INF: THE PROSPECTS FOR WEST EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT AND THE USSR S REACTIONS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060012-8
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: MEMO

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INF.: THE PROSPECTS FOR
WEST EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT
AND THE USSR'S REACTIONS
Information available as of 9 August 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
Foreword ..................................................................................................................... 1
The Importance of INF Deployments to the USSR ................................................. 3
Political Pressure To Forestall Deployment ............................................................. 5
Negotiating a Limit to Deployment .......................................................................... 5
Soviet Military Initiatives ........................................................................................... 6
Low-Risk Options ............................................................................................... 6
Cuba ..................................................................................................................... 6
Probes in Cuba .................................................................................................... 6
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles and Submarines With Missiles to Cuba .......... 6
Missiles in Cuba .................................................................................................. 8
Detected Activities in Cuba ............................................................................... 10
Deployments Against NATO Europe ................................................................ 14
Beyond Initial Deployment ....................................................................................... 14
An Alternative View From the Director of INR ..................................................... 14
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FOREWORD
In October 1982 the Intelligence Community issued a Special
National Intelligence Estimate, INF: The Prospects for West European
Deployment and the USSR's Reactions (SNIE 1.1/20-3-82), that, among
other judgments, estimated as "unlikely" the Soviet basing of nuclear
weapons in Cuba in response to US intermediate-range nuclear force
(INF) deployment. The principal purpose of this Memorandum is to
discuss new information and insights that have developed in the 10
months since that SNIE, and to share with holders the Community's
growing concern that the Soviets will respond to INF deployment in
ways that will, either individually or in the aggregate, pose a significant
challenge to US interests. Because of our heightened apprehension that
the Soviets may feel compelled to make good on their threats to put US
territory in an "analogous position," this Memorandum focuses on
Soviet reactions over the next nine months or so. However, Moscow's
struggle against INF and its reactions to deployment are likely to be
played out over a longer period of time, and may turn out to be no less
significant as a consequence.
The reader is forewarned that we still have very little direct or
hard evidence concerning how the Soviets intend to play their political
and military cards in the coming months. Thus, we are wary of making
firm judgments about what the USSR will or will not do. In view of the
profound consequences that would result if the Soviets made good on
their more ominous threats, it is prudent to consider that such threats
may represent expressions of intent rather than mere diplomatic
rhetoric.
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Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 11/20-3-82
1. As the date approaches for initial deployment
in Western Europe of ground-launched cruise mis-
siles (GLCMs) and Pershing II missiles, we are
increasingly concerned about the possibility of sig-
nificant Soviet countermeasures. Statements by key
Soviet officials make clear that Moscow perceives
INF deployment to be a powerful and historic
challenge to Soviet security interests. We are im-
pressed that Soviet leaders continue-as did Defense
Minister Ustinov as recently as 29 July-to threaten
to put US territory at risk in the same way as Soviet
territory is by INF. Moscow's persistence is disquiet-
ing for what it may reveal of its real intentions and
also because the continuing public threats will make
it harder for the Soviets to back away. We are
concerned that the Soviets are creating a situation in
which the superpowers could slide into an action-
reaction spiral with consequences not originally
intended by the USSR or the United States.
2. Our concern about Soviet intentions stems also
from the new dynamism of Soviet foreign policy
under Andropov and the Willingness of Moscow to
run risks and to pressure the United States in areas
of its vital interests, as they are now doing in Central
America and the Middle East.
3. Ten months ago in SNIE 11/20-3-82, INF: The
Prospects for West European Deployment and the
USSR's Reactions, the Intelligence Community con-
cluded that:
- Despite strong opposition from peace groups,
deployment of intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) was likely to proceed.
- The USSR would be likely to respond by
making counterdeployments in Europe and by
deploying submarines equipped with sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) near US
coasts.
- It was unlikely that the Soviets would take
either overt unambiguous steps to deploy nu-
clear weapons to Cuba or covertly introduce
them there.
4. The Community still holds to the first two views.
But we are more concerned that the Soviets may
decide to exercise Cuban options. Specifically:
- The Community now believes that there is a good
chance-but still somewhat less than fifty-fifty-
that the Soviets will send on visits to Cuba Bear
bombers configured to carry air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs) or submarines with SLCMs.
- The Community believes that the Soviets are
unlikely to send land-based missiles to Cuba or to
use Cuban facilities to service nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). We give
them about a 1-in-10 chance.
and the Soviet calculus could-be
di eren oor could change quickly. The Air Force
and the Army rate the chances of SS-20s as
significantly higher (1 in 4). For a fuller explana-
tion of these views, see paragraphs 23-28. Also,
see paragraph 36 for an alternative view from
the Director of INR.
The Importance of INF Deployments to the USSR
5. We believe the Soviets view INF deployment
with great concern. Moscow recognizes that deploy-
ment would strengthen the perception of the linkage
of US nuclear weapons to the defense of Europe,
would threaten key strategic targets in Moscow and
the western USSR, would complicate Soviet war plan-
ning, and would constitute a profound political set-
back to the USSR.
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They
probably perceive the P-II, with the :'AX and the D-5,
as part of a future US first-strike capability. The
Soviets are also concerned that INF would create a
precedent whereby future US theater deployments
could threaten to impact on the overall strategic
relationship with the United States.
7. The P-11s and GLCMs will also enhance NATO's
theater nuclear capabilities and complicate Moscow's
strategy for fighting a conventional war in Europe.
These missiles will have the capability of hitting a
wide variety of targets in Soviet territory, while
existing ones do not. Moreover, in addition to being
mobile the GLCMs will be deployed deep in NATO's
rear, making it tougher for the Soviets to neutralize
them early in a conflict.
8. The Soviets also see the political stakes as very
important. If they can frustrate INF deployment, they
would have seriously undermined NATO cohesion,
eroded West European willingness to resist Soviet
pressures, and thus won a major Soviet political vic-
tory. The Soviets might then manage to prevent
NATO modernization entirely.
9. To meet the INF threat, the Soviets have four
courses open to them: pressure the West Europeans to
stop or limit deployment, negotiate for the same
purposes, coerce the United States into swapping P-IIs
and GLCMs for comparable Soviet deployments, and,
finally, cope militarily and politically with the deploy-
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ment. These discrete courses are not mutually exclu-
sive. The Soviets are capable of following more than
one at the same time, and some combination of the
four, spread over time, is the most likely Soviet
response to INF.
commitment, Moscow in late November or early
December will need either:
- To make a deal sanctioning some US
deployments.
Political Pressure To Forestall Deployment
10. We expect the Soviets to work hard between
now and December to get the West Europeans to
postpone deployment. Moscow's chief target will be
West Germany. One reason the Soviets have singled
out P-II for special emphasis is that West Germany is
the only country in which it will be deployed. They
will use a combination of bilateral diplomacy, active
measures in support of disruptions at P-II-related
facilities in the Federal Republic, propaganda targeted
on West European audiences, and preparatory moves
in the USSR and Eastern Europe to remind NATO of
the military consequences of deployment. The Soviets
are almost certain to make new proposals for an INF
settlement in the early fall. Their purpose will be to
encourage sentiment for postponement of deployment
in Western Europe by raising the prospect of Soviet
flexibility and willingness to reach a genuine
accommodation.
11. Moscow will raise the pressure on the Kohl
government by making more pointed references to the
"palisades of missiles" that would come to divide West
and East Germany in case of NATO deployment, and
by attempting to woo the Social Democratic leader-
ship (particularly Helmut Schmidt) into calling for
postponement. The Soviets could significantly raise the
ante by harassing West Berlin and throwing into
question the Quadripartite Agreement. Moscow will
be reluctant to go this far, calculating that such tactics
would unite rather than divide the West Germans and
at some cost to its long-term strategy of chipping away
at Bonn's relationship with the United States and
NATO. But the Soviets have miscalculated reactions in
West Germany before, and there is a significant
chance-Andropov's July assurances to Kohl notwith-
standing-that the Soviets will use West Berlin to
underline their concerns about INF.
Negotiating a Limit to Deployment
12. If, as we expect, the Soviet pressure campaign is
failing and NATO is holding firm to its deployment
- To take military countermeasures to pressure the
United States to forgo deployments.
- Or, to live with the initial deployments and seek
to limit them by continuing political pressure.
13. The Soviets probably believe that sentiment for
a settlement of the INF issue will grow in Western
Europe and perhaps in the United States as deploy-
ment draws near. They probably interpret the con-
tinuing attention given the "walk in the woods"
formula, particularly by West German leaders, as
evidence that there is considerable interest in finding
a way out of the INF impasse, even at the expense of
P-II deployment. Moscow may well believe that it can
solve its P-II "problem" any time it chooses to, by
agreeing to the deployment of GLCMs and by com-
promising on involving other issues, including com-
pensation for French and British missiles in the con-
text of the strategic arms reduction talks (START). It
may believe that it only has to keep the pressure on in
Western Europe and to wait for the right moment to
reveal its compromise. As we move closer to deploy-
ment, however, Moscow may come to believe that
there is an irreducible minimum requirement that it
will have to satisfy for a negotiated settlement-that
is, some US GLCM deployments.
14. It may be a close call for Moscow, but we
estimate that the Soviets will choose not to sanction
any US deployments before they are an accomplished
fact. The Soviets would reason that:
- They would have accepted the precedent of a US
capability to attack the USSR with theater land-
based missile systems for strategic advantage
without any corresponding capability for the
USSR.
- They would, in effect, be accepting a significant
political victory for the United States and NATO,
and would be strengthening the idea that a tough
line with the USSR pays off.
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These considerations are likely to be more persuasive
than the Soviet calculation that:
-The USSR could negotiate to remove all (or
almost all) Pershing II missiles, and to put a cap
on future INF deployments, thus removing a
significant military threat.
- An agreement would demonstrate the USSR's
"reasonableness" and put additional pressure
on the United States to conclude a START
agreement more favorable to the USSR, and
also help revive the detente line in Western
Europe.
Soviet Military Initiatives
15. The Soviets will almost certainly feel it neces-
sary to take some action directed against US territory
in response to INF, if only to maintain some credibil-
ity in light of their frequent threats to do so. A more
far-reaching objective would be to force the United
States to stop INF deployments. However, the Soviets
will be hard pressed to choose among measures that
will make good on their threats without going so far as
to provoke a major confrontation.
tai ping SS-20s in the extreme eastern part of the USSR,
and because deployments would not have, or be seen
to have, much impact on the US-Soviet military
relationship.
18. The Soviets almost certainly have considered
deployments of nuclear weapons in the Western
Hemisphere; Cuba is the only feasible location. Nei-
ther Grenada nor Suriname is an attractive staging
area for Soviet ballistic missile submarines, or for land-
based ballistic or cruise missiles, in view of the limited
infrastructure and the vulnerability of those countries
to any US military response. The Soviets probably
consider Nicaragua equally unattractive for the same
reasons.
19. The Soviets could encounter difficulty in enlist-
ing Fidel Castro's cooperation for any effort involving
Cuban territory that ran a risk of confrontation with
the United States. But Moscow would use its consider-
able leverage and give assurances about protecting
Cuba's security. In such circumstances, Castro proba-
bly would acquiesce, even if reluctantly.
Low-Risk Options
16. The deployment of SLCM-equipped submarines
near US coasts-from bases in the Soviet Union-was
judged as the most likely Soviet option in the October
1982 Estimate. The Soviets could have a few subma-
rines configured to carry SLCMs by early 1984. This
option remains the most likely response, particularly if
the Soviets are looking for one that does the minimum
to make good on their threats, but without provoking a
major crisis. SLCMs from Soviet submarines would
pose a serious warning threat to the continental United
States. However, we strongly doubt that Moscow
would view such deployments as having enough im-
pact to cause the United States to change its policy on
INF deployment.
17. The Soviets probably have rejected placing
missiles in the extreme eastern portions of Siberia,
from which they could reach large portions of the
western United States. It seems likely
that the Soviets would reject such a course because of
the physical difficulty and costs of placing and main-
20. Short of a decision to actually deploy nuclear
weapons in Cuba, the Soviets could take ambiguous
steps to demonstrate that this is a live option, steps
they could reverse without appearing to back down.
Some of these could also be used as preparations for
implementing a nuclear weapons option later on.
These moves might include:
Significant improvements to air defenses in
Cuba, which could include the introduction of
Soviet-manned SA-5s, new air-interceptor fight-
ers, possibly the airborne warning and control
system (AWACS), and possibly the SA-X-12.
Introduction of additional Soviet troops into
Cuba.
- Increased port calls by Soviet combatant ships
and nuclear attack submarines.
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles and Submarines
With Missiles to Cuba
21. There is a good chance-but still somewhat less
than even-that the Soviets will send on periodic visits
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Figure 2
flange of SS-20 From Hypothetical Bases in the Soviet Far East
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to Cuba Bear bombers configured to carry ALCMs or
SLCM-equipped submarines. We have revised our
estimates of the availability of ALCMs since last fall;
we now believe that some missiles and a few Bear
aircraft would be ready for deployrr. ent in late 1983.
22. We believe that the Soviets might find these
options far more attractive than sending land-based
missiles or submarines equipped with ballistic missiles
to Cuba because they would be more ambiguous, more
easily reversible, and hence less provocative. Moscow
might hope that the fact that it had sent offensive
nuclear weapons to Cuba-the ambiguity notwith-
standing-would create a political environment in
which its offers to limit SS-20 deployment in return
for no US INF deployment would be accepted with
only minimal additional concessiors on the USSR's
part.
23. There are important reasons why the Soviets
might seriously consider sending missiles to Cuba:
- As described in paragraphs 5-7, the Soviets per-
ceive INF deployments as constituting a signifi-
cant military threat; it is possible that they
believe that the only way (aside from negotiating
an unfavorable settlement) to atop such deploy-
ments is by confronting the United States with a
comparable threat.
- SS-20s and cruise missiles in Cuba would provide
some limited military advantage. Specifically,
they would threaten Strategic Air Command
bases located in the south-central United States
and raise the level of the short- warning threat to
command, control, and communications targets
in the continental United States.
- Soviet leaders might be tempted by the enormous
political payoff of facing down the United States
in a second Cuban missile crisis. The ramifica-
tions would be of historic dimension, felt well
beyond INF and Western Europe. The Soviets
might be convinced that, since the USSR is in a
profoundly stronger military position vis-a-vis
the United States than it was in 1962, the chances
are good that it can win a major victory in a
repetition of the 1962 crisis.
They could also convince themselves that a
crisis would split US public opinion rather than
generate a strong consensus supporting US mili-
tary action, that Cuba itself is more heavily
defended than it was in 1962 and the adminis-
tration would be deterred by the prospect of
substantial losses, and that the West Europeans
would press Washington for a negotiated
solution.
24. While these are strong arguments for the
USSR's placing missiles in Cuba, the incentives, in
our view, are likely to be overshadowed by the
following:
- The Soviets probably believe that, with new
deployments of defensive weapons and more
survivable command, control, and communica-
tions systems, they could eventually limit any
deficiences in their capabilities to carry out
their strategic or theater war strategies caused
by the P-11s or GLCMs. They are already
making improvements to their command and
control survivability with a view to the MX
and D-5 threat as well as to that of the P-II.
They are working on defensive systems against
the cruise missile threat, which they will face
even if the GLCMs are never deployed in
Western Europe.
- Despite the military changes since 1962, Cuba
is still far from the Soviet Union and the
overwhelming preponderance of military pow-
er in the region still rests with the United
States. This consideration is likely to weigh
very heavily in the Soviet calculus.
- The Soviets recognize that there is considerable
sentiment in the United States for a firm
position with the USSR, around which strong
support for military action might well coalesce.
The Soviets might believe that, in view of its
general position on protecting US interests vis-
a-vis the USSR, the Reagan administration
would not be inclined to accept a "compro-
mise" solution to the crisis that met the USSR's
INF objectives.
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-The Soviets almost certainly believe that the
United States would be likely to respond with
force to Soviet moves to actually deploy land-
based missiles in Cuba.
25. Therefore, we believe that it is unlikely (about
a 10-percent chance) that the Soviets will deploy SS-
20s or other land-based missiles in Cuba either
before INF deployment or in the months after. We
view even a 1-in-10 chance as reason for concern.
There is a significant risk that Moscow's calculus
could change if the United States failed to respond
to any initial Soviet probes, or if the United States
failed to make clear a firm resolve to resist such a
deployment. There is also some possibility that a
situation involving threatened nuclear deployments
to Cuba could escalate into one wherein the dynam-
ics of the threat-initially made for political or
bargaining purposes-take on a momentum of their
own, and produce results not foreseen or intended
by either Moscow or Washington.
26. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, believes that the likeli-
hood that SS-20s will be placed in Cuba is greater
than the Estimate concludes. The Soviet leadership,
while aware of the potentially great risks involved in
deploying SS-20s to Cuba, is also cognizant of, and
might be tempted by, the significant. political (and to
a lesser extent military) gains that would be achieved
if the United States were forced to back down in a
second Cuban missile crisis. Furthermore, given the
significantly different US-Soviet military balance
today as compared with 1962, Soviet leaders might
anticipate that another Cuban missile crisis, in con-
junction with renewed Soviet declarations about a
desire to negotiate, would prompt West European
leaders to pressure the United States to withdraw the
Pershing II missiles and would split. US opinion
rather than generate a strong consensus in favor of
US military action. The Army concludes, therefore,
that there is a 25-percent chance that SS-20s will be
introduced into Cuba.
27. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force, also believes there is a
more significant chance (25 percent) that the Soviets
may deploy SS-20s to Cuba. He stresses the Commu-
nity assessment that the Soviets believe Pershing II
deployments will pose a serious, time-urgent threat
to a wide range of critically important targets in the
USSR, including their national command authority
and central command, control, and communications
structure. He believes the Soviets may judge that
deployment of nuclear-capable systems to the Carib-
bean is the only response that would pose a threat to
the United States comparable to the INF threat to
the USSR, and thereby might persuade the United
States to negotiate a withdrawal of the Pershing II.
All other "analogous responses" would be seen as
ineffectual. Some of these, including ALCM-
equipped Bears and SLCM-equipped submarines,
depend on new weapon systems that may not be
operationally ready when required.
28. The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State, does not see a cause
for an increase in the level of concern regarding
Cuba. The Director agrees with the Community
view that the introduction of SS-20s in Cuba is
unlikely, but also believes that any deployment of
ALCMs or SLCMs is even more doubtful. The
Soviets would see these systems as equally provoca-
tive as land-based systems, readily detectable, and
dependent on launch vehicles that are more vulnera-
ble to US retaliatory action. Further, the Soviet risk
calculus is not as susceptible to sudden change as the
Memorandum implies; the Soviets would be unlikely
to believe that they could measure the US reaction
to the introduction of nuclear systems in Cuba on
the basis of the US response to any lesser actions.
29. We have no clear evidence of any Soviet
military preparations for "analogous" response
against the United States. This does not foreclose the
possibility that preparations for military deploy-
ments in Cuba are already under way, because the
Soviets have the capability to undertake them unde-
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Deployments Against NATO Europe
30. Moscow almost certainly wil.. resume the con-
struction of new SS-20 bases in the European USSR as
a response to INF deployments. The Soviets are testing
a new variant of the SS-20 which could be available
for deployment in mid-1984. The Soviets might de-
ploy the variant and claim that because it was differ-
ent from the SS-20 it constituted an "analogous"
response to INF. The Soviets probably will begin
limited deployment of their long-range GLCM in the
western USSR in early 1984, claiming it is a direct
response to US GLCM deployments. The Soviets might
deploy SS-20s or GLCMs in Eastern Europe for their
political impact, although both systems can reach all of
Western Europe from the USSR and they would be
more vulnerable in Eastern Europe.
31. The Soviets are also planning to deploy new
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) systems in Eastern
Europe. The SS-23 SRBM was developed as a replace-
ment for Scud missiles already deployed in non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) areas. The Soviets would proba-
bly characterize SS-23 deployments as a response to
US INF deployments, but, in fact, they have planned
for years to upgrade existing Soviet units in Eastern
Europe with this system. The SS-12/22 SRBM is
currently garrisoned in the Soviet Union as a theater
asset; these units would probably move forward into
NSWP countries during wartime Pre-positioning
these systems in Eastern Europe would represent a
departure from this pattern, and would be a response
to US INF.
Beyond Initial Deployment
32. Moscow probably believes that, once US
missiles go into Europe, they will be very difficult
to remove. Hence, the Soviet preoccupation with
stopping deployment before it takes place. But the
Soviets are not likely to see the emplacement of a
few P-11s in West Germany and GLCMs in Italy
and the United Kingdom as the -end of the INF
struggle, particularly since deployments occur over
a five-year period. The chances are good that
Soviet carrot-and-stick tactics will continue after
December.
33. This means that the threat of Soviet counter-
deployments will continue after the first P-11s and
GLCMs become operational. We might well see a
continuum of Soviet military actions spread over the
next nine months or so that involves such activities
as significantly upgrading Cuban air defenses, or a
visitation of ALCM-configured Bears to the island,
or perhaps port visits by submarines equipped with
cruise or ballistic missiles. We cannot predict the
mix or timing of such actions, and they are likely to
be greatly affected by US responses. But we are
persuaded that the Soviets might well believe that
such ambiguous actions could sufficiently raise the
level of concern in the United States and Europe to
spur a new effort to reach a negotiated settlement.
34. We expect that, after an appropriate show of
displeasure and an interruption of INF talks, the
Soviets will resume negotiations. They may suggest a
merger of START and the INF talks, a face-saving
device that might also improve their negotiating
position. In any event, the Soviets will most likely
claim that the new intermediate systems they have
deployed (GLCMs, additional or modified SS-20s, or
new intermediate-range ballistic missiles) are coun-
termeasures to the US GLCMs and P-IIs. In this way
they will seek to protect their current SS-20 forces
and focus the negotiations on the "new systems."
35. The Soviets have long demonstrated that they
approach problems in a longer time frame than does
the West. The historic importance of the INF
deployment, both the military complications it pre-
sents for the USSR's strategy of conducting war in
Western Europe and the reinforcement of US ties to
Europe, will almost certainly generate a host of
Soviet responses over the coming years. We are
likely to see the USSR working against the deploy-
ment in the forthcoming Conference for Disarma-
ment in Europe and in START. We will see the
Soviets make military adjustments to cope with the
targeting problem presented by the P-11s, and par-
ticularly the GLCMs. We are likely to see the Soviets
justify a further buildup of their missile force in
Europe because of the INF deployment.
An Alternative View From the Director of INR
36. The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search, Department of State, believes that much of
the case for Soviet risk taking is overdrawn. The
Soviet reaction to INF deployments is likely to be
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spread out over a considerable period of time rather
than focused on the initial deployments. While
Moscow will see the initial deployment in December
as a setback, the Soviets will not wish to call further
attention to their political defeat and would not
conclude it required an immediate counteraction
entailing high costs or risks. The Soviet military
response will more likely be shaped by what Mos-
cow sees as military requirements than by an effort
to effect an analogous response. There would thus be
an evolutionary effort in Soviet theater forces to
mitigate the incremental effects of INF deploy-
ments. These will probably include defensive meas-
ures-improved air defense, surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems with antiballistic missile (ABM) capa-
bilities, and hardening of key installations-as well
as increments to offensive forces. He believes that,
while the Soviets are likely to announce an end to
their unilateral moratorium in reaction to the De-
cember deployment, the USSR could elect to defer
actual SS-20 deployments for political reasons.
Moreover, other systems may better fit the military
requirements for a response to INF. By focusing on
the short term, this Memorandum does not ade-
quately emphasize the postdeployment Soviet inter-
ests in capping, if not reversing, INF deployment by
political action. This interest will also have a more
restraining effect in the Soviet risk calculus than the
Memorandum suggests.
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