I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE YOU TO A FACE-TO-FACE DINNER DISCUSSION ON TUESDAY DECEMBER 11 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 26, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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DCI
DDCI
EXDIR
D/ICS
DDI
DDA
DDS&T
;Chm/NIC
Compt
D/Pers
D/PAO
SA/IA
AO/DCI
C/IPD/OIS
Please pass recommendation
to Ms. STAT
PAO says DCI will not go - someoje from
SOVA being asked to go.
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 Approved For Release 2008/12/02 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5
Face-To-Face
A program to improve understanding of
international issues through direct
communication between Government
officials and private citizens sponsored
the Carnegie Endowment for
jointly
internatioal Peace and the American
Foreign Service Association.
Suite 900. 11 Dupont Circle. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
[phone]
CABLE: INTERPEACE
TELEX: 248329 CEIP
November 26, 1984
Executive Registry
84. 9816
Dear Colleague:
I would like to invite you to a Face-to-Face dinner discussion
on Tuesday. December 11, 1984, to hear an address by Dimitri Simes,
Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. Mr. Simes, a noted commentator on US-Soviet relations, will
speak on The Chernenko Politburo: How Serious a Threat, How
Credible a Partner. During his address, Mr. Simes will discuss
the structure of the present Soviet leadership and what decisions
he believes that it can make in the field of US-Soviet relations.
In addition to his position at the Carnegie Endowment, Mr.
Simes is Professorial Lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School
for Advanced International Studies. He is the author of
several books and numerous articles, a regular columnist
with The Christian Science Monitor and frequently appears on
US and foreign television programs focusing on East-West
topics. Mr. Simes graduated from the Moscow State University
with a M.A. in modern foreign history in 1969 and received
the Soviet equivalent of a Ph.D. from the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations at the USSR Academy of
Sciences in 1972. He came to the United States in 1973 and was
naturalized in 1980.
We will meet in the Carnegie Conference Center, 11 Dupont
Circle, 8th Floor (entrance on New Hampshire Avenue, across from
the Dupont Plaza Hotel entrance). Parking is usually available in
the Brookings lot on P Street between 17th and 18th. You are
invited for cocktails at 6:30 pm. Mr. Simes will speak at 7:00,
followed by discussion until dinner at 8:00. Discussion will con-
tinue after dinner until 10:00 pm. Mr. Simes' address will be
on-the-record, and the the questions and answers will be
off-the-record.
We look forward to seeing you on the 11th. Please respond
whether or not X21 __plan to attend by calling Betty Katzner
(797-6414) no later than Thursday, December 6th.
Ver--y, truly yours,.
Ronald A. DwVhht
Director
Face-to-Face Program
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Take Small Steps
Toward Moscow
By Dmitri.K. Simes
WASHINGTON - Now that the
Presidential election is over, Amer-
icans can at last return to business
and politics as usual. Among the
pressing issues at hand, few things
are more important than relations
with the Soviet Union. What's more,
for the first time since the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan in December
1979. there are tentative signs of im-
provement in the American-Soviet
relationship.
Washington and Moscow, each for
reasons of its own, seem to be inter-
ested in a limited accommodation.
Momentous obstacles remain, how-
ever, and an eagerness to do too much
too fast could backfire.
Campaign considerations alone
cannot explain the new American em,
phasis on dialogue with Moscow.
White House insiders insist that Mr.
Reagan believes that his large-scale
military program, a renewed Amer-
ican geopolitical assertiveness and
the new mood of self-confidence have
created an advantageous environ-
ment for seeking arrangements with
the Kremlin.
His Secretary of State, George P.
Shultz, and national security adviser,
Robert C. McFarlane, are known to
feel the same way. The meetings be-
tween Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet
Foreign Minister, and President Rea-
gan and Mr. Shultz went as well as
could be expected in today's climate
of superpower hostility.
Achieving even this modest success
required a number of bureaucratic
and policy decisions. For example,
the report of the General Advisory
Committee on Arms Control and Div
armament, which listed possible (and
impossible) Soviet violations, was at
first withheld and then downplayed.
The Administration, both publicly
and privately, made clear to the
Soviet Union that some mutual rF
strains on testing of antisatellite
weapons would be considered it Mos-
cow agreed to resume talks on strate-
gic and intermediate-range offensive
systems.
Recent Soviet public pronounce.
merits and private comments
strongly suggest that the Kremlin
continues to distrust Mr. Reagan and
that no relatively minor changes in
American rhetoric, or even action,
will change this attitude quickly. Yet,
Moscow has signaled that it is rela-
tively open to American overtures.
There appear to be four reasons be-
hind the cautious Soviet willingness to
explore a diplomatic relationship
with the United States. First, the Rus-
sians tried a posture of uncompromis-
ing belligerence for months and it
backfired - deployments of Amer-
ican missiles in Europe go on without
much opposition.
Beyond that, the septuagenarians
damina.ing the Politburo are uncom-
fortable with a highly volatile situa-
tion of unrestricted rivalry. Soviet
leaders would prefer to block a re-
newed arms race that could cost the
Soviet Union dearly and tilt the mili-
tary balance in America's favor.
The Soviet leadership situation -
while still uncertain - contributes to
greater superpower interaction. Kon-
stantin U. Chernenko is now firmly
enough in charge to speak for the col-
lective leadership, and the Soviet
decision-making process seems to be
functioning more smoothly. The
Chernenko Politburo is hardly in a
position to undertake a much needed
fundamental reassessment of Soviet
foreign policy. But it seems capable
of conducting routine business, in-
cluding superpower diplomacy.
Finally, and most importantly, the
Russians increasingly fear that (to
use their terminology) the interna-
tional correlation of forces is shifting
against them. Their instinct is to
hang tough but to give priority to pro-
tecting their own position rather than
expanding geopolitically.
Nevertheless, neither side is ready
for a second detente. During a period
of domestic difficulties, the Soviet
elite needs Mr. Reagan's America-as
an external enemy. In addition, the
anticipation of yet another political
succession in the Kremlin discour-
ages ambitious politicians from ex-
perimenting with the bold approaches
needed to reach a major agreement
with the United States. In Washing-
ton, the naysayers maintain great in-
fluence inside the Administration.
.They will use Mr. Reagan's landslide
victory as evidence of a popular man-
date for an uncompromising stand
against the "evil empire."
The Russians, by their rhetoric and
deeds, traditionally help American
Dmitri K. Simes is senior associate at
the Carnegie Endowment for lnterna-
tional Peace.
Momentous
obstacles .
remain
critics of rapprochement. Even U
Moscow is willing to bargain ear-
nestly on arms control and other
issues, it will probably persist in ac
tion America= find abhorrent.
While Mr. Shultz may prefer to avoid
linking Soviet actions with negotia-
tions, will the Administration be able
to escape it amid public outrage over
Kremlin misbehavior?
Thus. too ambitious a pursuit of a
comprehensive settlement with the
Soviet Union may be counterproduc-
tive. Fundamental differences cannot
be resolved while the Soviet union re-
mains a totalitarian, global military
empire. And even a more modest
compromise may be beyond reach
after so much hostility has been accu-
mulated on both sides.
We should instead focus an small
but realistic measures that would
make sense in their own right - not as
stepping stones to a grander compact
- and that would be supported by the
American public and would contribute
to stability. Ratification of treaties on
nuclear threshold testing and peaceful
nuclear explosions, urged by Mr.
Chernenko, are in both sides' interest
and are not terribly controversial in
either country. So is Mr. Reagan's
suggestion (at Soviet urging) to pur-
sue contraints on antisatellite weap.
ore and his idea of holding regular,
Cabinet- and subcabinet-level meet-
ings between American and Soviet
representatives.
Those inside. and particularly out-
side, the Administration who want
more are hoping that these small
steps would contribute to larger-scale
undertakings. Much would depend on
Soviet willingness and ability to re-
spond. But even if the Russians con-
tinued to dig in their heels, marginal
but genuine diplomatic arrange.
ments would help de-escalate ten-
sions in the superpower rivalry. To
neglect such opportunities to build a
new rapprochement would risk end-
ing up with nothing. In cooperating
with the Russians, it is wise to aim
lower in order to hit higher.
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