STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Publication Date: June 18, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Doic
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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE WASHINGTON. D.C. 20319 / l
TO:
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
a)q- r/t 5y-.7- G3 2
SUBJECT: "Strategic Counterintelligepce and National Security"
Forwarded herewith is a copy of a research paper prepared by a
student at The National War College, Class of 1984. The subject
falls within the purview of your agency and is provided solely for
your information. The ideas and conclusions in the paper are
strictly those of the author. If you would like additional
information on the research program, or would like to suggest a
research topic that deals with an aspect of national security,
please contact Colonel Benjamin C. Buckley, USA, Autovon 223-8404 or
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R`TY N/. STAPF0
iol el, USAF
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REG
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STAT
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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
STRATEGIC STUDY
STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
by
R. B. WADE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT
Research Supervisor: Mr. John F. Gilhooly
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
March 1984
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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF.
TO: Mr. John N. McMahon
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
SUBJECT: "Strategic Counterintelligehce and National Security"
Forwarded herewith is a copy of a research paper prepared by a
student at The National War College, Class of 1984. The subject
falls within the purview of your agency and is provided solely for
your information. The ideas and conclusions in the paper are
strictly those of the author. If you would like additional
information on the research program, or would like to suggest a
research topic that deals with an aspect of national security,
please contact Colonel Benjamin C. Buckley, USA, Autovon 223-8404 or
Commercial [phone].
ST
nel, USAF
n of Faculty
T-112,.
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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
STRATEGIC STUDY
STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
by
R. B. WADE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT
Research Supervisor: Mr. John F. Gilhooly
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
Page
DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER
ABSTRACT
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
i
ii
iv
1
I.
THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
2
II.
STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
11
III.
CONCLUSIONS
27
IV.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
30
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DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER
This research report represents the views of the author and
does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the National
War College, the National Defense University, the Department of
Defense or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This document is the property of the United States Government
and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission
of the Commandant, The National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, D. C. 20319.
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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT
TITLE: Strategic Counterintelligence and National Security
AUTHOR: R. B. Wade, Federal Bureau of Investigation
DATE: March, 1984
The Counterintelligence Community is seen to be too
operationally oriented and fragmented to be fully effective. A
critique of current recommendations to correct these problems
concentrating on the multidisciplinary approach. The suggestion of
a matrix management system as an alternative means to enhance the
Community's effectiveness by improving interagency coordination and
providing better strategic intelligence. In the absence of
organizational reform, the paper recommends that a commission be
formed to analyze the current situation and institute changes to
improve the quality of strategic counterintelligence.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Robert B. Wade (B.A. Histor
University; M.A. Political Science, University eWashingtonington
Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation is~a
counterintelligence specialist. He is a graduate of The National
War College, Class of 1984.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Counterintelligence can be defined several ways, depending on
the perspective. No matter the definition, Positive intelligence,
which can be of strategic use to policy makers, can always be
generated. However, this type of intelligence has not been
furnished to top policy makers by the Counterintelligence
Community. The re.asvns for this are threefold. First, the
Community is organizationally and mission fragmented. Second,
Counterintelligence is not the major mission of any specific ,
organization and consequently, it has not received the resources
attention it deserves. Third, counterintelligence has been t or
operationally oriented. 00
To correct this situation, it has been recommended that the
Community be centrally reorganized and a multidiciplinar
y
counterintelligence approach initiated. This paper contends that
such reorganization is not practicable and would make
impact. little
A matrix management system, however, controlled through the
National security Council, would enhance the Community's
effectiveness by improving interagency coordination while better strategic intelligence. providing
In the absence of organizational reform, the paper recommends
that a blue-ribbon commission be formed to analyze the current
situation and institute a dialogue to improve the quality of
strategic counterintelligence.
The paper concludes, that
counterintelligence elements must balance their short-term
operational focus with strategic vision. In turn, it is incumbent
on policy makers to demand this from the Counterintelligence
Community.
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INTRODUCTION
There exists a vast amount of counterintelligence
literature. These accounts, however, normally emphasize specific,
colorful "spy" stories and ignore other, more significant,
contributions which counterintelligence can make to national
security. In order to better understand counterintelligence and the
sophisticated contributions it can make, this paper examines the
Counterintelligence Community and makes recommendations to enhance
its vital role in the national security process. The conclusions
arrived at, I hope, will provide a better understanding of the role
counterintelligence can play while raising issues worthy of further
discussion and analysis.
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CHAPTER I
THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
The current source of authorization for United States
intelligence activities, Executive Order 12333, defines
counterintelligence as:
"... information gathered and activities conducted to
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of
foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international
terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical,
document or communications.security programs."1
At its most basic level, counterintelligence is the
identification and neutralization of the hostile intelligence
threat. However, although it appears to be a simple concept, there
are many subtleties within it which have caused one commentator to
call it the "least understood" and "most mysterious" component of
intelligence2. This complexity is apparent in the numerous
definitions provided by various authors.
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Harry Howe Ransom, for example, has defined
counterintelligence as:
...intelligence activity devoted to countering the
effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence operations.
Essentially, it is a police function. More specifically, its
purpose is to protect information against espionage, to guard
one's intelligence operations from infiltration by the
adversary and to secure installations or material against
sabotage. Counterintelligence is, in a sense, a negative,
defensive function."3
On the other hand, others have seen a broader, more
aggressive role for counterintelligence. Newton S. Miler, a former
member of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, has stated that
"counterintelligence involves investigation and surveillance
activities to detect and neutralize the foreign intelligence
services and the initiation of operations to penetrate, disrupt,
deceive and manipulate these services ...to our benefit., "4
Most commentators view counterintelligence from one side or
the other of this offensive-defensive split. The majority of
professionals in the Counterintelligence Community, however, define
counterintelligence as offensive, (counter) human intelligence.
Their task, as they see it, is to target and neutralize the hostile
intelligence activity of foreign intelligence officers and their
agents.5 The greatest success, from this perspective, is the
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recruitment of a hostile intelligence officer while he remains in
place.' The value of information gained in such an operation, it is
believed, is greater than that received through any other method.
However, there is a third perspective which generally
receives less attention particularly by counterintelligence
professionals. This'is the fact that counterintelligence operations
can produce positive intelligence. Generally, since most
counterintelligence organizations are offensively (case) oriented,
the intelligence emphasized, such as a hostile services modus
operandi, has immediate operational-value. Although, at the same
time, intelligence pertaining to the hostile government's
capabilities, intentions, or gaps in information, is also
received.6 A hostile intelligence officer, for example, might
show interest in developing information about certain grain
diseases. Since this information is not operationally important
(e.g. personality assessment of the officer), its strategic value, a
possible low grain harvest in the foreign country because of
disease, may be missed. Consequently, it might not be provided top
policy makers for assistance in their deliberations.*
*Strategic intelligence is defined as foreign, positive intelligence
pertinent to national security.? Positive intelligence being "all
the things you should know in advance of initiating a course of
action.8
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Increased interest in one area might also signal the
imminence of military action. The British double agent, Dusko
Popov, for example, purportedly brought the FBI a questionaire for
Pearl Harbor, given him by the Germans, prior to the Japanese
attack. No action was apprently taken on this information since the
FBI apparently believed it to be German deception.9 The point is
that operational considerations, if Popov's account is correct,
overrode the strategic possibilities of furnishing this information
to policy makers for early-warning or possible use in our own
deception operation.
Further, faced with an increasing hostile presence,
counterintelligence managers must direct their limited resources to
investigations of the activities of h:jstile intelligence officers
where the immediate threat is and where tangible payoffs are
necessary. Although each component of the Community produces
individual reports and studies, they reflect their organization
orientation and center on "case" studies or "after-action" reports.
Consequently, there is little emphasis on the production of
strategic intelligence.
The Community as a whole could also produce strategic reports
of great value to policy makers. Studies could be made of the
potential threat posed by emerging nations, rising immigration or
even new technology. However, under the current system, these types
of problems are seen piecemeal, if at all.
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Top policy makers, in turn, do not demand this type of
information. Although it is only speculation, this attitude may
result from identifying the FBI's counterintelligence role with that
of law enforcement. The result is a passive, negative view of
counterintelligence and a lack of understanding about the type of
positive information counterintelligence can provide.10 These
differing views result in a situation where there is no impetus,
from within or without the Community, to change the current system.
The situation is complicated by the fact that the
Counterintelligence Community is composed of a number of executive
departments and agencies. Of these, the FBI, CIA and each of the
military services have operational counterintelligence
responsibilities. Each of these, as well as the nonoperational
elements, have differing missions and, therefore, different
perspectives of counterintelligence. Each organization, therefore,
has only a fragmented view which limits its operational and
strategic effectiveness.
The FBI, for example, has primary counterintelligence
responsibility within the United States. Its investigations are
geared to detecting and countering the human intelligence threat
posed by hostile intelligence services. CIA has a corresponding
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responsibility abroad albeit with emphasis on protecting its
collection efforts from the activities of the hostile service.
Concurrently, each of the military services conducts similar
activities, domestically and overseas, to protect our military
interests.
This structural fragmentation is an outgrowth of our domestic
political culture and its distrust of government power which might
inject its influence into the private lives of citizens.
Counterintelligence has overtones of "secret police" and the
Community reflects this desire fora division of power. Watergate
just confirmed this natural suspicion and allowed further erosion of
the investigative powers of the Community.
Functionally, this pluralism can and does lead to overlaps in
jurisdiction, bureaucratic "turf" battles and failures to pass
pertinent information throughout the Community. Although there are
established and generally effective procedures to facillitate
interagency cooperation, they tend to be informal and to lack clear
lines of authority and responsibility. The basic fact remains,
however, that each agency maintains a separate data base under its
control.
There is then no formal or systematic means to provide policy
makers with a Community-wide strategic intelligence product. The
Community is aware of the need to enhance its capability in this
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area and has, through the years, created various committees in an
attempt to coordinate the nation's counterintelligence effort.
Most
recently, for example, a Counterintelligence Staff was established.
Representatives from throughout the community are as signed to o the
Staff which provides staff assistance to the Director of Central
Intelligence. The staff also develops 1
Policy for the Community and
coordinates nonoperational matters throughout the group. It also
provides staff support to the National security Council
particularly
an annual threat analysis. However, although the Staff levies
individual requirements on elements of the Community, it has no
authority. Consequently, it does not overcome the Community's
pluralism (it only coordinates nonoperational matters) or
significantly raise the quality and quanity of strategic
intelligence.
Given the Political culture's tendency to distrust
intelligence organizations, it is interesting to note that
counterintelligence is not the primary mission for any of the
Community agencies. The FBI, as I have immiied, is first a law
enforcement organization while CIA is primarily concerned with the
collection and he
production of positive intelligence. Consequently,
in these and other Community organizations, counterintelligence
somewhat of an abused stepchild which does not is
get the attention,
resources and nurture it deserves. This reinforces the focus on
operational matters noted above.
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lil one final analysis, counterintelligence and
intelligence are different sides of the same c
Counterintelligence coin. Positive
is not just a reactive, law enforcement
function. It can
produce strategic intelligence.
Community, as it is Further, the
organized today, in a loose confederation of
independent, case oriented agencies, does not
role in national security play the strategic
that it is capable of. How to improve
this situation will be discussed in the next c
? hapter.
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NOTES
CHAPTER I (Pages 2-9)
1. "Executive order 12333," Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, December 7, 1981, p. 1347.
2. Roy Godson, "Counterintelligence: An Introduction," National
Strategy Information Center, Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence
Requirements for the 1980's? Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.,
1980), p 1.
3. Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge,
M4ass: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 14.
4. Newton S. Miler, "Counterintelligence" National Strategy
Information Center, Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for
the 1980's: The Elements of Intelligence, (Washington, D.C.
p. 49. , 1980),
5. Arthur A. Zuehlke, Jr., "What is Counterintelligence," in Godson,
ed., Intelligence Requirements for. the 1980's: Counterintelli ence,
p. 26.
6. Ransom, p. 14.
7. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 3.
8. Ibid, p. 210.
9. Dusko Popov, Spy/Counter-S y (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 1975), p. 132.
10. Zuehlke, p. 36.
11. Thomas Emerson, "Control of Government Intelligence Agencies,"
(The Political Quarterly, July-September, 1982), pps. 273-277. "
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CHAPTER II
STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The Counterintelligence Community, in structure and function,
is fragmented. These circumstances have led some knowledgeable
commentators to advocate reorganization and centralization of the
Community in an effort to provide better direction. The concern is
that there is nobody in charge of the national counterintelligence
effort and these recommendations are designed to give someone the
appropriate authority and responsibility. Typical recommendations
are:
The creation of a Director of National Intelligence who would
be separate from the Intelligence Community's operational elements
and have no institutional ties to the Community. One of his
responsibilities would be to provide guidance and tasking to all
Government counterintelligence elements.'
The establishment of a new, independent intelligence service
which would conduct both counterintelligence and positive
intelligence operations.2
Designation of a National Intelligence Officer for
Counterintelligence who would report to the National Security
Council.3
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Interwoven with these arguments for reorganization is concern that the U.S. does not have the capability a
foreign intelligence threat in its entirety. In response, some
critics have proposed a new concept which has become
multidisciplinary counterintelligence (MDCI) or known as
counterintelligence. all source
Proponents of this position, like Kenneth E.
DeGraffenreid, formerly a staff member of the Senate Select
Committee on Int.elli ence elect
g (SSCI?), argue that the intelligence threat
today is not just espionage (HUMINT) but technical systems, signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and photointelligence (PHOTINT
Their position is that these systems cross the )~ as well.
Community's
jurisdictional lines and, in light of of the Communi
fragmentation ty's
limit our ability to identify and counter them. Th
Community also does not e
possess the technical knowledge to fully
assess the threat thereby weakening our security further. are faced with a multidisciplinary threat, we Since we
kind.4 need to respond in
Supporters of MDCI believe that the means to rectif
situation is b y this
y forming an autonomous organization which would have
access to all intelligence source reporting, human and technical.
This agency would be totally separate from the Community's
operational components and would only conduct total threat
(strategic) analysis. Implicit in this system would
be a
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centralized file system incorporating all Government
counterintelligence files. The organization would analyze the
information received and provide the product, a national foreign
intelligence threat assessment paper, to Policy makers for action.
In addition, some commentators assume that the organization, in
performing its analytical functions, will need the authority to
provide guidance and tasking to all counterintelligence elements on
how to investigate certain cases-and what information to collect.5
This system, it is argued, would give the U.S. a better
picture of the foreign threat while providing a greater flexibilit
of response. A human source in-place, for example, might y
give
information contradicted by a technical source. Knowing this,
policy makers could direct that action be taken to verify the
correct source. If a hostile deception effort was uncovered,
direction could be given that a countermeasure be instituted to
negate the deception. Under the current system, commentators argue,
there is little likelihood that such deception would be found out.
A staff member of the SSCI sees MDCI as playing a broad
devils advocate role. In his view, all positive intelligence should
be looked at from the MDCI perspective. As a defensive measure,
MDCI should look at each aspect of our operations from the hostile
side. We might know, for example, that the hostile government might
have the ability to penetrate our communications.
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The MCDI organization would then task one of the counterintelligence
operational groups to test the theory and see if the communications
were being penetrated. Offensively, according to this individual,
MDCI would critique our own collection efforts to determine if we
are the target of an organized deception effort.6
DeGraffenreid' believes in an even broader MDCI program. He
would incorporate into MDCI, personnel, document, installation and
communications security which are not even defined in the current
Executive Order as counterintelligence. He not only believes MDCI
would defeat the foreign intelligence and deception threats, it
would also neutralize foreign attempts to obtain U.S. technology and
effect the American economy. Finally, he argues that an MDCI
organization could also assist other elements in the Intelligence
Community in responding to terrorism, anti-American propaganda and
other types of operations directed against our security.7
These arguments, I think, reflect a number of influences on
the Intelligence Community which have occurred during the past
decade. First, there is an increased awareness that the Soviet
Union is obtaining important technology, legally and illegally.
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Christopher Boyce, for example, voluntarily provided the Soviets
information on covert satellites used by the CIA which he obtained
from his employment at TRW. William Kampiles was another volunteer
who also provided the Soviets with information about another
classified surveillance satellite. These cases led to concern that
the Soviets would use the information learned from these systems to
deceive other U.S. technical collection systems.
Additionally, the post-Watergate Congressional Hearings on
the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities badly bruised those who
favored human intelligence activities. The Intelligence Community
still chafes under the legal and policy restrictions which
resulted. Emphasis was given to technical collection methods and
the human intelligence side was downgraded. This orientation
inevitably affected counterintelligence activities and a broader
scope for the discipline was envisaged.*
* For an example, see William R. Harris, 'Counterintelligence
Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by National Technical
Means* in National Strategy Information Center, Roy Godson, ed.,
Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's? Counterintelligence
(67ash ngton, D. C., 1980) .
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Further, the Congressional Hearings brought the intelligence
system into the public spotlight. Academics, as well as others,
then began to make a study of the intelligence process. MDCI expands
this beach head since it would also bring more people into the
counterintelligence process particularly non-professionals.
Finally, there is deep concern over unauthorized "leaks" of
classified information. By centralizing the intelligence process,
the reasoning is that these could be stoppered or the breach in
security found easily.
Much of the support for the multidisciplinary approach
originates in Congress especially in the SSCI. Most recently, the
SSCI attempted to gain support for a separate
group of analysts,
from throughout the Intelligence. Community, to perform MDCI. The
proposal met with strong objections from all members of the
Community and was deferred. Separate committees, composed of
leading members of the counterintelligence community, were
established, under the authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence, to look into the issue. To date, no further action
has occurred. However, one professional staff member of the SSCI
has stated that, whether the Intelligence Community likes it or
not," interdisciplinary counterintelligence is here to stay."
8
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Discussions over MDCI have served to highlight the iss
raised in the beginning of this report notably the need fo ues
strategic intelligence r
production and better coordination amon
elements. Even more importantl g its
y, perhaps, is the debate initiated
about the type of counterintelligence system needed to
challenge of the future. However, I would argue that meet the
the MDCI and centralization conce is inherent in
P , there are serious faults which
negate their possible implementation.
Foremost is the fact that MDCI, with its emphasis on
technical intelligence and concern about deception, is not
counterintelligence. t
Counterintelligence is concerned with
neutralizing human intelligence efforts. It is not oriented
equipped to deal with technical or
questions or to interpret the
technical product and vice versa.
Additionally, MDCI focuses on
protecting information which is a security function and not
the definition of counterintelligence in Executive Order part 12333 n
short, combining two different orientations approaches . In
techniques, would be like mixing water and oil. and
It would, I
believe, have an extremely adverse affect on our ability the foreign intelligence threat. y to deal
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Whenever there appears to be a lack of direction in an
organization, the initial impulse is to consolidate its functions
and create a distinct chain of command with a definite focus of
authority and responsibility. In considering such centralization
for the Counterintelligence Community, however, a number of problems
exist.
First, i do not believe our domestic political culture, with
its distrust of Government power, would allow a centralized
intelligence system. Democracy depends on public policy being
developed through a checks and balances g
process. Its foundation is
the separation of powers. A unified intelligence system would
violate all of these precepts.
Second, the creation of another bureaucracy, with its own
institutional goals, on top of the first, would further complicate
the original problems. It would be another competitor for scarce
resources and "turf." Who would control the new organization?
Practically, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the
individual agencies to give up or allow limitations, whether
perceived or not, on their power and influence. The situation would
violate every principle of organizational behavior.
Reorganization,
without having "everyone on board," would not only lead to "turf"
battles but would seriously limit the efficiency and effectiveness
of the new organization.
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Third, how would information be shared? The centralization
of files and data would violate the basic principles of security
such as compartmentation and "need to know." Some individuals would
presumably have knowledge of all the secrets of U.S. intelligence.
Who would want to pay the price for leaks from this organization or
for hostile possession of the information? The FBI,.for example,
takes great pride in protecting its sources and believes this is the
fundamental reason' people cooperate with it. It is extremely
doubtful that it would abandon this responsibility to a centralized
system.
Fourth, how would investigations and the dissemination of
information be handled to accord with the Freedom of Information and
Privacy Acts, which strictly limit what can be done?
Fifth, would an analytic product, free of competition,
provide better information to policy makers? Many.would argue that
it would not.
In discussing reorganization we must also determine if it
will make any real impact in the output of the Counterintelligence
Community. Richard Betts, in a study of intelligence failures,
addresses this issue. Betts argues that reorganizations of the
intelligence system make little difference unless they are in
response to the specific needs of decision makers.8
Reorganization can never compensate for the decision makers
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predispositions or for the ambiguity within the decision making
process. Betts further states that reorganization to address one
wrong will only create a new glitch in the system. Accordingly,
Betts concludes that any changes in the system should be specific
and minor. Besides, he notes, the intelligence system overall has
done well in the past and may not need any more modification.9
Clearly, the fragmentation and analytic capability of the
Counterintelligence Community need to be improved. Although most
professionals in the Community believe the current system of
interagency cooperation works well enough, one is left with the
belief that the U.S. Government would be better served if this
informal system of cooperation was formalized. The current
Executive Order recognizes this problem when it exhorts the
Community to "...seek to ensure full and free exchange of
information in order to derive maximum effort from the United States
intelligence effort."10
Betts' assertion that limited, modest structural adjustments
are better than full scale reorganization make sense to me. Given
the validity of these comments, what can be done to improve the
structure and analytic capability of the Counterintelligence
Community?
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First, someone needs to be in charge. Someone needs to
provide oversight of Community activities with the necessary
authority and responsibility to influence the production of
strategic intelligence.
Sherman Kent, in his classic work Strategic Intelligence For
American World Policy, argued for a highly centralized (positive)
intelligence system. His ideas eventually became the organizational
nucleus of the CIA. Although the prime mission of the
Counterintelligence Community must remain the neutralization of the
human foreign intelligence threat, some of his ideas have direct
bearing on the concerns I have expressed.
Kent believed that a centralized intelligence system should
perform a coordinating function. It should establish clear .
jurisdictional boundaries for the Community and ensure that these
were maintained. The organization should also see that the
Community's individual reporting was of high standard and manage all
interagency projects. This organization would also channel
resources to agencies that were in need. Kent stressed in his plan
that the organization should not participate in operations and
become embroiled in bureaucratic wars. Finally, it should be kept
inordinately small so that it did not bureaucratically
proliferate.11
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These functions, although somewhat too broad, are similar to
those that I believe need to be implemented to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of counterintelligence in the national
security process. There are a number of ways, aside from MDCI, in
which this can be done. One way would be to give the necessary
authority to one of the existing agencies in the Community. The most
logical choice, of course, would be the FBI which is the coordinator
for counterintelligence within the U.S. However, this would open
the door to charges of partiality as well as to organizational
politics. For these reasons, it would not be practical or desirable.
Another possibility would be to increase the authority of an
already established group such as the Counterintelligence Staff.
However, since it currently involves people detailed from their
agencies, institutional ties would be strong and politics would
probably play a continuing role. These factors would severely limit
the desirability of such a move.
A third alternative, which deserves some serious
consideration, would be the modified use of a system business has
termed "matrix management" This concept grew out of "high-tech"
industries, such as aircraft manufacturers, where several research
and development efforts were proceeding simultaneously. it was very
difficult to coordinate all these efforts in a formally structured
environment so the matrix model was created. This involves the
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creation of ad hoc groups, each led by a team leader, who manages a
specific project. The team leader reports to a project manager, who
coordinates that particular area of research, and to a functional
manager, who is responsible for the total effort. The team, for
example, might be concerned with wing stress. The leader would
report to the manager responsible for wing design and to the manager
responsible for the entire plane. The system theoretically,
therefore, balances the needs of specialization with the needs of
coordination. 12
Transfer of a method like this to the counterintelligence
system might allow specialized questions to be answered or monitored
via task forces or ad hoc committees while maintaining the integrity
of the individual agencies. In fact, the Counterintelligence
Staff's threat assessment is somewhat similar although not so
formalized. The establishment of this system, coupled with a small
coordinating group like that envisaged by Kent, would provide the
needed unification of policy while allowing the agencies of the
Community to continue their basic missions as they have in the past.
Structurally, the one major change in the current system that
would be necessary is the creation of a "counterintelligence
coordinator" with the authority and responsibility to perform the
functions outlined by Kent. Preferably, this person should be a
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civilian or possess no institutional ties to a Specific agency. He
assistance from a small staff of specialists, wh
might come from within the Communit o
return to avoid bureaucratic y but would not be allowed to
pressures or organizational bias.
Finally, the group should be
responsible to the National Security
Council to further prevent bias. This latter suggestion
the Counterintelligence Staff to be the might allow
foundation of the new
organization since the basic framework is already in Place.
The success of this organization, which I will
"National Counterintelligence Center," will ul term the
strategic leadership and thinking within the Community and on the
part of top policy make,...
Indeed, this ;,~
true for the current
"dclonal counterintelligence effort.
must make a greater effort to explain
they do, what resources they need and
the decision making process.
Counterintelligence managers
to Policy makers what it
what they can contribute
They must deter.~_ _
d
--- e
from the Community and do their
t
urn,
Policy
makers
process. They must
strategic
resources
what policy
best to provide it
, In
must bring counterintelligence into the
policy
require that the Community prod
intelligence and be willing uce quality to do to provide the necessary
so.
The Reagan administration has, from its ince tio
interest in u p n, expressed
pgrading counterintelligence. To date, significant
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changes have not occurred primarily because of bureaucratic
politics. In order to get the reform process moving again, i would
recommend that a Presidential "blue-ribbon" Commission be
established which would study the counterintelligence system and the
arguments for and against reorganization. The counterintelligence
system has changed little since World War II and it is time for
rethinking its purpose. The Commission would also kindle the needed
dialogue between the Counterintelligence Community and national
security policy makers. These actions can only benefit the
Community, policy makers and, most importantly, the nation.
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NOTES II
CHAPTER II (Pages 11-25)
1. Roy Godson, 'Intelligence Reform in the United States: The
Proposed Charter,' World Affairs, Summer, 1980, pp. 15-16.
2. Donovan Pratt, "Counterintelligence Organization and Operational
Security in the 1980's," Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for
the 1980's: Counterintelligence, p. 228.
3. Interview with a professional staff member of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (non-attribution).
4. Kenneth E. DeGraffenreid, "Building for a New Counterintelligence
Capabilty: Recruitment and Training," Godson, ed., Intelligence
Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence, pp. 263-276.
5. Roy Godson, "Intelligence Reform in the United States: The
Proposed Charter," World Affairs, Summer, 1980, p. 17.
6. Interview with a professional staff member of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (non-attribution).
7. DeGraffenreid, p. 263.
8. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence
Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, No. 1 (October, 1978)
p. 72.
9. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
10. "Executive order 12333," Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, p. 1337.
11. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949, pps. 91-94.
12. For a complete discussion of this topic see David R. Hampton, et
al., organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management
(Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982) pp. 507-509.
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CHAPTER III
CONCLUSIONS
The United States Intelligence Community is composed of
several departments and agencies. Each of these organizations has
some counterintelligence responsibility. Each, according to their
missions, sees this responsibility differently and defines their
objectives and goals accordingly. It is these different, albeit
complimentary, views which have led to the current situation where
the counterintelligence target is not getting the recognition, focus
and resources it deserves and is not fully performing to the best of
its ability.
The reasons for this are threefold. First, the Community is
organizationally and mission fragmented. There is not a strong,
central authority to speak for counterintelligence like the Director
of CIA speaks for intelligence collection requirements. No one has
specific authority or responsibility for counterintelligence and,
consequently, it does not receive the attention it deserves in the
security and decision making contexts. Second, counterintelligence,
in each organization, is always a secondary if not tertiary
mission. As a result, it must compete for a voice internally as
well as externally. Third, counterintelligence, as a discipline,
has been too operationally oriented. Resources have been directed
to this area at the expense of analysis. As a result,
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counterintelligence has developed a narrow, short-range, immediate,
and introspective view of itself.
As a result, the Counterintelligence Community has not
provided policy makers with the strategic information it should.
Counterintelligence though must learn to see itself as part of the
"Intelligence Community" and, as such, be able to provide policy
makers with positive information equivalent to that provided by
United States collection efforts. In turn, policy makers must be
educated about the types of strategic information the Community can
provide, and then must demand that type of information from it.
The answer, I believe, lies in minor reorganization of the
Community. It can not remain the informal confederation it is
today. It must speak with one voice so that a coherent, consistent,
and strategic counterintelligence program can be formulated and put
into practice. Given the political realities, the establishment of
a counterintelligence coordinator and staff in the National Security
Council appears to be the most logical answer.
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To avoid bias and bureaucratic politics, this individual
should be a civilian with the authority and responsibility to
implement a national counterintelligence program. A matrix
management system might be the means to bring strategic
counterintelligence to the attention of policy makers while
conveying their concerns to the Counterintelligence Community.
In order to initiate the reform process and foster dialogue
between policy makers and the Community, it is recommended that a
Presidential Commission be created to study the counterintelligence
system and arguments for reorganization.
In todays complex environment, with its concern over Soviet
expansionism, state sponsored terrorism, technology transfer and
other threats, decision makers need the best intelligence they can
have. Counterintelligence represents a seldom tapped reservoir. It
can and should play a large role in national security policy
formulation and execution.
In short, the Counterintelligence Community needs strategic
leadership. This is not to downgrade the operations function of
counterintelligence. It is an effort to provide a balance to the
Community which will best serve the nation's security.
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CHAPTER IV
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Blackstock, Paul W., and Shaf, Frank L., Jr. Intelligence,
Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Operations: A Guide to
Information Sources. Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1978.
Cline, Ray S. Secrets, Spies and Scholars. Washington, D.C.:
Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1976.
Eliff, John T., The-Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Felix, Christopher. A Short Course in the Secret War. New York: E.
P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1963.
Godson, Roy, ed. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's:
Counterintelligence. National Strategy Information Center:
Washington, D.C., New Brunswick (USA) and London (U.K.): Transaction
Books, 1980.
Godson, Roy, ed. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: The
Elements of Intelligence. National Strategy Information Center:
Washington, D. C., New Brunswick (USA) and London (U.K.):
Transaction Books, 1980.
Hampton, David R. Organizational Behavior and the Practice of
Management. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982.
Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.
Popov, Dusko. Spy/Counter-Spy. Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 1975.
Ransom, Harry Howe. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.
Whitehead, Don. The FBI Story. New York: Random House, 1956.
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Articles
Beichman, Arnold. Can Counterintelligence Come In From the Cold?'
Policy Review, Winter, 1981.
Betts, Richard. "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence
Failures are Inevitable." World Politics, October, 1978.
Emerson, Thomas. 'Control of Government Intelligence Agencies."
The Political Quarterly, July-September, 1982.
Godson, Roy. "Intelligence Reform in the United States: The
Proposed Charter." World Affairs, Summer, 1980.
Latimer, Thomas. "U.S. Intelligence and the Congress.' Strategic
Review, Summer, 1979.
Rees, David. "The Crisis in United States Intelligence.' Conflict
Studies, December, 1979.
U.S. Government Documents - Periodicals
"Executive order 12036.' Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, January 30, 1978. pp. 194-214.
"Executive Order 12333." Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, December 7, 1981. pp. 1336-1348.
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