NATO WARNING AND THE SOVIET'S EASTERN EUROPE PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000100020038-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: March 10, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP86T00302R000100020038-1
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: NATO Warning and the Soviet's Eastern
Europe Problem
The other day I said there was an as-
pect of the warning problem that comes out
of our work on the reliability of the East
Europeans that I would.write up. Attached
is a note on that subject.
Henry S. Rowen
Chairman
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - NIO/W
1 - NIO/SP
1 - NI0/LA
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/WE
1 - C/NIC Chrono
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NATO Warning and the Soviet's Eastern Europe Problem
NATO's commanders have long been worried about the threat of a
surprise Warsaw Pact attack. For one thing, NATO forces in peacetime
are poorly positioned for effective defense against a sudden Warsaw Pact
attack; for another, at the outset of war, the Soviets can be expected
to move swiftly against key NATO facilities, especially command and
control and nuclear weapon storage sites, in hopes of paralyzing NATO's
responses.
This is a real enough threat and the NATO authorities should take
it very seriously. However, it is also important to recognize how
potentially precarious the Soviet situation is in Eastern Europe and how
this might affect their decisions on how to go to war. Viewed from
Moscow, almost all of Eastern Europe is potentially hostile territory.
The evidence for this doesn't need repetition here, but it is probable
that none of the East European states are seen as reliable partners.
This suggests that in a period of intense East-West crisis -- one which
may escalate into a war -- the Soviets will take additional measures to
ensure that the non-Soviet forces behave as they are supposed to. This
could involve activities which would be additional indicators of Soviet
preparations for war including Soviet inspections of East European
troops, imposition of Soviet controls over Key communications facilities
and transport links, and the assignment of Soviet "advisors" down to the
regiment level. We should look at this possibility in the context of
our warning indicators.
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Even if the Soviets take those steps they must be worried about
what would happen in East Europe if their forces currently there become
engaged in fighting NATO forces and the East Europeans realize that
there is a greater chance than before to change the regimes they have
been living under? Or at least strike some blows (such as through
sabotage) at their subjugators? Consequently, would not the Soviets
want to maintain enough troops in the area for "police duties" or at
least to guard their lines of communication? These demands on a Soviet
troop presence could be large at the time these same troops are needed
against NATO's forces.
Proceeding from this analysis, two different strategies appear
possible for the Soviets: one is to strike a swift and hopefully
decisive blow against NATO without prior reinforcement aimed at getting
the war over with quickly. The other is to reinforce massively in order
both to secure their rear and to confront NATO with superior forces
before shooting starts. (On the second choice, they might try to
achieve tactical surprise by staging a "relaxation" of tensions during a
period of crisis and then striking.) The first course must look highly
risky to the Soviets because everything would hang on the success of the
bold strike. Its failure would mean not only the survival of NATO's
combat capacity, but perhaps then an Eastern Europe out of control. The
latter course, mobilization first, has the important disadvantage of
giving NATO time to adopt a less vulnerable posture and to make large-
scale pre-attack reinforcements.
The Soviets might try to resolve this dilemma by using nuclear
weapons from the outset reasoning that a sudden nuclear strike could be
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decisive within Europe, and that escalation could ue averted. but the
risks of adopting that course of action are enormous.
This line of argument should not induce complacency in NATO. On
the contrary, incorporating the Soviet's East European problem into
thinking about how they might start a war increases the likelihood that
they would opt for an initial bold strike, non-nuclear or nuclear.
Since the bold strike approach would not assuredly take care of the East
European problem, the Soviets would probably take at least some
preparatory measures to enable them to rush troops into Eastern Europe
where their task would be to assure continued East European cooperation
with them or, at worst, East European passivity. Assessing the probable
nature of these preparatory measures and, most important, detecting them
if they begin is an additional intelligence challenge.
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