PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000700010022-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2014
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 11, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
? January 11, 1956.,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Propoed Legislation to Establish a
Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence
The National Security Council, in accordance
with its responsibilities under Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 as amended7 has been requested to
develop an Administration position on proposed legislation
to establish a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
Accordingly, the Director of Central
Intelligence has submitted for Council consideration the
enclosed report on the subject containing (a) an analysis
of the proposed legislation and (b) recommendations as to an
Administration position.
The enclosed report is being tentatively
scheduled for consideration by the Council at its meetinP,
on Thursday, February 2, 1956,
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secret
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Special Assistant to the President
on Disarmament
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chaitman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Special Assistant to the President
on Atomic Energy
The Director of Central Intelligence
" 41t
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?CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
Jal)yUry 6, 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council
SUBJECT: Proposed Legislation to Establish a
Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence
REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Director of Central
Intelligence from the Executive Secretary
of the National Security Council on the
subject dated October 7, 1955.
This memorandum is submitted in.compliance with the
request in reference memorandum that the Director of Central
Intelligence submit to the National Security Council for con-
sideration a report containing (a) an analysis of the proposed
legislation to establish a Joint Committee on Foreign
Intelligence, and (b) recommendations as to an Administration
position.
I.
Analysis of Proposed Legislation.
A large number of resolutions were introduced in the
Senate and the House during the last session of congress, all
of which proposed the establishment of a Joint Congressional
Committee on Foreign Intelligence. Certain of these bills
referred to a Joint Committee "on Central Intelligence", but
the purposes and functions remain substantially the same.
Two basic resolutions were introduced in the Senate.
One of these (S. 2614) was introduced on July 227 1955 by
Senator Smith of New Jersey. This bill (Annex 1) was referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Chairman of which,
Senator George, requested the views of the Central Intelligence
Agency. These views were submitted to Senator George in a
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letter from the Director dated Aumst 18, 1955 (Annex 2).
Senator Smith had introduced this bill in keeping with a
general practice he has followed for introducing legislation
to carry out the various recommendations of the Hoover
Commission, and the Senator indicated to the Director that
he had not committed himself as to the subject matter of the
proposed legislation.
A further bill was S. Con. Res. 2 (Annex 3), which was
introduced on January 14, 1955 by Senator Mansfield. This
resolution was introduced not only for Senator Mansfield him-
self, but on behalf of 32 other Senators as well, including 6
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its
Chairman, Senator George, and members of Senate Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees as well. Two other
Senators added their names to this resolution after its
initial introduction by Senator Mansfield, bringing the
total of co-signers .of the Mansfield Resaution to 35. How
far all 35 are really committed to the support of the Bill
is not known.
Resolutions of this type must be introduced on an indi-
vidual basis in the House, and 26 such resolutions were
introduced during the last session.
Although the various resolutions differ as to details,
such as the number and composition of membership, they all
basically call for the establishment of a "Joint Committee
on Foreign (or Central) Intelligence," the principle
function of which would be to make continuing studies of
the foreign intelligence activities of the Government.
Under all of them, the Central Intelligence Agency is
required to keep the Committee fully and currently informed
with respect to its acitvities, and all matters in the
Senate or House relating primarily to the Agency or its
activities are to be referred to the Joint Committee. All
of the resolutions authorize the Joint Committee to hold
hearings, subpoena witnesses and documents, etc., and all of
them empower the Committee to appoint such staff it may
determine to be necessary in order to carry out its functions.
A list of Senate and House resolutions on a Joint Com-
mittee, together with names of sponsors and date of intro-
duction, is attached hereto as Annex 4.
The Present Congressional Review Mechanism.
Since the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency
in 1947 Congress has devised various methods for maintain-
ing its relations with the Agency and for securing the
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information necessary to provide the basis for necessary
authorizations and appropriations. These methods also
provide a means of keeping the appropriate Committees quite
completely informed as to the activities of CIA and its
general effectiveness and efficiency. During the initial
period of the Agency's existence the Congress was inclined to
leave it alone. As the work of the CIA increased in scope
and magnitude, however, and attracted increased attention
both at home and abroad, Congressional interest increased.
Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, for
example, were general in nature during the early years of
the Agency's existence, but became more extensive and more
detailed, particularly in the 84th Congress. The House
scrutiny of the CIA budget has never involved pressures to
reveal information which the Director wished to withhold, and
so far there have been no security breaches attributable
to any Congressional hearing on CIA matters. Although the
Senate Appropriations Committee did not conduct as extensive
ardetailed hearings as the House Committee on the CIA
budget, it has also reviewed the work of the Agency in
recent sessions.
A similar pattern has developed with respect to the
authorizing committees, which have been the Committees on
Armed Services of the House and the Senate. During the
84th Congress, the Senate Armed Services Committee formalized
its interest in the CIA through the following "Armed Services
Committee Standing Orders":
"11. Within 30 days after the adoption of these
standing orders there shall be appointed by the chair-
man, t0 serve for the duration of the Congress, the
followIng subcommittees, each subcommittee to con-
sist of not less than two members at least one of
whom shall be from the minority party. The duties
of each subcommittee shall be as indicated herein.
A member of the professional staff of the committee
shall be assigned by the chairman to assist each
subcommittee, such staff assignments to be in
addition to the staff member's other duties.
"(b) Subcommittee on Central Intelligence Agency:
Hold such meeting and briefings as are
necessary to maintain familiarity with the
operation of section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 as amended and the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
and the policies and programs being carried
out pursuant to those authorities, or being
planned.
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Provide a channel for liaison between the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Senate
Committee on Armed Services."
On January 28, 1955, Senators Russell (Chairman), Byrd,
Johnson of Texas, Bridges, and Saltonstall were designated
as members of this subcommittee. On March 4, 1955 a Secret
briefing was held for the Committee, and two of its members,
Senators Byrd and Saltonstall, were given specific CIA
briefings in the field during recent trips abroad, as was
General Verne Mudge, a staff member of the Armed Services
Committee. Chairman Vinson of the House Armed Services
Committee has advised us that he proposes to establish
promptly a subcommittee similar to the Senate subcommittee.
Apart from the formal relations with Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees, CIA has had some dealings
with other committees in the House and the Senate such as
Government Operations, Post Office & Civil Service,
Judiciary, Foreign Relations, and the Joint Committees on
Atomic Energy and on Printing.
The Desirability_a Additional Congressional Review
of Non-Intelligence Activities)
A basic fact which must be borne in mind in analyzing
this problem is that the establishment of a separate
Congressional Committee whose only functions relate to the
conduct of foreign intelligence activities would inevitably
mean a closer scrutiny by a much broader membership of the
Congress of the activities of the United States Government
in this field. Although most of the resolutions introduced
have referred to "intelligence activities," which might be
construed as not relating to operational activities, they
all further provide that the Director of Central Intelligence
is to report to the Committee on "all" activities of CIA,
which makes it likely that any aspect of CIA or related
Government operations in this field would also come under
scrutiny by the Committee. At the present time, intelligence
activities are described to the Congress through formal or
informal subcommittees of existing committees, the members
of which and the staffs of which have additional duties to
perform. If the membership, and particularly the staff, of
a new Congressional committee has no functions other than
those relating to foreign intelligence, it is inevitable
that the demands upon the Executive Branch for information,
operational and otherwise, will be considerably greater
than under present arrangements. The actual needs of CIA
for substantive legislation are neither frequent nor
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extensive enough to occupy a major amount of the time of
a Congressional committee or staff, and requests for funds
will still have to be reviewed by the Appropriations Com-
mittees themselves. The following analysis as to specific
problems assumes the foregoing facts.
a. Securita. It is inevitable that a more intensive and
broader Congressional scrutiny of CIA would rapidly raise
serious security considerations and tend to impair the
effectiveness of operations. Countless examples could be
given of instances where the unauthorized disclosure of
information as to a planned operational activity (e.g, the
overthrow of a foreign government and the many lesser
activities) could have disastrous consequences. Witting
representatives of the Executive Branch are frequently
offended, morally or otherwise, by certain proposed operational
activities, and their remarks or views are heard within the
secure confines of the Executive Branch. No such security
strictures7 however, could be imposed upon members of
Congress. :11though individual members of Congress will
vigorously and truthfully deny that their security is any
less complete than that of the Executive Branch, experience
has indicated that this cannot be relied upon across the
board, and leaks are inevitable.
Apart from the implications insofar as the security of the
United States is concerned, an intensive Congressional
scrutiny of CIA is likely to impair intelligence relations
with friendly foreign governments. Such relations,
particularly with governments not formally allied with the
United States, depend on the understanding that they will
be held on the basis of absolute minimum access. Apart
from the increased danger of leaks from more people know-
ing, creation of the proposed Committee, with staff and
other facilities, would in itself tend to create doubt
abroad as to the security of United States' handling of
material handed over by foreign sources, and would result
in the inevitable stoppage of flow of certain sensitive
information which by its very nature, is most important to
the United States. In this respect, intelligence relation-
ships are more sensitive than any foreign relationship of
the Atomic Energy Commission and than almost any foreign
relationship of the Department of State.
The staff for the Committee would present many problems.
To de its job the staff would undoubtedly attempt a thorough
and continuous review of all Agency activities and thus
become involved in the most sensitive of clandestine activities.
This is particularly true inasmuch as CIA has little
legislation to concern a staff.
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b. alLIlimailip_Eftween the Executive and the Congress. The
creation of a Joint Committee would raise fundamental
problems as to the basic constitutional relationship between
the President and the Congress, particularly with regard to
the President's function of the conduct of foreign affairs.
Although it is perhaps not generally understood in the Congress,
CIA does not set policy, but carries on its activities only
in accordance with policy set by the Department of State?
the National Security Council7 and, ultimately, the President.
Hence, if operational activities under NSC 5412 become
included in the Joint Committee's charters as is likely,
the Committee would feel it necessary to know the policy.
basis for each activity, and the State Department, and in
certain cases the White House itself, would become
immediately and directly involved, with the resultant danger
cf incursion into the foreign policy prerogatives of the
Executive.
It does not follow that the operational activities of CIA,
as distinct from the intelligence activites, should be
regarded as sacrosanct, and not subject to review or
criticism. The proper location for such a review, however,
is within the Executive Branch itself. The Director
reports on such Agency activities semi-annually to the
National Security Council, consults frequently with the
Operations Coordinating Board, and obtains policy guidance
from State, Defense and other interested policy agencies.
c. The Jurisdictional Problem. The "foreign intelligence
activities of the Government" involve many departments and
agencies in addition to CIA. In the IAC alone there are
represented the Department of State, the three Services and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the AEC, the FBI, and on
occasion, representatives of other agencies. This would
mean that a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence
would have to deal with activities of many agencies which
presently fall within the jurisdiction of other Congressional
committees, such as Armed Services, Foreign Relations and
Foreign Affairs, Atomic Energy, Judiciary, etc.
The argument is often made that the "success" of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy is proof that a Joint Committee
on Intelligence would be similarly successful. This
argument, however, fails to take into account that in the
case of Atomic Energy, at least in the field of operations
which are the major Congressional concern, the Committee
only deals with one agency of the Government. Moreover,
they deal with an agency which has a wide variety of
responsibilities requiring extensive legislation in many
fields of activity, such as pre-emptive relationships in
patents and property, civil defense, control of materials,
411.
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(-\
manufacture of weapons, etc. Atomic Energy bills deal with
construction of industrial facilities, housing facilities,
taxation, research and development, and a number of
activities which are of interest to large segments of the
American people. No such factors relate to the conduct
of foreign intelligence,
Even if a Joint Committee were to make a bona fide attempt
to confine its attention to CIA's intelligence activities,
it would address itself to only about one-eighth of the
foreign intelligence activities of the Government in terms
of personnel or budgetary problems. Moreover, the activities
of CIA cannot be understood in isolation because its role is
to contribute by its "services of common concern" to the
work of each of the other intelligence services of the vt
Government, and to draw together the work of all of them in )e'
the production of national intelligence. Thus, a thorough
understanding of the intelligence structure of the Govern-