KEY MILITARY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000300480002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 17, 1983
• Content Type: NIE

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EE\ Director of secret
Intelligence
Key Military Issues
in South Asia
Secret
NIE 30-83
17 June 1983
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NIE 30-83
KEY MILITARY ISSUES
IN SOUTH ASIA
Information available as of 10 June 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE .............................................................................:.............................. 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................................:...... 3
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 7
Soviet Intentions and Military Capabilities in South Asia ................................... 7
Soviet Strategic Objectives and Constraints ................................................ 7
Military Instruments Supporting Soviet Policy ............ ......................... :..... 7
Pakistan's Stance ............................................................ :.............................. 9
India Is Cautious ........................................................................................... 12
China's Limited Role ..................................................... :............. ................. 12
Indo-Pakistani Rivalry ............................................................................................ 13
Trends in Pakistani Military Capabilities ................................................... 13
Indian and Pakistani Military Capabilities Compared .............................. 14
Pakistan's Military Ties Abroad and Regional Implications ...................... 14
Growing Indian Military Strength and Regional Implications .................. 19
Outlook .................................................................................................................... 22
ANNEX B: MAJOR SECURITY CONCERNS OF MINOR COUNTRIES IN
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate focuses on two military issues in South Asia 1 that
will have an impact on US security interests in the next five years:
- The first, epitomized by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
entails Soviet military activities, capabilities, and intentions that
affect key countries and US interests.
- The second includes the military issues emanating from the
animosity between India and Pakistan, which have had three
major military conflicts in the past four decades. Mutual
distrust affects India's and Pakistan's defense policies, including
nuclear weapons development, their relationship with the
United States and the USSR, and prospects for regional
stability.
This Estimate addresses these two broad military issues and related
subissues, assessing their meaning for the countries involved, for other
countries in the region, and the overall implications for the United
States. Security issues in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Maldives
are discussed in an annex.
' For the purposes of this Estimate, South Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal,
Pakistan, the Republic of Maldives, and Sri Lanka.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
South Asian military issues have traditionally interested US policy-
makers only to the extent that a major Pakistani-Indian conflagration
could cause serious regional instability and thus create opportunities for
increased Soviet and Chinese influence in the area. These concerns were
reflected during the several Indian-Pakistani confrontations, the last of
which led to the partition of Pakistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan in December 1979 increased US attention to the region dramatical-
ly by underscoring the USSR's willingness to project its power into the
area.
Moscow's strategy aims at supplanting Western-especially US-
and Chinese influence and making the USSR the dominant power. To
achieve this goal, the Soviets seek to:
- Consolidate their power in Afghanistan.
- Neutralize Pakistan's opposition to the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan.
- Develop an alliance of powers encircling China.
- Encourage regional military and ultimately political depend-
ence on the Soviet Union.
- Exploit regional divisions to gain leverage.
Moscow has mixed success in moving toward these goals. The invasion
of Afghanistan increased significantly its military and political leverage,
but also strained somewhat its political relationships with the countries
of the region.
The Soviets view India as the most important geopolitical actor in
South Asia and the arms relationship as their key leverage in New
Delhi. Under Indira Gandhi's rule, Indo-Soviet relations will remain
close despite some Indian efforts to expand military contacts with the
West. New Delhi will continue to view Moscow as its most dependable
supporter against Pakistan and China and to value its sizable arms
relationship with the USSR. To ensure Indian regional dominance,
Prime Minister Gandhi is committed to modernization of the Indian
armed forces, for which large-scale Soviet military assistance is critical.
Over the long run India could grow increasingly concerned about Soviet
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intentions in the region and seek substantially broader ties with the
West, but probably would also retain a major military relationship with
Moscow, just as the 1977-79 Janata government did.
If the USSR concludes that in order to strengthen its hold over
Afghanistan it must reduce Islamabad's support to the Afghan insurgen-
cy, Moscow will almost certainly increase pressure on Pakistan. The
USSR will seek India's cooperation in weakening Pakistan's resistance to
Soviet regional aims but will receive only limited support from New
Delhi. India, in particular, would not support any move to dismember
Pakistan.
The Soviets have periodically exploited Indian-Pakistani tensions
to enhance their standing in New Delhi. Although India and Pakistan
are currently pursuing a dialogue aimed at easing tensions, a number of
issues could lead to a marked deterioration in relations or even war
between India and Pakistan in the next five years. These include:
- Pakistan's determined pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.
- A continuing territorial dispute over Kashmir.
- Each side's perception that the military modernization of the
other indicates hostile intent.
The nuclear issue is the most destabilizing. Senior Pakistani
officials believe that the development and deployment of nuclear
weapons are essential to counter India's overwhelming conventional
superiority and to establish a strategic balance between the two
countries. Pakistan continues to work for a nuclear weapons capability
despite the threat this poses to the US aid relationship.
We believe that India has not begun a nuclear weapons production
effort but has the technical capability to assemble such weapons on
short notice.. When India would move to develop and field nuclear
weapons remains dependent on the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear
program and an Indian decision to compete with China's nuclear
weapons capability.
Armed conflict between India and Pakistan is unlikely over the
next year, but Pakistan's ongoing nuclear weapons program may move
into a key stage within the next 12 months, when reprocessing of spent
fuel could begin if the political decision is made. India is growing
increasingly uneasy about Pakistan's nuclear effort
For the near term, both countries are expected to continue joint
diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions.
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If war should break out, India possesses major advantages-
strategic depth, large reserves, superior logistics-that would allow it to
prevail. Moreover, the Indian armed forces-the fourth largest in the
world-benefit from superior equipment and training. Even if Pakistan
receives all the arms and equipment sought under the current US arms
assistance package, the disparities between India's and Pakistan's
military capabilities will grow wider.
Islamabad will continue to harbor doubts about the reliability of
US political and military support. The sale of advanced US weapons
will be a major yardstick by which Islamabad measures US support for
Pakistan's security interests. Pakistan will not grant the United States
unrestricted use of military facilities and will remain firmly opposed to
association with any US regional defense arrangements.
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DISCUSSION
Soviet Intentions and Military Capabilities in
South Asia
Soviet Strategic Objectives and Constraints
1. Moscow's long-term strategy in South Asia aims
at supplanting Western-especially US-and Chinese
influence and making the USSR the dominant foreign
power in the region. In pursuing this objective, the
Soviets are working toward the following intermediate
regional goals:
- Consolidating their power in Afghanistan in or-
der to strengthen Soviet military capabilities in
the area.
- Neutralization of Pakistan's opposition to the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
- Development of allies in a move to encircle
China.
- Cultivation of their role as a major participant in
regional affairs.
- Encouragement of regional military, economic,
and ultimately political dependence on the Sovi-
et Union.
- Exploitation of regional divisions, notably Indo-
Pakistani differences, and domestic political in-
stability to gain greater leverage.
Moscow's strategy has had mixed results thus far. The
Soviet presence in Afghanistan increases the Soviet
military threat to the area and thus puts pressure on
the countries of the region. But the invasion has also
had political costs for the Soviets. The United States
has been brought back into the region through its
renewed security relationship with Pakistan. Soviet
relations with Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have
cooled. Even the Indo-Soviet relationship has suffered
some minor strains.
2. Moscow has actively pursued its interests in the
subcontinent since the mid-1950s, focusing primarily
on Afghanistan and India. As the Sino-Soviet rift
widened during the late 1950s, Soviet efforts intensi-
fied in search of support against China. In Afghani-
stan, Soviet influence grew steadily during the 1950s
and 1960s as Kabul turned to Moscow for most of its
military equipment and training after the United
States declined to provide such assistance. With the
Soviet invasion and installation of Babrak Karmal in
1979, the regime's dependence on the USSR became
complete. India has long been courted assiduously,
leading to a treaty of friendship and cooperation with
that country in 1971. The USSR openly supported
India in its 1971 war with Pakistan and played a
leading role in the settlement of the 1965 conflict.
Outside of Afghanistan, the Kremlin is likely to contin-
ue to place its highest priority in South Asia on
relations with India, which it clearly views as the
dominant regional power and its natural ally against
China.
Military Instruments Supporting Soviet Policy
3. The USSR will seek to foster closer links with
South Asia through political ties, trade and economic
aid, and a military presence and programs in the
region. Military activities have taken three distinct
forms: first, the direct employment of some 100,000
Soviet troops in Afghanistan; second, Moscow's large-
scale arms program with India; and third, the deploy-
ments of the Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean Squadron,
which has been operating in the region since 1968.
Over the next five years, these military efforts will
remain among Moscow's most important policy instru-
ments for advancing its goals in the region. The Soviet
Indian Ocean Squadron, which averages some 20 ships
since early 1983, will be used for political impact
through port visits and show-the-flag demonstrations.
(See figure 1 and table 1.) The USSR will continue to
press New Delhi for access to Indian naval facilities,
but these efforts are expected to remain unsuccessful.
The Soviets did successfully conclude a ship repair
contract with Sri Lanka last year, but entree to naval
facilities iri South Asia is unlikely over the next several
years.
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4. Moscow still faces significant constraints in pur-
suing its regional objectives. One is Soviet recognition
of the danger of a Western reaction to Soviet military
moves that threaten vital Western interests. The USSR
would try to avoid actions that it believed would risk a
direct military confrontation with the United States.
Widespread opposition to Communism, especially
among conservative Islamic groups in the region, is
another important constraint. Furthermore, Soviet ef-
forts to subdue Afghanistan, coupled with covert and
overt efforts to influence local governments, fuel
distrust of Moscow's intentions. The USSR will remain
especially wary of pushing India too hard, risking the
loss of New Delhi's support. Indian realization that
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Pakistan has replaced Afghanistan as the buffer state
against the expansion of a Soviet military presence to
India's border has introduced another cautionary note.
Finally, with the obvious exception of Afghanistan,
countries in the region remain generally dependent on
the West for much-needed economic assistance and
advanced technology.
5. The invasion of Afghanistan marked a major
shift in Soviet policy. For the first time since World
War II; Soviet ground troops were used in offensive
operations outside the Warsaw Pact. The USSR dem-
onstrated strong confidence in its ability to project
military power, particularly along its periphery, and
confirmed a clear willingness to use military forces
abroad.
6. The Soviets see firm control over Afghanistan as
a step toward a dominant presence and influence in
the region at large. To date, the immediate aim of
achieving political stability has eluded the Soviets
because of almost universal opposition within Afghani-
stan to Moscow's presence and the Communist regime.
7. Over the next several years, Soviet anti-insurgent
measures are expected to meet with only limited
success. (See figure 3.) The Kremlin probably 25X1
will concentrate on trying to develop large, loyal
political and military cadres to ensure the successful
entrenchment of Soviet power in Afghanistan, but we
do not rule out a significant increase in its military
presence.
8. On the diplomatic front, Moscow will almost
certainly continue to claim an interest in a political
settlement to confound and weaken the opposition, but
is not expected to make any meaningful concessions.
9. Pakistan's leaders believe that the Soviet occupa-
tion of Afghanistan has permanently altered their
country's strategic environment, raising the prospects
of a combined attack by their traditional enemy-
India-from the east and by Soviet forces on their
western border. Islamabad sees its options ranging
from accommodation to a major upgrading of the
country's defenses through a closer relationship with
the United States and continued strong ties with
China. For now, Pakistan has rejected the road to
accommodation for geopolitical as well as ideological
reasons and profits from increased aid and political
support from the United States.
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 Figure 3
Afghanistan: Operating Areas of Major Exile Groups
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 10. Although neither President Zia nor we see any
immediate threat of a Soviet invasion of Pakistan,
Pakistan's leaders believe that this possibility would
loom large over the long run if the Soviets consolidated
their control over Afghanistan. If the USSR concludes
that in order to strengthen its hold over Afghanistan it
must reduce Islamabad's support to the Afghan insur-
gency, it will increase pressure in Pakistan. The cur-
rent concern for Pakistan remains Soviet "active meas-
ures" such as efforts to destabilize the frontier regions
of North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan and
Moscow's support of the anti-Zia terrorist group, Al
Zulfiqar.
11. Islamabad would like to ease its strained rela-
tions with Moscow. Given the power and proximity of
the USSR, Pakistan realizes that to ignore the Soviets
or seriously provoke them would threaten the nation's
survival. The Zia government will keep its channels
open to the Kremlin, accept Soviet economic assist-
ance, and emphasize areas of common agreements.
These efforts are aimed at reassuring Moscow that
Pakistan has not closed off its options and reflect
Islamabad's uncertainty about the likelihood of long-
term Western support. Since 1954, Pakistan has drawn
$700 million of the more than $900 million in credits
and grants extended to it by the USSR.
12. Though not optimistic that the Soviets will
support a political solution in Afghanistan acceptable
to Pakistan, Zia faces domestic pressure-sparked by
the presence of almost 3 million Afghan refugees-to
find some peaceful resolution. Even so, the present
Pakistani Government is unlikely to accept a perma-
nent Soviet military presence in Afghanistan for a
variety of internal and external reasons. A successor
regime may be more willing to accept "the new
realities" in Afghanistan. Analysts do not concur on
Pakistan's determination over the longer term to main-
tain its opposition to the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan.
India Is Cautious
13. Although India is concerned about the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan and what this portends for
India's interests in South Asia, New Delhi's response
has been generally muted toward Moscow while criti-
cal of US countermoves. Prime Minister Gandhi's
central concern is to preserve India's special, benefi-
cial relationship with the USSR. New Delhi views the
Soviet domination of Afghanistan as irreversible-a
fait accompli that will be accepted by the internation-
al community in due time-and, publicly at least,
accepts Moscow's line that -foreign interference," not
Soviet troops, is the casus belli. US military operations
in the Indian Ocean will continue to draw criticism
from New Delhi while the Kremlin's subjugation of a
neighboring state is accepted.
China's Limited Role
14. China will hold to the view that the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan is not an immediate mili-
tary threat, but Beijing views Moscow's move as
seriously undermining limited Chinese influence in
South Asia and advancing Moscow's long-term objec-
tive of encircling China. Beijing does not believe that
Soviet forces in Afghanistan can be defeated, but
hopes that insurgent efforts will lead Moscow to seek a
political solution and withdraw its forces. In line with
this and to increase the cost of the Soviet occupation,
China has provided limited amounts of material sup-
port to the Afghan rebels. China will remain unable
and unwilling to affect events in Afghanistan signifi-
cantly, and its overall influence in the region will
continue to be severely limited.
15. Though the nature and scope of Chinese mili-
tary assistance to the Afghan resistance may increase
somewhat in the months ahead as insurgent forces
improve training and tactics, aid will remain limited
by Beijing's reluctance to directly challenge Moscow
and its concern over Pakistan's vulnerability to Soviet
reprisals. The security of Pakistan, China's closest
friend in the region, will remain Beijing's principal
worry. The Chinese fear that the USSR will force
Pakistan to acquiesce in Soviet interests by using the
threat of superior military force and by fomenting
internal dissent. Because of its own inability to supply
Islamabad with large increases in military aid, China
will continue to encourage the growth of Western-
especially US-support to Pakistan.
16. To further offset Soviet advances in the region,
Beijing will work to expand its relations with India.
Significant improvements in these ties will be unlikely
over the next few years because of Indian domestic
opposition, mutual suspicions, Indian concern for Sovi-
et sensitivities, and China's special relationship with
Pakistan.
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 Indo-Pakistani Rivalry
17. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has af-
fected significantly regional balance between India
and Pakistan and their policies toward one another.
Pakistan, for the first time, faces a significant military
threat from Afghanistan and has strengthened the
50,000-man paramilitary Frontier Corps supplement-
ing the four divisions protecting its western border.
India recognizes Pakistan's vulnerability to Soviet and
Afghan aggression and has muted its opposition to the
F-16 sale and cautiously moved into a diplomatic
dialogue to reduce tensions with Islamabad.
18. Fourteen of Pakistan's 18 divisions are located
to defend against India, but this reflects the history,
topography, and infrastructure of the country rather
than a benign attitude toward the Soviet threat from
Afghanistan. Pakistan has little strategic depth against
India, its historical adversary, and most of its principal
cities (including Lahore, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi)
and major lines of communication are within 100
kilometers of the Indian border. India's forces opposite
Pakistan are larger and better equipped than those of
Pakistan. The transportation and logistic infrastructure
of Pakistan is more developed in the east and can
better support large military forces than the less
developed west.
19. Deep-seated suspicions have characterized
Indo-Pakistani relations since 1947. A number of
ongoing issues could lead to a deterioration in relations
or even war between the two states:
- Each side's perception that the military modern-
ization of the other indicates hostile intent. De-
spite its increasing military advantage over Paki-
stan, India professes to believe that Islamabad
poses a serious threat to Indian national security.
Concerns about a Pakistani challenge to New
Delhi's regional preeminence are an important
factor driving India's procurement of Soviet and
Western arms and the accelerated development
of its arms industry. Each side distrusts the
other's relationship with the United States and
the USSR.
- Pakistan's determined pursuit of a nuclear weap-
ons capability. Pakistan's current leadership ap-
parently believes that nuclear weapons are essen-
tial to deter an Indian military attack.
- The continuing dispute over Kashmir. Because
neither Pakistan nor India has relinquished its
claim to Kashmir, tensions remain along the
disputed border.
- Mutual suspicions of covert support for each
other's dissident elements.
20. Despite these differences, India and Pakistan
are pursuing a dialogue that each hopes will keep
tensions manageable. A Joint Commission has been
created and ministerial talks continue on a Pakistani
proposal for a "no war" pact and an Indian counter-
proposal for a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooper-
ation. Still, cordiality in the Indo-Pakistani relationship
exists only to the extent that contentious issues are soft-
pedaled. Pakistan is unwilling to accept Indian de-
mands that a "no war" pact or friendship treaty be
contingent on agreement to resolve outstanding dis-
putes bilaterally and to renounce the right to have
foreign bases on its territory. Any fundamental prog-
ress toward accommodation remains contingent upon
a willingness on both sides to move away from en-
trenched national policies and longstanding mutual
distrust. Some further improvement in atmospherics is
possible, however, in the future.
21. Because regional conflicts encourage Soviet in-
roads and undermine US policy interests, Washington
supports improved Indo-Pakistani relations and re-
gional stability. New Delhi has been told emphatically
that US arms assistance to Pakistan is not directed
against India and will not alter India's overwhelming
military superiority. In addition, Pakistan remains
under strong US pressure to cease its nuclear weapons
development program.
Trends in Pakistani Military Capabilities
22. In Islamabad's eyes, New Delhi will remain the
foremost threat to national security. Islamabad's con-
tinuing efforts to modernize its armed forces are made
in the hopes of building a credible deterrent to Indian
political and military domination. To counter the
increasing military imbalance between India and
Pakistan, improvements in military preparedness will
remain a top priority of Pakistan's leadership, absorb-
ing more than 25 percent of the government's budget.
In the belief that only the development and deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons will significantly reduce the
decisive military advantage enjoyed by India, Pakistan
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 will continue its efforts toward a nuclear weapons
capabilityjoncern over possible Soviet
military pressure through Afghanistan will continue to
be secondary. Significant Soviet military action against
Pakistan is viewed as unlikely over the next few years.
More worrisome to Zia are Moscow's political efforts to
undermine his regime.
Indian and Pakistani Military Capabilities
Compared
23. A comparison of Pakistani and Indian armed
forces indicates that India has a marked edge in arms
and men. This advantage will improve
further during the next five years as New Delhi
continues to strengthen its forces at a faster rate than
Pakistan. The armed forces of both countries are
generally comparable in leadership, motivation, disci-
pline, and loyalty, but Pakistan's cannot match India's
forces in size because the costs are too great and its
trained manpower pool and industrial base are too
Pakistan's Military Ties Abroad and Regional
Implications
24. The United States. The sale of advanced US
weapons is the major yardstick by which Islamabad
measures US support for Pakistan's political and secu-
rity interests. Islamabad believes that modern US
weapons are essential to deter Indian or Soviet aggres-
sion. (See table 2.) The level of US support will also
affect related questions. A demonstrated US willing-
ness to meet Pakistan's perceived security require-
ments, for example, would reinforce Zia's policy of
supporting the Afghan insurgents. A perception of
inadequate US support for Pakistan's security interests
would strengthen arguments in Islamabad for a more
conciliatory policy toward Afghanistan.
Table 2
Pakistan: Selection of Programed
US Arms Deliveries
First
Last
Delivery
Delivery
100 M48A5 tanks
Mar 82
Jun 82
75 M113A2 armored personnel carriers
Mar 82
Sep 84
1,000 TOW missiles
Sep 83
Dec 83
10 AH-15 attack helicopters
Sep 84
Dec 84
40 F-16 aircraft
Dec 82
Nov 85
25. Islamabad will continue to harbor strong doubts
about the reliability of US support, especially as an
arms supplier-this is in part a legacy of the US arms
embargoes in the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and
1971. Many Pakistani officials believe that US arms
supplies are hostage to changes in US administrations,
annual Congressional reviews, and US policies on
nuclear nonproliferation, narcotics, and human rights.
A number of Pakistani officials have voiced concern
that US support for Pakistan is only a temporary
expedient to oppose the Soviets, and an improvement
in US-Soviet relations would leave Islamabad alone to
confront Moscow and its Indian ally. US unwillingness
to extend further military assistance or reluctance to
deliver sophisticated weapons already promised to
Pakistan would strengthen doubts about US reliability.
26. Some Pakistani officials are concerned that
Islamabad's reliance on US security assistance could
prejudice Pakistan's relations with Islamic and non-
aligned countries. Islamabad frequently reiterates its
independence from US policies and would not grant
the United States unrestricted use of military facilities
in Pakistan. Pakistan will remain firmly opposed to
association with any US regional defense arrange-
ments.
27. Western Europe. Pakistan will continue to
view the West European countries as the best alterna-
tive to the United States for modern arms and intends
to meet many of its weapons needs from European
suppliers. France has supplied most of the modern
arms in Pakistan's inventory and will remain Islam-
abad's principal European supplier because of the
broad range of quality weapons it produces. Italy
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could become a major new supplier for ships and
missiles. Financing is the principal obstacle to major
new arms deals with the West European countries,
which are reluctant to provide large credits with low
interest because of Pakistan's limited foreign exchange
holdings, tight balance-of-payments situation, and
large outstanding foreign debt.
28. Islamabad views the European suppliers, and
particularly France, as much more reliable than the
United States because their arms sales are governed
primarily by commercial rather than political inter-
ests. Many advanced European weapons are competi-
tive with US arms in performance and compare
favorably in cost. Western Europe's limited produc-
tion capacity, however, precludes large sales and early
deliveries. Most of the modern European arms for
which Pakistan is negotiating will not be available for
delivery before the mid-1980s.
29. China. Pakistan and China will continue to
maintain close military relations that are mutually
beneficial. Islamabad views close military cooperation
with Beijing as a deterrent to Indian aggression.
Beijing's strong support for Pakistan is intended to
frustrate Soviet designs to encircle China. India is
perceived in Beijing as supporting Soviet strategic
interests against both the United States and China.
30. Much of Pakistan's military equipment is sup-
plied by China, but Islamabad has failed to secure an
explicit commitment from Beijing to defend Pakistan.
China cannot provide the modern arms Islamabad
feels are needed to remedy Pakistan's military inade-
quacies because Chinese weapons are mostly repro-
ductions of obsolescent Soviet arms. (See figure 6.)
China's military options to support Pakistan in a
confrontation with India or the USSR will remain
extremely limited. The People's Liberation Army has
no major military units near Pakistan and would
require several weeks to move large units to the
Pakistani border. Beijing would also have difficulty
assisting Pakistan by applying military pressure against
India because of rugged terrain and strong Indian
forces along the Sino-Indian border. China's greatest
concern will remain the possibility of Soviet military
pressures on Beijing in support of India's objectives in
any Indo-Pakistani conflict. Instead of offering Islam-
abad an explicit defense commitment, Beijing will
continue to advocate that the United States give a firm
commitment to defend Pakistan and supply modern
arms, while China would provide less sophisticated
military equipment and strong political support.
31. Pakistan Provides China access to Western
weapons technology to assist Beijing's own arms devel-
tionship has been mutually beneficial, and Pakistan
and China have agreed to joint weapons development
and production projects based in part on Western arms
technologies acquired by Islamabad.
32. Pakistan and the Arab World. The expansion
of military ties with the Arab world is part of an
overall effort by Pakistan to cultivate relations with
For Pakistan, there are a
resulting from its growing military links with the
Arabs:
- Pakistan has received billions of dollars in hard
currency for its military expertise.
- The military relationship helps to preserve Paki-
stan's Islamic and nonaligned credentials and
secures Islamabad's access to vital Middle East oil
and financial assistance.
- Training of well-equipped Arab forces offers
Pakistan's military valuable "hands on" experi-
ence on a wide variety of sophisticated military
hardware not currently in Islamabad's inventory.
33. Many Pakistanis worry that, despite the bene-
fits, Islamabad's extensive foreign training and adviso-
ry commitments will continue to weaken Pakistan's
military capability because the program relies heavily
on the most capable and skilled instructors and techni-
cians. Pakistan's limited pool of educated and skilled
manpower makes it difficult to replace the officers
and senior enlisted men who are assigned abroad. The
problem will remain most acute in the Air Force and
Navy where greater technical skills are required.
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 Figure 6
Pakistan: Selected Major Military Equipment
Chinese-hull! Typo- ?9 lank on
parade
Destroyer l4ahur completing
sea trials.
Missile-armed F-I6 over
Pakistan.
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 Growing Indian Military Strength and Regional
Implications
34. In any circumstance of peace or war, India will
remain the preeminent regional power in South Asia.
To ensure Indian dominance, Prime Minister Gandhi
has made a major commitment to modernize the
Indian armed forces, convinced that Pakistan and, in
the longer run, China pose serious threats to national
security. At the same time, India has not seen its
interests served by the projection of Soviet military
power south into Afghanistan. The Indian armed
forces are already the fourth largest in the world, able
to defend against conventional attacks by any neigh-
bor. The modernization program is designed to assure
regional supremacy, military self-sufficiency, and rec-
ognition as a major power. Over the next three to five
years, general force levels will probably increase only
slightly, but the overall capability of the military will
improve significantly through the strengthening of
combat elements and the purchase of increasingly
more sophisticated weapon systems. India's continued,
large-scale dependence on Soviet military assistance
will remain a critical factor in the modernization of
India's forces. Since the late 1960s the USSR has
supplied approximately 80 percent of India's military
imports. (See figure 7.)
35. The West. New Delhi has made some effort to
diversify arms acquisitions in order to obtain more
sophisticated military hardware, enhance the indige-
nous production base, and reduce dependence on any
single supplier. Since late 1981, India has been ex-
panding military contacts with Western nations in the
search for advanced weapon systems and technology
not available from the USSR. New Delhi has also
sought to reduce its dependence on Soviet arms and
technology. India's improved military links with the
West stem largely from Gandhi's visits to Paris, Lon-
don, and Washington during the past 18 months and
from her decision, in early 1982, to allow the Indian
military to seek more sophisticated arms and technol-
ogy from Western nations. Taking advantage of this
new open-door policy, senior French and British offi-
cials have traveled to New Delhi, vying with one
another for lucrative arms deals with the Indian
Government. New agreements for Western aircraft;
missiles, and submarines have been signed, and negoti-
ations for the purchase of a wide variety of additional
weapons are under
way.
36. The Soviet Union. Alarmed at India's efforts to
diversify arms purchases and improve its relations
with China and Pakistan, Moscow moved to preserve
its "special" military relationship with New Delhi.
The Soviets have tempted India with offers of a wide
variety of more advanced weapons-aircraft, tanks,
air defense missile systems, and naval combatants-at
concessional prices and terms unmatched in the West.
They are also offering to provide the necessary tech-
nology to produce many of the arms under license and
accelerate deliveries of weapons already ordered.
37. The USSR will remain India's primary foreign
source for military hardware, supplying over 60 per-
cent of its combat aircraft and most of its capital ships.
Warsaw Pact countries will also continue to provide
India with over 60 percent of its armored vehicles.
New Delhi's perception of the Soviets as a reliable and
affordable arms supplier, willing to provide licensed
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 Figure 7
India: Selected Major Military Equipment
I ""Id" j,"
Fine h.Lulp ler
VII(, -23 I loeecr ,
II lu i n IC n lnice
20
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 production and the maturing and mutually advanta-
geous economic relationship between the two coun-
tries provide strong incentives to continue a close
military supply relationship. (See tables 5 and 6.)
Moscow's willingness to sell arms to India at low prices
and on easy credit terms and, equally important, with
licensed production will continue to make Soviet
weapons very attractive. Moreover, India's familiarity
with the large variety of Soviet weapons in its arsenal
and the interaction required to operate, modify, and
update this equipment create a common professional
interest in continued military cooperation. Moscow has
pushed hard for new arms sales (India signed two new
arms agreements in 1982, one for improved T-72 tanks
and the other for the Indian manufacture of MIG-27
fighter-bombers) and is increasing Soviet assistance in
expanding India's defense production capabilities.
38. India is striving to meet more of its require-
ments for modern arms from its own relatively large
defense industries. These industries currently are pro-
ducing fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, tanks, naval
ships, missiles, artillery, small arms, and electronic
equipment. Plans to produce follow-on versions are
under way. These advances notwithstanding, the de-
fense industries alone cannot meet the armed forces'
requirements for sophisticated arms-either quantita-
tively or qualitatively-because of generally poor
management and deficiencies in design capabilities
and production technology. This situation is unlikely
to change in the near future. Domestic industries will
continue to rely on foreign technology through direct
purchase, licensed production, and importation of
subsystems. As a result, New Delhi must buy foreign
arms outright and import considerable technical
know-how from both Communist and non-Communist
countries under licensing agreements if the defense
industries are to progress in the production of sophisti-
cated weapons. The USSR will remain the principal
foreign source supporting India's efforts to broaden
and update its military production capabilities. Addi-
tionally, France, the United Kingdom, and West Ger-
many will continue to offer significant production
technology.
39. During Gandhi's rule, Indo-Soviet relations will
remain close despite some Indian efforts to expand
military contacts with the West:
- New Delhi will continue to view Moscow as its
most dependable supporter against possible
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Table 5
India: Soviet Military and Economic Technicians,
1976-82
1976
300
1,350
1977
145
1,100
1978
150
1,000
1979
150
1,100
1980
170
1,400
1981
1,500
1982
1,700
Table 6
India: Soviet Military Assistance, 1977-82
(million dollars)
Agreements
Deliveries
1977
650.2
676.4
1978
948
245.0
1979
243.0
334.0
1980
2,563.8
583.4
1981
539.0
649.5
1982
2,968.9
966.0
threats from Pakistan and China, though the
Indians do not seek a common border with the
Soviet Union in a dismembered Pakistan.
- The Indian leadership generally values its sizable
arms relationship with the USSR and remains
reluctant to endanger these ties.
- Gandhi's deep-seated mistrust of the West, espe-
cially the United States, reinforces her belief in
the need for a strong Indo-Soviet connection.
- New Delhi and Moscow share a number of
common objectives in the region that further
their "special relationship."
40. Some areas of common interest include mini-
mizing Chinese influence in southern Asia, keeping
Pakistan weak and pliable, and thwarting US, Chinese,
and Pakistani moves toward closer mutual coopera-
tion. Additionally, both India and the USSR seek a
withdrawal of US forces from the region. Moscow also
]ends support to India's position as the leader of the
Nonaligned Movement.
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 41. Underlying these interests is India's determina-
tion to maintain its position as the paramount regional
power in South Asia. The military supply links with
the USSR provide the major underpinning for India's
military capabilities. Gandhi believes that the USSR
will continue to provide the cheapest and fastest
means for India to achieve its twin goals of self-
reliance and up-to-date armaments.
42. China. Relations between India and China have
improved somewhat in recent years, largely as a result
of Beijing's initiatives and mutual concern over Soviet
activities. Over the next few years, no major break-
through is expected on the principal divisive issue
between the two countries-the longstanding border
dispute that led to war in 1962. Rapid resolution of the
border problem is unlikely because it would require
substantial Chinese territorial concessions or Indian
acquiescence to the status quo. Gandhi's attitude
toward China will probably remain suspicious and
lukewarm. China's close ally, Pakistan, is her principal
preoccupation. US arms sales to Pakistan along with
Islamabad's determination to develop a nuclear weap-
ons capability make Gandhi very distrustful of the
Pakistani-US-Chinese relationship. Soviet anti-West-
ern and anti-Chinese propaganda will continue to
encourage New Delhi's suspicions.
43. The Middle East. India provides some military
training to a number of Third World countries, partic-
ularly in the Middle East. New
Delhi has developed military ties with many Islamic
states. India has sold military equipment to Bahrain,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Oman, and currently maintains
training teams in Egypt, Iraq, and Oman.
military personnel from the Middle East and North
Africa are training in India. New Delhi will continue
to cultivate assiduously its limited but, in India's view,
vital economic links with the Arab world. A significant
improvement in India's relations with the Middle East
will remain contingent on a fundamental progress in
Indo-Pakistani relations.
Outlook
44. The United States faces major challenges as well
as opportunities in South Asia over the next five years.
If the USSR concludes that in order to strengthen its
hold over Afghanistan it must reduce Islamabad's
support to the Afghan insurgency, it will increase
pressure on Pakistan. The USSR will seek India's
cooperation in weakening Pakistan's resistance to Sovi-
et regional aims. Toward this end, Moscow will contin-
ue to fan India's suspicions of greater US-Pakistani
military cooperation, with some success.
45. Moscow has pursued a carrot-and-stick ap-
proach in its dealings with Islamabad. The carrot is
largely economic aid. With over 1,000 Soviet econom-
ic advisers working in Pakistan, the Kremlin is expect-
ed to push for closer economic links to offset US and
Chinese influence. The stick will remain continued
military and political pressures. Military pressures will
probably be limited largely to cross-border operations
into Pakistan's tribal areas to maintain pressure on the
Zia government. A more serious threat will be continu-
ing Soviet efforts to undermine Zia's rule through
assistance to anti-Zia elements such as radical mem-
bers of the banned People's Party of Pakistan and the
Al Zulfiqar terrorist group. The Kremlin will also keep
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 alive well-established contacts with dissident tribal
groups in Baluchistan and can encourage tribal opposi-
tion to government forces in the sensitive North-West
Frontier Province. A full-scale Soviet invasion of
Pakistan is unlikely during the five-year time frame of
this Estimate. Arrival of Soviet military forces on
India's border would not be welcomed in New Delhi.
46. As long as Zia remains in power, the USSR faces
considerable obstacles. President Zia's neutralization of
domestic opposition and ban on political acivities have
circumscribed Soviet efforts to influence the political
process in Pakistan. In addition, the fact that the
United States provides substantial economic and mili-
tary assistance has so far made it difficult for the
Soviets to intimidate Islamabad. Pakistan's continuing
close relationship with China is a further important
factor inhibiting significantly closer Soviet-Pakistani
ties. For these reasons, the current level of Soviet
pressure on Zia is unlikely to convince him to stop
supporting the Afghan resistance and accept the pup-
pet regime in Kabul. Future prospects will depend, in
large measure, on the level of domestic opposition to
Zia and on the extent of support Pakistan receives
from the Westspecially the United States.
47. Islamabad will remain under pressure to find a
political settlement in Afghanistan and will keep its
channels open to Moscow. This is likely to lead
Islamabad to continue to welcome Soviet economic
assistance and to emphasize areas of common interest.
The refugee problem has become a major concern in
Pakistan. Local resentment continues, and the Army
remains uneasy about the potential for domestic un-
rest. While Pakistani leaders doubt that the Soviets will
agree to a settlement acceptable to Pakistan, they
believe that Islamabad must continue to probe for
Soviet flexibility. Although some of his senior advisers
have urged Zia to recognize the Kabul regime, he is
unlikely to accept such a political settlement unless the
USSR agrees to a withdrawal of its military presence in
Afghanistan and the voluntary return of refugees from
Pakistan.
48. Armed conflict between India and Pakistan is
unlikely over the next year, but, beyond that point,
several destabilizing factors could combine, leading to
war. The same elements that have ignited conflict
three times in 35 years-deeply rooted mutual dis-
trust, the disputed territory of Kashmir, and New
Delhi's view of Pakistan as an unstable and hostile
state-remain active today. More troublesome for
stability and US interests in the subcontinent is Paki-
stan's ongoing nuclear program, which is expected to
move into a key stage within the next 12 months, when
the reprocessing of spent fuel from the Karachi nucle-
ar power plant could begin.
49. India is growing increasingly uneasy over Paki-
stan's nuclear effort
moved into sustained production of fissile material
would prompt Gandhi to decide between activating
India's own nuclear weapons program
and/or ordering a preemptive military strike on Paki-
stan's nuclear facilities. In the meantime, New Delhi
will keep its options open. Both Pakistan and India are
expected to continue joint diplomatic efforts to reduce
tensions. Islamabad, we believe, would like to draw
out its diplomatic dialogue with New Delhi in part to
distract India from Pakistan's nuclear program. For
her part, Gandhi will remain suspicious of Pakistan
and unwilling to offer any meaningful concessions.
50. In general, Pakistan will continue to place less
trust in its relations with the United States than on its
longstanding close association with China and the Arab
world. Zia and any successor will seek to preserve the
military aid agreement with Washington but will
remain wary of US long-term resolve. Too close an
association will be eschewed, however, because of
strong domestic opposition, the desire to maintain
Pakistan's nonaligned image, and sensitivity to possible
Soviet reaction.
51. US arms assistance to Pakistan may slow Islam-
abad's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, but it is
unlikely to stop it. As a result, relations with Washing-
ton will come under increasing strain over the next
several years as Pakistan moves toward the capability
to reprocess spent fuel and fabricate a nuclear device.
52. India, because of its military capabilities, large
industrial base, and relative stability, will remain the
principal regional power, giving it major importance
in any consideration of US security interests in South
Asia. India could adversely affect those interests,
particularly in weakening Pakistan and supporting the
Soviet position in Afghanistan. The Soviet occupation
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of Afghanistan has raised concerns in India over a
possible confrontation in the region. To reduce
chances of such an event, New Delhi has sought to
improve its relations somewhat with the United States
as well as with Pakistan and China, but not at the
expense of its "special" association with the USSR.
Gandhi will try to avoid any action that would
threaten Indo-Soviet relations.
53. India will remain committed to a weapons
procurement policy that fosters continued dependence
on the Soviet Union for most imported weapon sys-
tems. Besides viewing the USSR as its most reliable
arms supplier, New Delhi regards Moscow as its only
dependable source of support in any future disputes
with Pakistan or China. As long as Indira Gandhi stays
in power, India is likely to remain suspicious of US
intentions in the region and view Soviet and Indian
foreign policy as generally compatible and mutually
reinforcing. Within the next 10 years, under a post-
Indira government, India's concern over Soviet inten-
tions in the region could grow. Throughout this period
New Delhi is likely to seek substantially broader ties
with the West without lessening its support from the
USSR.
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 1. While viewing larger regional issues such as the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and bitter Indo-
Pakistani differences as disturbing and potentially
threatening, the smaller nations on the periphery of
the Asian subcontinent will remain preoccupied pri-
marily with real or potential internal threats to estab-
lished political order. Because these nations are politi-
cally fragile and extremely poor, the potential for
subversion and widespread domestic unrest will con-
tinue to be a major concern for most. Two countries-
Nepal and Bangladesh-will remain particularly sensi-
tive to possible Indian and/or Soviet support to domes-
tic opposition groups. Though unlikely, a Libyan-
sponsored coup in the Republic of Maldives could lead
to Soviet access to the strategically important airfield
on Can.
Bangladesh
2. The armed forces, a major political force in
Bangladesh, will continue to play a central role in
governing the nation. The present martial law regime,
under Lieutenant General Ershad, may be replaced by
another military government. Ershad came to power
pledging to fight corruption and solve the nation's
massive economic and social ills, but seemingly intrac-
table problems remain. Food shortages and wide-
spread violence from political party and student activ-
ists calling for an immediate return to civilian
government could rapidly erode Ershad's ability to
govern. Coup-prone elements in the faction-ridden
military will remain alert to opportunities to move
against the regime.
3. Security forces will continue to conduct incon-
clusive armed skirmishes with the Shanti Bahini (Peace
Army) insurgents in the Chittagong hill region, who
oppose government efforts to move lowland Bengalis
into the tribal lands. Tribal opposition, which intensi-
fied in 1971, shows no sign of weakening.
4. Dhaka's relations with the USSR will remain
cool. The present government is likely to continue to
be deeply suspicious of India's intentions and view
China as an important counterweight to both Indian
and Soviet pressures. Relations with Beijing are expect-
ed to remain good though constrained by China's
limited resources and its growing interest in normaliz-
ing relations with India, China will remain a major
supplier of military equipment to Bangladesh.
Nepal
5. There is no significant challenge to King Biren-
dra's role at this time. However, enduring economic
ills and the failure to follow through on promised
political reforms, which led to serious student riots in
1979, could once again fuel broad opposition to the
government. The 24,000-man Royal Nepal Army is a
light infantry force, trained primarily to counter
internal threats. The Army, highly regarded by the
populace, would be able to subdue any domestic
unrest, but it would be no match if attacked by the
forces of India or China.
6. Because Nepal is politically fragile and extreme-
ly poor, it will remain vulnerable to foreign intrigue.
While growing increasingly wary of Soviet intentions,
Kathmandu sees India as its primary external threat,
Indian influence will remain pervasive in Nepal,
especially in the Terai region along the Indo-Nepalese
border. India's policies toward Nepal are guided chief-
ly by New Delhi's security interests along the sensitive
Sino-Indian frontier. New Delhi will insist on a stable
government in Kathmandu that is not susceptible to
Chinese influence.
Chinese-
Nepalese relations are cordial and are likely to remain
so, strengthened by Chinese economic aid aimed at
reducing Nepal's dependence on India.
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Sri Lanka and the Republic of Maldives
7. Sri Lankan society has been rent by communal
differences since the country's independence in 1948
and will continue to face communal strife between the
majority Buddhist Sinhalese and the minority Hindu
Tamils. Persistent economic difficulties have aggravat-
ed these tensions. Violence has erupted often, particu-
larly in the northern region of the island. Security
forces will continue to face random acts of violence as
well as a low-level insurgency campaign conducted by
Tamil separatists. The Sri Lankan Army and police
forces together will be capable of controlling these
threats to public order. However, in the unlikely event
that a well-organized, widespread insurgency or nu-
merous violent demonstrations erupted, security forces
would probably be forced to seek some external
support.
8. Sri Lanka will remain distrustful of India and the
USSR, and quietly supportive of the United States.
Even before the change of government in Colombo in
1977 and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, rela-
tions between Colombo and Moscow had become
generally cool. Indian regional ambitions are of great
concern to Sri Lanka. The government will remain
uneasy over India's push for regional dominance and
its potential support for separatist Tamil groups. In
keeping with its careful policy of nonalignment, Sri
Lanka is unlikely to offer the USSR or the United
States military facilities at the country's strategic port
of Trincomalee.
9. The Republic of Maldives faces no external
threat, and serious domestic armed opposition will
remain unlikely. Relations with its closest neighbors,
India and Sri Lanka, are excellent. Maldives does not
possess an army. Internal security is provided for by a
1,000-man paramilitary force, the National Security
Service, which could subdue any armed threat from
the populace. The country's principal strategic asset,
the former Royal Air Force airfield on Can in the
southernmost Addu Atoll, is only 400 miles north of
the US base of Diego Garcia. In 1977 the USSR sought
unsuccessfully to lease Can. The present government
in Male, under President Gayoom, will probably con-
tinue to oppose any Soviet efforts to gain entry to Can.
Though unlikely in the near term, a Libyan-sponsored
coup against Gayoom and his replacement with a
radical leader cannot be ruled out. The Maldives
government has accepted Libyan aid for the National
Security Service, and this has apparently led to in-
creasing Libyan influence within the Service. A radi-
cal government in Male might be willing to lease Can
to the USSR in return for military and economic
assistance.
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