EDNA MCENROE, NSC SECRETARIAT, CHECKED ON THE ATTACHED THIS DATE AND REPORTED THAT NOTHING HAD EVER BEEN DONE.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000700010010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 25, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

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-i
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25 February 1960 ?
Edna NbEtroe, NSC Secretariat, checked on
the attached this date and reported that nothing
had ever been done. At present it was a closed
case. If it were reopened on PB it would probably
come out in a new memo.
Betty S.
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\e's* OCI s 2164 51
50X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, CPP
THROUGH
SUBJECT
5 APR 1957
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
? ? Comment on 25 March Memorandum for the NSC
Planning Board: "Possible Withdrawal of
Forces from Central Europe"
1. OCI concurs in this memorandum's evaluation of the
USSR's readiness to withdraw its forces from East Germany and
Eastern Europe, as well as in the analysis of Soviet policy
on European security and German reunification.
2. OCI believes that the statement on West German
rearmament plans (Para. 22) does not adequately reflect more
recent information on the new German schedule. While the last
part of Para. 22 indicates a slow-down, the second sentence
is misleading in implying that the Germans are still trying to
adhere to their original commitment of a 3-4 year build-up
of 500.000 men and 12 divisions. (References:
This paragraph might better read, after the existing
first sentence:
"While the Adenauer government agreed originally
to provide forces of half a million men and 12
divisions in a 3-4 year build-up program dating
from 1 January 1956, it has since concentrated on
building up seven small divisions to combat-
readiness during 1958, and has been reluctant to
inform its NATO allies of its long-term aims
beyond the announced goal for the end of 1957
(135,000 men in uniform). Nevertheless, leaders of
German opinion, both Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats, have indicated the need, especially since
the Hungarian revolt, for Germany to regain some
posture of military defense. Despite the present
wait-and-see transitional period of the German build-
up, fundamental West German policy is still based on
the stationing of Western troops in Germany and on
loyal adherence to NATO as a military and political
ally."
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2. It may be relevant to point out that the discussion of
, the merits and demerits of German neutralization (Paras. 27-36)
leaves a. gap in the intelligence picture by omitting any
consideration of the probable policies of a united, neutral
Germany, and the effect of such policies on US interests.
Although speculative, a brief paragraph (inserted
between Paras. 32 and 33) might state:
"On the other hand, there is reason to believe
that a united, neutral Germany would exhibit more
nationalist feeling than the Federal Republic has
shown thusfar, particularly because the unification
of East and Vest Germany would bring the status of
the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line to the fore-
front of political consideration. This situation
would obviously produce new tensions and dangers."
PONTIN N-D. SHELDON
Assistant Director,
Current Intelligence
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STANDARC, FORM NO. OR -
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Ce MeM ra Urn UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
a Mr. Amory
FROM : VT. 07ebil
SUBJECT:
DATE: 4 April 1957
I have not attempted to integrate the attached comments or to add my
own. I think both Willard and John have some provocative thoughts worth your
while to read, although I doubt that they will get many backers for going as
far as they recommend toward withdrawing US troops. I emphatically agree that
the State draft is too long and diffuse and that it is futile at this stage to
get into the business of specific drafting comments.
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Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO SA/DDI DATE: 4 April 1957
PROM : 0/NE WE
SUBJECT: Planning Board Paper of March 25, 1957, "Possible Withdrawal
of Forces from Central Europe"
1. In general, I associate myself with EE's comments.
2. Throughout the paper, there is repeated reference to the
capacity of NATO military strength in Western Europe to deter or
counter a Soviet attack. Similarly, the point is repeatedly raised
that the Western Europeans would fear a US withdrawal as an indication
that the US was relying upon "push-button warfare" and that Western
Europe would be left indefensible and vulnerable to Soviet invasion.
These assumptions are not supportable; if we had a more accurate
picture clearly in mind the discussion of this problem might be more
fruitful than that made in the draft.
3. It should be recalled that the USSR has not invaded Western
Europe or otherwise used its preponderant land power in Europe since
1945, even though it could easily have done so, especially up to 1950.
In part the reasons were political and economic, but the principal
military reason was the US nuclear capability. That capability has
been greatly increased, and is much more formidable now than it ever
was. Western Europe since 1945 halZad and does not now possess the
capability to deter or counter Soviet attack; the capability to do
that rests in the US nuclear capability and essentially in the US
Strategic Air Command. The.sayalue of NATO forces in Europe is
essentially symbolic; it is,,visible demonstration that the US is
including the NATO area under its nuclear umbrella; it reassures the
Western Europeans on this score.
4. Two additional points need to be made: (a) the West Europeans
could lose their faith in deterrence or in US protection as a consequence
of certain US actions even if US forces remain, and (b) they could be
brought to retain their faith in US protection and the effectiveness of
the deterrent even if US forces leave. The two are not necessarily
identical. It is the content of US policy and the atmosphere in which
US defense policy, US foreign policy, and intra-NATO relations operate
which is the persuasive point; it is a failure to understand the actual
strategic situation and a lack of confidence in the permanence and depth
of the US commitment which persuades the Western Europeans to desire the
visible signs of it. But any sign that the US has lost faith in the
deterrent effect of its nuclear power, or any convincing demonstration
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FC TT
IT
STAT ,
that the US was coming to rely upon nuclear power to deal with any
minor contlict would lead the West Europeans into defeatism and
neutralism with their attendant dangers even in the face of a con-
tinued US military presence. On the other hand, if the US withdrew
from the continent, the Western Europeans' confidence would be re-
tained and could even be augmented if we said and did other things
to convince them that such action was not in anyway a "Fortress
America" strategy. (Such things as maintaining effective and
highly mobile conventional forces, keeping naval forces in the
European area, maintaining air bases on the European periphery,
assisting in the development of their awn military forces, main-
taining and extending close and intimate relations in intelligence
and planning, and greater political and economic caoperation in
NATO.)
5. If the above is true Cas I believe to be the case), then
we have greater maneuverability than the draft suggests. We could
make offers to withdraw from the continent which would be costly
for the USSR to accept or to refuse.
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;ILL
WILLARD MATTHIAS
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TO : SA/DDI
SI-AT FROM : 0/NE - EE
SUBJECT: Comment on Planning Board Draft Paper, "Possible Withdrawal
of Forces from Central Europe," March 25, 1957
SECRET
2 April 1957
1. Genera' - This is not a very impressive draft. Its internal
consistency, especially as between Sections II B and II C, leaves much
to be desired. After going a long way around it comes out at Para. 40,
not with a statement of "policies and actions which might bring about"
Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, but with the statement of a
pious hope that forces at work independent of Western policy will
ultimately achieve this result for us. It would have been easy to
reach this somewhat negative conclusion in a much shorter paper. I
believe, however, that there are more positive lines of action open
to US policy.
2. The base point from which to begin a discussion of this sub-
ject is the argument developed in Paras. 5-10 which concludes that
"the Government of the USSR has no real present intention of withdraw-
ing forces from Central Europe." This argument could be made even
more strongly, as it was in N1E.12-57. The USSR cannot withdraw with-
out endangering interests which it evidently considers vital. There
probably is no formula of counter-concession which the West could
devise which would induce Soviet withdrawal. Moreover, this is not
a short-term tactical situation, as Para. 11 implies by way of providing
a logical pretext for discussing possible terms of withdrawal in Section
II C. On ideological and military grounds control of Eastern Europe is
likely to remain a fixed and non-negotiable element of Soviet policy.
This will remain true even though Soviet diplomacy and propaganda
from time to time, for purely tactical reasons, appear to give a
contrary impression.
3. If this position is clearly understood, most of the argument
under II C. becomes irrelevant and does not need to be so laboriously
spun out. At the same time, because the Soviet position is in fact
rigid, there is an opportunity for a more flexible US policy than the
discussion under II C. indicates. Since US proposals for mutual with-
drawal are unlikely to be taken up, they can be put forward, always
assuming that they are acceptable to US allies, to achieve other
desirable results than negotiated understandings with the USSR. If
the US showed itself actively interested in concessions to effect
Soviet withdrawal, two important results would follow from a Soviet
refusal to entertain such proposals: a) The USSR's principal argument
for maintaining its control (euphemestically put as maintaining the
unity of the Socialist camp against the imperialist threat or strengthen-
ing the Warsaw pact against Nato war plans) would be undermined.
SECRET
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An active US diplomacy and propaganda for a negotiated withdrawal
of both sides would be a convincing demonstration that the US has
no aggressive plans. This would exacerbate the Soviet problem of
maintaining control since this control rests heavily on the myth of
US aggressive intentions. Thanks to the Yugoslays, the ideological
argument has already been made that the classic Marxist conception
of capitalist agression is outdated. It would be in our interest
to document this "heresy" since it has a great divisive potential
within the Soviet dominated "socialist camp." In particular, it
would stimulate and strengthen the nationalist elements within
the Satellites which, as Para. 40 points out, are the principal
hope over the long run for a gradual relaxing of the Soviet grip.
b)A demonstration of US willingness to withdraw from Europe in
agreement with our allies would, if rejected by the Soviets,
improve the political-psychological atmosphere surrounding our
military presence in Western Europe.
4. Even if there were some prospect that US proposals would
be entertained seriously by the USSR, the US could afford to go
further than the discussion under II C. seems to imply. The paper
in Para. 16, last sentence, refrains from assessing the military
consequences of US withdrawal from the continent. This cannot very
well be left out of the calculation and its omission is a serious
gap in the argument. If it were included, the net answer might well
be that, in view of the growth of German military power and current
weapons developments, the US military presence on the continent is
no longer essential. (The underlying military thinking in this paper
seems to rest too much still on the massive Soviet ground threat to
Western Europe, a conception which is outdated by the more recent
development of Western and Soviet military capabilities.) But US
withdrawal would have to rest on two conditions: a) It would have
to be undertaken with our European allies' consent. b) It would
have to buy a Soviet withdrawal significant enough to have political
consequences in Eastern Europe.
5. The discussion of the German problem (Para. 18 ff.) seems
unrealistic. Strauss' statement that the West "could not prevent"
Germany from opting for neutrality need not give rise to the alarm
reflected in the draft; he expressed a simple fact which our policy
should always have taken into account. Our position in Germany would
be stronger and there would be less danger of German neutralism if we
had taken the clear position that Germany's choice of alignment or
non-alignment after unification would be completely free.
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6. In actual fact, however, a great state like Germany could
not simply withdraw from the power context on which its existence
would depend. Clearly, the Soviets are under no illusions on this
point. They could have obtained a neutralized Germany almost at
will in recent years. But they do not trust formal declarations of
neutrality. They know that Germany would align herself where her
interests required, and they fear that Germany's choice would not
lie with the USSR. The key question here is where the interests of
a free Germany would lie. The West could contemplate a free German
choice with equanimity since Germany's interests in the foreseeable
future would almost certainly not lead her to take an anti-Western
position.
7. The paper is correct in calling attention to the Polish
problem in connection with German unification (Para. 34), but does
not make the right point. The present situation in Poland gives the
USSR added reason for not making a German settlement, since Soviet
military power in Germany and the unsettled border issue are a powerful
check on Polish independence. From the Western point of view, a
settlement of the Polish-German frontier issue must be made simultaneously
with German reunification. If this were done, Poland would not need to
lean on the USSR as a military guarantor and the opportunity for a
Polish policy of independence would be greatly enhanced. Thus reunifi-
cation of Germany, even a "neutralized" Germany, could open up new
political perspectives within the Soviet orbit even if a general
Soviet withdrawal from the Satellites was not achieved. Thus contrary
to the draft, it would not be essential to hinge a German settlement
on the USSR's complete withdrawal from the Satellites. It would be
excellent to achieve this, but even without it we would have greatly
advanced our Objectives: with Germany reunified and Poland free to
pursue a more independent line, the vulnerability of the whole Soviet
position in the Satellites would be greatly increased.
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obk
STAT
Note to and Matthias
0 ?_ n4/14:
27 March 1957
This looks like a fairly important piece of business, but as the
paper stands now nothing much will come of it.
The paper sets out to examine ways in which the US might ',encourage',
the withdrawal of Soviet forces from EE and in para. 10 it appears to
promise some proposals that would at least seriously embarrass the
Soviet position in EE. By Para. 40, however, it has rejected all
initiatives as disadvantages to the US and ends with a tired re-
affirmation of faith in the policy of depending on nationalist pressures
within EE to bring about a gradual attenuation of the Soviet position.
Perhaps there is no other course for the US, but I feel that some
of the arguments against other initiatives as stated in this paper are
of dubious validity.
Taking another approach, since the paper recognizes in para. 5 that
the USSR would not be willing to withdraw at the present and in para. 12
that the USSR would require a large1921.4 for its quo why bother to go
on with the exercise. If we are not prepared to pay the required quid,
why not concentrate on proposals which would be unacceptable to the USSR,
but embarrassing to their position in Europe.
May I have your individual comments by noon on 3 April.
James C. Graham
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Mr. Amorv";7
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'
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASH I NGTON
March 25, 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR TBE NSC PLANNING BOARD
SUBJECT: Possible Withdrawal of Forces from
Central Europe
REFERENCES: A. NSC 5616/2s para. 23
B. NSC 5705/1, para. i7?
Cr- SECRET
COP 1 0
The enclosed draft report on the subjects prepared by
Department of States is transmitted herewith for considera?
tion by the Planning Board at an early meeting.
The enclosure was submitted by the State Member as a
proposed response to paragraph 23 of NSC 5616/2 and para?
graph 17?b of NSC 5705/1, and also as a Staff Study in
support of the Discussion Paper on Political Issues which
is in preparation in the Department of State in connection
with the Review of Basic National Security Policy.
MARION W. BOGGS
Director
NSC Secretariat
SECRET
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POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROki
CENTRAL EUROPE: A FURTHER STUDY
- OF THE BALANCE OF POWER
Tanft_itr_SPLIsaLa
Page
I. The Problem...We...ea. *** *** 40??? ****** ?a* * 1
A. NC Directive.aep???????.????*?*ii?o?urisa** 1
B. Soviet Note of November 17) 1956.... *** ** 1
II. Discussion..,...e, 2
A. A study of the Balance of power 2
B. Evaluation of soviet readiness to withdraw 3
C. Policies and actions which might induce
soviet withdrawal .*******0*******c ***** * 7
(a) Total U. S. withdrawal frmi Euzope and
liquidat'fin of ***** . * 7
(b) U. S. withdrawal from coninental
Europ.e Of0fiil 9
(c) The central problem of Germany 10
(1) German reunification.... .. . ... 11
(2) German policy in support of NATO 13
(3) A possible shift in German policy
toward neutralization 13
(4) Russian withdrawal in return for
German neutralization 15
(d) Other possibilities of withdrawal:
The Bulganin note of November 17)
1956 20
D. Summary 21
E. Possible courses of action 23
SECRET
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DRAFT
POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM CENTRAL EUROPE;
A FURTHER STUDY OF THE BALANCE OF POWER
I. THE PROBLEM
A. NSC Directive
1. NSC 5616/2 of November 19, 1956 stated that it would
be in the U. S. interest to encourage developments which may
lead to the reduction and withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Eastern Europe, and instructed the Planning Board urgently to
undertake a study of the policies and actions which miht
bring about this result. A later NSC paper, 5705 of February
8, 1957, reaffirmed this directive.
B. Soviet Note of November 17, 1956
2. By an interesting historical coincidence, the Soviet
Government turned almost simultaneously to the question of
withdrawal of forces in Central Europe. On November 17, 1956,
in a letter from the Soviet Prime Minister to the President of
the United States, which was likewise tabled with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Soviet Government
advocated in addition to proposals in the general disarmament
field:
a. The reduction during 1957 by one-third of the
armed forces of the USA, USSR, France, and the UK
stationed on German territory.
b. The significant reduction of the armed forces of
the U. S., UK and France stationed in NATO countries and
Soviet forces in Warsaw Treaty countries.
SECRET
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c, Liquidation in the course of two years of foreiL;n
army, naval, and air bases on the territories of other
states.
There was likewise a proviso for serial photographic inspection
of armed forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to a depth
of 800 kms, on either side of the present Western Communist
boundary.
3. The U. S. returned an interim answer to the Soviet
note of November 17, 1956, when on December 31, 1956 the
President replied to the Soviet Prime Minister indicating
that U. S. proposals on disarmament would be made in the UN
and specifically in the Disarmament Subcommittee. However,
there seemed evidence to suggest that both the Soviet and the
United States Governments might be willing to separate the
purely disarmament aspects of the Soviet note from the more
political suggestions relevant to withdrawal of forces.
II. DISCUSSION
A. A Study of the Balance of Power
4. In accepting the postulate established by the NSC
as to the advantages of Soviet withdrawal, the essential
question is what inducement can be offered which can bring
about such withdrawal. Undoubtedly the USSR would at least
demand a probable equivalent reduction and withdrawal by the
U. S. and other NATO allied forces from Western Europe, with
the ultimate objective of securing the complete removal of
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American forces from the area covered by the North Atlantic
Alliance on the European continent. The question to be
evaluated, therefore,is in essence one of the balance of
power,
B. Evaluation of Soviet Readiness to Withdraw
5. Intelligence appraisals and other information
reaching the Department suggests that at the present time
the USSR would not be willing to remove its forces from
Eastern Germany and satellite Europe.
0. There appears to be no basic change from the Soviet
position on European security and German reunification
existing at the time of the Summit Conference. Withdrawal
of U. S. military forces from Europe continues to aprimary
Soviet objective. Nevertheless, it is by no means clear
that the Soviet leaders would be willing to pay the price of
withdrawing their troops from Germany and Eastern Europe
merely for U. S. withdrawal from Western Europe. Modifications
in the Soviet disarmament statements seemed designed to give
the impression that the Soviet Government's thinking in this
field is not static, that in fact some kind of deal is
possible; this is an important political warfare tactic,
particularly for dealing in the long range with German
aspirations for reunification,.
7. Soviet reasons for rejecting withdrawal of their
troops from Germany and Eastern Europe at this time seem to
fall into four categories:
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a. Effect in Eastern Europe
(1) The Soviet leaders realize that their
control of Eastern Europe has been threatened by the
national and basically anti-Soviet revolutions in
Hungary and Poland and by continuing Yugoslav
attempts to expand their influence. At least until
the present situation in Eastern Europe is stabilized
and the dimensions of "national communism" established,
they would reject any action, such as Soviet troop.,
withdrawal, which would be interpreted, both inside
Eastern Europe and out, as an indication of Soviet
willingness to weaken their grip on the area. The
Soviet leaders indicated in their important state-
ment of October 30, 1956 that they would upon request
withdraw their troops from any Eastern European
country, but only if other members of the Warsaw
Pact consented. However, subsequent communiques
reporting meetings with Rumanism, Polish, East
German, and of course of Hungarian Communist leaders
have indicated that Soviet troops will remain
"temporarily" in those countries. This no doubt
reflects the fact that Soviet troops and the
demonstrated Soviet willingness to use force to
keep Eastern Europe "socialist" and within the Warsaw
Pact are at this time the ultimate guarantees that
local Communist leaders will remain in power.
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(2) The Soviet leaders appear to realize that
they must go further toward allowing the appearances
of internal autonomy and toward bettering economic
conditions in Eastern Europe. However, these
recent challenges to the Soviet position have been
so dramatic that the Soviet Union requires time to
consolidate its present position. An actual pledge
of withdrawal of Soviet troops in the near future
might make consolidation along present lines most
difficult and would stimulate national variations
from the Moscow pattern, when what the Soviet
leaders want now is conformance to that pattern and
emphasis upon loyalty to the Communist Bloc.
b. Military. In this present period, the Soviet
military leaders apparently continue to feel that they
need the territory of Eastern Europe for maneuver in the
event of hostility, for radar sites, for air bases, and
for short-range missile launchinL, locations.
c. Internal Effects in the Soviet Union. New
"socialist" economic and political patterns devised by
the Poles, Hungarians, and Yugoslays have been important
stimulants to the questioning of Soviet practice (and
even of the Soviet system in some cases) by the Soviet
intelligentsia during the heady post-Khrushchev speech
days. Radical changes in Eastern Europe might stimulate
thought and discussion within the Soviet Union even
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('
more, a situation about which the Soviet leaders appear
to be particularly concerned.
d. Western European Pressures, The Soviet leaders
have probably felt that there is a chance that time,
changing weapons systems, and economic and political
pressure for U. S. withdrawal may create circumstances
which will bring about this result eventually without
their having to withdraw their own troops from Germany
and Eastern Europe.
8. Soviet military capability remains undiminished and
indeed is increasing. They retain a vast military machine,
which is being equipped with most modern weapons. The force
cuts announced by the Soviets cannot be verified, but would
not affect this conclusion in any event. Soviet forces could
control any uprising in the satellites without affecting their
capability to mount a major offensive.
9. Although the foregoing reasoning may be conclusive,
events of the past few months in Eastern Europe have left a
profound mark not only within. the Soviet Union itself but
likewise within the satellite periphery. It is pertinent to
quote the following appraisal, concurred in by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, in the Estimate of the World Situation
submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence as
NIE 11-3-57 of January 29, 1957:
"In the aggregate, we believe the Communist Bloc has
been weakened both physically and psychologically. The
military, political, and economic position of the USSR
in the Satellite area has deteriorated and relations
with Yugoslavia strained- The ideological and
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psychological leadership of the USSR has been impaired
and the strength of Communism as an international move-
ment has been diminished by organizational and
philosophical turmoil."
10. In consequence, it may be assumed with some certainty
that (a) the Government of the USSR has no real present
intention of withdrawing forces from Central Europe and (b)
it is presently vulnerable to a diplomatic counterattack from
the West. The Soviet Union has publicly announced to the
world its readiness to withdraw forces, and yet it realizes
that any withdrawal of its forces from satellite Europe would
be fraught with unfavorable if not fatal consequences. If its
bluff were called the USSR would be placed in a difficult
position.
C. Policies and Actions which might induce Soviet Withdrawal
11. The foregoing might be deemed a tactical appraisal
of the soviet position on withdrawal of forces from Central
Europe. The long-range strategic objective of the USSR is
to secure the removal of American military power from conti-
nental Europe and the United Kingdom, and ultimately to
achieve the removal of U$ overseas bases which could be used
for an atomic strike against the Soviet Union. /mother
benefit in this overall strategic aim would be the dissolution
of laTO
(a) Total U. d Withdrawal from Eurone and Liquidation
of Bas es .
12. Goming back to the essential inquiry requested by
the NSC, namely, to study the policies and actions which
might bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
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Eastern Europe, it seems clear that the USSR would not be
willing to withdraw its forces unless the quid for its quo,
was spelled in very large capital letters. The most simple
formulation of the Soviet readiness to deal on a mutual with-
drawal of forces was set out by Khrushchev in an interview
with Joseph Alsop on February 19, 1957 when he was reported
to have said: (Washington Post, February 20, 1957)
"Soviet troops would be withdrawn to the national
territory of the Soviet Union from all countries ?
in Europe where they are now stationed in accord-
ance with existing treaties and agreements. 'lean-
while, Western European countries would also with-
draw their troops stationed in the territories of
other Western. European countries. The United
States would also withdraw its troops to American
territory from Europe and Asia, and along with
that would go the liquidation of all foreign
military bases."
13. A more limited proposal on withdrawal was the
Bulganin note of November 17, 1956 whose basic propositions
were outlined in paragraph 2 above.
14. Even though accepting the evaluation that at the
present time the Soviet Union has no intention of withdrawing
from Eastern Europe, and that it would find itself in
difficulties if any such withdrawal were undertaken, it is
nevertheless possible that certain inducements in the form
of compensatory Western withdrawal of forces would bring
the Soviet Government to a readiness to order such a reduction
in its troop strength in satellite Europe as might be
acceptable not only to the Western powers but particularly to
Germany and the satellite sates. However, the Soviet Union
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would not be prepared to withdraw from Eastern Germany and
satellite Europe without insuring the basis of at least an
equal, and at most a greater, measure of security against
what it considers to be the potential threat of the U. S.
than now exists under the present balance of military power.
15. Khrushchev has already said that if the U. S. would
/ pack up and Eo home and liquidate its overseas bases, the
Soviet Union would withdraw its forces to the national
territory of the USSR. This simple, even-Stevanovich,
proposition would obviously redound to the strategic benefit
of Russia as it would leave the continent of Europe exposed
to the rapid redeployment of Soviet land power with no
adequate indigenous strength which could oppose such power.
Such a withdrawal of Soviet forces would, therefore, be
achieved at a price too stiff to contemplate.
(b) U. S. Withdrawal from Continental Europe
16. The Soviet Union after negotiation, might, however,
be willing to withdraw its forces in. Europe to its own
frontiers in return for a U. S. and possibly UK withdrawal of
forces from continental NATO Europe. This would be a
somewhat equivalent proposition, provided European forces
remained unchanged, since, although the threat of ready
deployment of Soviet forces Westward from its own frontiers
would still exist, the NATO lines would have deterrent
strength in the posting of U. S. forces in non-NATO areas
contiguous to NATO Europe, such as Spain, Morocco, Libya,
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and the Sixth Fleet. It might also be possible to negotiate
an arrangement whereby U. S. forces and air bases would
continue as at present to be stationed in the UK and Iceland.
In other words, the deal, if made, would be for U. S. forces
to withdraw from continental NATO Europe only. The
equilibrium of such a changed military balance of power is a
matter for military assessment.
17. On the political side, it would seem that given
the present temper of our continental NATO allies such a
massive withdrawal of American military power from
continental Europe would cause them to feel that the U. S.
was relying upon a strategy of "push-button warfare," and
that the removal of American land forces would leave
continental Europe open to a Soviet invasion. The Europeans
have amply indicated that they have no stomach for being
"liberated" after the devastation of an atomic war. In
consequence, on political grounds it would appear that the
U. S. could not contemplate the engineering of a Soviet
withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe if that is to be
bought at the cost of a compensatory withdrawal of U. S.
forces from NATO continental Europe, even with the retention
of bases and forces in Spain, the Mediterranean periphery
and the North Atlantic islands.
(c) The Central Problem of Germany
13. A third possibility for the negotiated withdrawal
of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe centers upon a solution
of the German question.
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(1) German Reunification
19. Paragraph 15 of NSC 160/1 sets forth as a basic
objective of United States foreign policy "the restoration by
peaceful means of Germany as a united state, with freedom of
action in internal and external affairs, firmly attached to
the principles of the United Nations, capable of resisting
both Communism and Neo-Nazism, and from which Soviet troops
have been withdrawn." The United States has repeatedly pledged
its unremitting support to the reunification of Germany as a
basic objective of its policy. Under Article 2 of the Bonn
Conventions, German reunfication is a treaty responsibility of
the United States (as well as of Britain and France).
20. There can be no prospect of lasting security in
Europe unless conditions of stability are established on the
European continent. The reunification of Germany is a
prerequisite to the stabilization of Europe.
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21. All German parties proclaim the reunification of
Germany in peace and freedom as the first objective of German
foreign policy. In recent months German political leaders in
both government and opposition parties have speculated upon
European security arrangements in connection with reunification
but all parties would reject any proposals regarding European
security such as the withdrawal or thinning out of foreign
troops in East and 1west Germany unless German reunification is
1/
likewise provided for.
1/ In recent months Germans both in the Government and opposi-
tion have shown interest in the possibility of the withdrawal
or thinning out of foreign troops in Germany in connection with
German reunification. The German note to the Soviet Union of
September 7, 1956, regarding German reunification mentioned
the possibility of developing "appropriate arrangements" along
the Eastern borders of a reunited Gerihany and referred explic-
itly to Prime Ainister Eden's proposa-J of the creation of a
demilitarized zone between East and West. This reference to
the Eden proposal was retained despite a suggestion by the
United States Government that it be omitted, In recent press
conferences Chancellor Adenauer has also referred in vague
terms to the withdrawal or thinning out of troops as an element .
in the reduction of international tensions. On January 31
Foreign Minister Brentano told the German Parliament that the
proposals made at Geneva still form the basis of the govern-
ment's policy in this field. The opposition parties in Germany
have also discussed this subject. The Free Democratic Party
has renewed its emphasis on the withdrawal of foreign troops at
least to the Rhine and the Oder as part of a German reunifica-
tion settlement. Leading Socialist politicians have advocated
that a test case for a functioning system of armaments limita-
tions and controls be made on the basis of a militarily thinned-
out zone in the heart of Europe which at the same time would
bring about German reunification and release the satellites.
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(2) German Policy in Support of NATO
22. The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany has
been alliance in NATO, the support of allied forces permanently
based on German soil, and the gradual buildup of a German mili-
tary contribution to NATO strength. The Adenauer Government
has agreed to provide land forces of half a million men organ-
ized in 12 divisions in three years from January 1, 1956, to-
gether with an air force of 1200 planes over a period of four
years from the same date. Leaders of German opinion, both of
the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, have indicated
the need for Germany to regain some posture of military self-
defense. However, a degree of zeal among the German people and
in the government itself toward moving rapidly to a posture of
moderate rearmament has been notably lacking. Nevertheless,
fundamental West German policy is thus far based on the sta-
tioning of Western troops in Germany and loyal adherence to
NATO as a military and political ally.
(3) A Posaihl_q Shift in German Polic Toward
Neutralization
23. As indicated in the footnote to paragraph 21, there
have nevertheless been indications that the Germans are begin-
ning to wonder if other means can not be found to achieve their
immediate primary objective of reunification with ,ast Germany
on conditions which would assure the elimination of the Commu-
nist taint from a united nation and the maintenance of the
sovereign independence of the Fourth Reich.
24. Three days after Chancellor Adenauer had publically
reaffirmed his past policy and in a press conference indicated
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that Germany could not contemplate any other policy, the Ger-
man idinister of Defense, Herr Franz-Josef Strauss, published a
so-called "theoretical article" in the weekly review Politisch-
Soziale Korrespondenz which is said to be closely associated
2/
with the governing parties in Bonn. Herr Strauss wrote:
25. "Nobody in the LioverninE7 coalition holds the view
that a Germany reunited in peace and freedom must
automatically be a member of the North Atlantic al-
lianCe. A reunited Germany will be able to decide
freely for itself within the framework of its poli-
tical possibilities.
"The contractual assurance of this possibility exists
not only on paper and not only in theory. Therefore,
it may be that, although there exists a preference
and also a security wish for a reunited Germany to
belong to a military alliance of the West, the hard
political requirements of the German people might
cause them to make a decision according to the
Austrian pattern La neutralization as between :bast
and West/.
a/
"The West would not want to and could not prevent
Germany from making such a decision. such a decision
would have to rest on very sober political and mili-
tary considerations. The road to such freedom of de-
cision, which will be open only when the entire
2/New York Times, February 20, 1957.
3/Italics added.
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German people participates, does not lead over the
battlefield but over the field of negotiations."
26. The Russians are able to read the Politisch-Jozjale
Norresnondenz as well as the Americans. It is not impossible
that in pursuit of its basic aim of reducing NATO strength the
Soviet Government may commence secret feelers with the West Ger-
man Government on the basis for a new settlement in Central
Europe.
(4) Russian Withdrawal in Return for German
Neutralization
27. Returning to the question of "policies and actions
which might bring about the withdrawal of ooviet forces from
Eastern Europe" the possibility suggests itself that in return
for the neutralization of a reunified Germany the Russians might
be prepared to concede withdrawal of their forces, most certainly
from Eastern Germany, and possibly from satellite Europe as well.
If such a negotiation were undertaken the Russians would contem-
plate a number of improvements in their security situation which
could be achieved by the neutralization of Germany, but against
these gains they would have to weigh the consequences of the loss
of Eastern Germany and of military control in the satellite
states.
28. In evaluating the possibilities of sucn a negotiation
the question of Austria is illustrative. No progress was made
over innumerable sterile meetings on the settlement of the
Austrian question and the withdrawal of allied and ,.Doviet forces
from that country until Germany entered the :TATO alliance. The
Joviets then moved to checkmate the allied military position by
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(
agreeing to the neutralization of Austria. Neutral Switzerland
already lay to the south of Germany and once Austria was neutral-
ized an East-West zone extending more than 500 miles was estab-
lished, effectively sealing off the land line of communication
between the newest NATO ally, Germany, in the north and Italy in
the south. With the contiguous extension of Yugoslavia to the
east and south along the Adriatic sea, the Soviet high command
could rest easier in the knowledge that land NATO forces were
buffered by the arc from the western frontier of Switzerland to
the 'Strait of Otranto.
29. It is not impossible that a similar evaluation of the
main chance may again motivate the leaders in the ia.emlin. If
Germany were made a neutral state the Soviet Union would insure
the withdrawal of American forces from that country and thus
force back the main deterrent power which is now poised on the
western side of Central Europe. The political consequences of
such a withdrawal might well start a reaction within NATO which
would lead to its further weakening. General Norstad has said
in speaking of the will to use NATO forces should the need arise:
30. "The will exists today. It is, however, the most
perishable of our assets. It cannot be produced and
stockpiled like a weapon. Rather, like a plant or any
other living thing, it needs continual refreshment.
Nothing could be more enfeebling to the spirit that so
far has animated NATO than a suspicion, however faint,
that some of its partners were withdrawing behind their
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own frontiers, counting upon their long-range weapons
to preserve the balance." 1Y
31. However, as against these advantages in the Soviet
eyes of the neutralization of Germany, the Kremlin must like-
wise evaluate the political consequences of the loss of Eastern
Germany as a Communist satellite and an uncertain military ally.
Probably, from a purely military point of view, the Soviet
General Staff could concede the withdrawal of its forces from
Eastern Germany and the relinquishment of such advanced bases
as the Red Army and air force have in that area without
conceding a major loss in military striking power. However, on
the political side it would be demonstrated to the world that
the advantages of Communism are not sufficient to withstand
the more positive benefits
a dynamic nationalism, and
neutralization of a united
of a
free enterprise system within
the Soviets in return for the
Germany would have to concede that
their communist dominance in East Germany had been an ephemeral
thing. However, after the events in Poland and Hungary few
realistic leaders in the Soviet Government would be inclined
to argue that Communist regimes in Eastern Europe are deep-
seated in the popular affection.
32. What would be the NATO reaction to a German or Soviet
proposal for the reunification of a neutralized Germany with
Department of State Bulletin, Vol XXXVI, No. 921,
February 13, 1957, p. 253.
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concomitant withdrawal of all foreign forces from its soil?
It is possible that the French would be pleased with such a
prospect on the more immediate and parochial ground that
German armed might would not be in a position again to attack
French territory and also on the wider ground that a neutral
buffer zone in Central Europe would lessen the chances of war
between East and West. The Italians, who are already sealed
off from access to Germany thruugh the Brenner Pass by the
neutralization of Austria, would probably not oppose and might
share a French judgment that the chances of war would be
diminished by the establishment of a neutralized zone. The
Swedes, Swiss and Yugoslays, who are already professional
neutrals in varying degrees, would undoubtedly welcome the
new arrangement. Here it might be si.d parenthetically that
in a system for European security based on. the neutralization
of Germany, gurantees might be expected from these powerful
neutrals whose armed forces are in fact more militarily
significant than those of most of our NATO allies on the
continent.
33. The NATO governments, and above all the U. S. and the
government in Bonn, thus may face a hard choice in adding
up the advantages and disadvantages of a reunification of
Germany, won at the price of neutralization and withdrawal not
only of Soviet forces but of American and other allied troops
from German territory. By such an arrangement the U. S. would
have achieved one of its asserted basic policies, the
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reunification of Germany by peaceful means, but without
Germany as an ally; and the Soviet Union in return for an
increase in security by the establishment of a buffer neutral
zone would have to accept a severe political loss in the
relinquishment of A Communist Eastern Germany. It could,
however, be argued that NATO existed as an effective going
concern while Germany was still demilitarized and that NATO
could continue as an effective deterrent force without the use
of German soil and manpower.
34. If a negotiation of such basic importance were under-
taken a further opportunity might be afforded of insisting
that Soviet forces withdraw not only from Eastern Germany but
Eastern Europe generally. Here, however, the paradox of
Polish reaction would undoubtedly come into play. Facing a
reunited Germany the Poles would probably turn to the Soviet
Union as the only military guarantor of the Oder-Neisse
frontier. Depending upon circumstances at the time a Polish
government might not want the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
However, elsewhere in the satellite states the withdrawal of
Soviet forces would be welcome. In the formulation of a basic
system of European security founded on the concept of
neutralized areas it would be in the interest of Germany
itself, as well ?as Western Europe generally, to insist that
Soviet forces be withdrawn to Soviet national territory.
35. Despite present U. S. and Federal German policies, one
dominant political hypothesis must always be kept in mind:
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if the German people decide that the main impediment to
peaceful reunification is the fact of their alliance in NATO,
they may decide that they want reunification more than
continuance in NATO, provided an equivalent security can be
found in neutralization,
36. Another assessment may strike the German mind: under
the proesent brittle balance of power it does not require even
a Teutonic imagination to conclude that if the balance were
militarily disrupted the battlefield would be Germany itself.
Former members of the German General Staff would likewise have
no difficulty in concluding that a major strategic target of
Soviet atomic bombing would be the German industrial complex.
In their future assessment of what is best for Germany, they
might conclude that a position as a powerful neutral state in
the center of Europe is safer than that of a divided Germany
on the frontier between NATO and the Soviet bloc.
(d) Other Possibilities of Withdrawal: The
Bulganin Note of November 17, 1956
37. Of the other possible policies and actions which
might result in a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern
Europe, the Bulganin proposals of November 17, 1956 can
probably be dismissed as not being acceptable to the West. On
the suggestion for a one-third withdrawal of U. S., UK and
French forces from Germany to be met by an equivalent
withdrawal of Russian forces from Eastern Germany, the Kremlin
has no doubt taken note of the publicly expressed intention of
the British Government to reduce its forces in Federal Germany
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r by more than one-third; nor will the Russians have failed to
note the fact that French NATO forces in Germany are of a
token character since most of the effective units are in
service in North Africa. The West, therefore, has in large
measure already accomplished a one-third withdrawal of forces
in Western Germany, nor has it received any compensatory
reduction in Soviet forces in return.
38. Evidence from various Western European capitals
suggests that a "significant reduction" of U. S., UK, and
French forces elsewhere in NATO territory as against a similar
reduction of Soviet forces in Warsaw Pact Europe might start
that process of "snow-balling'which would reduce NATO military
effectiveness below the point where it could serve either as a
( deterrent or a shield. (It should be kept in mind, however,
that the Soviets would have perhaps an even more formidable
problem of "snow-balling" behind the Iron Curtain.) As for the
liquidation of foreign bases on the territory of third states
within two years, it is clear that under present strategic
concepts such a course of action wuuld vitiate the effective
striking power of the U. S. against the USSR and China.
D. Summary
39. To sum up this appraisal of the various policies and
actions which might bring about a withdrawal of Soviet forces
in Eastern Europe the following conclusions emerge:
a. The main Soviet aim of reducing NATO power to
impotence and of forcing the withdrawal of American forces
from Europe has not altered.
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b. As of the present time, the Soviet Union would
find it disadvantageous to withdraw its forces from Eastern
Europe.
C. The most sweeping Soviet proposal -- complete
American withdrawal from Europe and liquidation of over-
seas bases in return for Soviet withdrawal of forces to
national territory -- would be one-sidedly to the advantage
of the Soviet Union and could not be accepted by the U. S.
d. A compromise solution, providing for the with-
_
drawinL; of Soviet forces to national territory and of
U. S. forces from continental NATO Europe but retaining
lodgment in Spain, North Africa and the Atlantic islands,
would probably cause the continental NATO allies to lose
heart and would result in such a diminution of NATO
strength as to be unacceptable to the U. S.
e. A proposal for the reunification and neutralization
of Germany would imply the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Eastern Germany and possibly also from satellite
Europe. It would impose a severe political loss on the
USSR through the disappearance of Communist Eastern
Germany, but it would have significant strategic advantages
for the Soviet Union in causing the withdrawal of American
and other NATO forces from Western Germany and in
completing the neutralization of central Europe from
Sweden to Yugoslavia. The neutralization of Germany on
these terms might have an overwhelming appeal for the
German people if they reached the conclusion that this was
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the only means to obtain reunification under acceptable
conditions. German neutralization might likewise have a
definite appeal to France and would be attractive to the
more powerful European neutrals such as Sweden,
Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.
f. The proposals for Allied and Soviet withdrawals
outlined in the Bulganin note of November 17, 1956 are on
the whole unacceptable to the U. S.
E. Possible Courses of Action
40. If the foregoing analysis is valid, possibly the most
effective long-range course of action would be for the U. S.
and its Western allies to exploit the forces of nationalism
and resistance in Eastern Europe which caused last yearls
revolutions in Hungary and Poland. While the immediate effects
of these developments will probably be a tightening of Soviet
control, as has happened in Hungary and East Germany, as well
as an attempt to circumscribe Polish freedom of action, never-
theless these forces may represent an irreversible trend to
which the Kremlin may seek to accommodate itself rather than to
hold mutinous populations in subjugation, with all attendant
risks. The Western powers may find it possible thus to weaken
the Soviet system through the development of relations with
particular satellite states interested in enhancing their
independence. An increasing recognition by the Soviets of
nationalism and independence may have a favorable effect on
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German reunification but it is of course likely that under
these circumstances the Soviets will try to premise German
reunification upon German neutrality.
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