(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002800020043-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: March 30, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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MF.MORAi~l~lii-i F:~R: Director of Central Intelligencz
FRC~~: Eloise R. Page
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Initiatives to Combat Unauthorized Disclosures
of Classified Intelligence Information.
1. On 30 A4arch 1984 I convened a meeting in response to
your charge to develop administrative, security and legal
initiatives which could be taken to help deal ~~~ith the
.problem of una~~thorized disclosures. At this meeting, which
was attended by the Executive Director, the General counsel,
the Director of Security, the Deputy Director of Legislative
LiUison, the Chairman of the Security Committee and senior
General Counsel representatives, including the Chairman of
SECO~?I's Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee,
the rapers at Tab A were presented. After some discussion,
it caas decided that the following proposals should be
submitted for your consideration.
Nothing is more necessary at this poia:, than to break the
cycle of futility by finding an appropriate Leak case, having
it t".oroughiy investigated and having the leaker i3entified
and appropriately disciplined.
A. Presidential Statement
-- Congressional and media focus on certain
aspects of ~;SDD-8~ diverted attention away from
the problem of intelligence leaks and, if
anything, the problem has gotten worse. L2ore
recently there has been some Congressional.
recognition of the seriousness of such leaks and
we again need to signal Executive Branch concern.
DOivNGRADE TO Ui.CLASSIFIED
tir'HEN SEPARATED FROi~t TAII A
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:r~rtF reco:a~~~r,;, _ i_ :ir:~.' ft;]. z Les: e,ent ial
r=.~t~~:Went to him L~~=;~.; ct and senior white Eous?
c ` ' :_ci gas, decry inc_; ~.j,-_~ harmful effects of lea'rs
u ~:; the national security, holding th~ra
;:~~~~onally respon~ib'~~ for security in their
Le.>pective org~anizatior.s, ana directing the
A r_?:orneyGeneral to :~igo-ously investigate
ir.tF~li.~.gance lea?cs .~~~~r. if adrainistratiae
s1c.~t.ionsr rather th~~a~ criminal prosecution will
b~> the sand result. Expressions of Congressional
support from the intelligence oversight
committees would.hel{~ im~;ieasurably.
B. Use of a Special Prosecutor
-- Current investigative timidity may
derive from the re.;ognition that there are
political costs .in pursuing an aggressive
investigation of media leaks.
~~=Te recom_mend Attorney General .appcintment
of a special prosecutor (independent counsel) to
~aursue sensi~tiv~ lea4: investigations. The
:special prosecutor should have all necessary
p:tsaers, including the ability to bring witnesses
before a grand jury.
- Use of_ a special prosecutor in
appropriate cases will help assure the public,
and particularly the media, that the investi-
gatior. *r=ill be ir*tpartial and objective and
neither politically motivated nor politically
r_onstrained.
C. Creation of a Se agate FBI Leak Investigation Unit
--~ Although rle report a significant nu:ai~zr
of leaks to Justice each year, very few are
investigated because Justice is not sanguine _
about sol~~9.ng suet cases ana prefers to use F3I
resources on other types of cases.
*~~)e .r_ecommend creation of a special uni t
within the FBI to do nothing but investigate
intolliger_ce .leeks. The Ir.telliasnce Coamunity
should support a line-iten apprcpriation to
finance this unit.
-- Bureau assistance is necessary because
certain key government components have no
investigative staffs and in other departments and
S E C R E T
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agencrics respo,~s.i.b.~.l.j.;:~~ ~=:n'i authority ar~~ solely
internal, ~~ith cne a~3:=_r:-:.~ unable to investigate
what happened to its i.n~~:oru~ation r~'r'ien
disse.:,inated to a sncozr,~? ;agency.
-- Intellget:ce CocaTxunity security
organizations and t;-se. DCI Security Committee must
?p?ovide appropriate assistance and work closely
with this FBI unit.
II. I?L`GUL~`lICN OF 'GOVF.I`:t_MET_J'iAL CON3?ACT ~-dITH THE P~IEDIA
-- Contact fietwe?en government officials ar.d
th- press very often is salutary, contributing to
public knowledge any informing public debate.
Goverment officials, however, have no license to
eopardize intelligence sources and methods or
mishandle classified information. Nevertheless,
newsmen reguiarl~i bray that they have daily
access to some of ~ou~ most sensitive intelligence
publications.
*~ie rE'COri1P.lenCi:
a) Centralizing vrithin each
agency the regulation of all press
contacts so a single official is aware
off" all authorized contacts;
b} .Elimination of press building
passes giving unsupervised or .
unrestricted access to government
.
bullding5;
c) Requiring employees to record
all press contacts relating to their
official positions and duties; and
d} Establishment of guidelines
for backgrounders and indoctrination of
employees on press tactics and proper
responses.
III. SECLRITY EDUCATIDi1
The public generally regards intelligence leaks as
interesting, even titilating and perhaps useful in exposing
governmental excess but basically har;r~less. Leakers are seen
as vag~.zely heroic, figur~s akin to whistleblov;ers, and leaks
are vi~.weu as a kind of game in which the govern.-;ent tries to
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hide ir-foratic,ra ~:t~i..l.e 't~?s ~r~~_aia trys to fines th~~ secrets.
Until the puh7.ic tz;ntii~XS}~;~nds that coinpro:nises of intelligence
sources an:J methods erode our ability to obtain vital
intzllig_ttoe and hurt the national security more than they
contrit,ate to public debate, public support for needed
security ri~,asures vrill ba lukewarm at be:.~t.
A. Presidential Co.~mis~ion
*'r~7e recommend creatior. of a Presidential
Commis ion to rev.ie~d intelligence leaks, to
examine steps wha~ch ,can be taken to protect
intelligence s?urces and methods from
unauthorized disclosure, to review existing
in~aestigative and legal constraints an3 to make
recommendations to improve the situation.
-- Intelligence leaks have been a problen
in both Democratic and Republican ad~ninistra-
tions. A nonpartisan blue ri.bban panel could
help to generate greatei public understanding of
the groblLm an~i s~a.i~p~or.i: foi appropriate i:cmedial
steps.
B. Sec~iri~y Briefings
*>~e re~onmend a redoubling of efforts to
mach policy leve]_ off.ici. ale in the State and
Defense nepartment.s, the National Security
Co~incil, and on the staff of the intelligence
e~~rsight committees. These security briefinc;s
sho~il.d not be in a lecture format i"n which the
a:fficial_ being briefed listens passively to a
recitation of rules. Instead, the briefing rust.
focus on the specific audience, citing the actual
damage caused by lea's and explaining haw, with a
modicum of care, intelligence sources ant methods
could have been protected vrith minimum irpact on
the underlying news story or policy. issue. There
must be practical guir3elines for senior officials
on how intelligence matzrial must be safeguarded
in dealing v~ith the press.
C. Outreach Program
*ti9e recommend an effort to increase pubJ.ic
awareness of the fragility of intelligence
s^urc~s and methods and the national security
implications of ini:nlligznce leaks. Senior
intelligence officials and public affairs
officers should take the titre to develop this
issue in speeches, articles and other prograns
which will reach izzportant segments of tree public.
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ArSt~f`-%ly, unauthor .zec _zsclosu.res of classified
inforTati-on are in violation- of the espionage laws but
Justice h~=s never successfully prosecuted a leaker under
these sta`.utes. In part, t;1i. s :r.a.y be because it is necessary
to prc~u e t!~at the indivirual transmitting the national
def~ns~ information did so c7ith reason to believe it would be
used to the injury of ,t2~e United States or to the advantage
of a foreign nation and in part, because of a reluctance to
treat leakers as spies.
A. Criminalizing Leaks
*Pae recommend new legislation (lab B)
criminalizing the willful unauthorized disclosure
o~ classified information by government employees
or other persons with authorized access to
classified information.
-- Such legislation would be free of the
intent requiremAnts iI1 the currant espionage laws
and would make willful unauthorized disclosure of
classified information illegal per se.
-- It is unlikely that this could be passed
in this session of Congress and we might consider
c;eferral of this legislation until next year.
B. Injunctive Relief
-- At the appropriate time after passage of
legislation criminalizing the unauthorized
disc~osure of classified information, we might
consider seeking legislation (Tab C) providing
fir injunctive relief in leak cases siriilar to
that available under the Atomic Energy Act.
2, To the extent appropriate, implementation of these
recom:~endations should be discussed with our oversight
committees. ;n this manner, we can capitalize on the growing
Congressional concern about damage to intelligence from leaks
and can avoid triggering a partisan political response to
actions c?:hich seek to weal with a very seri-ous and very
urgent problem facing the Community.
Eloise R. Page
Attar: me:~ts: As stated.
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S E C R E T
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MEi:URL~iiJ+3t~I ~0~: general Coilllscl
Ed:~una Coh~,~
Asst~~ciate Gon=oral Counsel/Chairman,
LTnauthorize3 Disclosures Investigation
Subcommittee , SECOP~i
5UE:TECT: Tn telligence Leaks
1. Unauthorized disclosures have become so commonplace,
investigative action has b,ezn s? timid, success in solving
leak cases has been ~so infreque^t, punishment of the fecti?
leakers actually found has bear. ~>o ;Wild and so hiddon an3
pro se:.~utior. of l~ea'Kers has beco:.:e so improbable that leaking
has emerged as a virtually ris'r.-free activity. Inc:eed, a
recent expression of presidential concern about leaks was
greeted not by a renewed national reJoly? to protect fragile
intelligent~e sources and methoas, but instead by the concern
that security might actually be tightened and tiZat 'leakers
might actually be in~Iibited. Lea:cers were turned into heroes
and security officials into villains. Beakers have been
emboldened and szcurity officials intimidated.
2. It really is time to turn this around by a more
vigorous prograra ~f security acrareness within the Government,
and by educating the public at large about the pernicious
nature of disclosures which do great damage to our
intelligence sources and to the continued availa'oility of
vitally needed information while contributing only mir.imaily
to pub]_ic debate. 4vs must pursue lank investigations Tore
vigorously. GtiTe must removo those ~aho violate their trust
from Government service in a very public any? visible way and
deal even more harshly cait?h senior officials who should know
better and-who should set a responsible example for the rest
of the bureaLicracy. Finally, we need better laws. `~e need a
mec~~anism to make leak investi,a~ions a bipartisan
undertaking and we reed to stop confusing leakers with either
whistleblowers or spies. We must have a law, sep>;missic~n on unauthorized disclosure of classified
information., A bi-partisa.j group of ciistinguisneci present and fonTer members
of all three branches oaf government could be given all the facts and asked to
report and rec~o~rrnend remedial action. Com i n, fro~rt sur.h a broad-based group,
the reco>nnendations sh?auld com!and widespread support and would provide a
means of informing the Arr!erican people of the gravity or the threat, if not
the c+etails of it. fon~!ation of a co^mission would provide a way to meet
several of the needs 2nu~!erat+ed abode. Thp primary drawback is that this is
an election year. Although timing is important, the action could be taken
~
after the election,. because the problem will still~b ~ with us.
nr~*f ICI I!;= (1"II Y .. _.___... _ _.._.._~ ,....-..
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 i f
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Dirr:'ctC~r
lra3~`l~igf~nco Cornrr~u;~ity Sia~f
W,35hirtgton" D.C.20505 IC$-03~2-?83
N;:TiaRAT~Ot~1 FOR:
VIA-
FROM:
.Director of Central ,Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
}tA'~t E. A. ~tarkhal ter, Jr., USN
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
,
SUSJEC~:
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
(U~
1, Senior tn2mb~rs of the Intelligence Community Staff hive mat to
consi d~r? respor-s4s Lo your call for proposals to'counter the vraut.;~ori zed
disclosures of classified intelligence which are increasing in number and
severity. Th? reco:r..mendati ons of thz group are i n five basic categori ~s --
educati on, 1 egi s1 ati on, investi gati an$ , mDd : a i nterfaca ar,d i rformation
control. This mnmorandrim discusses proposals in each of ti~ese categories..
2. Ec~u~?t~n -Thera appears to be a lack of appreciation of the
l'QTISor~.1 Pr;r ~,,, o i i.}t''_C]?l~ ~l~ ~d r y 1~.. ati on OT,S,1 ~~5 i fi 2d z ntel 17 Qer~c2
infornati n~ both to th> national security and to the individuzl traking the .
disclesur~. Each recipient of Sensitive Compartmented Infor;~ation (SCI is
`tndoatrinated on the potential damage to th9 national secu~?ity of such
revelations, as f: ell as the papal ti es prescribed in 7i tl e 18, Sections 793
through 798. t+zverthQless, incidents continue which indicate that these
elements of ris'~ are rot being taken serioc:sly. Reciaien~s of classified
i nte11-i Bence must be convinced. that its . un1 awful revzl a ti on i s rPprehensi bl e,
-and that i ndivi duzls who take it upor. the+nsel vas to dpci ~e when the system may
be ignored place the ~oational security and tharselves in jeopzrdy.
3. In wartirrer the popul ation reco3nizes the need to keep nil i tart'
secrets . The concept that "1 Dose 1 i ps 's'ink= $hi ps" "i s wall accepted. ~!e need
a campaign, beginning Frith the President, to convince all concerned that
classified information must be protected if we are to avoid national
disastor. A vigorous Presidential charge to the Cabinet and the Executive -~
Office of the President, relayed through channels t ~ 1l levels, is an
essenti a7 e1 ement of this campaign. - ~
~, ,Awareness of the importance of securit to intelligence rust be_
extended to thQ Congress. Thb whole-hearted cooperation'of bath?le islators
ranc~u ort
~~ eta ff r^,e~-~?.,~5 i 5 i r,di~soznsa-~ b'~. hot onl y- t~e~i s~i~~ v~ p~_,
needed to safeguard ~t'he material"_pravided_to_the ConSress,_but a so to put
teeth into the anti-leak ef~for~. ~
,~.
. - CL BY 5IGrdER
e~rr* n ~ n7
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5 . .~.o s?+~`~f~ this e f -fart L~-ed ; ~? e, documents mus ~~ ~ ~ sal assi fi ed properly
and concern a~.a~ut disclasuures sho:,ld be limited to tho,e ~ `fecting national
security.
~. .4 o.,a_ti,~e ~effart t+t+ seas;~i ye the governmAnt and the public tp the
disas.ruus cons-aquer~ce~s of iilAgLl disciasures, even one kicked off by the
Fr~esident, has a limitetI half-3dfe. There must be a plannad follorf-vp. In
addit.o^. to the obvious rejndo.ctrin3tion efforts, consider?tion should be
given to an ongoirxg program of darragz-oriented "1 essons 1 earned" p?resenta-
ti tins . These are enrS si tined as tirn~l y, ~speci fi c, succinct and techni ca11 y
competent ~ridetitape sha~+s detailing the nature o` the unauthorized disclosure
and the specific losses svff~red as a result. They would be shown to
audiences cleared #ar the compramissd information as a means of reinforcing
the need for strong security.
7. Because of the general derision with which the media regard
government efforts to stop 3eaks and because the generic term "leak" is -
zssacia??ed wi?ih disciose~rrs tfiat are politically Prrtbarrassing, It nay be
advisab"le to avoid that term-and speak only of "unauthorized disclosures of
classified i nfor~a.ation." .
remain ?for the judiciary to shop the same resoles.
8. _ ~*i tl ~.~~~- - The exi sti nc_espi pna ,e ? ae~s ~?+e~~z drafted to ?rQ`~~;t
~1..~..~..e~rP~s -~ ~?~ ~~ g?rei ~- events. They did not contempl ate 'the hemorrhaging
of classified diat3 t1~at hes f?llaked the mQdia exylasion, The divulgence of
classi -i ed i~nforaation to the Russians by way of Jack nnderson` s column, for
e.~atnple, is a rLlative-y rear pnenoreron. Even though the intentions of the
7 eakzr r:.ay ba ?~ nobly i n7o~ ~ the p~abl i c of facts he thinks. sho:,l d be know~~,
t'~e results are the Sarre as directly transmitting the information to the KGS_
g, attached is a copy o~` the proposed bill tQ proh-ib-~t certain
unauthorized disciasures of classified i~~fonration. f=ormulated on the basis
o?i the Willard Report, it is an excel i ent vehicle ror closing the .1 oophol e
thzt allows indiviauais to ignore cl4ssi~=icatiot~s and rake tFeir awn de~cisiores
about -~hat must or gust not be .kept secret. Passage o` such a bill would make
it clear ~ihat both the i~gislative and exeeutive ~iranches are serious about
.pr`serving our ability to keep our national security secrets. It ~.~ould then
i0. The chances of passing the vnauttiorized' disclose, es bi11 are,
directly related to the Congress `s perception o~f hose responsibly the Ezecuti ve
Branch uses its classification po:~ers. As noted above, the effort to educate
govern^~e:~t employzes hand the public, to the extent possible) on the need for
effective secrecy must al so include the Congress and 1 egi sl ati ve staff ?--
~persor,r~l. The means of reaching this objective are~hp saran for bath
branches of geverr~nent -- graphic deronstrations t~~t unauLhorizPCt disclosures
zre costly in terms of money, national derense, i~teiligence capabilities, and
sometimes, human lives. - ::
ii . Levi si ati on also' is needed to make the unauthori 2e__possessi on of
classified material a trine. It is illogical for the U.S. Goverrnnent to be
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unable to hr?it3g charges against, a~- a;: lea.~L: sue to recover classified
material from, Jack ~~t~d.e.rsun, who rakes a ma::kery of classification, or from
Avi anon. leek _anrLSpa: e_5.ecbnnla}y, which has printed c1 assifi ed satellite
imagery. t e - wou a e action against an orCinary citizen, it should
act Hith the same vigor against journalists why damage the national security.
The Attorney 6ener,~1 as~d the mineral Counsels of the Intelligence Cor~r-uni ty
sho~.~ld begin a crasfi program to draft a legislative proposal and to review the
possibilities of action even without?~ new law.
12. ~fhether D*- irtot thL effort to pass new legislation is successful , it
is vital that Cwnoress die included in any awareness-raising AroQra~, A
secondary obJect~vE would tie to raise the security standards oT the congres-
sional staffs. Many staffers have access to Wore sensitive inforr.~ation than
Bone CIA or AlSA gersoranel , who are polygraphed as well as backgrounded ~ and
are subject to periodic reprotessing. Congressional staffers are not steeped
i n the di sci p1 i n2 of Security as are the intelligence prafessi oval s, and Raoul d
almost certainly benefit from a greater appreciation far the need for secrecy.
? 13. ?~Fi nil l y, the p~robl ern _of reinforci n,~ the.. responsi bi i i ti es of formerly
cleared reci~ents,of classified ynforznatian to continue to maintain secret
requ?~r~as atte~?i on. A-gec-io~~c r~:inder by mail r~igh?t be eo,~sidered, but
except for CIA and hISA, it could be difficult to identify those w;zo should
retei :~e them. In the future, the archival Ella of the Corr unity-wide,'
Computer-assistQd Corapartr~Qntesl Control (4C~ Systec~, which will contain the
identities o:? i ndi vs dual s f~or~}2rly approved -For access to SCI , Shaul d assist
with-this pro 5l en. P~eanwhile,, the messaga needs. to be spread that our mold
boys" can do a 1 of of fia:?n by #al ki ng too ouch. Ci eared pbrsor,s still
employed in governTent must be r?ecninded frequently and forcefully that thosQ~
who have r`tired, o~. ta'xen jobs in the irdustriai sector, may not legally
receive ci assi fi zd i nfornsation uni ess they 'are spzci f i tally cleared for i t..
? 1 ~ . Inve1ti c~.tiars ~ ~ The i nee sci ati on of unauthorized d 5 scl osuret has
rarely proven success~u ove; the years. The bread d:ssem~nation require e
i ntel i i pence reportz na, t-~e 1 ack of an effectual i Hues t~ gati ve program
? throughout the cover ~.~entzan 'apparent tolerant attit~:de tor;ard those echo Hake
~iliicit disclosurzs, and :the absence of a legisiat~ve basZS or actlorr have
Made for a hic!hiy_frustratzng s1~Uation:' KSDD-84 of-"ers hope for greater
success i n the future, but there is-r-;uc~-'to :be done. ~ -
.' ~ .. ,
15 , Although leak investigations are 'searches for needs es i n haystacks,
occasionally goad investigative work will produce results. Unfortunately, ?'
unauthorized disclosures to the nedia are?cansensual zcts between two parties,
neithar of whom is likely to admit participation, and one of whom enjoys a '~
specsal degree of privilege under the Eirst Amendment. Legsslation will help,
but thLre can't be a trial until a defendant is ide