LEAKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002800020038-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: April 19, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUSPENSE
Remarks
3637 (10-81)
VJ Executiv4 Secreiary
7/ C7IY
ate
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IExecuth,0,-;.,,F--7
84- 1 740
19 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Leaks
1. Bill Baker, Johnny Foster and Leo Cherne are going to give us their
thoughts on the leak problem based on the papers produced by Eloise. I am
committed to get back to Biden and Murtha with some ideas on how the leak
problem might be addressed.
2. I believe that Eloise's papers have been sent to the members of the
SIG-I, so they will have reviewed them by the meeting tomorrow. If you can
kind of open up a dialogue and get their thinking, I will pursue it further
at the meeting on the hostile presence. If I can get your ideas after your
talk with the SIG-I, I will move forward with the Congress and NSC.
William J. Casey
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DCl/ICS 84-3007
6 April 1984
Director of Central Intelligence
Eloise R. Page
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
-
Initiatives to Combat Unauthorized Disclosures
of Classified Intelligence Information
1. On 30 March 1984 I convened a meeting in response to
your charge to develop administrative, security and legal
initiatives which could be taken to help deal with the
problem of unauthorized disclosures. At this meeting, which
was attended by the Executive Director, the General Counsel,
the Director of Security, the Deputy Director of Legislative
Liaison, the Chairman of the Security Committee and senior
General Counsel representatives, including the Chairman of
SECOM's Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee,
the papers at Tab A were presented. After some discussion,
it was decided that the following proposals should be
submitted for your consideration.
I. INVESTIGATION
Nothing is more necessary at this point than
cycle of futility by finding an appropriate leak
it thoroughly investigated and having the leaker
and appropriately disciplined.
A. Presidential Statement
to break the
case, having
identified
-- Congressional and media focus on certain
aspects of NSDD-84 diverted attention away from
the problem of intelligence leaks and, if
anything, the problem has gotten worse. More
recently there has been some Congressional
recognition of the seriousness of such leaks and
we again need to signal Executive Branch concern.
DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM TAB A
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*We recommend a forceful Presidential
statement to his Cabinet and senior White House
officials, decrying the harmful effects of
leaks. Expressions of Congressional support from
the intelligence oversight committees would help
immeasurably.
B. Use of a Special Prosecutor
-- Current investigative timidity may
derive from the recognition that there are
political costs in pursuing an aggressive
investigation of media leaks.
*We recommend Attorney General appointment
of a special prosecutor (independent counsel) to
pursue sensitive leak investigations. The
special prosecutor should have all necessary
powers, including the ability to bring witnesses
before a grand jury.
-- Use of a special prosecutor in
appropriate cases will help assure the public,
and particularly the media, that the investi-
gation will be impartial and objective and
neither politically motivated nor politically
constrained.
C. Creation of a Separate FBI Leak Investigation Unit
-- Although we report a significant number
of leaks to Justice each year, very few are
investigated because Justice is not sanguine
about solving such cases and prefers to use FBI
resources on other types of cases.
*We recommend creation of a special unit
within the FBI to do nothing but investigate
intelligence leaks. The Intelligence Community
should support a line-item appropriation to
finance this unit.
-- Bureau assistance is necessary because
certain key government components have no
investigative staffs and in other departments and
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SLLRET
agencies responsibility and authority are solely
internal, with one agency unable to investigate
what happened to its information when
disseminated to a second agency.
-- Intelligence Community security
organizations and the DCI Security Committee must
provide appropriate assistance and work closely
with this FBI unit.
II. REGULATION OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTACT WITH THE MEDIA
-- Contact between government officials and
the-press-very often is salutary, contributing to
public knowledge and informing public debate.
Government officials, however, have no license to
jeopardize intelligence sources and methods or
mishandle classified information. Nevertheless,
newsmen regularly brag that they have daily
access to some of our most sensitive intelligence
publications.
*We recommend:
a) Centralizing within each
agency the regulation of all press
contacts so a single official is aware
of all authorized contacts;
b) Elimination of press building
passes giving unsupervised or
unrestricted access to government
buildings;
c) Requiring employees to record
all press contacts relating to their
official positions and duties; and
d) Establishment of guidelines
for backgrounders and indoctrination of
employees on press tactics and proper
responses.
III. SECURITY EDUCATION
The public generally regards intelligence leaks as
interesting, even titilating and perhaps useful in exposing
governmental excess but basically harmless. Leakers are seen
as vaguely heroic figures akin to whistleblowers, and leaks
are viewed as a kind of game in which the government tries to
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hide information while the media trys to find the secrets.
Until the public understands that compromises of intelligence
sources and methods erode our ability to obtain vital
intelligence and hurt the national security more than they
contribute to public debate, public support for needed
security measures will be lukewarm at best.
A. Presidential Commission
*We recommend creation of a Presidential
Commission to review intelligence leaks, to
examine steps which can be taken to protect
intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure, ta-review existing
investigative and legal constraints and to make
recommendations to improve the situation.
-- Intelligence leaks have been a problem
in both Democratic and Republican administra-
tions. A nonpartisan blue ribbon panel could
help to generate greater public understanding of
the problem and support for appropriate remedial
steps.
B. Security Briefings
*We recommend a redoubling of efforts to
reach policy level officials in the State and
Defense Departments, the National Security
Council, and on the staff of the intelligence
oversight committees. These security briefings
should not be in a lecture format in which the
official being briefed listens passively to a
recitation of rules. Instead, the briefing must
focus on the specific audience, citing the actual
damage caused by leaks and explaining how, with a
modicum of care, intelligence sources and metnods
could have been protected with minimum impact on
the underlying news story or policy issue. There
must be practical guidelines for senior officials
on how intelligence material must be sateguarded
in dealing with the press.
C. Outreach Program
*We recommend an effort to increase public
awareness of the fragility of intelligence
sources and methods and the national security
implications of intelligence leaks. Senior
intelligence officials and public affairs
officers should take the time to develop this
issue in speeches, articles and other programs
which will reach important segments of the public.
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rk 1., 1
IV. LEGISLATION
Arguably, unauthorized disclosures of classified
information are in violation of the espionage laws but
Justice has never successfully prosecuted a leaker under
these statutes. In part, this may be because it is necessary
to prove that the individual transmitting the national
defense information did so with reason to believe it would be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of a foreign nation and in part, because of a reluctance to
treat leakers as spies.
A. Criminalizing Leaks
*We recommend new legislation (Tab B)
criminalizing the willful unauthorized disclosure
of classified information by government employees
or other persons with authorized access to
classified information.
-- Such legislation would be free of the
intent requirements in the current espionage laws
and would make willful unauthorized disclosure of
classified information illegal per se.
B. Injunctive Relief
-- At the appropriate time after passage of
legislation criminalizing the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, we might
consider seeking legislation (Tab C) providing
for injunctive relief in leak cases similar to
that available under the Atomic Energy Act.
2. To the extent appropriate, implementation of these
recommendations should be discussed with our oversight
committees. In this manner, we can capitalize on the growing
Congressional concern about damage to intelligence from leaks
and can avoid triggering a partisan political response to
actions which seek to deal with a very serious and very
urgent problem facing the Community.
Attachments: As stated.
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tuoise K. Page
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OF PSF (riY
DIPECTOR 07 C7NiaAl. INTELLIGENCE
Z.13C?It;ty c.ormin111)4
SECOM D-069
19 March 1984
MEMORANUUM FOR:
Director, Intelligence Community
Staff
FROM:
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Chairman
SUBJECT:
Intelligence
Leaks
REFERENCE:
DCI MEMO
25X1
Subject:
Intelligence Leaks and Counterterrorism
Capabilities
1. The referent memorandum and the recent SSCI hearings have raised new
hopes that something can be done at last about those who breach their oaths
and reveal classified intelligence to the news media. The following
observatiorm on the leak situation may be useful to you in carrying out the
DC1's charge.
2. While Senator Biden's helpful attitude is gratifying, there is a need
to stimulate public opinion against leaks of classified information. There is
a great groundswell of apathy about leaks, both within the government and
among the general public. It is essential that new leak legislation, if it
can LIL passed, not be regarded with the same enthusiasm as the Volstead Act.
3. There has been little opportunity to take the anti-leak message to
rank-and-file government employees. Even worse, the public receives all its
information about leaks and anti-leak efforts from the news Media. While the
DCI videotape has been shown to high-level audiences in some; not all,
Intelligence Community agencies, it has not been generally presented to middle
and lower graded personnel, even in CIA.
4. We are not doing enough to create a climate of acceptance for anti-
leak efforts. Almost without exception, audiences vier4ing the DCI leak
videotape have expressed the belief that no progress will be made until senior
officials of the government stop leaking classified information for their own
purposes. The opinion persists that the public chastisement of one or more
identified high level leakers is essential to marshalling any anti-leak
support. The message is clear--mere words- are not enough. The government
must demonstrate that leaks are a sufficiently severe problem to warrant
decisive, well-publicized action against senior, well-connected officials.
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5. There -;s a reasonable reluctance to use the Espionage Act to
prosecute leakers. Legislation is needed to deal specifically with the
disclosure of classified information by cleared individuals to unauthorized
persons. No matter how cne views it, this is a different crime from
espionage. Nevertheless, it is no less a breach of trust by a federal
official than illegal use of a limousine, disclosure of crop futures, or
misappropriation of federal funds. It deserves its own law. We should not
drive tacks with a sledge hamar. We have offered, then withdrawn,
legislative proposals on this topic for the past two years.
6. As the leak situation grows worse, our posture to combat leaks also
seems to be going downhill. The Brooks Bill, if passed, would hamper the
anti-leak effort. More importanta it would send a message that efforts to
combat leaks are somehow immoral, unconstitutional,or worse. It is essential
that Congressional liaison officers throughout the Community do everything
possible to educate members of both Houses on the pernicious nature of leaks
and the extremely disadvantaged posture of the government in combatting -
them. A solid defeat for the Brooks Bill is an indispensable step in our
effort to turn public opinion around.
7. CIA and the rest of the Community need to determine as precisely as
possible what the leak story is and how much of that story can be told
publicly; how much more can be told to Congressional leaders, and how much can
be told to top Administration officials. Unless we can present a credible
story that the US intelligence effort is being significantly damaged by leaks,
no amount of hand wringing is likely to have any effect, whatsoever.
8. We need to determine ways to get the general story before the public
and the specifics to those who can help lead the way back from apathy. 'Having
a good story doesn't help unless we can get people to listen. The DCI anti-
leak videotape has been an excellent counsciousness-raising exercise, but
there has been a constant uphill struggle to get audiences to view it. We
need to produce a new, hard-hitting, factual message on leaks and cbtain
authority to require cleared personnel throughout the government to attend.
e-
9. The fact that after four decades, the DCI still finds the slogan
"loose lips sink ships" useful indicates that posters are a powerful medium.
We should mount a poster campaign against leaks throughout the government.
Posters provide the message to masses of people without requiring any action
on their part_
10. As has been reiterated, the current procedures for -investigation of
unauthorized disclosures are geared to failure. The fragmented, agency-by-
agency approach to investigating leaks of information that is disseminated
government-wide doesn't provide a uniform effort. In order to ensure that
competent investigative resources are concentrated on areas most likely to
yield results, an overall, coordinated effort by a single agency is
required. The FBI is the only agency capable of doing the job. It is also
essential to the continued protection of intelligence sources and methods that
the investigation be closely ct,ordinated with senior Intelligence Community
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officials Olo cr rin tfta ris!K of additional revelations of classifi?d
information at every step of the invastigation and recommend appropriate
action to avoid compounding or problems.
11. The fragmented approach to investigation does not permit any
analysis of leaks for possible patterns. Centralized investigation and
coordination would afford the opportunity to analyze the content, apparent
intent, possible sourcing, etc., in order to focus investigative efforts whore
they are likely to yield results. Sophisticated investigative and analytical
techniques, as currently being applied to the fight against narcotics, need to
be used against leaks. The current simplistic approach does not work.
12. To avoid having an anti-leak effort evaporate in a cloud of
frustration, there should be personnel and other resources dedicated to the -
investioation and prosecution of leaks, preferably with a Congressional
mandate. The current unsophisticated, relatively low level, effort appears to
result from reluctance to devote resources to a no-win situation. If the "
resources and appropriate guidelines can be made available, we can win, at
least some of the time. A concerted effort to mount a strong pilot operatk
offers the best chance of success.
13. Senator Biden's concern about lack of utilization of "graymail"
procedures illustrates to points that must not be ignored. The first is that
the passage of legislation, per se, is not enough to cure a bad situation.
The second is that nothing can be done about the leak problem unless some of
the offenders-rare identified and penalized.
14. I have telephoned all the members of the Security Committee and
requested their thoughts on new approaches to the leak problems. 'Their
responses will be provided to you when received.
15. Finally, I propose that we consider recommending appointment of a
presintial commission on unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.. A bi-partisad group of distinguished present and former members
of all three'branches of government could be given all the facts and asked to
report and recommend remedial action. Coming from such a broad-based group,
the recomnendations should command widespread support and would provide a
means of informing the American people of the gravity of the threat, if not
the details of it. Formation of a commission would provide a way to meet
several of the needs enumerated above. The primary drawback is that this is
an election year. Although timing is important, the action could be taken
after the election, because the problem will still b w:
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DIrt.'l;1(11
trite:lige:ICC,' CO111:11;111! y tOt
I (.
24 May 1983
3 1 MAY 1983
NOTE FOR: OCI-
VIA: DDCI
SUBJECT: Recommendations on the Leak Problem
The attached memorandum presents our ideas
and some recommendations on the leak problem. It
is the product of two things: (1) three separate
meetings with senior staff personnel, and (2) the
carefully considered thoughts over a long period
of time of the Security Committee. I think it is
pretty comprehensive, and some of the ideas have a
lot of merit. Unfortunately, the memorandum is
also rather long and not well suited for a quick
review. My purpose in sending it along as is--and
encouraging you to take the time to go through
it--is to give you a timely input as you consider
remedial action.
We are going to continue to pursue the subject
and will advise you of any additional thoughts.
And, of course, we are ready to respond to any
requirements that you may have for us to develop
policies and procedures for the Community.
Attachment
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
FROM:
SECRET
Director
Intellioence Community Staff
Wasningion. D.C. 20505
Director of Central.Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
ICS-0802-83
24 May 1983
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
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1. Senior members of the Intelligence Community Staff have met to
consider responses to your call for proposals to7tounter the unauthorized
disclosures of classified intelligence which are increasing in number and
severity. The recommendations of the group are in five basic categories --
education, legislation, investigations, media interface and information
control. This memorandum discusses proposals in each of these categories.
2. Frilwatipo - There appears to be a lack of appreciation of the
consequences of the unauthorized revelation of classified intelligence
information, both to the national security and to the individual making the
disclosure. Each recipient of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is
indoctrinated on the potential damage to the national security of such
revelations, as well as the penalties prescribed in Title 18, Sections 793
through 798. Nevertheless, incidents continue which indicate that these
elements of risk are not being taken seriously. Recipients of classified
intelligence must be convinced that its unlawful revelation is reprehensible,
and that individuals who take it upon themselves to decide when the system may
be ignored place the national security and themselves in jeopardy.
3. In wartime, the population recognizes the need to keep military
secrets. The concept that "loose lips sink ships" is well accepted. We need
a campaign, beginning with the President, to convince all concerned that
classified information must be protected if we are to avoid national
disaster. A vigorous Presidential charge to the Cabinet and the Executive
Office of the President, relayed through channels to all levels, is an
essential element of this campaign.
4. Awareness of the importance of security to intelligence must be
extended to the Congress. The whole-hearted cooperation of both legislators
and staff members is indispensable. Not only is Legislative Branch support
needed to safeguard the material provided to the Congress, but also to put
teeth into the anti-leak effort.
Cl FY clnNFP
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5. To make this effort credible, documents must be classified properly
and concern about disclosures should be limited to those affecting national
security.
6. A one-time effort to sensitize the government and the public to the
disastrous consequences of illegal disclosures, even one kicked off by the
President, has a limited half-life. There must be a planned follow-up. In
addition to the obvious reindoctrination efforts, consideration should .be
given to an ongoing program of damage-oriented "lessons learned" presenta-
tions. These are envisioned as timely, specific, succinct and technically
competent videotape shows detailing the nature of the unauthorized disclosure
and the specific losses suffered as a result. They would be shown to
audiences cleared for the compromised information as a means of reinforcing
the need for strong security.
7. Because of the general derision with which the media reoard
government efforts to stop leaks and because the oeneric term "leak" is
associated with disclosures that are politically gmbarrassing, It may be
advisable to avoid that term and speak only of "unauthorized disclosures of
classified information."
8. Legislation - The existing espionage laws were drafted to protect
U.S. secrets trom foreign agents. ,They did not contemplate the hemorrhaging
of classified data that has followed the media erni_r-c_i_rtnil--h-c?ki--ti---1---s of
classified information to the Russians by way of for
example, is a relatively new phenomenon. Even tiough the intentions of the ?
leaker may be to nobly inform the public of facts he thinks should be known,
the results are the same as directly transmitting the information to the KGB.
9. Attached is a copy of the proposed bill to prohibit certain
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Formulated on the basis
of the Willard Report, it is an excellent vehicle for closing the loophole
that allows individuals to ignore classifications and make their own decisions
about what must or must not be kept secret. Passage of such a bill would make
it clear that both the legislative and executive branches are serious about
preserving our ability to keep our national security secrets. It would then
remain for the judiciary to show the same resolve.
10. The chances of passino the unauthorized disclosures bill are
directly related to the Congress's perception of how responsibly the Executive
Branch uses its classification powers. As noted above, the effort to educate
government employees (and the public, to the extent possible) on the need for
effective secrecy must also include the Congress and legislative staff
personnel. The means of reaching this objective are the same for both
branches of government -- graphic demonstrations that unauthorized disclosures
are costly in terms of money, national defense, intelligence capabilities, and
sometimes, human lives.
11. Legislation also is needed to make the unauthorized possession of
classified material a crime. It is illogical for the U.S. Government to be
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unable to brine char
t, or at least sue to recover classified
material
whn
makes a mockery of classification, or from
which has printed classified satellite
imaoery.
It the :U.S. woulo take action
against an ordinary citizen, it should
act with the same vigor against journalists who damage the national security.
The Attorney General and the General Counsels of the Intelligence Community
should begin a crash program to draft a legislative proposal and to review the
possibilities of action even without a. new law.
12. Whether or not the effort to pass new legislation is successful, it
is vital that Congress be included in any awareness-raising program. A
secondary objective would be to raise the security standards of the congres-
sional staffs. Many staffers have access to more sensitive information than
some CIA or NSA personnel, who are polygraphed as well as backorounded, and
are subject to periodic reprocessing. Congressional staffers are not steeped
in the discipline of security as are the intelligence professionals, and would
almost certainly benefit from a greater appreciation for the need for secrecy.
13. Finally, the problem of reinforcing the:responsibilities of formerly
cleared recipients of classified information to continue to maintain secrecy
requires attention. A periodic reminder by mail might be considered, but
except for CIA and NSA, it could be difficult to identify those who should
receive them. In the future, the archival file of the Community-wide,'
Computer-assisted Compartmented Control (4C) System, which will contain the
identities of individuals formerly* approved for access to SCI, should assist
with this problem. Meanwhile, the message needs to be spread that our "old
boys" can do a lot of harm by talking too much. Cleared persons still
employed in government must be reminded frequently and forcefully that those.
who have retired, or taken jobs in the industrial sector, may not legally
receive classified information unless they are specifically cleared for it.
14. InvestigLtions - The investigation of unauthorized disclosures has
rarely proven successful over the years. The broad dissemination required of
intelligence reporting, the lack of an effectual investioative program
throughout the aovernment, an apparent tolerant attitude toward those who make
illicit disclosures, and the absence of a leoislative basis for action have
made for a highly frustrating situation. NSOD-84 offers hope for greater
success in the future, but there is much to be done.
15. Although leak investigations are searches for needles in haystacks,
occasionally good investigative work will produce results. Unfortunately,
unauthorized disclosures to the media are consensual acts between two parties,
neither of whom is likely to admit participation, and one of whom enjoys a
special degree of privilege under the First Amendment. Legislation will help,
but there can't be a trial until a defendant_is identified. The abysmal track
record of leak investigations to date dictates that the Federal Bureau of
Investioation is the only agency with any chance of success. Fragmented,
single-agency efforts simply do not work. Nor does the proposal to form
interagency units to investigate unauthorized disclosures offer any reasonable
hope for improvement.
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16. Even the FBI will require some help -- the full cooperation of other
aoencies, the legislation discussed earlier, and guidelines that permit the
use of as full a range of investigative tools as possible. The Attorney
General and the Director of the FBI should be instructed by the President to
provide the most permissive guidelines possible, consistent with the protec-
tion of civil liberties, for FBI investigations of unauthorized disclosures of
classified information. In addition, appropriate manpower allocations to the
FBI should be made to ensure a vigorous effort to solve unauthorized disclo-
sures. Without this, the Bureau cannot be expected to neglect other important
investigations to undertake tasks that offer a low probability of success and
almost certain criti ism i
I- I
20. Rress..In?erface - NSDD-84 mandates policies to govern contacts
between media representatives and agency personnel, leaving implementation to
the individual agencies. The effort to eradicate unauthorized disclosures
would be assisted greatly by the adoption of uniform rules for all agencies.
21. The discussi.on of government information, especially sensitive
intelligence, by a government employee is not a private, personal matter.
There seems no reason why the government cannot require the reporting of all
contacts with the news media, during or outside of duty hours, in which
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government business is discussed. Failure to follow such a rule could be
made subject to administrative sanctions of varying severity. Data on such
contacts could be computerized, by names of government employees, names of
media representatives, subjects of discussions and dates of contacts, pro-
viding a means of determining a great deal of information that could take
inordinate amounts of investigative effort. It wouldn't tell who made
unauthorized disclosures, but it would.proyide a means of determining who
might have had the means and the opportunity, and possibly even the motive
to have done so.
22. It would be ideal, from the standpoint of security, to abolish back-
grounders. Recognizing that this isn't going to happen, there should be firm
control of background briefings to the press. There must be clear-cut guide-
lines on who may authorize and present backgrounders. Every such briefing
should be attended by a security or public affairs officer isthaAnaws_Abat_is
s.ensiIive about the topic being discussed and is capable of ottering guidance
to the briefer. A record should be kept of briefings by names of participants
and authorizing officials, dates and topics, preferably in a computerized
mode. Presenters of background briefings should 'be required to prepare
summaries of what was presented. These should be cross-referenced to the
automated index of background briefings. The documentation of this infbrma-
tion and its retrievability will not only serve as an invaluable investigative
resource, but its existence will promote prudence in the presentation of
backgrounders and in other dealings with the press.
23. Even if all these proposals were adopted, there would be individuals
who would continue to divulge classified information to the press. But they ?
would find themselves operating at considerably greater risk. Simple failure
to comply with the reporting requirements would be cause for administrative
sanctions, and it would become easier to detect such failures by having a
reliable record of compliance, it is likely that associations between
oovernment personnel and media representatives are known to at least some
associates of both, and the possibility of being reported by a concerned
colleague would be enhanced by the revised rules. An effective education .
program about leaks should have the salutary effect of highlighting to their
associates those who may deal with the media without observing the reporIing
requirements. If those who comply are sufficiently convinced of the need for
regulation of press contacts, they may be inclined to "blow the whistle." It
would then be necessary for the government to demonstrate the seriousness of
its intent by taking administrative action against the nonreporting
individuals, regardless of their positions.
24. The matter of "authorized" or "official" leaks needs close atten-
tion. If the appropriate official determines?it is in the national interest
to release for publication information that was classified until that point,
there should be a means of recording that fact. Such a record would
appropriately be kept somewhere in the Executive Office of the President.
This record could provide a means of avoiding the expenditure of resources
to investigate such disclosures as "leaks."
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25. Finally, the revolving door practice of appointing national media
personalities as top level government press officers should be carefully
reexamined. Such appointments must face the incumbents with conflicts of
interest and severely ambivalent feelings, both during and after their federal
service. It may be unrealistic to expect them to deny their colleagues
information which they feel is unjustifiably classified and to expect them
to forget, and never use, information they received officially.
26. Infonmation_Contilol - Some people believe there are enough
information control policies, procedures and regulations on the books to bring
the government to a complete halt if they were strictly applied. While this
view may have some merit, it should not serve as an excuse for not trying to
secure our sensitive information. The concept that security is everybody's
business must not be given lip service and then cast aside.
27. Except for the need for developing a strong, national information
control program for the emerging electronic information systems, it is
unlikely that more document control regulations &re needed or practicable.
What is needed is for everyone to be educated in-the existing policies and
procedures and to make a renewed effort to comply. While everyone claims to
know the regulations, it is likely that few could pass a comprehensive -test on
information security and control.
28. Steps to improve information control would include detailed
comparison of practices with policies; the reeducation of all personnel in
information security, and a motivational program to enhance awareness of the.
consequences of improper handling of sensitive intelligence. Better
information control is needed, but it must come from motivated people. More
regulations are not the answer.
29. Summary - Unauthorized public disclosures of classified information
in the news mediaare damaging to the national security. Our defense against
them must come from within, from those who are cleared for access to, and who
have signed agreements to protect, classified information. It is clear that
some of these people, for reasons of their own, have not kept their word. It
also appears that neither the overall level of concern about this situation
nor the government's capability for remedial action is up to the job. '
30. To encourage wholehearted support of our efforts to protect classi-
fied information, we must convince those who have agreed to keep the secrets
that they have a moral and legal obligation to keep that convenant. The rules
on SCI are simple and clear. It is inconceivable that anyone who gives such
information to uncleared individuals is unaware of what he is doing.
Therefore, such persons must be unconvinced of the seriousness of the security
program.
31. A massive reeducation program for all legitimate recipients of
classified information is the first step in attempting to achieve the
necessary change in attitude.
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32. A policy and resource commi tment to the solution of at least the
most flagrant cases of unauthorized disclosure is al so needed. This means the
devotion of sufficient FBI assets to i nvesti ?a ti ons and an al 1 -out effort to
obtain passage of unauthorized disclosure laws.
33. A severe ti ghteni ng of pol i ci es concerni ng rel ati onshi ps of cl eared
individuals with media representatives is essential. To be meaningful , this
must include strict oui deli nes, reporii ng procedures, information retrieval
capabilities, and impartial administrative penal i ti es for noncompliance.
34. Renewed awareness of i nformati on- control policies and procedures and
their importance to the national security is needed. If classified documents
can be turned over to the media or other unauthorized persons without bei ng
noticed, the system isn't working. . It must be made clear that "the system"
really is the people who operate it.
35. If you wish elaboration or action on any of the above items,
appropriate elements of the Intelligence Communi tY Staff are prepared to
assist in any way possible.
Attachment:
Draft unauthorized disclosures bill
?
All? paragraphs of the text
are classified SECRET
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New version of proposed 18 U.S.C. -791
is attached. Note that the cover language
specifies that the proposal would have
to be recoordinated within the Administration
before being sent to the Congress
-
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In the course of Administration development of the Fiscal
Year 1984 Intelligence Authorization Bill, the Intelligence
Community obtained from the Office of Management and Budget
clearance of a proposal to establish criminal penalties for
certain unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
The proposal was based in part on the report of the Interagency
Group on Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information
chaired by Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Civil Division)
Richard K. Willard. It was coordinated with Deputy Assistant
Attorney General (Criminal Division) Mark Richard, as well as
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Legislative Affairs.
For a number of reasons, including the issuance of NSDD-84
just before the Authorization Bill was forwarded to the
.7r
Congress, and in deference to the intelligence committees'
preference for handling the Intelligence Authorization in as
unobtrusive a manner as possible, the unauthorized disclosures
proposal ultimately was not transmitted as part of the
Authorization Bill. The climate for transmittal of the
proposal as part-of the?F-iscal -Year 1985 Int-e1-1-igence---
Authorization Bill also was considered unfavorable, due to
continuing controversy over NSDD-84.
The proposal (attached) has been modified to include former
officers or employees for a period of five years following
termination of their government service. It has been
reconfigured as a separate bill, and prepared for transmission
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at an opportune moment as an initiative from the DCI. The
proposal would have to be .recoordinated within the
Administration before being sent to the Congress.
2
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Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
This letter transmits for the consideration of the Congress
legislation to provide criminal penalties for the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information by individuals who have had
authorized access to such information. The legislation is
designed to deter unauthorized disclosures of classified infor-
mation, which damage the national security interests of the
United States and raise grave questions about the ability and
willingness of the United States Government to protect its
secrets.
With the exception of disclosures of information in the
narrow categories of atomic energy Restricted Data, communi-
cations intelligence or cryptography, and identities of covert
agents, disclosures of classified information by government
employees and others with authorized access to classified
information, such as government contractors, do not constitute
21E se criminal offenses. /n many circumstances such conduct
would violate the Espionage Act or statutes protecting
government property from theft, but a variety of legal and
practical problems usually prevent such prosecutions. The
proposed legislation contains straightforward, easily
understood, and readily enforceable provisions prohibiting
willfdr?Unauthorized disclosure of classified information by
government employees and others XI authorized access to
classified information, who have had
? The proposed legislation has been narrowly tailored to
establish criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures of
classified information only when committed by individuals who,
by virtue of their acceptance of employment in positions of
trust involving the national security, have freely undertaken
the legal and moral obligation to protect classified
information. The legislation has also been crafted carefully
to preserve access to classified information by the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government.
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Timely consideration of this legislation of great
importance to the continued security of the nation would be
greatly appreciated. The Office of Management and Budget has
advised that enactment of the proposed legislation would be in
accord with the President's program.
Sincerely,
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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Two versions of the
Injunction Provision
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23 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director; Intelligence Community Staff
Executive Director
Deputy Director for Administration
General Counsel
Director, Office of Legislative Liaison
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence .
SUBJECT: Intelligence Leaks and Counterterrorism Capabilities
1. We need a quick and intensive review of what could be done to
attack the leak problem again in every possible way - legislatively,
administratively, and every other conceivable way. The current staccato
of leaks, the increasingly damaging impact and expression of concern and
offers of support in the Conarecs mandate thic The latAct and mnct chnnle-
ing is the broadcasting
2. Particularly significant was Joe Biden's reaction - the tongue
lashing he gave Justice for their passive attitude and general ineffectiveness,
and his demand that, if the gray mail legislation which he sponsored was not
enough to enable them to go after leaks, they tell them what else needs to
be done. This all may make for an opportunity to launch a more effective
campaign against leaking which can cost us the great bulk of intelligence
assets if it keeps up.
3. I attach a memorandum prepared on how leaks damage our counterterrorism
capabilities. The OKI strongly disagrees with its passiveness and acceptance
of our continued exposure to leaks even to the extent of seeing leaks as
sometimes helpful.
4. Will all five of you get on this, working your respective areas of
authority and influence, to gather ideas and do the necessary research to
come up with a program of action.
5. I will meet with you whenever you are ready.
William J. Casey
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