SPEECH FOR THE AIR WAR COLLEGE CLASS OF 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 25, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1 , , i / i j.
11 -
UNCLASSIFIED when blank - TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document - Automatically downgraded or
declassified when filled in form is detached from the controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT (COLLATERAL)
CIA T.S. C ONTROL NUMBER
TS-83-0715
CIA COPY NUMBER
#3
DOCUMENT DATE
25AUG83
DATE RECEIVED
25AUG83
NO. PAGES
24
NO. OF ATTACHMENTS (CIA T.S. # of Attachment)
BRANCH, BADGE #, OR LOCATION
DCI/0LL
LOGGED BY
TAK
SUBJECT:
Speech for the Air War College, Class of 1984
CIA SOURCE INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR
EXTERNAL SOURCE INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR
DIRECTORATE
OFFICE/BRANCH
AGENCY
CONTROL NUMBER
COPY NO.
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or
classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted
outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the
matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of
custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and forwarded to the Agency Top
Secret Control Office.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (Outside CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
DIRECTORATE & AREA OFFICE
DIRECTORATE & AREA OFFICE
DIRECTORATE & AREA OFFICE
DATE
DATE
DATE
T
O
P
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
2 5 AUG 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director, Public Affairs Office
SUBJECT Speech for the Air War College, Class of 1984
1. Attached are backgrounds to topics you may wish to
address at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, when
you speak to the Class of 1984 on "Intelligence and the Policy
Process" at 10:00 a.m. in the auditorium on Monday, 12
September. General Hod es, commandant of the College, and CIA
representative will meet your plane.
2. Approximately 250 students and faculty members with
the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel will be in the
audience. It will be a closed session and all attendees will
have Top Secret clearances. Foreign officers attending the
3. You have been asked to speak for 45 minutes, then a
break, followed by 45 minutes of Questions and Answers.
General Hodges will introduce you. A throat-mike will be
available, and he will hook it around your neck before
returning to his seat in the audience. The mike has an
adequate amount of cord so that you are free to move around the
platform. Unless you prefer a monitor, the question and answer
period will be handled by you. Your speech will be taped for
our records.
4. An informal luncheon hosted by General Hodges will
follow your address. Approximately 16 people will be at your
table including the General, some
students and faculty members. A business suit is the dress of
the day.
5. In,Annex II for further information are:
Biography of General Hodges
Scope Sheet
History of the Air War College
Resident Program
25X1
2bA11
Unclassified when
separated from
attachments
TS-83-0715
Copy#3of6
Tnp q.rPrm
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRET,
Background Topics For DDCI
REMARKS TO THE AIR WAR COLLEGE
12 September 1983
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRET
I. Local Anecdotes for Introduction
II. Intelligence and the Policy Process
III.
IV. Soviet Active Measures
V. The Soviet and Cuban Threat to Central America
IV. Terrorism
ANNEX I. Technical Developments in Intelligence
II. Additional Materials on the Air War College
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
There are two rather amusing topics at Maxwell Air Force
Base. One is the local newspaper called The Montgomery
Advertiser:
*One of the more startling facts I discovered as the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is that about 50% of
the key judgments and conclusions reached in our finished
intelligence publications are based on open source material,
especially the press. I therefore have become more aware of
the content of the media, both local and national. I
understand that Montgomery, Alabama, has a newspaper called The
Advertiser. After looking it over, I am inclined to ask my
friends at the US Information Agency to put you all on their
subscription list because you probably come close to qualifying
as a denied area without benefit of an iron curtain.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
A second is that trustees from the local penitentiary
?I also learned that there is a federal prison located
on Maxwell Air Force Base. This surely guarantees that you are
never short of qualified faculty or knowledgeable guest
speakers. I am certain that former Attorney General John
Mitchell, while he was in residence, could have given a fine
talk on the perils of being a Washington decisionmaker.
(These suggestions were provided by
Finally, students always like to poke fun at their
*I'm honored to be at the Air War College, founded by
the great aviation pioneer General Orval Anderson back in
1946. He talked the Air Force out of naming it the Joint Air
Command and Staff School. He didn't like the acronym:
J-A-C-A-S-S .
3
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRETI
II. Intelligence and the Policy Process
?Lesson of Pearl Harbor learned. President needs total,
evaluated, coordinated national intelligence. He's getting
it--and using it.
?State, Defense, CIA big three of intelligence
community. All use same data base, but compete in analysis.
Differing views encouraged. No one has monopoly on wisdom.[
*In earlier period, quantity of information
insufficient. No longer a problem. In technical field,
problem is how to process enormous quantity. Focus also on
improving quality of analysis.
?Many problems today require interdisciplinary
approach. Example: understanding Iran requires socio-cultural
approach, as well as political and economic
?Many issues today are transnational: nuclear
proliferation, political instability and insurgency, terrorism,
technology transfer.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1 25X1
SECRETJ
?With growth of technical collection, traditional
relationship of tactical and national intelligence has
changed. Every field commander cannot have own private
satellite. But, a satellite can simultaneously satisfy
requirements of both a commandlike SAC and the policy planners
of the NSC. Current DCI strong supporter of making national
collection systems available to meet tactical needs.
?Relationship with Congress has changed. Congress far
more involved in foreign affairs, including intelligence.
Division of oversight committees along party lines (cf. Central
America) particularly unfortunate. Partisan oversight is no
oversight at all. American people deserve better than that.
Now that it has started, especially in the House, don't know if
can be turned around.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRETI
?In 1979, in Japan, a young Soviet officer named
Stanislav Levchenko came over to our side. He was first Soviet
"active measures" officer to defect to West. He had a lot of
specific information to give us, but also described for us
Soviet strategic concept of "active measures" in all its
fullness.
?Active measures is Soviet term for all operations aimed
at influencing the policies of other nations, as distinguished
from intelligence. Includes what we would call covert action
but much broader. Active measures refers to an orchestration,
at highest level, of all Soviet instrumentalities, overt and
covert, in pursuit of worldwide Soviet objectives.
?Soviet active measures include: diplomacy, propaganda,
agitation, disinformation, forgeries, clandestine radio, press
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRET
placement, and political influence operations. Primary target
is US. Common aim of influence operations is to insinuate
Soviet views, in a non-attributable fashion, in foreign
governmental, journalistic, academic, and artistic circles.
?Strategic objectives are to denigrate US, to isolate it
from friends, influence public opinion against US military
programs and against CIA, and undermine political resolve of
the West to oppose Soviet encroachments.
?Soviet active measures in Western Europe have been well
documented. In summer of 1977, Soviets initiated an intensive
worldwide campaign against US production of neutron bomb.
Campaign in Eastern Europe faithfully mirrored Soviet
effort.
?World Peace Council, a Soviet front, went into action;
staged incidents in Istanbul, Accra, Stuttgart, Frankfort,
10
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRETI
Lima, Tripoli, and Tanzania. There followed media pickup in
Western Europe. First came "hack comment" from fronts and
Cps. Second type of comment, and the far more important, was
that of the non-Communists situated politically in center or on
left. The adverse editorial treatment given neutron bomb by
this non-Communist journalistic sector was Soviets' real
propaganda success.
*The Soviets initiated the neutron bomb campaign; but
more often they exploit something already there. Desire for
peace is strong among all nations. When it becomes a
"movement", the Soviets try to manipulate it, even to finance
it. When movement revolves around a controversial issue,
particularly one with military implications like modernization
of theater nuclear forces in Western Europe, Soviets move in a
massive arsenal of "active measures" to push issue.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRETI
V. The Soviet and Cuban Threat to Central America
*The Soviets do not want war--just fruits of war. To
accomplish their goals, Soviets have designed a low-risk,
low-profile strategy
?This strategy makes maximum use of surrogates to front
for Soviets allowing Kremlin to remain half-hidden in the
shadows. We now see them using surrogates such as Cuba.
Cubans in turn use Nicaragua. Finally, Nicaraguans use
Salvadoran guerrillas. In El Salvador, we face surrogates of
surrogates of surrogates.
?Strategy at work today in our own back yard in Central
America. It is a clever strategy that is particularly
difficult for an open nation like ours to counter. Any direct
response by West can be conveniently condemned as
imperialistic.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRET,
?Strategic stakes high in Central America. Soviet
theorists have not overlooked fact that strategically Caribbean
Sea and Central America form this nation's fourth border.
?Half of all our foreign trade passes through either
Panama Canal or other Caribbean sea lanes. Soviet control of
sea lanes could destroy our capacity to resupply Western Europe
in an emergency.
?Soviet military deliveries to Cuba have increased
dramatically.
?Strengthened military forces have enabled Cuba to
assume more influential role in hemisphere than size or
resources would indicate. Soviet assistance to Cuba now totals
more than 8 million dollars a day. F-I
Approved For Release 2008/08/22: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1 25X1
SECRE'
?Cuba's immediate goals are to consolidate control of
Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. Then, with Nicaraguan
assistance, overthrow governments of El Salvador and
Guatemala. Later would come Honduras and Costa Rica.
?About 8000 Cubans are in Nicaragua today, including
some 2000 military advisers. Soviets have 50 military and 100
economic advisers. Soviet personnel are assisting Sandinistan
security services, and even Nicaraguan general staff. East
Germans, Libyans, Vietnamese, and PLO personnel also active in
Managua.
?Sandinistas have been engaged in huge military
buildup. Somoza's National Guard numbered 9000 before 1979 and
about 15,000 at height of fighting. Sandinistas now have
25,000 regular troops and 50,000 in active reserve and militia
forces. F-I
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1 25X1
SECRETI
?Arms shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvador are
well-orchestrated. Arms come in by air, sea, and land.
?On 15 March 1982, Costa Rican Judicial Police
discovered house in San Jose that had cache of half a million
dollars worth of weapons, explosives, uniforms, and forged
visas. These were to be transported through Costa Rica to El
Salvador by Nicaraguans in vehicles with hidden
compartments.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
SECRETI
?But one example of arms smuggling taking place all the
time. Guerrillas in El Salvador using these arms to go after
economic targets, to try to force government into static
defense posture. Without Nicaraguan aid, insurgents in El
Salvador would have to give up.
?Struggle will continue. Soviets, Cubans, and
Nicaraguans believe US Government and American people are
unable to maintain a consistent policy of opposition.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1 25X1
SECRE~
'In April 1983, a tremendous explosion ripped apart US
Embassy in Beirut; 57 killed, 17 of them Americans. This is
but latest example of how terrorist groups threaten US lives
and property abroad
?Our task is to track and infiltrate, if possible, these
groups. Infiltration is not easy. Groups use strict
compartmentation and other sophisticated security
procedures
?A handful of countries provide arms, money, and
training to terrorist cells: USSR, Libya, Cuba, Syria, East
Germany, Iran, and South Yemen. For some of these countries,
terrorism has become an accepted instrument of state policy.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1 25X1
SECRET)
?US citizens are primary targets of radical groups.
Some 200 Americans killed since 1968. About half were victims
of indiscriminate attacks.
?More and more, terrorists are specifically singling out
Americans for assassination. US diplomats are most frequent
victims; American businessmen are next likeliest target. US
firms have paid an estimated 125 million dollars in ransom over
past 10 years.
?Greatest number of terrorist attacks occur in Lebanon,
France, Spain, and West Germany. Most common type of attack is
bombing. We have recorded nearly 4,500 bombings worldwide
since keeping records 15 years ago.
?Terrorism is mindless, irrational, and dangerous
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
5t;L;xL-f/
You will probably receive questions on
intelligence reconnaissance systems. ANNEX I has
been coordinated with Ev Hineman and and
is at the appropriate classification level for this
group. It may provide you some thoughts for your
answers.
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
Additional Materials on the Air War College
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
Biography
United States Air Force
Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20330
MAJOR GENERAL PAUL H. HODGES
Major General Paul H. Hodges is commandant of the Air War
College, and vice commander of Air University, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Ala.
General Hodges was born Jan. 21, 1930, in Washington,
D. C. He graduated from Lowell High School in San Francisco
and then attended Oberlin (Ohio) College until the outbreak of
the Korean War. He enrolled in the aviation cadet program
and received his commission as a second lieutenant in
December 1952. General Hodges resumed his academic
studies while on active duty and received a bachelor of arts
degree in history from the University of Omaha in 1966. He
graduated from the Air War College in 1971.
His first assignment was to Otis Air Force Base, Mass., as
a radar observer in F-94s. After completing pilot training and
advanced gunnery school, General Hodges flew RF-84F's with
the 303rd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Sembach Air
Base, Germany, from 1956 to 1958. He transferred to the 18th Tactical Reconnaissance
Squadron at Laon Air Base, France, where for the next two years he flew RF-101s. While
serving with the 18th, General Hodges competed in Royal Flush V, a biennial aerial
reconnaissance competition among North Atlantic Treaty Organization units.
In 1960 General Hodges was assigned as an instructor pilot at Shaw Air Force Base, S. C.,
flying RF-101s and F- 10113's with the 4414th Combat Crew Training Squadron and in 1962
represented the Tactical Air Command in the reconnaissance phase of the William Tell
competition. In March 1963 he moved to Tactical Air Command headquarters at Langley Air
Force Base, Va., and served as an air operations officer in the Special Activities Section of the
Directorate, of Operations until he entered the University of Omaha in June 1965.
After earning his degree in January 1966, General Hodges reported to Mountain Home Air
Force Base, Idaho, for duty as operations officer for the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron,
and later that year become chief of the Standardization and Evaluation Branch for the 67th
Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. In December 1966 the general was assigned to the 16th Tactical
Reconnaissance Squadron at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam, where he flew 209
combat missions as an RF-4C aircraft commander.
Following his Southeast Asia tour of duty, General Hodges spent three years at Kadena Air
Base, Okinawa, serving first as operations officer, then commander of the 15th Tactical
Reconnaissance Squadron.
General Hodges entered the Air War College in 1970 and after graduation was assigned to
Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., as chief, Reconnaissance Division, Directorate
(Current as of September 1982) 0 V E R
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
of Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Research and Development.
From August 1973 to February 1974, General Hodges served as vice commander of the 26th
Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Zweibrucken Air Base, Germany. He then transferred to Royal
Air Force Station Alconbury, England, as commander of the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing.
While there he flew RF-4C's and F-5E's. In March 1977 he took command of the United States
Air Forces in Europe's largest wing, the 601st Tactical Control Wing at Sembach Air Base,
Germany. - The wing operates a mobile tactical air control system providing surveillance and
command and control of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization aircraft in defensive and
offensive air operations.
He returned to the United States in 1979 and was assigned as deputy director for operations,
National Military Command Center, Washington, D.C. In May 1980 General Hodges was named
deputy director for operations (reconnaissance, electronic warfare and command, control and
communications countermeasures), Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3. He assumed
his present duties in July 1982.
The general is a command pilot and has accumulated 5,000 flying hours. His military
decorations and awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two
oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service
Medal, Air Medal with 14 oak leaf clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal and Republic of
Vietnam Gallantry Cross with palm.
He was promoted to major general Jan. I, 1982, with date of rank Aug. I, 1978.
General Hodges is married to the former Joan M. Cerwonka of Medford, Mass. They have
two daughters: Joanne and Leigh. His hometown is Galway, N.Y.
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
(1L-1D) INSTRUCTION PERIOD NO. 2125
TITLE: INTELLIGENCE AND THE POLICY PROCESS
INTRODUCTION: The role of intelligence is to provide
information and analysis to those who formulate and execute
national security policy. The finished intelligence product
does not come from a single organization, but rather it
usually represents a coordinated composite. Intelligence
supports the policy process; it is the prelude to decisions
and a guide to action. The decision maker's first requirement
usually is for the most accurate possible picture of the
international environment in which he must pursue national
objectives. The test of intelligence is- how well it provides
this picture.
OBJECTIVE: To comprehend the role and influence of
intelligence information and organizations on the policymaking
process.
DESIRED LEARNING OUTCOMES (Students should be able to):
1. Discuss roles of the "intelligence community" in the policy
process.
2. Explain the impact of national estimates on policymaking
and discuss the methods by which interagency disagreements are
resolved.
3. Identify current intelligence issues (e.g., executive
direction, protection of sources, covert action, oversight by
Congress, controlling damage to US capabilities, "failures" to
estimate major events, efforts to rebuild clandestine
capabilities, etc) and their influence on the policy process.
1. U.S., Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Role
of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific
Affairs," 96th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1980 pp. 20-27.
ADDITIONAL READINGS:
*1. "Controversy Over Legislative Limitations on Covert US
Intelligence Operations: Pro and Con," The Congressional
Digest, Vol 59, No 5 (May 1980): pp.131-160.
*2. Thomas K. Latimer, "US Intelligence and the Congress,"
Strategic Review (Summer 1979): pp. 47-56.
355
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
*3. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why
Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics
(October 1978): pp. 61-89.
* Not included in Instruction Circular.
356
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
history
World War lI experiences of Army Air Corps leaders demonstrated the
importance of the old Air Corps Tactical School. At the end of the war, these
leaders undertook the task of planning a comprehensive professional educational
system for the greatly expanded Army Air Corps. The Air War College is the
apex of this system.
On 12 March 1946. War Department letter AG 352 redesignated the Army Air
Force School to Air University and concurrently established the Air War College
to prepare selected officers for the employment of large Air Force units and to
insure the most effective development of the Army Air Forces. Throughout the
years. this mission has kept pace with changing concepts of air power,
continuous international tensions and the increased'pace of technology.
Austin Hall. headquarters for the old Air Corps Tactical School. was the first
home of the Air War College which opened on 3 September 1946 with 40 faculty
and staff personnel and 55 students including 45 Air Force. 5 Army. 2 Marine
Corps. 2 Royal Air Force, and I Royal Canadian Air Force. Except for a decline
during the Korean conflict and Vietnam. the student body increased steadily to a
high of 315 in the class of 1974.
The current class of 1983 has 258 students. an optimum number for the
college. and includes students from all US military services, civilian
governmental agencies, and many allied forces. Over 6500 students have
graduated from the Air War College Resident Course.
Anderson Hall, Building 1401. is now the home of the Air War College. This
building was dedicated 28 January 1966 in memory of Major General Orvil A.
Anderson. early military aviator, pioneer balloonist and aerospace explorer, and
Air War College's first commandant.
Since relatively few senior Air Force officers have an opportunity to attend the
Air War College resident course, the Directorate of Associate Programs of the
College administers two nonresident courses. The Correspondence Program.
begun in 1947. offers the advantages of guided self-study, and the Seminar
Program. instituted in 1961, gives senior officers an opportunity to improve their
professional education through study and discussion of selected Air War College
materials in seminars at their home stations. Study materials include audio and
video tapes of resident course guest speaker lectures and faculty presentations
prepared especially for the Associate Programs.
General Anderson
Commemorative Plaque
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1 1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
Resident Program
Curriculum: The Air War College curriculum stresses the application of
aerospace power. A major portion of the academic year is devoted to a thorough
and critical analysis of current strategy with a view toward the development of
optimum alternative future strategies. The course provides for an in-depth
evaluation of US and allied capabilities as they may be applied across the broad
spectrum of conflict. It also includes instruction in the use of modern analytical
techniques used by DOD to evaluate competing strategies and weapon systems.
The curriculum allows for a wide range of individual differences in experience
among students and provides ample opportunity for student-faculty research on
current problems facing the Air Force.
AIR WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM FLOW PLAN (AY 82-83)
SOVIET MILITARY
STUDIES (2)
GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCE EMPLOYMENT (3)
NATIONAL SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT (1)
NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY STUDIES (2)
FEBRUARY I MARCH
MILITARY EMPLOYMENT
LEADERSHIP AND
PROFESSIONALISM
(1)
PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2)
STRATEGIC FORCE
EMPLOYMENT/SPACE STUDIES (5)
I NATIONAL SECURITY STL'ItY
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND
DEFENSE DECISION MAKING (3)
ELECTIVE TERM III (SPRING)
4 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
9 August 1983
NOTE FOR:
FROM: EA/DDCI
SUBJECT: DDCI Speeches
1. In response to your suggestions for trying to be helpful in pro-
viding support to the DDCI for upcoming speeches, I offer the following,
which will be disappointing for you. The DDCI simply does not feel com-
fortable with prepared speeches. He finds it difficult, moreover, to
really focus on preparing for these speeches much more than about a week
ahead of time. Within those limitations, I think the best we can try for
is for you to offer up candidate topics and eventually an outline in
bullet form of ideas about those topics and-possible backup reading
material. He will then weave his remarks from that material. If you can
try to provide this about two weeks ahead of time, we can try to get some
reaction and provide any more guidance sometime during the following week.
2. With thatin mind, on the Air War College Address scheduled for
12 September:
-- You might provide some bullets on the intelligence process.
-- Because of s r' om ar me n concerns, he would not
be willina to discus
-- My guess is he would feel comfortable replaying themes he
has tended to use in the past, including the Soviet threat, techno-
logy transfer, the rebuilding of the Intelligence Community, etc.
3. If you will work on this and get us something a couple of weeks
ahead of time, that would be helpful. If you could also advise me what
the World Affairs Council scheduled for 30 September is interested in, we
could also get started on that one. Under the circumstances, I think
this is the best we can do.
4. As I have mentioned before, one area in which you could always be
helpful would be providing any anecdotes or local color items.
Distribution: I-" 10 7
ORIG & 1 to Addressee )C F 6230
25X1
25X1
1 to EA/DDCI
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
26 July 1983
SA/DDCI
SUBJECT: Air War College Address
After talking with our contact at the
Air War College, we've learned that
Mr. McMahon's audience will have Top Secret
clearances. They have also requested that
he address the following topics if rc-
possible:_
we are going to go ahead and
see what information we can gather on
these issues. I think this will add the
necessary depth to an introductory
discussion on the intelligence process as
given to you in the Army War College speech.
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
26 July 1983
SA DDCI
SUBJECT: Air War College Address
After talking with our contact at the
Air War College, we've learned that
Mr. McMahon's audience will have Top Secret
clearances. They have also requested that
he address the following topics
possible: F- I
we are going to go ahead and
see what information we can gather on
these issues. I think this will add the
necessary depth to an introductory
discussion on the intelligence process as
given to you in the Army War College speech.
TA' 7
~
STAT
SIAI
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DOCI
p 0. .
3
EXDIR- '
4
D/ICS ..
"-"-
6
DDA`
::
5 ::
:a
-7
DDQ `
-~`
8
DDS&T
9
ChWNIC"_
~
10
=GCti
?~'.
~
12
_Compt
44," "
' _
-
13
14
a D% cfs:
AO
15.
D/OErA
16
C/PAD/OEA
17
SA/IA
_.
w:
fi rv
18.
:A0/DCL.
19
-C?IPD/OIS
?-`
A
20
21
~.,
22
1~~= 03d7
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR WAR COLLEGE (ATC)
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE. AL 36112
[W&
1 4 JUL 1983
Mr. John N. McMahon
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washinc ,on DC 20505
I am very pleased to invite you to the Air War College to address the Class of
1984 on "Intelligence and the Policy Process" at 1000 on Monday,
12 September 1983. We have scheduled 45 minutes for your presentation and an
additional 45 minutes for a question/answer period. Following your
presentation, we would appreciate your attendance at a luncheon with a group of
our students. Attachments 1 and 2 reflect the desired scope of the
presentation and provide an overview of the Air War College program.
As you know, most of our students are colonels and lieutenant colonels or their
naval equivalents from the US Armed Forces, primarily the Air Force. We also
have civilians from U.S. Government agencies and international officers
representing some 25 countries. Since we expect your remarks to be classified
to provide the most meaning to our US students, we have made other arrangements
for the international officers and they will not be present during your
briefing.
Our Protocol Office will contact you to assist with travel arrangements.
Colonel Cecil Robins will provide additional information and assistance. His
telephone number is [phone] or 2386.
We appreciate your interest in the Air War College and look forward to your
visit.
PAUL H. HODGES
Major General, USAF
Commandant
2 Atch
1. Scope Sheet
2. Air War College Bulletin
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
(1L-1D) INSTRUCTION PERIOD NO. 2125
TITLE: INTELLIGENCE AND THE POLICY PROCESS
INTRODUCTION: The role of intelligence is to provide
information and analysis to those who formulate and execute
national security policy. The finished intelligence product
does not come from a single organization, but rather it
usually represents a coordinated composite. Intelligence
supports the policy process; it,is the prelude to decisions
and a guide to action. The decision maker's first requirement
usually is for the most accurate possible picture of the
international environment in which he must pursue national
objectives. The test of intelligence is how well it provides
this picture.
OBJECTIVE: To comprehend the role and influence of
intelligence information and organizations on the policymaking
process.
DESIRED LEARNING OUTCOMES (Students should be able to):
1. Discuss roles of the "intelligence community" in the policy
process.
2. Explain the impact of national estimates on policymaking
and discuss the methods by which interagency disagreements are
resolved.
3. Identify current intelligence issues (e.g., executive
direction, protection of sources, covert action, oversight by
Congress, controlling damage to US capabilities, "failures" to
estimate major events, efforts to rebuild clandestine
capabilities, etc) and their influence on the policy process.
1. U.S., Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Role
of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific
Affairs," 96th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1980 pp. 20-27.
ADDITIONAL READINGS:
*1. "Controversy Over Legislative Limitations on Covert US
Intelligence Operations: Pro and Con," The Congressional
Digest, Vol 59, No 5 (May 1980): pp.131-160.
*2. Thomas K. Latimer, "US Intelligence and the Congress,"
Strategic Review (Summer 1979): pp. 47-56.
355
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
*3. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why
Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics
(October 1978): pp. 61-89.
* Not included in Instruction Circular.
356
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
 AIR WAR COLLEGE
BULLETIN
Thirty Seventh Edition 1982 1983
AIR UNIVERSITY (ATC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1
Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1