POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AFRO-ASIAN MILITARY TAKEOVERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000400110010-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 18, 1959
• Content Type: MISC

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Ic) OpDf.I (TSC) No. 3qf Copies, Serie;
June 18s 1969 ONF TIAL
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40 a- 1,41/6-001
PjLhfu.m.9..W.WLt.Lsn.L2Em......mAfro.Asian unit Takeovo 3 1,1 I
e4.-.4,y}LC?14.1
Mr? President and Momborm of the Council:
This study has been a valuable exercise in self
-
scrutiny within the Department? We welcome Mr 0 Gray's
initiative in requesting it and this opportunity of comp.
slanting an sertain of its conclusions?
I shall first explain what the paper purports to do
and what it does not purport to do? Then I Shall discuss
briefly four areas of our thinking which are highlighted
in the Summary of Conclusions?
These are:
10 Why parliamentary democratic institutions are on
the wane in underdeveloped Free Asia?
20 Why we must expect more military takeovers.?
30 Lessons from our Latin American experience which
are applicable to Asia
40 The ()hailing. of "second stage revolutions" to
authoritarian military regimen?
The study considers the short and lonverange implir
stations of the military takeovers in Burma, Iraq, Pakistan,
the Sudan and Thailand, Iraq excepted, the short.prango
developments ensuing upon these takeovers have been help-
fUl, especially In Burma,
But the larger implication Is whether these military
regimes will do what is required of them in the long haul
to achieve the stability required to withstand counter-
revolutions, anarchy, economic deterioration and other
developments Which can point a society downhill toward
Communism?
The paper is concerned, therefore, primarily with
long-range implications? We attempt merely to assess the
advantages and disadvantages of military autocracies in
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the Asian moId0 We pass no judgment on the relative end*
phasis which should be placed on security as against
economic development in any country?
Nor does the paper deal with any of the policy and
administrative ohangeei or changes in attitude on our
parte Which may be required If we are to "manage the
Asian revolution more effectively,
' The study is focused on the underdeveloped non?
Communist countries of the Middle Eastp South Asia end
the Far East ?? an area embracing the Afrioan Arab States
of the Sudan and Egypt. It draws parallels from the.
developmental history' of Latin America and develops con'
elusions which should bear relevance to the emergent .
states of Africae as well as to the area studied?
Japan is excluded as an advanced country and Turkey
might well, have been exoluded because it has weathered
its revolution and is pointed toward stability and
Europeanisation.
The paper recognises that mocurity0 stability and
coping with the revolution of rising expectations are the
principal conoerne of either a civilian or military regime
,throughout this area0 It emphasises the dangers to milt..
tary regimes if they do not balance security considerations
against developmental neceesitiee, since Communism will
continue to pose particular threats to any Asian S00107
in a state of stegnationp,
It is obviously difficult and hazardous to generalise
in respect of such a vast and varied area? Nevertheless
these four major policy implications emerge from the study
as applicable to the entire area:
10 Zith the possible exoeption of India and Ma'am
Western democratic institutions left behind by the colonial
powers have proven generally inadequate to the Asian revolu-
tion and are now in decline 0 The crisis confronting a
backward society during the modernisation process espe
oially where security and overvopulstion are complicating
fasters in so profound that authoritarian controls and
disciplines are required to guide the revolution an stable
courses. The resultant authoritarianism is either imposed
or poved by the military component of the society? W0
amiat socepi these facts0
gaRiglaL
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20 During this oriels* the eaceptable range of choice
of regimes in power range in general between government
regulation trending toward etateesecialism* In vehiCh come
democratic values are preserved* and the more extreme con-
trols of Communieme The extent to which demooratic values
influence government* and private enterprise playa a role
in economic development* will depend on the extent to which
a regime avoids reliance on-Communist methods*
3. Communism will continue to appeal to the Asian
intelleotual and revolutioniet beoauee of its proven ability
to carry backward ocuntrie mpeedily through the ;micas of
modernisation and industrialisation* No Asian regime or
Weetern Power can diecount this appeal until Western teche
aquas have more completely mactered the "management" probe
lems of development lathe context of Communist competition?
40 Military regLme ire.theorotioally as* oompetent as
civilian regimes to &tarry sooleties through the developmental
twists* proviiled they underetand the problem* keep security
and development in balance* and "olvillanize" as fully as
possible* Since the trend Is toward military takeovers* the
civilian and military arms of US foreign policy at learn
haw to work more closely with military regimes Lathe
"management" of their internal revolutions*
shall MAW develop four areas of our thinking which
throw additional light on these policy implications*
Ix
A number of mesons centering on cultural traditione*
religion* and the burden of living explain the decline of
Asian demoteratic institutions* There can be no real democ-
racy in countries the the preponderant majority is illit-
eratea cannot express on intelligent Choice between demoe
*ratio values and Communist blandishmante0 accepts a
fatalletio or quietist religion* recognises authoritarianism
as eh. traditional way of life* and IA too enmeshed in the
struggle for survival to have time or energy for individual
self-advanoement*
In hindeight* we were unrealistic in expecting that
the sophisticated norms of democracy could work* either
politically or economic 11y* once Free Asia out am colonial
ties and accepted the full responsibilities of government*
The area* which Is new emerging from a "shakedown" period
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of testing democracy Is reverting to authoritarian norms
more suitable to indigenous problems and capabilities?
This reversion to tradition is accepted by practical poll'
tician and intellectual alike, and is endorsed by the .
Arden nilitary?
Whereas the countereelltes of the colonial period -0
the Nehrus or Naha* Pashas espoused democratic norms in
their struggles for selfegovernment and independence, the
counter0elites, of today are returning to authoritarian
traditions in efforts to move forward more rapidly toward
resolution of their problene?
On the economic side, notwithstanding that private
enterprise continues to play an important role throughout
the area, this authoritarianism is expressed in indigenous
developmental restore bleed on central planning and forms
of *tette-socialism*
We must aot become alarmed or defeatist over these
developments ? Democracies have seldom led traditional
agricultural societies through the barrier of modernims0
tit= to sustained economic growth* This has been done
only in our country and in a few Western European countries
which developed democratic institutions after centuries of
auto:mac:70
Outside Western Europe and the English...peaking world,
social revolutions and economic breakthroughs have ine
variably occurred under autocrats? Japan, the Soviet
Union, Turkey and various Latin American states provide
examples of this phenomenon* Should India succeed on its
present course, it will provide an exception and example
ehich will have tremendous reperoussions throughout Asia?
Yet we oust remember that India possesses certain trappings
of both political and *canonic authoritarianism
Our alternatives, therefore, are not between democracy
and Communist but between the more benevolent forms of
authoritarianism and Comm:aim*
About the best we can do at the present stage of Asian
-development is to work as ciceely as possible with autocv
moles in efforts to encourage them to preserve human rights
and thus preserve a base from which democratic values can
emerge as a literate middle class develops and the masses
gain more of a stake in their future
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Thus,. must resist trends toward authoritarian ex,
trwmes, whether to the loft toward Communiam or to the
' right toward models established earlier in the century
by Hitler and the Japanese war lords. Both these extremes
jeopardise our intermits and our purposes.
XII
It appears to be an historic phenomenon that during
the modernisation crisis of a society, the military are
either at the apex of power or constitute the major
institutiom-inpbeing which supports, or is in a position
to overthrow, the government in power. We have witnessed
this throughout the history of Latin America and it is
repeating itself as a fact of life in Free Asia today.
The paper enumerates other reasons why we 0=
expect more military takeovers in Free Asia during its
modernisation crisis and there is no need to elaborate.
But the footnote to paragraph 11 deserves attention*
It reveals that of the 25 countries considered within
the study area, only nine -, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Cambodia and Malaya
can be excepted from these three tests: Is the government
1) A military autocracy/
2) An authoritarian government deeply dependent on
military support?
3) A likely candidate for a military takeover
within two years?
Of these nine exceptions at least four Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Nepal aro really feudal
rather then modern state**
This inventory and forecast eloquently reenforoo a
conclusion that our long.range Interests in Asia depend
on the extent to which we can influence the Asian military
toward sound statecraft.
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Study of the political and economic development
of Latin America -- Which in generalhas attained
considerable higher planes in both fields than has
Free Asia -- reveals a number of do's and don't's
which can profit us in Asia. There are substantial
differences between Latin America and Free Asia
which are detailed in the paper. Yet there also
appear to be relevant parallels of developmental
experience which furnish useful guides to action.
At least three appear to be warranted:
1. Our Latin American experience indicates the
difficulties of making over backward societies in
our own Image and argues in favor of allowing Free
Asia to develop its own indigenous modernized
developmental systems, including reliance on military
regimes in time of crisis.
2. Because Of Communist competition, comparable
levels of development in Free Asia must be accomplished
more.rapidly than they were in Latin America and .
against the backdrop of a real security threat. This
security.threat demands a greater allocation of avail-
able resources to the military than is necessary or
warranted in Latin.Amerida. The necessity of maintain-
ing ieCurity and.development in balance becomes of vital
isiOrtanee under such circumstances, especially when the
military Are in power.
3. We should do the possible to avoid in Free
Asia a 'repetition of the role which irresponSible
demogogiO and corrupt military dictators have played in
Latin America 7- whether they be leftists like. Peron
or rightists of the Gomez variety.
We should bear. In mind, nevertheless,, that in
Mexico as in Turkey, social revolutions conducted by
Military dictators paved the way for greater stability,
an acceptance of representative institutions, and a
transfer of power to civilians without resort to costly
"second stage revolutions", The widest Possible repeti-
tion of this sequence should be our objective in Asia
in conducting relations with military regimes.
CONDTIAL
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III.?.
V
I shall conclude with a few remarks oath*
problem which "second stage revolutions" pose to
military autocracies, especially those which become
alienated tram the intelligentsia and the masses and
which are overthrown usually only at great cost and
by violence?
These revolts often come from within the military.
Nasser's takeover and Ayub's takeover in Pakistan are
examples. General Abboud in the Sudan has put down
two such revolts and Kassim one. Sometimes, as in
Pakistan, they represent mere shifts of power within
the ruling oligarchy. Sometimes, ao in the case of
Peron, Nasser and Kassim they represent alignments
with what are conceived to be mass aspirations and a
shift in political and economic orientation designed
to build a mass following.
These revolutions appear to be phenomena of any
developing society. They reinforce the necessity of
a military regime's keeping security and developmental
progress in balance for, if this is not done, there
appears always to come that time when the dissident
intelligentsia, or the dissident younger officer group
often in combination -- will give expression to mass
dissatisfaction and seek to overthrow the regime,
usually by violence.
In backward societies all disciplined and literate
human resources are required and these revolutions
represent a tragic dissipation of resources. Latin
American history repeatedly testifies how such revolts
can retard the developmental process and, perpetuate
instability.
The civilian and military arms of US policy should,
therefore, seek to cushion developing societies from such
shocks,. This would appear to require at least three
courses 'of action: (1) Our influencing military regimes
susceptible of influence or leverage on our part to keep
the modernization process in balance, (2) our.encouraging
them to "civilianizen as deeply as possible, and (3) our
encouraging them to point toward a return to representa-
tive and responsible civilian power.'
.!.814PaIRETflik_
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A principal reason why a sturdy two party
system adds stability to a society is that the
failure of one party can pave the way for the other
party to take remedial action by orderly processes
and without the costs and shocks of revolutions.
In a developing society governed by a military regime,
the best insurance against revolutions and the
emergence of a counter-elite would appear to be
benevolent authoritarianism which imparts a sense of
national unity, gives a role of national participation
to the intelligentsia, and holds power in trust for
civilians and more representative institutions.
Unless this is done, and unless the intelligentsia
can influence the regime somewhat as an opposition
party influences the governing party in representative
government, history seems to prove that rifts between
the military, autocracy and the counter-elite will widen
into revolution, except where, as the Turkish and
Mexican revolutions indicate, the military autocrats
understand fully the demands of the modernization
crisis and are, therefore, authentic political leaders.
VI
This completes my presentation. This is a large
subject and one which should be kept under constant
review. It presents problems with which we must live
for decades and our experience with Latin America
proves they would be serious problems even if the
Communists were not competing with us for control of
the Asian revolution.
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