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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86S00588R000300360002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -Seeret
Intelligence
Younger Generation
The Emergent Italian Communist
Party Elite: The Challenge of a
-Seent_
EUR 85-10184
November 1985
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Younger Generation
The Emergent Italian Communist
Party Elite: The Challenge of a
This paper was prepared byl Ithe
Office of European Analysis with contributions from
EURA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, European Issues Divison,
he Office of Central Reference.
Secret
EUR 85-10184
November 1985
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The Emergent Italian Communist
Party Elite: The Challenge of a
Younger Generation
Summary The Italian Communist Party (PCI) has undergone a process of genera-
Information available tional change in recent years that will inevitably affect its internal
as of 15 October 1985 structure and its domestic and foreign policies. Large numbers of younger
was used in this report.
people have entered the party hierarchy and now hold a majority of lower-
and middle-ranking posts as well as a growing share of the senior posts.
Their views are likely to have a major impact on the balance of power
among the four contending factions in the senior leadership: the dominant
centrist faction, led by Party Secretary Alessandro Natta, and the social
democratic, orthodox Marxist, and radical groupings.
This "emergent elite" differs markedly from the senior leadership in terms
of its social background, political experiences, and values:
? It is much less "proletarian" and tends to be considerably better
educated and more likely to hold white-collar or professional positions. In
fact, members of the iconoclastic "new middle class" that has also
emerged elsewhere in Western Europe in the last decade now overwhelm-
ingly dominate the ranks of the PCI elite.
? It has fewer members whose sole political experience has been within the
confines of the PCI subculture. Fewer of today's predominantly young
elite were born into "red" families or belonged to the PCI youth
federation. Many more were involved in freewheeling student and other
leftist movements prior to joining the party.
Although evidence about its specific views is still skimpy, this emergent
elite appears to be by no means monolithic. We believe its unique traits and
experiences have predisposed its members to favor freer debate within the
party, to oppose any PCI move in the direction of either orthodox
Communism or social democracy, and to have a jaundiced view of both
superpowers:
? The most recent authoritative survey of PCI officials suggests that the
emergent elite is less inclined than earlier ones to go along with the PCI's
policy of "democratic centralism"-which calls for all key decisions to be
made at the top. Already, lower- and middle-ranking officials have
forced through significant changes in party rules to require greater
openness in debate and have been more willing than their predecessors to
challenge and even publicly criticize the senior leadership. Although
emergent elite pressure is not likely to make the party truly democratic, it
will lead to a greater measure of open debate.
Secret
EUR 85-10184
November 1985
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? In domestic policy, the available evidence indicates that the majority of
emergent elite members are comfortable with the policy favored by the
party's dominant centrist and particularly the radical groupings. This
combines professed acceptance of democratic principles and pragmatic
short-term economic and social programs with a continuing commitment
to long-term radical change. Despite some recent setbacks, this policy has
kept the PCI the second-largest party in Italy, with about 30 percent of
the vote in recent years. In our judgment, the emergent elite is not
inclined to challenge it-if only for opportunistic reasons.
In the foreign policy area, the younger elite-which matured politically
during years of declining Soviet popularity within the Italian left-is
reinforcing the senior leadership's current tendency to keep its distance
from Moscow. At the same time, many younger members have an affinity
with the general aims of the peace movement and a general disdain for US
policies. They are thus likely to exert pressure on senior party leaders to re-
verse toleration for Italian membership in NATO in favor of a more
independent West European defense effort or even nonalignment.
We believe that, over the near term, the senior leadership will be able to re-
tain its policy of tolerating Italian participation in NATO and working to
enhance the party's image with the United States. However, emergent elite
opposition may eventually cause the party to adopt a more questioning and
confrontational approach to Italy's membership in NATO and to US links.
This would be especially likely if the skepticism leftist parties and even
some governments elsewhere in Western Europe have exhibited toward
NATO and the United States continues to grow and if the Soviet Union
under Gorbachev develops a less threatening image.
Secret iv
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Contents
Summary
Introduction
1
A "New Middle-Class" Complexion
3
Differing Path Into Politics
A More Activist and Independent-Minded Bent
6
Impact on Party Decisionmaking
International Perspectives
The Renewed Debate Over Policy
The Emergent Elite and the Party's Future
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The Emergent Italian Communist
Party Elite: The Challenge of a
Younger Generation
The political fortunes of the Italian Communist Party
(PCI) have taken a tumble after years of steady
advance. The party suffered a major defeat in the
May 1985 administrative elections when it failed to
outpoll the Christian Democrats, as it had done in the
previous year's elections to the Europarliament. In-
deed, because the PCI's vote sagged while Christian
Democratic and Socialist totals advanced, the party
was ousted from the ruling coalitions of several major
cities including Rome, Milan, and Turin. This setback
was followed by the defeat of the PCI-sponsored
referendum last June that was aimed at reversing the
Craxi government's restrictive wage control policies.
Italian press observers agree that these setbacks have
dashed any hopes within the PCI of assuming national
power in the near term. The setbacks, combined with
the power vacuum created by longtime Secretary
General Berlinguer's death last year, have reignited a
debate within the party's senior leadership about the
wisdom of the basic philosophy that has guided party
decisions in recent years:
? The dominant centrist faction led by Secretary
General Alessandro Natta contends the party
should continue its generally moderate domestic and
international policies, which it has combined with
some more traditionally Marxist elements such as a
continuing commitment to long-term radical change
in Italian society and the principle of democratic
centralism in the party's own decisionmaking
process.
? The minority social democratic faction, headed by
Giorgio Napolitano and Luciano Lama, argues that
the party should explicitly opt for social reform
rather than transformation, as well as for greater
internal democracy, a complete break with Moscow,
and closer relations with Socialist Prime Minister
Bettino Craxi.
? A small radical group led by Pietro Ingrao favors
greater internal democracy combined with a strong
commitment to a radical social program, while a
Stalinist remnant led by Armando Cossutta would
like the party to restore orthodox Communism and
close ties to Moscow.
We believe that future debates about the party's
direction will involve lower- and middle-ranking party
officials to a much greater degree than in the past,
and that their participation will inevitably affect the
balance among these four factions. Traditionally, the
PCI has been a centralized party in which policy has
been determined almost exclusively by the Secretary
General acting in coordination with the most senior
leadership organ-the Directorate. In recent years,
however, and particularly since Berlinguer's death, a
growing number of party officials below this level-
ranging from members of the party's nominally pow-
erful but traditionally obedient central committee, all
the way down to section chiefs-have begun to de-
mand for themselves a bigger role in the party's
decisionmaking process. We believe this development
reflects in large part the appearance of an emergent
elite of lower- and middle-ranking officials that is
middle class and far more educated and youthful than
its predecessor-and more vocal and independent
This paper will examine the changes that have taken
place in the ranks of party leaders below the Director-
ate level in recent years. It will focus on the emergent
elite's social background, political socialization, and
values, and the impact these will have on internal and
external PCI policies in the post-Berlinguer era. Al-
though we know less about this emergent elite than we
do about the senior party leadership and believe that
it is by no means monolithic, we think the available
evidence does permit us to draw some useful conclu-
sions about its dominant attitudinal and behavioral
tendencies.
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Secret
The PCI's appeal to younger people has declined
substantially in recent years. Membership in the PCI
youth federation, for instance, fell from about
130,000 in 1976 to only about 45,000 in 1984. The
decline in youthful support for the PCI was also
re lected in a sharp drop in voting support by people
under 30, beginning with the 1979 election. This trend
has led to a gradual rise in the average age of PCI
members in recent years and has contributed to a
substantial decline in overall party membership, from
about 1.8 million in the mid-1970s to about 1.6
million today.
Most observers believe that the decreased attraction
of the PCI for young people stems from the party's
efforts of the late 1970s to gain power by cooperating
with the Christian Democrats. This led young people
to view the PCI increasingly as just another power-
hungry party rather than as a force for change.
Moreover, according to academic and press commen-
tary, they viewed the PCI s often ambiguous policies
on issues of concern to young people in the late 1970s
and 1980s-environmental preservation, civilian nu-
clear power, and nuclear disarmament-as inade-
quate. Younger Italian leftists have increasingly de-
voted their energies in recent years to one-issue "new
politics" protest groups and have voted in increased
A Profile of the Emergent Elite
The emergent elite, which now dominates all but the
highest organs of the party, differs from the senior
party leadership in terms of its social background,
formative experiences, and political values:
? According to data produced by the PCI itself,
lower- and middle-ranking leaders are much better
educated than in the past and more likely to have
white-collar or professional rather than proletarian
backgrounds.
numbers for political parties focusing on these issues,
such as the Radicals and most recently the "Greens. "
In an effort to attract more young people into the
party, the leadership of the PCI youth federation
(FGCI) decided in 1985 to adopt a more independent,
youth-oriented stance. At the federation's national
conference earlier this year, the FGCI leadership
openly criticized the PCI position on a number of
issues of concern to younger leftists. These included
its waffling on nuclear energy, its alleged lack of
concern for disadvantaged groups such as homosex-
uals and women, and its failure to vigorously oppose
US deployments of additional nuclear weapons in
Western Europe. They also decided to transform the
youth federation from a training ground for future
PCI elites to a federation of groups focusing on issues
of concern to youth.
The PCI senior leadership has grudgingly accepted
these changes in the youth federation's structure,
viewing them as steps necessary for bringing new
blood into the party. Their hope, according to diplo-
matic reporting, is that, once inside the party, the
recruits brought in by "one-issue politics" will be
inculcated in the broader PCI ideology.
Fewer of them, for instance, have parents who
belonged to the Communist Party, or were mem-
bers themselves of the Communist Party youth
organization.
The differences in social background and political
socialization, we believe, partly account for survey
results showing that the emergent elite-like other
members of the "new middle class" in Italy and
throughout Europe-is more independent minded and
participation oriented than its predecessors who now
occupy the top party posts.
? Survey evidence indicates that the younger PCI
members also are considerably less likely to have
matured within a purely Communist subculture.
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Secret
Growth in Influence
Attracted by Berlinguer's charisma and the apparent
success of his efforts to transform the PCI into a party
of government, large numbers of people in their
twenties and thirties joined the PCI in the early-to-
mid-1970s. Indeed, the proportion of people under 40
in the party as a whole increased by 5 percentage
points even while total party membership was rising
sharply. The numbers dropped off again in the late
1970s as younger leftists, according to academics and
press analyses, came to view the PCI increasingly as
an "establishment" party because of its efforts during
this period to form a coalition government with the
Christian Democrats (see inset).
25X1 According to academic and press analyses, the PCI
leadership made a special effort in the 1970s to
incorporate many of these young recruits into the
ranks of the hierarchy. The leadership saw this effort
as one way to blunt the leftist youth.rebellion of the
late 1960s, which had threatened the PCI's domi-
nance over the Italian left. The party also needed a
large number of replacements for party officials who,
because of the PCI's spectacular advances in local and
regional elections during this period, left their full-
time positions in the party to assume posts in public
25X1 The effects of this influx on the overall composition of
the hierarchy became evident in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. As table 1 indicates, the proportion of
those under 40 who held lower- or middle-level posi-
tions in the party rose substantially throughout the
1970s, especially in the higher ranking of these posi-
tions. A 1979 survey of PCI congress delegates found
that about three-fifths of the sample had joined the
party only since 1970 and that the vast majority of
these delegates were at the time of the survey under
the age of 35.'
To a lesser extent, rejuvenation has also taken place in
the upper reaches of the party hierarchy-the party's
Central Committee, Directorate, and national parlia-
mentary delegation. Within the Central Committee,
' This survey, whose results were published in 1983, is the most
recent, in-depth study of the attitudes and characteristics of PCI
officials. It was prepared by the Center for the Study of Political
Table 1
Proportion of Under-40s in
Various Leadership Categories
Members of federation
central committees
Full-time federation
officials
Delegates to national
congresses
PCI elected local
councilors
56
57
(1973 figures)
67
(1978 figures)
56
40
59
(1977 figures)
for instance, the proportion of "under 40s" rose from
just over a quarter in 1972 to over a third in 1983.
There was a similar increase in the PCI delegation in
the lower house of parliament, where the proportion of
those under 40 rose from 16 percent in 1970 to 23
percent in 1983. Even the party's highest decision-
making organ, the Directorate, has experienced an
influx of young leaders. In 1972, for instance, only
three of the 34 members were under the age of 40; in
the Directorate elected in 1983, eight of 33 members
were in this category.
A "New Middle-Class" Complexion
A great many of the young people recruited into the
PCI during the early 1970s were well-educated pro-
fessionals with middle-class backgrounds. Their entry
into the party significantly altered the social composi-
tion of the party membership and, eventually, its
leadership as well. As table 2 indicates, the proportion
of professionals, intellectuals, white-collar employees,
and university students in the party as a whole has
increased from 4 percent in 1969 to 11 percent, after
remaining fairly constant in the previous two decades.
A disproportionate number of these new recruits
found their way into the PCI's leadership ranks,
causing significant change in its overall composition.
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Table 2
Social Composition of the PCI Membership
Industrial and Traditional Middle
Agricultural Workers Class a
a Artisans, small farmers, and businessmen.
b White-collar professionals and students.
Primarily retired workers.
Although educated professionals and white-collar
workers have always been overrepresented at the top
of the party because of their generally superior ad-
ministrative and political skills, the influx of the
1970s has given professional "new middle-class" and
white-collar workers unquestioned dominance in
lower- and middle-echelon leadership posts as well:
? White-collar and professional workers and students
comprised three-fifths of the national congress dele-
gates and federation committee members in 1979;
they held only about half these posts 10 or 15 years
earlier (see table 3).
? Among full-time, paid officials, those whose original
profession was of a white-collar or professional
nature or who had been university students before
joining the party staff rose from 45 percent in 1972
to 56 percent in 1978. This trend was accompanied
by a sharper rise in the educational attainments of
these officials: by 1978, 55 percent had finished
high school or college, compared with 38 percent
only five years earlier. Among federation secretar-
ies-one of the highest ranking categories of paid
officials-both of these trends were magnified: about
75 percent of them in 1979 had "new middle-class"
backgrounds, compared with about 53 percent in
1972. Three-quarters also had completed high school
or college as opposed to less than half seven years
earlier.
The 1979 survey of PCI national congress delegates
provides clear evidence that in the case of full-time
officials the influx of young people into the hierarchy
was largely responsible for the growth of new middle-
class influence. Among those officials who joined the
party during 1970-74-now comprising nearly a third
of the current lower- and middle-echelon leadership-
55 percent had attended or graduated from a universi-
ty, compared with 35 percent of those who had joined
in the 1960s and less than 15 percent who had joined
prior to 1960. About two-thirds of the "class" of the
early 1970s had white-collar, professional, or student
occupational backgrounds, compared with about one-
third of those who entered the party in the 1940s or
1950s and about half who entered the party in the
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Table 3
Social Composition of the PCI Elite
Industrial and
Agricultural Workers
Traditional Middle
Class a
New Middle Class b
Housewives
Others c
1966 d
40
8
51
I
1
NA
1975 d
36
5
56
1
2
27
7
62
I
4
1979 d
33
4
61
1
26
5
65
1
4
1983 d
29
3
61
1
5
a Artisans, small farmers, and businessmen.
b White-collar professionals and students.
c Primarily retired workers.
d Delegates to PCI National Congress.
e Members of the central committees of provincial federations.
I Includes housewives.
g This figure includes all categories other than workers.
Differing Path Into Politics than their older counterparts to have even emerged
In addition to being younger and belonging to the new from families strongly sympathetic to the PCI: far
middle class, members of the emergent elite are less fewer enjoyed parental approval of their decision to
likely than their predecessors to have matured politi- enter the party, and more provoked open conflict with
fewer of them have roots in "red" families. As table 5 Perhaps the most striking difference between the
(foldout) shows, only about half the full-time officers current and emergent elite, however, concerns their
and elected public officials who entered the party early political experiences. Many of the party's senior
during the 1970s had fathers who were PCI members, leaders experienced political repression under Fascism
compared with three-fifths to three-quarters of those and even during the early postwar period, while
in these leadership categories who joined earlier.
Younger officials were in most cases also less likely
cally within the tightly knit world of the Italian their parents by this decision.
Communist "subculture." For instance, considerably
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Table 4
Attitudes on Party Involvement
Percent
Year of
Inscription
in Party
Rigorous
Application of
the "Line"
Spirit of
Political
Initiative
Capacity
for Original
Ideas
Prior to 1949 a
38
50
40
NA
43
46
1950-59 a
40
48
49
NA
44
45
NA
48
55
1970-74 a
21
58
58
NA
52
54
1975-76 a
19
57
55
NA
55
57
1977-79 a
23
52
48
NA
58
59
Among the following things, what would give you greater pleasure of the communes. Many younger PCI leaders gained
or satisfaction? administrative or policymaking positions as a result:
Year of
Inscription
To Know That
You Are
To Have
Contributed
Making
New
in Party
Esteemed
Decisively to the Friends
and Appreciated Resolution of an
by Your Friends Important
and Colleagues
Problem
To 1949
38
54
8
1950-59
32
61
7
1960-69
23
71
6
1970-74
19
73
8
1975-76
22
72
7
1977-79
13
70
17
according to an academic study, about 80 percent of
the approximately 7,000 commune seats won by the
PCI in 1975 went to candidates in their twenties. The
party's lower and middle leadership ranks thus con-
tain many members who from a fairly early age have
had experience in addressing day-to-day political
problems, and who have had to deal with officials of
other parties on a regular basis.
A More Activist and Independent-Minded Bent
i
l
ca
Would you maintain the same relationship with a friend who In our judgment, the differing social and polit
abandoned the Communist Party? background of the emergent elite has led them to
Year of Inscription in Party Officials Answering "Yes" develop views that differ from those now at the top.
More members of the emergent elite are likely to
To 1949 39 place emphasis on free self-expression, individual
1950-59 43 achievement, and active participation in decisionmak-
1960-69 52 ing-values long shown to be positively associated
1970-74 57 with higher educational levels and socioeconomic
1975-76 60 status. Such differences in outlook are reinforced by
1977-79 71 the fact that fewer members of this group experienced
a The top row are answers from officials; the bottom row are Fascist repression or have had strong roots in the
Communist subculture-experiences that have tended
25X1
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younger leaders matured politically in a more demo-
cratic milieu. Moreover, those who joined the party in
the 1950s and 1960s were far more likely to have
received early organized indoctrination in PCI beliefs
through membership in the PCI youth federation
(FGCI) than those who joined during the 1970s (see
table 5) The outbreak of the student rebellion and the
.,. " """ ""` ""6"'"""'b ""' `""'" "..'-
1960s also had an impact on the shape of the PCI
elite. Younger PCI officials are several times more
likely to have been involved in student or other
extraparliamentary movements before joining the par-
ty than any of the older groups, according to the 1979
survey of PCI officials.
Finally, due to the PCI's electoral successes of the
1970s, substantially more members of the emergent
elite have had a hands-on political education apart
from work within the PCI itself. During the mid-
1970s, the PCI scored dramatic gains in local and
regional elections, achieving office in half the prov-
inces, two-thirds of the largest cities, and 40 percent
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to inculcate unity and discipline above other consider-
ations. We believe the emergent elite's broader politi-
cal experience has also encouraged independence,
confidence, and outspokenness.
25X1 Data from the 1979 survey of the PCI leadership lend
support to these judgments (see table 4):
? Younger full-time officials and members of PCI
governing committees at various levels were gener-
ally more likely than older ones to emphasize inde-
pendent initiative and judgment in describing in
general terms the characteristics of a "good" Com-
munist official.
? Among full-time officers-whose main job is to
transmit party policies to party members and sup-
porters-younger ones were considerably less likely
than older counterparts to place emphasis on the
rigorous application of the party line.
duty to the party.
? Younger officers were more likely to indicate they
would maintain contacts with a PCI "renegade"-
indicating a generally more relaxed attitude about
Impact on Party Decisionmaking
The unique backgrounds and behavioral patterns of
the emergent elite have had a growing impact on
internal PCI politics. Lower- and middle-ranking
party officials have in recent years increasingly assert-
ed a right to participate in PCI policymaking. Indeed,
the PCI national congress in 1983 even saw a chal-
lenge-albeit a limited one-to "democratic centra-
lism," the basic principle of party governance that
limits debate and centralizes decisionmaking author-
ity at the top:
? According both to US Embassy, Rome, reporting
and press accounts, the Central Committee, react-
ing in part to pressure from below, has held several
vigorous debates on party electoral strategy and
foreign policy-although in the end it has followed
conventional practice of lining up unanimously be-
hind the Directorate.
? Several elected local PCI officials have taken the
unprecedented step of publicly criticizing the party's
performance in local government. Most recently, the
PCI youth federation, which previously had been
under the close control of the national party leader-
ship, publicly took issue with some key PCI policies,
including the very sensitive question of tolerance for
Italian participation in NATO.
? In local party conferences held prior to the 1983
congress, PCI federations rejected candidates for
seats who had been proposed by the party hierarchy.
Many federations decided these questions through a
secret ballot rather than through the traditional
show of hands. During the same precongress meet-
ings, virtually all PCI federations passed by over-
whelming margins a proposal by Ingrao to ease
democratic centralism by requiring the Directorate
to put majority and minority reports before the
Central Committee for debate whenever the Direc-
torate was divided substantially over an issue.
The PCI's senior leadership has given some ground to
pressures for increased internal democracy. In recent
years, official policy documents have spoken of "dem-
ocratic centralism" as a "method" of governance,
rather than as a basic "principle" of the party as they
had in the past. And, during the process to select a
replacement for Berlinguer, the Directorate engaged
in an unprecedented consultation of the members of
the Central Committee before making a choice.
Nonetheless, the leadership appears unwilling as yet
to accept any fundamental change. Natta and the
Directorate have essentially kept policymaking within
their hands, and some key leaders, including Natta
himself, have spoken publicly in favor of retaining
"democratic centralism" in broad form. According to
press accounts
most senior leaders are alarmed about the growing
lack of discipline among lower- and middle-level
officials. Indeed, according to press accounts, the
party's Directorate has ignored repeated requests by
Ingrao to establish a commission to examine PCI
governance procedures.
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Domestic Policies
Under the leadership of its centrist faction headed
formerly by Berlinguer and now by Natta, the PCI's
strategy for obtaining national power has vacillated
sharply in recent years. In the 1970s, the party, while
not renouncing its traditional long-term objective of
transcending capitalism, made a major effort to estab-
lish its democratic credentials by consistently profess-
ing its loyalty to the Italian constitution and by
supporting moderate economic theories such as wage
restraint. It also provided parliamentary support for
governments led by the Christian Democrats (DC)
and sought to enter into a national coalition govern-
ment with that party. Because its courting of the DC
failed to yield results and proved unpopular within the
party, this strategy was dropped in 1980 in favor of a
vague line known as the "democratic alternative." In
theory, this called for the PCI to seek an alliance with
the Socialist Party (PSI) and leftwing Christian Dem-
ocrats in order to oust the DC from its dominant
position in Italian politics-and then to start down the
path toward the "third way," which would be more
democratic than Soviet-style socialism yet more egali-
tarian than Western-style capitalism. In practice,
however, because Craxi is allied with the DC and his
policies are market oriented, this strategy has involved
harsh attacks against Craxi, attacks that culminated
in the unsuccessful PCI-sponsored referendum in
June 1985 aimed at overturning the government's
wage control policies.
The minority factions within the senior leadership
each have a distinct perspective on the appropriate
domestic political strategy for the PCI, according to
press and academic analyses. On the extreme left,
Cossutta's small Stalinist faction wants the party to
abjure democratic values in favor of Marxist-Leninist
formulas. The left-of-center Ingrao faction basically
supports the "democratic alternative," but takes more
seriously than the Natta group the need to move
decisively and quickly toward the "third way." It also
is even more adamant in rejecting cooperation with
the Socialist Party under its current moderate leader-
ship, preferring that alliances be formed with radical
social groupings such as the peace and environmental
movements. On the right of the party, the "social
democratic" wing led by Napolitano and Lama wants
the party to return to the more moderate line of the
1970s. This group would like the party to abandon its
pretensions to achieve long-term radical social change
and seek an alliance with the PSI on the basis of a
purely reformist program.
We know less about the emergent elite's stand on
domestic political issues than about its views on
internal party governance. The available evidence
suggests, however, that younger officials will be less of
a force for change in domestic policies than in internal
party governance. These leaders, who matured politi-
cally within the "new left" movement of the 1960s
and early 1970s, do not appear drawn either to
orthodox Marxism or to social democracy. We suspect
that, for the most part, their hearts at least are with
the Ingrao faction, which most closely approximates
new left views in the senior leadership. Because the
Ingrao faction's disagreements with the dominant
Natta group are more a question of emphasis than
direction, however, the emergent elite usually finds
itself aligned with the Natta-Ingrao groupings in
opposition to the Stalinist and social democratic fac-
tions in the party:
? According to press accounts, "social democrats"
figured prominently among those removed from lists
of delegates to the congress in voting before the
1983 congress. Even Napolitano, the leading social
democrat and one of the PCI's best known figures,
barely survived a vote at his local Naples federation.
At the same time, Cossutta's proposal at the con-
gress that the PCI declare itself a "fighting revolu-
tionary party" received negligible support.
? In his bid to succeed Berlinguer, Directorate mem-
ber Achille Occhetto received surprising support
from lower- and middle-ranking party officials.
Occhetto is a protege of mainstream leaders such as
Berlinguer and Natta, but in his younger days was
close to Ingrao and the PCI left. According to US
diplomatic reporting, Occhetto has also been a
leading opponent of cooperation with the Craxi-led
Socialists.
? Unlike the controversy over internal governance, the
policy of the "democratic alternative" and the
stance toward the Socialist Party did not provoke
any significant negative reaction from lower levels
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of the elite at the 1983 congress. Indeed, according
to press accounts, the most popular figure by far at
the congress was the "purist" interpreter of the
"democratic alternative," Ingrao.
25X1 Finally, we see no indications of widespread social
democratic or orthodox Marxist tendencies among the
most successful and ambitious younger members of
the elite-those who have already achieved important
positions in the middle and upper levels of the hierar-
chy. Most of the prominent PCI leaders in their
thirties and early forties (see appendix) have been
associated in press and diplomatic reporting with the
party mainstream or with the Ingrao group to the left.
This is not surprising since the "rising stars" within
the PCI have been chosen by the senior leadership. It
nevertheless means that these individuals are most
likely to obtain senior positions and will have a
disproportionate influence on the party's future poli-
25X1 International Perspectives
The most striking features of the PCI's current
foreign policy are its relative independence from
Moscow, its professed support for Italian membership
in NATO, and its concerted effort to convince Wash-
ington of its Western credentials. We believe that the
growing influence of the emergent elite is reinforcing
the party's move away from the Soviet Union, but it
may also bring into question at least some aspects of
PCI support for the Atlantic Alliance and the efforts
to ingratiate itself with US policymakers.
25X1 Although it has not by any means broken its ties to
the Soviet Union-even internal critics of PCI policies
toward the Soviets only speak of a "wrench" in
relations-the PCI senior leadership has since the
mid-1970s increasingly criticized Moscow, especially
for human rights violations at home and abroad.
Criticism of Moscow peaked in 1981 when, in the
wake of the invasion of Afghanistan and the military
takeover in Poland, the PCI leadership issued a
statement claiming that the October Revolution had
lost its "propulsive force" and that the Soviet Union
no longer served as a model for other countries.
its invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, far fewer of
them learned reverence for the Soviet Union in the
confines of the pre-1970s PCI subculture. The reserve
of this group toward the Soviet Union was illustrated
in its negative reaction to efforts by Cossutta's ortho-
dox Marxist faction 2 to eliminate from the 1983 party
program a reference to the loss of the "propulsive
force" of the October Revolution. At PCI federation
congresses of that year, however, this reference was
almost invariably approved by large margins, and
Cossutta ultimately withdrew his objection at the PCI
National Congress
At the same time that the PCI has moved away from
the Soviets, it has made cautious yet persistent efforts
to improve ties to and its image in the United States
and the Atlantic Alliance in general. In the mid-
1970s, Berlinguer reversed the party's previous oppo-
sition to Italy's participation in NATO, saying that in
the context of detente the Alliance was an essential
shield for Western democracy. The PCI has continued
to tolerate NATO membership since then despite the
deterioration in East-West relations. It also has voiced
only muted opposition to INF deployment in Sicily.
Some PCI officials have privately even asked US
diplomats for detailed information on the Strategic
Defense Initiative, although the party has opposed it
publicly. We believe that the PCI's overtures toward
the United States and the Atlantic Alliance are in
part a tactical ploy to increase the party's legitimacy
because links with the West enjoy broad support
among Italian voters. They also reflect, in our judg-
ment, a genuine concern among some party members
' Although few senior party leaders count themselves among this
faction, a 1983 survey indicated that some 15 percent of PCI
members-generally older ones, we suspect-supported Cossutta's
faction, and almost half agreed with its view that the October
cording to a 1984 USIA survey of Italian voters, almost two-thirds
of the PCI supporters said they saw Soviet policies as increasing the
risk of war, and half expressed little or no confidence that the
USSR would act responsibly in world affairs. In a 1983 survey of
PCI members, on the other hand, about half the respondents said
that the United States was the major threat to world peace. Only 4
percent pointed to the Soviet Union alone, but 40 percent thought
Younger party officials came to political maturity
when the Soviet Union's image had been damaged by 25X1
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Although most emergent elite members seem to ac-
cept, if only grudgingly, the senior leadership's ratio-
nale for tolerating NATO, we suspect that many of
them favor, at the very least, a more independent
defense role for Italy and Western Europe either
within or outside the Alliance, and possibly even a
move toward nonalignment. Because of their relative
youth, most matured politically during the Vietnam
era and thus probably learned to take a very dim view
of US foreign policy. Moreover, many probably sym-
pathized with the West European "peace movement"
if only because of their earlier involvement in broadly
similar student and other extraparliamentary protest
activities. There have, in fact, been scattered indica-
tions that at least a significant minority within the
emergent elite are prepared to challenge the party's
toleration of Italian links to NATO:
? Against the wishes of the national leadership, many
local federations considered resolutions calling for
Italian withdrawal from NATO during meetings
held in the runup to the 1983 National Congress.
These resolutions passed in scattered federations-
principally in the south-and in total obtained the
support of nearly a fifth of the participants.
Strategic Defense Initiative. PCI leaders have in-
sisted to US diplomats that the youth federation's
extreme neutralist views-which they attribute to
the naivete of very young party members-do not
reflect the views of the party as a whole.
The emergent elite will have its next major opportuni-
ty to influence PCI policy at the party's 1986 con-
gress. This meeting has been called to help resolve a
bitter debate in the wake of the recent electoral
setbacks. We think that the emergent elite will press
hardest for increased internal democracy. We do not
expect the emergent elite to favor any dramatic
moderation in the party's basic domestic line, but it
may successfully insist on changes in leadership or in
political tactics to restore the party's momentum.
There may also be a challenge to the senior leader-
ship's efforts to improve ties to the United States and
the Atlantic Alliance, although we do not expect this
will be strong enough to force a fundamental change
in the PCI's international policies in the near term.
? Most dramatic of all was the Communist youth
federation's call earlier this year for Italian with-
drawal from NATO and the dismantling of all
missiles in Europe. The federation also criticized the
national leadership for its muted response to the
for instance, have publicly reiterated that the PCI
should present itself as an explicitly reformist party
The Renewed Debate Over Policy
The PCI's recent setbacks have ended a brief morato-
rium on internal party bickering designed to give
Natta a chance to establish himself. Leaders of the
PCI's social democratic faction in particular have
begun to speak out against the line pursued under
Natta's leadership. Lama and Napoleone Colajanni,
and seek alliance with Craxi and his party.
Radical faction leaders such as Ingrao, on the other
hand, have reiterated strong opposition to cooperating
with the Socialists under Craxi, and again have raised
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the alternative of working more closely with the
Although members of the dominant faction, including
Natta, have admitted that their strategy of seeking an
alliance with the Socialist Party while attacking the
policies of its leader is contradictory, they have shown
no inclination to modify the PCI's line. They recog-
nize that the party's chances in the next general
election in 1987 depend on its ability to project unity
and purpose, however, and have moved up the date of
the party's next congress from 1987 to April 1986 to
promote an early resolution of the internal debate.
The senior leadership also appointed a 77-member
commission to draft a new program for the party and
a 16-member committee to supervise its work. Al-
though all four factions are represented, press ac-
counts suggest that the social democratic grouping
has been allotted almost half the seats on the supervi-
sory committee, probably as a conciliatory gesture by
the Natta group. On the other hand, the Natta faction
has sought to ensure continuity in the program to be
presented to the congress by entrusting its drafting to
a group within the commission heavily dominated by
e ma
publ
Although pressure from the emergent elite is in large
measure responsible for the freer debate that will take
place at the congress and precongress meetings, we
think members of the elite will generally wind up
supporting the Natta and Ingrao factions, whose
policies coincide most closely with their new-left
outlooks. Practically none will favor a shift toward
Stalinism, in our view, and few will favor social
democracy and cooperation with Craxi's Socialists,
because recent events do not carry the unequivocal
message that would force a change in the views they
have held since their youth:
? They can attribute the party's decline in the local
and regional elections to factors that do not call into
question the validity of the "democratic alterna-
tive." They can argue, for example, that the elector-
ate simply wanted a change after a decade of PCI
participation in local government, particularly since
a number of party officials were involved in munici-
pal scandals.
? Moreover, the elections offered no clear-cut evi-
dence that a social-democratic strategy would have
worked any better. The party was defeated in
Milan, where social democrats are largely in con-
trol, and won in Florence, where party leaders were
hardline on cooperation with Socialists and had
previously withdrawn from a leftist coalition.
? And finally, despite its setbacks, the PCI remains
the second-largest party in Italy. The new elite, in
our view. will be reluctant to support any move that
would risk jeopardizing that position.
In any case, press reporting since the May 1985
elections indicates that there has been no significant
increase in sentiment favoring a shift toward social
democracy-a move that, according to one correspon-
dent, PCI officials in Rome criticized as "becoming
like all the others," "suicidal," and a "blasphemy."
support from below. Press accounts suggest, for exam- We think that members of the emergent elite-
ple, that Natta supported a proposal by Massimo particularly the more ambitious full-time and elected
D'Alema, a leading younger PCI official, that debates officials-are nonetheless concerned by the PCI's
at PCI Directorate meetings b
de
7_ i i
recent blows and because the factional leaders may
believe they can obtain an advantage by lining up
The Emergent Elite and the Party's Future
In our judgment, the emergent elite is likely to play an
even more independent and critical role than in 1983
in reviewing the program presented by the senior
leadership. The party's recent electoral setbacks and
the current absence of an effective and charismatic
leader are likely to reinforce the inclinations of mem-
bers of this group toward involvement in decisionmak-
ing and independence of judgment. We would expect,
at minimum, strong pressure from lower leadership
levels for the program to include provision for in-
creased internal democracy and greater openness of
debate. For their part, senior leaders may be more
inclined than in the past to give ground both because
their own self-confidence has probably been dented by
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recent loss of electoral support. In our judgment,
younger leaders in this congress are likely at the very
least to give serious considerations to changes in both
the party's senior personnel and its short-term politi-
cal strategy as ways of restoring the party's political
momentum:
? We suspect that many lower- and middle-level
officials share the view expressed by Italian press
commentators that Natta's lackluster performance
has contributed to the PCI's electoral slide. Al-
though the PCI traditionally has not been inclined
to punish national leaders for electoral setbacks, we
would certainly not discount the possibility of a
groundswell in favor of replacing Natta with a
younger, or at least more personable, leader with
similar ideological leanings. Occhetto or the popular
Directorate member from Bologna, Renato Zangh-
eri, are two of the people the emergent elite might
support.
? Even if it does not rise up against Natta, we suspect
that much of the emergent elite will be sufficiently
emboldened to press for the inclusion of more
members of its generation in the party's top offices.
opposite effect on the party's working-class support-
ers. For instance, the antinuclear and libertarian
policies approved recently by the PCI youth federa-
tion-which we suspect many older members of the
emergent elite also favor-may prove unattractive to
many workers. In addition, academic commentators
have noted that many of the PCI's traditional sup-
porters have been attracted to the party because of its
image of unity and strength, which might be tarnished
by the more freewheeling debate and more open
factionalism that would inevitably accompany in-
creased internal democracy.
Italy and possibly even against NATO membership.
In the area of international policy, the emergent
elite's jaundiced view of both superpowers will have
mixed consequences for the party's effort to under-
score its Western credentials by distancing itself from
Moscow while professing fealty to Italy's NATO and
US connections. We doubt the new generation of PCI
leaders will question the policy of independence from
Moscow-if anything, they probably believe in it with
more conviction than many of their seniors. We
expect, however, that there will be pressure at the
congress and later from the emergent elite for a
hardening in the PCI's attitude toward the Atlantic
Alliance. The elite contains a substantial number of
individuals who are attracted to the idea of reducing
transatlantic links, and we think it possible that these
individuals could mount a vigorous campaign against
the PCI's tacit toleration of US INF deployments in
? We believe that many emergent elite members will
conclude from the PCI's recent setbacks that the
party's current strategy of simply resisting the
government on economic policy is inadequate. They
may thus press senior leaders to develop a more
positive image for the party-for instance, by plac-
ing greater emphasis on short-term programs such
as institutional and fiscal reform and stimulating
economic growth, while continuing to highlight the
PCI's commitment to long-term radical change.
Even if the PCI were to become more democratic,
youthful, and programmatic, however, we doubt that
its electoral strength would increase. Although such
changes might improve the party's appeal to middle-
class voters, we think that they might have the
We doubt that these pressures will be sufficiently
strong at this congress to force the senior leadership to
alter the party's policy toward the United States and
the Alliance. We suspect that the dominant faction's
judgment that the party must tolerate Italian partici-
pation in NATO will outweigh the ideological aver-
sion to Italy's links to the United States and NATO.
Over the longer term, however, support from the
emerging elite for a reduction of transatlantic links
could force a modification of party policy if the
following two conditions developed:
? Growth of anti-Alliance sentiment within other
West European leftist parties. The PCI has in
recent years intensified its links to West European
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social democratic parties, the West German SPD in
particular. Many of these parties have already
taken positions on key security issues-INF, for
instance-which are at variance with Alliance poli-
cies. Indeed, even some Allied governments have at
best given only grudging support to INF deploy-
ment. To the extent that non-Communist parties
and governments in other countries maintain or
intensify anti-US and anti-NATO positions, many
in the emergent elite will begin to question why it
would hurt the PCI's legitimacy were it to follow a
similar course. The upshot of this over the longer
term is likely to be a greater PCI willingness to
question NATO security policies along with a less
solicitous and more confrontational approach to-
ward the United States.
? Perceived Soviet moderation under Gorbachev. Giv-
en their early memories of Soviet adventurism and
their maturation outside the PCI subculture, we
doubt that the emergent elite will ever have a very
favorable view of the Soviet Union, whatever its
future behavior. Nevertheless, should the Gorba-
chev regime project a more moderate image at home
and abroad, its view of the Soviet Union as a
dangerous self-interested superpower could fade,
thus prompting many born this generation to ques-
tion whether NATO, or at least a strong US
military and especially nuclear presence in Western
Europe, is needed as a "shield" for Italian
democracy.?
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Table 5
Age Differences in Political Socialization
for Various Categories of the PCI Leadership
Parents approved of
entry into PCI
Parents opposed
entry into PCI
Was member of PCI
youth federation
Was member of
another party
Belonged to student
or other political
movements
Elected PCI Local and National Officials
Prior
1950-
1960-
1970-
1975-
Prior
1950-
1960-
1970-
1975-
Prior
1950-
1960-
1970-
1975-
Prior 1950- 1960- 1970-
1975-
to 1950
59
69
74
76
to 1950
59
69
74
76
to 1950
59
69
74
76
to 1950 59 69 74
76
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Secret
Secret
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