EL SALVADOR: THE INSURGENT ALLIANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86S00596R000200590001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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V N- S,LICf,{, - Directorate of
" \ O E7 r'f intallicanea
El Salvador:
The Insurgent Alliance
Seere-t
CR 84-14055
August 1984
017
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Directorate of Secret
El Salvador:
The Insurgent Alliance
Central Reference, with a contribution from
This paper was prepared by Office of
h Office of Scientific and Weapons
Secret
CR 84-14055
August 1984
Research. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. (u)
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Latin America Division, OCR,
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Preface
information available as
of 15 August 1984
was used in this report.
El Salvador:
The Insurgent Alliance F-1 25X1
The Salvadoran insurgent alliance is a complex network of organizations,
which in its present form dates from 1980 (see Figure 1). Its origins can be
traced back to Communist activities in El Salvador in the early 1930s, but
the alliance now encompasses organizations that cover the left end of the
political spectrum from extreme Marxist-Leninist to democratic socialist.
Although the roots of the alliance are mainly internal and grounded in the
country's history, Soviet and Cuban officials have actively sought ways to
exert their influence over groups in the alliance-especially to try to unify
them as they had done with the factions of the Sandinista movement in
Nicaragua before the Sandinista victory in July 1979. In the event of a
guerrilla victory in El Salvador, a socialist (Communist) state could
emerge, but it would evolve only after considerable accommodation among
the various groups. The form and orientation of an insurgent government
will depend on the evolution of events in the region and on whether or not
orthodox Salvadoran Communists-who to the best of our knowledge are
numerically in a minority-could manage to gain dominance in the
government. n
The groups in the alliance are beset by differences over strategies and
tactics and are often factionalized by personal rivalries among leaders.
Disputes about policy occur between the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla lead-
ers, who see themselves as the leaders of the alliance and who make its key
political decisions, and the non-Marxist overseas representatives, who
claim to be the political spokesmen for the alliance. Moreover, several
guerrilla chiefs show continued unwillingness to subordinate their personal
quests for power to one of the overall goals of the insurgency-the creation
of a truly unified organization. Nevertheless, all alliance members endorse
the common goal of replacing the Salvadoran Government by conducting
antigovernment insurgency within the country and propagandizing the
alliance's cause abroad. At present, they are unified in their policy
regarding negotiations with the government: they reject participation in
elections and demand a power-sharing arrangement with the regime,
although some democratic socialists in the alliance seem less hardline on
this issue, according to recent US Embassy reporting.
At the head of the alliance is the Unified Revolutionary Directorate
(DRU). It appears, however, to be mainly a paper organization, and it
exercises little authority. Two major umbrella organizations are subordi-
nate to the DRU:
? The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), which con-
sists of five Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups.
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Figure 1
El Salvador: Organization of Insurgent Alliance
Farabundo Marti
National Liberation
Front (FMLN)
Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (DRU)
FMLN/FDR
Political-Diploma
Commission (CP
Revolutionary
Coordinator of
the Masses (CRM)
Farabundo Marti
Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL)
People's
Revolutionary
Army (ERP)
Armed Forces of
National Resistance
(FARN)
Communist Party of
El Salvador/Armed
Forces of Liberation
(PCES/FAL)
Popular Revolutionary
Bloc (BPR)
Revolutionary
Workers
Movement (MOR)a
Revolutionary
Democratic
Front (FDR)
cFr
Popular Leagues of
28 February (LP-28)
United Popular
Action Front
(FAPU)
on,
National Democratic
Union
(UDN)
Revolutionary Party
lof Central American
Workers/Popular Liberation
Revolutionary Armed
Forces (PRTC/FARLP)
Popular Liberation
Movement
(MLP)
'In December 1983 the MOR broke away from the FPL and FMLN, This chart does not delineate the actual power relationships
carrying part of the BPR with it. between the organizations.
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? The Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), the overt political arm of
the insurgencyn 25X1
We believe, on the basis of
information appearing in the Salvadoran and foreign press,
that the FMLN exercises far greater power in the alliance than the FDR:
? Groups subordinate to the FMLN are the military decision makers in the
alliance who conduct the actual insurgency.
? FMLN leaders have more input than FDR leaders into political decisions
made by the alliance. Many FDR political pronouncements have been
formulated in close collaboration with the FMLN. The FMLN has
countermanded some political decisions announced by the FDR.
? FMLN members make up the top hierarchy of the DRU.
? FMLN leaders exercise considerable power over FDR Marxist front
organizations. Until the formation of the FDR in 1980, the Marxist front
groups were affiliated solely with the guerrilla organizations now subor-
dinate to the FMLN. While Marxist front groups are now theoretically
subordinate to the FDR, their individual members owe greater allegiance
to the FMLN. Moreover, many Marxist front group members have
joined their parent guerrilla organizations in the FMLN.
? Alliance representatives abroad whose political orientation is known are
predominantly from the ranks of the FMLN. 25X1
The alliance is aided in carrying on its resistance to the government
through the advice, arms, financing, training, and propaganda support it
receives from Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. Because of their
proximity to El Salvador, Cuba and Nicaragua are the insurgents' most
important supporters. Cuba and Nicaragua are both used by the insurgents
as meeting places, and Nicaragua has permitted alliance leaders from both
the FMLN and the FDR to establish their headquarters and personal
residences there. Cuban influence with the insurgents probably extends to
some control over individual leaders who travel frequently to Havana, but
no evidence exists to establish their subordination to the Cubans as
contracted agents. Information on support from the Soviet Union, on the
other hand, is not as considerable as the data available on Cuban and
Nicaraguan assistance. This lack of information may, in part, reflect
Moscow's effort to obscure their relationship with the insurgents. The
alliance also has sought and received support from Third World countries
and "liberation" groups, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization and
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Basque terrorists. In addition, the alliance has found a receptive audience
in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada-mostly among private
groups but also with some governments.' 0
Terms Related to the Salvadoran Insurgent Alliance
BPR Popular Revolutionary Bloc
CPD Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Front/Revolutionary
Democratic Front Political-Diplomatic Commission
DRU Unified Revolutionary Directorate
ERP People's Revolutionary Army
FAL Armed Forces of Liberation
FAPU United Popular Action Front
FARLP Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed Forces
FARN Armed Forces of National Resistance
FDR Revolutionary Democratic Front
FMLN Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FPL Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces
LP-28 Popular Leagues of 28 February
MIPTES Independent Movement of Salvadoran Professionals and
Technicians
MLP Popular Liberation Movement
MNR National Revolutionary Movement
MOR Revolutionary Workers' Movement-Salvador Cayetano
Carpio
MPSC Popular Social Christian Movement
PCES Communist Party of El Salvador
PRTC Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
UDN National Democratic Unionl
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The Insurgent Alliance-Membership
The Unified Revolutionary Directorate 1
The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 2
History 5
Leadership 6
The People's Revolutionary Army 7
History 7
Leadership 8
History 9
Leadership 10
The Communist Party of El Salvador/The Armed 11
Forces of Liberation
History 11
Leadership 11
The Revolutionary Party of Central American 12
Workers/Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed
Forces
History 13
Leadership 13
The Revolutionary Democratic Front 13
Leadership 14
International Activities 15
Foreign Support 15
International Spokesmen 17
1. El Salvador: Organization of Insurgent Alliance
2. Insurgent Fronts and Areas of Concentration
3. FMLN/FDR Representatives Abroad
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Secret Viii
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El Salvador:
The Insurgent Alliance
The leftist opposition in El Salvador traces its begin-
nings to the founding of the Communist Party of El
Salvador (PCES) in the early 1930s and the 1932
Communist-inspired peasant uprising in the western
part of the country. After the uprising and the
government repression that followed, the proscribed
Communist Party engaged for almost 40 years in
organization building and political activism that ex-
cluded armed action. By the late 1960s, however,
PCES radicals were demanding the establishment of
a military infrastructure to engage in armed resist-
ance to the government-demands opposed at that
time by the majority of PCES leaders.n
The 1970s, characterized by an increase in interna-
tional terrorist acts, saw the emergence in El Salvador
of many radical groups that are now part of the
1970 Dissident Communist Party members founded the FPL, an action that signaled a clear
break with the politically active but nonviolent PCES.
1972 A group of student terrorists formed the radical ERP.
mid-1970s Radical leftist front organizations began mass demonstrations and civil disobedience. At
peak strength in December 1979, the major fronts had 60,000-100,000 members.
1977 Violence and terrorism increased dramatically (following the presidential election), as
front groups took to the streets, engaged in strikes, kidnaped foreign officials and
Salvadoran nationals, and occupied foreign embassies.
1979 After years of rejecting violence, the PCES decided to form its own military wing, the
FAL. In December 1979 guerrilla groups began in earnest to unify their insurgency efforts.
1980 The FDR, the DRU, and the FMLN were established.
Jan 1981 The FMLN launched the "final offensive"-a major military offensive to bring down the
government; it failed when an expected uprising by the populace did not follow. Insurgents
have since concentrated their efforts in the countryside, actively engaging in Maoist-style
guerrilla warfare.
insurgent alliance. All five guerrilla groups discussed
in this paper and most of their associated front and
party organizations were formed in that decade,
during which they committed terrorist acts and insti-
gated and directed civil disobedience.F
The Unified Revolutionary Directorate
Salvadoran guerrilla leaders meeting in Havana in
May 1980 formed the DRU (with the help of Cuban
and Soviet party officials) because,
they were convinced that the
success of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas was primarily
the result of a unification of the Nicaraguan insurgent
factions. (The DRU was initially intended to be the
functional equivalent of the Sandinista National
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Directorate. Although both the FMLN and the FDR
are members of the DRU, its executive body has
always been made up solely of FMLN members-
three representatives from each of the five FMLN
constituent guerrilla groups.) The insurgents said in
an August 1981 news release that the DRU had
several subordinate units, including a support staff
and an international relations commission.)
In practice, the DRU has not really functioned as a
viable control organization because of friction among
the guerrilla factions. Its inability to implement direc-
tives by which all the insurgent groups would be
bound was especially apparent at the time of the
FMLN's "final offensive" in January 1981 and dur-
ing the general offensive that took place in the midst
of the March 1982 elections for the Constituent
Assembly. Some factions gave only lukewarm support
for those actions, and one FMLN group, the Fara-
bundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), decid-
ed not to participate in the 1982 offensive. Moreover,
leaders of the various factions have seemed to be
selective about attending DRU meetings, and the
body has seldom met with representatives of all
groups present. F7
The DRU still exists on paper, and on 14 June 1984
the guerrillas celebrated the fourth anniversary of its
official establishment, claiming that the insurgent
"politicomilitary organizations took an important step
in the formation of the revolutionary vanguard of the
Salvadoran people with the creation of the DRU."
During the last year and a half, however, decision-
making for the alliance seems to have shifted to the
FMLN five-member General Command, which is a
less unwieldy body. The DRU is seldom mentioned in
guerrilla communiques. Insurgent news releases indi-
cate that the General Command signs off on guerrilla
policy and propaganda statements. F7
The Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN)
At the May 1980 meeting in Havana the Salvadorans,
Cubans, and Soviets also decided on the concept of a
coordinating organization for the insurgency, al-
though the FMLN was not formally established until
the following November. Its five guerrilla groups, all
of which have or have had their headquarters in
Nicaragua, are the:
? Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL).Z
? People's Revolutionary Army (ERP).
? Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN).
? Communist Party of El Salvador/Armed Forces of
Liberation (PCES/FAL).
? Revolutionary Party of Central American
Workers/Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed
Forces (PRTC/FARLP).F-]
The General Command of the FMLN comprises the
heads of the five guerrilla units: Leonel Gonzalez
(FPL), Joaquin Villalobos Hueso (ERP), Ferman
Cienfuegos (FARN), Jorge Shafik Handal
(PCES/FAL), and Roberto Roca (PRTC/FARLP).
' The FMLN and its subordinate FPL were both named after
Agustin Farabundo Marti, who founded the PCES in 1930 and was
executed by Salvadoran authorities shortly after the beginning of
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Profile of the Insurgent Leaders
Throughout its history the insurgent movement has
struggled against the problem of internal strife. Ri-
valries among the individual leaders of the five
guerrilla groups and intense resentment of authority
of any kind-a quality central to the rebel personal-
ity-have generated serious divisiveness in the move-
ment; but common goals, common political beliefs,
common friends, common enemies, and common per-
sonal backgrounds have helped hold them together.
Joaquin Villalobos, the most powerful of the guerril-
la leaders, has emphasized: "Today there aren't even
any political differences among the revolutionary
organizations, but subjective interest almost demands
that differences exist because they are different orga-
nizations. "I
For the most part, cohesion within the insurgency is
obstructed by the personal ambition of the guerrilla
leaders. In discussing their differences, these leaders
talk of procedural disputes; the overt agenda of
disagreements tends to focus on strategic issues con-
cerning the conduct of the revolution. But the covert
agenda of "who is going to be in charge" is always
operative and always a major issue. We believe that
each group leader-and many of their subordi-
nates-considers himself uniquely qualified to con-
trol the movement and ultimately to control the
destiny of El Salvador. We doubt that this sort of
tension will be resolved by existing group processes.
El Salvador's insurgent leaders are rebellious not
only in their politics but in their personalities. They
did not emerge full-blown from behind a corporate
desk or even a highly disciplined political organiza-
tion-with the exception of PCES leader Jorge Sha-
fik Handal-to lead an insurrection against the
government. Most of them probably rebelled against
their parents' discipline and values, and most partici-
pated in organized rebellion as university students.
They rebelled and continue to rebel against the
established government of El Salvador, and many,
despite their Marxist-Leninist convictions, have re-
belled against the restraints imposed by the PCES.
Because rebellion is an integral part of the insurgent
leaders' personal identities, they are unwilling to step
aside and let others take charge.
The leaders of the various groups-with the possible
exception of Leonel Gonzalez,
have a common socioeconomic
background. They are of middle- or upper-middle-
class origin. All may have attended UES-three
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Characteristi-
cally, they were active in political movements during
their student days, and their current political beliefs
tend to coincide on most major points. All talk
publicly and privately about a future socialist
(Marxist-Leninist) government for El Salvador. Fi-
nally, all of them believe in the philosophical proposi-
tion that the end justifies the means, and this princi-
ple has been a dominant theme in their activities. For
example, they have even executed comrades if they
felt the overall goals of the revolution warranted such
action.
Military victory for the insurgents, resulting in the
collapse of the government of El Salvador, would
provide the most serious test of the ability of the
insurgent leaders to function as a cohesive unit.
Having devoted their lives to rebelling against the
establishment, they-like all revolutionaries-would
find it difficult to become the establishment-to
become a positive rather than a negative force. In
such circumstances, their personal differences would
probably intensify, and it would not be surprising to
see some of the charismatic guerrillas, such as
FARN leader Ferman Cienfuegos, drop by the way-
side over the long term, with the more disciplined
professionals, such as Jorge Shafik Handal of the
PCES and Leonel Gonzalez of the FPL, dominate.
The most likely immediate arrangement, however,
would be a joint governing coalition such as currently
exists in Nicaragua. Moreover, these new leaders of
El Salvador, still oppositional by nature and having
eliminated their current enemy, would probably di-
rect most of their energies against an externalfo-
cus-the United States-seeking to blame this coun-
try for El Salvador's problems and at the same time
attempting to unify the population. F-1
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(All have maintained residences in Nicaragua.
however,u they are
spending more time with their units in El Salvador
than they have in the past.)
guerrilla press statements, indicates that
decisionmaking authority for the insurgent alliance
now seems to be in the hands of the General Com-
mand. Its ability to make and implement decisions
has-like that of the DRU-often been hindered,
however, by personality conflicts and policy differ-
ences among its members. This inability was especial-
ly evident before the death in April 1983 of FPL head
Salvador Cayetano Carpio, who was the instigator of
many disputes, according to a variety of press
Figure 2
Insurgent Fronts and Areas of Concentration
Guerrilla front boundary
ERP (People's Revolutionary Army)
FPL (Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces)
PRTC/FARLP (Revolutionary Party of Central
American Werkers/Popular Liberation
Revolutionary Armed Forces)
Mixed
Departamento boundary
o Usulutan 1l
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
that since that time, although differences
still remain, the five insurgent groups and their
leaders have attempted to move toward greater coop-
eration; the FMLN General Command now appears
to be speaking as the voice of authority for the
insurgents. For example, all five of its members have
publicly called for discussions with the government,
bringing them in line with similar statements by FDR
leaders.
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policy and may be carried out by units ignoring
organization orders. According to
insurgent public statements, the more
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The Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces.'
The Marxist-Leninist FPL was the largest and most
radical of the guerrilla groups until Carpio's death
and the resulting schism in the organization. In terms
of strength, it now appears to be the second largest
(after the ERP); estimates in Decem-
ber 1983 put FPL strength at 2,800 to 3,500 mem-
bers.' We believe, on the basis of
Embassy reports, that a group of former FPL adher-
ents actually belong to the Revolutionary Workers'
Movement-Salvador Cayetano Carpio (MOR), a
splinter organization that operates outside the alli-
ance. Available data on MOR strength is conflicting:
the group comprises
about 100 armed insurgents, but the US Embassy
reports a Salvadoran leftist as saying that it has about
575 members and sympathizers.
Since Carpio's death, the FPL's new, more flexible
leaders have had some success in tempering the FPL's
notorious reputation and its disruptive tactics within
the alliance. The group has nonetheless maintained a
ruthless urban terrorist network that uses assassina-
tion as a weapon in its attempt to gain power. For
example, the organization claimed responsibility for
the murder of US Navy Lt. Cmdr. Albert Schaufel-
berger in May 1983. FPL units in the countryside,
moreover, have summarily executed military prisoners
of war.
' Although FPL has been used alternately as the name for both the
FPL's military and party arms, the organization often refers to its
military wing as the Armed Forces of Popular Liberation (FAPL).
conciliatory FPL members who have assumed leader-
ship roles in the group condemn the killing of prison-
ers, believing that such acts generate unfavorable
publicity for the insurgent cause.'
History. The FPL was formed in 1970 by Carpio, who
broke with the PCES after having served as its
secretary general during 1964-69.
Carpio tenaciously held the
view that the FPL was the cutting edge of the
revolution and that he was the natural leader of the
FMLN-stances that alienated other insurgent lead-
ers. Moreover, a
variety of Salvadoran and foreign press reports indi-
cate that he clashed over policy with younger fellow
guerrilla leaders Joaquin Villalobos (ERP) and Fer-
man Cienfuegos (FARN). For example, the FPL had
always called for a "prolonged popular war" that
would concentrate on a gradual development of popu-
lar support and a long-term war of attrition. The ERP
and FARN, however, argued that frequent insurrec-
tional activity, as set forth by Che Guevara in his foco
theory of revolution, was the key to achieving victory.'
In addition , the FPL
rejected even the idea of negotiations that would lead
to anything less than a complete turnover of power to
the insurgent alliance.
some
6 The FPL has publicly stated that some of these killings have been
committed by the MOR or b dissident members of the FPL's
urban terrorist command.n
6 Guevara stated that guerrilla war should be pursued with the
Latin American experience in mind and that it was often unneces-
sary to wait until all the conditions for revolution were fulfilled. He
theorized that dedicated professional revolutionaries could win
power by establishing themselves in the most vulnerable zones of
national territory-insurrectionary centers or locos. The revolution
would then spread slowly throughout the country by concentrated
actions while winning over the masses, who would eventually join
the guerrillas in the final insurrection against the enemy. For a
detailed discussion of the foco theory, see Regis Debray's Strategy
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young FPL leaders wanted to resolve the continual
differences with other guerrilla leaders and pressed
Carpio to give way to younger, more flexible individ-
uals.
in late 1982 then FPL deputy commander Melida
Anaya Montes also agreed with the dissidents. The
dispute between Carpio's supporters and his detrac-
tors surfaced openly in spring 1983, when Anaya
Montes was murdered in Managua, by a group of
Carpio's followers. Nicaraguan and Salvadoran insur-
gent news releases reported that Carpio, distraught at
Anaya Montes's assassination by people close to him,
committed suicide, also in Managua.
press reporting, however, indicates that
some observers and some members of the
insurgent alliance have questioned this account. The
new leaders of the FPL publicly say that Carpio
actually ordered Anaya Montes's murder, and=
has said that Carpio had her killed
because she advocated greater unity within the
FMLN and had become more popular than he was.
Carpio loyalists claim that the deaths were the un-
planned culmination of Cuban plans to disgrace Car-
pio because the Cubans viewed his activities as disrup-
tive.
Leadership. Factionalism between hardline Carpio
followers and FPL members who wanted more coop-
eration with other guerrilla groups intensified after
Carpio's death and the selection of more conciliatory
leaders in September 1983. At that time Leonel
Gonzalez was elected first secretary of the Central
Committee of the organization's party and command-
er in chief of its armed forces, and Dimas Rodriguez
became party second secretary and deputy command-
er in chief, according to press accounts. Insurgent
press releases indicate that the new leaders began
taking steps to resolve differences with the leaders of
the other FMLN guerrilla groups, an approach
staunchly contested by Carpio loyalists.=
The dispute reached a critical stage in December,
when a group of Carpio's followers left the FPL and
formed the MOR.
(The MOR siphoned off
much of the FPL's labor following when a major labor
affiliate associated with the FPL front organization-
the Popular Revolutionary Bloc joined the new
splinter group.) The military force of the MOR may
be composed entirely of former members of the FPL's
urban terrorist network in San Salvador who are
Carpio loyalists and have publicly rejected the current
leadership. The MOR has criticized FMLN policies,
and the FMLN, in turn, considers the MOR an
outlaw organization.
Western press accounts indicate that FPL leader
Gonzalez has experience as an educator and a politi-
cal organizer. Before becoming the group's head, he
spent much of his time at FPL headquarters in
Nicaragua, where he dealt with other Salvadoran
insurgent factions and was a logistics, political, and
military coordinator for FPL activities in El Salvador.
He now serves as a member of the Political Commis-
sion of the Central Command, the FPL's top body.
he has visited Cuba and
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Leninist organization, we believe-on the basis of
organization is now the foremost in the insurgency 25X1
and that other alliance groups should follow their
lead. both FMLN and 25X1
FDR leaders have complained about the ERP's ten-
dency to act without considering the broader needs of
the alliance. Although the ERP says it is a Marxist-
the ERP's history-that it 25X1
is not strictly tied to orthodox Communist theory and
is more flexible than other insurgent factions. ERP
policies are more likely to be dictated by available
opportunities or potential setbacks than by ideology.
Over the years the ERP has emphasized military
action and terrorism over political activism. Group
members have engaged in assassinations, kidnapings,
bombings, and the occupation of government build-
ings and foreign embassies. On the basis of its
performance and its adherence to Che Guevara'sfoco
theory, we surmise that the ERP believes that drastic
armed attacks will eventually ignite a final insurrec-
tion and motivate the people to help overthrow the 25X1
government.F_~ 25X1
History. The ERP was founded in 1972 as an urban
terrorist organization. In its formative years, it was an
eclectic mixture of largely Marxist student radicals
and some Christian-socialist militants bent on vio-
lence. Some of its members undoubtedly drew part of
their early inspiration from Western anarchist terror-
ist groups, who had gained international attention
from their numerous violent acts to disrupt the exist-
ing political systems in their countries during the late
1960s and early 1970s. In the early days of the
organization, ERP leaders openly expressed ideologi-
cal sympathy for China and its former ally, Albania.
The People's Revolutionary Army. The ERP has been
the most militarily active of the FMLN guerrilla
groups,
Despite its longtime emphasis on military activism,
the ERP has made some attempt at political organiz-
ing and propagandizing. In 1977 it created a party
organization, the Salvadoran Revolutionary Party
(PRS); and a front group, the Popular Leagues of 28 25X1
February, to look after these functions. Because of its
n maverick reputation, the ERP was late to join in plans
the past year the ERP has probably become the
largest FMLN member with 3,000 to 3,500 armed
combatants. With Carpio out of the way and the
FPL's loss of strength, ERP chief Joaquin Villalobos
and other leaders of the group may feel that their
to unify the insurgency, which began in earnest at the 25X1
end of 1979. As a result, it had to agree to already
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established general guidelines and agreements set
down by its fellow organizations and their foreign
supporters. In addition, to make the organization
more acceptable to its partners in the FMLN, ERP
leader Villalobos dissociated himself from the group's
earlier excesses and past ideological isolation, ascrib-
ing both to early leaders of the organization. F-]
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The Armed Forces of National Resistance. The
FARN has a reputation both in El Salvador and
internationally as the least doctrinaire and most na-
tionalistic of the five guerrilla factions. Its leader,
Ferman Cienfuegos, publicly says that the organiza-
tion's decisions are based on goals of the insurgency,
not on revolutionary theories. For example, the
FARN was the principal advocate of the "final
offensive" insurrection strategy but now acknowl-
edges the possibility that the war will be long term.
ERP leadership executed Dalton and possibly other
dissidents, and some Western writers maintain that
Villalobos himself was the triggerman. ERP members
sympathetic to Dalton's policies broke away in protest
and formed the FARN and its party organization, the
National Resistance (RN).' To pursue its goal of
intensified political work among the masses, the
FARN affiliated itself in 1975 with the already
existing United Popular Action Front, which is now
the FARN front organization. F-1
disagree-
ments with other guerrilla groups over issues such as
the FARN's willingness to negotiate with the govern-
ment and the animosity between FARN leaders and
the heads of other insurgent factions have caused
considerable friction in the alliance. For example, the
FARN left the DRU in 1980 in the aftermath of one
wide-ranging dispute-concerning the FARN's oppo-
sition to decisionmaking on the basis of the principle
of democratic centralism, its advocacy of an early
"final offensive," and its opposition to FPL attempts
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sees negotiations as a useful tactic for strengthening
the insurgent position, while continuing the war.
the FARN has a
strength of 1,400 to 1,500 members.
History. Shortly before the FARN was established in
1975, a group within the ERP, led by noted poet and
former PCES member Roque Dalton, publicly pro-
tested ERP emphasis on terrorism and the adverse
effect of such actions on the Salvadoran people. The
group urged instead a program of organizational work
among the masses. Because of this policy dispute the
to dominate the insurgency.
the FARN returned to the DRU in
October of that year after Cuba mediated the differ-
ences.
and policy, brewing since the failure of the January
1981 "final offensive," erupted the following June at
a meeting of the organization in Havana. FARN
dissidents claimed that the vote for a new central
committee of the organization was illegal. They also
reportedly argued against the FARN policy of giving
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military matters precedence over political matters, 25X1
comparing that policy to one in the ERP that caused
FARN members to break away. The dissidents lost
the dispute, and their leader, Jose Alberto Ramos (an
FMLN leader who may have once been a DRU
member) was expelled from the organization.8
' For a detailed discussion of this incident, see Dissent, Winter 1982.
['In March 1982 the US press reported that Ramos was living in
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P C S
the USSR and Cuba would like to see the
PCES/FAL dominate any future government coali-
tion established by the guerrillas, and much of Han-
dal's and the PCES/FAL's prominence is due to
continued Soviet and Cuban support. Moreover, in
May 1983 the Soviet Union and Cuba urged the other
FMLN insurgent factions to align themselves with
PCES decisionmaking because the party had the
strongest Marxist credentials of any of the groups,
FAL.
The Communist Party of El Salvador/Armed Forces
of Liberation. The military arm of the Moscow-
supported PCES, the FAL is the guerrilla group with
the closest relationship to the Soviet Union. With an
estimated armed strength of 1,100 to 1,300 members,
the group is militarily one of the weakest in the
alliance. Shafik Handal heads both the PCES and the
We believe, however, that the five insurgent factions
still make their own decisions regarding their activi-
ties and that the PCES/FAL decides on overall
FMLN policies jointly with the other groups. In the
event of a guerrilla victory, the strongest military
factions-the ERP and' the FPL-would probably
attempt to play the major role in a government the
insurgents established despite the preferences of the
Soviets and Cubans. The PCES undoubtedly would
also have a significant role in a government coalition
because of the active participation of its military
elements in the insurgency. F7
History. During the 1960s and most of the 1970s the
PCES was reluctant to engage in military actions.
The party leadership reversed that policy, however,
after a 1979 conference in Havana, at which the
Cubans and the Soviets told Handal and the other
party leaders to join the insurgency. Since then
Handal has fully supported military action, publicly
justifying the militant policy of the PCES by citing
Lenin's dictum of shifting tactics to fit the circum-
stances. 7_~
The PCES/FAL brought to the alliance political and
organizational expertise and party contacts that it had
developed over the years with a broad spectrum of
Salvadoran society and Communist nations. For ex-
ample, its front organization, the National Democrat-
ic Union, which was established in 1968, has had well-
developed ties to many non-Marxist Salvadoran
political organizations demanding social, political,
and economic reform. In addition, the party's ties to
foreign Communist parties have opened doors for
FMLN leaders, allowing them to use the extensive
propaganda machinery available to Moscow and its
allies. Handal and the PCES/FAL also have had a
major role in acquiring arms and aid for the guerrillas
from abroad. For example,
in mid-1980 Handal traveled to
Cuba, the U R, Vietnam, East Germany, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Ethiopia to successfully request aid,
especially arms, for the "final offensive."n
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make up the FMLN.
The Revolutionary Party of Central American
Workers/Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed
Forces. The military arm of the PRTC, the FARLP is
the smallest and least known of the organizations that
to be the organization's main foreign adviser
the PRTC/FARLP main-
tains close ties to Cuba and Nicaragua. Cuba appears
at one time it
may have had links to the Soviet Union through one
of its founders, Fabio Castillo, a former Salvadoran
presidential candidate who has had considerable con-
tact with the Soviets. On the basis of this contactC
the most recent disagreement has occurred over a
program of political assassination-possibly not sanc-
tioned by the PRTC/FARLP's top leadership-that
is being carried out by the organization's terrorist unit
in San Salvador. In early 1984 that unit publicly
claimed responsiblity for the murders of several far-
right politicians and a labor leader in San Salvador. F
and military stategies. According to the US Embassy,
we believe that Castillo is a
the PRTC/FARLP suffers from organizational prob-
lems and an inability to decide on its overall political
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History. The PRTC was founded as a regional party
organization in Costa Rica in 1976 and has branches
in all Central American countries. The most active
branch is in El Salvador. Until early 1983 the party
and its military forces in the FMLN were both called
the PRTC. Since then, however, the military forces
have been referred to as the FARLP. The front
organization of the PRTC, the Popular Liberation
Movement, was formed in 1979.n
Because of the PRTC's relative obscurity in its forma-
tive years and Havana's lack of information about it,
the group was not well known to Cuba when it first
joined the insurgency. Moreover, we believe that the
Cubans themselves may have avoided contact with the
PRTC because of the group's Trotskyite bent. By
,1982, however, Havana's ties to the PRTC appeared
well established, and
a meeting of the PRTC regional directorate
(which would have included representatives from El
Salvador) was held in Cuba in April 1982.
Leadership. Unlike the other FMLN groups, the
PRTC/FARLP has had Nicaraguans in top leader-
ship posts
The PRTC/FARLP
States with organization funds.
the organization's onetime
military chief and second in command, Jacinto San-
chez, deserted in mid-1983 and came to the United
fellow FMLN groups.
may suffer internal problems similar to those of its
the FARLP.
Roberto Roca, whose true name is Francisco Jovel
Urquilla, heads both the PRTC in El Salvador and
The Revolutionary Democratic Front
The FDR is a political and diplomatic organization
and is not involved in military activities. It was
established by Marxist guerrilla leaders and non-
Marxist political leaders in early 1980 to bring to-
gether five Marxist front groups and three small non-
Marxist political groupings. The Marxist groups had
been operating under a loosely knit, now largely
moribund unit called the Revolutionary Coordinator
of the Masses, which the insurgents had created in
February 1980 to provide central direction to the
guerrilla front groups; at the same time, non-Marxist
groups were under an organization called the Demo-
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cratic Front, which had been created only a few weeks
earlier.)
? The Independent Movement of Salvadoran Profes-
sionals and Technicians, formed in early 1980 as a
moderate socialist organization with an original
membership of several hundred, including doctors,
The Marxist groups of the FDR consist of the
following:
? The Popular Revolutionary Bloc, a militant front
organization of the FPL, was founded in 1975.
Before 1980 it had 50,000 to 70,000 members. Its
largest labor organization has now joined the break-
away MOR.
? The Popular Leagues of 28 February is a violent
front group of the ERP, now largely integrated with
it. It is a small coalition of about 1,000 students,
teachers, and peasants.
? The United Popular Action Front, created in 1974,
subsequently became the front group of the FARN.
It had a membership of 12,000 to 20,000 before
1980.
? The National Democratic Union is the front group
of the PCES. Formed in 1968, it has been recog-
nized by the Salvadoran Government as the only
legitimate Marxist party. Many of its leaders have
joined the FAL or left El Salvador.
? The Popular Liberation Movement (MLP) was cre-
ated in 1979 as the political front for the PRTC.
Many of its small membership of students and
teachers have been incorporated into the FARLP;
others serve in diplomatic positions for the insurgent
alliance.fl
? The National Revolutionary Movement, a small
social democratic party founded in 1964 and a
member of the Socialist International.
? The Popular Social Christian Movement, a group of
former members of El Salvador's Christian Demo-
cratic Party who broke away from the party in early
1980.
lawyers, engineers, and writers.
PCES had effective control of the group.
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Although the FDR appears to have a broader political
base than the FMLN, it has lacked direction to carry 25X1
out its internal political responsibilities almost from
its inception. (Most domestic political activities are
carried out by the FMLN.) Many FDR leaders,
particularly non-Marxists, left the country in 1980
following a loss of popular support and the murder of
FDR members and sympathizers by government secu-
rity forces and extreme rightwing terrorists. More-
over, it has no representatives on the DRU.n
Although its domestic political base is virtually nonex-
istent, the FDR retains some significance because of
the international visibility enjoyed by its non-Marxist
members. Even hardline, Marxist-Leninist FMLN
leaders recognize the value of these individuals to the
alliance-that is, their acceptance abroad as political
spokesmen for the alliance and their ability to gain
sympathy for the guerrilla cause among non-Commu-
nist groups in Western countries. 1
Leadership. Guillermo Manuel Ungo, president of the
FDR since 1980, is a striking example of a non-
Marxist who lends credibility to the guerrillas' cause
in the international arena. His democratic leftist
views are well known, and he has excellent contacts
among international leftist organizations. Despite his
FDR post, he has no real power in the insurgent
alliance, but he continues to lend himself to the cause,
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Foreign Support 9
Cuba is the alliance's most important external sup-
porter. It has provided political and military training
and arms to the guerrillas. Leaders of the alliance
often travel to Havana to consult with Cuban offi-
cials and many
have had personal contact with Fidel Castro. The
insurgents also hold important organizational meet-
ings in Cuba. Through these contacts they have the
benefit of Cuban insight and guidance that sometimes
takes the form of operational planning.
The Cubans have criticized significant failures of the
insurgents, and 25X1
they sometimes have withheld support in an effort to
bring about policy changes concerning unity and
tactics. Although Havana's influence with the alliance
may extend to control over individual leaders, little
evidence is available to suggest that any of them are 25X1
contracted agents of the Cubans.
however, that even a reported non- 25X1
Marxist like FDR President Ungo is heavily influ-
enced by the Cubans. 25X1
the rumor is that "Havana doesn't own Ungo, but it
can certainly rent him."I 25X1
Nicaragua's influence with the guerrillas is second to
that of Cuba; its geographic location and the Marxist-
Leninist orientation of its leaders are major reasons
for its access to the insurgents. Besides providing the
locale for the headquarters of FMLN groups and the
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been located in Managua, although
residences of their top leaders, Nicaragua supplies the
guerrillas with training, arms-mostly transshipped
from other countries-and sites for meetings. More-
over, headquarters and offices of FDR officials have
since the beginning of
dependency on the Sandinistas.
1984, many FDR representatives have left Nicaragua
in order to decrease foreign criticism about their
with arms.
The Soviet Union provides advice, training, and
financial and propaganda assistance to the Salvador-
ans. Moscow has also been involved in the acquisition
and shipment of arms to the guerrillas, but to obscure
involvement, the Soviet role in arms support has been
mostly indirect. Moscow has asked allies-including
East European countries-to provide the guerrillas
established
The Soviet role in support of the insurgency is not as
direct as that of the Cubans and Nicaraguans, al-
though Moscow's assistance to the guerrillas has been
difficult to document, the Soviets
Although Soviet support for the alliance as a whole is
give the organization financial support.
the Soviets also train
is one of the weakest groups in the insurgency.
FPL members. The PCES/FAL is the alliance mem-
ber most responsive to Soviet dictates, but militarily it
the stronger mili-
Moscow.
tary organizations-despite their Marxist-Leninist
orientation-have shown some disinclination to re-
ceive guidance from the Soviets and the Cubans,
although they readily accept and seek material sup-
port. All the guerrilla groups have or have had in the
past leaders who were once official Communist Party
members. We have no information, however, that
identifies any of them-other than PCES leaders-as
current party members or as being directly tied to
The insurgent alliance receives support from some
Third World countries. For example, Vietnam has
supplied the Salvadoran insurgents with US weapons
captured after the fall of the Saigon government. and
FMLN/FDR Political-Diplomatic
Commission (CPD)
In January 1981 the DRU established the CPD to
serve as the basis for a future government of the
guerrillas and to ensure that FMLN member groups
had a voice in the alliance's diplomatic activities. (At
that time diplomatic activities were being supervised
primarily by FDR officials.) Since the failure of the
`final offensive" in January 1981, the alliance has
tabled the concept of the CPD as a future government
and today is concerned mainly with making interna-
tional diplomatic overtures.F-1
CPD membership is heavily weighted in favor of the
extreme left, as evidenced by its top leadership. Five
FMLN leaders and two FDR officials compose the
commission's executive directorate: Marxist-
Leninists Salvador Ricardo Samayoa Leiva (FPL),
Ana Maria Guadalupe Martinez Menendez (ERP),
Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz (FARN), Mario Or-
lando Aguinada Carranza (PCES), and Fabio Cas-
tillo Figueroa (PRTC) and democratic leftists Hector
Francisco Oqueli Colindres (FDR) and Ruben Ignacio
Zamora Rivas (FDR).
Hanoi also established training programs in Vietnam
for all of the FMLN guerrilla groups.
the insurgents may also have obtained
US weapons from Ethiopia.
the guerrillas have received arms from Libya
and financial assistance from Iraq.
The Salvadorans also receive support from and pro-
vide assistance to other insurgent groups in Guatema-
la and Honduras. In addition, the guerrillas maintain
relations with "liberation" rou s.
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International Spokesmen
Because of the external support it receives, the alli-
ance has been able to carry on a comprehensive
international campaign, both through the constant
travel of FMLN and FDR officials and through the
assignment of representatives abroad-FMLN offi-
cials publicly claim that the alliance has assigned
representatives to more countries than the Salvadoran
Government has. The insurgents maintain a presence 25X1
in the capitals of most West European nations, select-
ed Latin American countries, the United States,
Canada, and several African countries (see figure 3).
Moreover, about 75 local solidarity committees exist
in more than 60 countries. Through its diplomatic
initiatives, the alliance has gained worldwide atten-
tion for what is essentially an internal Salvadoran
problem.F_-]
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Figure 3
FMLN/FDRRRepresentatives Abroad
aFMLN-Farabundo Marti National Chile
Liberation Front
FDR-Revolutionary Democratic Front
F.R.G.-Federal Republic of Germany
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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FMLN/FDR Representatives Abroad li
North America
Mexico, Central America,
South America
Chief Representative
and Caribbean
Chief Representative
Hector Oqueli Colindres, MNR
Chief Representatives
Fidelina Martinez, FARN
United States
Eduardo Calles, MIPTES
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Washington, D.C.
Guillermo Manuel Ungo, MNR
Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay
Francisco Altschul, MPSC
Ruben Zamora, MPSC
Francisco Diaz Rodriguez, MPSC
Alberto Arene, MPSC
Costa Rica
Brazil
Arnoldo Ramos
Carlos Alberto Molina, MIPTES
Rene Moreno
New York City
Rolando Elias Julian Belloso, ERP
Colombia
(Fr.) Rafael Moreno
Jorge Alberto Villacorta, MPSC
Carlos Calles
Canada
Cuba
Venezuela
Dina Mendoza, FARN
Pedro Fuentes
Gerardo Godoy, MNR
Margarita Gonzalez, ERP
Calixto Zelaya
Western Europe
Norma Guevara, PCES
Chief Representative
Andres Martinez, FPL
Africa
(Fr.) Luis de Sebastian
Silvia Martinez
Chief Representative
Austria
Jorge Rodriguez
Marisol Galindo Toledo, ERP
Francisco Herrera
Dominican Republic
Algeria
Belgium
and Jamaica
Unknown
Roberto Castro, FPL
Unknown
Libya
Roberto Guillen
Eastern Caribbean
Nelson Arrietta, FPL
Federal Republic of Germany
Juan Ramon Cardona
Mozambique
Luis Leandro Uzquiano, MPSC
Mexico
Jorge Arturo Palencia
France
Jose Salvador Arias Peflate, MPSC
Ruth Argandona, ERP
Enrique Guatemala Garcia, ERP
Ana Maria Echeverria, ERP
Jose Antonio Hernandez, FARN
Roberto Lopez, ERP
Benito Tovar, FPL
Cesar Marti, ERP
Aronetta Diaz de Zamora, MPSC
Antonio Martinez Uribe, PCES
Panama
Iberian Peninsula (Spain and
Freddy Guandique Rodriguez, PCES
Portugal)
Jose Francisco Marroquin, MNR
Enrique Rubio
Alfredo del Transito Monge, PCES
Italy
Jaime Suarez, FARN
Unknown
Netherlands
Unknown
Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden,
Denmark, Finland)
Gabriel Lara
Switzerland
Roberto Cordero, PCES
Francisco Galindo Velez
United Kingdom
Unknown
" Representatives to Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe are
not listed. Many military and political representatives of the insurgent
alliance are located in Nicaragua, however. Although no names of
FMLN/FDR officials assigned in Bloc countries are currently available, the
region is said to be the responsibility of the Communist Party of El Salvador.
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The FMLN/FDR Political-Diplomatic Commission
(CPD) is the top diplomatic organization of the alli-
ance. Its officials carry out key international diplo-
matic initiatives, especially regarding a negotiated
solution to the war. No evidence exists, however, to
indicate that the CPD or any other organization in the
alliance is responsible for appointing overseas repre-
sentatives. We surmise that each member group may
assign its own representatives to specific countries and
that member groups may have to reach joint decisions
about critical posts or regions when questions of
jurisdiction arise.)
Official representatives and traveling spokesmen ag-
gressively seek out foreign government and party
officials, legislators, members of the media, and pri-
vate citizens who are, according to a variety of press
and Embassy reports, often sympathetic to their cause
and accept at face value the information they provide.
On the other hand, reports from several US embassies
in Western Europe indicate that many government
officials there are well aware that the non-Marxist
spokesmen of the FDR have little power in the
alliance and that the Marxist-Leninist military lead-
ers of the FMLN are its major decisionmakers. F-1
The alliance has proved adept at using both Salvador-
an and non-Salvadoran Roman Catholic priests, at-
tractive females, human rights activists, intellectuals,
and sophisticated Salvadoran guerrilla commanders
in both official and nonofficial capacities to project
the image of an insurgency dedicated to achieving
social justice. For example:
? The alliance's chief official in Western Europe, Luis
de Sebastian, is a Jesuit priest.
? A known guerrilla and terrorist, the attractive Ana
Guadalupe Martinez, figures prominently in alli-
ance diplomatic overtures.
? Another female, Marianella Garcia Villas, whose
death in El Salvador in 1983 caused a great stir in
Western European countries because of her reputa-
tion as a human rights activist, was a high-ranking
official of the extreme left.
? Roberto Armijo Navarette, the alliance representa-
tive in Paris from 1980 until late 1983, is a noted
Salvadoran writer and poet.
? Many Western officials and newsmen, after con-
tacts with guerrilla commanders such as FARN
leader Ferman Cienfuegos and PRTC/FARLP
chief Roberto Roca, come away impressed with
their moderation, social consciousness, and lack of
ideological commitment.F_~
The international press often labels the overseas rep-
resentatives of the alliance as moderates, and the
presence of FDR leaders Guillermo Ungo and Ruben
Zamora, once legitimate leaders of democratic opposi-
tion parties in El Salvador, lends credibility to that
image. Both men are frequent spokesmen for the
alliance because they are generally well received in
forums such as the Socialist International. 7-1
The insurgent alliance had considerable early success
in its international campaign to gain legitimacy. For
example, in June 1980 the Socialist International
voted to support the FDR, and in August 1981
Mexico and France issued a joint statement recogniz-
ing the FMLN/FDR as a "representative political
force" in El Salvador. Several other countries subse-
quently indicated support for the FDR. US diplomats
have reported since 1982, however, that some foreign
officials have questioned the information given to
them by alliance representatives about internal Salva-
doran events. Moreover, we believe that if the new
administration of President Duarte is able to govern
effectively and reduce substantially the human rights
abuses, the perception of El Salvador will change in
the West, taking away a major propaganda issue from
the insurgent representatives. Thus, it will be more
difficult for them to find receptive audiences in
Western capitals. 1
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