FRANCE: THE NATIONAL FRONT'S IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86S00588R000300290002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
on the Political System
France:
The National Front's Impact
SeeFet
EUR 85-10149
September 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
France:
The National Front's Impact
on the Political System
This paper was prepared by Office of
European Analysis, with contributions from
Office of Central Reference, and
olitical Psychology Center, O ce o
Scientific and Weapons Research
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Western Europe Division,
EURA,
Secret
EUR 85-10149
September 1985
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France:
The National Front's Impact
on the Political System
Key Judgments Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front, which dominates the extreme right of
Information available the political spectrum, has capitalized on rising popular dissatisfaction with
as of 1 September 1985 the mainstream parties to leap into prominence just as French politics is
was used in this report.
entering a period of uncertainty:
? Public opinion polls and voting patterns indicate that the traditional
dichotomy between left and right is breaking down.
? The Socialists seem certain to lose their majority in next spring's national
elections, leaving the President (whose mandate extends to 1988) at odds
with the legislature for the first time under the Fifth Republic.
? A new electoral law that will distribute parliamentary seats in proportion
to votes received has produced uncertainty about how voting support will
be translated into legislative strength.
Le Pen, focusing heavily on emotional issues like immigration and law and
order, has played on popular discontent and cleverly exploited the media to
gain attention. To date, this has resulted in more press coverage than real
power, but next spring the new electoral law will almost certainly allow the
National Front to enter Parliament for the first time, giving Le Pen control
over some 20 to 30 seats.
We believe, however, that popular support for the National Front-
currently about 10 percent-has peaked. The party faces several problems
that will limit its support among the electorate:
? Its program is a simplistic and ineffective response to the central issue in
the election-France's very real economic problems.
? Public opinion is not sympathetic to the party's views; judging by opinion
polls, much of its support comes from protest votes, which are likely to
move to one of the major opposition parties in an important national
election.
? The party has failed to recruit experienced and popular leaders. 25X1
? The mainstream parties of the center and right are determined to gain
and exercise power without the National Front, if possible.
The National Front's importance will ultimately depend on the relative
strength of the major parties:
? If-as we believe likely-the centrists and the rightwing neo-Gaullists
win a clear majority of the votes in 1986, the National Front will remain
only a marginal irritant.
Secret
EUR 85-10149
September 1985
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? On the other hand, if the mainstream opposition falls short of a working
majority, it would be forced to choose between striking a deal with the
Socialists or the National Front. If the centrists and neo-Gaullists opt for
Le Pen-and we think there is a fair chance they would try-we believe
he will strike a hard bargain. In our view, Le Pen's chauvinistic
concentration on domestic matters might sidetrack the more cooperative
attitude toward Atlantic affairs that has developed in France in recent
years.
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A Traditional Constituency on the Far Right 6
Opposition to Leftist Policies 6
Anatomy of the National Front 7
The Party's Program 7
Party Leaders and Members 7
Responses of the Other Parties 13
Prospects for 1986
Implications for the United States 16
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France:
The National Front's Impact
on the Political System
disproportionate amount of influence.
Introduction
The recent surge in support for rightist demagogue
Jean-Marie Le Pen and his National Front could
allow the extreme right to play a significant role in
French politics for the first time since Gen. Charles de
Gaulle launched the Fifth Republic in 1958. The rise
of a far rightist party that can claim some 10 percent
of the vote in national elections coincides with shifts in
public opinion that are undermining the longstanding
political structure based on four major parties-two
on the left and two on the right. National Front
fortunes have been further boosted by a new electoral
law that will distribute seats within constituencies in
proportion to each party's vote-a probable ticket into
Parliament for the National Front, which has been
kept out for nearly three decades by the old winner-
take-all electoral system. These alterations in the
French political framework are taking place as the
country prepares for a legislative election next spring
that is likely to usher in a political crisis: the Socialists
will almost certainly lose control of Parliament, leav-
ing France-for the the first time under the strongly
presidential Fifth Republic-with a president from a
different party than the legislative majority. Amid the
tensions that probably will prevail in the postelections
period, Le Pen may be able to use the 20 to 30
deputies he is likely to have in Parliament to wield a
The Political Mood
The rise of the National Front owes much to recent
shifts in the political mood. Results of public opinion
polls over the last two years show that voters are
deeply troubled by the failure of the Mitterrand
government to deal with France's economic and social
problems-a radical change from the euphoric early
months of Socialist rule. Although the percentage of
Frenchmen expressing a pessimistic view about the
future shifts up and down from month to month, the
average for the year was 58 percent in 1983 and rose
to 66 percent in 1984. Concern about economic
problems is particularly acute. When questioned in
the autumn of 1984, a sample of the public said the
government's top priorities should be to create jobs,
straighten out the economy, and protect purchasing
power. Social concerns and worries about personal
safety were further down the list; international issues
rated even lower. There has been some improvement
in the gloomy polling results in 1985; but a sense of
malaise remains, and we believe it will continue to
breed support for extremist groups like the National
Front during the runup to the 1986 election
At the same time, many French doubt that traditional
leaders and political parties are capable of coping with
the crisis:
? A June 1985 poll indicated that 53 percent of the
population think the government is not very
competent.
? Mitterrand's approval ratings are bumping along at
record lows between 35 and 40 percent.
? In a December 1984 poll, 62 percent of the respon-
dants said that politicians were not concerned with
the truly important issues, and 82 percent said they
thought politicians were liars.
? When asked, in a 1983 survey, which party was best
at handling the issues, one-third of the sample had
no opinion.
One result of this disillusionment with politicians has
been a slow drift away from the confrontation be-
tween left and right that has long characterized 25X1
French politics:
? In early 1985, only 37 percent of the public thought
the distinction between left and right was meaning-
ful (down from 43 percent in 1981), and 27 percent
did not consider themselves to be either left or right
in their political sentiments (up from 20 percent as
recently as 1983).
percent wanted less confrontational politics.
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Rise of the National Front
After 11 years of obscurity, the National Front leapt
into prominence in 1983 by winning between 9 and 17
percent of the vote in a series of municipal elections.
This support was considerably more than candidates
from the extreme right had received during the last 30
years. In June 1984 the party won 11 percent of the
vote in the European Parliament election, and in
March of this year they scored 9 percent in nation-
wide local contests. The increased strength of the far
right was strategically important because it often
provided the margin to defeat a leftist incumbent. Le
Pen's party did well by carefully selecting the areas
where it would present candidates and stressing the
issues of immigration and crime that are more impor-
tant in local elections than in national contests. For
the established rightist parties the message seemed
clear: if they wanted to tighten their grip on a
majority vote, they would have to take the National
Front into account. This electoral success has largely
been the result of a favorable conjunction of circum-
stances, but it also draws strength from Le Pen's
personal abilities and from longstanding historical
conditions.
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Le Pen's Political Skills. Probably the most decisive
reason for the National Front success, in our view, has
been Le Pen's ability to recognize and play upon
popular fears, frustrations, and doubts. After 30 years
as a minor player in the intrigues and schisms of
politics on the extremist fringe, by a lucky coincidence
Le Pen was able to establish himself as the predomi-
nant leader of the far right just as the Socialists were
stumbling. Le Pen has also been able to capitalize on
the voters' weariness with the same old faces. All of
the major leaders-Mitterrand (Socialist), Georges
Marchais (Communist), Valery Giscard d'Estaing and
Raymond Barre (Union for French Democracy-
UDF), and Jacques Chirac (Rally for the Republic-
RPR)-have been prominent for a decade or more. As
the polling data shows, many voters feel that the
politicians of all of the mainstream parties have failed
to solve the country's problems. Le Pen has picked up
on this dissatisfaction with the traditional parties and
takes time off from flaying the left to lambaste the
UDF and RPR for not being forceful enough in
challenging the Socialists.
Although many of Le Pen's views invite comparison
with the Nazis, he has been skillful and shrewd, in our
view, about making them palatable to French public
opinion. Because he carefully avoids being specific
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about his extremist positions, press commentary is left Robert Badinter from the Socialist Party and Simone
to focus on the divisive and authoritarian implications Veil from the UDF, are special targets of his ire, but
of his statements. Earlier this year, for example, in Le Pen is too wily to attack them openly for being
fulminating against the Socialists' desire to grant Jewish. When his supporters express themselves in
independence to New Caledonia, he maintained that
"a free nation cannot exist without geopolitical living
space." Rival politicians who are Jewish, such as
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letters to newspapers or answers to telephone surveys,
however, they are much less restrained. Le Pen may
be cautious, but his supporters clearly have no trouble
? Le Pen's wife cast doubt on his carefully cultivated
image as a family man by revealing that she had left
him because he kept her in virtual seclusion and
reading between the lines of his speeches.
Le Pen probably has helped to vulgarize political
debate in France, but he has not crossed the line
between rhetoric and advocating the use of force.
Although he stirs strong emotions, he is careful to
avoid openly inciting his followers to violence. The
disturbances that often disrupt the party's meetings,
according to press accounts, are usually triggered by
leftwing protesters. He insists he does not want to
destroy the democratic system, but instead seeks to
work within it.
Le Pen and the Media. In our view, Le Pen's skill at
exploiting the media has been an important factor in
his successful bid for attention. Indeed, in many ways
he is more prominent as a television and newspaper
phenomenon than as a political force. Despite the
extensive media coverage, his party still holds only a
handful of posts. Ten seats in the European Parlia-
ment bring little power, and the old winner-take-all
voting system left the National Front with only one
victory in the 2,000 local contests earlier this year,
despite winning 9 percent of the vote.
In covering him, journalists have been torn between
their attraction to a new and striking story and their
concern about what he represents and what his rise
might mean for the French political system. Except
for the papers and magazines owned by rightwing
press baron Robert Hersant, the media generally
handle Le Pen with a mixture of suspicion and alarm.
Few journalists sympathize with his views, and the
broadcast networks are controlled by the Socialist
government. During the runup to the local elections in
March, for example, each day seemed to bring a more
sensational story:
? One of the new members of the National Front's
delegation to the European Parliament, Gustav
Pordea, was accused of being an agent for Roma-
nian intelligence.
? Several Algerians revived accusations about torture
sessions carried out or ordered by Le Pen during the
war for Algerian independence.
claimed that she fears for her personal safety.
In sum, the media attention to Le Pen has been
something of a two-edged sword. Many voters are
undoubtably appalled by both his behavior and his
views-his hard-hitting style does not conform to the
dignified and aloof manner that the French have come
to associate with leadership since the days of General
de Gaulle. On the other hand, Le Pen has on occasion
profited handsomely from being in the spotlight.
During his first major television interview in February
1984, for example, he stunned the audience by observ-
ing a moment of silence during the broadcast for the
victims of the Soviet gulag. After the program, his
approval rating in the polls jumped from 9 percent to
16 percent. Even the accusations of torture may have
improved his standing with those who resent the
presence of so many Arabs in France.
Le Pen has worked hard for his success. He has also
benefited from historical forces and from a number of
political and economic developments that were outside
of his control.
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A Traditional Constituency on the Far Right. Ever
since the revolution of 1789, there have been groups
whose extreme nationalism has usually kept them out
of the mainstream of political developments. From
time to time, however, they have played a significant
role. Napoleon established a tradition of leadership
based on authority and national grandeur. In the
years that followed, others sought to model themselves
on him and lauded an idealized France, while con-
demning bureaucrats and politicians for besmirching
their country. Their affection for tradition and order
found a resonance among the broader public in times
of rapid social and economic change, such as the
period after the French defeat in 1940 when the Vichy
government took over and during the turbulent last
months of the Fourth Republic when the Poujadist
movement rose to prominence. Usually, however,
these extremist movements have been short lived and
have made little lasting impact. Poujadist candi-
dates-including Le Pen-polled over 11 percent of
the vote in 1956 and got 52 seats, but two years later
they dropped below 1 percent and disappeared from
Parliament. Le Pen himself received less than I
percent of the vote in the 1974 presidential elections,
and in 1981 he was not even able to round up the 500
signatures of public officials required to qualify as a
candidate.
We believe that the decline of the old smokestack
industries and the Socialists' efforts to encourage a
transformation to an economy based more on services
and high technology have created the kind of social
and economic uncertainty that is fertile ground for a
revival of the far right. Traditional terms of reference
and expectations are becoming irrelevant. Industries
such as steel and automobiles are a drain on resources
rather than a source of jobs and pride. Unemployment
rises and purchasing power falls regardless of whether
the government in power is of the left or of the right.
Government intervention, once the engine of growth
and modernization, now appears to hinder progress.
Mitterrand's policy of accepting short-term austerity
as the price for a better foundation for long-term
growth has not yet proved itself convincingly to the
public. The result, as the polling data shows, is that
political loyalties have weakened and many people are
looking for new policy alternatives.
The Protest Vote. There is also a tradition in France
of casting a ballot for an opposition party-without
necessarily agreeing with its ideology-as a protest
against indifferent government. Before 1981 the
Communists drew a large number of these votes, but,
when they joined the leftwing governing coalition in
1981, protest voters had to seek another outlet. Exit
polls taken after the June 1984 European elections
revealed that the second most important reason people
gave for voting for the National Front-after concern
about the number of immigrants-was to demon-
strate opposition to the leftist government. With the
Communists back in the opposition, the National
Front will have some competition for the protest vote,
but they will still benefit from it because-unlike the
Communists-they have never supported the Socia-
lists' controversial program of economic austerity,
which has disillusioned so many leftist voters.
Opposition to Leftist Policies. We believe the Na-
tional Front has also benefited from widespread disen-
chantment with the left. In 1981 the Socialists were
swept into power on a wave of enthusiasm for new
ideas and different leadership, even though many of
the voters were not committed to every aspect of the
leftwing program. After a heady year of attempted
reforms, Mitterrand realized the costs were becoming
excessive and retrenched. The government's decision
to pursue structural modernization, even though this
meant reining in living standards and accepting rising
unemployment, alienated many voters. Some leftists
thought he had backtracked too far, while most
rightists still felt he had not gone far enough. After
1982 a large pool of voters rejected the government's
policies-in an August 1983 survey, 53 percent of
those responding thought the government's policy was
wrong and was only aggravating the situation-and
were looking for an alternative. The Communists
withdrew from the governing coalition to try to
dissociate themselves from the austerity policy; on the
right Le Pen sought to draw disgruntled voters by
outdistancing the mainstream opposition in criticizing
the government.
P
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Anatomy of the National Front
The Party's Program. Despite its success since 1983,
so far the National Front, in our opinion, has present-
ed neither a well-articulated ideology nor a detailed
plan for governing France. Instead, Le Pen has
endorsed broad concepts such as order, authority, and
patriotism and presented himself as a man who speaks
frankly about what is really troubling the average
Frenchman. Thoughtful, nonpartisan commentators
in France, like the academic expert on rightwing
politics Rene Remond, think the problem with the
party's platform is not that it is racist or fascist, but
that it is too simplistic to be effective against the real
challenges stemming from unemployment and the
immigrants in France. According to press reports, Le
Pen is aware that the failure to take a stand on a large
number of issues is a source of weakness, and he has
asked a sympathetic university professor to put to-
gether a detailed party program.
Lacking an extensive platform, Le Pen relies on
repeating several favorite themes in his speeches:
? Nationalism ("France and the French first'). Le
Pen couples praise of traditional values that he
considers endangered with calls for reducing the
number of foreigners living in France ("2 million
immigrants = 2 million unemployed") (see inset).
? Anti-Communism. In addition to his blasts at the
French Socialists (whom he sees as little different
from the Communists), he favors a tougher line
toward the Soviets, backed up by an accelerated
program of civil defense. Despite the vigor of his
rhetoric, he does not advocate resorting to terrorism
in the struggle against the left like some extreme
rightwing groups elsewhere in Europe.
? Restoring order. Le Pen has called for strengthen-
ing the powers of the French President-already
probably the most extensive of any elected official in
Western Europe-and bringing back the death pen-
alty. He also criticizes Justice Minister Badinter for
being soft on crime. Another variation he plays on
this theme is to deplore the "moral laxity" in
France.
? Reversing the decline in French population. The
National Front wants to increase family allowances
and repeal the laws liberalizing abortion ("the geno-
cide of French babies") pushed through by former
Minister of Health Veil.
? Reducing the role of the state. Le Pen favors
extensive denationalization of industry and restrict-
ing the government's control of education
Party Leaders and Members. If Le Pen's political skill
is one of the National Front's chief assets, the weak-
ness of its organization is, in our view, the party's
chief liability. One of the things that sets Le Pen
apart from past rightwing extremists is his ambition
to build up a large-scale organization. He has had a
good deal of success: membership of the party, ac-
cording to press accounts, has grown phenomenally to
about 50,000-up from 20,000 a year ago and 10,000 25X1
two years ago. Although the National Front has been
able to draw voters from the other parties, it has had
less success in recruiting experienced leaders. A re-
view of the credentials of the party's governing board
and local chairmen shows that, of the over 100 people
who make up its national and local leadership, only
one, besides Le Pen, has served in the national
legislature; another seven have been in local govern-
ment. None of Le Pen's closest aides are products of
the elite schools that provide so much of French
leadership (see inset). In March, Le Pen was able to
find candidates for only three-fourths of the positions
up for election in local contests. The social back-
grounds of these candidates show the sources of the
National Front's leadership at the local level and
highlight their distance from the traditional political
elite (see table). As has been shown, one of the results
is that the party is less popular than Le Pen. The
weakness of the National Front's organization makes
it easier for Le Pen to dominate the party, but we
believe it also means he will have trouble using it as a
tool for mobilizing potential support.
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Figure 1
Distribution of Immigrant Population by Departments
Percent of immigrants
residing in France
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Le Pen sees the immigrant population in France as
the source of many of the country's problems, and
public opinion surveys show his calls for restricting
immigration are one of the main reasons people
support him. The issue is widely misunderstood,
however.
There are about 4.5 million immigrants living in
France, according to official statistics, of which about
2 million are employed. Immigrants make up 8
percent of the population and 17 percent of the work
force. About half of the immigrants currently in
France came during the economic boom of the 1960s
when the country's industries were desperate for
labor. As a result, until recently the immigrant
community has included a much higher percentage of
single, young men than the overall population.
Most of the immigrants have come from Spain,
Portugal, and Italy and are well integrated into
French society. Concerns about assimilation focus
mainly on the 800,000 Algerians, 500,000 Moroc-
cans, and 200,000 Tunisians.
Immigrants usually work in low-paying jobs requir-
ingfew skills, such as construction and industrial
assembly lines. They are concentrated in Paris and
the old centers of the smokestack industries in the
eastern half of the country (see figure 1).
Public opinion surveys show that 42 percent of re-
spondents overestimate the number of immigrants
and 58 percent think there are too many of them.
Over half are convinced that immigrants receive more
in social benefits than they pay in taxes. In the public
mind, concentrations of immigrants are also associat-
ed with unemployment, crime, and high failure rates
in schools. National Front attacks on foreigners feed
on and encourage the perception that neighborhoods
with a high proportion of, immigrants are plagued
with social problems because of the presence of Arabs
rather than because of poor working and living
conditions.
In fact, there is at least a grain of truth in National
Front accusations that immigrants are a source of
crime: according to press accounts, immigrants are
responsible for about one-third of the petty crime in
France. On the other hand, because of the high
percentage of young males, they have not been a
major burden on social programs like family allow-
ances, health insurance, or pensions. They tend to be
the victims of unemployment-not its cause-and
their jobless rate is twice that of the overall popula-
tion.
Academic studies suggest that the challenge of deal-
ing with immigrants is likely to be permanent; indeed,
it may be getting worse. Some restrictions on new
immigration are already in effect, but foreign workers
now in France are increasingly staying longer and
trying to bring in their families. This is changing the 25X1
social profile of the immigrant community and will
eventually increase the burden on the social security
system.
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oc%Avi
National Front Candidates for
the March 1985 Local Elections a
Liberal professions
14.0
Small businessmen
11.0
Company presidents
10.5
8.0
7.0
Le Pen draws his supporters from a wide variety of
special interest groups, and we believe he will have
difficulty reconciling their diverse priorities as the
party tries to work out a platform. According to press
reports, groups that have attached themselves to his
bandwagon include. fundamentalist Catholics who
support his crusade against abortion, racists who
worry about the presence of Jews and Arabs in
France, conservatives nostalgic for the days of Petain
or even the monarchy, and nationalists who have
never forgiven the government for giving up Algeria.
Profile of National Front Voters. By renouncing
violence and making a major effort to build up an
organization, Le Pen has widened the appeal of the
extreme right. National Front support cuts across
traditional political alignments, reflecting, in our
view, the appeal of his attack on politics as usual.
According to public opinion polls, the sources of the
party's support are broad, if shallow, and derive from
a segment of French life that is rarely seen by tourists
or diplomats: a world of crowded public housing
projects, frustrated ambitions, and fear about the
impact of change. Surveys published in the French
press show that National Front voters are fairly
evenly distributed across social, age, and educational
groups, although they are most numerous among
small businessmen, white-collar workers, and profes-
sionals. A February 1984 poll showed that 29 percent
of its supporters were working-class voters demon-
strating their concern about deteriorating neighbor-
hoods and competition for jobs from foreigners. Geo-
graphically, National Front voters tend to come from
large cities and the industrial regions of the north and
east-areas of high immigrant populations (see figure
2, compare with figure 1 showing immigrant popula-
tion).
Although National Front voters represent a variety of
social backgrounds, they do not reflect overall French
public opinion. According to polls taken at the time of
the party's first national electoral breakthrough in
June 1984, 38 percent of Le Pen's supporters listed
immigrants as the issue that most concerned them.
Only 8 percent of the total number of voters agreed
that the immigration problem was the top priority.
The main concerns of the general voting population
were, on the contrary, high unemployment (listed by
28 percent of those responding) and protection of
purchasing power (listed by 21 percent). Another
survey, taken later that year, showed that most
French think the causes of crime are unemployment
and poor housing rather than the presence of immi-
grants. In addition, 51 percent of those responding to
an April 1984 poll disagree with Le Pen's opposition
to abortion.
The approximately 10 percent of the electorate who
have voted for the National Front probably are a soft
base of support. Polls of National Front voters show
that only 50 percent consider themselves to be on the
extreme right of the political spectrum; 27 percent
class themselves as mainstream right and 15 percent
as center. Exit polls taken during the June 1984
European elections, in which the party received 11
percent of the vote, indicate that only about 7 percent
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Figure 2
Distribution of National Front Vote by Department
Local Election,
March 1985
Percent of votes cast for
National Front Party
Over 15 percent
10-15 percent
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of the voters said they would vote for the National
Front in the coming legislative elections. Neither Le
Pen's approval ratings in public opinion polls nor the
percentage of the electorate intending to vote for the
National Front in 1986 have grown dramatically over
the last two years (see figure 3).
International Links. We believe that, due to its
nationalistic orientation, the National Front does not
give much priority to cultivating international ties.
Figure 3
Le Pen's Popularity and Intentions
to Vote for the National Front
Those favoring an ? Those intending to
important future role vote for National
for Le Pen Front in 1986
al attempts to forge links with other rightwing parties
Uniquely French in its origins, its concerns are almost
entirely domestic. The party is not a member of any
like-minded international organization that could pro-
vide advice or financial assistance. Le Pen's occasion-
in Europe have met with only limited success-most
notably in the European Parliament where the Na-
tional Front's 10 representatives have formed a group
that includes five members from the neofascist Italian
Social Movement and one sympathetic Greek.
Le Pen's efforts to spread his message abroad have
stirred up the same controversies that characterize his
appearances in France. According to reports from the
US Embassy in Athens, his trip there in December
sparked rioting and demonstrations by leftists as well
as protests from the local Jewish community. In
March the US Embassy in Bern reported that Swiss
authorities withdrew permission for a speech by Le
Pen because of concern that there might be violent
protests.
Responses of the Other Parties
Le Pen's success in the polls and media has forced the
four major parties to assess what the rise of the
National Front means for them. Le Pen has brought
new issues into the national political debate and
drawn voters from across the political spectrum. Each
of the other four main parties has reacted differently,
but all are torn between condemning the National
Front and using its newfound popularity for their own
benefit.
The mainstream opposition's strategy is to keep the
National Front isolated on the fringe of French
politics, and, in our view, they have been generally
successful. During the local elections in March, Na-
tional Front voters switched over to the RPR and
UDF candidates in the second round to defeat leftist
Jan Jun Sep Nov Mar Jun
1984 84 84 84 85 85
candidates, according to US Embassy reporting; the
RPR and UDF, on the other hand, refused to recipro-
cate. The following month, the RPR and UDF signed
an agreement that they would campaign together and
govern together in 1986-without the National Front.
According to the US Embassy in Paris, the main-
stream opposition plans to play to the concerns of
National Front voters, but will claim that the RPR
and UDF will be in a better position than Le Pen to
win the election and do something about France's
problems. To vote for Le Pen, they will maintain, is to
divide the opposition and play Mitterrand's game by
denying the parties of the center and right a convinc-
ing victory. The Embassy reports, however, that the
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moderates of the UDF are less enthusiastic than the
RPR about making an open appeal for extremist
support.
The RPR. We believe Paris Mayor Chirac's party is
the most concerned about the National Front, because
it has both the most to lose and the most to gain from
the rise of the far right. At present, Le Pen's success
hurts the RPR by cutting into its constituency (25
percent of those who voted for Chirac in the presiden-
tial election of 1981 voted for the National Front in
the 1984 European elections), and Chirac's support in
the polls has been dropping precipitously in recent
months. On the other hand, Le Pen's appearance on
the political scene means that Chirac no longer suffers
the opprobrium of being the most extreme candidate
on the right. Looking to the future, Chirac probably
hopes that-as the candidate whose approach and
program most closely resemble Le Pen's-he stands to
profit if National Front voters decide the party has no
chance of winning and want to cast a vote that will
matter. Capturing Le Pen's supporters could make the
Mayor of Paris the dominant partner in the coalition
that is likely to be victorious in 1986. Chirac's position
is a delicate one, though: catering to Le Pen's support-
ers alienates his more moderate allies in the UDF; but
embracing the UDF would abandon the extreme right
constituency to the National Front.
Chirac appears to be relying on a two-track strategy
to deal with the dilemma; he will keep Le Pen at
arm's length while trying to court National Front
voters. Having refused to form a nationwide electoral
alliance with Le Pen, he has promised, in conjunction
with the UDF, not to ask the National Front to join a
governing coalition in 1986. At the same time, Chirac
has spoken out more forcefully on issues-such as law
and order and immigrants-that preoccupy those who
have voted for the National Front. In addition, he has
taken a more nationalistic stance on some internation-
al issues-for instance, by playing up the threat that
the entry of Spain and Portugal into the European
Community poses to French farmers.
The UDF. Chirac's flirtation with the National Front
is unacceptable to most members of the UDF, a loose-
knit coalition of parties of the center and moderate
right. According to public opinion polls, most UDF
voters-along with most of the public-oppose any
mom LiSCOUKS J
cooperation between the established rightist parties
and the National Front. Veil and former President
Giscard have refused to deal with Le Pen; Barre has
met with him, but nothing has come of the encounter.
In the past, the growth of the National Front has
taken votes away from the UDF, but not as much as
from the RPR. Polls show that only 15 percent of
those who voted for Giscard in 1981 switched to the
National Front in 1984.
Although the UDF has less in common ideologically
with the National Front than the RPR, it, too, might
profit from Le Pen's efforts to push his way into the
political mainstream. As long as National Front
candidates are seriously in the running, they draw
more votes from the RPR than from the UDF, and
this strengthens the UDF's influence in the opposition
coalition. Should the National Front lose momentum,
on the other hand, the UDF might inherit a sizable
number of its voters, since polls now show that Barre
is ahead of Chirac as the second choice of National
Front supporters.
The Socialists. The left tends to see Le Pen as a
useful example of the dangers attending a return to
power by the right. The National Front has only
limited appeal for leftist voters, and surveys show that
6 percent of those who voted for Mitterrand in 1981
backed Le Pen in the 1984 European elections (anoth-
er indication of how Le Pen's appeal cuts across
traditional alignments). Public statements by Socialist
leaders make it clear that, while they are genuinely
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leftist electorate back into the Socialist fold.
concerned about the dangers of the extreme right,
they also see the National Front as a convenient
bogeyman for scaring an apathetic and dispirited
In our view, Mitterrand believes that the Socialists
will lose their absolute majority in the legislature in
1986. With the collapse of the union of the left-the
strategy that led to victory in 1981-his goal, in our
view, is to encourage the divisions among the opposi-
tion and then use elements of the fragmented legisla-
ture to forge a new coalition in which the Socialists
would still play an important role. Having the Nation-
al Front in the legislature serves his purposes by
dividing the votes of the center and right and rallying
National Front.
The Communists. Marchais and his party are vehe-
ment opponents of the National Front, but, in any
case, the Communists will only be on the fringes of
the political scene in 1986. The party is preoccupied
with its own internal struggles and collapsing base of
support; it has little energy left to devote to analyzing
and countering the National Front. Instead, the Com-
munists make ritual denunciations of Le Pen and
anyone who deals with him, and lambaste Mitterrand
for the electoral reform that will enable the National
Front to enter Parliament for the first time. Although
polls reveal that only 2 percent of those who voted for
Marchais in 1981 shifted to Le Pen in the 1984
voting, the National Front will compete for the non-
Communist protest vote that has gone to Marchais in
the past. It is highly unlikely that the Communists
will have much bargaining power in the new parlia-
ment, and their contribution to the political maneu-
vering that will go on in the new legislature probably
will be limited to rhetorical confrontations with the
Prospects for 1986
The rise of the National Front, in our view, is a
symptom of increasing fragmentation in the French
party system and a harbinger of uncertainty and
instability in the future. The traditional framework of
French politics-with competing coalitions on the left
and right-may be dissolving. Indications that the
political framework is changing include not only the
rise of the National Front, but also the breakdown of
the union of the left and the continuing rivalry among
Chirac, Barre, and Giscard for the leadership of the
mainstream opposition. Nor is Le Pen the only one
trying to take advantage of a breakdown in the left-
right dichotomy and the public's desire for a new 25X1
approach. President Mitterrand-by appointing Lau-
rent Fabius as Prime Minister and governing without
the Communists-gives every impression of trying to
construct a more centrist, pragmatic, and nonpartisan
appeal. If he is successful, he may take some of the
wind out of Le Pen's sails, but he has probably not left
himself enough time to effect such a fundamental
change before the election next spring.
We believe the National Front will have a limited-
but potentially important-influence on the French
constitutional crisis looming in 1986. Le Pen has
seized advantages from situations that were not of his
making in the past, and he may have the opportunity
to do so again next year. In our view, the party's vote
is likely to be less than 10 percent in the legislative
elections, due to its limited program, organizational
difficulties, and the softness of its support. Its drawing
power could increase, though, if the economy deterio-
rates dramatically or if the mainstream rightist par-
ties exasperate the voters by continuing to devote so
much energy to internecine struggles. Even a small
block of National Front deputies could play a decisive
role if the RPR and UDF are not able to get a
parliamentary majority.
Given the limited appeal of the National Front and
the weakening of traditional political alliances, we
believe there are two probable scenarios for the
outcome of the 1986 legislative elections:
? In our view, the most likely result of the elections
under the new system of proportional representation
is that the RPR and UDF will get a narrow 25X1
majority of the seats (see figure 4). This would allow
them to control both Parliament and the Cabinet
without having to depend on the National Front.
Confined to the sidelines, the National Front will
try to build on its past successes in drawing the RPR
to the right. For instance, Le Pen might try to goad
Chirac into confronting Mitterrand openly and
throw up obstacles to working with the Socialists.
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Figure 4
Possible Outcomes of 1986
Legislative Elections
National Front (FN) -
Rally for the Republic (RPR)
Union for French Democracy (UDF)
Socialist Party (PS)
French Communist
(PCF)
Hung Parliament No Majority
Possible Without National Front
Socialist Party (PS)
French Communist
(PCF)
The National Front would also be potential allies
for those in the RPR and UDF who favor a more
nationalistic foreign policy. We anticipate, however,
that after a few years of rule by the RPR and
UDF-especially if they can generate an economic
recovery-many of the factors that gave rise to the
National Front will be undercut, and the party
probably will slip back into obscurity.
? It is less likely, in our opinion, but still possible, that
no party or coalition of parties will end up with a
working majority in the legislature. A shift of only a
few percentage points in the results could dramati-
cally alter the possibility of organizing a majority
with the National Front (see figure 4). The chances
of such an outcome would increase if the Socialists
are able to increase their vote and the rightist
leaders continue to bicker among themselves. In this
case, Mitterrand probably would attempt to strike a
deal with the RPR and UDF. If the Socialists could
find enough partners in the UDF and RPR to make
up a majority, the National Front would remain in
the political wilderness. If Mitterrand's ploy failed,
the legislature would be plunged into confusion and
deadlock. Le Pen is shrewd enough and ruthless
enough to take full advantage of such a situation.
His price for cooperation would be high: concessions
on appointments and policy-especially in the areas
of immigration policy and law and order. In our
view, any arrangement between the UDF/RPR and
the National Front would be controversial and
probably highly unstable.
We believe it unlikely that the Socialists will be able
to swing the electorate around enough to win an
outright majority in the legislative election. Should
they do so, however, Le Pen and the National Front
probably would continue to play a spoiler role among
the opposition parties. A leftist government provides
the far right with plenty of easy targets, and Le Pen
might even manage to maintain his party's current
level of popularity. Although in the short term the
National Front might wield a disproportionate
amount of influence in an opposition distressed and
divided by the loss of what seemed a sure victory, Le
Pen would be left with little or no influence on
national policy.
Implications for the United States
Whatever the role of the National Front in 1986-a
minor irritant or a spoiler with a major potential for
upsetting the political system-we believe France is
likely to be preoccupied with internal affairs over the
next year or so. The main threat to US interests would
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come if the National Front contributed to an atmo- ? The President's authority in foreign policy may well
sphere of political uncertainty by encouraging and be challenged, making decisionmaking uncertain.
exploiting instability as well as indulging in national- Crucial support for French foreign policy-such as
ist posturing. the defense budget-might be held hostage to politi- 25X1
Under the Socialists, France, in our view, has moved
quietly, but steadily, toward closer cooperation with
NATO through policies such as supporting the de-
ployment of Pershing II missiles in West Germany,
organizing a Rapid Action Force that could be sent to
the front on short notice, and urging the West Euro-
peans to contribute more to their own defense.' These
policies have been carried out not only because Presi-
dent Mitterrand has decided they are in the French
national interest, but also because Mitterrand was
backed up by majorities in the legislature and by
public opinion.
We believe French support for these policies that
further US interests could be endangered if the
outcome of the 1986 legislative elections puts the
National Front in a pivotal position. Although the
National Front does not have a carefully considered
program for foreign affairs, its nationalistic approach
and drive to repudiate the Socialists' work could make
France a more difficult partner in. the Atlantic Alli-
ance. Le Pen has made favorable comments on Amer-
ican economic policy in press interviews and is viru-
lently anti-Soviet, but we believe his influence would
work in favor of a more truculent and independent
foreign policy. Le Pen's influence would have a
negative impact not only on the substance of French
policy, but also on the manner in which it is carried
out:
? The French consensus that favors a strong national
defense and limited cooperation with NATO could
be damaged in the period of confusion that might
well follow the elections. An inward-looking and
more nationalist France could be less cooperative in
NATO and the European Community. The French
Government might also take a more protectionist
stance on trade issues.
cal rivalries. 25X1
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