COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000701230002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 12, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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SFCPFT 0 NIE 13-7-70
12 November 1970
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S
COiNCLl'SIONS I
DISCUSSION 4
I. FO111:1GN PUI.ICI: SO\I I: I't{I\CII'I,I:S AND PI11ORITII1:S 4
A. The Icicolo(fica1 Ba;c 4
B. The Alilitar Inwrc(licnt 5
(.. Domestic Constraints :U[ectin~~ I'orci n Initiatkcs 6
It. PROSPECTS AND CUN"11NGI:NCIES S
A. Pckiw,'s Activist IForci!gn Polio- S
B. Sino-Sot ict Relations S
C. The Triangcilar Relationship: 1.'S/ USSH/China 10
D. Chinas Regional Aims 11
I-. China and the tV'urlcl Coniintmity 14
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S
INTERNATIONAL POSTURE
NOTE
Chinas return to active diplomacy rniscs new (tueslions'bout the
direction of its foreign policy. After four hears in which the internal
preoccupations of the Cultural Revolution thoroughly overshadowed
foreign relations, Peking is note moving to repair its international
image and to exploit new opportunities. In attemmpting to estimate how
China will play this new role in international politics over the next year
or so, this paper will examine Peking's options in terms of those policy
factors which are 'most likely( to remain constant and those which are
subject to greater' variations in response to domestic or external events.
It must be acknowledged at the outset that ice have remarkably
little information on. the decision-making processes in Peking. Thus,
estimates of short-run tactical moves are susceptible to considerable
error. As in the past, sudden twists and turns in Chinese policies will
probably continue to sun-prise us. But in the broader perspective of
lone;-range goals and basic capabilities, this paper attempts to set useful
guidelines on the course that China is likely/ to follow in adapting to
the outside world.
CONCLUSIONS
A. With the waning of the radical and frenetic phase of the Cul-
tural Revolution, Peking has substantially recouped its earlier diplo-
matic position and is moving to compete for influence in new areas.
Its successes to (late-due in large part to the receptivity of other nations
to a more normal relationship with the Chinese-have been impressive,
especially in areas of secondary importance to Peking. In areas of prime
concern, i.e., the Soviet Union, the US, Southeast Asia and .Japan,
progress has been marginal and Peking's policy less sure.
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B. Many domestic and foreign obstacles stand in the way of achiev-
ing Peking's basic goals, whether these be China as a great power and
leader of the world revolution or as a more traditional but highly na-
tionalistic country concerned primarily with Asian interests.
C. On the domestic side, stability and steady growth in basic ele-
ments of strength-economic, military, political-are far from assured.
Even in the best of circumstances, China's marginal economy will serve
to limit its maneuverability in foreign affairs. A great deal of work
remains to be done to restore effective government administration,
and to rebuild a communist party. So long as Mao lives, the possibility
of disruptive campaigns exist and his death could usher in a period
of leadership uncertainty and intense preoccupation with internal
affairs.
D. Externally, China's aspirations remain blocked directly or in-
directly by the realities of the international scene including: the vastly
superior power and hostility of the USSR, its most immediate threat
as well as rival for ideological leadership in the Communist world;
the US presence and US commitments around the periphery of China;
and the growth in economic strength and self-confidence of another
traditional rival, Japan.
E. Even should the Chinese regime wish to alter its basic foreign
policy approach and use its growing military force aggressively in
peripheral areas, its options would be limited by the risk of provoking
one or another of the superpowers. From Peking's point of view, mili-
tary adventures in Southeast Asia, against Taiwan, in Korea, or in the
Soviet Far East would be needlessly risky and the potential prize not
worth the game. Peking does, however, have room, even in present
circumstances, for some maneuver directly between the two great
powers as well as around their flanks or under their guard in South-
east Asia, the Near East, Africa, and even in Eastern Europe.
F. At present, the Chinese see the USSR as their major military
threat. By accepting negotiations with the Soviets, cooling border
tensions, and improving their diplomatic image, the Chinese apparently
judge that: they have reduced the risk of hostilities with the Soviets.
There is little prospect, however, of a genuine rapprochement emerging
from the present Sino-Soviet talks. But both sides are apparently
concerned that their dispute not end in a military test. Thus, as long
as they both continue to exercise the present degree of military caution,
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there is likely to be some improvement in diplomatic and trade rela-
tions but little movement in border talks. As long as Mao lives there
is almost no chance of significant compromise on the ideological
questions.
G. With the US, Peking has moved from its previous intransigence
to a more flexible approach better designed to exploit the Sino-US re-
lationship for Chinese purposes. The Chinese hope to unsettle the
Soviets by playing on their fears of a Sino-American rapprochement
as well as exploit the potential for changes in the balance of forces
in ]East Asia resulting from the drawdown of the US military presence.
In pursuing its new flexibility, however, Peking does not expect an
early major improvement in Sino-US relations and any small improve-
ments are likely to be limited to marginal issues.
H. Japan poses special problems to Peking because it too is an
Asian power, is outstripping China in economic growth, and is strongly
resiistent to Maoist subversion or Chinese threats. And the Chinese,
who remember Japanese imperialism in China during World War II,
wonder what threat the Japanese may become to their security over
the long term and fear Tokyo will one day take on the role of pro-
tector of Taiwan. The Chinese answer so far has been to continue
with a rather rigid and vituperative propaganda attack on Japan's
leaders, their policies, and their alleged ambitions in Asia. While this
may impress the North Koreans and some people in Southeast Asia,
it does little good for China's cause in Japan itself. Nonetheless, and
despite the burgeoning growth in Sino-Japanese trade, any basic shift
in China's approach to Japan seems unlikely in the present ideological
climate in Peking.
I. In Southeast Asia, Peking's earlier fear that the Indochinese war
might spill over into China seems to have lessened. Indeed, the Chinese
seem to believe that the US is being forced gradually to withdraw its
military presence from the region and that this process will eventually
improve the prospects for Chinese influence. Rather than use overt
military force to exploit possible developments in this area, Peking's
more likely course will be to increase its support to subversive and
insurgent activity. The Chinese will seek to maintain their role as revo-
lutionary leaders without exposing themselves to undue cost or risk.
In addition they will rely on conventional diplomacy when this suits
their needs. There is abundant evidence that Peking feels no need to
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set deadlines and has no schedule to fulfill; it is clearly prepared for
the long haul.
J. In the longer run, if Mao's successors follow a more steady and
pragmatic course, they are likely to have greater success than Mao
in expanding China's political influence and acceptance. We cannot
be sure, of course, how future leaders will see their situation, and it
is possible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing
power in a more aggressive manner. We think it more likely, however,
that they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy at
the overt level and on subversion at the covert level. The open use of
military force will probably be judged needlessly risky.
K. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if
invaded, we see no compelling factors moving Peking toward a policy
of expansionism, or even a higher level of risk-taking. For all its verbal
hostility and latent aggressiveness, neither the present nor the probable
future leadership is likely to see foreign adventures as a solution to
China's problems.
DISCUSSION
1. FOREIGN POLICY: SOME PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
A. The Ideological Base
1. In part, Peking still perceives the outside world in traditional ways. The
Sino-centric view of the Middle Kingdom has survived the advent of the com-
munists. The past century has left a residue of bitterness and frustration among
those Chinese-certainly the vast majority-whose sense of nationalism and
patriotism has been outraged by what they see as unfair treatment of China
by foreigners. This basic sense of injustice and frustration has facilitated the
people's acceptance of enormous sacrifices and has permitted the communists
to carry out revolutionary programs aimed at reaching grandiose-often un-
realistic-goals. While popular expectations have been repeatedly disappointed,
the basic dynamism of Chinese nationalism remains to be exploited again and
again. Unlike the ideology of Maoism, which may not long survive its creator,
the traditional sense of China's privileged role in the world will probably remain
a constant theme in this and any foreseeable Chinese government.
2. Maoist ideology, which emphasizes the inevitability of class conflict and
world revolution, adds an ingredient of violence and militance to traditional
Chinese drives. It attempts to project the revolutionary experience of the Chi-
nese civil war onto the world stage by advocating the defeat of the affluent
Western Powers through the mobilization of the poor countries in the world.
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6. Since China's intervention in the Korean War, which Peking considered
a defensive move, China's military posture has remained basically cautious
and prudent:. Moreover, after this experience Peking appeared somewhat, more
restrained in the use of military threats to further its foreign policy objectives.
The abortive move against the off-shore islands in 1958 and the defensive
reinforcement along the Formosa Strait in 1962 both reflected Peking's concern
over another confrontation with the US. Even against the demonstrably weaker
power of India, Peking was careful in 1962 not to become embroiled in a lengthy
campaign. Peking was probably satisfied to make the point that, in spite of
severe internal difficulties, China was still ready and able to defend itself.
7. For all Peking's militance in the ideological field, the deployment of China's
military forces remains basically defensive. Maoist military doctrine emphasizes
defense in depth and the engagement of the entire civilian population to over-
come an attack. The fear of a US attack has eased, in part because of a lessening
concern since 1965-1966 that the Southeast Asian war might spill over into
China, and is probably lower now than at any other time in the past 20 years. The
Chinese now view the Soviet Union as posing the most immediate military threat
and over the past year have been conducting an extensive campaign to prepare
for the possibility of an eventual war. In accordance with this altered threat,
there are indications that the Chinese are adjusting their military deployments,
although there has been no wholesale movement of troops to the northern border.
8. Even though the main approach to the defense of China still emphasizes
defense in depth-e.g., Mao's "people's war"-there is more to its military pos-
ture than a readiness to fight a prolonged, defensive war within China. The
Peking leadership has clearly given a high priority to acquiring the military
symbols of a great power, especially strategic weapons, but also conventional
forces as well. Peking probably wants the strategic weapons primarily. as a de-
terrent against a Soviet or US attack and to increase Chinese bargaining strength
on international issues. There is no evidence that the achievement of a strategic
capability will necessarily make the Chinese more aggressive. They will continue
to be deterred by overwhelmingly superior US and Soviet power both from out-
right attacks and from engaging in "nuclear blackmail" in East Asia. China
wants its views to have impact on the international scene and is willing to ex-
pend scarce resources to achieve this goal, but it can be expected to continue
to exercise caution in employing its conventional and nuclear strength. Peking
expects its political influence in Asia to grow, not from the open use of military
power, but through active diplomacy and the encouragement and support of
subversive and revolutionary activities, all backed by the looming presence and
growing power of immemorial China on the Asian scene.
C. Domestic Constraints Affecting Foreign Initiatives
9. In addition to the ideological and military preconditions cited above, do-
mestic factors determine and often severely restrict the range of foreign policy
tactics and instrumentalities open to Peking. These domestic constraints operate
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to limit the economic, psychological, and bureaucratic resources available for
the conduct of foreign relations.
10. The Chinese economy during the 1960s did not even approach the high
sustained growth rates of the 1950s. A combination of factors were responsible
for this failure-the distorted planning and bizarre management of the Great
Leap Forward at the end of the 1950s; the cessation of Soviet aid; bad agricul-
tural. conditions in the early years of the decade; and finally, the disruptions
of the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, the proportion of resources de-
voted to the military sector increased, adding to China's technological capabilities,
but further hobbling development of the civilian economy.
11. This failure to maintain a high rate of growth in the civilian economy
limits China's capability to use economic leverage for foreign policy goals.
China's image in the early 1950s as the economic model for Asia has been
largely destroyed. The fabled potential of the "China market" has lost much
of its attraction to world traders, thereby reducing the political concessions
Peking can exact in exchange for trading privileges.
12. Policy ineptitude also hinders the Chinese. If Peking's intense preoccupa-
tion with internal politics had paid off in terms of rapid economic, social, and
political development, the Chinese might now have a sounder domestic base for
the conduct of foreign affairs. In fact, the major experiments designed to push
China ahead, including both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolu-
tion, have been disasters. Although the economy has largely recovered, party
organization remains disrupted, civil administration has been hampered, and
lasting tensions have been created within the leadership as a result of the
Cultural Revolution.
13. The foreign policy apparatus proved as vulnerable as other bureaucratic
organs to the impact of the Cultural Revolution. For nearly three years, the
formulation and execution of foreign policy were paralyzed by political in-
fighting. Red Guard activities in embassies abroad and within the foreign min-
istry itself brought constructive activity to a virtual standstill. All ambassadors
but one were recalled to Peking, embassy staffs were substantially reduced, and
militant posturing was offered as a substitute for traditional diplomacy.
14. This is not to say, of course, that China's presence was not felt in the
outside world during the Cultural Revolution. Trade and aid programs con-
tinued, as did support for subversion in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. And
China's potential as a great power was evident to the world as the development
of nuclear weapons continued despite domestic turmoil. Nonetheless, it was
not until 1969 that Chinese ambassadors began to trickle back to their posts,
and the current campaign to retrieve China's international status and influence
started in earnest. The return to pre-Cultural Revolution diplomacy has been
slow and uneven, and the balance between radical and more pragmatic influences
remains delicate and potentially unstable.
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A. Peking's Activist Foreign Policy
15. With its foreign affairs apparatus largely restored, Peking is moving
quickly to recoup its pre-Cultural Revolution diplomatic position and to com-
pete for influence in new areas. This drive has emphasized peaceful coexistence
and has sought influence through conventional, diplomatic means. Its successes
to date-due in large part to the receptivity of other nations to a more normal
relationship with the Chinese-have been impressive, especially when com-
pared to the almost total isolation at the height of the Cultural Revolution.
Most of the gains, however, have come in areas of lesser concern to Peking and
under circumstances which have made improvement in relations easy and rela-
tively cheap.
16. In areas of prime interest to the Chinese, Peking's policy has been less
sure. Uncertainty and cautious experimentation have been characteristic of
relations with the Soviet Union, the US, Southeast Asia, and Japan. In these
areas where policy decisions are more difficult, differences within the leader-
ship apparently come to the fore and strain the entire decision-making process.
This was especially marked in the fluctuations of Chinese policy toward the
USSR during 1969 and the continuing holding operation pursued vis-a-vis the
Soviets in 1970. Peking's handling of the recent turmoil in Cambodia-and its
effect on Sino-American relations-also betrayed an initial hesitance which
underscored the regime's difficulties in formulating policies on major foreign
issues.
B. Sino-Soviet Relations
17. Though some of the immediate danger has been removed from the situa-
tion, the Sino-Soviet dispute remains the single most important bilateral con-
cern for Peking. At the same time, it conditions and determines many aspects
of the Chinese posture in dealing with other Communist states, the Third
World, and the West.
18. Although relations between Moscow and Peking had been deteriorating
markedly over the last decade, and the Soviet troop deployments along the
Sino-Soviet border had been building since the mid-1960s, the Chinese did not
appear to take the threat of Soviet military action seriously until after the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Even then, Peking sought to deter the Soviets by
adopting a harshly militant posture, combining provocative behavior on the
border with strident propaganda and an intensive war preparations campaign.
Soviet pressure continued to grow in 1969, however, and after bloody clashes on
the Ussuri in March and in Sinkiang during August, Soviet diplomats began to
drop broad hints about a possible pre-emptive strike against Chinese nuclear
and strategic weapons facilities. The Chinese, aware now that they might be
faced with the choice between backing down and risking their nuclear installa-
tions, finally agreed in September to the border negotiations which opened
in Peking October 20.
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19. The experience of that tense summer moved the Chinese to reassess their
foreign policy tactics. Far from deterring the Soviets, their militant posture had
not only raised the possibility of broad conflict with the Soviets to an.unaccept-
able level, but also deepened Chinese diplomatic isolation. After what was ap-
parently a prolonged debate early in the fall, the leadership decided that border
talks offered the most viable means of defusing the dangerously tense situation.
At the same time, the decision was apparently taken to launch a wide-ranging
diplomatic campaign to restore China's world status and influence, both as a
deterrent to the Soviets and in support of Chinese objectives outside the bilateral
Sino-Soviet framework.
20. Since the opening of the border talks, there has been no evidence of
progress on any of the basic issues confronting the negotiators. In spite of the
stalemate, however, there have been no specific reports of new border clashes,
which argues that the mere existence of the talks has had some stabilizing effect.
For their part, the Chinese have demonstrated their concern for maintaining
the talks at the highest possible level by vigorously resisting any move which
might lead to their downgrading. The Soviets seem to have conceded this
point, possibly because of their preoccupation with events in Eastern Europe and
the Middle East, and a consequent unwillingness for now, to trigger new com-
plications with China.
21. Despite the soothing effect of the talks, the border situation remains poten-
tially explosive. The Soviets have continued their force build up along the border.
Although the Chinese have not significantly beefed up force levels near the
border, there is some evidence that they have deployed troops north into areas
close enough to be readily available in an emergency. They are also trying to
improve the effectiveness of their paramilitary forces. Chinese civil defense
campaigns to build air raid shelters, disperse population and stockpile food-
all of which are useful for domestic political reasons as well-remain in effect.
22. There have been signs of some slow, halting normalization of state rela-
tions, although the ideological gulf remains as broad as ever and questions of
principle and substance are no closer to solution than before. After protracted
haggling an exchange of ambassadors is in the final stages of arrangement, and
discussions for the 1970 Sino-Soviet trade protocol have been completed.
23. The prospect of a genuine rapprochement growing out of the Sino-Soviet
talks now seems remote. As long as Mao lives there is almost no chance of
significant compromise on the ideological questions. Peking, seeing no prospect
of a military advantage over the Soviets, appears committed to the long-term
process of keeping tensions below the flash point while attempting to pile up
political points in the communist world by embarrassing the Soviets at every
opportunity. Even with a continuation of the deep national antagonism and the
ideological schism, both sides are apparently concerned that the dispute not
end in a military test. Over the last year both sides have had cause to estimate
the costs of a prolonged military confrontation, presumably a prospect that
neither finds particularly advantageous.
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C. The Triangular Relationship: US/USSR/China
24. The Chinese approach to the US has been strongly affected by their polit-
ical conflict with the USSR. This was apparent earlier this year when Peking
moved from its previous intransigence against the US to a more flexible approach
better designed to exploit the Sino-US relationship for Chinese purposes. The
primary aim was undoubtedly to unsettle the Soviets by playing on their fears
of a Sino-US rapprochement. By demonstrating their concern over this possibility,
the Soviets have probably insured that the Chinese will continue to exploit
the "triangular relationship" wherever and whenever it suits their needs. Even
though events in Cambodia caused the Chinese to take a harder line against
the US, they have clearly maintained the option to return to a more o flexible
posture when it serves their interest.
25. The potential for changes in the balance of forces in East Asia resulting
from the drawdown of US military presence is another factor encouraging more
flexible Chinese tactics toward the US. The Chinese will hope to speed Ameri-
can troop withdrawals from the area, especially from Taiwan. At the same time,
they see possibilities for improving their relations with states now forced to rely
less on American guarantees. Peking may also hope that it can exert its in-
fluence to exacerbate frictions caused by a reduction in the US posture. The
Chinese probably see the US-GRC relationship as particularly vulnerable in
this respect.
26. There are no indications that Peking expects to bring about an early,
major improvement in Sino-US relations. The Chinese probably expect no far-
reaching Uri concessions on Taiwan, which remains the main test for Peking.
Nor are they likely to give up the US as the prime target in their ideological
offensives against the capitalist-imperialist enemy. Nonetheless, Peking will wish
to maintain sufficient flexibility to exploit the triangular relationship and to move
promptly in whatever direction offers the maximum benefits.
27. For these reasons any early improvement in Sino-US relations is likely
to be limited. For example, although recent US trade concessions have been
studiously ignored by the Chinese in public, they have privately shown some
interest in how far the US might move in this direction. While likely to reject
any formal trading relationship, the Chinese seem ready to accept more subtle,
indirect trading through third parties. Similarly they are likely to show little
interest in formal diplomatic recognition so long as the US remains committed
to the GRC. At the same time, however, they will probably retain an interest
in keeping lines of communication open through contacts such as those at Warsaw.
The pace of Chinese gestures will probably be slow and erratic, subject to pres-
sures felt in Peking from changes in Sino-Soviet and Soviet-US relations.
28. For some years to come, Sino-Soviet relations will be Peking's major con-
cern in foreign affairs. Peking has already shown an acute sensitivity to the pos-
sibility that the US and the USSR might find considerable common ground in
opposing China. In reaction, Peking will attempt to exacerbate the existing
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suspicions between Moscow and Washington; will increasingly portray itself
before the world as the innocent victim of "collusion" between the superpowers;
and will throw out lines to other Western Powers and the Third World in an
effort to elicit new support. The more direct solution would be for Peking to
seek a rapprochement with Moscow, but there seems little likelihood that Mao
could accept the shifts required to move his regime closer toward the Soviets.
Thus, over the next few years, or until Mao's death, Peking will probably con-
centrate on keeping the Sino-US-USSR relationship as fluid as possible in order
to prevent any alliance against China.
D. China's Regional Aims
29. Southeast Asia. Peking's early fears that the Indochinese war might spill
over into China seems to have lessened in recent years. Even though Peking
has expressed apprehension that US frustration in Vietnam might lead to further
escalation, the basic judgment of the Chinese seems to be that the US is bogged
down in an indecisive effort that is more likely to lead to a withdrawal than
to further expansion of the fighting. Their confidence in this judgment must
have been shaken temporarily by the US move into Cambodia, but their calcula-
tion of the ensuing political costs for the US has probably persuaded them that
it is still valid. Thus, what we believe to be their long-range estimate probably
remains unchanged; i.e., in a protracted struggle Hanoi's patience will outlast
that of the US.
30. As regards the likelihood of the PLA being sent into Southeast Asia for
offensive action, the evidence of the past 20 years suggests Peking would be
inclined in this direction only if China's security is seen as threatened, as on
the Sino-Korean border in 1950, or if China is provoked, as on the Sino-Indian
border in 1962. Thus, we continue to believe that China would use its military
forces to prop up North Vietnam if it appeared that there was a real danger
of that government collapsing. Similarly, China would no doubt react with the
PLA, to a direct military threat elsewhere along its southern borders.
3].. Peking's more likely response-and almost certainly its initial response-
to aggravation in this area would be to increase its support to subversive and
insurgent activity. The fact that China continues its long-term improvement of
its logistic capabilities along this border, including the current road building
in northern Laos, illustrates Peking's desire to have support facilities ready for
whatever contingencies may develop. The character of the facilities, operational
considerations, and recent history all suggest that Chinese plans in this area
relate to the defense of south China and the assistance of nearby insurgencies
rather than to a massive push by the PLA into Southeast Asia. The objective,
as before, would be to bring into existence friendly governments responsive to
Peking's political influence; and, in Peking's view, this could be done better
by indirection-including diplomatic pressure-than open aggression.
322. Thailand and Burma are already targets for a subversive effort. Thailand's
close ties with the US guarantee China's continuing hostility. Thus far, Peking
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has had little opportunity to apply diplomatic pressure on Bangkok and has
been relying on a long-tern campaign to encourage insurgency against the gov-
ernment. There is no suggestion that Peking sees this as an easy task or one that
can be accomplished quickly even if given a high priority. On the contrary,
Peking is consistent in advocating local self-reliance and has given little mate-
rial aid to the active insurgents. Should there be a substantial reduction in the
US presence in Southeast Asia, the Chinese may combine this low-level activity
with more positive diplomatic blandishments.
33. In Burma, Chinese propaganda is encouraging revolutionary activity, sup-
plemented by small amounts of aid in arms and training to dissident ethnic
minorities. But diplomatic contacts with this neutralist government have been
damaged rather than broken. Peking's return to moderation in other areas of
its diplomacy may eventually be extended to include improved relations with
Rangoon. Indeed, it now appears that both sides are prepared to resume more
normal relations. Even so, Peking is not likely to abandon its support of Burma's
insurgents.
34. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese are likely to persist in encouraging
local revolutionaries, but in these relatively remote areas, significant material
assistance its unlikely to be provided. The Chinese will continue to find it diffi-
cult to refuse requests for aid from any source that claims an insurgent or revolu-
tionary capability, but they will continue to urge self-reliance rather than de-
pendence on outside aid. Thus, the Chinese will maintain their role as revolu-
tionary leaders but without exposing themselves to undue cost or risk. There
is abundant evidence that Peking feels no need to set deadlines and has no
schedule to fulfill; it is clearly prepared for the long haul.
35. South Asia. China's interest in India has a relatively low rank on Peking's
scale of priorities. China is concerned with Sino-Indian border issues, with per-
sistent rivalries with the Soviets over influence in South Asia, and with demon-
strating that India is incapable of playing the role of a leading Asian power.
Toward these ends Peking has sought to embarrass and intimidate New Delhi,
but without becoming deeply involved in the effort. For instance, Peking has
propagandized and provided limited arms and training to Naga and Mizo tribes-
men in eastern India without, however, attempting to turn this into a major
campaign.
36. On a. larger scale, Peking's military aid to Pakistan-the major non-com-
munist recipient of such Chinese aid-was born out of common enmity to India.
In the process the Pakistanis have become major clients of the Chinese and Peking
will probably seek to preserve and nurture this relationship even if Sino-Indian
relations should improve somewhat in the coming years. Tentative feelers between
Peking and. New Delhi suggest both parties may be ready for a return to con-
ventional diplomacy. While formal ties may be restored, in line with Peking's
current effort to bolster its diplomatic image, the relationship will undoubtedly
remain cautious and cool for some time to come.
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37. The Asian Communists. Peking now seems determined to consolidate the
currently improved ties with both North Vietnam and North Korea. If only
because of the primacy of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Peking is likely to go to some
lengths to improve its relations with Pyongyang and Hanoi, preferably at Moscow's
expense. The error of pushing Pyongyang and Hanoi, whether ideologically or
politically, now seems to be clear to Peking and is unlikely to be repeated in
the same gross forms as during the Cultural Revolution.
38. China's present call for "militant unity" is probably designed, in the first
instance, to squeeze out the Soviet Union. It also serves to give the impression
of a more active role in the "anti-imperialist" struggle than China's cautious
actions warrant. Indeed, it seems likely that China will continue to tailor its role
toward propaganda and material support of those on the front lines rather than
expose itself to greater risk. This apparent effort to write itself belatedly into
any possible settlement in Indochina, together with its sponsorship of Sihanouk,
will require careful diplomacy if it is not to alienate Hanoi. Having borne the
burden of the fighting, the Vietnamese are likely to be especially sensitive to
any Chinese attempt to dictate strategy or tactics. Currently the Chinese are
moving with finesse but their natural bent toward chauvinism is nearly as likely
to erupt against the Vietnamese as against Westerners.
39. Japan represents a special case for Peking. Because of Japan's remarkable
economic performance and US encouragement for it to assume a more active
role in Asia, Peking is showing concern over Japan's potential military power,
and its possible designs on another Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.
This concern was heightened last fall by the signing of the Nixon-Sato com-
munique on the reversion of Okinawa. Peking has always been apprehensive
over Japan's expanding influence in Asia, particularly in Taiwan, and has taken
the view that the Nixon-Sato communique signaled a more assertive and direct
role for the Japanese in the area. Peking's reaction has been marked by indigna-
tion and by an unsettling conviction that as the US disengages from Asia, Japan
will fill the void both economically and militarily and will assume the lead role
in countering China. Adding, to Peking's dilemma is the awareness that its
political assets and leverage in Japan have markedly dwindled and its image
has suffered from the extremes of the Cultural Revolution.
40. Despite its limitations-and past failures-Peking seems to have decided
to continue on a course of limited meddling in Japan's internal affairs. Peking
has also launched an intensive propaganda campaign which raises the specter
of a remilitarized, imperialistic Japan, a foreign policy ploy designed to fan
traditional Asian fears and to undercut Japanese influence. Moreover, the Chinese
are attempting to build a case against US-USSR-Japanese "collusion," which
is also intended to strengthen Peking's hand in its competition for influence in
Asia. So far this approach has been successful in helping improve China's relations
with North Korea, but has not had a significant impact on Peking's non-com-
munist neighbors. Furthermore, the campaign has not been allowed to affect
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materially China's burgeoning trade with Japan, which is expected to reach
record levels again this year.
41. Taiwan. The continued existence-indeed thriving-of the Nationalist
Chinese Government in Taiwan remains a central issue in Chinese foreign policy.
This symbol of the unfinished revolution remains a highly emotional issue even
after two decades. The Peking leadership faces the general frustration of knowing
that they cannot take Taiwan by force, that it will not fall to them by default,
and that the growing strength of the independence-minded Taiwanese could
weaken Peking's claim to the island and perpetuate the issue indefinitely. The
continued recognition of the_GRC by many countries in the world and its presence
in the UN and other international bodies blocks Peking from full international
participation and remains a major irritant to the Chinese Communist leadership.
Finally, the Taiwan issue is a complex obstacle to improved relations with both
the US and Japan, thus severely limiting Peking's freedom to maneuver on
international issues.
42. Korea continues to attract Chinese interest because of the strategic role
of the peninsula, the quadrilateral competition for influence there, and the
volatile relationship between the north and the south. Peking has worked as-
siduously to regain its influence in Pyongyang and has succeeded in reviving
warm displays of friendship. While attempting to limit the role of the US, USSR,
and Japan, however, Peking will also seek to limit North Korean adventurism.
The outlook is for tough political support for Kim II-song's propaganda out-
bursts combined with quiet restraint on his military excesses to avoid drawing
China into another military confrontation on the peninsula.
E. China and the World Community
43. Where Peking's security interests are not directly engaged, Chinese diplo-
matic activity over the last year has involved far more tactical flexibility than
has been shown vis-a-vis the US and the USSR. The face shown the world once
again broadly resembles that displayed prior to the Cultural Revolution, a care-
fully nurtured image of reasonableness, but entailing little or no change in long-
term goals. Sino-Soviet considerations are part of the equation in most of this
diplomatic activity, and in some cases, notably in Eastern Europe, tend to
dominate the Chinese approach.
44. Eastern Europe has become an attractive target for Peking because Soviet
problems there seem to draw Soviet attention away from China. In addition
to its close ties with Albania, Peking has been actively cultivating the Rumanians,
and more recently has shown real flexibility in shelving ideology and improving
long-frigid relations with Yugoslavia. Ambassadors have returned to Hungary,
Poland, and East Germany. Peking is clearly preparing for long-term competition
with the Soviet Union and for this reason alone is likely to give greater attention
to the East Europeans. Much will of course depend on the subtlety and finesse
of Peking's approach, but at this point the Chinese have apparently assessed the
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opportunities as worth pursuing. In this effort as in other diplomatic endeavors
now underway, Peking will likely recover ground lost during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, and, if it can hold to its new pragmatic diplomacy, achieve some forward
movement.
45. Elsewhere in the world, Peking is showing revived interest in fostering
better relations where the cost is cheap and the opportunities tempting. This
does not rule out support for revolutionary activity, as is evident in the Near
East. In contrast to the heavy arms aid from the Soviets to the Arab world, the
Chinese apparently hope to sway the Arabs by concentrating their aid on the
fedayeen. This will probably be mainly propaganda on "people's war" with
some training and small-arms aid. This also serves to keep the pot boiling and
the Soviets distracted. But while denouncing the ceasefire as an American-
instigated "Munich" and declaring strong support for the fedayeen in the Jor-
danian crisis, the Chinese have carefully refrained from attacks on the Arab
governments involved, apparently unwilling to compromise future state relations
in the area.
46. In Africa, the Chinese will be concerned to restore diplomatic losses to
the GRC in recent years. This will require more professional diplomacy and less
proselytizing. Indeed, China's Foreign Ministry already seems to have accepted
this retreat from Maoist missionary work. For the most part, aid projects are
likely to remain modest but with special efforts to make them practical and
highly visible. The construction of the $400 million Tanzania-Zambia rail line
appears to be China's prestige project for Africa; the Chinese apparently also
hope, through the provision of military aid, to convert Tanzania into a major
beachhead in Africa.
47. In an effort which may be intended mainly to spotlight Peking's return
to the world scene, the Chinese have also been displaying unprecedented in-
terest in UN membership. In earlier years, Peking put preconditions on its mem-
bership which were clearly unacceptable to the international body. More recently,
Chinese officials have dropped their extreme demands and have sent out a
number of cautious feelers for support in the UN. Whereas Chinese diplomats
formerly spurned such support, now they go out of their way to express appre-
ciation for it. Despite all of this activity, Peking has not softened its opposition
to any "two-China" formulation, and has continued to make it clear that the
GRC must either withdraw or be dismissed before Peking would accept UN
membership. Widened diplomatic recognition of Peking, such as by Canada and
Italy, is steadily improving the chances for its admission to the UN; such an
outcome seems likely within the next few years.
48. In general, and barring the contingency of military attack by the USSR,
China's future international posture is likely to depend more on Chinese internal
developments than on external factors. If domestic political and economic
problems accumulate, so will the pressure to give them even higher priority,
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with a concomitant lessening in foreign interests. Mao Tse-tung remains the key
variable. So long as he retains his dominance within the leadership, Mao could
attempt to reverse the present relatively moderate trends. In the past, his
impatience has grown as his goals for China have been frustrated by economic
reality and recalcitrant human nature. His ability to retreat and consolidate is
still evident, but it is questionable whether his age and health will permit
another major push toward his visionary aims. In any event, despite his deep
concern over the ideological conflict with the Soviets, Mao's attention is likely
to remain primarily on developments within China. Nor is he likely to abandon
his caution and risk the destruction of China by provocative moves against either
the US or the USSR.
49. Mao's death during this period could create succession problems that could
give Peking reason to project a low posture on the international scene for some
time. Almost any foreseeable combination of successors-even presumably hard-
core Maoists like Lin Piao, the designated successor-would probably play for
time to consolidate their positions and to strengthen China to meet possible
challenges. In the longer run, as those who follow Mao face up to the needs of
China, the trend is likely to be away from the ideological excesses of Maoism
toward a more realistic adjustment to the difficulties-as well as the opportu-
nities-facing China. Indeed, if the successors persist in the present movement
toward greater flexibility and pragmatism, they are likely to have greater suc-
cess than Mao in expanding China's political influence abroad. And for the longer
run, China's traditional ethnocentrism will continue to fuel an assertive and
potentially aggressive nationalism.
50. Presumably they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy
at the overt level and on subversion and insurrection at the covert level. This
could include "war by proxy" as well as efforts to exacerbate US relations with
its Asian allies and to exploit internal tension within these countries. We can-
not be sure, of course, how future leaders will see their situation, and it is pos-
sible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing power in a
more aggressive manner. It now seems likely, however, that the open and offen-
sive use of military power will continue to be judged needlessly risky and
therefore counterproductive. Even the development of an operational strategic
weapons system may reinforce Chinese caution rather than encourage a more
reckless policy. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if
invaded, or if threatened directly with invasion, we see no compelling factors
moving Peking toward a policy of expansionism, or even a higher level of risk-
taking. For all its verbal hostility and latent aggressiveness, neither the present
nor the probable future leadership is likely to see foreign adventures as a solu-
tion to China's problems.
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