USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000701160015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
SNIE 11/50/37-82
USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL
CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND AFGHANISTAN
Information available as of 2 March 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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KEY JUDGMENTS
In the year that has elapsed since the publication of SNIE
11/50/37-82, the use of chemical and toxin agents has continued and
we have found nothing in the evidence acquired since the beginning of
1982 that would contradict our earlier findings on any of the countries
with which we are concerned. The evidence has continued to come
from many different sources and has amplified our understanding of
events of previous years as well as events occurring during 1982
In Afghanistan, the Soviets have continued to use chemical agents
selectively, through at least January 1983. Analyses of physical samples
have, for the first time, provided evidence of mycotoxins. Chemical
agents other than toxins have also been used, but we have not yet been
able to identify them through sample analysis.
In Laos, Vietnamese and Lao troops, under Soviet supervision,
have continued to use lethal and incapacitating chemicals and toxins
against the H'Mong resistance, through at least December 1982.
In Kampuchea, the Vietnamese forces have continued to use lethal
and incapacitating chemicals and toxins against the DK and KPNLF
resistance forces, through at least February 1983.
In Thailand, in 1982, Thai villages near the Kampuchean border
for the first time became targets of Vietnamese chemical attacks.
Samples from these attacks have been analyzed and trichothecene
mycotoxins have been identified.
Physical samples from both Laos and Kampuchea provide further
confirmation that trichothecene mycotoxins are among the agents used.
Our earlier conclusions on this have been reinforced by much better
medical data and additional chemical analyses
Toxins have been found in urine, blood, and tissues of victims of "yellow
rain" attacks and in samples of material collected from attack sites.=
Soviet implication in the provision and use of these weapons
continues to be supported by reporting from
defectors, resistance groups, and refugees
In 1982, independent investigations conducted by other govern-
as well as by private groups, yielded evidence and
analysis broadly supportive of US conclusions.
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DISCUSSION
1. Throughout 1982 the Vietnamese .and Lao con-
tinued their policy of using lethal agents and toxins
against villagers and resistance forces in Laos. While
the pattern of attacks remained consistent with that of
previous years, the number of fatalities reported per
attack decreased. The decrease suggests that less lethal
chemical agents or lower concentrations of the same
agents have been used. The decrease could, however,
also be attributed to other factors:
- The H'Mong population had already been deci-
mated by the high fatalities and refugee exodus
caused by earlier attacks dating back at least to
- Surviving H'Mong people remaining in Laos
were more wary and quick to take cover at the
first indication of an attack.
- The H'Mong survivors were not taking time to
count victims. This is supported by the very few
reports that cite precise numbers for casualties in
specific chemical attacks
2. Descriptions of the attacks have not changed
significantly. The H'Mong typically describe aircraft
or helicopters as spraying a yellow rainlike material on
villages and crops, causing in the human targets the
familiar hemorrhaging symptoms characteristic of tri-
cothecene toxin poisoning, as set forth in detail in the
SNIE. In a number of cases, however, only abdominal
pain and prolonged illness, and no bleeding, were
reported. The divergence of symptoms, also observed
in earlier years, suggests that other agents or combina-
tions of agents are also being used. One likely explana-
tion is that different solvents or carriers, exposure
levels, and routes of absorption for the same agents
alter their efficacy in individual attacks. The situation
is further complicated by the fact that different
groups-men, women, children, and animals-often
exhibit different symptoms.
3. The trichothecene toxins that have been identi-
fied by the United States are only one of the compo-
nents of "yellow rain." There is much that we do not
know about the total composition of the material
sprayed or dropped from aircraft, or about other
chemicals that may be in use. For example, the
H'Mong consider the red smoke they have observed in
rocket /artillery munitions as more toxic than the
"yellow rain." They have also reported the use of a
green gas and described a white sticky substance that
dried to a powder and produced smallpox-like rash
and necrosis of the skin. These reports indicate that
several different types of agents have been used both
to inflict casualties on the resistance forces directly,
and to drive the H'Mong from their villages by
contaminating the environmentF__1
supports our earlier judgment that the
Soviets are directly involved in chemical warfare
support in Laos. This involvement includes training,
storage and inspection, and supervision of use of
chemical agents. Conclusive proof of Soviet supply of
the chemical agents is still lacking. Indeed, given the
limited collection possibilities and opportunities avail-
able to us, such proof is unlikely to be acquired.
In Kampuchea
5. In 1982 the Vietnamese demonstrated their in-
difference to the international concern over the use of
chemical warfare by conducting a number of attacks
near the Thai border (at least six occurred on Thai
territory) and by continuing the attacks even while the
UN investigating team was in Thailand. Proximity and
visibility of the attacks made collection of fresh sam-
ples for analysis much easier than was the case in Laos
and Afghanistan. That proximity also allowed other
governments and international organizations to exam-
ine recent victims and collect evidence.
6. In 1982, Kampuchea provided a wider range of
sources and kinds of information than in previous
years. The earlier chemical attacks were conducted
primarily against the Democratic Kampuchea (DK)
troops, who served as the main source of information.
At present, information is also obtained from the
Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF),
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ese defectors, and international organizations.
7. The number of deaths reported per attack also
decreased in Kampuchea. As in Laos, the decrease
may be explained by Vietnamese use of less toxic
chemicals or less effective methods of dissemination or
by improved countermeasures taken by DK forces and
other intended victims. As in previous years, both
Vietnamese and resistance forces claimed deaths and
casualties from poisoned food and water.
8. The combat situation in Kampuchea is much
different from that in Laos. There is a greater fre-
quency of direct engagement of field combat forces,
frequently involving exchanges of artillery fire. Chem-
ical shells are often fired on opposing forces or their
sanctuaries. has verified
at least one such chemical attack in late 1982
the Vietnamese also spread chemi-
cals along trails and the border. As in Laos, there are
also confirmed reports of aircraft spraying "yellow
rain."
9. Our first positive identification of trichothecene
mycotoxins came in 1981 from a sample collected in
Kampuchea. Since that time, samples of vegetation,
residue, soil, and water, as well as human blood, urine,
and autopsy tissue, have been collected and analyzed.
These analyses have been positive, showing that the
Vietnamese have continued to use toxins. Background
control samples have continued to be negative. Other
chemical agents or combinations are also being used,
but we have not yet been able to identify them
through sample analysis.
In Afghanistan
10. The Soviets have continued selective use of
chemical agents throughout the past year against
resistance forces and against villages that did not
cooperate with the Afghan authorities. Reports during
1.982 have amplified and added credibility to our
earlier findings. In Afghanistan there is no question
that the Soviets themselves are using chemical agents
and possibly toxins. In addition, we continue to receive
reports that the Soviets have provided chemical agents
to the Afghan forces for use against the Muiahedin.[
11. For the first time we have evidence of the
presence of trichothecene mycotoxins in Afghanistan,
through the discovery of toxin contamination of a
piece of Soviet protective equipment. Laboratory
analysis of a Soviet protective mask has revealed the
presence of T-2 toxin (sample 7, annex D, table D-3),
in a quantity of approximately 1 microgram on the
area examined (one-fourth of the mask). This finding
was confirmed independently by three different lab-
oratories.
12. Also for the first time, the United States ac-
quired new (unused) Soviet
gas masks, canisters, an comp ete protective suits
captured from a Soviet convoy by Mujahedin forces in
August 1982. No information on the location of the
attack or intended destination of the convoy is avail-
able. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the Soviets
would not provide such protective gear to their forces
in Afghanistan unless they anticipated a need for it-
that is, for use in connection with employment of CW
agents and weapons. Comprehensive protective gear
of this sort would not be required as protection against
the kinds of nonlethal riot control chemicals that the
Mujahedin have been accused of using.=
13. Reporting from Afghanistan had long included
descriptions of events similar to the "yellow rain"
attacks reported from Southeast Asia. However, be-
cause of the remoteness of attack sites and difficulties
in sample collection, we have been unable to obtain
physical evidence of the presence of mycotoxins in
Afghanistan until the recent confirmation of the pres-
ence of T-2 on the Soviet gas mask. This now greatly
strengthens our previous assessment that "toxins prob-
ably have been used since 1980."
14. The biggest mystery remains the identification
of the other agents being used. Some familiar CW
agents can be inferred from descriptions of signs and
symptoms. For example, the medical effects resulting
from some chemical attacks are consistent with the use
of the nerve agent tabun. (Reportedly, tabun is one of
the agents present in the CW stocks maintained by
Soviet forces in Afghanistan.) Other reports indicate
use of an incapacitating agent that causes unconscious-
ness for several hours.
15. As early as 1980 we began receiving reports of
Soviet forces dropping or pumping one or more
chemical agents into tunnels, caves, and underground
waterways where resistance forces and their families
take shelter. Reports of those incidents contain de-
scriptions of symptoms that have puzzled the experts.
Of particular concern are reports of rapid blackening
and decomposition of tissue, a description that fits
none of the CW agents known to us. The frequency
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and consistency of these accounts from many different
tribal groups have led us to conclude that they must be
taken seriously and that we may be dealing with a new
class of chemical or toxin agent or with combinations
not previously known to the West.
interviewed eyewitnesses who re-
ported that gasoline and probably diesel fuel were
poured into tunnels and ignited with incendiary pow-
der and shells. The number of deaths and condition of
the bodies were consistent with fire and asphyxiation.
16. There has been no change in the manner of
dissemination of the chemical substances. The pre-
dominant delivery system still appears to be helicop-
ters firing CW rockets, dropping chemical-loaded
bombs or canisters, or spraying chemicals directly. F_
Findings From Other Countries
17. There is a growing body of international evi-
dence that supports the US findings of chemical
weapons use. Non-US private experts and governments
have collected and independently analyzed samples
and have obtained testimony from witnesses of attacks
and from medical personnel. A few examples follow.
18. Non-American physicians with good credentials
in tropical medicine have testified that they have
treated chemical warfare victims. For example, a
French physician has provided testimony on his treat-
ment of victims at a Kampuchean hospital. Similar
testimony came from a Swedish International Red
Cross worker in Kampuchea. A New Zealand doctor
and his British associate at the World Vision Hospital
at Ban Vinai refugee camp are convinced that H'Mong
villagers are victims of repeated chemical warfare
attacks in Laos. An increasing number of these physi-
cians have made strong public statements and, to date,
not one doctor who has examined victims claiming
CW injury has publicly or privately disputed his
claims after examination.
19. Two French physicians who worked in Afghan-
istan described the unusual wounds caused by what
they believe were poisoned bullets. French scientists
have found trichothecene toxins in samples from
Southeast Asia. Thai scientists have reported finding
mycotoxins in their samples.F_~
20J I officers acquired
portions of gas masks from attack sites in Afghanistan.
The tests conducted on them are as yet incomplete,
but early indications and some signs and symptoms of
persons handling the contaminated masks suggest that
chemical agents were used in the attacks.
21. Several carefully done epidemiological studies
have been prepared by Canadian governmental and
academic institutions. Their findings are consistent
with ours on all but technically minor points.
22. The December 1982 report of the UN Experts
Group provided as much support as the United States
could reasonably expect from such a multilateral
entity. The document supported individual US claims
in more than a dozen specific technical areas, faulted
the Soviet "scientific explanation" in strong language,
and declared other hypotheses (other than use of CW)
to be remote and inconsistent with the human testi-
mony and the laboratory data at hand. Its failure to
support the US charges fully was attributed by most of
the world press to the political-not scientific-inhibi-
tions of the Experts Group.
Implications for Intelligence
23. The fact that chemical and toxin agents con-
tinue to be used in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan
despite a highly publicized UN investigation, diplo-
matic pressure on the Soviet, Vietnamese, and Lao
Governments, and growing international acceptance
of the evidence suggests that the perpetrating govern-
ments do not believe that their activities are as yet
sufficiently damaging politically to warrant their ter-
mination. This is not to say that Moscow, Hanoi, and
Vientiane have ignored the charges being levied
against them. But rather than stopping the illegal use
of chemical and toxin agents, they have launched a
major propaganda counteroffensive.
24. In May 1982 the Soviets submitted a "scien-
tific" study to the UN blaming the toxin poisoning in
Laos and Kampuchea on US use of herbicides during
the Vietnam war. The Soviet study claims that wide-
spread use of herbicides allowed toxin-producing fungi
to flourish in Vietnam. Winds then allegedly blew the
spores into Laos and Kampuchea, contaminating the
environment. It is surprising that the Soviet Academy
of Sciences would lend its name to the production of
such a scientifically indefensible paper. Nevertheless,
the overall Soviet counterpropaganda effort has not
been without effect in diverting public attention away
from the Soviet actions and focusing them on the
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proposed US chemical warfare modernization pro-
gram and on past US use of herbicides in Vietnam. An
international scientific conference was held in Ho Chi
Minh City (Saigon) in January 1983 to call attention to
the lone-term effects of herbicide use on nature and
man.
25. The comprehensive assessment of the CW evi-
dence that the United States has published and briefed
worldwide in classified and unclassified form has
helped to persuade many governments that lethal
agents, including toxins, are being used and that the
Soviet Union is implicated. There is a reluctance on
the part of most governments, however, to levy such
charges publicly. Governments are loath to take a
public position on the issue because to acknowledge
that the USSR has violated its international commit-
ments is to call into question the trustworthiness of the
USSR as a party to arms limitation agreements. Even
the most conclusive and incontrovertible intelligence
evidence is unlikely to galvanize other governments
into forceful public positions on an issue that has such
politically unpleasant implications.)
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