WARSAW PACT RELIABILITY: THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000100040005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 25, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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HEADQUARTERS: USAF.
;INTEWGENCE
T
A S$ES$
N4T RELE ASABLE TO FORtATiONALS
DATE: 25 AMY 1882 Nt. 2-82 Classified by: ACS/L
eview on: 25 JAN 2'
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
REPLY TQ
?TTN OF I N E
.1.1ECT Headquarters USAF Intelligence Assessment
1. This publication is designed to furnish substantive intelli-
gence assessments to USAF organizations and key individuals as
specified by the ACS/Intelligence. These assessments are prepared
by analysts assigned to Air Force Intelligence. The common
purpose of each assessment is to provide informed judgments on
foreign military, political, and socio-economic developments
affecting the attainment of national objectives and USAF missions.
2. This assessment is meant to bring together in a unified
discussion what is known about Soviet perceptions of the reliabil-
ity of its Warsaw Pact allies. During the preparation of this
publication, it became evident there is little substantive
material available relating to this subject; it is therefore an
extremely fertile field for further investigation. This assessment
is intended to disseminate what is known about Soviet perceptions
and to stimulate further collection and research on a subject of
vital concern to the US and its Allies.
f. :7.'Y ,,'9T NQIYLGA, a ' , a z y u;i.+F I n to l i i g e n c e Assessment
,f s`s~3c J (S/NOFORN)
This page standing alone is UNCLASSIFIED.
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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
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EGRET
HEADQUARTERS USAF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Major Kenneth M. Currie, AF/INES
CONTRIBUTORS:
Lt Colonel Phillip D. Gardner, AF/INES
Lt Colonel Storm C. Rhode, AF/INER
Mr Robert Boyd, AF/INEG
Mr Tommy L. Whitton, AF/INES
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Introduction
(U) The USSR is well aware the reliability of its Warsaw
Pact allies' military forces is a key factor in the political
and military equation in Europe. Reliability has been of
critical concern to the Soviets in the past and was of decisive
importance in the Soviet decisions to intervene in Hungary
in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. It may yet prove to be
a key factor in any contemplated Soviet decision to intervene
with military force in Poland.
(S) Warsaw Pact military plans presuppose the full partici-
pation of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) armed forces.
Lacking reasonable assurances of reliable Warsaw Pact support
of military operations, the USSR would be very unlikely to
initiate hostilities against NATO except in what it deemed the
direst necessity. It is almost certain the Soviets have
developed contingency plans in the event its NSWP allies should
waver in their commitment to a war against NATO. Yet, in order
to institute such plans, the Soviets realize they must constantly
appraise Pact reliability in any situation.
(S/NOFORN) Warsaw Pact forces opposing NATO are primarily
Soviet, but NSWP forces make a significant contribution--and
indeed are critical--to Soviet strategy for conflict in Europe.
Of the 163 active Warsaw Pact divisions opposing NATO, 53 belong
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77
? T !
to the NSWP countries. Besides these active divisions, the
NSWP armies also have mobilization divisions which can be
geared up for conflict in Western Europe (4 East German, 2
Polish, 2 Czechoslovak, and 3 Bulgarian), although even at full
strength these would be smaller and less well-equipped than
standard Warsaw Pact divisions. The Pact's success in
achieving its wartime objectives will depend upon its ability
to control and coordinate multinational, joint service operations
of great complexity. In implementing these wartime plans,
the reliability of the NSWP forces is a critical factor in
Soviet calculations of the projected success of these military
operations.
(S) Besides constituting in sheer bulk nearly a third of the
Warsaw Pact divisions available for combat against NATO, certain
NSWP armies are tasked with specific frontal operations against
NATO, a fact which increases their importance in the Soviet
scheme of things and renders all the more important the question
of their reliability. The Soviets and their NSWP allies have
established a Northern Front in the Western Theater of Military
Operations (TVD) comprised of 15 Polish army divisions. This
front is commanded by a Polish general and his staff and is the
only Warsaw Pact command at the front level or higher which is
headed by a non-Soviet officer. The Soviets are also counting
on Czechoslovak divisions to shoulder a large share of the
potential fighting in the southern portion of the Western
TVD. The Soviets have sought to assure the reliability of
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the Polish and Czechoslovak units by targeting them against
traditional enemies, the Germans. However, if the Soviets should
discover they cannot rely upon these Warsaw Pact allied forces,
they will be forced to use Soviet forces from other, possibly
critcal, areas to cover the resulting gaps in the Warsaw Pact
lines.
(S) Recent events in Poland have placed in grave doubt
the wisdom of relying upon the Poles for so critical a role in
Warsaw Pact war plans. Although Moscow hopes in time--with
the normalization of the Polish situation and the resumption of
normal military and political training in the Polish Armed Forces--
the Poles can he counted upon fully to perform their wartime
mission, the Soviets may be planning to assume a larger role in
the operations of the Northern Front.
(S) Besides the importance of the NSWP countries in the
conduct of actual military operations against NATO, the territories
of these countries are vital for the movement of Soviet military
forces and supplies. The major lines of communication from the
USSR run through Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia and
the national forces of these three countries are responsible for
the operation, maintenance, and protection of these networks.
The importance of these networks and their vulnerability was in
stark evidence during the Polish crisis when labor disorders in
virtually all sectors of the Polish economy seriously curtailed
deliveries of essential raw materials, such as coal, to the
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Soviet Union. Consequently, Moscow must be assured of NSWP
reliability if it is to be able to count upon a smooth functioning
of the logistics systems vital to its conduct of offensive war
against NATO.
(S) While the dependence upon the NSWP countries for a third
of the divisions and virtually all of the LOCs in the Forward
Area suggests the Soviets have judged whatever reliability prob-
lems may occur to be manageable, the Soviets continually monitor
and attempt to improve this reliability. Moscow no doubt is
extremely sensitive to any changes which would force modifications
in its war planning.
Ensuring Warsaw Pact Effectiveness
(U) Concerned as they are about the factor of reliability
in their war planning, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies
have adopted a series of measures intended to assure the total
subordination of the military to the interests of the ruling
parties and the concomitant reliability of the national forces
in the event of conflict with the West.
(U) Among those actions designed to assure the political
subordination of the military to the Party elite are the creation
of numerous Party-military interfaces designed to establish the
"politicization" of the armed forces, the cooption of the officer
corps into the power structure, and the establishment of a political
control structure consisting of both a political control network
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organic to the military--the main political administrations--and
security police "special sections" tasked with rooting out "sub-
version" and "disloyalty." The main political administrations
also work to ensure the reliability of the armed forces through
political education of the troops. Other measures used to encourage
Pact reliability include joint Warsaw Pact exercises--designed
to test wartime concepts and to condition the NSWP forces
to working and fighting with their Soviet "comrades in arms"--;
designation for Warsaw Pact service of key armed forces units
whose political and military reliability is much higher than
the average unit: and--in several Warsaw Pact countries--the
creation of relatively large, politically reliable security
troop bodies. In the last case, the use of more reliable forces
spares the largely conscript regular forces the odious task
of firing, upon fellow countrymen, thereby forestalling what
could constitute a major test of their reliability.
(S) Finally, the USSR itself employs several methods throuah
which it seeks to exercise control over its NSWP allies to assure
their commitment to the Warsaw Pact mission as perceived in Moscow.
These methods include the assignment of Soviet "liaison officers"
to the national ministries of defense and the stationing of Soviet
military advisers, in many cases, down to the division level;
the maintenance of bilateral military agreements with the NSWP
treaty members; and Soviet domination of the command positions in
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the Warsaw Pact, despite some greater efforts in recent years to
give at least a superficial appearance of intrapact cooperation.
The Party-Military Connection
(U) One of the means by which the loyalty and reliability
of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states is assured is the
politicization of the military. Within the USSR., this has proceed-
ed to the point where there is a substantial congruence of values
between Party and military leaders concerning the goals of societal
change, the legitimacy of Party rule,. and the desirability of
further expanding Soviet military power. The military is repre-
sented on the highest Party bodies, and Party affiliation and
loyalty are prerequisites for advancement in rank and responsi-
bility. The military is accorded a leading role in the determina-
tion of defense and national security issues and enjoys a high
degree of autonomy in the elaboration of Soviet military science.
The congruence of Party and military views and the recognition
of the unique needs and capabilities of the military have resulted
in a firm commitment by the military to the political system.
(U) The situation is somewhat different in the NSWP states,
however. This is the result of several factors.,, among them the
relative newness of the regimes and military establishments and
the dominance of Soviet military doctrine. The latter attribute
negates somewhat the need for an East European military possessing
the unique knowledge and skills characteristic of its Soviet counter-
part. The degree of politicization of the military varies from
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country to country among the NSWP states, but in general the
East European militaries have not been as involved in Party
politics and the formulation of foreian and defense policies as
their Soviet comrades. Nonetheless, East European military input
into regime decisionmakinq appears to have increased over the
years. Poland is the most obvious and extreme example of this
development.
(U) The existence of East European military establishments
standing outside the arena of Party politics in the past created
the potential for an armed forces leadership which placed national
interests above those of the communist regime. This certainly
caused the Soviets some concern as to the reliability of their
East European allies: in 1956, Khrushchev was confronted by
Polish military units willing to fight Soviet forces to protect
Polish sovereignty. More recently, Jaruzelski purportedly declared
in 1976 Polish armed forces would not fire on Polish workers.*
(U) Despite these past concerns, overall trends in Party-
military relations in Eastern Europe should steadily change in
Moscow's favor. The longer the East European regimes are in
power, the greater becomes the military's stake in preserving
the status quo, thereby protecting its privileged position in
society. The East European militaries increasingly have become
involved in regime policymaking; consequently, their interests
conform ever more closely to those of the Party leadership. This
*It was, in fact, the Polish security forces (the ZUMO) which
had primary responsibility for imposing martial law. See the
discussion on p. 15 below.
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trend toward greater convergence of views may be encouraged
still further by the ever larger numbers of officers fully educated
in the Party-military ethos of the Soviet bloc who join the
Eastern European armed forces leadership cadres.
(U) At the same time, this poses another potential source
of trouble for the Soviets. As the East European military leader-
ships increase their expertise in military affairs and expand
their access to and identification with the communist regimes,
they may well become more resistant to the Soviets," treatment of
them as "junior partners" in the Warsaw Pact. While this will
have little if any impact upon the overall reliability of the
Warsaw Pact in the near term,. Moscowys continued heavy-handed
dominance of Pact affairs could exacerbate existing frictions
within the alliance structure.
Cooption of the Officer Corps
(U) Closely related to the use of Party-military interfaces
to ensure the reliability of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in the
event of internal and external crises is the cooption by the
Party leadership of the leading members of the military high com-
mand, thereby acquiring directly their military expertise and giving
them direct access to the policymaking process. Senior military
leaders serve on the party politburos and defense councils
in the Warsaw Pact states, thus assuring them of a direct input
into the national security decision- and policymaking process.
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It must also be assumed, since it is the Party elite which reaches
down into the military to coopt its leading members, only those who
appear to be the most politically reliable and committed to regime
policies will be selected.
( U ) I n light of the above, one must treat with caution the
characterizations of such East European military leaders as Jaru-
zelsi as "national communists" who might challenge the political
legitimacy of the East European communist regimes. Jaruzelski
may well possess a differing perception of the proper means for
achieving political and economic change within the constraints
of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. However, his political
training, his military training in the USSR and connections
with the Soviet military leadership, and his rise to the top of
the Polish Party and government apparatus attest to his overall
firm commitment to regime policies which will pose no serious
threat to Moscow. The same can be said of virtually all other
military leaders within the Warsaw Pact states. Quite simply,
these military leaders would not have risen to the top if they
had demonstrated less than complete commitment to the socialist
system.
The Political Control Apparatus in the Military
(U) In all the Warsaw Pact countries there exists an extensive
system of political education and controls designed to ensure the
reliability of the armed forces and improve their fighting spirit.
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The system of political education is intended to instill in the
officer and conscript the proper moral-patriotic feelings toward
military duty and the communist homeland. The control apparatus
functions as a watchdog to weed out those individuals who fail to
demonstrate the proper values and represent a potential threat to
discipline and morale. With the passage of time and the emergence
of a truly communist military cadre., the control function has become
less important, but the role of the political apparatus as a "national
university" for moral-patriotic education has increased.
(U) The Warsaw Pact political control apparatus consists
of main political administrations (MPA) of the armed forces. Al-
though the chiefs of these MPAs hold military rank and are con-
sidered part of the military high command., their organizations
are actually directly subordinate to the communist party and report
through party channels. These separate reporting channels provide
the Party an alternate source of information for assessing the
status of the armed forces. The MPA structure parallels the
military chain of command, with deputy commanders for political
affairs (zampolit) assigned down to the company level. Although
these "political" officers primarily are responsible for troop
indoctrination, they do wear military rank and share culpability
with the military commander for any decline in the overall combat
readiness of the troops of the unit. The political officers
evaluation of the officers and the troops under their command is
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an important part of their personnel folders and is critical to
their opportunities for promotion.
(U) Troop Education. Military-patriotic education at the
troop level consumes several hours each week of the troop training
schedule. Its central themes stress the importance of the inter-
national socialist duty of the soldier and the "predatory,"
"aggressive" nature of the West. The Warsaw Pact soldier is to
be instilled with a hatred of his capitalist "class enemy."
The West is portrayed as the main threat to world peace; this
characterization is contrasted with the peaceful, "defensive"
nature of Warsaw Pact military policy.
(C) While much of the content of political education proves
to be tedious to the average conscript and there is some concern
over the effectiveness of troop indoctrination (the Warsaw Pact
military press is replete with criticism of the failings of
various political officers and their training efforts), the pro-
gram overall has a positive impact from the standpoint of the
Party and military leadership. Military-patriotic education
complements and builds upon the political training which citizens
of the Warsaw Pact states receive virtually from infancy. Despite
the reported cynicism among many youth in the communist countries
of Eastern Europe, interviews with defectors and emigres make it
clear the citizen comes to accept many of the precepts of the
communist world view and comes to view the West through the
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prism of his communist political indoctrination.
(U) Troop Control. Political reliability is critical to
advancement in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. The enter-
prising young conscript will seek Party membership if he wishes
to advance in rank, and a Party membership card is a virtual
necessity for the officer who wants to get ahead. Warsaw Pact
troops, particularly the officer cadre, are evaluated partly
upon the basis of their "party mindedness" (partiynost'). Anyone
who demonstrates the slightest deviation from the Party line or
who displays a lack of commitment to Party work in the military
runs a grave risk of jeopardizing his military career--or subsequent
civilian career, in the case of the conscript.
(U) The Security Police Apparatus. Complementing the activi-
ties of the Party MPA apparatus within the military are the "special
sections" of the security police. These organs are tasked with
weeding out espionage and subversion within the armed forces.
There can be little doubt they also evaluate the political
reliability of the individual service member. In short, these
organs serve in a counterintelligence role very similar to that
of the investigative services of the US armed forces. However,
they are organizationally separate from the armed forces and
their purview extends to ferreting out "ideological diversions,"
a crime which is interpreted very broadly in the communist lexicon.
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Warsaw Pact Exercises
(U) The Warsaw Pact yearly conducts a series of command
post and set piece field exercises--such as "Union" and "Brother-
hood-in-Arms"--designed to test joint command procedures. Per-
haps just as importantly, however,, these exercises condition the
NSWP staffs to working and fighting with their Soviet comrades.
The exercises demonstrate Pact solidarity, and however much one
may question the true military utility of some of these exe- ci ses,
they do serve to reinforce perceptions of the Pact defending
against potential Western aggression. The exercises serve one other
important function: they demonstrate the USSR`s military power,
thereby reminding the NSWP allies of the limits of their autonomy.
Designation of Key Units for Warsaw Pact Duty
(S) The NSWP countries also attempt to resolve potential
problems of troop reliability along the border with NATO through
another means: the designation of the more politically reliable,
better trained military units for Warsaw Pact duty. Poland., for
example, has committed half its ground forces to the Warsaw Pact
in the event of a conflict with NATO. The remainder would stay
in Poland as part of a so-called internal front. The "external"
front committed to the Pact consists of eight mechanized divisions,
five armored divisions., one sea landing division,. one airborne
division,. and other front and army combat and support units.
These 15 divisions comprise the Warsaw Pacts Northern--or Polish--
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front, a key component of the Soviet's Western theater of military
operations (TVD).
(C) The USSR does not follow a conscious policy of assigning
its most reliable units to the NATO theater, but the disposition of
the Soviet population achieves the same effect. The regions of the
USSR nearest NATO are predominantly Slavic, and the mobilization
reserves for the Category II and III divisions in this area will come
from these areas. At a time when the Soviet leadership may be con-
cerned with the problem of successfully integrating increasing num-
bers of non-Slavic, non-Russian speaking peoples into the armed
forces, this factor should help to lessen concern about the potential
effectiveness of the Soviet units along the Western front.
The Role of Internal Security Forces
(U) All Warsaw Pact states maintain relatively large troop
bodies tasked with providing internal security against both do-
mestic and external enemies. Although some Western sources refer
to these troop bodies as "paramilitary," they in fact could
constitute a sizable augmentation to the armed forces of the
Warsaw Pact; consequently, they should be considered assets of the
armed forces of the member states--although they do not report
through ministry of defense channels. These troops generally
consist of the most highly capable, politically reliable young
men drafted for military service since they are, in effect,
the "palace guard" of the communist regime.
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(U) These forces all have a key role to play in the event of
domestic unrest in the Warsaw Pact countries. In all likelihood,
the regime will opt to use these more politically reliable forces,
rather than regular army troops, to put down domestic disturbances.
This will spare the regular armed forces conscript the potentially
traumatic experience of firing on his fellow countrymen, an event
which could rapidly lead to a decline in the morale and political
reliability of the regular army. It was this uncertainty over
the reliability of the regular armed forces in quelling domestic
unrest which explains why the Polish regime relied primarily upon
the security forces to bear the bulk of the burden of imposing
martial law and ending worker strikes and demonstrations, although
regular army units stood ready to render assistance.
Soviet Measures for Controlling The Warsaw Pact Allies
(U) Beyond the active measures all Warsaw Pact states use to
enhance the reliability and effectiveness of their armed forces, there
are certain other steps the Soviet Union has taken to ensure its
control over its East European comrades. These measures are
designed to neutralize any anti-Soviet or nationalist sentiment
within the NSWP armed forces and guarantee NSWP military planning
is in strict accordance with Soviet objectives.
Soviet Military Representation in the Warsaw Pact
(S) The USSR maintains a senior military representative to
each of the NSWP ministries of defense. His job entails far
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more than simple liaison, however; he is responsible for overseeing
the activities of the Soviet advisers which are present in almost
all the NSWP armies down to the division level. These advisers
do much more than assist their East European military comrades
in resolving military questions; they make key inputs into NSWP
military decisionmaking at all levels of the "host" country's
military establishment. This pervasive Soviet military presence
may have been instrumental in neutralizing whatever latent sentiment
for active military resistance may have existed within the
Czechoslovak armed forces in 1968.
(S) In addition, these Soviet military advisers are tasked
with reporting upon the political as well as combat readiness of
the national forces to which they are assigned. These assessments
would be expected to play a key role in the selection of NSWP
officer cadre for further advancement in rank and responsibility
and selection for higher command schools in the USSR.
(U) Another example of Soviet military "representation"
to control the NSWP allies can be found in the groups of forces
stationed in the Forward Area. While the political control
function of the groups of forces may be relatively less important
in the case of the GDR, it is certainly accurate to say they fulfill
this role in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and they could, if neces-
sary perform this mission in Poland as well. Should the armed
forces of any of the NSWP member states falter in the event of a
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conflict with the West, the Soviet groups of forces could be
used to stiffen their will to fight.
(U) Finally, the Soviets dispatch high-ranking military
leaders on official visits to their Warsaw Pact allies, another
visible reminder of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. Soviet
troops in Eastern Europe also conduct publicized visits to Soviet
war memorials located throughout the region, a step designed
to remind the citizens of these states of their World War II debt
to the USSR for liberation from Nazi occupation.
Domination of Command Positions in the Warsaw Pact
(S) Despite certain cosmetic changes in recent years designed
to give the appearance of greater involvement of the NSWP military
leadership in Warsaw Pact command and control, Pact doctrine, tac-
tics, policies, armaments, and materiel continue to be dominated
overwhelmingly by the Soviets. The Pact Commander and his Chief of
of Staff, as well as the theater and forces commanders, have always
been Soviet officers. It is doubtful this situation ever will
change appreciably.
(C) NSWP defense and deputy defense ministers now meet fairly
regularly with their Soviet counterparts to discuss Pact policy and
there has been a modest effort towards drawing NSWP officers into
the Pact's field command structure. Pact meetings occasionally
are characterized by resistance to Soviet policy initiatives--prin-
cipally coming from the Romanians--and several NSWP countries
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have expressed concern over meeting Soviet defense spending
objectives for the Pact as a whole. Nevertheless, Soviet prefer-
ences still carry the day in virtually all significant Pact
matters. Given the unequal nature of the alliance and the depend-
ence of the NSWP armed forces upon the USSR for equipment and
materiel, it could not be otherwise.
(U) Although the Soviets probably perceive their almost
total dominance of the Warsaw Pact as beneficial in guaranteeing
the control of the NSWP armed forces, there is a counterproductive
side to continued Soviet dominance. The growing economic and mili-
tary potential of several of the NSWP countries and the public
characterization of the Pact as a partnership likely will result
in increasing pressures from the NSWP states for a more important
voice in the determination of Pact policies. Soviet resistance
to these demands will only serve to increase frictions within
the alliance structure. Nevertheless, Moscow probably feels
such friction is a small price to pay to ensure the Warsaw Pact
conforms to Soviet national objectives. The growing sophistication
of Soviet/Warsaw Pact combined arms doctrine and the increasing
technical complexity of Warsaw Pact armament may result in even
greater Soviet domination of the Pact, despite the wishes of
Moscow's NSWP allies.
Bilateral Military Agreements with Eastern Europe
(U) Moscow also has been careful to establish a series of
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bilateral military treaties with all its East European allies
which tie them almost as closely to the USSR as do the provisions
of the Warsaw Treaty. Finally, the Warsaw Pact Joint Command is
not a wartime command structure. The Soviets even now would
control the military operations of their Warsaw Pact allies
through a High Command in the Western TVD--a wartime command
structure directly subordinate to the USSR's Supreme High Command--
although nominally there would continue to be a "Unified Command"
of the Warsaw Pact.
The Soviet Assessment of Pact Reliability
(C) Overall Soviet perceptions of Pact reliability are critical
to Moscow's planning for operations against the West. The political
status of these forces is considered to be a critical ingredient in
the Soviet concept of the "correlation of forces" between the USSR
and the West. Ensuring a high moral-patriotic sense of duty to
the socialist commonwealth is a primary concern for the Soviet
military leadership. However, Soviet perceptions are difficult to
define due to the absence of conclusive data. We know the Soviets
monitor Warsaw Pact reliability, work to improve it, and evince
concern over any signs of its deterioration. Although we cannot
state precisely the overall Soviet assessment of the reliability
of its Warsaw Pact allies, a general assessment can be made.
Such factors as the domestic situation in a NSWP country--
Poland comes most readily to mind in this regard--the deteriorat-
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ing economic situation of the East European countries, and NSWP
member states' resistance to certain Soviet policy initiatives
no doubt generate concern in Moscow over the reliability of
Eastern Europe. These problems, however, do not help to define the
parameters of the Soviet assessment of how much it can rely upon
the NSWP member states in the event of a conflict with the West.
This assessment is a composite derived from other sources, including
Warsaw Pact exercises, Soviet planning for war with NATO, and Soviet
initiatives within the Pact.
(C) The overall situation at the time of a decision for
action also is a determining factor in assessing NSWP reliability.
The Soviets make special efforts to monitor reliability closely,
including sending delegations led by senior officers to evaluate
reliability in a crisis situation; e.g., such groups were sent
to Poland.
(S) What we know about current Pact war plans and the degree
of NSWP armed forces involvement in those plans indicates Moscow
believes it can, under most conditions, count upon its Warsaw
Pact allies in the event of conflict with NATO, at least during
the early stages. East European forces and lines of communication
are critical to the conduct of a war against NATO, and there is
no evidence the Soviets have deemphasized their importance in
such a conflict. Nevertheless, the events in Poland probably
have forced the Soviets to reevaluate Poland's contribution to Pact
war plans and to devise contingency plans which place less reliance
YpN
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~-'~~sai3l~ Y.
upon the Polish armed forces to carry out missions in their
assigned frontal area of responsibility.
The Polish Crisis and the Soviet Reaction
(S) Recent Soviet military activity indicates serious concern
over the repercussions of the Polish crisis for Warsaw Pact planning.
The massive Soviet exercise Zapad-81 (West) held in the Baltic Sea
area and the Western USSR in early September 1981 may in part
indicate Soviet contingency planning for assuming responsibility
for operations in the Northern (Polish) Front of the Western
TVD. There were no Polish forces involved in the exercise, which
appeared to exercise several of the operational concepts and
objectives which would be expected in the Northern Front. Given
the current crisis in Poland, the USSR probably realizes it
cannot count upon the full level of Polish participation previously
planned for in the event of war with NATO. This may only be a
perception of a temporary weakness; the Soviets no doubt are
hoping stability will return to Poland in time and Warsaw will
once again be able to meet fully its commitments to Pact objectives.
Nevertheless, we cannot discount the possibility they perceive the
problem with the Poles to be a more long-term one which will
require permanent realignments of Warsaw Pact missions and forces.
(U) The Polish crisis probably poses the most clear-cut
challenge to Warsaw Pact military integrity ever, at least from
the Soviet perspective. There can be little doubt the challenge
represented by Solidarity and the danger of the spread of the
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"counterrevolutionary" virus to the rest of Eastern Europe are
of more than passing concern to the Soviets and have increased
Moscow's sensitivities to any signs of weakness within the
Pact. There is no evidence, however--short of possible changes
to accommodate the Polish situation--which would indicate the
Soviets have altered their view of the overall reliability of
their Warsaw Pact allies.
Soviet Prophylaxis: Tying Eastern Europe More Closely to Moscow
(U) Soviet efforts to achieve greater political, economic,
and political integration of Eastern Europe and the USSR are
evidence of a more long-term concern over potential challenges
to Warsaw Pact integrity. Moscow was very likely concerned the
rapid increase in East European commercial and cultural ties
with the West following the advent of detente in the early 1970s
posed a possible threat to the raison_d'etre of the Warsaw Pact:
defense against the threat of Western aggression. Consequently,
the Soviets claimed there could be no lessening of the ideological
struggle even during a period of diplomatic detente. Soviet
interest in inoculating its Warsaw Pact brethren against the
virus of Western democracy was more apparent in its intensified
efforts to promote increased integration of the Soviet and East
European economies and societies. The Soviets have pointedly
noted to Warsaw the allegedly disastrous effects upon the Polish
economy produced by an overreliance upon the economic credits from
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the West, a comment Moscow no doubt intends to serve as a warning
to the other Warsaw Pact member states. Moscow likely believes
the other East European economies will be more wary of any further
expansion of trade with the West, thereby increasing the importance
of their economic ties to the USSR. There can be little doubt the
Soviet leadership sees in closer economic and political integration
a further guarantee of the military reliability of the NSWP
armed forces.
The Soviet Balance Sheet
(U) Moscow realizes the degree of NSWP reliability will de-
pend to a great degree on the conditions under which war breaks
out and is waged. Although the Soviets are aware a number of
scenarios are possible for war in Central Europe, Moscow appears
generally to adhere to one scenario for Warsaw Pact military
planning purposes. Soviet exercises and military writings presume
a conflict in Europe will be preceded by a lengthy period--per-
haps several weeks--of increasing international tensions. Once
war erupts, Soviet/Warsaw Pact doctrine calls for rapid offensive
warfare against NATO with the objective of defeating the NATO forces
and occupying much of Western Europe in the shortest possible time.
The Soviets know a number of factors could well intervene to disrupt
such a scenario for wartime success, but it is the scenario which
guides their planning and determines the role of the NSWP allies in
that planning.
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 (U) The USSR is acutely aware the reliability of its Warsaw
Pact allies is dependent upon many factors once conflict with the
West appears imminent or actually breaks out. The Soviets and
their allies will thoroughly prepare their populations for the
prospect of conflict and will attempt to portray the West as the
aggressive party. Given the party's virtually complete control
of the media and the propaganda organs, this task will be greatly
simplified. The Warsaw Pact states thus should prove capable of
manipulating the perception of the peoples of Eastern Europe
concerning responsibility for the outbreak of war. Consequently,
it will be difficult for the West to ensure an effective counter
to Soviet and East European propaganda in this regard, although
some measures to do so will be available.
(U) Success, rather than an assessment of responsibility
for starting war in Europe, should prove to be the more decisive
factor in ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of the
Warsaw Pact forces. Success in a war against NATO, regardless
of who started it, likely will breed enthusiasm on the part of
the NSWP armed forces for continuing the conflict against such
traditional enemies as the Germans. An unsuccessful war could
well begin to tear at the fabric of Warsaw Pact reliability, but
the Soviets probably believe NSWP reliability will remain suf-
ficiently intact short of a complete collapse of the Soviet
Armed Forces. Should war with NATO evolve into a protracted
conventional conflict in which the West has a chance to mobilize
 its resources such as it did in World War II, victory for the
Soviets would become problematic. Consequently, the Soviet
doctrine for war in Europe emphasizes rapid offensive warfare
against NATO with military objectives to be achieved in the
shortest possible time, thereby denying the Western powers time
to bring their reserves into play and the East Europeans the oppor-
tunity to reconsider their situations.
(U) Based upon what we currently know about Soviet war plans,
the Soviets probably believe they can count upon their Warsaw
Pact allies to carry out a war with NATO based upon this scenario.
The Warsaw Pact force posture and concepts for war in Europe
provide ample evidence of this overall Soviet assessment of the
reliability of the NSWP armed forces. Nevertheless, the Soviets
probably believe some of their East European allies will prove more
steadfast in the conflict than others. Based upon the state of
Soviet relations with each country and the status of the armed
forces in each, the USSR probably believes Bulgaria and the GDR
are the most reliable of its Warsaw Pact allies. Poland, once
considered among the most reliable, likely has dropped in the
Soviet estimation--albeit perhaps only temporarily--to somewhere
in the middle of the reliability scale, probably roughly on a par
with Hungary. Should the situation in Poland stabilize and the
economic situation begin improving, the Polish armed forces may
well regain their former stature in the Soviets' eyes. Czechoslo-
vakia, for obvious reasons pertaining to 1968, must be considered
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to be even less reliable. The Soviets have sought to counter
the problem with the Czechoslovak armed forces through the
establishment of a joint Soviet-Czechoslovak Front opposite
Prague's traditional enemy, the Germans. Finally, the Romanians--
who continue to refuse closer cooperation with the Pact, quarrel
incessantly with the USSR over foreign policy issues, and have
vowed to resist intrusions in their territory by any power--are
undoubtedly viewed by Moscow as the least reliable of their Pact
allies, despite the internal orthodoxy and rigidity of the Ro-
manian political system.
Exploiting Soviet Vulnerabilities
(U) NATO has limited resources for influencing the reliabil-
ity of the NSWP armed forces. Overt actions designed to undermine
the reliability of these forces would be construed by the Soviets
as hostile acts and probably would elicit a sharp Soviet reaction.
Nevertheless, there are several tactics available to the West
which could serve to degrade Pact reliability as perceived by the
Soviets and deter the USSR from initiating an attack upon NATO.
These tactics primarily involve measures in the economic, diplo-
matic, and cultural realms which would be designed to draw these
countries closer to the West and loosen their ties with Moscow.
(U) Western trade with Eastern Europe has offered one means
of expanding contact with these countries and increasing their
dependence upon the West. The Polish crisis and the generally
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poor credit situation of Eastern Europe argue against any signifi-
cant expansion of this trade in the near term, however.
(U) Western pressure upon the USSR and Eastern Europe
to expand cultural contacts as provided for in the Helsinki
agreements offers another means for achieving closer ties with
Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies and undermining in East European eyes
Moscow's characterization of the West as inherently hostile to
the countries of Eastern Europe. Soviet resistance to expanded
contacts lessens the effectiveness of this tactic; however, con-
tinued Western pressure may produce some positive results in the
long run.
(U) One of the more readily available means for undermining
the cohesiveness of the Warsaw Pact available to NATO consists of
Western media broadcasts to Eastern Europe. Such broadcasts serve
to counter the Soviet charges of Western aggression, reveal the
offensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, and emphasize the one-
sided nature of the Warsaw Pact and the general domination of
Eastern Europe by the USSR. It is impossible to measure the effective-
ness of such broadcasts in terms of undermining the reliability of
the East European armed forces, but obviously the Soviets believe
they have enough of an impact upon the populations of Eastern Europe
to warrant jamming the Western transmissions.
(C) In the event of conflict in Europe, the NATO allies could
employ a variety of psychological warfare techniques which, when
applied properly, could significantly degrade the morale and re-
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liability of the NSWP forces. Existing ethnic problems, dissatis-
faction within the ranks, poor living conditions, and general
apathy are among the factors exploitable for the purpose of en-
couraging defections, desertions, and surrender.
(U) Obviously, the most effective means for presenting the
Soviets with the problem of Warsaw Pact reliability is a Western
military posture designed to deter or defeat a Warsaw Pact attack
upon NATO. If the Soviets can be prevented from waging a success-
ful short war against NATO, then the centrifugal forces prevalent
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should come into play.
Under such conditions, the Soviets would be unable to maintain
overall confidence in the reliability of their Warsaw Pact allies.
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A *-;? ~r% 1?a: ni n 'r' rR
THIS PAUL 116 ~U1TuLMS 1r1ty
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
SAF/OS, Wash DC 20330
SAF/US, Wash DC 20330
Air Staff
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AFRES/DOI, Robins AFB GA 31098 (2)
Major Commands
HQ AFLC/IN, Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433
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HO USAFE/IN, APO New York 09012
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Separate Operating Agencies/Direct Reporting Units
Aerospace Defense Center/IN, Peterson AFB, CO 80914 (2)
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AF/RE, Wash DC 20330
National Guard Bureau/CF, Wash DC 20310
Other
Chairman JCS, Wash DC 20301
JCS/J-5, Wash DC 20301
JCS/SAGA, Wash DC 20301
JSTPS/JL, Offutt AFB NE 68113
CIA (NIO, NFAC, Office of Soviet Analysis (12), FBIS (3)),
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Director, National Security Agency, Ft George G. Meade MD 20755,
(Attn: T124/CDB) (10)
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Operating Units
HQ AFLC/OC-ALC/XRO.,. Tinker AFB OK 73145
HQ AFLC/OO-ALC/XRO., Hill AFB UT 84406
HQ AFLC/SA-ALC/XRO., Kelly AFB TX 78241
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ARRS/IN, Scott AFB IL 62225
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