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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Under the Socialists
France: Institutional Change
Gonfidential
EUR 85-10077
May 1985
360
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 France: Institutional Change
Under the Socialists
Western Europe Division, EURA, on
This paper was prepared byl Office of
European Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Confidential
EUR 85-10077
May 1985
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(ontidential
France: Institutional Change
Under The Socialists
Key Judgments French Socialists have failed to carry out the sweeping institutional
Information available reforms that they promised when they won a massive presidential and
as of1 April 1985 legislative mandate in 1981. They have nationalized some industries, but
was used in this report.
other changes fall far short of revolutionizing basic French institutions-
most of all government. Some attempts to change the system have failed;
some have been severely watered down; others have merely continued
policies begun under former President Giscard and even de Gaulle:
? President Mitterrand has devolved significant powers and responsibilities
from the state-appointed prefects to local councils; much of the potential
for greater local autonomy implicit in his reforms, however, remains
unrealized for want of tax resources to back them up. We believe that
budgetary constraints will prevent Mitterrand from following through in
this area.
? Partisan maneuvering and the inertia of tradition have undermined
announced Socialist intentions to free French television and radio from
government control. Mitterrand's attempt to break up press trusts,
moreover, miscarried when many leftists realized that the proposed laws
endangered their own media interests.
? Socialist plans to reshape French education also have either languished
or misfired; most important, massive public protests and opposition even
within leftist ranks forced Mitterrand to retreat from efforts to secularize
private schools-an emotion-charged and longstanding leftist goal.
In our view, French Socialists are unlikely to attempt further significant in-
stitutional reforms. Most leftists appear more interested in fine-tuning the
modest changes already made-especially in the economy-in order to
improve their record of success in time for the 1986 legislative elections
and the 1988 presidential contest. The Socialists have already had a go at
most of the reforms on their agenda, and those remaining would be
controversial enough to distract the government's attention from bread-
and-butter issues that Mitterrand knows will determine the outcome of the
elections. Socialists are proposing a change in the national electoral system,
but partisan calculations appear to have limited their efforts in this
direction. The changes that Mitterrand recently proposed will probably not
disrupt the stability of the political system as much as his opponents have
speculated and will not improve significantly the prospects for the French
Communist Party, Mitterrand's rival for votes on the left.
iii Confidential
EUR 85-10077
May 1985
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Although conservatives stand a good chance of winning the legislative
elections next year, we believe that they will back down on most of their
threats to roll back the limited reforms the Socialists have enacted.
Widespread public acceptance of government direction of the economy and
the dearth of potential buyers for ailing national companies will, in our
view, limit denationalizations. Other Socialist innovations, like decentral-
ization, have built on the policies of centrist and conservative administra-
tions and are popular even with rightwing voters.
Socialist exposure to the realities of government is likely to benefit the
United States to the degree that it has forced the French left to jettison
shopworn ideology and to adopt a more pragmatic attitude toward the
problems of governing and management. In our view, the sobering impact
of these failed attempts at institutional reform, together with the early
economic failures, has pushed France's non-Communist left toward the
center of the political spectrum and has discredited extremist rhetoric
within Socialist ranks. This greater sense of moderation and realism may
have positive repercussions, especially on France's sometimes difficult
bilateral relations with the United States.
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i-onnaenuai
Blueprint for Change 3
A Significant First Step 6
Freeing Television and Radio 6
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Confidential
France: Institutional Change
Under the Socialists
French Socialists rolled to power in 1981 on a wave of
promises to enact sweeping and fundamental institu-
tional changes in French society. Long years in the
political wilderness during the Fourth Republic and
the Gaullist era had prompted them to devise a
program of institutional reform that promised to give
ordinary people greater control over government (au-
togestion). Many of the Socialists' proposals-such as
secularization of education-sprang directly from
long Socialist and Republican traditions; others de-
rived from the decade-old Common Program that the
Socialists had negotiated with the Communist Party
(PCF) in 1972. A few were invented during the 1981
election campaign and reflected the personal predilec-
tions of Francois Mitterrand, the first Socialist presi-
dent of postwar France. One month after Mitterrand
ousted the centrists and Gaullists from the Elysee,
National Assembly elections gave Socialists a legisla-
tive mandate to enact their ambitions.
This analysis focuses on four categories of institution-
al reform that figured prominently in Socialist plans
and promises prior to the 1981 elections-decentral-
ization, media, education, and the electoral and con-
stitutional system. It examines the extent of some of
the most important changes that they have made thus
far, assesses prospects for further changes before the
left faces crucial legislative elections in 1986 and the
presidential contest in 1988, and speculates on how
lasting the changes will be.
The new Mitterrand government moved quickly to
negotiate nationalization agreements with arms and
steel companies in the fall of 1981 and secured
legislation to absorb five major industrial groups,
two financial holding companies, and several banks
by early 1982. It also pushed through negotiations to
take over French subsidiaries of ITT and Honeywell.
By mid-1982, the government had doubled its share
of the industrial sector to about 30 percent and well
above this mark in such key industries as nonferrous
metals (66 percent, compared with a previous 16
percent), chemicals (52 percent, up from 16 percent),
and electronics (42 percent from less than 5 percent).
The government also took over three cooperative and
36 private banks, and assumed the minority shares of
three seminationalized banks (Credit Lyonais, Ban-
que Nationale de Paris, and Societe Generale)-
bringing more than 90 percent of French banking
under direct government ownership. Remaining
private-sector domestic and foreign banks account for
only 3.2 percent of deposits and 7.4 percent of loans.
Socialists also passed legislation establishing worker
councils in each factory. Although the councils are
only advisory, companies must consult them on im-
portant matters such as reductions in the work force
of various plants
The French presidential election of May 1981 stimu-
lated an unusual amount of debate, evoking numerous
promises from both sides about the future of French
society. Mitterrand and the Socialists shaped the
election debate around a carefully prepared leftist
agenda for change, forcing President Giscard d'Esta-
ing to speak to these issues. Although Mitterrand
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Confidential
himself seldom spoke in specifics, party tracts concen-
trated on defining a detailed program for reforming
France-especially its institutions.' Mitterrand suc-
ceeded in making "change" the focus of the election
and in stirring enthusiasm-even among centrist vot-
ers-for the reforms his party promised.
In their campaign for the legislative election one
month later, Socialists called for a complete mandate
to fulfill the popular desire for change implicit in
Mitterrand's victory. In both campaigns the Socialists
promised to:
? Nationalize basic industries and introduce an un-
precedented degree of worker participation in
management.
? Decentralize government by transferring substantial
power and fiscal resources to regional and depart-
mental governments.
? Secularize the educational system, while opening
admissions to all institutions-especially the univer-
sities and the professional training schools (grandes
ecoles) that are favored recruiting grounds for gov-
ernment and commercial elites.
? Decentralize the media, opening the door to private-
ly owned local radio stations and enforce the law
against press conglomerates.
? Reform the political system to ensure greater voter
control, largely by reducing the presidential term
from seven to five years and by introducing a
proportional voting system
In assuming office, Mitterrand quickly set about
nationalizing firms and implementing other elements
of the Common Program adopted by the leftist coali-
tion. Partisan rhetoric on both sides reinforced the
impression that the Socialists really were out to
change the institutional fabric of French life. Social-
ists, moreover, characteristically laced their post-
election promises with extremist language: they con-
demned "collaboration" with "class enemies";
' Two campaign documents recited virtually the entire litany of
changes from the Socialist tradition: the party's Socialist Plan for
France in the Eighties (1980) and Mitterrand's 110 Propositions for
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"When I'm President, everything will be
possible.
France has been a highly centralized state since the
mid-17th century, when Cardinal Richelieu-and,
after him, Mazarin and Louis XIV-broke the power
of the regional nobility and installed royal agents to
supervise municipal and provincial governments.
Successive regimes refined this administrative struc-
ture, and after the Revolution of 1789-which actu-
ally furthered centralization-Napoleon decreed the
administrative apparatus based on prefects that
France largely retains today.
Municipal and regional councils of France's 96 met-
ropolitan departments are governed directly from
Paris through a system of administrative guardian-
ship. Prefects-civil servants of the Ministry of
Interior-not only supervise the affairs of popularly
elected local assemblies, but also have complete
responsibility for maintaining public order and en-
forcing laws in their departments. Prefects and their
staff supervise the financial affairs of local govern-
ments, whose budgets are submitted for Paris's ap-
proval before they are considered in councils, and in
recent years have provided badly needed technical-
administrative expertise to local government.
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respected voices within the party called not simply for
social reforms but for "destroying" the existing op-
pressive institutions; others talked about "heads rol-
ling."
Mitterrand made decentralization the first order of
business of the new Parliament, declaring that France
needed "a decentralized authority in order to preserve
itself." His determination to decentralize was partly a
response to the frustrations of Socialist mayors and
other local leaders who had often complained of being
stymied by national governments. Decentralization
also had resonance with the electorate, since opinion
polls suggested that a solid majority of Frenchmen
agree that France had become over centralized. Final-
ly, it was also ideological; many Socialists in the
1970s developed the conviction that, whether in the
factory or in politics, Socialism ought to push for
greater self-management-more local control over
local affairs.
Blueprint for Change
The loi Defferre-named after Gaston Defferre, the
powerful Socialist mayor of Marseille whom Mitter-
rand appointed to head the significantly renamed
Ministry of Interior and Decentralization-was the
first of nine laws and 50 decentralizing decrees en-
acted after the legislative election in 1981. Together
they have partially dismantled the highly centralized
administrative structure of the French state-a sys-
tem of scrutiny and direction from Paris, popularly
called la tutelle, that the French had accepted for
over 200 years as a given of their political system.
In essence, decentralization a la Mitterrand devolved
power from the departmental and regional prefects to
the local councils. It transformed prefects into more
benign "Commissioners of the Republic" and desig-
nated them coordinators between Paris and the more
powerful local entities. Commissioners also doubled as
representatives of the government's interests in the
regional assemblies. Executive decisionmaking powers
Gaston Defferre, Former Min-
ister of Interior and Decentral-
were transferred to the presidents of regional assem-
blies and to mayors. Without restructuring local
government, the decentralization legislation:
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? Expanded substantially areas of self-management
enjoyed by municipalities, departments, and re-
gions. Municipalities, for example, now have control
over urbanization; they can issue building permits
and devise their own comprehensive zoning and 25X1
development plans. Regions, on the other hand, have
gained greater budgetary oversight and some con-
trol over regional universities.
? Redirected lines of authority, giving the depart-
ments control over some communal affairs and
giving regional assemblies some oversight of both.
Departments, for example, gained important control
over distribution of government block grants to
municipalities.
? Made elections to regional assemblies direct and
introduced a measure of proportional representation
into communal elections (for cities with a population 25X1
of over 5,000). Other measures restricted concurrent
officeholding from a maximum of five to three
offices.
? Refined the system of revenue sharing between
Paris and local governments, most importantly by
expanding the types of local projects for which
shared funds are allocated and by increasing the
allocations for some categories of projects.
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Figure 1
French Administrative Structure
- Direct control of all functions
- Direct control of some functions
- No formal control (represents)
LH Departmental
Prefect
Minister of Finance
Departmental
Council
Regional Commis-
sioner of the Republic
Commissioner
of the Republic
Departmental
Council
H
Municipal Councils
Although the departmental Commissioners retained Tradition and Redtape
authority over local police and military affairs, the As is so often the case in France, however, laws alone
legislation generally freed municipal governments do not provide a clear picture of what is really
from a priori prefectural "tutelage" and, most impor- happening. Numerous press and US Embassy reports
tant, gave local executives more authority over spend-
ing revenues earmarked for local use.
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have pointed out that the Socialist experiment in
decentralization is less revolutionary than it at first
appears:
? The government has been forced to backtrack on
some intended reforms.
? Other reforms do not represent dramatic change
over past practice.
? Some reforms, moreover, have been severely wa-
tered down in practice.
The most significant example of backtracking is the
controversial and aborted effort to reform Parisian
government. According to a wide variety of press
reports, the Socialists intended to redistribute local
power from the office of the mayor, where it was
traditionally concentrated, to the city's district (arron-
dissement) councils. Popular Paris Mayor Jacques
Chirac charged partisan politics and orchestrated so
much local and national opposition that Mitterrand
decided to shelve the proposal-which, in any case,
would have enhanced the local power of the right.
Nor were the much-vaunted reforms in the prefectur-
al system revolutionary. Although prefects certainly
had more potential power in the past, they seldom
used it as heavyhandedly as the reforms implied.
According to local political officials cited in both the
press and academic studies (based on the opinions of
both rightist and leftist politicians), moreover, the new
Commissioners do about the same things they did as
prefects. Le Monde suggested early in the decentral-
ization crusade that the prefects had been made "to
disappear in order to better reappear." Numerous
local officials in the Norman department of the
Calvados-an industrialized area with several large
towns and generally leftist governments-recently
confirmed this view to academic interviewers.'
Most tellingly, the Socialists have hesitated to turn
over sufficient revenues to make the increased author-
ity of local governments real, at least according to
statements by many local officials. The Mitterrand
] "I can assure you," said the longtime mayor of an important
Norman city, "that Caen has not suffered from the tutelle as long
as I have been mayor. We have been able to do what we want. The
only time the Prefect ever vetoed one of our projects came when we
wanted to expand a building that would have destroyed the view
government has tried to hold down tax increases,
while boosting nationally administered programs-
such as military modernization, job retraining, and
industrial research and development. This has meant
that Paris has had to hang on to revenues that might
have been turned over to local governments. Mean-
while, locally controlled sources of revenue remain as
limited as under previous governments and shared
revenues from Paris have lagged behind the transfer
of responsibilities and functions
Several additional features of the fiscal administra-
tion also call the radical character of the Socialist
reforms into question:
? In the first place, the Socialists have merely fol-
lowed through or expanded on the system of block
grants that was planned and partly implemented by
Giscard.'
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? Government tax policies, meanwhile, have reduced
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nues, while increases in national taxes of various
kinds have made it difficult for local governments to
do the same. In particular, the government declared
a 2-percent reduction in the professional license
fee-which is the most important source of local
revenue.
? Some officials also complain that the economic
crisis-widely blamed on Paris-has further re-
duced the revenues for the professional license fee.
In replacing the bilateral relationship between local
officials and Paris with a more complicated mix of
relationships among four levels of government, more-
over, the reformers have sown some confusion in 25X1
intergovernmental relations, according to numerous
press reports. Regional, departmental, and municipal
authorities once had only to worry about their rela-
tions with Paris. Now, although they must still con-
cern themselves primarily with managing relations
' It was under Giscard, moreover, that substantial central revenues
were first redistributed, and that an equalization fund was intro-
duced within the grant system to redress inequalities between the
way municipalities are taxed and the way block grants are allocat-
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with the central government ministries, they must also
deal much more with each other. For example, the
control and responsibilities that Paris alone once
exercised over local planning and budgeting are now
shared at least in part by both departmental and
regional authorities, as well as by local councils
themselves. Decrees that devolved power to local
entities have left it to them to work out how best to co-
operate in exercising them. The various levels will
certainly take years to settle into a new balance of
relations, and not without considerable push and tug.
A Significant First Step
Although the Socialists' record of decentralization is
clearly not as revolutionary as it seems at first glance,
Mitterrand has made some significant strides-initi-
ating changes that almost certainly portend more than
they have so far accomplished.' By taking on powerful
foes at both the local and national levels, Mitterrand
has at least won support for the principle of decentral-
ization, a battle that previous governments hesitated
to fight. According to US Consulate reports, at a
recent opposition-dominated meeting of regional as-
sembly presidents, "no one contested the concept or
desirability of decentralization."
Having long considered themselves the victims of
heavyhanded Gaullist manipulation of the state-
controlled media, Socialists routinely punctuated
party rallies and congresses with calls for radical
reorganization and decentralization of television and
radio. Over the years, Socialist Party militants de-
manded guaranteed leftist access, especially to mana-
gerial and programing responsibilities, and called for
dismantling the government boards that supervise
management appointments in the state-owned media
companies.'
' Two recent studies of decentralization both emphasize this point.
See Gerard Belorgey, La France decentralisee (Paris : 1984), and a
case study of Bordeaux, Les pouvoirs locaux a 1'epreuve de la
decentralisation (Paris : 1983), directed by Albert Mabilian.
' Early in his presidency, Giscard, too, had vowed to make radio
and television independent of government. In 1974 he broke up the
Gaullist media conglomerate known as the Office de Radiodiffu-
sion Television Francaise (ORTF), substituting in its place seven
media companies. These included three television networks that
were supposed to be competitors. However, the functions assigned
to each-one, for example, was required to carry large numbers of
re iriented programs-soon modified direct competition.
Confidential
Mitterrand on Reforming the Media
Television and radio will be decentralized and
pluralist. Local radio stations will be able to estab-
lish themselves freely as a public service. Their
framework of activities will be established by the
local authorities. A national audiovisual council
will be created, with the representatives of the state
in the minority. Creative activities will be encour-
aged. The rights of citizen-band broadcasters will
be recognized.
The independence of the French Press Agency
vis-a-vis the State will be guaranteed.
All censoring of information ... will be
forbidden.
We do not want a purge, but nonetheless a certain
number of command controls have to be held by
men and women whose views correspond with those
of the majority of the country. We must ensure the
policies desired by that majority, which we are
putting into practice, are really implemented.
Freeing Television and Radio
In the presidential campaign, Mitterrand said specifi-
cally that his administration would make a priority of
eliminating government domination of broadcasting
media and breaking up the private press monopolies-
reforms that together would almost certainly have led
to a major restructuring of French media. As presi-
dent, Mitterrand named a blue-ribbon committee-
headed by Pierre Moinot, the former head of
ORTF-to devise changes in French broadcasting.
The Moinot Report eventually recommended creating
a 60-member, nonpartisan "assembly"-drawn large-
ly from business, the professions, and the arts-to
supervise broadcasting management and to insulate it
thoroughly from government interference. It also ad-
vised numerous other changes that one academic
study characterized as amounting to "a complete
reorganization of French broadcasting."
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Jean-Claude Heberle replaced the independent-mind-
ed Pierre Desgraupes in December 1984 at the head
of France's popular network, Antenne 2. Heberle
gained powerful allies among Socialists by producing
a friendly documentary about then opposition leader
Mitterrand. His appointment, which was widely re-
ported to be the result of strong government pressure
on the Audiovisual High Authority, placed all three
networks in the hands of government sympathizers.
Heberle has recently come under fire because of two,
apparently forced, resignations at A2. First, longtime
news director Albert du Roy quit to join the cable
network, CANAL PLUS, amid speculation that polit-
ical differences with Heberle figured prominently in
his decision. Next, Christine Ockrent-popular an-
chorwoman of A2s top-rated evening news-resigned
recently, fueling even more speculation that du Roy
had been forced out for partisan reasons. Ockrent
departed in such a swirl of accusations and intima-
tions of political pressure that Heberle at one point
threatened to sue her.
The independent leftist daily Liberation speculated
recently that the Heberle shakeups reflected Mitter-
rand's displeasure with the independence of the A2
news team. Other informed observers have seen in
them the opening salvos of a possible government
effort to bring the network news more into its camp
before the crucial elections in 1986 and 1988.
In the meantime, however, Socialists acted with parti-
san zeal worthy of their rightist predecessors to bring
the broadcasting media under greater leftist control.
Mitterrand and his ministers persuaded media com-
pany managers to resign and, with one or two excep-
tions, placed reliable Socialists at the helms. They
also appointed Socialists to programing and manage-
ment positions and ensured that leftist journalists
found positions in the networks. Correct political or
union credentials, rather than experience or compe-
tence, were often the basis for hiring or firing,
according to the US Embassy in Paris. Jean-Claude
Heberle, a close friend of Mitterrand, and Herve
Bourges, a Socialist militant described by one respect-
ed journal as an ardent supporter of UNESCO's
repressive "new world information order," now head
the two most important television networks. Under
pressure from their junior partners in the leftist
coalition, Socialists also named Communists to jour-
nalistic and management positions in television and
radio and appointed a Communist to a new Audiovi-
sual High Authority established as an intermediate
board between ministers and management. The new
High Authority, however, is strictly partisan in com-
position and, in any case, has little power to shield
management from government or even to enforce its
own demands.'
Despite partisan appointments and ineffectual at-
tempts to insulate the audiovisual media from govern-
ment influence, the Socialists have not intervened as
blatantly or as often as their predecessors in broad-
casting affairs. For example, according to academic
studies, Giscard and Michel Poniatowski, his Interior
Minister, intervened directly and on numerous occa-
sions in the appointments of news personnel in the
three networks. Mitterrand has also carried through
legislation formally abolishing the government's au-
diovisual monopoly and in doing this has presided over
two important innovations that probably presage a
revolutionary change in French broadcasting:
? The Socialists have legalized and tried to police the
behavior of the pirate radio stations that Giscard
struggled unsuccessfully to close. Over 1,000 pri-
vately owned radio stations are now licensed, ac-
cording to press reports (see map).
? The left has also permitted the privately owned, but
strictly regulated, cable television service that was
planned under the Giscard administration. Al-
though the new network is in private hands, the
state-owned publicity agency HAVAS owns 42 per-
cent of it, and its president is a longtime Mitterrand
6 Mitterrand did establish a 56-member National Audiovisual
Council, composed along lines suggested by the Moinot Report, but
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Figure 2
Proliferation of Private Radio Stations in France
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