800-km
range, first deployed in 1971 and 1972. ]Both are
mobile; neither is capable of targeting the western
2 This section draws on the conclusions of NIE 13-3/8-83, Chinese
Capability for Nuclear Conflict.
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USSR. The CSS-1 force is being reduced in number
and replaced by CSS-2s. CSS-1s probably will be
:phased out by 1990. The CSS-2, with a design now 20
years old, probably will not be upgraded and the
:numbers deployed probably will level off by 1985.
The Intelligence Community estimates that the num-
ber of these two types of missiles currently deployed is
60 to 115. The CSS-2 force probably will be supple-
mented by solid-propellant missiles beginning in the
late 1980s or early 1990s, based on the submarine-
launched ballistic missile (CSS-NX-3) that was success-
fully launched at sea in October 1982. By 1993 we
expect China to have 120 to 220 nuclear ballistic
missiles. Additionally, we estimate that China now has
some 150 nuclear bombs and some 50 nuclear demoli-
tion munitions.
35. The 12-tube Xia-class nuclear-powered ballis-
tic missile submarine (SSBN), designed to carry the
CSS-NX-3 solid-fueled SLBM that was tested from a
diesel-powered submarine in October 1982, began its
sea tests early in 1983. It will probably become
operational between 1984 and 1987. Its CSS-NX-3
missiles are expected to have a range of 2,400 km, and
initially will pose a threat to targets in the eastern
of the Soviet Union.
a total of four or five could be
completed by 1993.
36. China's nuclear strategy throughout the period
will continue to rely on warning to permit the dispers-
al of its mobile missiles to survivable wartime launch
positions. Objectives and employment concepts will
not fundamentally change; the characteristics of the
delivery systems will force reliance on a minimum
retaliatory strategy against population and industrial
targets. Capability for tactical nuclear operations, al-
though still extremely limited relative to those of the
superpowers, will improve and provide Chinese lead-
ers with some new options below the level of a
strategic retaliatory attack.
37. China's strategic nuclear missile force today is
very small and backward in its technology in compari-
son with those of the Soviet Union and the United
States (see the table)
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focus their nuclear weapons development efforts
mainly on improving the CSS-4, increasing reliability
and readiness of their mobile MR/IRBM force, devel-
oping solid-propellant missiles, and developing tactical
nuclear weapons.
38. By the end of the period, the Chinese strategic
nuclear force will still be very small relative to the
Soviet and US forces, and its technology, will lag
behind that of all four other nuclear missile powers.
Nonetheless, US and Western export control policies
will affect the pace of China's program. If the United
States strictly limits the export of technologies related
to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, to
electronic and antisubmarine warfare, and to intelli-
gence gathering, the Chinese will make slower prog-
ress toward upgrading their current strategic nuclear
forces. On the other hand, scrapping most US controls
over export of the technologies described above, giving
the Chinese access to dual-use computer and electron-
ic technology roughly equivalent to that available to
most non-Communist developing countries, would al-
low them to speed up somewhat the improvement of
nuclear forces in this decade and to establish the
industrial basis to introduce new generations of weap-
ons in the late 1990s. China's capabilities would still
not be in any sense comparable to those of other major
missile powers because of limited ability to apply
advanced technology to mass production of sophisti-
cated military weapons.
39. Despite these limitations, however, the addi-
tions and improvements in the Chinese strategic mis-
sile force during this period, together with effective
use by the Chinese of mobility, camouflage, and
deception and the addition of some tactical nuclear
weapons, will increase China's capability to retaliate
against a nuclear attack and thus add to the deterrent
value of the force. The deterrent effect is also height-
ened by the Soviet view of China as the most threaten-
ing of the third-country nuclear powers and the
assumption in Moscow that the Soviet capital remains
the target of highest priority for Chinese missiles.
China cannot be certain that Moscow's defenses could
be penetrated. Nor could the USSR ensure against the
penetration of Moscow's defenses by one or more of
the Chinese missiles.
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One SSBN with 12 launchers is expected to be operational in the
period 1984-87.
er, antitank mines, tank laser rangefinders, and air-to-
air missiles, and copying the Soviet AT-3 Sagger
missile and the SA-7 low-altitude surface-to-air missile.
defense capabilities slowly during this period, particu-
larly by introducing antitank missiles, improved tanks,
better tactical communications systems, and more
vehicles. The Soviets will continue to have a substan-
tial advantage in mobility and in modern equipment,
but the Chinese probably will have somewhat nar-
rowed the gap in ground defenses in certain respects. 25X1
their capability to respond to a Soviet attack with a
use, electronic technologies, the size of the gap would
probably widen at a somewhat slower pace. The
Chinese will not have acquired a credible offensive
capability against the Soviets, but will have enhanced
States were to scrap most controls on a range of dual-
of the higher technology required, and here the gap
will widen despite Chinese progress. If the United
Progress in air force capability will be slower, because
long-term war of attrition, provided the Soviets do not
resort to nuclear weapons. By 1993, however, overall
improvements in China's military-industrial complex
will have created a basis for accelerating the modern-
ization of conventional forces in the 1990s.
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China and Potential Adversaries:
A Comparison of Strategic Nuclear Missile Forces, Midyear 1983
reaching all of the Soviet Union, but only the extreme northwestern
United States.
Modernization of Conventional Forces
40. Shortage of funds and the technological back-
wardness of China's industrial plant and R&D infra-
structure will prevent an across-the-board moderniza-
tion of Chinese armed forces during the period of this
Estimate. Conventional forces probably will continue
to receive lower priority in funding and personnel
than nuclear strategic forces. The Chinese are making
efforts to remedy some of the most glaring deficien-
cies, notably in modern aircraft, antitank and air
defense, radar, mobility, communications, and intelli-
Despite these handicaps,
they have made some progress since 1974, developing
a new 130-mm self-propelled multiple rocket launch-
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Policies and Strategies for Exploiting Improved
Nuclear Capabilities
The Search for Major Power Status: A Seat at the
Table?
42. Chinese leaders, sensitive to not being taken
seriously, look forward to the time when China will
qualify for a seat at the table with the superpowers.
But they are realistic enough to recognize that in the
early 1990s China will still be far behind in industrial
production capability, advanced technology, and mod-
ern weapons. In the interim, China may seek to
occupy a role analogous to that of France. In this
situation China would not in fact formally occupy a
seat at the table but its tacit consent will increasingly
be needed by those at the table on some key issues
such as arms control.
43. The central theme of China's security strategy
during the period of this Estimate will be one of a
loose alignment with the United States that enhances
its freedom of maneuver between the superpowers. In
1979-80, Chinese concern over Soviet expansionism in
Afghanistan and Vietnam and euphoria over the nor-
malization of Beijing-Washington relations combined
to produce fairly close political alignment with the
United States. By 1981-82, however, China had
changed tactics. It sought to enhance its leverage with
the United States without appearing allied. Though
still more disposed toward the United States than
toward the Soviet Union., China became more
independent in rhetoric while remaining close in
substance. This is likely to prevail for the next 10
'Years-barring a sudden, threatening advance of Sovi-
et power, US moves perceived in Beijing as designed to
make permanent the independence of Taiwan from
China, or the onset of political instability in China.
Advancing Toward Security Goals
44. The achievement of China's security policy
goals will depend heavily on internal stability during
the leadership succession and the success of economic
reforms in producing a respectable rate of economic
growth-say, 5 to 6 percent during the period of this
:Estimate. Prospects for political stability and modest
economic growth are fairly good., Thus, by the early
8 See NIE 13-10-82, Political Succession in China. The basic
Ihrust of this Estimate is that, although the succession from Deng
xiaoping to Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang remains a somewhat
fragile proposition, the chances favor a manageable succession and a
continuance of pragmatic policies, at home and abroad.
1990s, China probably will have acquired a greater
capability to deter attacks on Chinese territory and to
accelerate the modernization of its armed forces dur-
ing the 1990s. Success in these respects will also
enhance China's influence in the region and the world
and give it a more substantial claim to a seat at the
table with the superpowers.
Strengthening the Nuclear Deterrent
45. The Chinese continue to view a strengthened
strategic nuclear force as the most effective method of
deterring nuclear attack and to some extent a large-
scale conventional attack also. They believe that the
combination of their existing strategic nuclear force,
their large, although ill-equipped Army, and their
concept of "people's war" provides reasonable assur-
ance of a fairly long period of peace during which
they can modernize their industrial and technological
base and thereby modernize their conventional forces
while continuing to improve their strategic. forces.
They regard the "quick fix," such as Vietnam's acqui-
sition of large amounts of advanced Soviet weapons, as
an impracticable solution for a country the size of
China. They see little choice but to follow the slower,
and in the long run more dependable, course of
building a self-reliant defense industry. If, however,
China were suddenly to acquire sizable amounts of
hard currency-unexpected oil reserves discovered
and exploited-the purchase of some additional West-
ern weaponry to offset Soviet numbers would become
possible.
Countering Soviet Encirclement
46. The Soviet effort to encircle China, particularly
through Soviet relations with India and Vietnam, is
seen by Chinese leaders as increasing the risk of
China's having to fight a two-front war. It is also
viewed as impeding the achievement of China's secu-
rity goals, which include surrounding itself with
friendly neighbors, increasing China's regional and
world influence, and recovering lost territories. Thus
Beijing has resumed negotiations with the Soviets and
the Indians, while maintaining firm ties with Pakistan
and giving covert aid to the Afghan rebels. For the
next 10 years, at least, diplomatic maneuver and
cautious aid to certain opposition groups are likely to
be important means of countering Soviet encircle-
ment; maintaining extensive bilateral relations with
the United States and Japan is another.
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Wrestling With the Vietnam Impasse
47. The Chinese see Soviet ties with Vietnam as the
most serious security threat next: to that posed by
Soviet forces themselves. Vietnam's actions in Kampu-
chea further exacerbate Sino-Vietnamese relations.
China has attempted to counter Vietnamese and Sovi-
et activities in the area by low-level aid to the
Kampuchean rebels and by diplomatic efforts, partic-
ularly in Southeast Asia. The Chinese will probably
continue to avoid direct military action and rely on
their aid and diplomacy to isolate Hanoi and Moscow
internationally.
Maneuvering Within the Strategic Triangle
48. Assuming progress, even though slow and un-
even, toward modernizing their industrial base and
armed force, Chinese leaders will have increased
confidence in their ability to conduct a more
independent foreign policy. Ideally, they would like to
maintain some degree of leverage over both Moscow
and Washington. However, China's leaders view lever-
age as more a tool to help achieve security than an end
in itself. They will be constrained, therefore, in attain-
ing this ideal posture by the hard facts that the Soviet
Union will pose the more serious threat to China's
interests and that the United States will have more to
offer in needed technology, training, and trade.
Fostering Ties With Japan and Western Europe
49. The Chinese will seek to improve their freedom
of maneuver relative to the superpowers by strength-
ening links with Japan and Western Europe. Access to
the technology, trade, and training available in these
industrialized states will reduce, although by no means
eliminate, China's dependence on the United States in
these fields. That dependence could be totally elimi-
nated in response to a sharpening confrontation over
Taiwan, but only at the cost of significantly slowing
China's development. Consequently, Chinese leaders
will try hard to prevent damage to those parts of the
bilateral relationship most important to China's
development.
Cultivating the Third World
50. Emphasis on China's links with the Third
World will continue to be more rhetorical than sub-
stantive, except with those few Third World countries
that can afford to buy substantial quantities of Chinese
goods, especially Chinese weapons. Third World ties
do not contribute directly to China's security, other
than those with countries bordering on China, such as
Pakistan, Burma, and North Korea, but are a potential
source of support in international forums. China will
continue to solicit Third World support in opposition
to Soviet expansionism; in some situations Chinese
policies will be parallel to those of the United States
and in other places opposed. Chinese leaders will
gauge gains and losses in China's weight in the world
to some extent by their ability to mobilize Third
World support for Chinese positions.
Recovering Hong Kong and Macau
51. The recovery of sovereignty over territories
claimed by China but under control of others is
unlikely to be accomplished during this period, except
possibly for Hong Kong and Macau.
Implications for the United States of China's
Future Security Policies
52. The security policies likely to be followed by
China over the next 10 years do not pose an apprecia-
bly increased military threat to US interests, despite
the improvements in China's strategic nuclear and
conventional military capability likely during this
period. This judgment holds even if US export controls
are substantially liberalized to provide dual-use tech-
nology related to the strategic areas of nuclear weap-
ons and their delivery systems, electronic and antisub-
marine warfare, and intelligence gathering. The
Chinese will continue to be concerned primarily with
improving their capability to deter or defeat a. Soviet
attack and to resist further encirclement or consolida-
tion of Moscow's position on China's borders. Many
factors inhibit them from using military force outside
China, even to recover territory claimed by them but
controlled by others. However, if our assumption
concerning leadership succession or internal stability
were to change, we could not rule out a more aggres-
sive Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese Nuclear Force Improvements and the
Superpowers
53. For a number of years the Soviets have taken
account of Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability
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against the USSR; since the deployment of the CSS-4,
the United States has had to consider the Chinese
threat to the continental United States as well as to US
bases in Asia. Should the United States become en-
gaged in combat with Chinese forces (for example, in
Korea or the Taiwan Strait), it could no longer threat-
en the use of nuclear weapons against China without
taking into account the possibility of Chinese nuclear
retaliation against targets in the United States. Within
10 years, Chinese capability to retaliate will be some-
what greater than it is today, although still small
relative to the nuclear capabilities of the superpowers.
54. Because of the great disparity between Chinese
nuclear forces and those of the superpowers that will
continue to exist for the next 10 years, the Chinese will
not brandish their weapons against either of the
superpowers. On the contrary, they will continue to
declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear
weapons and will continue to call for the abolition of
those weapons (confident that the superpowers will not
agree).
Effect of China's Nuclear Forces on Nonnuclear
States
55. Improvements in China's strategic nuclear force
will not significantly increase the susceptibility of
nonnuclear states to Chinese pressures. Whatever ad-
ditional leverage China may have gained on such
states by becoming a nuclear power it gained long ago
when successful testing and possession of nuclear
devices and missiles became widely known. Soviets
and Americans have discovered the difficulty of trans-
lating nuclear weapons capability into political advan-
tage, and the difficulty is even greater for a weak
nuclear power like China. Increases in its strategic
nuclear forces will, however, have other effects. States
that fear China's military power (such as India or
Vietnam) will continue to feel a compulsion to pay the
price of protection by a superpower. Increases in
China's nuclear retaliatory capability will also tend to
weaken confidence in the willingness of a superpower
to risk retaliation against its own territory in order to
protect an ally.
Maneuvering Between the Superpowers
56. Even though the disparity between China and
the superpowers will remain great in both strategic
and conventional weapons, 10 years of political stabil-
ity and economic progress would give the Chinese
leaders greater confidence that their goal of a self-
reliant defense production capability is attainable.
Increased self-confidence, while not significantly in-
creasing the leaders' propensity to risk large-scale
military conflict, would encourage in them the deter-
mination to try to maximize their freedom of maneu-
ver in dealing with the two superpowers. Thus, China
probably will continue to adopt foreign policy posi-
tions that diverge from the United States on a range of
Third World issues, while cooperating or consulting
where US and Chinese interests coincide.
57. For many reasons Chinese leaders will wish to
avoid too close a strategic alignment with the United
States. Chinese leaders have a growing confidence in
their ability to deter armed conflict, a belief that
Soviet internal problems and external entanglements
reduce the threat to China, hopes for negotiating a
lowering of tension with the Soviet Union, differences
with the United States over several important issues
(notably Taiwan), and a desire to burnish China's
credentials with the Third World. Nevertheless, Chi-
na's view of the Soviet Union as the chief threat, its
need for US trade, technology, and training, and its
interest in common with the United States in opposing
Soviet expansionism, especially in Afghanistan and
Vietnam, will provide a basis, albeit limited, for
strategic collaboration with the United States in the
form of consultation on strategic questions and parallel
foreign policy actions. Some improvement in US-
Soviet relations would give the Chinese greater incen-
tive to seek strategic collaboration with the United
States than exists today. The Chinese desire to avoid an
overly close alignment with the United States is likely
to persist throughout the period, in the absence of
some new, threatening move by the Soviet Union.
Persisting Need for Access to Western Technology
58. Even if China remains politically stable and
pursues a policy of seeking to expand its access to
trade, training, and technology from the advanced
industrialized countries, it is unlikely to narrow the
technological gap, for technological change will con-
tinue at a rapid pace in the West. China will continue
to have difficulty absorbing new technology into the
Chinese military-industrial system except in high-
priority areas such as nuclear weapons. Ten years from
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minor adjustments in the Sino-Soviet border; their
"recovery" will not require the threat or use of force.
The manner of their "recovery" will be closely
watched in Taiwan.
61. The strengthening of China's strategic nuclear
capability will not significantly improve prospects of
recovering sovereignty over Taiwan, for nuclear weap-
ons are not practicable instruments for Chinese leaders
to use for that purpose. The strengthening of conven-
tional forces over the next 10 years, however, probably
will somewhat widen the edge that mainland forces
have today over Taiwan forces. Beijing will reserve the
option of using military force against Taiwan as a form
of political pressure, but is most unlikely to resort to it.
The military costs would be high, the physical damage
to Taiwan's infrastructure and industry would be
severe, and the political and resource burden of a
subdued but recalcitrant population would be great. A
military attack on Taiwan would also gravely damage
Beijing's relations with Washington and Tokyo. Beijing
can be expected to maintain pressure on the United
States to reduce and eventually phase out weapons
sales to Taiwan, in the hope of convincing Taiwan's
leaders that they have no choice but to negotiate a
settlement.
62. Japan and Korea. The increase in China's
military power will not significantly affect the Chinese
position with respect to the US-Japanese security
treaty or the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese will
continue to regard the security arrangements between
Japan and the United States as an important counter to
the Soviet military buildup in East Asia and as a check
on Japan going it alone. They will also prefer stability
on the Korean Peninsula to renewed conflict there,
which could pose excruciatingly difficult choices for
them. Conflict in Korea would disrupt the peaceful
environment so important to China's development and
seriously damage its essential relations with Japan and
the United States.
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now China's dependence on training personnel over-
seas and importing technology from abroad will still be
very great. Consequently, China will continue to be
inhibited from taking foreign policy actions that
would impair its access to foreign technology. These
inhibitions will generally work in the US interest.
China and Arms Control
59. The disparity between China's small nuclear
force and those of the superpowers offers little incen-
tive to the Chinese to enter into arms control negotia-
tions. China also lacks the technical capability to
observe and closely monitor nuclear missile develop-
ments in the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, the Chinese will pay closer attention to
arms control negotiations between the United States
and the Soviet Union than they have in the past. In the
case of the current negotiations on intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF), they fear that a US-Soviet agree-
ment could result in increasing the nuclear threat to
China. Accordingly, over the next decade the Chinese
may participate in arms control talks provided these
talks are expanded beyond the confines of the super-
power club. China-and Japan and Korea-will in-
creasingly feel threatened by Soviet INF deployments
and will want the United States to persist in arms
control proposals based on global limits."
Effects on Asian States Friendly to the
United States
60. Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Chinese proba-
bly will reach agreement with the British during this
period on the recovery of sovereignty over Hong
Kong, although the actual exercise of their sovereignty
probably will not occur until 1997 when the British
lease on the New Territories expires. Hong Kong and
Macau probably are the only "lost territories" that will
be recovered during this period, except for possible
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ANNEX A
INDICATORS THROUGH 1993
Indicators that would support the findings of this
Special Estimate are:
Indicators that would cast doubt on those findings
are:
- Gradual, steady development of nuclear forces.
- Continuing hostility between China and the
USSR.
- A stable succession from Deng Xiaoping to Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.
- Continuation of policies supporting the open
door to the West.
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- Significant political instability in China.
- Rapid improvement in Chinese-Soviet relations.
- Substantial retrogression in US-Chinese relations.
- Marked increases in funds for military
modernization.
- Hostile military action toward Taiwan.
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