ASEAN: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980S AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000500850003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: NIE

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t, e
N I E 50-83
ASEAN: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980s
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
Information available as of 15 June 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 3
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
The United States and ASEAN-Near-Term Prospects ...................................... 5
ASEAN's Major Concerns ...................................................................................... 6
Strategic ............................................................................................................... 6
China ................................................................................................................... 7
Soviet Union ........................................................................................................ 7
Security Cooperation .......................................................................................... 7
Economic Trends and Issues .................................................................................. 7
External Economic Relations ............................................................................. 8
The Question of Integration ............................................................................... 9
Problems and Prospects Over the Longer Term .................................................. 9
Intra-ASEAN Developments: A Stronger ASEAN? ......................................... 9
Regional Concerns .............................................................................................. 10
Economic Relations With the Developed Countries ........................................ 11
ANNEX A: Genesis of ASEAN .................................................................................. 13
ANNEX B: Organization ........................................................................................... 15
ANNEX C: Expanded Membership .......................................................................... 17
ANNEX D: Economic Cooperation .......................................................................... 19
ANNEX E: Economic Indicators ............................................................................... 23
ANNEX F: Chronology of Key Events ..................................................................... 25
ANNEX G: Comparison of ASEAN and Vietnamese Military Forces ................... 27
ANNEX H: Security Concerns of Individual Member States ................................. 29
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SCOPE NOTE
This National Intelligence Estimate addresses the relationship
between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN)-Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand-on the eve of the Secretary of State's visit to the June 1983
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting at Bangkok. It assesses the problems
and prospects for ASEAN members and for the organization itself.
Separate annexes provide background on organization, expanded mem-
bership, and economic issues. The Key Judgments describe our expecta-
tion that, although political and economic problems will persist, the
ASEAN region as a whole will remain one of the most prosperous and
stable regions in the Third World.
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Brunei
(U.K
Singapore
Y ingapore
Ma.) aysia
Java Sea
*Jakarta Indonesia
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Australia
Papua
New
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The ASEAN nations' prospects for political stability, economic
growth, and regional tranquillity are among the best in the Third
World.
The region will remain basically pro-US and anti-Communist for
the foreseeable future, although ASEAN as an organization will avoid
overidentification with outside powers. The states will remain suspicious
of the USSR's intentions in the region, as well as of China and Vietnam,
which they view as posing the greatest potential threat to their security.
Previous intra-ASEAN frictions and disputes have become more
muted over the past several years, in part because of these perceived
threats. We expect increased ASEAN intelligence and security coopera-
tion, but we do not foresee that ASEAN will develop a formal military
alliance.
All the ASEAN states are committed to a political solution in
Kampuchea, which in ideal circumstances would include the withdraw-
al of Vietnamese troops and free elections. Differences of view exist,
however, and unilateral probes by ASEAN members to resolve the
Kampuchean issue will continue. These are unlikely to disrupt ASEAN
unity.
The established ASEAN preference for a personalized, ad hoc
system of consensus building will continue, as will resistance to a strong
centralized bureaucratic structure.
Only limited progress is anticipated in reaching economic integra-
tion within ASEAN. Nor will ASEAN develop into a free trade area,
much less a common market, over the next decade.
ASEAN economic growth will continue to outpace that of other less
developed regions, making it an expanding market for US exports and
investment. Japan will remain the region's leading economic partner
and present the stiffest competition for the United States.
We expect that ASEAN nations will continue to focus on their own
economic progress, try to take advantage of Sino-Vietnamese rivalry to
deflect the threats from those countries, and rely largely on the US
presence in the region for their long-term security. They will seek and
welcome more US trade and investment, striving to improve what they
regard as inequitable terms of trade.
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In sum, political and economic problems will persist in individual
ASEAN countries, and US-ASEAN relations may be strained by differ-
ing views on economic, maritime, and refugee issues, and possibly over
US relations with China. Nevertheless, we expect no major challenges to
US economic and political ties with the ASEAN nations over the next
few years.
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DISCUSSION
The United States and ASEAN-
Near-Term Prospects
1. At least in the near term, the ASEAN nations as a
group (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and
the Philippines) present no major problems for the
United States. As staunch anti-Communists, ASEAN
members welcome a US presence in the region to
counter pressure from Vietnam, the Soviets, and Chi-
2. ASEAN's economic value as a producer of pri-
mary commodities, center for investment, and grow-
ing market for US goods make it important to the
United States. In the near future, US commercial
prospects in Southeast Asia look bright, especially
relative to those in other less developed country (LDC)
regions. Although some countries-Indonesia and the
Philippines-are trimming their development pro-
grams because of foreign exchange stringencies, the
region's economic growth is likely to top the LDC
average. The United States, because of a strong dollar
relative to the yen and the highly aggressive nature of
Japanese export competition, may lose some of the
market share it gained during the 1970s. Nevertheless,
the region's political stability and good economic
prospects offer considerable potential for US exports.
3. Despite the basic convergence of interests, some
frictions exist and are likely to continue between the
United States and ASEAN. For example, ASEAN
reacted favorably to stepped-up US assistance to Thai-
land in response to the Vietnamese presence in Kam-
puchea, but there are differences within ASEAN over
how prominent a role the United States should play.
Although ASEAN sees the United States as playing a
key role in the continued political and economic
stability of Southeast Asia, sentiments opposed to
interference by outside powers are never far below the
surface. ASEAN does not see these sentiments as being
aimed against the United States, but rather as steps to
inhibit big-power involvement in the region. ASEAN's
stand on some economic issues may also conflict with
US interests. Criticism of the United States will be
tempered, however, by ASEAN's desire for technology
transfer and increased trade and investment.
4. ASEAN, as a regional organization for mutual
support and protection, has made progress toward
cohesion since its founding in Bangkok. The Bangkok
Declaration establishing ASEAN was signed on 8
August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thai-
land, and the Philippines. While it stressed economic,
social, cultural, and technical cooperation, the under-
lying goal of the signatories was regional political
stability in the face of Chinese-supported insurgencies
and Communist aggression in Indochina. The first
major initiative of ASEAN came in 1971 when its
foreign ministers called for creation of a Zone of
Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality in Southeast Asia-
the ZOPFAN concept. (See inset.)
The formal cornerstone of ASEAN foreign policy is
the concept first enunciated in 1971 of Southeast Asia
as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOP-
FAN), free from any form or manner of interference
by outside powers." The ZOPFAN concept asks that
the Big Powers recognize and respect ASEAN's neu-
trality. Vietnamese aggression and the expansion of
the Soviet presence in the region have led most
ASEAN officials to describe ZOPFAN as a long-term
goal which is unrealistic under the present circum-
stances. For the foreseeable future, the ASEAN coun-
tries will welcome a regional US military presence,
and look to the United States as a major supplier of
military equipment and defense-related economic
support.
5. Regional cohesion is a fresh and still-tentative
concept for the ASEAN partners, which until recent
years valued their special bilateral ties with major
outside powers more than relations with each other.
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The American military withdrawal and the fall of all
non-Communist governments in Indochina brought a
new sense of urgency to the Association. In 1976 and
1977 the ASEAN heads of state affirmed their support
for ZOPFAN and regional cooperation as essential to
peace. Steps were taken to establish a permanent
ASEAN secretariat. Vietnam's signing of a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow and the
invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 promoted further
ASEAN cohesion.
6. The ASEAN governments continue to resist a
strong centralized bureaucratic structure for the Asso-
ciation, preferring a more personalized and ad hoc
system of consensus building. ASEAN leaders are
reluctant to relinquish the prerogatives of sovereignty,
but they increasingly value ASEAN solidarity and
point to ASEAN unity as the linchpin of their foreign
policies. Reflecting this viewpoint, a network of con-
tacts and informal exchanges continues to spread
among the bureaucracies and increasingly among the
private sectors of the ASEAN countries, which will in
time strengthen the sense of regional identity.
ASEAN's Major Concerns
Strategic
7. ASEAN views Vietnam's occupation of Kampu-
chea as the most immediate threat to the stability of
the region. Concern over Kampuchea has been great
enough to bring about ASEAN's most significant pub-
lic declaration of cooperation-a joint call for the
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea
and an avowal of support for the Kampuchean resist-
ance. Despite differences of opinion among ASEAN
states on the nature of the threat, ASEAN is publicly
committed to:
- A political solution within the framework of
relevant UN resolutions and the Declaration of
the International Conference on Kampuchea
(ICK).
- Support for the coalition of Kampuchean
resistance.
- Political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on
Vietnam.
8. Thailand, Singapore, and more recently Malay-
sia, the most enthusiastic ASEAN states in support of
Kampuchea, have brought the others into a consensus
favoring political support to the anti-Vietnamese
resistance coalition-the CGDK-and have taken the
lead in providing material aid for the non-Communist
factions of Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk. The Thai
have furnished supplies and advice to the non-Com-
munists, served as a conduit from other ASEAN states
to the non-Communist Kampucheans (and from China
to the Khmer Rouge), and have reacted to Vietnamese
attacks on the border camps. Singapore has contribut-
ed arms and ammunition, and Malaysia material
support and guerrilla training, to the non-Communists.
The Philippines are adhering to the ASEAN political
consensus, but have offered little except some medical
supplies. Indonesia, questioning the usefulness and
propriety of military aid to Kampucheans, has sent
only humanitarian medical aid.
9. ASEAN lobbying efforts at the United Nations
have succeeded in preserving the seating of the Demo-
cratic Kampucheans, despite annual efforts by Hanoi
to replace them with the Heng Samrin delegation. The
ASEAN delegates are also generating increasing sup-
port for a UN resolution calling for withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Kampuchea and self-determina-
tion for the inhabitants.
10. ASEAN persuaded Japanese Prime Minister Na-
kasone, during his visit last month to ASEAN capitals,
to strengthen Japanese support for the ASEAN policy
of opposing the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea.
In this and other policy aspects, the Japanese visit
helped to solidify Japanese-ASEAN relations. Naka-
sone, on his return to Tokyo, reaffirmed the Japanese
freeze on aid to Vietnam, increased assistance to
Kampuchean refugees, and openly supported the
ASEAN position on Kampuchea.
11. On the other hand, the policies of the new
Labor government in Australia are causing some con-
cern in ASEAN states. Labor policy calls for restora-
tion of aid to Vietnam, intended to provide an alterna-
tive to Vietnam's close association with the USSR. The
Australians are also unwilling to support the CGDK
because Pol Pot's forces are included in the coalition.
Nevertheless, as a result of the strong objections of
ASEAN leaders, Prime Minister Hawke has agreed to
consult with ASEAN before shifting policy, and will
seek a middle ground acceptable to his constituency
and to ASEAN.
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12. Although pleased with its diplomatic accom-
plishments and the formation of the coalition, ASEAN
remains frustrated by the internal bickering of the
factions and handicapped by the legacy of the Khmer
Rouge. Some in ASEAN prefer the status quo to any
action that might antagonize Vietnam or precipitate
further Chinese involvement, and are willing to accept
a Hanoi-controlled Kampuchea as a buffer to Chinese
expansionism. Indonesia, in particular, which assumes
the ASEAN Standing Committee chairmanship in
June, will continue to urge negotiations with Hanoi.
There is no evidence to date, however, that indicates
the Vietnamese are prepared to negotiate seriously on
the issue of Khmer self-determination. Without some
sign of Vietnamese flexibility, ASEAN is unlikely to
deviate from the general guidelines of the ICK.
13. Beijing has downgraded links with Communist
parties in Southeast Asia in an attempt to improve
government-to-government relations. Beijing has re-
fused, however, to renounce party-to-party ties, claim-
ing that to do so would open the door to Soviet
influence. Suspicions of Beijing's intentions remain
strongest in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, where
there are large Chinese communities. This explains
why most ASEAN countries oppose major US arms
sales to China.
14. Although the Soviet Union had traditionally
been regarded as constituting little direct threat to the
region, Soviet military presence in Indochina and the
South China Sea, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the
exposure of KGB operations throughout Southeast Asia
have heightened ASEAN fears. Unlike the Chinese,
however, the Soviets are perceived as having little if
any potential to encourage domestic insurgencies,
although small pro-Moscow groups in Thailand and
the Philippines are carefully watched. ASEAN is also
concerned that the Vietnamese might be encouraged
by their Soviet backers to undertake additional aggres-
sive acts.
Security Cooperation
15. ASEAN is not a military alliance and is not
likely to become one. Defense cooperation in ASEAN
is largely bilateral and includes military exercises,
training exercises, border security cooperation, and
intelligence exchanges. Emphasis is on improving in-
terlocking bilateral security arrangements, in combi-
nation with individual efforts to upgrade conventional
military capabilities. ASEAN countries have occasion-
ally selected weapon systems with an eye on common-
ality. While these trends may continue, the individual
ASEAN states will for the foreseeable future look
principally to the United States for the region's de-
fense. ASEAN leaders realize that their military power
is no match for Hanoi and feel that a defense pact
would only provoke Vietnam. (See annex G.) Also,
nonaligned sentiment is especially strong in Malaysia
and Indonesia, both of which would oppose any
ASEAN-wide military pact with the West.
16. The major joint strategic and security coopera-
tion consists of periodic ASEAN intelligence ex-
changes, mostly on Vietnamese military activity and
on Soviet and Chinese involvement in Southeast Asia.
The ASEAN-wide intelligence meetings are supple-
mented by more frequent bilateral exchanges, all
conducted without publicity.
17. Some of the ASEAN states have treaty commit-
ments to outside powers. New Zealand, Australia, and
the United Kingdom are linked to Malaysia and
Singapore under the Five-Power Defense Arrange-
ment of 1971. Under this agreement a small contin-
gent of New Zealand forces is stationed in Singapore
and Australian aircraft are based in Malaysia. Despite
its nonaligned policies, Malaysia welcomes the Austra-
lian Air Force presence. The United States also has
formal treaty commitments to Thailand and the
Philippines.
18. ASEAN states would look mainly to the United
States if they were to be victims of a serious aggressive
act. But, barring such an event, they prefer the current
loose arrangements. They see no need to formalize
either an ASEAN military arrangement or an ASEAN-
US pact. Nonetheless, they find some comfort in the
US military presence in the region.
Economic Trends and Issues
19. ASEAN is one of the world's fastest growing
regions and is the fifth-largest trading partner of the
United States. The member countries all aim toward
further industrialization of their economies, and all are
heavily dependent on trade, particularly with Japan
and the United States. The economic performance of
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the ASEAN region is illustrated in annex E. The
region's remarkable economic growth has resulted
from individual ASEAN country endeavors rather
than ASEAN group initiatives. In ASEAN's 15 years of
existence, its progress on economic integration has
been slow.
20. Singapore already is in the ranks of the "newly
industrializing countries" (NICs) and the other ASEAN
members hope to join that club within the next dozen
years. Thus, their major economic concerns are
growth, markets for their rising exports, and good
relations with the United States and Japan as prime
potential investors. Singapore and, to a lesser extent,
the Philippines seek to foster more intra-ASEAN
economic integration. Indonesia is and will probably
remain less interested.
External Economic Relations
21. The most effective common effort among
ASEAN members has been with third countries and
international organizations. ASEAN countries have
adopted "economic bloc" tactics to give their views
more "clout," gain more aid and foreign investments,
and improve access to major industrial markets. De-
spite persistent efforts to diversify markets, the trade
of ASEAN countries has been and will continue to be
largely with the industrialized market economies.
22. OECD countries have accounted for about 60
percent of ASEAN's total trade in recent years. In
1980, Japan absorbed 27 percent of the exports of
ASEAN members and supplied 21 percent of their
imports. The United States has managed to hold a
relatively stable position as the second most important
trading partner of ASEAN countries, buying about 17
percent of ASEAN exports and supplying about 15
percent of ASEAN imports.' (See table.) The European
Community accounted for 13 percent of ASEAN
exports and 12 percent of its imports in 1980.
23. ASEAN members place a high value on symbol-
ic gestures by trade partners. Some ASEAN officials
have stressed the need for a higher level of US
participation in the US-ASEAN economic dialogue,
noting that US support for ASEAN appears more
political than economic. ASEAN officials consider the
visits of high-ranking officials of Japan, the European
Community, and Canada and their participation in
' A recent academic study indicates a disturbing development in
US efforts to compete with Japan in the ASEAN region-a recent
decline in exports of high-technology products to Indonesia and the
Philippines. The study concluded that the reason for the decline lies
more with US laws and lack of trade effort than with developments
in ASEAN. See Lawrence Krause's Policy Toward the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations: Meeting the Japanese Challenge
(Brookings Institution, Washington, 1982).
ASEAN States: Trade With the United States, 1978-82
(million dollars)
Indonesia
US Exports
721.7
968.8
1,392.9
1,264.3
1,943.8
US Imports
3,395.5
3,622.9
5,182.5
6,022.3
4,224.2
Malaysia
US Exports
687.8
924.0
1,291.3
1,464.8
1,710.7
US Imports
1,439.3
2,152.6
2,584.5
2,185.0
1,884.6
Philippines
US Exports
1,019.6
1,540.1
1,987.2
1,757.3
1,834.6
US Imports
1,130.2
1,490.8
1,749.0
1,974.0
1,806.3
Singapore
US Exports
1,455.8
2,248.8
2,972.5
2,958.3
3,170.4
US Imports
1,057.8
1,479.6
1,920.8
2,113.6
2,195.3
Thailand
US Exports
541.5
840.1
1,090.0
1,010.0
861.6
US Imports
414.2
600.1
815.4
945.8
883.9
ASEAN Total
US Exports
4,426.4
6,521.8
8,733.9
8,454.7
9,521.1
US Imports
7,437.0
9,346.0
12,252.2
13,240.7
10,994.3
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formal dialogues as expressions of support for ASEAN
goals.
24. Japan, in particular, has followed a deliberate
policy of engaging ASEAN in high-level consulta-
tions-such as Nakasone's visit in early May-and
encouraging Japanese cooperation with ASEAN pri-
vate-sector initiatives. The Japanese and ASEAN
chambers of commerce and industry meet regularly
for talks on investment and industrial cooperation. The
Japanese consider that cooperation with ASEAN as an
institution could bring significant good will and com-
mercial benefits to its large and growing ASEAN trade
relations.
The Question of Integration
25. ASEAN members have not yet decided to pur-
sue the long-run goal of economic integration. Prime
Minister Lee of Singapore and President Marcos of the
Philippines were once optimistic that ASEAN could
form a free trade association by 1990.
26. Some degree of complementarity already exists
in the region, particularly between Singapore and the
other partners. Singapore could perform an even
larger role as a distribution, financial, and service
center for the region. Member-country economic de-
velopment patterns are likely to increase complemen-
tarity, particularly in manufactured products. The
potential for further growth in intraregional manufac-
tured products trade is particularly good, partly be-
cause of the dynamic trade effects generated by the
rapid pace of industrialization during the past few
years.
27. Despite widely publicized "showcase efforts" at
greater economic cooperation, intra-ASEAN trade has
remained low, representing about 16 to 17 percent of
ASEAN members' recorded total.Q Moreover, a sub-
stantial part of the intraregional trade consists of
entrepot activities centered in Singapore. Among
ASEAN members, the Philippines has the lowest level
of trade integration. Manila, attempting to diversify its
markets and sources of imports, has shown the greatest
enthusiasm in recent years toward greater intra-
' There is a downward bias in the recorded intraregional trading,
particularly between Indonesia and Singapore, mainly because of
undervaluation and smuggling. Theoretically, intra-ASEAN imports
should, of course, equal intra-ASEAN exports. The differences are
due to factors such as different valuation systems at ports of entry
and dispatch and underinvoicing practices.
ASEAN economic integration. On the other hand,
Indonesia has adopted shipping regulations intended
to eliminate Singapore as a transshipment point.
28. ASEAN is not likely to develop into a free trade
area, much less a common market, over the next
decade. Progress within the institution will, instead,
continue in a gradualist mold with emphasis on coop-
erative schemes arrived at by consensus. Intra-ASEAN
trade will benefit from the cumulative effects of the
generalized trade liberalization efforts and the experi-
ence gained through dealings among ASEAN business-
men, as well as from continuing economic
development.
29. Economic integration, rather than closer coop-
eration among ASEAN members, could have greater
effect on the US and Japanese economic roles in the
region. Integration would not necessarily expand near-
term opportunities for investment or trade for the
United States. It might also lessen the attractiveness of
Singapore and the other members with relatively more
open economies. The elaborate business networks
which Japan has built in Southeast Asia since the 1950s
would be hurt to the extent that ASEAN's collective
arrangements were granted preference over bilateral
ties.
Problems and Prospects Over the Longer Term
30. A number of issues could cause problems for the
ASEAN countries or for US relations with the region
over the longer term. They range from domestic
insurgent groups, often abetted by one or more of the
Communist nations, through protectionism and rival-
ries for markets and investments.
Intra-ASEAN Developments: A Stronger ASEAN?
31. In the summer of 1982 the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers created a special task force to recommend
changes for the Association in the next decade. This
action was motivated by concern that economic coop-
eration was proceeding too slowly and a hope that
lessons might be learned for more successful forays
into the international scene. Task force members
discussed organization, trade barriers, commodity co-
operation, industrial cooperation, legal coordination,
transportation, communications, and the goal of ulti-
mate regional neutrality under the ZOPFAN concept.
The task force has no mandate to discuss military
cooperation.
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32. The final task force report will probably contain
a number of general recommendations, including:
- Recognition of the influence that ASEAN, as a
body, carries in the United Nations and other
multinational bodies and recommendation that
members seek areas where an ASEAN position
can be achieved.
- A call for the gradual reduction of tariff barriers
within ASEAN and increased regional economic
planning, with emphasis on the recently ap-
proved ASEAN Joint Ventures (AJV).
- Commitment to harmonize ASEAN commodity
policy and to study alternative approaches to
influence market Wechanisms.
- Support for the gradual strengthening of the
ASEAN Secretariat.
Other recommendations will stress the need for ex-
panded cooperation in communications, technology
transfer, transportation, and law and judicial
procedures.
33. Task force members may also address the issue
of ASEAN membership, urging that only Brunei be
admitted to the organization. Such a recommendation
would confirm ASEAN resistance to consideration of
Papua New Guinea or Sri Lanka, two countries fre-
quently mentioned as possible additional members.
There may also be a recommendation that ASEAN
oppose formal creation of a Pacific Basin organization,
although language on this subject would be vague to
avoid offending the South Koreans, who show increas-
ing interest in Southeast Asian matters.
34. The task force will probably recommend re-
structuring the organization to give the economic
ministers more authority. Tightening of the committee
system and new mechanisms for third-country dia-
logues may also be suggested. While some ASEAN
participants value the range of economic discussions
characteristic of past dialogue meetings, others appar-
ently favor limiting future agendas to specific issues on
which agreement can be reached in advance.
Regional Concerns
35. A host of minor issues among ASEAN members
will persist, ranging from the problem of refugees
from Indochina through minor maritime and territori-
al claims, to law of the sea issues and seabed disputes.
None is serious; none is likely to disturb the good
relations among the member nations.
36. The refugee problem raises both intra-ASEAN
and international concerns. The ASEAN countries
expect third countries to continue to resettle refugees
and otherwise help them cope with the refugee prob-
lem. ASEAN is concerned, however, that the UN-
sponsored program for orderly departure (the ODP)
from Vietnam could eventually limit the ability of
third countries to absorb Vietnamese refugees from
ASEAN countries. The adoption of more restrictive
policies by the United States or other resettlement
countries would then become a source of friction. The
absence of possibilities for large-scale repatriation of
Indochinese refugees limits the options currently avail-
able to first-asylum countries. Measures aimed at
deterring refugees in a humane way are being devel-
oped, but, if humane deterrence fails, some first-
refuge countries will use harsh measures to deter new
arrivals, thus raising some of the problems the United
States previously experienced in coping with this issue.
37. Within ASEAN, many of the competing mari-
time claims have been amicably resolved, although
minor disputes over small islands still exist between
Singapore and Malaysia and between Malaysia and the
Philippines. Malaysia and Indonesia signed a treaty in
early 1982 in which Malaysia recognized Indonesia's
archipelagic principle in exchange for guarantees of
undisturbed air and sea passage between East and
West Malaysia. Thailand and Malaysia have delineat-
ed their sea boundary and agreed to share seabed
exploitation of the one unresolved area.
38. Illegal fishing also continues to be a source of
conflict among the ASEAN states. In 1982, for exam-
ple, Malaysia and Indonesia detained a total of eight
Thai fishing trawlers.
39. As resource exploitation of the seabed begins in
these potentially mineral-rich areas, tensions are likely
to increase. In the past, ASEAN countries have period-
ically placed markers or small military units on con-
tested reefs or islets, but so far the ASEAN states have
been unwilling to use force to dislodge each other.
40. In addition to these territorial disputes, the law
of the sea negotiations and increased Soviet naval
presence have underscored concerns about the right of
passage through the straits of Southeast Asia. Piracy
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and smuggling further complicate maritime relations,
but increased patrol capabilities should help to reduce
these activities in the future. However, complicity of
local authorities will prevent the elimination of these
illegal and lucrative activities.
Economic Relations With the Developed Countries
41. ASEAN economic growth will continue to out-
pace that of other LDC regions, making it a growth
market for US goods. Meanwhile, years of political
stability and profitable opportunities make the area
attractive for new US investment. Lower wage scales
in the region will draw foreign capital that for the past
five to 10 years gravitated toward northern Asia. Wage
levels in these northern countries have become too
high for some labor-intensive manufacturers. Only
Singapore will move into the more sophisticated man-
ufactures over the next several years.
42. Japan is likely to remain the ASEAN region's
principal economic partner and present the stiffest
competition with US exports. We expect the Japanese
to maintain their sensitivity toward ASEAN's institu-
tional evolution, which aids their commercial efforts.
43. The ASEAN states, particularly Malaysia, have
perceived the United States as indifferent or insensi-
tive to some of their interests and to the region as a
whole. US efforts in the ASEAN markets will probably
be enhanced by current endorsement of US private
business cooperation with ASEAN private-sector ini-
tiatives. High-level US consultations and visits are
improving these perceptions.
44. Any criticism of the United States is likely to be
tempered by ASEAN's desire to promote technology
transfer and investment. ASEAN would like the Unit-
ed States to promote ASEAN trade, increase ASEAN
access to US markets, accelerate private investment,
and assist regional projects. For example, ASEAN
officials have feared that the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive would divert US attention and investment from
Southeast Asia and possibly impact negatively on sugar
exports and light manufactures.
45. Thus, although ASEAN as an organization will
remain hesitant to move rapidly toward integration,
there will be increasing economic cooperation, and the
region will continue to experience dynamic economic
growth. Its industrialization schemes suggest large
import requirements in capital goods and technology,
which offer promising trade opportunities for the
United States despite the possibility that the region
could pose increased competition in manufactured
exports such as electronic components.
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ANNEX A
GENESIS OF ASEAN
1. The two direct antecedents of ASEAN were the
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo.
ASA was created on 31 July 1961 by Thailand, Malaya
(which became Malaysia in 1963), and the Philippines.
It called for an annual meeting of foreign ministers
and the creation of committees on sociocultural, eco-
nomic, and technical cooperation. The organization
had little chance to become active, however, because
the Philippines and Malaysia suspended diplomatic
relations in 1963 over the Sabah issue. ASA's revival in
1966, however, led to the formation of ASEAN.
2. Maphilindo was conceived by Philippine Presi-
dent Macapagal in 1963 to promote the concept of a
Greater Malaya and to keep open his claim to North
Borneo. The Manila Accord, signed by the leaders of
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, called for
cooperation to maintain stability in the region and
stated that foreign bases were "temporary in nature."
Maphilindo collapsed with the breaking of relations
between Indonesia and Malaysia under the late Presi-
dent Sukarno's "confrontation" policy. Although a
failure, Maphilindo was Indonesia's first regional in-
volvement and thus helped lay a foundation for
ASEAN.
3. The abortive coup in September 1965 in Jakarta
marked the beginning of the end of Sukarno's power
and a new emphasis on regional cooperation under
General Soeharto. With confrontation between Malay-
sia and Indonesia over, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat
Khoman drafted a proposal for a Southeast Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC)
which, in revised form, became ASEAN.
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ANNEX B
ORGANIZATION
1. ASEAN's elaborate committee structure is gov-
erned in large measure by ministers who make deci-
sions by consensus. Although criticized by Westerners
who see consensus decisionmaking as contributing to
inaction, ASEAN policymakers would have it no other
way. Items are tabled if consensus cannot be achieved,
avoiding argument and disunity that might result from
majority rule. Once a decision is achieved, all mem-
bers are firmly committed, having negotiated quietly
behind the scenes to arrive at a common position. This
practice has worked well, particularly on the Kampu-
chean issue. There is some evidence that the consensus
protocol occasionally breaks down, however, as shown
by Malaysia's unilateral announcement of intention to
manufacture a car and Thailand's independent agree-
ment with the European Economic Committee on
multifibers. The major problem for the ASEAN orga-
nization, however, continues to be the translation of
ministerial decisions into effective policy.
2. Philippine officials, influenced by their Western
cultural heritage, have repeatedly urged that ASEAN
write a constitution and bylaws that specify modes of
operation and channels of authority. The ASEAN
majority, however, prefer the generalized wording of
the Bangkok Declaration, the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia as sufficient foundation for an ad hoc
decisionmaking process.
3. ASEAN has deliberately restricted the growth of
supranational bureaucracy. The Secretariat was first
proposed in 1968, but did not materialize until 1976.
Indonesia and the Philippines pushed for a strong
Secretariat with a long-term secretary general to make
policy initiatives. There was too much opposition,
however, and the secretary general was given a two-
year tour and little more than caretaker responsibil-
ities. The current Secretary General, Dr. Chan Kai
Yau from Singapore, is frustrated by lack of support
for the Secretariat, noting that he even has difficulty
in gaining access to funds pledged by the member
states. His staff must continually plead for long-
overdue reports and studies from the five country
secretariats. Only after several years of painstaking
negotiation was the decision made to add five econo-
mists to the Secretariat staff. The Secretariat occupies
a large, virtually empty building in Jakarta and still
lacks a useful data base, library, and communications
center. The majority remain reluctant to donate more
money and yield authority to the supranational bu-
reaucracy. Many ASEAN leaders believe that such a
bureaucracy would tend to inhibit the informal ex-
changes at the ministerial level, a key to ASEAN's
success.
4. Despite regular ministerial conferences, the
ASEAN heads of state have not met since the 1977
summit in Bali. Despite calls for another heads-of-state
meeting, there is an apparent great reluctance to meet.
ASEAN leaders even contrived to avoid meeting si-
multaneously in Bangkok at the time of the Thai
Bicentennial celebration in 1982. Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir has toned down his predecessor's
adamant refusal to meet in Manila, but is unlikely to
go until the Sabah issue has been resolved to his
satisfaction. Other heads of state have expressed reluc-
tance to meet on the grounds that summits demand
startling, breakthrough press statements, something
unlikely to be generated by the ASEAN gathering.
Until there is a compelling reason for the leaders to
meet-and an agreed-upon outcome-a summit re-
mains unlikely.
5. The foreign ministers are technically responsible
for "the formation of policy guidelines and coordina-
tion of activities." In fact, it is the economic ministers
who have dealt with the increasingly complex eco-
nomic issues. Yet, their decisions must frequently
await approval by the foreign ministers. Meetings of
ministers of labor, social welfare, education, and infor-
mation have also been officially established. Personal
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and hierarchical conflicts have contributed to delays in
decisionmaking. While several structural changes have
been proposed to ease the ministerial conflict, the
foreign ministers do not favor adjustments that might
dilute their authority.
Committee System
6. The Standing Committee, which is responsible to
the foreign ministers, is another stage in the decision-
making process. It is a floating group chaired by the
foreign minister of the country that hosts the next
foreign ministers' meeting and includes the resident
ambassadors of the other four countries as members.
The Standing Committee is currently chaired by Thai
Foreign Minister Sitthi in anticipation of the June
1983 ministerial in Bangkok. Supposedly responsible
for budget and communication, the Standing Commit-
tee's transient nature has prevented its development as
a productive body. Indeed, it is often cited as a
handicap to progress. There is a move afoot to abolish
the Standing Committee or to make it a permanent
unit but, once again, a consensus on its future is
lacking.
7. An elaborate committee system has evolved as
ASEAN tackles new fields. There are nine permanent
committees under the auspices of the Economic Minis-
terial. Five are divided among the members: Thailand
is responsible for finance and banking; Malaysia for
transport and communications; Singapore for trade
and tourism; Indonesia for food, agriculture, and
forestry; and the Philippines for industry, minerals,
and energy. The remaining four committees are not
linked to any specific ASEAN member. These com-
mittees have spawned a number of subcommittees,
often with conflicting responsibilities and little author-
ity. Some committees rarely meet, while others are
quite active with overlapping programs. Even the
Secretariat is hard put to name all the committee
members or identify their projects.
8. Each member state has a national secretariat of
varying quality and size in its ministry of foreign
affairs. Indonesia's large staff has a reputation in
ASEAN for inefficiency, while some members of
Singapore's minuscule staff are not only efficient but
wear two hats. Each secretariat complains about nu-
merous, fruitless meetings generating mountains of
paper and about the little support provided by the
ASEAN Secretariat. National secretariats have varying
influence within their own foreign policy establish-
ments, and with other ministries and agencies, and
most of their work appears to be a reaction to
ministerial discussions rather than the initiation of
policy proposals.
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ANNEX C
EXPANDED MEMBERSHIP
1. Although a formal invitation has not been ex-
tended, Brunei is expected to become ASEAN's sixth
member shortly after it achieves independence on 31
December 1983. Brunei until recently was suspicious
of its larger neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia. Rela-
tions have improved markedly, and the fact that
Brunei has held observer status in ASEAN should
assure smooth integration into the region. ASEAN
finds Brunei's high per capita income and stable
economy attractive, and appreciates its strategic loca-
tion within the ASEAN archipelago.
2. No further expansion is likely in the next five
years. ASEAN has expressed some interest in admit-
ting Burma, but the Burmese have indicated they have
no desire to join. Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka
are occasionally mentioned as members (in fact, Sri
Lanka has specifically expressed an interest) but there
is no consensus in ASEAN in favor of their member-
ship. Papua New Guinea has had observer status in
ASEAN for several years and was given special status
in 1981 to allow its delegates to speak on matters of
direct interest.
3. Rumors periodically surface that ASEAN may
extend dialogue status to South Korea or to Latin
American and African organizations, as it has to the
European Economic Community. A number of mem-
bers have political reservations about including South
Korea and would prefer to keep the dialogues at the
present number. Similarly, reservations have been
expressed about Pacific Basin Community proposals,
for fear that a formal organization would dilute
ASEAN influence in the region and probably be
dominated by Japan. The ASEAN Secretariat does
have periodic contact with the Secretariat of the South
Pacific Forum, but neither organization has shown
much interest in more extensive ties. Individual
ASEAN states are showing increased interest in the
South Pacific area, and diplomatic and trade relations
with states in that region are likely to grow.
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ANNEX D
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Trade Liberalization
1. Trade cooperation has consisted principally of
the regular negotiations of intra-ASEAN tariff reduc-
tions as stipulated by the 1977 Preferential Trading
Arrangements (PTA). These tariff reductions, negotiat-
ed on an item-by-item basis, were raised from around
10 percent initially to an average of 20 to 25 percent.
To further speed the process, ASEAN members agreed
to across-the-board tariff cuts on progressively higher
value items in intra-ASEAN trade. In April 1980 a 20-
percent margin of preference was extended to all
items with 1978 import values of less than $50,000.
This ceiling was raised to $500,000 in 1981 and to $2.5
million by 1982.
2. The number of items on which intra-ASEAN
tariffs have been reduced has been large (8,529 by
January 1982) and growing, but the trade expansion-
ary impact has been relatively minor. Preferences on
"coals to Newcastle" products or on items where
ASEAN partners are unlikely to have productive
capacity pad the numbers. Under continuous pressure
to offer a set number of items for inclusion in the PTA
at each negotiating round, member countries tend to
offer irrelevant items or to break items down into
detailed variants, each one of which is then offered as
an individual product for preferential treatment. To
cite an absurd example, the Philippines has reduced
the import tariff on snow plows from 20 percent to 18
percent for ASEAN producers. As for across-the-board
tariff reductions, they are subject to national exclusion
lists of "sensitive items," which greatly weaken their
impact.
3. In November 1982, ASEAN further liberalized
the PTA, but some ASEAN officials acknowledge that
this latest move is likely to have only modest impact.
The ASEAN economic ministers agreed to across-the-
board tariff cuts of 20 to 25 percent on items with
import values of up to $10 million. They also recom-
mended that tariff cuts on nonfood items already
under the PTA and on future exchange arrangements
be deepened to a maximum of 50 percent.
Industrial Cooperation
4. The first substantive program of ASEAN indus-
trial cooperation was the well-publicized 1976 package
deal of five ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP). Each
AIP, then valued at $250-300 million, was to be owned
jointly by ASEAN member countries, with the host
country holding 60-percent equity and the other four
countries 10 percent each. The output would be
eligible for preferential trade under the ASEAN PTA.
The initial package included urea plants for Indonesia
and Malaysia; a superphosphates plant for the Philip-
pines; a soda ash facility for Thailand; and a diesel
engine factory for Singapore. The idea was given a
boost by Japan in August 1977 when Prime Minister
Fukuda pledged $1 billion in financial support if
studies established the economic viability of the
projects.
5. Progress on AIPs has been limited, with only two
industrial projects close to realization. These two-
natural-gas-based urea plants in Aceh, Indonesia and
Bintulu, Malaysia-would probably have been under-
taken anyway. The ASEAN label was merely attached
to national development efforts. Lengthy Japanese
feasibility studies compounded delays arising from
domestic and technical considerations. Difficult politi-
cal wrangling over site selection held up agreement on
Thailand's soda ash project until June 1982, and
difficulties in finding private Thai investors are likely
to delay it further. The Philippines finally selected a
copper fabrication plant, which was approved by
ASEAN in January 1982, after abandoning two previ-
ous project proposals-the superphosphates plant and
then a pulp and paper mill.
6. Intra-ASEAN rivalries prevented agreement on
Singapore's diesel engine project. Singapore had to
withdraw its proposal because Indonesia and Malaysia
refused to grant import preferences to Singaporean
engines that would compete with their domestic en-
gines. Singapore decided to build its diesel engines as a
national scheme. However, it did not put forward a
new industrial project for ASEAN approval and has
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kept only a token interest of 1-percent financing in the
AIP program. Singapore agreed to continue in the
program only because Japanese concessionary financ-
ing terms required that the ASEAN projects be fi-
nanced by all five members.
7. Critics of the AIP program complain that the big
ventures are costly, cumbersome to organize, and may
not bring significant long-term economic benefits.
Malaysian aides have suggested privately that the
program be dropped, adding to doubts that a planned
second round of government-backed AIPs will get off
the ground.
8. The ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC)
scheme was an additional "showcase" device for pro-
moting industrial cooperation by encouraging firms in
member countries to specialize in products comple-
mentary to each other. Unlike AIPs, which are basical-
ly government projects, sectoral complementation
projects are based on private initiatives and are imple-
mented as private-sector projects, with governments
providing only the legal framework. AIC products are
to be granted a 50-percent margin of preference under
the PTA as well as nontariff preferences negotiated
bilaterally. Only an auto complementation scheme-
so far, consisting of two approved packages-has been
agreed to by ASEAN members.
9. Competing national interests have caused the
complementation scheme to bog down in bureaucratic
red tape and equivocation. Plans by Indonesia and
Malaysia to each develop a national automobile indus-
try appear to have ended the original intent of the
automotive AIC to produce an "ASEAN car." Singa-
pore has argued that having to give special treatment
to AIC products would lead to further protectionism
and the granting of monopoly rights within the region
for ASEAN products. Prime Minister Lee even sug-
gested in 1980 that a member country should be
permitted to abstain from participation in the comple-
mentation scheme, arguing that "when four agree and
one does not, this can still be considered as consensus
and a five-minus-one scheme can benefit the particu-
lar four without damaging the remaining one." A
weaker compromise agreement limiting the prefer-
ences for AIC products was finally reached.
10. A recent and most promising proposal for
ASEAN private-sector industrial cooperation is the
ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) plan. This
plan-which has been pushed hard by businessmen in
the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry-
languished for more than two years while ASEAN
officials tinkered with its main provisions. Under the
plan-finally approved in November 1982-products
made by joint ventures controlled by two or more
ASEAN private investors can qualify for a 50-percent
tariff reduction when traded between participating
ASEAN countries. After three years, products would
automatically be given preferential treatment by all
five countries. Since only two ASEAN countries need
participate in an AIJV, the new program will indeed
make it easier for ASEAN private firms to establish
joint ventures.
11. Some ASEAN businessmen believe that the
joint-venture program may be the needed catalyst to
more intra-ASEAN investment and trade. However,
ASEAN governments still will have the final say on
what products will qualify for the plan. As with earlier
industrial cooperation efforts, differing governmental
plans and perceptions may restrict the potential of the
AIJV plan.
Cooperation in Other Economic Sectors
12. ASEAN has established various other programs
with modest goals and limited success. Agricultural
programs have been pursued under the framework of
the ASEAN Common Agricultural Policy, which seeks
to increase interdependence and cooperation in the
production of foodstuffs. A Food Security Reserve
Agreement, which provides for establishment of a
50,000-ton emergency rice reserve, was signed in late
1979. In the field of transport and communications, a
wide spectrum of programs seeking to harmonize and
unify existing systems have been approved. However,
lack of funding has hampered implementation, and
only 26 of 114 initiated projects have been completed.
13. ASEAN has made some progress in financial
cooperation. A $200 million swap arrangement was
established in August 1977 among ASEAN monetary
authorities to help member countries with temporary
international liquidity problems. The ASEAN Finance
Corporation (AFC) was established in March 1981 to
help finance private projects involving more than one
ASEAN country. Its objectives are to participate in
and attract financing for industrial development proj-
ects in the region; to promote intraregional trade; to
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promote financial cooperation within ASEAN; and to
mobilize resources for the AIP, AIC, and AIJV
schemes. It has a paid-up capital of $48 million
contributed by major banks and financial institutions
in all five ASEAN countries.
14. The AFC, incorporated in Singapore, has the
legal status of a merchant bank operating in an
offshore Asian Currency Unit (ACU). It could accept
deposits in US dollars and other offshore currencies
and could extend loans in such currencies. The AFC
has just assembled a professional staff, is considering
cofinancing of several regional project loans, and is
planning a major fund-raising effort for future devel-
opment bank-style operations.
15. Concrete cooperation within ASEAN in the
energy field has been limited. In 1976 the ASEAN
states agreed to aid any member country suffering
from an energy shortfall of more than 20 percent of its
normal requirements. But ASEAN is not likely to ad-
vance from an emergency petroleum-sharing scheme
to common management of energy resources. Indone-
sia and Malaysia cannot afford to sell large amounts of
oil on concessional terms to other ASEAN members,
for they need foreign exchange for their national
development plans. Oil and gas exploration on a
regional basis has been discussed but is unlikely to
proceed. With the current world oil glut, the incentive
to increase energy cooperation has been reduced.
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This annex, in figures 1, 2, and 3, summarizes
production and trade data over two separate periods
for the ASEAN states. Our source of information is the
Figure 1
ASEAN States: Growth of Production
World Development Report, 1982 (calculations by J. 1-5
P. Estanislau and A. A. Aquino in "An Economic
Overview of ASEAN," Center for Research and Com-
munications, Manila, February 1983).
Gross
Domestic
Product
Figure 2 Figure 3
ASEAN States: Structure of Production ASEAN States: Growth of Merchandise Trade
(Proportion of Gross Domestic Product) (Average Annual Growth in Percent)
Manufacturing
13% of total production
65% of industry
Manufacturing
19% of total production
51 % of industry
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ANNEX F
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
August 1967 ASEAN formed with signing of ASEAN or Bangkok
Bangkok Declaration by Ministers Malik, Indonesia; Razak, Malay-
sia; Ramos, Philippines; Rajaratnam, Singapore; and
Thanat Khoman, Thailand.
August 1968 Second Ministerial Meeting. Established annual meeting
Jakarta on economic and other nonpolitical subjects.
December 1969 Third Ministerial Meeting. Agreement for promotion of
Cameron Highlands cooperation in mass media and cultural activities. Estab-
March 1971
Manila
lished joint ASEAN fund to finance regional projects.
Fourth Ministerial Meeting. Recommended and ap-
proved 124 projects.
November 1971 Special Ministerial Meeting to sign the Kuala Lumpur
Kuala Lumpur Declaration calling for recognition of Southeast Asia as a
April 1972
Singapore
April 1973
Pattaya
May 1974
Jakarta
Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality.
Fifth Ministerial Meeting. Senior officials initiate series of
political meetings.
Sixth Ministerial Meeting.
Seventh Ministerial Meeting.
May 1975 Eighth Ministerial Meeting. Joint declaration of ASEAN
Jakarta parliamentarians (January) and journalists (March).
February 1976 Summit meeting to sign the Declaration of ASEAN
Bali Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation;
permanent secretariat approved; discussion of large-scale
industrial projects.
March 1976 Economic Ministers agreed to implement first five
Kuala Lumpur ASEAN industrial projects.
June 1976 Ninth Ministerial Meeting.
Manila
June 1976 ASEAN Secretariat established in Jakarta.
February 1977 Commemorative ministerial meeting, concluded Agree-
ment on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement;
established emergency sharing schemes in energy and
rice.
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July 1977
Singapore
August 1977
Kuala Lumpur
June 1978
Pattaya
June 1979
Bali
June 1980
Kuala Lumpur
September 1980
October 1980
June 1981
Manila
December 1981
Bangkok
June 1982
Singapore
24-25 June 1983
Bangkok
Tenth Ministerial Meeting. Declaration of principle to
combat abuse of narcotic drugs; declaration for mutual
assistance in natural disasters.
Summit meeting coinciding with celebration of 10th
anniversary of founding of ASEAN.
Eleventh Ministerial Meeting.
First US-ASEAN Dialogue, creation of US-ASEAN Busi-
ness Council.
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. ASEAN Foreign
Ministers met in January 1979 to deplore the Vietnamese
attack and call for UN action to restore peace.
Twelfth Ministerial Meeting.
UN General Assembly passes ASEAN resolution on Kam-
puchea calling for international humanitarian relief, re-
settlement of displaced Khmer, withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Kampuchea, and Kampuchean self-
determination.
Second US-ASEAN Dialogue.
Thirteenth Ministerial Meeting; Post-Ministerial meetings
with dialogue countries.
Third US-ASEAN Dialogue.
UN General Assembly passes ASEAN resolution on
Kampuchea.
Fourteenth Ministerial Meeting; Post-Ministerial dia-
logues.
UN International Conference on Kampuchea held in
New York. Conference declaration called for Vietnamese
withdrawal followed by free elections.
UN General Assembly passes ASEAN resolution on
Kampuchea.
Fourth US-ASEAN Dialogue.
Fifteenth Ministerial Meeting.
UN General Assembly passes ASEAN resolution on
Kampuchea.
Sixteenth Ministerial Meeting followed by meetings with
dialogue countries.
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ANNEX G
COMPARISON OF ASEAN AND VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCES
Individual ASEAN states have undertaken defense modernization and expansion of combat forces, weap-
improvements in recent years, encouraged primarily on systems, and surveillance capabilities. Except for a
by Vietnamese and Soviet activities in the region. current naval advantage, ASEAN's collective military
Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have strength remains no match for that of Vietnam
improved their deterrence capability through the
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