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• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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%eue~ uirectorate OI
Intelligence
Big Four in Flux
Western Europe:
The Labor Unions of the
EUR 85-10005
January 1985
330
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EIL~Cfq,C Directorate of Secret
91
(F - Intelligence
Western Europe:
The Labor Unions of the
Big Four in Flux
This paper was prepared by I Office
of European Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
European Issues Division, EURA, on
Secret
EUR 85-10005
January 1985
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Western Europe:
The Labor Unions of the
Big Four in Flux
Key Judgments Trade unions in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and West Germany
Information available with few exceptions remain on the defensive despite Western Europe's
as of 17 December 1984 modest recovery from three years of recession and record unemployment.
was used in this report.
The unions have suffered heavy losses in membership, an erosion of their
members' living standards, cuts in hard-won social welfare benefits, and
blows to their morale. Job security, consequently, has replaced wage
increases as their highest priority.
The present uneasy truce with management and government, born of
economic exigency, has been broken in a few instances this year by
Communist- and leftwing Socialist-influenced unions, but their actions
have served mainly to divide and thus weaken the union movement:
? In the United Kingdom, miners, led by a self-styled Marxist, have been
on strike for more than 10 months but have not won significant support
from labor or the general public. Instead, the strike has embittered the
debate between leftist and moderate unions over the proper tactics to use
against employers and the government.
? In France, the Communist-dominated Confederation Generale du Tra-
vail (CGT) has been threatening greater militancy since the Communist
Party left the Mitterrand government in July, but appears prepared to at-
tack only carefully selected targets. The union seems to fear that its rank
and file may not respond to its call for general confrontation with
employers and a government of the left. Nevertheless, the CGT's
consistently more aggressive opposition to Mitterrand's austerity pro-
grams has further soured relations with the other major union
federations.
? In Italy, the Communist-affiliated wing of the Confederazione Generale
Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) joined the Communist Party in challenging
the Craxi government's efforts to readjust the automatic wage indexation
mechanism. It fractured labor movement unity in the process, however,
making union militancy on the national level less likely in the short run,
although the three major confederations apparently are still capable of
concerted action on a limited number of specific issues.
? In West Germany, the left-leaning metalworkers-the largest industrial
union in non-Communist countries-and the hard-left printers struck for
a 35-hour workweek this spring. The strike was unpopular even with
large sections of the metalworkers' rank and file, however, and other
unions are expected to continue the moderation traditional in West
German labor relations.
Secret
EUR 85-10005
January 1985
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Individual outbursts of militancy are likely to recur, in our judgment,
especially in the hardest hit unions, but in the short run almost all unions
are unlikely to follow such a lead. We believe union moderation will
continue at least for the next year or two despite the current uneven
recovery, primarily because unemployment is widely expected to remain
high. Similarly, we believe the unions will persevere in their grudging
compromises with government austerity programs.
In the longer term, however, union militancy may revive, especially in
France and Italy, should austerity programs continue to bite and to
threaten existing jobs further. Union leaders, for example, may be more
willing to undertake militant job actions if the erosion of their membership
continues and rank-and-file frustration deepens. Communist-affiliated
unions particularly are likely to take advantage of local labor troubles to
try to restore their credibility with workers, especially if they continue to
have difficulty in mobilizing national demonstrations. The prospects for
increased union militancy depend also on the tactics of their affiliated
political parties. Should the French and Italian Communists, for example,
decide on a sharper antigovernment line, their labor union affiliates almost
certainly will follow suit.
In any case, economic and political realities suggest that even a more
militant approach is unlikely to slow the long-term decline of West
European trade unionism. The political clout of the unions is shrinking
because falling membership is reducing the electoral base they can claim to
represent. At the same time, although the unions almost certainly will
maintain their symbiotic ties to parties of the left, those ties are visibly
fraying. In West Germany and the United Kingdom, substantial numbers
of workers voted for parties of the right in the general elections of 1983. In
France and Italy, the unions have been made painfully aware how limited
their influence is even over left-led governments. The unfavorable prospects
for their affiliated parties in the next several years, moreover, argue for
continued decline in the unions' ability to win favors from governments.
Consequently, we believe that it will be difficult for the unions to recover
the political ground they are currently losing, especially given their
narrowing base of support.
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Secret
Union Setbacks
Rank-and-File Discontent
Political Reverses
Union Responses
The British Unions
The Italian Unions
Page
iii
Moderation in the Short Term 12
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Western Europe:
The Labor Unions of the
Big Four in Flux
Trade unions in the Big Four-West Germany,
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom-remain on
the defensive, economically and politically. They have
regained some of the influence and self-confidence
they lost during the recession that took hold in 1980,
but, despite renewed militancy by some-mostly left-
ist-unions, their position is weaker than before the
recession. Although a modest recovery is under way in
all four countries, such aftereffects of the recession as
high unemployment and loss of political clout are
likely to haunt the unions for several years.
Nevertheless, the unions remain powerful enough to
disrupt the economic strategy of their respective
governments, if they choose, and to exert a sometimes
considerable influence on domestic policy in general,
both directly and through their attachment to major
political parties (see table 1). Consequently, whether
they will remain moderate, or whether renewed mili-
tancy-now confined largely to unions of the left-
will spread, has direct implications for the political
and economic future of the Big Four.
shipbuilding, and textiles, but overall membership too
is falling:
The West German metalworkers union, IG Metall,
the largest in the world, declined by 40,000 in 1983,
and the West German chemical, printing, construc-
tion, railway, textile, and coal miners unions togeth-
er lost an additional 57,000 (see table 2 for current
membership figures).
? The British unions have lost over 15 percent of their
members since 1980.
? The Italian Communist-dominated Confederazione
Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) lost 246,500
members between 1979 and 1982 (roughly 7 percent
of its membership), and the Christian Democrat-
affiliated Confederazione Italiana Sindicale del
Lavoro (CISL) lost 260,000 (10 percent of its
membership) between 1980 and 1982. Only the
Socialist-lay federation, the Unione Italiana del
Lavoro (UIL), continued to gain adherents, although
its membership, exclusive of retirees, fell by 15,000
in 1982.'
Trade unions in France, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany are weakened after three years of
recession, despite the current recovery. They have
suffered heavy losses in membership, an erosion of
their members' living standards, threats to hard-won
social welfare benefits, and blows to their morale. As
a result, their political leverage has also weakened.
Effects of Economic Decline
The economic decline and ensuing record unemploy-
ment impinged heavily on union membership. The
losses were greatest in the highly unionized traditional
industries hardest hit by recession, such as coal, steel,
Even the French confederations, some of whose
membership figures are deliberately inflated, have
revealed that their numbers have fluctuated since
1976. The Confederation Generale du Travail
(CGT), which now claims 1.9 million members, has
admitted a loss of 600,000 in that period.
The losses, moreover, contrast sharply with the situa-
tion in the recessions of 1971 and 1975, when union
membership at least held its own in the four countries.
' Italian unions inflate their membership figures by counting retired
members. The figures given here include active workers only, for all
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Table I
A Cross-National Comparison of Unions
Organization
Trades Union Congress
(TUC)
TUC unions: reformist
in long-term objectives;
work within mixed econ-
omy. Accept Keynesian
framework for economic
analysis. Pragmatic
rather than ideologically
inclined. Favor industri-
al democracy. A vocal
left wing, however,
presses a strongly anti-
capitalist line, including
opposition to industrial
democracy.
The TUC has little real
power. Even central
union organizations can-
not always control their
branches. Collective bar-
gaining is largely decen-
tralized. Most strikes
are wildcat strikes. Both
craft and industrial
unions belong to the
TUC. Approximately 50
percent of work force
unionized.
Most unions belong to
the Labor Party, in
which they hold a voting
majority. Relations be-
tween the unions and the
Labor Party are other-
wise similar to those in
the FRG. The Labor
Party depends heavily on
union members for
funds.
Confederazione Gener-
ale Italiana del Lavoro
(CGIL)
Confederazione Italiana
Sindicale del Lavoro
(CISL)
Unione Italiana del
Lavoro (UIL)
CGIL: anticapitalist,
radical in long-term ob-
jectives. UIL: radical,
but tending toward re-
formist in long-term ob-
jectives. Accepts Marx-
ist framework for
economic analysis.
CISL: reformist in long-
term objectives. Accepts
Keynesian framework
for economic analysis.
All three favor industrial
democracy. CISL is sep-
arated from the other
two federations because
it is Catholic in origin.
The three major federa-
tions joined in a United
Federation in 1972 for
collective bargaining but
dissolved it in 1984. The
federations control bar-
gaining and strike deci-
sions, but a few excep-
tionally large unions
such as the metalwork-
ers have some negotiat-
ing autonomy. Unions
are of the industrial
type. The unions are fi-
nancially weak and have
no strike funds. Approxi-
mately 36 percent of
work force unionized.
The CGIL is Commu-
nist-affiliated, but has a
strong Socialist minor-
ity. The CISL is tied to
the Christian Demo-
crats. The UIL is a lay
union with ties to the
Socialists. All depend on
their respective parties
for funds (and some
come from emigrant
workers).
Confederation Generale
du travail (CGT)
Confederation Francaise
Democratique du
Travail (CFDT)
Force Ouvriere (FO)
CGT and CFDT: hostile
to capitalism; radical in
long-term objectives.
CGT especially empha-
sizes ideological con-
frontation and propa-
ganda. Accept Marxist
framework for economic
analysis. FO: reformist
in long-term objectives;
closer to British unions
in orientation. CGT and
some in the CFDT op-
pose industrial democra-
cy because it distracts
attention from funda-
mental class antago-
nism.
The three major federa-
tions exercise strong
control over individual
unions, including strike
decision. Unions are of
industrial type. (Note:
nominal membership
figures are inflated, es-
pecially in the CGT and
are, therefore, unreli-
able.) Strike funds are
small and dues are an
uncertain source of
funds. Approximately 23
percent of work force
unionized.
CGT is dominated by
the PCF, and CFDT has
close ties to the PS. Both
confederations are a
source of recruits for
their respective parties.
The CGT is funded by
the PCF. All unions get
significant sums from
various government min-
istries. FO is politically
independent.
Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
bond (DGB)
DGB: reformist in long-term
objectives; works within
market economy. Accepts
Keynesian framework for
economic analysis. Favors
industrial democracy in the
form of codetermination.
Centralized structure both
for DGB and individual
unions, but unions have con-
siderable autonomy. Unions
control collective bargaining
on regional or national ba-
sis. Strike decisions rest
with central organization of
individual union. Unions are
of industrial type. Approxi-
mately 35 to 40 percent of
work force unionized.
Nominally nonpartisan, the
DGB enjoys a symbiotic re-
lationship with the SPD.
Unions are a major source
of party funds.
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Table 1 (continued)
Legal regulation The state is seen as an
antagonist. Industrial re-
lations are largely un-
regulated. Unions oper-
ate under voluntarily
agreed rules, in the main
not legally enforced. Re-
cent government regula-
tions limiting freedom to
strike are much resent-
ed.
Strikes are the common-
est collective bargaining
weapon. No central con-
trol of strikes-branches
can defy unions and
TUC orders with impu-
nity. Political action
usually taken through
Labor Party.
Pursuit of union goals is
not hindered by the
state, but unions remain
wary of it.
Confrontation common,
though less so in last few
years. General strikes
for social reforms or po-
litical reasons common
from 1969 through mid-
1970s. Recent policy
more pragmatic. Strikes
a ritual of collective bar-
gaining process. Most
strike-prone unions of
the four countries stud-
ied here.
Job security, consequently, has replaced wage in-
creases as the highest priority for workers in Western
Europe, especially in the Big Four. Growing interest
in the 35-hour workweek rests on the belief that even
if it creates no new jobs-despite union assertions that
it will-at least it will preserve existing employment.
Recent strikes by French auto workers, Italian steel-
workers, West German metalworkers and printers,
and British miners and dockers have at their heart the
preservation of existing jobs.
General economic recovery has not much improved
the workers' lot. In the present climate of austerity,
the unions find their economic straits all the more
galling because their material success before the
recession was so impressive. In West Germany, work-
ers have accepted wage increases below the inflation
rate in every year since 1981, and in the current wage
rounds are committing themselves to do so again in
Unions regard labor law
as a protection, not a
curb, but are wary of the
state.
Highly politicized. CGT
follows PCF tactical de-
cisions. Other major
unions have leftist sym-
pathies but try to pursue
independent actions.
Strikes are frequent in
collective bargaining,
but less so than in Italy
and the United King-
dom. Occasional politi-
cal strikes occur.
Unions consider the state
neutral or their ally against
employers. They see state
action as an alternative to
class conflict.
Cooperation with govern-
ment and employers
formalized in "concerted ac-
tion" agreement on incomes
policy, 1967-77. Self-re-
straint in wage claims has
continued since then. Code-
termination is a source of
moderation, because it ties
unions to individual factory
performance. Strikes are
relatively rare. Convention-
al political lobbying and
demonstrations are the main
tactics.
1985. In 1983, for the first time, Italian unions were
compelled to lower the rate of the scala mobile, the
automatic wage indexation mechanism that functions
as a quarterly cost-of-living escalator. The Italian real
and nominal wage rate has continued to grow more
slowly during the last two years. In France, real wages
are higher than they were five years ago, but they
have fallen during the past 18 months. Real wages in
the United Kingdom alone have defied this downward
trend, mainly because of the Thatcher government's
successful fight against inflation. This year nominal
wage settlements are expected to reach an average of
6.5 percent-some unions already have won 7.5-
percent settlements-but inflation, now roughly 5
percent, also is expected to rise despite government
claims that it will fall to 4.5 percent by the end of the
year.
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Table 2
Membership and Political Orientation of
the West German DGB-Affiliated Unions a
Political
1982
1983
Orientation
Total
7,856,000
7,773,000
Metal Workers (IG Metall)
2,680,800
2,576,000
2,536,000
Left leaning
Public Service, Transport, and Bus (OcTV)
1,099,400
1,180,000
1,174,000
Center-left
Chemicals, Paper, and Ceramics (IGC)
650,700
643,000
635,000
Center-right
Construction, Quarrying, and Building
517,800
531,000
524,000
Center-right
Materials (BSE)
Postal Workers (DDG)
428,900
457,000
458,000
Center
Railway Workers (GdED)
414,200
392,000
387,000
Center
Coal Mining and Power (IGBE)
362,100
368,000
367,000
Center-right
Commerce, Banks, and Insurance (HBV)
314,200 _
368,000
360,000
Left leaning
Textiles and Clothing (GTB)
290,100
276,000
264,000
Center-right
Food, Drink, and Catering (NGG)
252,400
265,000
264,000
Center-right
Education and Science (GEW)
158,700
186,000
200,000
Hard left
Police (GdP)
152,500
169,000
167,000
Center
Timber and Plastics (GHK)
145,100
156,000
150,000
Left leaning
Printing and Paper Manufacturing (IGD)
146,000
145,000
146,000
Hard left
Leather (GL)
53,000
51,000
Center
Arts (GK)
42,100
48,000
48,000
Hard left
Market Gardening, Agriculture, and
41,300
43,000
42,000
Center
Forestry (GGLF)
a Two independent unions-the German Salaried Employees Union
(DAG), with roughly 501,000 members, and the Christian Union
Federation (CGB), with 287,000 members-compete with DGB
affiliates but hardly rival them in influence or numbers. In
addition, approximately 1.7 million permanent civil servants
(Beamte) are not represented in collective bargaining because of
legal restrictions and receive their pay increases directly from the
Bundestag.
Rank-and-File Discontent
Unions are facing a crisis of confidence, not only
because the general public is ceasing to accept as self-
evident their continued usefulness to society, but
because union members themselves are growing disil-
lusioned with their organizations.
The legitimacy of unions is not in question-a recent
French poll, for example, found 70 percent of the
public opposed to abolishing them-but there is an
increasing public impression that their power is exces-
sive. In France, despite the accession of a government
of the left-widely believed to be prounion-in 1981
public opinion polls showed rising hostility to trade
union power. Moreover, according to a poll taken
after the municipal elections in March 1983, "the
greater role of the trade unions" was cited as a reason
for voting for the opposition by 54 percent of those
who did so. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, public
opinion polls have recorded majorities in favor of the
Conservative government's legislation to curb union
power. In Italy, 51 percent of the respondents to a
survey in July 1983 believed the unions were scarcely
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sides. The vast bulk of the trade union movement has
studiously avoided giving the miners more than luke-
warm verbal support. The interests of some unions,
like the truckers who are crossing picket lines to haul
coal to power stations and the steelworkers whose jobs
depend on coke reaching their mills, are directly
opposed to those of the miners. In West Germany,
only a third of the members of the DGB, the major
trade union confederation, favor the 35-hour work-
week, according to opinion polls. Many metalworkers
went on strike reluctantly in May, doing so to preserve
labor solidarity rather than through genuine support
During the heyday of the West European economic
miracle, impressive new welfare benefits represented
a considerable social as well as economic advance for
workers. An unemployed British manual worker with
a wife and two children, for example, may receive
benefits equal to as much as 92 percent of his salary.
Other countries' income maintenance and replace-
ment benefits are almost equally generous. Improve-
ments in old age, disability, health, and education
benefits also owe much to union pressure.
Optimistic union expectations of continued prosperity
and increased rewards were reinforced by rising
membership figures. During the 1960s and the first
half of the 1970s, the rate of unionization grew
steadily. In Italy, it reached an estimated 59.9 per-
cent of the work force in 1977, one of the highest in
Western Europe. In the FRG, total membership kept
growing until 1982, despite worrisome declines in
certain branches. British unions were flourishing as
late as 1980, with unions recognized in 67 percent of
workplaces and with 62 percent of all workers on
25X1 union rolls.
Much of this membership growth was the result of
unionization of the public sector, including many civil
servants and workers in nationalized industries. This
enlarged union horizons by extending their bargain-
ing power with government and private employers. It
also lent added force to continued union pressure for
ever greater wage and benefit increases, through the
beginning of the recent recession.
democratic, if at all. Only 28.8 percent thought they
25X1 had the right amount of power, although almost a
third thought they had too much.
Within the unions, severe internal strains-caused by
disagreements between leftists and moderates on
goals and tactics and disillusion with the current crop
of leaders-have breached the hard-won solidarity of
the labor movement. Among the latest examples, the
British miners' strike has not won universal approval
even within the National Union of Mineworkers, and
other unions directly affected are being forced to take
for a shorter workweek.
In Italy, the United Federation agreement of the
three union confederations-committing them to bar-
gain jointly with employers-broke down in February
over proposed responses to the government austerity
program; there was even talk of a secession by the
Socialist wing of the CGIL. In France, many observ-
ers looked to the social security elections in October
1983 to provide clues to labor's mood. The result was
a relatively disappointing showing for the leftist CGT
and Confederation Francaise Democratique du Tra-
vail (CFDT) and a strong turnout for the centrist,
rightist, and white-collar Force Ouvriere (FO), Con-
federation Generale des Cadres (CGC), and Confeder-
ation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC).
The enterprise committee elections this past March-
held biennially in all industrial and commercial firms
with more than 50 employees-confirmed the waning
appeal of the CGT and CFDT. The FO, politically
unaffiliated and more inclined to negotiate than to
strike, was the chief beneficiary. The trend appeared
to be slowing last November, but the US Embassy
pointed out that it is too early to say whether it has
stopped on the basis of two CGT victories in plants in
troubled industries.
Political Reverses
The political climate, too, is less congenial to the
unions. The Thatcher government in the United King-
dom is unabashedly antiunion. In Bonn, the Christian
Democrat-led coalition also is less sympathetic to
union demands than the Social Democratic govern-
ment it replaced. Even the Socialist government of
France had to change its initial course of generosity to
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the workers, and the Socialist-led coalition in Italy is
pledged to a tough austerity program that could affect
the level of social welfare benefits, including pensions
and the unemployment fund.
In France until last July and-to a lesser extent-in
Italy, union responses to the economic plight of their
members were constrained by the need to support
their affiliated political parties in government coali-
tions that initiated austerity programs. While the
French Communist Party was a member of the
Mitterrand government, the CGT moderated its cus-
tomary level of confrontation with private employers
and the state. The Socialist CFDT, by contrast, has
remained generally supportive of government policy,
with a few significant local exceptions such as the
Talbot car plant strike in December 1983. In Italy,
the presence of the Christian Democrats in the
Socialist-led coalition is reining in its affiliated union
confederation, the CISL. The strong Socialist pres-
ence in the UIL is doing the same for it. In addition,
the Socialists in the Communist-dominated CGIL
have been bolder in asserting Socialist party interests
in the confederation now that a Socialist prime minis-
ter is in office, especially since the CGIL's number-
two man, Ottaviano Del Turco, is a Socialist known to
be close to Prime Minister Craxi.
Ties with political parties traditionally believed to
champion union interests have suffered as well owing
to recession-induced strains and the leftward lurch of
some parties. In West Germany, the 20 to 30 percent
of industrial workers that consistently voted
CDU/CSU rather than Social Democratic is estimat-
ed to have swelled to approximately 40 percent in the
March 1983 election. In the British election of June
1983, an estimated 60 percent of union members
voted for the Conservatives or the Liberal-Social
Democrat Alliance, rather than for the Labor Party.
Even more damning, the Trade Union Act passed in
July requires members of unions with political funds
to vote by March 1986 whether to continue them.
According to a recent opinion poll, 12 of the 15
largest unions might vote to abolish their political
funds. Because unions provide 80 percent of Labor
Party revenue, such a step could bankrupt the party.
Equally significant, recent efforts to induce unions not
already affiliated to join the Labor Party have been
utter failures, and there is strong rank-and-file senti-
ment in some of the larger member unions in favor of
breaking their ties with Labor. We believe disaffili-
ation to be a remote possibility for individual unions,
because it would gravely complicate their relations
with the rest of the labor movement. But the existence
of sentiment favoring such a move undoubtedly will
continue to undermine union morale and prestige.
The recession dampened union militancy, and its
aftereffects have kept it relatively low. Not only is
strike activity down even in the United Kingdom and
Italy (see chart), but union expectations in collective
bargaining have become more realistic than in the
heady years of big wage increases before 1979. More-
over, the enforced restraint of union demands has led
to often bitter disputes over tactics and shattered the
unity of action forged by labor movements in more
prosperous years. Although there are signs of renewed
militancy among leftist and Communist-dominated
unions in hard-hit traditional industries, these unions
are exceptional and are strongly influenced by the
tactical considerations of their affiliated leftist politi-
cal parties. As yet their militancy has not infected
other unions.
The British Unions
The recession has tamed even the British unions,
which governments used to defy only at their peril.
The Conservatives had played on the unbridled power
of the unions in the 1979 election campaign, and their
efforts to curb union militancy led to legislation in
1980 and 1982 restricting the unions' previously near
absolute freedom to strike. The laws banned second-
ary picketing and sympathy strikes and subjected
unions to fines and civil suits for infractions. The
government also has passed legislation effectively
requiring unions to conduct secret ballots in elections
for national executive positions and before mounting
strikes, which it hopes will reduce pressure on rank-
and-file members to opt for extremist leaders and
policies.
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The Big Four:
Trend of Working Days Lost,
1970-83
a 1983 data for Italy are unavailable.
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Although Thatcher's hard-nosed approach has helped
curb union militancy, we believe that the doubling of
unemployment during the past four years has been the
principal factor behind union moderation. Rising job-
lessness has weakened the unions organizationally and
sapped their morale, as members have grown more
concerned with saving their jobs than with winning
gains. The steelworkers, for example, who last struck
in 1980, have grown so gloomy that not even the loss
of half their jobs since then has induced them to call
another national strike.
Excluding the miners' strike, the number of working
days lost to strikes since 1981 has been less than half
the average for the 1970s. Although the Thatcher
government sometimes has caved in to union wage
demands, more often it has stood its ground. This was
true of the printers' union challenge late in 1983 to
the new laws against secondary picketing. It was also
true of a union initiative last year that sought to
reverse the government's decision to ban unions from
its electronic intelligence center in Cheltenham on
national security grounds. In both cases, the courts
ultimately backed the government. The Trades Union
Congress's subsequent attempts at confrontation nei-
ther mobilized the membership nor intimidated the
government, prompting the leadership to seek a dia-
logue with the Thatcher administration instead. F_
Even the 10-monthlong miners' strike has evoked only
lukewarm support from the rest of the labor move-
ment. The strike is a tribute to the single-mindedness
of Arthur Scargill, the self-styled Marxist leader of
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) who has
vowed to bring down the Thatcher government. The
National Coal Board's (NCB) intention to close down
20 uneconomic pits in 1984, at the cost of 20,000 of
the country's 180,000 mining jobs, provided Scargill
with highly committed militants, especially among
miners in Yorkshire and South Wales who will not
migrate in search of work and who see little prospect
of alternative employment to sustain their communi-
ties.
Even within the miners' union there is opposition to
the strike. Nottingham area miners have refused to
stop work without a national strike vote. In all, as
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many as 63,000 miners are estimated to be still at
work, according to the NCB. Their numbers in-
creased in a slow trickle until November, when some
12,000 miners returned to work, many apparently
encouraged by the Board's offer of Christmas bonus-
es. Few miners have returned to work, however, in the
diehard regions of South Wales and Yorkshire, and
elsewhere the number of returnees has begun to fall.2
From the outset, the extreme violence of the strike
including pitched battles between thousands of pickets
and police, and on 30 November the killing of a taxi
driver who was transporting a working miner-has
cost the miners public support, according to numerous
opinion polls. Attempts last autumn to drum up
support from Libya and the Soviet Union-the press
trumpeted Scargill's admission that the Soviets had
given the NUM nearly $1 million-are very likely to
tarnish further the union's reputation.
Scargill's militancy, moreover, has alienated many
trade unionists. Moderate union leaders who spoke
with the US Embassy last July dreaded a Scargill
victory because it would pressure them into confronta-
tions with employers, with disastrous consequences for
the union movement as a whole. Some left-leaning
unions, particularly the railwaymen and the powerful
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU),
have voiced support for the miners, but the rank and
file do not share their leaders' enthusiasm for active
assistance, and continue to move coal across picket
lines. Steelworkers, fearing that coke shortages would
give the government an excuse to close obsolete mills,
have encouraged truckers to continue hauling coal.
Equally important, union workers at electricity gener-
ating plants have refused to call sympathy strikes.
Even the traditionally militant dockers-part of the
TGWU-refused to rally round the miners, ignoring
pleas from TGWU leaders to refuse to unload import-
ed coal and iron ore. The TGWU hoped to expand
local dock strikes last July and August to support the
miners, according to the US Embassy, but, once the
dockers were assured that their own jobs were not at
risk, they returned to work in embarrassing haste.
2 The NCB has proved unable to overcome the reputation for
ineptitude it acquired early in the strike, thanks to repeated public
relations gaffes. Its unskillful handling of the bonus offer, according
to the press, is only the latest in a series of failures to capitalize on
The miners' strike has so openly fragmented the labor
movement that TUC leaders, fearing last September's
annual TUC conference might founder on the issue,
forced a compromise on Scargill and his supporters,
according to the US Embassy. It papered over differ-
ences with the moderates and gave the miners far less
practical assistance than they demanded. The key
resolution, pledging to respect the picketing of coal
shipments, depends on the backing of unions that have
already rebuffed the miners.
Even the Labor Party leadership finds the strike an
embarrassment. The deputy party leader, Roy Hatt-
ersley, told the US Embassy in July that a Scargill
victory would be "disastrous" for Labor and its new
leader, Neil Kinnock. In October, the annual Labor
Party conference did pass a resolution strongly favor-
able to the miners, over Kinnock's objections, but
Labor support is unlikely to go beyond highly colored
rhetoric.
The Italian Unions
The Italian labor movement, even more than its
British counterpart, entered the recent recession with
a legacy of militancy and a decade of unprecedented
gains in wages and benefits exacted from manage-
ment and government, including an automatic wage
indexation system, the scala mobile. With the sharp
rise in unemployment during the last three years,
however, matched by a decline in industrial produc-
tion, Italian workers are no longer in a position of
relative strength when faced with contract negotia-
tions. Strike activity is down considerably from the
record level of 1979. Moreover, labor unity, formerly
a significant source of Italian labor's strength, has
been shattered over the issue of scala mobile reform,
although local unions occasionally manage to unite on
a few issues.
Until recently, the United Federation, consisting of
the Communist-dominated CGIL, the Christian
Democrat-linked CISL, and the Socialist-lay-affiliat-
ed UIL, presented a united labor front in collective
bargaining. Politically, the UIL, the CISL, and the
CGIL have been pressed to support the government's
austerity program, which included a reduction in the
Scala mobile. Craxi's immediate aim was to reduce
inflation, but his ultimate objective was to curb union
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US Embassy officials.
power as a condition of improving national economic
performance, according to Socialists who spoke with
The leaders of the CISL and the UIL, along with
Socialist CGIL unionists, had for some time accept-
ed-and occasionally even conceded to the press-
that reform of the previously untouchable scala mo-
bile was needed to keep labor costs down, increase
productivity, and slow the growth of unemployment.
Resistance by CGIL hardliners to any change, howev-
er, was compounded by growing intransigence on the
part of the Communist Party, which, commentators
generally agreed, feared the loss of blue-collar sup-
port. The three confederations did separately sign the
labor cost agreement in 1983 that retained intact the
principle and function of the wage escalator, but also
committed Italian labor to accept a diminished scala
mobile rate for the first time. Last February, howev-
er, CGIL hardliners balked at a further reduction in
the scala mobile, and the United Federation, already
under strain before Craxi took office, collapsed. On
May Day, for the first time in 15 years, the three
confederations held separate rallies, and the collective
turnout was significantly smaller than in former
years. The plaintive calls for renewed labor unity at
each demonstration merely underscored the width of
the breach.
Even this display of CGIL militancy scarcely veils
worker reluctance to take aggressive action. From the
outset the PCI was more enthusiastic in challenging
the government than the CGIL. Luciano Lama, the
popular CGIL leader-a darkhorse candidate for the
PCI leadership this year-consistently took a milder
line against the decree than the PCI. CGIL-initiated
"spontaneous" strikes were less successful than PCI-
organized demonstrations, because the party's superi-
or organizing machinery not only provided direct
support, but mobilized other groups, including stu-
dents, the unemployed, and pensioners, to give the
impression of mass opposition to the government's
proposals, as a CGIL Communist official admitted to
the US Embassy.
For the CGIL, the PCI's success in blocking confir-
mation of the decree in the Chamber of Deputies in
April' and in allowing the passage of a watered-down
version in June may have been a Pyrrhic victory.
CGIL isolation from the other two confederations has
emphasized-to its detriment-its political link to the
PCI. In addition, internal tensions between the Com-
munist and Socialist factions in the union have in-
creased. The Socialists resented the Communist ma-
jority's actions but are compelled to stay, because
they are too few to survive independently and too 25X1
much at odds with the UIL leadership to join the
Socialist-lay federation,
We believe that the rift between Communist, Chris-
tian Democratic, and Socialist labor forces will not
heal easily, although all appear to be seeking noncon-
troversial common ground for joint action. In July, for
example, the three confederations jointly condemned
the Polish Government's trial of trade union militants.
As a result of the rift, labor unity henceforth probably
will be nominal, although it may revive on some
bread-and-butter issues on the local level. This por-
tends a period of reduced labor militancy on the
national level, at least in the short term, as well as a
growing polarization of the work force that may
The French Unions
Labor unions in France, generally less militant than
their British and Italian counterparts, were initially
buoyant under a government of the left that alone
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among the Big Four pursued expansionary economic
policies to combat the recession and implemented new
workers' rights. The negative consequences of these
policies, however, led the government to switch to a
regimen of austerity in 1982, resulting in erosion of
real wages, a large number of business bankruptcies
(with fewer government bailouts), and higher unem-
ployment.
For the most part, leftist labor groups continue to
back the government despite its turn toward economic
austerity, including a temporary wage and price
freeze in 1982. Most of the rank and file are mindful
of the alternative to the current government and,
according to opinion polls, recognize that French
economic difficulties are inextricably linked to the
broader West European industrial decline and to
world economic conditions. As a result, many appar-
ently accept the need for industrial restructuring.
Nevertheless, French workers are increasingly restive,
and each of the three leading labor confederations has
sought to differentiate its position from the others in
order to retain credibility among its rank and file.
Consequently, as in Italy, labor unity has dissipated.
1987, and thousands of demonstrators brought the
region to a halt on 4 April. In May the CGT closed
down a large Citroen factory near Paris, to protest the
laying off of 6,000 workers-14 percent of the compa-
ny's work force-and the strike soon spread to four
other factories.
The militancy of the CGT contrasts sharply with the
generally more conciliatory attitude of the CFDT and
the FO, according to the US Embassy and press
reports. They joined in the protests in Lorraine, but
distanced themselves from the CGT's hardline rejec-
tion of the government steel plan. The CFDT was
prepared to negotiate with the government, and the
FO hedged its objections and acknowledged Mitter-
rand's good will. True, the CFDT did instigate the
Talbot strike in December 1983, but, at Citroen in
May, it took a milder line, while the CGT flatly
rejected any compromise.
Internal debates on the extent and duration of contin-
ued cooperation with the government wracked both
the CGT and the PCF, according to the US Embassy
and kept up the pressure
Worker discontent thus far has erupted only in spo-
radic outbursts, which have been consistently support-
ed only by the CGT. The government's plans for
industrial restructuring-involving 200,000 job cuts
in the sectors of coal, steel, shipbuilding, automobiles,
and telecommunications-crystallized labor disen-
chantment and sparked considerable demonstrations
throughout the spring. The Communist-dominated
CGT took the lead in challenging the Mitterrand
program, in close collaboration with the PCF, despite
Communist participation in the government at the
time. The other confederations, although often as
vocal, were less active in rejecting the government's
line.
In some major industries, notably coal and steel, the
CGT rode the crest of a wave of unrest that carried
the other unions along; elsewhere, it set the pace.
Coalminers struck nationwide in March to protest pit
closures they estimated would cost more than 25,000
jobs over the next four years. In the same month,
steelworkers in Lorraine rioted over reported govern-
ment plans to cut between 12,000 and 20,000 jobs by
the CGT, in fact, had taken the lead
in urging the PCF to quit the coalition, a decision it
finally made on 19 July, when the new Socialist Prime
Minister, Laurent Fabius, refused to make conces-
sions on the government's austerity program. The US
Embassy notes that Henri Krasucki-not only head of
the CGT but a member of the PCF Politburo-and
other union leaders had been contending for months
before the final breach that by sharing responsibility
for unpopular economic decisions the party was fray-
ing its ties to its working-class base.
The West German Unions
The election of the Kohl government combined with
the recession to unsettle West German unions, even
though militancy is alien to the country's tradition of
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labor relations. With few exceptions, such as the
metalworkers' and printers' strikes this year, the
unions have been far less strike prone than their
British, Italian, and even French counterparts (see
chart). The waning of the German "economic mir-
acle," however, is damaging the common assumptions
upon which labor peace has rested. Although the
social consensus is still intact, labor, industry, and
government are increasingly wary of one another.
Traditionally, the unions have been moderate in their
wage claims, in part because labor is entrenched in
the economic and political establishment.' The code-
termination laws put workers' representatives on the
supervisory boards of most large private and publicly
owned companies, giving them an especially large
influence in the coal and iron industries. The unions
themselves own several large companies that give
them a stake in the overall health of the economy. The
recession-induced shift in union priorities from wage
increases to job preservation also is keeping down
wage demands. Since 1981 all the unions have accept-
ed annual wage increases below the inflation rate.
Stresses in union relations with management and the
Kohl government are jeopardizing labor peace, al-
though it continues to hold, with notable exceptions.
The hard economic times are forcing some employers
to rescind supplementary wage and fringe benefit
agreements at the factory level, as a metalworkers'
union official told the US Embassy, and prompting a
second look at concessions already made in other
areas such as codetermination. The Kohl govern-
ment's proposed social welfare cuts in maternity and
other benefits, meanwhile, are modest in themselves.
But to Germans accustomed to one of the most
generous benefit packages in Western Europe, any
diminution is a serious psychological loss. More sig-
nificantly, the government, already suspected of at-
tempts to compromise the traditional autonomy of the
25X1 collective bargaining process, openly sided with the
employers in the recent printers' and metalworkers'
strikes, further straining its ties to labor.
Nevertheless, even the metalworkers' strike, the long-
est and costliest West German labor conflict since the
end of the Second World War, failed to override the
fundamental unwillingness of most West German
workers to undertake militant action and illustrated
how far out of touch with the rank and file union
leaders had become. Only a perceived threat to the
solidarity of the union brought the metalworkers onto
the picket lines, and, except for the leftist printers, no
other union struck for the 35-hour workweek, al-
though it has been a DGB priority since 1982.
Led by the giant, left-leaning metalworkers' union, IG
Metall, the DGB contended that a 35-hour workweek
(at 40 hours' pay) would practically restore full em-
ployment-a claim most experts dispute. But at bot-
tom, the unions were even more concerned to protect
existing jobs with this scheme than to create new ones,
according to the US Embassy. From the outset, the
unions themselves were divided on the merits of the
35-hour workweek, and several, including the miners
and construction workers, now find early retirement
schemes a more attractive alternative. The textile
workers' union settled for an early retirement scheme
at the height of the metalworkers' strike. Moreover,
the US Embassy and longtime observers of the labor
scene all agree that the rank and file had never been
consulted about the original decision to press the
issue, and the leadership did not try to generate
enthusiastic support until the strike was under way.
During the past two years, opinion polls repeatedly
have shown that at most one-third of all West Ger-
man workers approve of a 35-hour workweek. F_~
Despite lukewarm worker interest, and the DGB's
carefully qualified promises of support, the metal-
workers' and printers' leaders decided to make the
35-hour workweek the principal subject of this year's
labor negotiations, because preserving threatened jobs
had become an urgent goal. In addition, the hard-
leftist printers have a history of militant confronta-
tion. They were prepared to strike this spring even
though the failure of their last strike, in 1978, had left
them so deeply in debt that they still had virtually no
strike funds.
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Aware of their limited support-an April poll re-
vealed that only 20 percent of IG Metall members
favored a strike for the 35-hour workweek-the met-
alworkers decided to confine their action to Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Hesse, in part because these were
the two areas where they were most certain to win the
75-percent majority required by law in favor of a
walkout. Even so, the 80-percent "yes" vote in Baden-
Wuerttemberg was the lowest mandate for a strike in
the metal industry since 1956. Only loyalty to the
union-the foremost theme among interviewed work-
ers-kept the rank and file off the job. The printers
had to rely on strikes only in selected newspaper and
printing plants, because of both worker apathy and
lack of funds.
The strikers failed to draw much more than lipservice
from the labor movement. The DGB did organize a
mass demonstration in Bonn on behalf of IG Metall
but successfully fended off the urging of militants for
nationwide work stoppages. Even while the strikes
were in progress, six unions, including an independent
white-collar union, accepted expanded versions of the
government's early retirement plan in settlements that
preserved the 40-hour workweek.
Once the metalworkers realized their isolation, and
the government grew alarmed by the mounting politi-
cal and economic costs of the strike, a face-saving
compromise was cobbled together through mediation.
IG Metall came to terms at the beginning of July and
the printers soon settled for much the same benefits.
Neither side achieved its stated goals. IG Metall
failed to win a 35-hour workweek, and, even within
the labor movement, there was general agreement
that the settlement would create no new jobs. Never-
theless, the union did win a 38.5-hour workweek with
no loss of pay, a useful step toward safeguarding
existing jobs and a precedent for further reductions in
working time. The price of this victory, however, was
a wage settlement once again below the inflation rate,
and renunciation of its hard-won right to control work
schedules. At the same time, according to the US
Embassy, employers believe that they are well placed
to recoup at least part of the estimated 5 percent the
settlement will add to their costs, because the newly
granted flexibility in work schedules should enable
them to raise productivity.
We believe that, over the next year or two, trade
union militancy in West Germany, and to a somewhat
smaller extent in the United Kingdom, France, and
Italy, will remain at a relatively low level, with only
occasional outbursts of labor unrest in depressed
regions or hard-hit sectors of industry. Relative mod-
eration is likely to continue beyond 1985 in the United
Kingdom and West Germany, although the potential
for increased militancy exists, especially among left-
leaning British white-collar unions, and in further
union-government friction in West Germany. By the
end of 1985, however, French and Italian unions may
try to recoup their losses by taking more militant
strike actions, and by attempting to mobilize their
remaining clout at the polls. In our judgment, eco-
nomic and political realities make it unlikely that
renewed militancy will reverse the decline of the West
European labor union movement.
Moderation in the Short Term
Union militancy in the United Kingdom is likely to be
curbed at least through 1985 by continued high
unemployment, especially in heavy industries where
unions traditionally have enjoyed their greatest
strength. Moreover, unions no longer can count on the
unhesitating and unanimous support of their mem-
bers, and moderates continue to preach cooperation
with government and employers. The violence of the
miners' strike and the intransigence of its leaders also
are discrediting militant tactics. Some unions are so
fearful of layoffs and falling membership, especially
in the engineering industry, that they are trading no-
strike agreements and flexible work practices for
exclusive organizing and negotiating rights-a signifi-
cant departure from traditional British industrial
relations.
The TUC annual conference in September demon-
strated the unwillingness-and inability-of the
unions to return to the mid-1970s style of confronta-
tion. The "new realism" of 1983-a readiness to
cooperate with employers and the government-is
discredited, but hardly dead. Moderates retained the
balance of power on the TUC Executive Council,
albeit with a reduced majority. In striking contrast to
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its largely rhetorical support of the miners, the TUC
decided to resume participation in the tripartite talks
with the government and industry on economic devel-
opment that it had broken off in March over the
banning of unions at Cheltenham. We believe that
this sort of limited cooperation with government and
employers probably will continue, to the extent that
government policies and employers' economic con-
straints do not wholly undermine moderate leaders,
because there is no realistic alternative available to
25X1 the unions.
The great exception to this increasing union modera-
tion, the miners' strike, is likely to drag on for several
months, having passed the 10-month milestone in
mid-December with the two sides as far apart as ever
on the central question of closing uneconomic pits.
Beyond the immediate impasse, it will be difficult to
reconcile the disputants, because at bottom they are
struggling to decide who controls the coal industry.
Moreover, although the strikers are suffering priva-
tions, they apparently feel prepared to endure them
indefinitely, partly out of loyalty to the union, partly
thanks to help from the national social safety net and
financial aid or credit offered by local governments,
other unions, mortgage holders, and local merchants.
The strike probably will peter out, in our judgment,
once it becomes clear to a still-intransigent Scargill
that the government and the coal board can outlast
the isolated miners. Provided the government does not
further undercut union moderates and provided it can
keep the economy in fuel through the winter, we
believe it will be difficult for militants to whip up
more than verbal support for the miners. Eventually,
we believe, a face-saving formula will be found that
25X1 nonetheless preserves the NCB's freedom to close
uneconomic pits.
Any such settlement of the miners' strike, however
tactfully worded, will discredit militant tactics and
leave the union-and the labor movement-notice-
ably weaker. The mutual recriminations within the
NUM between strikers and those who kept working
are bound to weaken it as much as the inevitable
layoffs. Within the TUC, the split the miners' strike
provoked will be slow to heal. The public display of
labor movement disunity has already harmed its
reputation and diminished its effectiveness. At the
same time, we believe a defeat for the miners is likely
to continue the demoralization of British labor, al-
ready frustrated by its inability to mount an effective
challenge to government policies that militants claim
are intended to break the entire union movement.
We believe that the Italian labor scene will remain
relatively quiet at least through the autumn of 1985.
Militant CGIL Communists may be expected to mark
their differences from further austerity moves by a
government excluding the PCI, but further modest
reductions of the scala mobile when the current
limitations that expire at the end of this year are
likely to arouse less passion than the current one did.
Moreover, although the PCI appears
prepared to thwart Craxi's program, the CGIL has
carefully distanced itself from recent PCI efforts to
hold a referendum on the cost-of-living adjustment
reduced by Craxi's decree law. In our estimation,
CGIL General Secretary Lama's enhanced prestige
will enable him to maintain the moderate line he has
consistently advocated, despite any PCI efforts to the
contrary. Moreover, if he is succeeded at the end of
1985 by Bruno Trentin-currently the slight favorite,
according to US Embassy interlocutors-relations
with the other major federations may improve, further
strengthening the hand of CGIL moderates.
The destruction of the United Federation also is likely
to lessen labor militancy on the national level in 1985.
The labor movement is organizationally weaker now
than it has been in nearly 20 years. Despite efforts by
all three confederations to find common ground for
renewed unity of action on bread-and-butter issues, it
is likely to be many months before they can reestab-
lish the coordination and easy working relationship
they enjoyed before the split. They did manage to
come together for a national strike in November-the
first since the split in February 1984-in favor of
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fiscal reform, but, in Florence and Milan, leftwing
workers hooted UIL speechmakers, signifying that a
unitary strike does not necessarily demonstrate labor
unity. In the interim, we believe the CGIL leadership
will try to avoid militant tactics that would emphasize
the gulf separating it from the other confederations or
reopen the wounds it inflicted on its own Socialist
minority.
We anticipate only selective displays of union militan-
cy in France in 1985, although the PCF's departure
from the government gives it and the CGT a freer
hand to challenge Mitterrand's economic policies.
Following the PCF congress in February 1985 and the
redefining of party objectives, the CGT may launch a
somewhat broader campaign against Socialist auster-
ity programs, but we believe it will choose its targets
carefully. The CFDT and the FO will continue to
support the government, in our judgment, but work-
ers' discontent, disillusionment with austerity meas-
ures, and fear of unemployment probably will inspire
strikes in selected cases.
Although the CGT urged Communist withdrawal
from the government, the confederation is reluctant to
commit itself to a strategy of confrontation before it
has had time to mull its choices and learn PCF
The CGT is likely to be constrained also by the
unwillingness of other unions to join a general attack
on the government. The CFDT still generally supports
the Socialists, especially on wage policy. The less
confrontational FO is not only glad to see the Com-
munists out of the government, it has a reputed
former member, Michel Delebarre, as Labor Minis-
ter. The important national teachers' union, FEN, is
controlled by Socialists, and has been enervated by its
recent unsuccessful campaign against the private
school system. A major CGT campaign against gov-
ernment economic policy would court an embarrass-
ing failure in the likely absence of support by these
unions. The CGT had a foretaste of this on 25
October when it failed publicly to mobilize the rank
and file in a civil servants' strike. In addition, we
believe the CGT will wish to tread carefully to avoid
giving the impression that, alone among the unions, it
is trying to destroy a government of the left.
At the same time, the CGT has more leeway for
promoting or exploiting industrial unrest now that the
PCF is in opposition. Despite Mitterrand's success so
far in defusing union demands one by one, even in
industries such as steel and coal, where the CGT is
strong, private-sector wages, shipyards, and national
talks between labor and management over increased
flexibility in hiring, firing, and benefits are issues the
CGT may exploit. The climate of labor relations
probably will deteriorate, in our judgment, since the
government remains determined to push through its
fundamental plans. Government intransigence may
lend an air of legitimacy to CGT militancy and help
to reestablish its traditional leadership of the French
trade union movement.
ences with the government, using the CGT as a
The CGT also may adopt a more militant stance after
the PCF congress in February 1985-if not in the
runup to it-because CGT and PCF leaders believe
their equivocation on economic policy, while Commu-
nist ministers were sitting in the Cabinet, badly
eroded their credibility with their working-class base.
To recover lost ground and to rebuild the morale of its
cadres, the PCF may wish to accentuate its differ-
Despite the growing stresses within the West German
union movement, in our judgment, the probability of
continued moderation is high for the next year. Old
habits of cooperation die hard, and there is still broad
agreement among union leaders, industry, and gov-
ernment on the limits of economic concessions. At the
same time, this cooperation is growing strained.F_
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Now that the pace-setting metalworkers have come to
terms, similar settlements are likely to become the
norm even for unions in favor of the 35-hour work-
week. The large center-left public service workers
union, OeTV, for example, which had demanded 10
paid days off as an equivalent to a 38.5-hour work-
week, settled in November for a modest 3.2-percent
raise in 1985 and two additional days off. More
conservative unions, including the chemical workers,
certainly will not abandon their accustomed modera-
tion in upcoming negotiations with management.
asserted itself even during the recent strikes. The
DGB's pessimism about its remaining clout led it to
restrict its support for the strikes,
We believe it will continue to
offer only limited aid under similar circumstances, as
long as the moderates retain the balance of power.
Militancy and Decline in the Long Term
Beyond 1985, we believe the unions in the Big Four
are likely to remain moderate, on the whole, since the
trends currently putting them on the defensive are
likely to continue to weigh on them at least for the
remainder of this decade. Unemployment is almost
certain to remain high through the end of the decade,
economists generally agree, and governments are un-
likely to change their austerity policies to create new
jobs. Consequently, we believe fears for existing jobs
are likely to make the unions tread warily before
undertaking militant action on a national level. The
continuing disillusionment of the rank and file with
militant tactics also is likely to constrain the unions.
On the other hand, should current policies of coopera-
tion with governments and employers fail to yield
results, moderate union leaders too may be discredit-
ed, further alienating workers from the unions.
In addition, unions probably will lose still more
members-and with them political clout-as restruc-
turing and the contraction of old, declining industries
continue. At the same time, new service and high-
technology industries are likely to remain less fertile
ground for union recruitment, because they contain a
high proportion of women and part-time workers
traditionally hard to organize-and because,
The political clout of the unions is shrinking-a trend
we believe the unions will find hard to reverse-
because falling membership is reducing the electoral
base they can claim to represent. At the same time,
although the unions almost certainly will maintain
their symbiotic ties to parties of the left, those ties are
visibly fraying. In West Germany and the United
Kingdom, substantial numbers of workers voted for
parties of the right in the general elections of 1983. In
France and Italy, the unions have been made painful-
ly aware how limited their influence is even over left-
led governments. The unfavorable prospects for their
affiliated parties in the next several years, moreover,
argue for continued decline in the unions' ability to
win favors from governments. Consequently, we be-
lieve that it will be difficult for the unions to recover
the political ground they are currently losing, espe-
cially given their narrowing base of support.
Nevertheless, the potential for increased militancy
exists, particularly in France and Italy. In Italy, all
three confederations may undertake selective strikes
in the autumn of 1985 and in 1986, in connection with
the triennial contract negotiations in major industries.
Moreover, some unions traditionally less amenable to
central control, such as the metalworkers, may re-
sume militant actions on the local level, regardless of
confederation wishes. In addition, we believe that the
impetus for more militant actions among Italian
workers will grow, particularly in the industrial sec-
tor. The government's dim prospects for encouraging
or creating service-sector jobs to offset industrial
losses may prompt unrest in hard-hit industries. Labor
leaders may be compelled to engage in militant
behavior in order to reassert some of the strength that
unions have lost with declining membership. Equally,
government austerity plans and efforts to restructure
industry may lead to disruptive action by threatened
workers, comparable to last summer's strikes of CGIL
longshoremen in Venice and Trieste-backed by the
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PCI out of fear of losing a valued political base-to
protest efforts to break their expensive and inefficient
stevedoring monopoly. Finally, a change in PCI tac-
tics or a government headed by a non-Socialist might
prompt a more militant CGIL stance and remove a
constraint on UIL freedom of action. In France, if the
government's economic policies do not visibly ease
labor's economic burdens and relieve its fear of large-
scale layoffs in declining industries, we believe the
militancy of all three major union federations is likely
to increase.
Even in the United Kingdom and West Germany,
increased militancy cannot be ruled out. The miners'
strike demonstrates that left-led militancy in Britain
is far from over. Similar-though rather more limit-
ed-actions may occur over the longer term as other
unions-like the dockers or the printers in the Nation-
al Graphical Association-find themselves so
squeezed by layoffs and falling membership that they
have less to lose by challenging management and
braving the antiunion laws. The brief dock strikes, the
recently averted rail strike, and the narrow avoidance
of selective strikes last fall by white-collar local
government workers similarly show that job security
and wage claims may spark worker unrest. In the
public sector especially, which contains both declining
industries with hard-pressed unions and public serv-
ices with militant white-collar unions, we believe
further outbursts may be expected.
In West Germany, the scope for militancy will broad-
en after 1985. The metalworkers already have served
notice that they intend to push for a further reduction
in the workweek when their current wage contract
and the master agreement with employers expire in
1986. Employers privately fear a political spillover
onto the 1986 negotiations because they will take
place just as the union is choosing a new president-
probably the present deputy leader, the militant Franz
Steinkuehler-and only a few months before the 1987
national elections. Moreover, labor relations are'likely
to be clouded in the future because of the friction
between the unions and the other social partners that
has accumulated in recent years.
Politically, the DGB leadership is likely to remain
moderate during the next three or four years given the
results of union leadership elections held during the
last three years. Nevertheless, the potential for in-
creased leftist influence remains, especially among the
younger generation, and union leaders in any case will
continue to try to mollify leftists in order to maintain
labor unity.
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