SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001900160003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 195
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 16, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Add-on
WASHINGTON
October 16, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Selected National Security Issues
Executive Registry
84. 7027/2
Enclosed are two copies of the September 1984 Selected National
Security issues book for your use. The book summarizes our
objectives and accomplishments and provides talking points for
the specific issues selected. We intend to publish an updated
version quarterly. The National Security Council Executive
Secretary has a limited number of additional copies.
I would appreciate any comments and suggestions you may have to
assist us in updating and maintaining this book as a useful aid
for dealing with national security issues.
Attachment
Selected National Security Issues, September 1984
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SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
This is a compilation of selected national security issues,
national objectives, Administration accomplishments during the
past four years, and key talking points for each issue. We
selected these particular issues not only because of their
significance in national security affairs, but also because of
their high interest. This document is not intended.to be a
comprehensive or in-depth review of our national security policy.
However, we do hope that it serves a useful purpose by providing
insight into our selected national security policies.
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Selected National Security Issues
September 1984
Table of Contents
Page
Overview ....................................................1
Regional Issues
The Soviet Union .......................................6
Eastern Europe..... ............................ .10
Western Europe ........................................13
Japan .................................................16
Peoples Republic of China .............................18
East Asia/Pacific Basin ...............................20
Israel/Arab States/Lebanon ............................23
Iran-Iraq War .........................................25
Afghanistan/South Asia ................................27
North Africa ..........................................29
Africa: Security .....................................30
Africa: Development ..................................33
Latin America/Caribbean ...............................36
Global Issues
International Economics ...............................39
International Energy ..................................43
Terrorism .............................................45
Arms Control ..........................................47
Deterrence ............................................51
Strategic Modernization ...............................52
ICBM Modernization ....................................55
Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise missile .............57
Strategic Defense Initiative ..........................59
ASAT Development and Arms Control .....................61
Space. ........................................... ..63
Military Capability/Readiness .........................66
Nuclear Weapons Modernization in NATO .................69
Non-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons ......................71
Technology Transfer...... ........................ ...73
Revitalization of Special Operations Forces ........... 75
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SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
OVERVIEW
The two most important foreign policy questions any
Administration faces are:
o Where does America stand?
o What does America stand for?
Answers to these were increasingly in doubt in the 70's. They
are no longer. By providing clear answers we have helped to make
the world a safer place and to keep it safe in the future.
The Starting Point
Before January 1981, international affairs had come to seem
especially troubling for Americans. The reason was simple -- the
actions of the Carter Administration had raised doubts, around
the world and for our own people, about basic questions like:
o military security: Would the U.S. continue to get weaker
or regain her strength?
o Domestic economy: Would we be able to lick the problem of
inflation and low growth?
o International economy: Would we continue to work for free
trade or retreat into self-defeating protectionism?
o Arms control: Would we continue to accept one-sided
agreements or insist on equality and real reductions?
o Alliances: Would we stand by our friends and be able to
get them to follow through on commitments to us?
o Regional crises: Would the U.S. continue to lose the
influence necessary for promoting regional stability and
peace? Was it still better to be a friend of the U.S.
than Soviet Union?
A President must act. And he must be prepared to give clear
answers to these question. He can't expect to protect America's
interests by:
o Claiming the problems we face are too hard,
o Pretending that Cuban troops roaming around the Third
World are a "stabilizing" force,
o Offering our friends just enough help to fail, or
o Settling slowly but surely for second best.
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If this is how we act, it's absolutely clear what we'll get. The
Carter Administration claimed the invasion of Afghanistan opened
its eyes to the danger of Soviet expansion, but then gave so
little help to Pakistan -- the country most threatened by the
invasion -- that it was rejected as "peanuts." Nothing isolates
,,America more than weakness and unreliability.
Accomplishments
The job the American people asked us to do was to rebuild, and
make the world a safer place again. This is precisely what we've
done. Soviet aggression has not claimed one square inch of
territory since 1981. We have made clear and steady progress in
reversing the global trends that we inherited. And we have
worked to restore the strength on which successful American
diplomacy and effective agreements depend:
o In Europe we and our allies stood up -- united -- to the
most intense campaign of Soviet intimidation in 25 years.
o On arms control we've made revolutionary proposals that
would really increase everybody's security.
o Our own recovery and the strategy we and our allies forged
at the Williamsburg summit are helping to revive the
international economy. We are showing that it can be done
without resorting to trade-war tactics.
o In the Middle East, we have presented the most
far-reaching peace plan ever put forward by the U.S. And
our friends in the region, Israel and the moderate Arabs,
again know they can count on us. We are continuing to
improve our relations with the moderate Arabs, while
simultaneously expanding our security cooperation with
Israel.
o In Central America, we've met the challenge of military
subversion and expansionism. We've helped the first
democratic government of El Salvador in years to protect
itself; working with Caribbean nations, we helped return
the government of Grenada to its people.
o In Africa we have been diplomatic mediators, helping to
bring about the first non-aggression agreements ever
between South Africa and her neighbors, and using our
influence to seek solutions to problems rather than
confrontation.
o We have united the free world against repression in Poland
and the Soviet war of conquest in Afghanistan. There is a
powerful message in the fact that most of the world's
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insurgencies are now fighting against the Soviet Union or
Soviet clients. These are the true national liberation
movements of our time.
o The President's personal diplomacy has built the best
relations our country has ever had with Japan and China.
Good relations with each of these Asian powers has not
been at the expense of bad relations with the other. We
are working with both to improve their ability to defend
themselves.
o We are reaching out to all friendly nations of the Pacific
Basin, to seek enhanced economic and security ties Th
this dynamic region so vital to America's future.
o We have made dramatic progress in working with others to
curb the read of nuclear weapons to new states and to
unstable regions of the world.
o We no longer fear energy shortages -- oil imports are way
down, our reserves are high, and we've forged effective
emergency energy agreements with our allies.
o We have taken control of the tide of strategic technology
to the USSR, eliminated preferential credit terms for the
Soviets, and reduced the risk of European dependence on
Soviet energy.
This is where America stands. And because what we have achieved
is ideep and durable, it opens the door to still broader
opportunities in the years ahead.'
Next Steps: Looking Ahead
America is stronger today than four years ago. But we didn't
restore our strength for strength's sake.
What America stands for is what it should always stand for --
peace, prosperity and democracy. And it has to do more than
treat these as slogans -- it has to know what it takes to get
there, and have the vision to set bold goals.
We've shown we can do that, but the American people deserve to
know what the agenda for the next four years will be.
Peace. We are all for peace. Our people are entitled to
security. The question is how to turn rhetoric into results.
-- Conduct relations with the Soviet Union based on strict
reciprocity and true restraint. Seek and achieve
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agreements based on real reductions in nuclear forces.
Our proposals are still on the table; we encourage the
Soviets to come back.
-- Affirm our long-term commitment to reduce mankind's
terrible reliance on nuclear weapons, by exploring the
ti technology of strategic defense, and by improving the
conventional capabilities of this country and our allies.
-- Seek immediate breakthroughs in other areas where peace is
at risk: e.g., preventing proliferation of nuclear
weapons to new countries, turning back the tide of
international terrorism, resolving dangerous regional
wars, and showing countries that have looked to the Soviet
Union the viability of the democratic, free enterprise
alternative.
Prosperity.
Stirrings in the international economy reflect our
own vibrant
blip?
recovery. How to assure that this is not just a
Continue
the
responsible policies at home that have put
us back
on
our feet. This is central to worldwide
growth,
but
also to other goals. The discipline we
showed
in
attacking problems has increased confidence
in America across the board.
This can be the basis of a second goal: reaching and
implementing a world consensus on free market policies
to assure an enduring economic recovery. In
particular, focus on liberalized trade and financial
stability.
Put the protectionist temptation behind us. An open
world economy is the best -- only -- way to sustain a
recovery in which whole world participates. We want to
get others to "swear off" too by reducing barriers to
investment, etc.
Solve the international debt problem in a way that
treats the disease not just the symptoms. We are
already helping democratic friends like Mexico and
Argentina work their way out of their crisis, and on
conditions that will require responsible economic
management in the future.
Democracy. America believes in a future of democratic
possibilities, and knows that in the long run democracy is the
best peace program we have to offer. Progress -- 90% of Latin
America's people now live in countries that are democratic or on
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a transition timetable. And countries that seemed to have no
hope of democracy -- like Argentina and Guatemala -- have made
major breakthroughs.
o Goals:
ti -- Make the Americas the hemisphere of democracy in this
decade. The steadiness of this Administration's
policies is one part of making this possible. The
recommendations of the bipartisan Kissinger Commission
on Central America must be a further pledge to this
process. Issue the challenge of democracy to nations
around the world, doing what we can to encourage trends
toward democracy and to discourage those who would
repress their people or help others whose formula for
government is repression instead of democracy.
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REGIONAL ISSUES
SOVIET UNION
Issue:
How can the United States further deter Soviet direct and
indirect aggression and reduce the risk of a U.S.-Soviet
war?
Objectives:
o Reduce, and eventually eliminate, the use and threat of
force in solving international disputes;
o Reduce the vast stockpiles of weapons in the world,
particularly nuclear weapons, on a balanced, stabilizing,
and verifiable basis;
o Establish a better working relationship with the Soviet
Union, one marked by greater cooperation and under-
standing; and
o Deter Soviet aggression and to facilitate negotiation of
agreements which would reduce tension and diminish the
threat of war.
In pursuing these objectives, our approach is based on three
guiding principles:
o Realism, which means that we must recognize the nature of
the world we live in and the Soviet system, and must not
sweep problems under the rug, but must deal with them
forthrightly.
o Strength, which is more than military power; it is an
amalgam of political unity and will, economic health, and
an adequate defense. The Soviet Union respects strength;
it takes advantage of weakness.
o Dialogue, which means that we are prepared to discuss the
problems that divide us and to work for practical and fair
solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.
Accomplishments:
o The world is safer today than it was four years ago. Our
ability to deter aggression is being restored, and the
growing tide of Soviet direct and indirect aggression we
saw in the 1970's has receded.
o Our global alliances and traditional friendships,
essential to deterring Soviet aggression, have been
repaired and are sound.
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o The Soviet Union has also avoided actions which could
cause direct conflict between us as opposed to what
happened, for instance, in 1973, when Soviet preparations
to intervene directly in the Middle East caused us to go
on a world-wide strategic alert. NATO's call for the
deployment of INF missiles in Europe to counter the threat
of the Soviet SS-20's is a case in point.
o we have placed far-reaching and ambitious arms reduction
proposals on the table.
o we have moved to place our working relationship on a more
businesslike footing, and to increase contacts between our
societies.
o we have made it clear that our cooperation with the Soviet
Union will depend to a great extent on Soviet compliance
with existing agreements; including those on arms control,
human rights, and other major issues.
o We have established a pattern of consultation on regional
issues. Despite our fundamental disagreements on many of
these, consultations help us and the Soviets to avoid
actions which could escalate into direct conflict.
o We have in place a policy designed for the long term,
since management of our relations with the Soviet Union
must be steady and must avoid the rapid fluctuations of
the past, which weakened our ability to defend our
interests. It is based upon a realistic assessment of the
Soviet Union, and on the recognition that we must preserve
peace between us as we work toward solving problems.
Talking Points:
o Our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is aimed at
achieving a lessened reliance on the use or threat of
force, a reduction in nuclear and other armaments, and a
more constructive U.S.-Soviet working relationship. We
also seek to deter further Soviet direct and indirect
aggression in the world.
o During the 1970's the USSR increased its military power
far beyond its defensive needs and used force and the
implied application of force to expand its control over
other countries.
o Either directly or through surrogates the Soviets have
supported the establishment of communist regimes in Africa
(Angola, Ethiopia), in Asia (Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos),
in Latin America and the Caribbean (Nicaragua, El Salvador
and Grenada), and blatantly invaded a neutral country
(Afghanistan). They turned Communist Cuba into a base for
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aggression in Latin America and Africa. At the same time,
they are attempting to undermine NATO by deploying SS-20
nuclear missiles against Western Europe.
o This pattern of aggression not only poses a threat to many
independent nations, but ultimately to American security
and to the American way of life.
o During the same period, the Soviet Union reached nuclear
parity with us, and in some areas pulled ahead of us, in
some aspects of strategic nuclear capabilities and
particularly in conventional armaments.
o This Administration has moved decisively to contain Soviet
expansionism. No country has fallen to Soviet aggression
since 1981 and, despite its frequent saber-rattling and
truculence, Moscow has been more cautious in its military
behavior over the past four years. This is largely due to
our refurbishing of our deterrent capacity and
strengthening of our alliances.
o At the same time, we have created a sound basis for
realistic and peaceful management of our overall
relationship with the Soviet Union. In the past four
years, the United States has made dozens of specific
proposals to the Soviet Union which, if accepted, would
reduce tensions, lower arms levels and provide for a
better and more realistic working relationship.
o We have agreed to upgrade the "hotline" for crisis
communications between our capitals.
o We are discussing extending our agreements on avoiding
incidents at sea and on cooperation in fishing.
o We have proposed reviving agreements on cooperation in
environmental protection, housing, health, and
agriculture.
o we have renewed our agreement on consular, economic,
industrial, and technical cooperation.
o We have proposed conducting a joint simulated space rescue
mission.
o We are discussing again the proposal to open consulates in
New York and Kiev.
o We are negotiating to resolve differences on our maritime
boundary off Alaska.
o We are proposing to discuss new uses of the hotline,
search and rescue procedures for those lost at sea, and
joint military and diplomatic communications.
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o While Moscow has refused since December 1983 to negotiate
with us on reducing nuclear arms, we believe that it is in
the interest of both countries to negotiate verifiable
agreements for lower arms levels, and to improve our
relationship in other respects. We will continue our
ti efforts, and believe that the Soviet leadership will
eventually come to understand that such negotiations are
in its interest as well.
o Until the Soviets agree to real arms reductions, it is
essential for us to continue our currently planned defense
modernization program. If this program is curtailed
without verifiable agreements to constrain threatening
Soviet programs, the Soviet leaders will have little
incentive to negotiate, but will simply wait in the hope
of achieving their objectives without any concessions on
their part.
o The Soviets have effectively exploited Western strategic
technology to modernize their military capabilities. Our
own modernization program is based on achieving
conventional deterrence through technological superiority,
rather than numerical equality. We will continue our
determined efforts to stem the flow of strategic
technology to the Soviets to ensure that we derive the
maximum deterrent value from our modernization program.
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EASTERN EUROPE
Issue:
Given U.S.-Soviet tensions and the Soviet campaign to
reimpose more stringent controls on Eastern Europe, how
ti can we maintain and improve our relations with East
European countries?
Objectives:
o Differentiate our policies toward East European countries
to encourage domestic liberalization, diversity, and more
autonomous foreign policies.
o Promote security through enhanced trade, economic and
political cooperation.
o With those countries that manifest foreign policy autonomy
or domestic liberalization, stimulate and further develop
the East-West dialogue through cultural and scientific
exchanges, international meetings, high-level visits,
bilateral councils, and government-to-government contacts.
o Help foster genuine national reconciliation in Poland that
includes dialogue among the Government, Church, and the
people (especially the Polish workforce); restoration of
free trade unions; implementation of economic reform; and
an enhanced role for the Church.
o maintain our strong support for an independent, unified,
non-aligned, economically viable, and stable Yugoslavia.
Accomplishments:
o In spite of U.S.-Soviet tensions and tighter Soviet
controls in East Europe, we have succeeded in preventing
the deterioration of U.S. relations with several East
European countries and, in fact, have strengthened
bilateral ties with Hungary and Romania through a policy
of differentiation.
o We have improved U.S.-Hungarian relations significantly,
as manifested in a series of mutual high-level visits,
resolution of all family reunification cases, Hungary's
adherence to the conditions of MFN status, and our support
for their membership in the IMF in 1982.
o We have improved the special U.S.-Romanian relationship
through frequent exchanges and mutually beneficial
political and economic steps. Romania has continued its
independent foreign policy -- most visibly in its
criticism of Moscow's new nuclear deployments and its
decision to ignore the Soviet Olympic boycott. Also, by
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establishing the U.S.-Romanian Human Rights Roundtable, we
have been able to communicate successfully the importance
we attach to immigration and overall human rights issues.
o The vice President's trip to Eastern Europe in September
1983 served as a visible manifestation of our
ti differentiation policy and furthered bilateral dialogue
with key East European leaders. His visits to Yugoslavia,
Romania, and Hungary provided a foundation for durable
improvement in U.S.-East European relations, and his
speech in Vienna during the trip was the first clear,
high-level articulation of our differentiation policy.
o Our sanctions policy toward Poland has contributed to the
recent moderation displayed by Warsaw (the declaration of
amnesty for all political prisoners); has served and will
continue to serve as an effective lever to encourage the
Polish Government toward more concrete progress (economic
reform, restoration of free trade unions, etc.); and has
also enabled us to respond to positive measures taken by
the Polish Government with equally significant steps.
o Over the last three years, we have provided over $100
million in humanitarian aid to Poland. Specifically, the
Administration has assisted voluntary agencies (CRS, CARE,
and Project Hope) by providing food, medicine and other
humanitarian aid to the Polish people through
non-governmental channels.
o We have bolstered our bilateral relations with Yugoslavia
through such steps as' the multilateral "Friends of
Yugoslavia" economic assistance package in which the U.S.
played a key role; and hosting the visit of President
Spiljak to the U.S. in 1984 -- the first top-level
Yugoslav visit to the U.S. since 1978.
Talking Points:
o We have successfully maintained, through our policy of
differentiation, good bilateral relations with several
East European countries, despite overall East-West
tensions and persistent Soviet efforts to tighten
political controls.
o We have rejected any notion of there having been a
"lawful" division of Europe. There was no agreement at
Yalta to divide Europe into "spheres of influence."
Rather, the Soviet Union pledged itself to grant full
independence to Poland and other states in East Europe,
and to hold free elections. The Soviet violation of these
obligations is a root cause of East-West tensions today.
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o Our strong economic recovery has enabled us to support
some East European (Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary) efforts
to resolve short-term liquidity problems and implement
long-term economic reform and stabilization efforts.
o With respect to Poland, we have maintained, a measured,
effective step-by-step approach under which we are easing
our sanctions in direct response to meaningful
liberalization measures taken by the Polish Government.
We have also provided humanitarian aid through
non-governmental channels (totaling over $100 million)
over the last three years. It is essential that the
regime move toward genuine dialogue and reconciliation
with all elements of Polish society, including the
workforce.
o With respect to Yugoslavia, we have maintained good
relations through high-level visits, continued bilateral
trade and mutually beneficial commercial activity.
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WESTERN EUROPE
How can the United States most effectively expand and
strengthen our longstanding and deep political, economic,
and military ties with and interests in Western Europe?
Objectives:
o Strengthen the NATO Alliance and our political and
military relations with other Western European nations.
o Neutralize Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from its
West European Allies.
o Make effective and meaningful arms control an essential
element in strengthening peace and security.
o Stimulate further the economic recovery of our European
Allies and friends.
o Promote closer U.S.-West European coordination of trade
and financial policies.
o Ensure that we and our Allies have access to sufficient
energy supplies to meet Western security needs.
o Curb the flow of militarily significant technologies,
products, and resources from the West to the Soviet Union
and its Allies.
o Devise an effective U.S.-Allied policy to combat
international terrorism.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has put relations with our European
friends and Allies on a stronger and steadier course.
This was partly accomplished via frequent meetings between
the President and key European leaders, including two
Presidential trips to Europe.
o We have worked closely with our Allies to develop
coordinated policies for addressing problems beyond the
NATO area. This has included especially close
consultations with regard to the Middle East and the
Iran-Iraq war, where we have reached agreement within the
International Energy Agency on how to handle a major
reduction in oil supplies. This has helped to calm the
oil market and keep the price of oil down.
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o In the absence of an arms control agreement, we have begun
deploying INF missiles in Europe, thereby shoring up the
deterrent whose credibility was being called into question
by Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles and other
significant force improvements.
Q INF deployment, begun after the closest and most intensive
consultations in NATO history, has helped neutralize
Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from Europe and has
sent Moscow a strong signal of Alliance resolve and
solidarity.
o At the same time, we and our Allies remain fully committed
toward achieving significant arms reduction. The Alliance
recently demonstrated its continuing interest in moving in
this direction by deciding unilaterally to withdraw an
additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Europe.
o We have played a major role in developing measures to
improve NATO's conventional defenses through better
utilization of emerging technologies and enhanced arms
cooperation, as in the U.S.-FRG Patriot program.
o The Administration has successfully renewed military
basing agreements with Spain, Portugal, and Greece that
are vital to our deterrence strategy.
o The U.S. economic recovery has helped stimulate robust
non-inflationary economic growth in West European
countries. (European economies grew 2.4% in 1983; the
forecast for 1984 is .4.5%.')
o Agreement has been reached to discuss GATT and a new round
of trade negotiations, including trade with and among
developing countries. These initiatives will strengthen
the economic expansion in the U.S. and Western Europe, and
help spread the recovery to the LDCs.
o Together with our Allies, we have begun to develop a
comprehensive approach to resolving the world debt
problem.
o We have agreed with our Allies not to subsidize the Soviet
economy or aid Soviet military expansion by offering
preferential trading terms or easy credits.
o We have agreed with our Allies to restrict the flow of
products, materials, and technology which would increase
Warsaw Pact military capabilities.
o We have helped to foster a more balanced and realistic
understanding among our Allies of the Soviet threat and
the means by which the Soviets seek to achieve their aims.
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o We have agreed with the Europeans on a strategy to reduce
European dependency on the Soviet Union as an energy
supplier.
o We have reached agreement with our Allies to explore the
possibility of a joint space station. _
S
o We have agreed with our Allies on concrete steps to combat
international terrorism.
Talking Points:
o Our objectives in our relations with our Western European
Allies and friends have been to expand and strengthen our
political, economic, and military cooperation; to assist
in spurring their economic recovery; and to negate Soviet
efforts to sow discord among us.
o The western Alliance system has become strong again. we
have excellent relations with all of our Allies, and
President Reagan has developed strong personal ties with
many European leaders. As President Reagan said when he
met with the NATO Foreign Ministers in May 1984, "For us,
our NATO partnership is an anchor, a fixed point in a
turbulent world."
o We are working closely with our Allies in a number of
areas of fundamental importance to us all. These include:
the pursuit of peace and arms control with the Soviet
Union; planning cooperative responses to a possible oil
shortage; resolving- the' world debt problem; restricting
the flow of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and
its Allies; reducing European dependency on Soviet energy;
exploring the possibility of a joint space station; and
combating international terrorism.
o The Alliance is in fundamental agreement regarding the
nature of the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and its
Allies. Despite Soviet threats, NATO is deploying INF
missiles to counter the SS-20 deployments, has reached a
new consensus on preventing the flow of militarily
significant technologies to the East, and has undertaken a
program to enhance NATO's conventional defense capability.
o The U.S. economic expansion has provided the impetus for
robust non-inflationary growth in West Europe. Other
joint initiatives, designed to eliminate protectionist
tendencies and promote trade with developed as well as
less-developed nations, will continue to strengthen the
economic expansion in the U.S. and West Europe and help
spread the recovery to the LDCs.
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Issue:
How should the United States manage the increasingly
complex relationship with Japan?
Objectives:
o Maintain and strengthen our excellent bilateral relations.
o Encourage Tokyo to meet its declared commitments for
self-defense.
o Continue to manage our economic and trade relations in a
careful and sustained manner.
o Enhance our ability to compete openly with the Japanese in
high-technology.
o Seek Japanese support for our key security and other
policies in other parts of the world.
o Urge Japan to import more U.S. energy.
Accomplishments:
o The President and Prime Minister Nakasone have established
a close personal working relationship which has led to
increased U.S.-Japanese, cooperation in economic and
security areas.
o In the trade area, Japan has liberalized its market to
enable greater import of U.S. goods, including beef and
citrus.
o The Japanese have faithfully abided by the voluntary auto
restraint agreement, limiting their export of automobiles
to the U.S.
o The President and Prime Minister Nakasone have agreed to a
long term energy cooperation program which will mean
thousands of newly created U.S. jobs and greater security
for both nations.
o The Finance ministers of each country have endorsed a plan
to further open Japanese financial markets, which, by
"internationalizing" the yen, should improve the
yen-dollar relationship over the longer term.
o In the defense area, Japan has agreed to an expanded
defense role which, if carried out, will aid global and
regional deterrence.
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Talking Points:
o The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the foundation of U.S.
policy in the Pacific.
o The President's trip to Japan in November 198.3 and the
Vice President's follow-up in May 1984 strengthened U.S.-
Japanese ties and the partnership for peace existing
between our two countries.
o Japan has opened further its trading and financial
markets, has committed itself to importing more energy
from the United States over the longer-term, and has
agreed to increase its regional defense expenditures.
o We are pleased that the Japanese have allocated more funds
to improve their defense establishment, and that they have
committed themselves to pursue more market-opening
measures. Nonetheless, Japan has an obligation to take on
even greater responsibility in both the military and
international economic areas.
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PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
How can the United States facilitate continued, steady
improvement in a long-term relationship with China?
ti
Objectives:
o Provide conditions conducive to continued growth in our
cultural, economic, and trade relations.
o Increase our dialogue with Beijing on political and
strategic matters of joint concern.
o Demonstrate to the Chinese the similarity of our global
objectives.
o Enhance our mutually beneficial relationship with China
without compromising our moral and legal commitments to
the people of Taiwan.
Accomplishments:
o The highly successful visits of Premier Zhao to the U.S.
and President Reagan to China reflect both countries'
strong determination to improve their ties.
o Over the past three years, we have signed a number of
agreements which will lead to expanded commercial and
cultural ties, including most recently a tax treaty, which
will avoid double taxation and facilitate joint commercial
ventures, and a protocol on cooperation management,
industrial science, and technology.
o The U.S. has liberalized controls over exporting high-
technology products such as computers and laboratory
instruments to China.
o The U.S. and China have begun a limited but important
cooperative relationship designed to strengthen Chinese
military defensive capability.
o The U.S. welcomed the Chinese to the 1984 Olympics after a
hiatus of 32 years, along with a team representing the
People of Taiwan.
Talking Points:
o With Premier Zhao's visit to the U.S. last January and the
President's return visit to China in April, we have shown
the world how important the relationship is to both
countries and how determined Washington and Beijing are to
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strengthen it. Under President Reagan's leadership, our
ties with China have become closer than they have been at
any time since our re-establishment of relations in 1972.
o We are realistic about our relationship, frankly
acknowledging the fundamental differences in ideology and
ti institutions between our two societies. We do not
minimize our differences, but neither are we dominated by
them.
o We seek to enhance our mutually beneficial relationship
with China in the areas of cultural, economic and trade
relations, without compromising our moral and legal
commitments to the people of Taiwan.
o U.S.-Chinese cooperation and understanding contribute to
peace and stability in Asia and in the world. We share
many of the same foreign policy objectives. We have begun
a limited but important cooperative arrangement designed
to strengthen Chinese defensive capability.
o President Reagan feels that bilateral progress in five
areas -- trade, technology, investment, student exchanges,
and exchanges of scientific and managerial expertise is
particularly promising in assisting China's modernization
efforts.
o Our trade with each other shows great promise for the
future, particularly in areas such as machinery,
technology, oil equipment, petroleum, agricultural, and
manufacturing products.
o Americans have invested almost $700 million in joint
ventures and offshore oil exploration in China, making the
U.S. China's largest foreign investor. Some 50 Chinese
firms have established offices or branches in the United
States, and China has invested in several joint ventures
in the U.S.
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EAST ASIA/PACIFIC BASIN
What should the United States do to facilitate the growth
of secure, prosperous, and politically stable nations,
closely associated with U.S. principles and goals, in
Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Basin?
Objectives:
o Continue developing a comprehensive Pacific Basin
development strategy that will enhance regional
cooperation with the U.S. throughout the area.
o Support the continued strengthening of U.S. economic,
political, and security ties with the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
o Deter North Korean aggression by continuing to provide a
U.S. force presence as well as security assistance to the
Republic of Korea.
o Encourage direct talks between North and South Korea while
discouraging efforts to involve the U.S. in them.
o Resolve the Southeast Asia POW/MIA issue as a matter of
the highest national priority.
o Maintain our historically close ties with Australia and
New Zealand and enhance regional security cooperation
under the ANZUS treaty organization.
o Encourage the development of friendly, democratic Pacific
Island nations with foreign policies supportive of U.S.
interests.
Accomplishments:
o The President's trips to Asia in 1983 and 1984, the Vice
President's trip last May, and Secretary Shultz's visit
this summer clearly affirmed our commitment to a policy of
close cooperation with the countries of the region.
o We have moved well along with our friends and Allies in
the region in the process of forging a Pacific Basin
development strategy. The endeavor was discussed
regionally for the first time at ASEAN's July meeting in
Jakarta, where the members agreed to concentrate first on
human resources development throughout the area.
o We have actively supported the economic development of the
ASEAN countries and have established excellent bilateral
relations with each of them.
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o U.S.-Korean relations are excellent, security ties have
never been stronger, and our expanding economic
relationship is taking on increasing significance.
o This Administration has established close personal ties at
all levels with Australian and New Zealand officials.
o Bilateral treaties of friendship with four Pacific nations
the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and New Zealand
(for Tokelan) -- were signed by the President and ratified
by the Senate. The treaties resolve long-standing
conflicting territorial claims and preserve U.S. fishing
rights and other interests.
Talking Points:
o The nations of the Pacific Basin represent the most
dynamic and fastest-growing economies in the Free World.
The President has noted that: "I see America and our
Pacific neighbors as nations of the future going forward
together in a mighty enterprise to build dynamic growth
economies and a safer world."
o We have strongly supported ASEAN's economic and political
activities and have simultaneously increased our security
cooperation with the individual member states. We have
encouraged the ASEAN countries to continue their forward-
looking economic policies based on free trade. We are
encouraging increased U.S. trade and investment in the
region.
o We are supporting ASEAN nations in forging a Pacific Basin
development concept.
o The U.S. strongly backs ASEAN's quest for a negotiated
settlement in Kampuchea. At the same time we have made it
clear that the POW/MIA matter remains the most important
bilateral issue between ourselves and Vietnam. This issue
must be fully resolved to our satisfaction before there
can be any discussion of normalizing our relations with
Hanoi.
o The United States will maintain its security commitments
to the Republic of Korea. We will continue, however, to
urge North and South Korea to ease tensions through
bilateral negotiations.
o We conducted a major review of the ANZUS Treaty in 1983
when a new government came to power in Australia. The
review reaffirmed the organization's relevance and
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importance to the security of all three partners. That
relevance and importance is unaffected, we believe, by
changes in the political parties exercising. power in any
of the member countries.
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ISRAEL/ARAB STATES/LEBANON
How can the United States effectively improve prospects
for a lasting peace between Israel and her-Arab neighbors
and assist Lebanon in attaining unity and stability?
Objectives:
o Resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict through a just and
lasting settlement, achieved by direct negotiations among
the parties to the conflict.
o Facilitate the improvement of relations between Egypt and
Israel in accordance with their peace treaty.
o Ensure the security of Israel within defensible and
recognized international borders.
o Expand U.S. relations with selected Arab states.
o Support the development of a strong, independent central
government in Lebanon.
o Obtain the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
Accomplishments:
o The United States took the lead in setting up the
Multinational Force' and Observers in the Sinai. The
success of this venture made it possible to return the
Sinai to Egypt.
o The President's peace initiative of September 1, 1982 set
forth a balanced set of positions which the parties to the
Arab-Israeli conflict know the U.S. will stand by as soon
as negotiations are resumed.
o The agreement of May 17, 1983 providing for the withdrawal
of Israeli troops from Lebanon, although since abrogated
by Lebanon under Syrian pressure, was achieved as the
result of strenuous efforts by the United States.
o We did the right thing by'pursuing our peacekeeping effort
in Lebanon which helped preserve a relative peace for
almost fifteen months and reduced the daily slaughter of
innocent civilians.
o The presence of our Marines and the Multinational Force in
Beirut also gave the government of President Amin Gemayel
a sorely needed opportunity to organize and reduce the
fighting in his country.
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o At the request of the Government of Egypt, we assisted --
in cooperation with other western nations -- in
mine-clearing operations in the Gulf of Suez following the
mining of this vital waterway by an unknown party. We
also assisted the Saudi Government in like manner in their
waters near Jidda and Yanbu.
We reached agreement with Israel late last year to set up
a Joint Political Military Group to plan and coordinate
strategic cooperation and to begin negotiations leading to
the establishment of a free trade area. We continue to
make progress on both fronts.
Talking Points:
o Israel and her Arab neighbors have been in conflict since
the State of Israel was founded in 1948. Ever since that
time, it has been our policy both to help Israel survive
and defend itself and to work with Israel and the Arab
States to help them resolve their differences peacefully.
This Administration has reaffirmed and re-emphasized these
two key aspects of our overall Middle East policy while
attempting to help both parties understand that U.S.
security cooperation with them is essential to achieve our
mutual goal of peace in the region.
o As a nation, we have invested a great deal in working for
peace in the Middle East. Although not all these
investments have yet paid tangible dividends, they serve
to demonstrate our deep interest in helping bring peace,
freedom, and prosperity td all the peoples of the region.
o American-Israeli relations have been on the upswing.
Cooperation between us reached a new high level when we
agreed at the time of Prime Minister Shamir's visit here
last November to work closely together against Soviet
intervention in the region and to establish a free trade
area.
o Israel faces serious economic problems that only she,
through serious efforts of economic discipline, can solve,
but we will support those efforts.
o We support Lebanese efforts to obtain the withdrawal of
all foreign forces from their country. We believe that
any settlement between Lebanon and Israel should be
reached through direct negotiations and should ensure the
security of Israel's northern border while respecting
Lebanese sovereignty.
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IRAN-IRAQ WAR
How can the United States contribute to international
efforts to improve the security of the Persian Gulf
region?
Objectives:
o Support diplomatic efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and
prevent its spread to the Persian Gulf and other
countries.
o Assist our friends in the Gulf to meet their legitimate
self-defense needs in the event that the Iran-Iraq
conflict expands.
o Eliminate Soviet opportunities to exploit the conflict and
further destabilize the region.
o Ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to
international shipping.
o Maintain our current state of military readiness to deter,
and if necessary, defend against possible escalation of
the conflict, thereby reducing the threat to
non-belligerent oil and shipping interests.
o Continue to urge. our Allies and regional states to
cooperate in the event' of a crisis to avoid panic
oil-buying and subsequent oil price increases and
shortages.
Accomplishments:
o By providing U.S. AWACS aircraft and surface-to-air
missile systems to Saudi Arabia, we have demonstrated to
our friends in the Gulf that we are committed to helping
them meet their legitimate self-defense needs.
o By encouraging restraint by both combatants, by not
supplying arms to either side, and by discouraging the
sale of military equipment to Iran by Western suppliers,
we have helped prevent a widening of the war.
o In response to instability in the Persian Gulf, the U.S.
has led a process within the International Energy Agency
to improve international energy emergency preparedness.
An IEA decision (July, 1984) calls for a coordinated stock
draw in the event of a crisis coupled with other measures
(demand restraint, increases in indigenous production) to
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avoid a rush to the spot market. In addition, all nations
which do not have adequate stocks have agreed to make best
efforts to increase them.
o The Soviets have not yet improved their position in this
important region. _
Talking Points:
o The United States is and has been concerned about this
four-year-old conflict because it threatens the security
of the other states in the Persian Gulf and the flow of
Gulf oil to the West.
o We support efforts to prevent a widening of the Gulf War
and to bring about a negotiated settlement. We have
worked closely with our Allies in efforts to contain the
conflict and to prepare for any temporary disruption of
the flow of oil from the region.
o We are committed to helping our friends in the Gulf meet
their legitimate self-defense needs and to help keep the
Gulf open to the shipping of non-belligerents.
o We are attempting -- so far successfully -- to avoid
direct Soviet or other external involvement that would
further destabilize the region.
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AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH ASIA
What should the United States do to help end the Soviet
military occupation of Afghanistan, enhance 'Pakistani
security against external aggression, and encourage
peaceful relations among all South Asian nations?
Objectives:
o Support U.N. resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
o Assist in obtaining the restoration of Afghanistan's
neutral and non-aligned status, self-determination for the
Afghan people, and the opportunity for Afghan refugees to
return home in peace, freedom, and honor.
o Improve bilateral relations with all South Asian
countries.
o Promote regional understanding and cooperation in order to
reduce the possibility of an all-out arms buildup,
especially in nuclear weaponry, in the area.
o Assist Pakistan to remain free and secure despite the
threats posed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Accomplishments:
o We have helped keep the issue of Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan before world public opinion; there is
overwhelming international condemnation of Soviet behavior
there.
o The United States has contributed heavily to the support
of the 3.4 million Afghan refugees who have fled their
homeland; we are the largest contributor to the refugee
relief effort in Pakistan.
o We have been in the forefront of those nations encouraging
a political settlement that would allow the Soviets to
withdraw from Afghanistan.
o Thanks largely to the provision of $3.2 billion in
American aid, Pakistan's security has been enhanced.
o We have enhanced our commercial relationship with India
and have generally improved bilateral relations with all
South Asian countries.
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Talking Points:
o U.S. policy on South Asia has focused on seeking an end to
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, strengthening
Pakistan's security against potential Soviet aggression
and, promoting regional South Asian peace and
understanding.
o Our position on Afghanistan has been shared by 117 nations
which have consistently voted with us on UN General
Assembly resolutions regarding Afghanistan. We have also
helped promote the search for peace by supporting
Pakistan's efforts to seek a political solution to the
Afghan dilemma through the good offices of the UN
Secretary General.
o Our observance of Afghanistan Day has helped international
efforts to keep the Afghan issue in the spotlight.
o We have made a strong commitment to help Pakistan protect
itself, providing it with $3.2 billion over the next
several years in economic and military assistance.
o We have worked through the International Atomic Energy
Agency and other organizations to reduce chances of
nuclear weapons proliferation into the region.
o We have conducted a dialogue at the Head of State level
with India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh in
the last three years. Our contacts have also continued at
other levels.
o We have encouraged South Asian countries in general, and
India and Pakistan in particular, to develop strong and
peaceful relations.
o We have supported efforts to improve regional ties such as
the South Asia Regional Cooperation forum. We see these
efforts as being the best way to build future stability in
the area.
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NORTH AFRICA
What can the United States do to help curb Libyan
aggression and terrorism in North Africa and facilitate
ti the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict?
Objectives:
o Pressure Libya, through cooperative measures with our
friends and allies, to stop using terrorist tactics and
military aggression abroad.
o Support negotiations aimed at resolving the Western Sahara
dispute.
o Develop further our commercial ties with Morocco and
Tunisia to help these two states economically.
o Foster improved relations with Algeria.
o Support efforts at rapprochement by the Maghreb states.
Accomplishments:
o Measures have already been agreed upon with our Allies to
contain Libyan terrorism and aggression. U.S. and Allied
assistance to Chad and Sudan has helped blunt Libyan
destabilization efforts in the region.
o Relations with Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria have never
been better.
Talking Points:
o Libyan-sponsored terrorism poses a direct threat to
Libya's North African neighbors as well as to many other
states. We vigorously oppose such acts and are joining
with our friends and Allies in doing everything we can to
curtail these activities.
o The long struggle between Morocco and the Polisario over
control of the Western Sahara remains unresolved. We
support efforts to get the contending parties to negotiate
an end to the conflict and endorse the resolutions of the
Nairobi OAU summits of 1981 and 1982 which specify that
the solution to the conflict should include a cease-fire
preceding a referendum as an expression of
self-determination.
o We have improved our relations with Morocco, Tunisia, and
Algeria and stand ready to assist them in meeting the
problems that they face.
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AFRICA: SECURITY
How can the United States respond most effectively to
requests from friendly African states- for help in
resisting outside aggression and promoting peaceful
solutions to local conflicts?
Objectives:
o Increase security assistance on a selective basis to those
countries under threat of external aggression.
o Promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional
conflicts through diplomatic means.
o Continue working for the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from the southern African region as part of our
multifaceted initiative to create a security framework
under which all states of the region can live in peace.
Accomplishments:
o We have blunted the Soviet projection of power in Africa.
No sizable new influx of Soviet or surrogate forces has
occurred, and Moscow has gained no new African allies
since 1981. Mozambique and other African governments
allied with the Soviets in the 1970's have begun dialogues
with us and have moved away from Soviet influence toward
genuine non-alignment.
o We have been a catalyst facilitating the peaceful
resolution of local disputes. Specific examples include
the improvement in relations between Kenya and Somalia,
the March 1984 non-aggression pact between South Africa
and Mozambique, and the February 1984 agreement providing
for disengagement and withdrawal of South African forces
from Angola.
o Timely U.S. security assistance and military air
deployments helped counter Libyan aggression in Chad and
Sudan in 1983 and helped Somalia stop an armed incursion
from Soviet-aligned Ethiopia in 1982.
o We have obtained agreement by all parties on
implementation of the UN plan for Namibia, pending only
Angolan agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal. We have
established a reputation as an honest broker in our
diplomatic work on this most difficult of Africa's
problems.
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o We have played a quiet but vital part in bringing about
general diminution of cross-border violence in southern
Africa.
o We have been encouraging South Africa to take constructive
steps away from apartheid toward true democracy. We have
ti begun programs of support to black trade unions, begun an
important effort to provide scholarships to black South
African students, and have undertaken a program of
financial support to human rights organizations in South
Africa.
Talking Points:
o The United States has a significant geopolitical and
strategic stake in the security of the African continent
and the seas around it. Our interests are seriously
affected when Soviets, Cubans, and Libyans seek to expand
their influence in the region by force or by exploitation
of instability.
o The late 1970's saw Africa become increasingly exploited
by the Soviet Union and its allies. Violence in southern
Africa and the Horn of Africa was escalating, insurgencies
were growing in eight African countries, and cross-border
armed raids by opposition groups were occurring elsewhere
on the continent. Feeding on these conflicts, the Soviet
Union poured almost $5 billion in arms into Ethiopia,
Angola, and Mozambique and fielded almost 5,000 military
"advisors" in Africa. Two Cuban expeditionary forces,
totaling almost 40;000 combat troops, were garrisoned in
Ethiopia and Angola. Libyan-sponsored subversion against
neighboring African states was on the increase and in
1980-81 a Libyan military force of 8,000 occupied Chad.
o Thanks in large part to U.S. policies and efforts in the
area, the Soviets have added no new national converts in
Africa since 1981 nor have they dispatched new surrogate
troop contingents to Africa. Several African governments
which were counted as Soviet allies in 1980 have moved
toward a real non-alignment.
o U.S. military assistance to Africa has increased from
$94.7 million (FY 81 actual) to $211.6 million (FY 85
request). The bulk of the program has been converted to
grant aid in recognition of the difficult economic
situations of the recipients. We nonetheless have
maintained a 4:1 ratio of economic assistance to security
assistance in Africa in recognition of the fundamental
security role economic stability and progress plays.
o There has been a significant increase in dialogue among
neighboring states in southern Africa. This process has
led, with the U.S. acting as a catalyst, to a
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non-aggression pact between South African and Mozambique
in March 1984 and a landmark force disengagement agreement
between South Africa and Angola formalized in Lusaka in
February 1984.
o We have undertaken a special regional security initiative
00 for southern Africa. Specific components include a
complex diplomatic initiative to lead to an
internationally recognized settlement of the Namibia
problem and Namibian independence; support for regional
economic development; withdrawal of foreign forces from
the area; and support for peaceful progress in ending
apartheid in South Africa.
o There is a growing dynamic for change in South Africa and
the last few years have seen important, fundamental
changes: institutionalization of black trade unions,
legitimization of black residence in urban areas, the
enfranchisement of coloreds and Asians, major increases in
expenditures for black education, and the beginning of
black municipal and local self-government. We have played
a quiet but real part in encouraging and facilitating such
constructive forces for peaceful, positive change and
movement away from racial segregation, separation, and
discrimination.
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AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT
What should the United States do to help African countries
come to grips with their critical economic and
developmental problems?
Objectives:
o Work with other nations and organizations to combat famine
by providing food relief assistance.
o Induce African governments to make serious and sustained
efforts to help themselves by undertaking substantial
structural reforms.
o Persuade African governments that economic development
goals can best be pursued through mechanisms and
incentives which incorporate the principles of private
enterprise and free trade.
Accomplishments:
o In three years we have doubled the quantity of emergency
foodstuffs shipped to meet specific life-threatening
famine problems in Africa, and we have led the world in
providing humanitarian aid to African refugees.
o In three years we have increased our non-emergency food
and developmental aid to'Africa by 20 percent, tying this
assistance to structural reform and increasing local
agricultural productivity.
o We have submitted to Congress a new Economic Policy
Initiative which calls for $500 million in funds to
support those African governments making the hard reforms
and policy changes necessary for recovery.
o We have joined the African Development Bank and increased
our support to the African Development Fund.
o We have placed major stress on the need for private sector
development in Africa, recognizing that the unleashing of
the indigenous private sector holds the key to long-term
economic development.
o We have seen major economic reforms take hold in Zaire and
Liberia where recovery is beginning.
o we have seen agricultural production raised dramatically
in Somalia when centralized controls were lifted.
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o We have seen every self-described Marxist and
Marxist-Leninist government in Africa (except Ethiopia and
Angola) approach Western donors for increased aid in
return for fundamental reversals in economic policy,
including decontrol of the economy and freeing of the
private sector.
Talking Points:
o Virtually all 45 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa, with a
rapidly growing population that now totals 400 million,
face an economic crisis of stark proportions. Per capita
food production has fallen by 20 percent in the last 20
years; real per capita income has decreased 2-3 percent
per year over the past three years. A tenacious drought
continues to ravage the continent from the Sahel area to
South Africa. Refugees number over two million. A
recession that has touched every African nation began with
the 1979 oil crisis and has not yet ended.
o The economic crisis has many causes -- drought, the
flow-through effect of recession in the developed world,
effects of the 1979 oil price increase, civil wars -- but
the World Bank identifies the prime cause as the failure
of inappropriate domestic price incentives. Too many
African governments have held too long to failed policies
which stifle domestic production, chief among them being
the rigid hewing to central planning and control precepts
and practices.
o The unprecedented economic crisis in Africa threatens U.S.
interests on several levels. Unless alleviated, African
leaders may increasingly look to authoritarian political
strategies. Moreover, economic malaise breeds political
instability that opens opportunities for Soviet, Cuban,
and Libyan meddling. The African debt problem, though
small compared to other areas, puts strain on the
international financial system and defaults could increase
that strain. Unchecked crisis will lead to greater famine
and civil strife. A weak performance in Africa reduces
trade with the West, inhibiting worldwide recovery.
o we remain committed to private sector development in
Africa, including Western private investment and trade, as
the long-term answer to the continent's development needs.
We see agricultural self-sufficiency as the first order of
economic recovery and development there. We fully support
the international financial organizations in requiring
structural reforms in return for renewed financial
assistance.
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o The efficiency and success of our efforts so far may be
measured by the fact that nearly all the centrally-planned
economies in Africa have undertaken positive change in the
direction of freeing the private sector. (Only Ethiopia
and Angola have not.)
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LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively assist Latin
American and Caribbean democracy, economic improvement,
and ability to resist outside aggression and subversion?
Objectives:
o Encourage, as much as possible, the current trend toward
democratic government in the region.
o Improve the economic well-being of the free peoples of
Latin America and the Caribbean.
o Assist friendly, democratic governments and peoples in the
region to defend themselves against externally-supported
Communist subversion and aggression.
o Ensure that the historically close U.S.-Latin American
relationship continues.
Accomplishments:
o We have provided consistent support and encouragement for
democratic institution building: today 26 of 33 countries
with 90% of the population are democratic or in
transition. Since November 1980 there have been 33 free
elections in 24 countries, virtually all with very high
voter participation, including El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic.
The Administration has provided tangible support for
democratic labor unions and democratic institution-
building through programs, such as the new National
Endowment for Democracy proposed by President Reagan in
1982 and passed by the Congress in 1983.
o Under the leadership of this Administration, U.S. economic
assistance to the Latin America-Caribbean region has more
than doubled. 70 percent of the U.S. foreign assistance
to Central America is economic.
o This Administration has taken the lead in formulating two
major, comprehensive regional assistance and development
programs for the area: the innovative Caribbean Basin
Initiative, which offers increased access to the U.S.
market for 12 years and can create many jobs and sources
of income; and the President's Initiative for Democracy,
Peace, and Development in Central America, implementing
the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America in January 1984, now awaiting
Congressional action.
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o We have been working with the area's public and private
sectors and the International Monetary Fund to encourage
involved parties to work effectively to resolve the $380
billion Latin American debt problem.
o The U.S. has worked diligently through regular and special
diplomatic channels to pursue realistic. solutions to
Central America's problems. Our efforts have included
several trips to the region by the President, Vice
President, and Secretary of State, and the consecutive
appointments of two Presidential Special Envoys to Central
America who made a total of 16 trips to the region in the
last year. We also have continuously supported the
peace-seeking process initiated by the Contadora countries
(Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela).
o Our most dramatic Caribbean accomplishment was to join, in
October 1983, with the East Caribbean democracies at their
request to rescue their and our citizens in Grenada,
remove the Soviet bloc/Cuban presence from Grenada, and
facilitate the process leading to the restoration of
democratic institutions in Grenada. Since that time, the
U.S. has helped the Caribbean democracies maintain a small
multinational peacekeeping force on the island to provide
security.
o Our defense assistance to El Salvador has been modest
(about $339 million over the past five years) but has been
vitally important to that country's efforts to strengthen
its armed forces enough to withstand repeated guerrilla
attacks and give democracy a chance to take root.
o U.S. military exercises in Honduras and provision of U.S.
military training and assistance to Honduran forces have
helped deter aggression by Nicaraguan forces, which number
100,000 persons including reserves.
Talking Points:
o The United States is linked by history, proximity, and
special ties of friendship with the 33 independent
countries and 380 million people of Latin America and the
Caribbean. Objectives of this Administration have been to
encourage democracy, support economic improvement, use
active diplomacy to solve disputes, and provide security
assistance so that governments threatened by Soviet bloc,
Cuban, and Nicaraguan subversion could defend their
people.
o For the region as a whole, a highly encouraging recent
trend has been the return of several countries to
democratic government. Today, 26 of 33 countries are
democratic or in a defined process of democratization.
These account for 90% of the area's population. The
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Administration has consistently encouraged the process of
democratic institution-building in the area.
o In Grenada, the United States and the Caribbean
democracies rescued a nation from Soviet bloc and Cuban
control and internal repression.
Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan-assisted subversion and
Communist aggression have created a crisis in Central
America, particularly in El Salvador. Continued Communist
success would pose the threat, as the President has
stated, that "100 million people from Panama to the open
border on our south would come under the control of
pro-Soviet regimes." We are countering this threat by
helping those people to defend themselves.
o While our military assistance to the region has been
modest, our contribution in economic and developmental
help has been substantial. Through the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and the President's Initiative for Democracy,
Peace, and Development in Central America, our commitment
to help speed the process of economic growth in those
areas will become even larger and, we believe, more
effective.
o We are continuing to work with friendly governments in the
region to help them cope with their severe debt problems.
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Global Issues
International Economics
Issue:
What should the United States do to help sustain and
extend world economic recovery, help debtor nations help
themselves, and assist the developing countries to begin
to realize substantial, lasting economic growth?
Objectives:
o Formulate and implement sensible economic policies at home
aimed at stemming inflation and government spending.
o Develop a Free World consensus on policies designed to
achieve enduring, non-inflationary economic recovery,
financial stability, and liberalized trade.
o Encourage an effective IMF-based economic adjustment
process for debtor nations including sufficient private
and public financing and selective reschedulings to ease
the debt burden on LDC's and to restore conditions for
sustainable economic growth.
o Heighten Allied attention to the security dimensions of
East-West economic relations including the forging of
common objectives in NATO, OECD, IEA and COCOM.
Accomplishments:
o This Administration has succeeded in rebuilding a strong
domestic economy which has pulled much of the world out of
recession and into recovery: average growth rose from
around 1% in 1981 to above 4% for 1984; average inflation
of 10% in 1981 was cut to an expected 4.5% this year; 6
million American jobs were created in the past 18 months
alone.
o A consensus among the Allies has developed which reaffirms
the economic policies espoused by President Reagan:
market-oriented adjustment in our domestic economies;
strengthened management of the LDC debt problem; and trade
liberalization and open markets.
o we have begun implementing a sensible five-part strategy
to handle the debt problem that was developed at the
Williamsburg Summit and embodied in the Williamsburg
Declaration and was later reaffirmed at the London Summit.
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o Substantial progress has been made in domestic and
international energy emergency preparedness through the
accelerated build-up of our Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(SPR) and an IEA agreement among the Allies for early use
of petroleum stocks and demand restraint to avoid
unnecessary volatility in the spot market.
ti b An historic Allied consensus on East-West economic
relations has been achieved which has led to elimination
of preferential terms on credits to the USSR; reduction of
the political/economic risk of Western European dependence
on Soviet energy resources; and strengthened measures in
COCOM to reduce the availability to the Soviets of
strategically important Western technology.
Talking Points:
o The President inherited a fractious and deteriorating
international economic order characterized by record
inflation, high unemployment and severe recession.
o From the outset, the President emphasized the importance
of sensible domestic economic policies designed to halt
inflation, increase employment, and stem the tide of
increased government spending.
o The President has repeatedly demonstrated his strong and
visionary leadership in advancing a common Allied approach
to key economic, trade, financial and security objectives
through bilateral meetings in Washington and abroad,
annual economic Summit meetings and in international fora
such as OECD, IEA, NATO and COCOM.
o The President first put forward his economic policies at
the Ottawa Economic Summit in 1981. By the time President
Reagan hosted the Williamsburg Summit two years later, it
was clear that his policies were leading the U.S. and the
free world on the path to full economic recovery. Under
the President's leadership the Summit leaders agreed to
coordinate policies to promote sustainable,
non-inflationary growth and to forge a consensus on the
security dimensions of East-West economic relations which
had proved elusive in the past.
o This was followed up a year later by the successes of the
London Economic Summit which reinforced the importance of
free market economics, open markets, and management of the
debt problem. Agreement was also reached on important
political statements on East-West relations, terrorism,
democratic values and the-volatile Persian Gulf situation.
o Working closely with our NATO Allies and Japan, we have
made major gains in correcting the serious imbalance of
the past between the advantages of trading with the USSR
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and our common security requirements. We have reached
agreement with the Allies on eliminating preferential
terms on credits to the USSR and reducing the substantial
risk of Western European dependence on Soviet energy
resources.
o In working closely with the COCOM countries, we have met
head-on the challenge of stopping the flow of
militarily-relevant Western technology to the USSR through
the upgrading of the COCOM review process, the
harmonization and tightening of national licensing and
enforcement procedures, and the monitoring of the
potential military application of emerging technologies.
o The President has taken important steps to assure that we
can manage the impact of any temporary energy disruption.
Our Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) has been increased
fourfold and our efforts through the IEA to coordinate an
coordinated response to an energy emergency have been
highly successful.
o The five-part debt strategy adopted by the Summit leaders
at Williamsburg, and reaffirmed in London, has
successfully contained the debt crisis. The
Administration has also encouraged modification of the
strategy, to include such measures as multi-year
reschedulings for those responsible debtor countries who
have performed well under IMF programs. We have also
supported an increased flow of long-term direct investment
to debtor nations and endorsed closer cooperation between
the IMF and World Bank.
o Through the leadership of President Reagan in the Summit
process, the Allies have dedicated themselves to the
expansion of international trade by the reduction of trade
barriers.
o The President has given major new impetus to American
economic ties with Asia by reaching out to the
economically dynamic Pacific Basin nations, including a
significant improvement in bilateral relations with Japan,
and strengthening relations with China, South Korea, and
other countries of this vital region.
o The improvement of the world economy, led by the U.S., and
Allied agreement to resist protectionist trade policies
and to assist struggling, developing nations through
encouraging IMF-based economic adjustment, government and
private sector financing and increased investment have
begun to restore economic and financial stability to a
number of Third World countries.
o In our own hemisphere, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and
the Central American Peace Initiative have helped open up
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markets for the exports of our neighbors and Allies. Our
efforts to help Grenada rebuild its economy, as
illustrated by our commitment to complete the airport at
Point Salines, and our active support of U.S. private
sector initiatives to expand Grenadian investment and
trading potential are demonstrating the benefits of a
return to democracy.
o The President has also initiated a major Administration
effort to increase the effectiveness of resource
allocations to meet the urgent problem of world hunger by
providing help to build new infrastructure where needed,
and by taking other measures to speed up the impact of
relief measures.
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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
Issue:
How can the United States best guarantee a reliable and
adequate supply of the energy resources needed for
national and international security -and economic
well-being?
Objectives:
o Reduce government intervention in the energy sector
through increased reliance on the market mechanism.
o Improve the energy security of the U.S. and its Allies by
action to reduce both the probability of future
disruptions and the impact such supply interruptions might
have on our economics.
o Promote U.S. energy exports to Pacific Basin and European
nations.
o Urge key Allies to diversify their energy resources so
that they are not dependent on single supplier nations,
particularly in the case of energy imports from the Soviet
Union.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration's decision to deregulate oil prices has
stimulated domestic production and cut oil imports
dramatically.
o The size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve has quadrupled
to over 400 million barrels of oil, giving the U.S. an
enormous oil buffer against future oil disruptions.
o The U.S. has led an initiative within the International
Energy Agency to reduce reliance on Soviet energy. Studies
indicate that European nations could become highly
dependent on Soviet energy in the 1990's and that such
dependency could make them highly vulnerable to
disruptions for technical and/or political reasons. In
May 1983, Ministers from IEA countries agreed that their
countries would not become overly dependent on Soviet gas
and that they will give preference to OECD energy resource
development, particularly to Norwegian gas fields.
o President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone agreed in
November of 1983 to a program to increase energy trade
between the United States and Japan. Over the.long run,
this will create thousands of new jobs for Americans and
greater energy security for both our nations.
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Talking Points:
o U.S. Administrations since the time of the 1973/1974 oil
embargo have seen energy as a constraint on economic
systems. The present Administration sees energy as an
opportunity.
o Our action to deregulate oil prices has already brought
about a significant drop in our import dependence by
spurring domestic production.
o Studies show that with continued energy deregulation the
U.S. can achieve almost complete sufficiency in energy
supplies by the next decade and at the same time provide
ample supplies of energy to our Allies.
o We have urged our Allies in Europe and the Pacific to
consider increasing their reliance on U.S. exports of
energy, particularly coal. This can provide them an
important source of stable supply for many future decades,
thereby reducing their dependency on more uncertain
supplies. Prime Minister Nakasone and President Reagan
have endorsed principles for energy trade between the
United States and Japan, which will mean jobs for citizens
and greater security for both nations.
o In addition, we have led a process in the International
Energy Agency to improve emergency preparedness of key
industrialized countries to ensure that we do not have
another wave of price increases and physical oil shortages
as occurred in 1973/74 and 1979.
o To do our share, we have quadrupled the Strategic Oil
Reserve which now holds over 400 million barrels -- or
about 80 days of our imports. At the initiative of the
U.S., twenty-one member nations of the International
Energy Agency agreed in July 1984 to coordinate their
stocks in the event of a crisis to minimize the impacts a
disruption would have on their economies. Those countries
without stocks have agreed to make best efforts to
increase them.
o In addition to improving our ability to cope with a
Persian Gulf oil disruption, we have successfully urged
the Allies to reduce dependence on Soviet energy. The May
1983 IEA agreement confirms that the Europeans will look
to indigenous sources, particularly Norway, instead of
relying further on the Soviet Union for critical gas.
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TERRORISM
Issue:
How can the United States improve its deterrence of,
protection against, and response to terrorist attacks?
Objectives:
o Improve the effectiveness of legal instruments under which
persons involved in terrorist activity can be prosecuted.
o Improve international cooperation in combating terrorism.
o Develop and build enhanced security and operational
capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist acts.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has submitted four bills to Congress
which are designed to strengthen the legal instruments for
dealing with terrorists.
o western leaders at the London Economic Summit in June 1984
issued a declaration on international terrorism which
includes a seven-point agreement on cooperative steps to
be taken against terrorism.
o The President has issued a directive which, among other
things, calls for: Improved intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination; better security protection
and awareness; legal action to thwart terrorist attacks
before they occur; and improved capability to respond to
attacks, based on a cogent analysis of what responses are
most likely to deter future attacks.
o The Administration has proposed to the Soviets an
agreement that would facilitate rapid communication via
the hotline in the event of terrorist nuclear incidents.
Talking Points:
o During 1983, international terrorism took an appalling
toll in human life. In that year alone, Americans were
either the targets or incidental victims of 270 terrorist
attacks. 271 U.S. citizens died as a result of terrorism.
In the U.S. six people died in 31 terrorist incidents.
Terrorism poses an increasing danger to democratic
societies, and to our way of life. It is an
indiscriminate form of warfare being waged against the
U.S. and other democratic societies.
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o in recent years we have seen a growing phenomenon -- the
direct use of terror by foreign states. State terrorism
accounts for an increasing number of terrorist murders and
assassinations. Some states are providing training,
financing, and logistical support to terrorists and
terrorist groups. These activities are a growing source
ti of danger to us and are a severe challenge to America's
foreign policy.
o We seek to improve the ability of all the democracies to
combat terrorism, to coordinate their actions, and to
share information.
o Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, every sovereign nation
has the right of self-defense. When we have credible
evidence of an impending terrorist attack, the U.S. has
the right and responsibility to confuse, disrupt, and
prevent that attack.
o Terrorists are criminals. We expect our law enforcement
agencies to protect us against terrorists and other
criminals. American citizens, including diplomats and
military personnel, have been the victims of a major share
of the terrorist incidents over the past decade. The fact
that most attacks against Americans are occurring overseas
does not reduce our responsibility to protect Americans --
the duty is no less clear, only more difficult.
o We will meet the challenge of terrorism head on. But in
so doing, we must remain faithful to our democratic
values, institutions; and laws.
o Two bills now pending before Congress would enable us to
adhere fully to provisions of the Montreal Convention
against aircraft sabotage and the UN Convention against
taking hostages; another bill would provide the authority
to pay rewards for information on international terrorist
activities; a fourth bill would allow prosecution of those
who assist states or groups to engage in terrorism.
o On July 23, 1983, the President issued a public statement
urging international cooperation against terrorism, a
subject he addressed again on September 17, 1983, in a
message to European Chiefs of State and Heads of
Government.
o The President has also proposed to the Soviets an
agreement that would facilitate rapid communications via
the hotline in the event that terrorists acquired,
threatened to use, or used a nuclear device -- events we
consider highly unlikely but nonetheless believe we should
be prepared to deal with.
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ARMS CONTROL
Issue:
The United States is seeking to negotiate meaningful,
verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union
ti that reduce the arsenals and risks of war and truly
enhance global security.
Objectives:
o Reduce the risks of war between East and West,
particularly nuclear war.
o Negotiate meaningful arms control agreements involving
militarily significant arms reductions and constraints
that enhance stability and are based on the principle of
equality.
o Include effective verification measures and procedures in
to help assure compliance with agreements.
o Ensure that arms control remains a component of, not a
substitute for, a comprehensive, coherent security policy
that includes the maintenance of credible deterrent
forces.
o Support expanded membership in the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and seek to prevent the spread of nuclear
explosives to additional countries.
Accomplishments:
o This Administration's is the most far-reaching arms
control agenda in U.S. history.
o This summer we accepted the Soviet proposal to meet to
discuss effective and verifiable limits on the military
uses of outer space. We are prepared to meet with them
without preconditions to seek agreement on feasible
negotiating approaches toward this end, as well as to
discuss other issues of mutual interest including the
resumption of nuclear arms reduction talks suspended by
the Soviet Union.
o START: Before the Soviets refused in December, 1983, to
set a date for the next round of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START), we had proposed that both sides
undertake deep reductions to equal levels in their
strategic nuclear forces: a cut of up to one-half in
strategic ballistic missiles and a one-third cut in their
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warheads; a reduction to equal numbers of heavy bombers,
with quantitative constraints on air-launched cruise
missiles; tradeoffs in U.S. and Soviet advantages; and a
number of "build-down" approaches.
o INF: We proposed far-reaching arms control accords in
the negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF). Major U.S. initiatives included: (1) the
"zero-zero option" we introduced when talks began in
November, 1981 (this option would eliminate some 600
Soviet INF missiles including 378 SS-20's armed with 1,400
warheads, as well as all of the U.S. Pershing II's and
cruise missiles planned for deployment by NATO in response
to the Soviet buildup.); and (2) our 1983 proposal for an
equal interim level of such missiles by the two sides
while work continued to produce agreement on zero missiles
for both nations. Regrettably, the Soviets walked out of
the INF negotiations in November, 1983, having rejected
all U.S. initiatives to eliminate or reduce the entire
class of longer-range INF missiles considered most
threatening by both sides.
o MBFR: In 1982 and again in the Spring of 1984, the U.S.
and NATO proposed in the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna major new initiatives to
resolve disagreements over the size of conventional
forces, and their reduction, in Central Europe. Our
proposals envisage major troop reductions to equal NATO
and Warsaw Pact levels and effective verification
procedures.
o CDE: At the 35-nation Conference on Confidence - and
Security-Building Measures in Europe (CDE) that opened in
Stockholm in January, 1984, the U.S. and other Western
nations proposed a package of concrete measures that would
make military activities in Europe more open and would
make it far more difficult to launch a surprise attack or
intimidate others using military forces. In June, 1984,
the President announced that we would consider a Soviet
proposal on non-use of force in Europe if would begin
serious negotiations with us on the Western package of
confidence-building measures.
o CW: In April, 1984, the U.S. proposed to the 40-nation
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva a comprehensive
treaty banning development, production, use, transfer, and
stockpiling of chemical weapons, to be monitored through
far-reaching challenge inspection procedures.
o Nuclear Testing: The U.S. has three times within the past
year sought to work with the Soviet Union in strengthening
verification provisions of the signed, but unratified,
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (prohibiting nuclear tests
exceeding 150 kilotons) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
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Treaty. The Soviets have rejected such efforts, even as
we have received evidence of likely Soviet noncompliance
with these threshold agreements and with the.Limited Test
Ban Treaty that obliges the parties not to conduct an
underground nuclear test if the explosion would cause
radioactive debris to be present outside-the borders of
the state conducting the explosion.
o The U.S. has also supported discussion, at the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva, of verification and compliance
issues related to a comprehensive test ban. Such a ban is
a long-term U.S. objective in the context of major nuclear
arms reductions, much reduced reliance on nuclear
deterrence, and the assurance of effective verification.
o Non-Proliferation: We are seeking strengthened
international safeguards to prevent further proliferation.
o Hotline, Incidents at Sea: The U.S. in July, 1984, signed
a new agreement with the Soviet Union to improve the
Direct Communications Link or "hotline" and in June, 1984,
renewed the U.S.-Soviet agreement to prevent incidents at
sea.
Talking Points:
o Nuclear War: The President and his Administration have no
higher priority than reducing the risks of war. Nuclear
war in particular, as the President has said repeatedly,
cannot be won and must never be fought. We seek arms
control agreements' that truly enhance stability and
security.
o Arms Control: The Administration has a broad arms control
agenda involving far-reaching proposals for arms
reductions, constraints, and confidence-building measures.
We are seeking agreements that are militarily significant,
equitable, and verifiable. In each of our efforts,
including a number of major negotiations, the U.S. and our
Western Allies have made forthcoming new proposals in an
effort to achieve progress.
o ASAT/Space: We offered to meet with the Soviet Union this
fall without preconditions to discuss feasible negotiation
approaches on limiting the military uses of outer space.
We have also supported discussion of ASAT/Space issues,
focused on legal and verification issues, at the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
o START/INF: Late last year the Soviet Union broke off the
two nuclear arms reductions negotiations in Geneva, the
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and those on
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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). The President
has made clear his strong desire to resume these talks in
order to agree on major cuts in the nuclear arsenals of
both countries.
o Negotiations: In addition, we are actively involved in a
.
ese
include the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions (MBFR), the Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe
(CDE), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) negotiations
in Geneva on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, as well
as discussions at the CD on limits on nuclear testing, on
outer space, and on other areas of concern.
o Compliance: The U.S. is seriously concerned about Soviet
noncompliance with existing agreements. As indicated in
the President's January, 1984, Report to the Congress on
seven compliance issues, we have determined that the
Soviet Union has violated the Geneva Protocol on Chemical
Weapons, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, the
Helsinki Final Act, and at least two provisions of SALT
II: telemetry encryption and a rule concerning ICBM
modernization. The Report also indicated that the Soviet
Union has almost certainly violated the ABM Treaty,
probably violated the SALT II limit on new types of
missiles, probably violated the SS-16 deployment
prohibition of SALT II, and is likely to have violated the
nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty. We must insist that the Soviets rectify those
areas where they are in-violation. For our part, we are
continuing to carry out our own obligations and
commitments, and will continue to seek effective
verification and compliance measures in all arms control
efforts we undertake.
o Confidence Building Measures: The U.S. has proposed a
wide range of CBMs in START, in MBFR, at the CDE and in
other fora to help to ensure that war does not erupt
because of accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding.
In July 1984, the Soviet Union signed what we hope will be
the first of several agreements to this end: an agreement
to upgrade the hotline. We hope that, over time, the
Soviets will agree to build on this to establish a much
broader-based means of ensuring against accidental nuclear
war.
number of other serious arms control efforts
Th
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DETERRENCE
Issue:
What can the United States do to convince potential
aggressors not to use force in challenging U.S. vital
interests?
Objectives:
o Reduce the risk of war or coercion by the threat to use
force.
o Ensure that our national security forces working along
with those of our Allies are capable of implementing our
deterrence strategy.
Accomplishments:
o Through our strategic, intermediate-range and nuclear
conventional forces modernization programs, we have begun
to remedy the significant vulnerabilities in those forces
which were inherited in 1981.
o The strong U.S. leadership and Alliance unity existing
today have greatly strengthened deterrence. As a result,
we have decreased the risk of Soviet miscalculation and
increased the security of both ourselves and our Allies.
Talking Points:
o Deterrence is the -cornerstone of U.S. national security
policy. we deter by ensuring that the leadership of all
potential aggressors is aware of our policy to maintain
forces adequate to deny an aggressor his basic war aims
and, through retaliation, make the costs of aggression far
outweigh any potential benefits.
o The President has emphasized that a nuclear war cannot be
won and must never be fought. Our recognition of this
fact is not sufficient to prevent nuclear war: we must be
certain that the Soviet leadership understands it as well.
o Deterrence is not and cannot be based on bluff. We must
have a credible retaliatory capability sufficient to deter
the wide variety of attacks the Soviets are capable of
making. The Soviet leadership must understand that,
should they attack us or our Allies, our forces will
retaliate against key elements of Soviet power and will
thereby make the costs of aggression outweigh any possible
gains.
o Our nuclear modernization programs remove vulnerabilities
in our deterrent forces and, as a result, enhance our
ability to deter attack and prevent war.
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STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States close the gap between its
strategic capabilities and those of the Soviet Union?
Objectives:
o Redress the most serious weaknesses in our current
strategic posture.
o Provide incentive to the Soviets to negotiate meaningful
arms reductions that promote strategic stability.
Accomplishments:
o The President early-on recognized the need for strategic
modernization and as a result proposed a five-element
mutually reinforcing program to restore the strategic
balance.
o The five-point program directed the Department of Defense
to: design and produce a cost-effective Peacekeeper
intercontinental ballistic missile; refine and improve the
basic design of the B-1 strategic bomber and place it into
series production; select a design and develop an Advanced
Technology Bomber (ATB) to complete the basic
modernization requirements of the strategic bomber force
of the 1990s and beyond; develop an improved Trident
II/D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile system and a
nuclear-armed SLCM; and design and deploy improvements to
our command-and-control system to ensure positive control
to further reduce the risk of war.
o Two major changes to the President's program were
incorporated after its initiation: at the recommendation
of the Scowcroft Commission, work was initiated on a Small
ICBM for deployment in the 1990s; and an intensive
research program aimed at elimination of the threat of
ballistic missiles was begun.
o Significant progress has been made on all five of the
Strategic Initiatives.
o Improvements to the Strategic Command-and-Control system
are being implemented.
o The first production B-lB will be rolled-out in September,
months ahead of schedule and below cost. Research on the
ATB is on or ahead of schedule.
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o The first 21 Peacekeeper missiles are in production, and
the Peacekeeper missile has had five successful test
launches.
o Research on the D-5 missile is on schedule and the
nuclear-armed SLCM has been deployed.
o Improvements to our strategic defenses are being
implemented, and the President's Strategic Defense
Initiative is now underway.
Talking Points:
o Strategic modernizat
ion
r
made in a number of areas. ea y een
is required to redress the serious
weaknesses in our strategic posture caused by the massive
Soviet build-up of strategic forces over the past 10-15
years, a period of U.S. restraint in deployment of
strategic systems. It is also needed to restore our
deterrent strength and to provide strong incentives to the
Soviets to negotiate genuine arms reductions.
Under President Reagan's leadership, a multi-element,
mutually reinforcing strategic modernization program has
been initiated. Significant progress has al
d b
o Strategic communications-and-control systems are being
improved to ensure that we could employ our nuclear forces
effectively, which is essential to a credible deterrent.
o Bomber modernization is- underway to reduce the risks
associated with the aging and potentially vulnerable B-52
force.
o modernized sea-based forces, currently the most survivable
leg of our strategic Triad, are being created, as
represented by the new Trident II/D-5 missile.
o Our land-based missile force is being modernized to remedy
an important part of the strategic imbalance.
Contributions of the ICBM include: prompt hard target
capability; secure command-control-and-communications;
rapid re-targeting; high alert rate; and low operations
and support costs -- 12 percent of the total for the
entire Triad.
o The President's strategic modernization program is an
essential element in helping us meet our arms control
objectives. We have stated that we are willing to
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negotiate trade-offs in each side's advantages and a
build-down of strategic systems leading to significantly
lower and more stable strategic forces. We seek to reach
an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement.
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ICBM MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States maximize the effectiveness of
the ground-based portion of the strategic Triad in support
of credible deterrence? -
Objectives:
o modernize the aging ICBM force through the deployment of
100 Peacekeeper missiles and the development of a new
small mobile ICBM.
Accomplishments:
o The Peacekeeper test program has been an outstanding
success: all test objectives have been met or exceeded,
and accuracy/reliability results have been excellent.
o Production has been approved and initiated on the first 21
Peacekeeper missiles, and basing work at F.E. Warren Air
Force Base, Wyoming, is progressing on schedule. All
other requirements for an operational deployment of
Peacekeeper in 1986 are on schedule.
o Development of the small ICBM has begun and is on schedule
for a possible deployment in the early 1990's.
Talking Points:
o ICBM modernization is essential to the viability of the
strategic Triad of bombers, submarine missiles, and ICBMs
that has kept the peace for well over two decades.
o The President has endorsed the recommendations of the
Bipartisan Scowcroft Commission to deploy as soon as
possible 100 Peacekeeper missiles and develop a small
ICBM, while vigorously pursuing arms control.
o The Reagan Administration proposal of 100 missiles is half
the size of the Carter program, but is part of a balanced
strategic modernization program.
o Peacekeeper is the only near-term ICBM that can help
restore the strategic imbalance that developed as the
Soviets modernized during a period of U.S. restraint.
o Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have modernized their
ICBM force through the addition of a new generation of
MIRVed ICBMs, 150 SS-17 missiles, 308 SS-18 missiles and
360 SS-19 missiles. The U.S. made no new deployments
during this period.
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o Peacekeeper deployment is also needed to demonstrate U.S.
resolve and to encourage the Soviets to resume arms
control negotiations. Failure to deploy Peacekeeper
would: undercut NATO's decision to modernize its
long-range nuclear force through deployment of GLOM and
Pershing II missiles; reward the Soviets for failing to
resume START negotiations; and provide no incentive for
the Soviets to begin serious negotiations aimed at
limiting and reducing strategic systems.
o Peacekeeper deployment is a vital first step in a logical,
comprehensive, and progressive approach toward permitting
us and encouraging the Soviets to move toward smaller,
survivable, and more stable systems at lower levels of
forces. Without Peacekeeper, the Soviets have no
incentive to move in this direction in the near term.
With ICBM modernization, stability and deterrence will be
enhanced well into the Twenty-First Century.
o A new single warhead small ICBM is also required. Each of
these ICBMs represents a low-target value from a Soviet
attack-plan perspective. A flexible and survivable basing
mode is being developed as a complement to a small ICBM.
(Current emphasis is on a hard mobile concept.)
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NUCLEAR-ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively modernize the
Navy's deterrent capability?
Objectives:
o Offset the threat posed by the Soviet Union's development
and deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).
o Enhance the U.S. deterrent posture.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration announced the decision to deploy
nuclear SLUM as part of its October 1981 Strategic
Modernization Program. The nuclear-armed SLCM contributes
to our strategic reserve force and the modernization of
our worldwide naval deterrent capability.
o Funding of the SLCM program first was approved by the
Congress in FY 1981 and has continued without interruption
ever since, enabling the program to meet its scheduled
initial deployment date of July 1984.
Talking Points:
o In the early 1970's the U.S. decided to develop
conventional and nuclear-armed SLCMs to improve our
deterrent posture and to offset the threat imposed by the
development and deployment of Soviet nuclear SLCMs.
o The nuclear-armed SLCM provides badly-needed modernization
of our Navy's deterrent capability. When deployed on
surface ships or submarines, it is a highly survivable
system. It is a highly accurate weapon, and its
procurement costs are relatively low.
o The.SLCM program actually offsets a Soviet capability that
has existed since the early 1960's, when their first
sea-launched cruise missiles were deployed. Moscow now
has seven operational SLCM systems, six of which are
dual-capable -- i.e., are currently deployed in both
conventional and nuclear-armed configurations. At least
two of these systems feature weapons with ranges in excess
of 400 kilometers that can threaten many costal U.S.
cities.
o The ban on nuclear-armed SLCMs -- which in effect would be
a unilateral one -- proposed by the House of
Representatives thus would allow the Soviets to hold a
monopoly in such systems, giving Moscow even less reason
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to negotiate genuine arms reductions. Unilateral U.S.
restraint will soon become even more ill-advised, since
the Soviets are preparing to deploy a new weapon system
similar to the U.S. Tomahawk.
o At the same time, such a ban, by precluding the deployment
of the U.S. counterpart, impairs a needed modernization of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability and a significant
enhancement of our nuclear reserve force.
o In fact, rather than being stabilizing, a ban would add to
instability by continuing to force the U.S. Navy to
concentrate its deterrent capabilities aboard a small
number of platforms. By contrast, the deployment of
SLCM's would result in the dispersal of our deterrent
capability across the fleet, thereby both assuring
increased force survivability and reducing the
attractiveness of a first-strike to potential aggressors.
o A ban would constitute unilateral arms control by
restricting only the U.S. SLCM Program. Such a move is
all the more ill-advised since in addition to their
existing SLUM force the Soviets are preparing to deploy a
Tomahawk -- if they have not already done so --
look-alike: the SS-NX-21. As a result of our unilateral
restraint, the Soviet Union would have even less reason to
negotiate seriously to realize real nuclear arms
reductions being sought by the Administration.
o In spite of the known difficulties in negotiating an arms
control agreement which. includes SLCM's, the U.S. has
stated its desire to resume negotiations at the START and
INF talks with no preconditions and with all forces open
for discussion.
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STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
Issue:
How can the United States attain its long-range goal of
ultimately making ballistic missiles impotent and
obsolete?
Objective:
o Explore the potential of advanced technologies to enable
the U.S. to develop and deploy an effective defense
against ballistic missiles.
Accomplishments:
o On March 23, 1983, the President directed that research
within the limits prescribed by the ABM Treaty go forward
on neutralizing the ballistic missile threat as a prudent
hedge against a possible breakout by Moscow from the ABM
Treaty.
o Government and outside experts conducted two studies
between June and October 1983 to determine whether
advanced technologies could support development of an
effective anti-ballistic missile defense and whether such
defenses could enhance deterrence, stability, and
prospects for arms reductions. The results of both were a
qualified "yes" -- qualified because the studies
recognized some uncertainties that could only be resolved
through further research. As a result, these experts
recommended a vigorous research program designed to answer
the remaining questions as to whether an effective defense
is feasible.
o After consulting Congressional leaders and our Allies, the
President directed that the additionally needed research
get underway under a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
an effort to be conducted over approximately the next five
years. work will be restricted to research on a broad
range of defensive technologies consistent with our treaty
obligations. The objective is to provide answers that
will permit us to make an informed decision in the future
on whether to proceed with developing such defensive
systems.
Talking Points:
o The President's Strategic Defense Initiative seeks to
explore the potential of emerging defensive technologies
to enhance deterrence by significantly reducing the
military effectiveness of ballistic missiles.
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o It does not constitute a decision to develop and deploy
such a defensive systems. Rather, it is a research
program that is designed to answer a number of
technological questions that must be answered before the
promise of defensive systems can be properly assessed.
o The Soviet Union has the world's only active ballistic
missile defense system. For well over a decade, they have
had a vigorous defensive technologies research program
that includes upgrading this system, seeking a
rapidly-deployable ABM system, and actively investigating
advanced defensive technologies. The U.S. program is,
therefore, a prudent hedge against possible Soviet gains
that would adversely affect U.S. and Allied security.
o Advanced defenses have the potential of reducing the value
of ballistic missiles, and thus increasing the likelihood
of negotiated reductions.
o Taken together with balanced offensive forces and
effective arms control measures, advanced defenses against
ballistic missiles could increase deterrence and stability
by: making aggressors less certain about the outcome of
an attack; making pre-emptive attacks on retaliatory
forces less attractive; and reducing or eliminating, when
combined with effective air defenses, the military utility
of these nuclear weapons.
o The initiative in no way signals a shift in priority away
from the modernization of strategic and intermediate-range
nuclear assets and conventional forces that is essential
to the maintenance of deterrence in the decades ahead.
o The U.S. intends to continue to work closely with the
Alliance to ensure that, in the event of a future decision
to deploy defensive systems, Allied, as well as U.S.,
security against aggression would be enhanced. Any future
decisions concerning potential deployment of defensive
systems would be made in full consultation with our
Allies.
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ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT) DEVELOPMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
Issue:
How can the United States best protect its interests in
space and strengthen deterrence?
' Objectives:
o Ensure that we have a full range of options for protecting
our military and civil systems deployed in space.
o Develop anti-satellite and space weapons systems as well
as negotiate agreements that maintain and strengthen
deterrence in these areas.
Accomplishments:
o The U.S. supports formation of a committee to discuss the
need for improvements to the existing body of
international law governing outer space in the
forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
o In March 1984, the Administration submitted a
comprehensive report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on
ASAT Arms Control which pointed out that there are several
factors that impede the identification of effective ASAT
arms control measures. These include significant
difficulties of verification, diverse sources of threats
to U.S. and Allied satellites, and threats posed by Soviet
targeting and reconnaissance satellites that undermine
conventional and nuclear deterrence. The report also
indicated that the U.S. would continue to seek selected
limits on specific types of systems or activities.
o The Soviets introduced their own ASAT system in 1972 which
is today the world's only deployed ASAT system. In June
1984, they offered to discuss space-related arms control
issues in Vienna.
o The U.S. has announced its readiness to meet with the
Soviet Union in Vienna this fall without preconditions to
discuss feasible negotiation approaches on limiting ASAT
systems, even as we also seek a resumption of the nuclear
arms reduction negotiations.
o The U.S. ASAT Program under development has made
significant technical progress: the ASAT Boost System has
been tested; tests will soon be made involving the booster
and its miniature homing vehicle; and tests against a
target in space are scheduled.
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o Research continues on technologies with potential for ASAT
use, including directed energy weapons and space tracking
technology.
o Survivability of U.S. space assets is being upgraded
through the development of measures which reduce or
eliminate the effectiveness of Soviet ASAT systems.
ti
Talking Points:
o Current Soviet ASAT capabilities include an operational
orbital interceptor system; ground-based test lasers with
probable ASAT capabilities; possibly the nuclear-armed
Galosh ABM interceptors; and the technological capability
for electronic warfare (jamming) against space systems.
o The operational Soviet ASAT system threatens all key U.S.
low-altitude satellites.
o The 1978-1979 ASAT arms control talks revealed major
U.S.-Soviet differences, and subsequent study has brought
space arms control issues into sharper focus. Problems in
space arms control include: verification difficulties;
high risk of Soviet break-out due to existing Soviet ASAT
capabilities and research; difficulties in defining space
weapons, since many ground-based systems have space
capability and manned space systems have extreme
flexibility; and the fact the Soviets have existing
systems whereas we do not.
o The Soviets' proposal for an ASAT arms control treaty
lacks provisions for effective verification, is unclear
with regard to Soviet targeting satellites, and does not
deal with residual ASAT capabilities. The moratorium
proposal seems clearly designed to block tests of the U.S.
ASAT while allowing the USSR to maintain its monopoly with
the world's only operational ASAT interceptor system.
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SPACE
Issue:
How can the United States capitalize on the full potential
of the medium of space in satisfying overall national
interests? -
Objectives:
o Strengthen the security of the United States.
o Maintain U.S. space leadership.
o Benefit economically and scientifically by exploiting
space.
o Expand U.S. private sector investment and involvement in
civil space-related activities.
o Promote international cooperative activities in space that
are in the national interest.
o Work with other nations to preserve the freedom of space
for all activities that enhance the security and welfare
of mankind.
Accomplishments:
o On July 4, 1982, President Reagan signed the National
Space Policy to guide the conduct of our space program.
The policy states that our space program will be conducted
according to several principles.
o We are committed to the exploration and use of space by
all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of
mankind.
o We reject any claims to sovereignty by any nation over
outer space, celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and
reject any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire
data from space.
o We consider the space systems of any nation to be national
property with the right of passage through and operations
in space without interference.
o We encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space
capabilities, technology, and systems for national
economic benefit.
o We will conduct international cooperative space-related
activities that achieve sufficient scientific, political,
economic, or national security benefits for the nation.
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o Our space program will be comprised of two separate,
distinct, and strongly interacting programs-- national
security and civil.
o The Space Transportation System (STS) is the primary space
launch system for both national security and civil
government missions.
o We will pursue activities in space in support of our right
of self-defense.
o We will continue to study space arms control options.
o Our Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy, which was
issued on August 6, 1982, promulgates broad U.S.
objectives in international space cooperation and provides
policy on space launch and technology assistance.
o The President has directed the maintenance of orbiter
production through manufacturing structural and component
spares.
o In May 1983, the President established a policy to
facilitate the commercialization of expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs). A Senior Interdepartmental Group (Space)
study subsequently led to establishing procedures for
licensing commercial space launches and giving lead-agency
responsibility to the Department of Transportation.
o Following the completion of-an interdepartmental study,
the President announced in his State of the Union Address
on January 25, 1984, that developing the frontier of space
would be one of the four major goals for the U.S. in the
1980s. In this context he announced that: the U.S. will
develop a permanently-manned space station and place it in
orbit within a decade; our friends and Allies are invited
to join us in the program; and we would implement a number
of initiatives designed to promote private sector
investment in space.
o At the London Economic Summit in June 1984, the Summit
partners welcomed the U.S. invitation to participate in
the Space Station program and agreed to review
international participation at the next summit.
o On July 20, 1984, the President announced 13 initiatives
to encourage commercial activity in space.
o On August 15, 1984 the President approved a National Space
Strategy. The Strategy implements the National Space
Policy by providing 17 priorities for the U.S. Space
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Program in the STS, Civil Space, Commercial Space, and
National Security Space areas. Seven'follow-on efforts to
further implement the policy are directed.
Talking Points:
ti p A vigorous and forward-looking space program is one of the
most highly visible and tangible demonstrations of world
leadership.
o Few other national endeavors have equaled the potential of
the U.S. Space Program to: perform functions in the
national security, domestic and private sectors that
either cannot be performed any other way or cannot be
performed as economically or as well; advance the
state-of-the-art in high technology; and elevate the human
spirit, capture our imaginations, demonstrate our
pioneering initiative, and hold out hope for a progressive
future for our nation and all mankind.
o No other President has taken a more personal interest in
U.S. space policy, attached higher priority to it, or
promulgated more policy decisions dealing with it than
President Reagan. Since announcement of his National
Space Policy on July 4, 1982, the President has issued
approximately eight directives and made numerous decisions
that will help implement this broad policy. The Senior
Interdepartmental Group (SIG) for Space was established to
coordinate the implementation.
o Much remains to be done to set the U.S. Space Program on a
course that ensures U.S. leadership in the decades ahead.
By the President's direction, a National Space Strategy
has been completed which establishes broad priorities for
the U.S. Space Program and identifies potential issues to
be resolved through follow-on studies.
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MILITARY CAPABILITY/READINESS
Are our armed forces more "ready" than in 1980?
Objectives: -
1,
o Continue to improve training and skill levels of U.S.
forces.
o Reduce longstanding defects in combat sustainability,
including stock levels of critical consumables.
o Provide modern and sophisticated conventional equipment to
enhance combat effectiveness and survivability.
o Blend equipment, stock level, and manpower improvements
into more combat capable armed forces.
o Provide better capability to deploy forces to combat
requirements and sustain them once deployed.
Accomplishments:
o In force readiness (i.e., the ability of forces, weapons
systems, etc. to deliver outputs--without unacceptable
delay--for which they were designed), substantial progress
has been made in the past three years and steady
improvement is projected for the future.
o Since FY 1980 there has been an almost 20 percent increase
in the number of enlisted personnel with four or more
years of service, and the percentage of recruits with high
school diplomas has increased from 68 percent to 92
percent.
o While trends in average training hours/flying
days/steaming days have been steady or have improved
slightly since 1980, the quality of training has improved
considerably, and the number of units rated "substantially
ready" has increased by about 25 percent.
o Trends in the material condition (i.e., mission-capable
rates) of most major weapons categories have been steady
or slightly improving since FY 1980. Now, however, we are
supporting larger numbers of more sophisticated and
complex weapons, operating them for longer periods, and
still realizing readiness improvements in some areas.
o In force sustainability (the staying power of our forces
in combat), because of the long lead times involved in
procurement, our increased funding from FY 1982-84 for
sustainability has not yet been fully translated into
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significantly increased inventories. However, we have
increased the budget allocation by 100 percent over the
1980 level, which will result, for example, in an increase
in munitions sustainability of 14 percent for'the Army, 62
percent for the Air Force, 58 percent for the Navy and 24
percent for the Marine Corps.
b In force structure (i.e., the numbers, size, and
composition of our defense forces units), we have provided
for significant increases in the numbers of some units
(divisions, battalions, tactical fighter wings, Navy
aircraft squadrons, and ship battle groups) over the past
four years. The need to provide balance among the
components of military capability within finite resources
.has required, however, that revisions in force structure
receive a somewhat lower priority than modernization,
readiness, and sustainability.
o In Strategic mobility, we can deliver 25 percent more
tonnage to Europe by air. We have done more to improve
sealift since 1981 than in all the years since WW II.
o In Force Modernization, we have obtained appropriations of
over $27 billion for construction of 34 new major combat
ships. We have funded a substantial increase for
procurement of modern weapons systems for the Army and
Marine Corps, e.g., for some 2,929 M-1 Abrams tanks; 2,200
Bradley Fighting vehicles; 171 AG-64 Apache attack
helicopters; 430 Light Armored Vehicles; over 1,000
Armored Amphibious Vehicles; and 3,000 Stinger missiles.
We can provide 62 percent more air sorties in Europe,
sorties whose individual effectiveness is improved because
they are newer aircraft carrying more accurate weapons.
o The introduction of more modern, capable, and effective
weapons systems has in some cases been accompanied by a
period of lower apparent readiness, in terms of equipment
fill, during the period of transition when not all of the
ancillary support equipment has been delivered and there
are no suitable substitutes to offset the shortage. This
apparent reduction in readiness, however, is only
temporary and is more than offset by modernization
improvements that enhance overall capability.
o The Bottom Line: In the professional judgment of each
U.S. Unified and Specified Commander-in-Chief, his command
is indeed far more ready "by every measure of common
sense" than it was four years ago.
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Talking Points:
o This Administration inherited several acute defense
problems which required immediate attention: There was no
comprehensive plan for strategic modernization; production
rates for many important procurement programs were grossly
inefficient; war reserves were extremely low; and there
was an ongoing "hemorrhage" of skilled manpower. The
commitment to address and resolve these problems appeared
to have been woefully inadequate.
o This Administration's primary objectives have thus been to
improve near-term training, readiness, and manpower
problems; integrate the modernization of strategic forces;
increase conventional force modernization; and make
inroads in the longstanding deficiencies in combat
sustainability.
o Overall, substantial progress has been made in many
aspects of these problems in the past three years, and
gradual but steady improvement is projected in the future.
We have more and better people; they are better trained;
and our men and materiel are better supported.
o It has never been our view that all the problems we
inherited could be solved within four years. But we have
shown that it is possible to set defense priorities and to
make balanced progress in improving overall military
capabilities.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN NATO.
How can the United States best advance the process of
modernizing NATO's weapons to provide an effective and
credible deterrent which supports NATO -strategy while
preserving the Alliance's unified approach to
modernization?
Objectives
o Continue, in the absence of an arms control agreement, to
deploy long-range intermediate nuclear weapons (LRINF) in
accord with the 1979 NATO Decision.
o maintain an effective and credible nuclear deterrent in
NATO which supports NATO strength at the lowest reasonable
inventory level.
o Enhance the utility, survivability, and safety of nuclear
weapons in NATO.
Accomplishments
o The NATO nuclear weapons inventory has been reduced to its
lowest level in twenty years. Following a withdrawal of
1,000 warheads in 1980 as part of the 1979 Dual-Track
Decision, we reached further agreement in 1983 to withdraw
1,400 additional weapons.
o Alliance unity has been maintained through extensive
consultations throughout INF negotiations. We agree on
negotiating positions and on adherence to measured
deployment of 572 LRINF weapons in the absence of a
verifiable, equitable arms control agreement.
o we continue to explore ways to reach the lowest inventory
level and weapons mix consistent with a credible and
effective nuclear deterrent.
o We have obtained Allied recognition of and support for
improvements in conventional defense capabilities to
permit less reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.
U.S. defense improvements have led the way in reducing the
need for early resort to nuclear weapons.
o A limited but effective modernization program for
shorter-range systems has been developed, to provide
needed capabilities at reduced inventory levels.
Modernization also enhances the accuracy and flexibility
of stockpile warheads.
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Talking Points
o Over the last four years, progress in NATO nuclear weapons
modernization has been substantial. We have reduced the
overall weapons inventory to the lowest level in twenty
years, and in 1983 we reached agreement in the Alliance to
ti withdraw another 1,400 warheads, plus an additional
warhead for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise
Missile deployed.
o We have maintained Alliance unity in pursuit of both
tracks of the 1979 Dual-Track Decision. We have
negotiated constructively and flexibly on INF, with full
Alliance accord on our position, until the Soviets broke
off the talks; we have adhered to a measured and limited
deployment of Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise
Missiles in the absence of an equitable and verifiable INF
arms control agreement.
o We have pursued a limited modernization program for other
short-range nuclear warheads, which will allow us and NATO
to maintain a credible, effective theater nuclear
deterrent at the lowest possible inventory level.
o We have led the way in conventional defense improvements
in NATO, and have convinced the Allies of the wisdom of
our efforts to improve conventional forces and reduce
reliance on nuclear weapons if deterrence fails.
o During the last four years, the United States has
undertaken a sustained,- expanded, and in some cases
unprecedented, level of consultations with its NATO
Allies.
o The NATO Special Consultative Group (SCG), chaired by the
U.S., met regularly and often to review and coordinate our
INF negotiating efforts.
o The NATO High-Level Group (HLG), also chaired by the U.S.,
has also met frequently to examine critical nuclear issues
facing the Alliance, providing the analysis on which NATO
decisions on these issues have been based.
o The U.S. has participated in semi-annual meetings of the
Ministerial-level Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to discuss
nuclear issues in the Alliance.
o The U.S. also has participated in a series of bilateral
High Level Defense Group meetings with various NATO
partners which have resulted in improved understanding of
defense matters.
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NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
How should the United States respond to pressures to
renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict?
Objectives:
o Support NATO strategy of not being the first to use force
of any kind.
o Protect our ability to deter attack by avoiding
categorical assurances that we will never be the first to
use nuclear weapons.
o Deflate the charge that a policy of forswearing the
first-use of nuclear weapons enhances stability and
security.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has reaffirmed U.S. adherence to the
principle, embodied in both the UN Charter and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Charter, that we will not be
the first to resort to force of any kind.
o In consultation with our NATO Allies, we also have
revalidated the strategy of flexible response as first and
foremost a deterrence strategy, not an aggressive
strategy.
o The U.S. has offered to discuss, in CDE, a proposal for a
formal agreement on non-use of force if the Soviets will
enter serious negotiations about substantive and
verifiable confidence-building measures which enhance
security and lessen the possibility of an outbreak of war.
Talking Points:
o America's policy on how to promote world peace has
consistently been more inclusive--and thus potentially
more productive -- than any one declaration on a specific
kind of weapon: we are pledged not to be the first to use
force "of any kind."
o Our policy on this issue has been developed in close
consultation with our Allies, especially the other NATO
members. We approach this issue in concert.
o A declaration about non-first-use of a specific weapons
type, such as nuclear weapons, would send confusing
signals about our sincerity and credibility in carrying
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out a deterrent strategy designed to prevent any
aggression, nuclear or conventional, against the Western
democracies.
o Over the last four years, we have devoted considerable
energy and resources to improving conventional defense
ti capabilities. This will allow us to reduce our reliance
on nuclear weapons and maintain a credible overall
deterrent -- but from a posture which enhances overall
security rather than placing it at risk.
o Signaling in advance to a potential aggressor who clearly
enjoys a substantial advantage in conventional and
chemical forces how we might -- or might not -- respond to
his aggression could encourage him to see how far he might
be able to go. This would undercut NATO's longstanding
deterrence strategy, thereby actually increasing the
chances of nuclear war.
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Issue:
How can the United States and its Allies resolve their own
disparate views and devise a comprehensive means of
preventing the Soviet Union and its Allies-from acquiring
sensitive technology?
Objectives:
o Recognize and explain, both to ourselves and our Allies,
the nature of the threat posed by technology transfer.
o Reach agreement on the extent of the threat.
o Introduce new countermeasures and constraints to impede if
not prevent such losses.
o Continue to improve our intelligence on technology
transfer matters.
o Curb the loss of sensitive technology without working
undue hardship on U.S. and Allied economic interests.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
o The Reagan Administration is the first to fully recognize
the security risk posed by technology transfer. It has
made many statements both publicly and in private to
Allies and U.S. business on the threat and our intention
to defeat it.
o The flow of information on technology transfer available
to us has increased dramatically. The results are being
seen in court cases and convictions for both diversion and
espionage in technology loss.
o Both U.S. Customs and the Commerce Department have
significantly increased their enforcement work, and since
1980, technology transfer has become an area of priority
in our intelligence effort.
o The security services of our Allies have expelled many
Soviet intelligence collectors, a result partially
attributable to U.S. efforts to highlight this issue.
Additionally, the U.S. has closed down many means
previously used by the Soviets to acquire technical
information.
o In COCOM the U.S. has made great progress in convincing
our Allies that the threat is serious. The recent COCOM
agreement is evidence of that achievement.
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Talking Points:
o The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Allies have sustained a
large-scale effort for some time to obtain Western
technical information and to adopt it to their military
and supporting industrial base requirements. The Soviets
are well behind the U.S. in many technologies having
military use, e.g., computers and microprocessor
technology, and thus require Western, and especially U.S.,
information to meet weapons requirements.
o Europe and Japan are, like ourselves, innovative and
scientifically advanced. Our Allies have a vested common
concern in stemming technology loss, as this loss leads to
higher defense budgets for all, while concurrently
weakening deterrence. On the other hand, each ally has
its own view of its economic relationship with Bloc
countries; there is, therefore, a tension of competing
interests among our Allies over economic gain versus the
provision of technology to the Bloc. At issue is how to
resolve these disparate views.
o Despite progress, a problem so complex as the loss of
technology cannot quickly be remedied. The Soviets are
very skilled in their collection techniques and know
specifically what they must have. Since the collection of
technical information has been a long-standing campaign,
with numerous avenues of collection, impeding this effort
is not quickly done.
o The U.S. is an open society with a heritage of free
expression. This freedom of expression is exploited by
the Soviets in their collection program; the U.S.
Government must ensure proper protection of sensitive
information while not impeding the rights and traditions
of free expression.
o The effort to slow or stop the loss of strategic
technology must be a persistent, long term undertaking.
It is essential both for ourselves and our Allies that the
threat continue to be highlighted and exposed for the
danger that it poses, and that countermeasures, both
unilateral and bilateral, be kept in place and supported,
and backed by the highest levels in the Administration. A
great deal of progress has been made and this progress
must be sustained and enhanced by organizational, legal
and technical means.
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REVITALIZATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
why is it necessary to expand and improve U.S. military
Special Operations Forces (SOF)?
Objectives:
o Rebuild and maintain SOF capable of conducting the full
range of assigned missions at all levels of conflict on a
worldwide basis.
o Provide the National Command Authority a flexible military
force for use in pursuit of strategic national objectives,
especially in situations in which the use of conventional
forces would be inappropriate or infeasible.
o Answer the challenge of Soviet-sponsored or encouraged
destabilization in the Third World by maintaining the
ability to help others build their nations and counter
low-level aggression.
o Ensure that the process of revitalization is fully
completed by 1990.
Accomplishments:
o The Reagan Administration has made SOF revitalization one
of its highest defense priorities.
o Management of the SOF revitalization effort has been
enhanced by the creation of the Joint Special Operations
Agency under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
activities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
o Command and control has been improved through the
establishment of the Army's 1st Special Operations Command
and the Air Force's 23rd Air Force (MAC).
o SOF force structure is being expanded with the activation
of new Special Forces Groups, Ranger battalions, and SEAL
Teams, and existing understrength units are being fleshed
out.
o we are procuring new special operations aircraft and Naval
Special Warfare Craft and replacing outdated equipment
such as weapons and radios.
o We are undating and revising SOF doctrine and expanding
and improving specialized training.
o We are working to ensure that those who serve in special
operations have opportunities for career advancement equal
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to those of their peers in other branches of service.
Talking Points:
o The Reagan Administration inherited SOF debilitated by a
decade of neglect and deep cuts in funding and manpower.
o Our determination to revitalize these forces is based on
the recognition of the strategic role they can play at all
levels of conflict.
o In particular, we are concerned about the threat to our
security posed by low-intensity conflict. Since Cuba went
communist, 17 countries have fallen to this, form of
aggression, and today one out of four countries in the
world is engaged in some form of hostilities. More
importantly, because the nuclear and conventional defenses
of the Free World have deterred direct Soviet aggression,
the Soviets have turned to destabilization as a more
subtle means to achieve their expansionist goals.
o SOF have a unique role to play in countering this threat.
Because of their specialized skills, they are ideally
suited to train others to act in their own defense and
build their nations so peace and freedom can prevail. In
so doing, they are reducing the likelihood of more
widespread aggression.
o Since 1975, SOF have been involved in more than 500 Mobile
Training Teams deployed to some 60 countries around the
world. Today they account for more than one-quarter of
such teams and are the most heavily committed of our
military forces.
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6194
Add-on
WASHINGTON
October 16, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Selected National Security Issues
Executive Registry
84. 7027/2
Enclosed are two copies of the September 1984 Selected National
Security Issues book for your use. The book summarizes our
objectives and accomplishments and provides talking points for
the specific issues selected. We intend to publish an updated
version quarterly. The National Security Council Executive
Secretary has a limited number of additional copies.
I would appreciate any comments and suggestions you may have to
assist us in updating and maintaining this book as a useful aid
for dealing with national security issues.
Attachment
Selected National Security Issues, September 1984
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Jtl.Kt I
Ccntral Intelligence Agency
Mmsfrrglon, a C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Selected National Security Issues Book
Executive Registry
Ls4- 7027 /
3 1 AUG 1984
1. I reviewed with interest the latest draft of the "Selected
International Security Issues Book" which you and your staff have
compiled as an aid for Administration spokesmen. This should be an
invaluable tool in ensuring that this Administration speaks with a single
voice on the many itive issues covered in this important
compilation.
2. To assist in this effort I have asked my experts to review this
draft from two perspectives: first, to see if there is any classified
information contained therein that would need to be excised, and; second,
to check and ensure that it is factually correct. With respect to
classification, they found only one item of concern
and that wa-r- thp
acknowl edement
Finally, you
Will TIM zz c e some suggested rrections which have been made for
the sake of accuracy.
3. Bud, if you need any further assistance in this matter please
call. I -look forward to receiving the final version of this very useful
paper
DISTRIBUTION
1 DDCI
1 -? EXDIR
1-DDI
Attachmen : ER FILE
As stated
7s7 1213-"m J. Cr+q
Wil l iam J . Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
SFrPFT
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25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
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UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: Selected National Security Issues Book
Corrections Intended for Accuracy's Sake
Page 14, 6th bullet: "(European economies grew 2.4 percent in 1983; the
recast r 1984 is 4.5 percent)". COMMENT: Although we don't know the
source of these numbers, we would point out.that the OECD forcast are 1.3
percent in 1983 and 2.3 percent in 1984.
Page 22, 9th bullet: This bullet suggests that our peacekeeping effort
in Lebanon stoppe the daily slaughter of innocent civilians." We think
it would be more accurate to say that it reduced the daily slaughter.
Page 29, 5th bullet: In the sentence: "The February 1984 non-aggression
pact between out Africa and Mozambique and the April 1984 agreement
providing for disengagement and withdrawal of South African forces from
Angola," February 1984 should actually be March 1984 and the reference
to April 1984 should be to February 1984.
Page 31: In the first partial tic change February 1984 to March 1984 and
April 1984 to February 1984.
Page 34, 5th bullet: In the sentence "There have been no military coups
since July 80 in Latin America]." strike this phrase in as much as
there have been two military coups--one in Guatemala and one in
Boliva--since that date.
Page 35, 5th bullet: This bullet refers to the aggresssion of Nicaraguan
forces which are said to "number 100,000 persons; we would suggest that
this read Nicaraguan forces, which number 100,000 persons including
reserves."
Page 43, 7th bullet: For the sentence: "During 1983, international
terrorism took an appalling toll in human life--including 274 Americans
who died in 393 separate incidents." --we suggest you substitute the
following: "During 1983 international terrorism took an appalling toll
in human life. In that year alone Americans were either the targets or
incidental victims of 270 terrorist attacks. 271 US citizens died as a
result of terrorism."
Page 43, 8th bullet: For the sentences: "In recent years we have seen a
new p enomenon--t a direct use of terror by foreign states. State
terrorism accounts for the majority of terrorist murders and
assassinations." --we suggest that these be rewritten as follows: "In
recent years we have seen a growing phenomenon--the direct use of terror
by foreign states. State terrorism accounts for an increasing number of
terrorist murders and assassinations."
IINri ASSTFTFn
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UNCLASSIFIED
Page 44, 3rd bullet: In the sentence: "American citizens, including
diplomats an military personnel, have been the victims of 40 percent of
the terrorist incidents over the past decade." --we suggest the phrase
"40 percent of the terrorist incidents" be changed to read "a major share
of the terrorist incidents."
Page 46, 4th bullet: The phrase that reads "We have received evidence of
possible Soviet non-compliance with these agreements and with the limited
test ban treaty." --should read "evidence of likely Soviet non-compliance
with these agreements and with the limited test ban treaty."
Page 55, 7th bullet: In the sentence that reads "At least two of these
systems feature weapons with ranges of 400 kilometers that can threaten
strategically important US land targets." --change the last phrase
"strategically important US land targets" to "coastal US cities."
Page 60, 2nd bullet: Change the last phrase "electronic warfare
(jamming) caps > ity against space systems" to "and the technological
capability for electronic warfare (jamming) against space systems."
UNCLASSIFIED
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NOTE FOR:
9 August 1984
A 84
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT: Selected National Security
Issues Book
During your absence the attached
publication was received from Bud
McFarlane. It is intended as a guide for
Administration spokesmen on key foreign
policy issues. McFarlane requests your
views on this package before the end of
August. I have taken the liberty of
farming this out to the experts and have
asked them for their thoughts from two
perspectives. First, does it contain
classified information and second, is it
factually correct? With those comments
in hand I drafted the attached letter for
your signature.
There was only one security problem
but several relatively minor factual
errors. Hope this helps
STAT
Attachment
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THE WHITE MOUSE
6194
Add-on
PITTJ
August 18, 1984 7027
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Selected National Security Issues Book
Attached is a draft of the Selected National Security Issues book
which we have compiled as an aid to Administration spokesmen. We
plan to update the book on a regular basis.
We would very much appreciate your comments by the end of August
before we finalize this version.
Robe C. MdFarlane
Attachment
Selected National Security Issues Book
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'
 M1,4% ArT
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SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
August 1984
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This is a compilation of selected national security issues,
national objectives, Administration accomplishments during the
past four years, and key talking points for each issue. We
selected these particular issues not only because of their
significance in national security affairs, but also because of
their high interest. This document is not intended to be a
comprehensive or in-depth review of our national security policy.
However, we do hope that it serves a useful purpose by providing
insight into our selected national security policies.
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Selected National Security Issues
August 1984
Page
Overview ....................................................1
Regional Issues
The Soviet Union ..................................... .6
Eastern Europe .........................................10
Western Europe ........................................13
Japan...
... ..........................................16
Peoples Republic of China .............................18
East Asia/Pacific Basin ............................... 20
Israel/Arab States/Lebanon ............................22
Iran-Iraq War .........................................24
Afghanistan/South Asia ................................26
North Africa ..........................................28
Africa: Security .....................................29
Africa: Development ..................................32
Latin America/Caribbean ...............................34
International Economics ...............................37
International Energy ..................................41
Terrorism .............................................43
Arms Control .......................................... 45
Deterrence ............................................49
Strategic Modernization ...............................50
ICBM Modernization ..... ...... .... .. ...............53
Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise missile .............55
Strategic Defense Initiative .... .....................57
ASAT Development and Arms Control .....................59
Space .................................................61
Military Capability/Readiness .........................64
Nuclear Weapons Modernization in NATO .................67
Non-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons ......................69
Technology Transfer ...................................71
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SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
OVERVIEW
The two most important foreign policy questions any
Administration faces are:
o What does America stand for?
Answers to these were increasingly in doubt in the 70's. They
are no longer. By providing clear answers we have helped to make
the world a safer place and to keep it safe in the future.
The Starting Point
By January 1981, international affairs had come to seem
especially troubling for Americans. The reason was simple -- the
actions of our leadership had raised doubts, around the world and
for our own people, about basic questions like:
o Military security: Would the U.S. continue to get weaker
or regain her strength?
o Domestic economy: Would we be able to lick the problem of
inflation and low growth?
o International economy: Would we continue to work for free
trade or retreat into self-defeating protectionism?
o Arms control: Would we continue to accept one-sided
agreements or insist on equality and real reductions?
o Alliances: Would we stand by our friends and be able to
get them to follow through on commitments to us?
o Regional crises: Would the U.S. continue to lose the
influence necessary for promoting regional stability and
peace? Was it still better to be a friend of the U.S.
than Soviet Union?
A President must act. And he must be prepared to give clear
answers to these question. He can't expect to protect America's
interests by:
o Claiming the problems we face are too hard,
o Pretending that Cuban troops roaming around the Third
World are a "stabilizing" force,
o Offering our friends just enough help to fail, or
o Settling slowly but surely for second best.
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2
If this is how we act, it's absolutely clear what we'll get. The
Carter Administration claimed the invasion of Afghanistan opened
its eyes to the danger of Soviet expansion, but then gave so
little help to Pakistan -- the country most threatened by the
invasion -- that it was rejected as "peanuts." Nothing isolates
America more than weakness and unreliability.
Accomplishments
The job the American people asked us to do was to rebuild, and
make the world a safer place again. This is precisely what we've
done. The Soviet aggression has not claimed one square inch of
territory since 1981. We have made clear and steady progress in
reversing the global trends that we inherited. And we have
worked to restore the strength on which successful American
diplomacy and effective agreements depend:
o In Europe ope we and our allies stood up -- united -- to the
most _intense campaign of Soviet intimidation in 25 years.
o On arms control we've shown the way with proposals that,
for a change, would really increase our security. We've
put more elements of the East-West military equation on
the table than any previous Administration.
o Our own recovery and the strategy we and our allies forged
at the Williamsburg summit are helping to revive the
international economy. We are showing that it can be done
without resorting to trade-war tactics.
o In the Middle East, we have presented the most
far-reaching peace plan ever put forward by the U.S. And
our friends know they can count on us; one sign of the
change -- both sides in Israel's elections claimed they
would have the best relations with America.
o In Central America, we've met the challenge of military
subversion and expansionism. We've helped the first
democratic government of El Salvador in years to protect
itself; working with Caribbean nations, we helped return
the government of Grenada to its people.
o In Africa we have been diplomatic mediators, helping to
bring about the first non-aggression agreements ever
between South Africa and her neighbors, and using our
influence to seek solutions to problems rather than
confrontation.
o We have united the free world against repression in Poland
and the Soviet war of conquest in Afghanistan. There s a
powerful message in the fact that most of the world's
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insurgencies are now fighting against the Soviet Union or
Soviet clients. These are the true national liberation
movements of our time.
o The President's personal diplomacy has built the best
relations our country has ever had with Japan and China.
Good relations with each of these Asian powers has not
been at the expense of bad relations with the other. We
are working with both to improve their ability to defend
themselves.
o We are reaching out to all friendly nations of the Pacific
Basin, to seek enhanced economic and security ties wits
this dynamic region so vital to America's future.
o We have made dramatic progress in working with others to
curb the spread of nuclear weapons to new states and to
unstable regions of the world.
o We no longer fear energy shortages -- oil imports are way
down, our reserves are high, and we've forged effective
emergency energy agreements with our allies.
o We have taken control of the tide of strategic technology
to the USSR, eliminated preferential credit terms for the
Soviets, and reduced the risk of European dependence on
Soviet energy.
This is where America stands. And because what we have achieved
is deep and durable, it opens the door to still broader
opportunities in the years ahead.
Next Steps: Looking Ahead
America is stronger today than four years ago. But we didn't
restore our strength for strength's sake.
What America stands for is what it should always stand for --
peace, prosperity and democracy. And it has to do more than
treat these as slogans -- it has to know what it takes to get
there, and have the vision to set bold goals.
We've shown we can do that, but the American people deserve to
know what the agenda for the next four years will be.
Peace. We are all for peace. Our people are entitled to
security. The question is how to turn rhetoric into results.
-- Conduct relations with the Soviet Union based on strict
reciprocity and true restraint. Seek and achieve
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agreements based on real reductions in nuclear forces.
Our proposals are still on the table; we think the Soviets
will be back.
-- Affirm -our long-term commitment to end mankind's terrible
reliance on nuclear weapons, by exploring the technology
of strategic defense (and exploring the willingness of the
Soviet Union to work with us on it), and by improving the
conventional capabilities of this country and our allies.
-- Seek immediate breakthroughs in other areas where peace is
at risk: e.g., preventing proliferation of nuclear
weapons to new countries, turning back the tide of
international terrorism, resolving dangerous regional
wars, and showing to countries that have looked to the
Soviet Union the viability of the democratic, free
enterprise alternative.
Prosperity. Stirrings in the international economy reflect our
own vibrant recovery. How to assure that this is not just a
blip?
-- Continue the responsible policies at home that have put
us back on our feet. This is central to worldwide
growth, but also to other goals. The discipline we
showed in attacking problems has increased confidence
in America across the board.
-- This can be the basis of a second goal: reaching and
implementing a world consensus on free market policies
to assure an enduring economic recovery. In
particular, focus on liberalized trade and financial
stability.
-- Put the protectionist temptation behind us. An open
world economy is the best -- only -- way to sustain a
recovery in which whole world participates. We want to
get others to "swear off" too by reducing barriers to
investment, etc.
-- Solve the international debt problem in a way that
treats the disease not just the symptoms. We are
already helping democratic friends like Mexico and
Argentina work their way out of their crisis, and on
conditions that will require responsible economic
management in the future.
Democracy. America believes in a future of democratic
possibilities, and knows that in the long run democracy is the
best peace program we have to offer. Progress -- 90% of Latin
America's people now live in countries that are democratic or on
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a transition timetable. And countries that seemed to have no
hope of democracy -- like Argentina and Guatemala -- have made
major breakthroughs.
-- Make the Americas the hemisphere of democracy in this
decade. The steadiness of this Administration's
policies is one part of making this possible. The
recommendations of the bipartisan Kissinger Commission
on Central America must be a further pledge to this
process. Issue the challenge of democracy to nations
around the world, doing what we can to encourage trends
toward democracy and to discourage those who would
repress their people or help others whose formula for
government is repression instead of democracy.
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REGIONAL ISSUES
SOVIET UNION
Issue:
How can the United States deter further Soviet direct and
indirect aggression and reduce the risk of a U.S.-Soviet
war?
Objectives:
o Reduce, and eventually eliminate, the use and threat of
force in solving international disputes;
o Reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world,
particularly nuclear weapons, on a balanced and verifiable
basis;
o Establish a better working relationship with the Soviet
Union, one marked by greater cooperation and
understanding; and
o Deter Soviet aggression and to facilitate negotiation of
agreements which would reduce tension and diminish the
threat of war.
In pursuing these objectives, our approach is based on three
guiding principles:
o Realism, which means that we must recognize the nature of
the world we live in and the Soviet system, and must not
sweep problems under the rug, but must deal with them
forthrightly.
o Strength, which is more than military power; it is an
amalgam of political unity and will, economic health, and
an adequate defense.
o Dialogue, which means that we are prepared to discuss the
problems that divide us and to work for practical and fair
solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.
Accomplishments:
o The world is safer today than it was four years ago. Our
ability to deter aggression is being restored, and the
growing tide of Soviet direct and indirect aggression we
saw in the 1970's has receded.
o Not one square inch of additional territory has fallen to
communist aggression since 1981.
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o The Soviet Union has also avoided actions which could
cause direct conflict between us -- as opposed to what
happened, for instance, in 1973, when Soviet preparations
to intervene directly in the Middle East caused us to go
on a world-wide strategic alert. -
o our World alliances and traditional friendships, essential
to deterring Soviet aggression, have been repaired and are
sound.
o NATO's action in backing the deployment of INF missiles in
Europe to counter the threat of the Soviet SS-20's is a
case in point.
o We have created a sound basis for realistic and peaceful
management of our relations with the Soviet Union.
o We have placed far-reaching and ambitious arms reduction
proposals on the table.
o We have moved to place our working relationship on a more
businesslike footing, and to increase contacts between our
societies.
o We have made it clear that our cooperation with the Soviet
Union will depend importantly on Soviet compliance with
existing agreements; including those on arms control,
human rights, and other major issues.
o We have established a pattern of consultation on regional
issues. Despite our fundamental disagreements on many of
these, consultations help us and the Soviets to avoid
actions which could escalate into direct conflict.
o we have in place a policy designed for the long term,
since management of our relations with the Soviet Union
must be steady and must avoid the rapid fluctuations of
the past, which weakened our ability to defend our
interests. It is based upon a realistic assessment of the
Soviet Union, and on the recognition that we must preserve
peace between us as we work toward solving problems.
Talking Points:
o Our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is aimed at
achieving a reduction in the use of force, a reduction in
nuclear and other armaments, and a better U.S.-Soviet
working relationship. We also seek to deter further
Soviet direct and indirect aggression in the world.
o During the 1970's the USSR increased its military power
far beyond its defensive needs and used force and the
threat of force to expand its control over other
countries.
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o Either directly or through surrogates the Soviets
attempted to establish communist regimes in Africa
(Angola, Ethiopia), in Asia (Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos),
in Latin America and the Caribbean (Nicaragua, El Salvador
and Grenada), and actually invaded a neutral country
(Afghanistan). They turned Communist Cuba into a base for
aggression in Latin America and Africa. At the same time,
they attempted to undermine NATO by deploying SS-20
nuclear missiles against Western Europe.
o This pattern of aggression not only posed a threat to many
independent nations, but ultimately to American security
and to the American way of life.
o During the same period, the Soviet Union reached parity
with us, and in some areas pulled ahead of us, in
strategic nuclear capabilities.
o This Administration has moved decisively to contain Soviet
expansionism. No country has fallen to Soviet aggression
since 1981 and, despite its frequent saber-rattling and
truculence, Moscow has been more cautious in its military
behavior over the past four years. This, we believe, has
happened because we have repaired our deterrent capacity
and strengthened our alliances.
o At the same time, we have created a sound basis for
realistic and peaceful management of our overall
relationship with the Soviet Union. In the past four
years, the United States has made dozens of specific
proposals to the Soviet Union which, if accepted, would
reduce tensions, reduce arms levels and provide for a
better and more realistic working relationship.
o We have proposed conducting a joint simulated space rescue
mission.
o We have agreed to upgrade the "hotline" for crisis
communications between our capitals.
o We are discussing again the proposal to open consulates in
New York and Kiev.
o We are discussing extending our agreements on avoiding
incidents at sea and on cooperation in fishing.
o We have renewed our agreement on consular, economic,
industrial, and technical cooperation.
o We have proposed reviving agreements on cooperation in
environmental protection, housing, health, and
agriculture.
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o we are seeking to resolve differences on our maritime
boundary off Alaska.
o we are proposing to discuss potential nuclear terrorist
incidents and search and rescue procedures for those lost
at sea, and improving joint military and diplomatic
communications.
o Moscow has, however, refused since December 1983 to
negotiate with us on reducing nuclear arms. We believe
that it is in the interest of both countries to negotiate
verifiable agreements for lower arms levels, and to
improve our relationship in other respects. We will
continue our efforts, and believe that the Soviet
leadership will eventually come to understand that such
negotiations are in its interest as well.
o Until the Soviets show a readiness to negotiate
realistically, it is essential for us to continue our
defense modernization program. If this program is
curtailed without verifiable agreements to constrain
threatening Soviet programs, the Soviet leaders will have
little incentive to negotiate, but will simply wait in the
hope of achieving their objectives without any concessions
on their part.
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EASTERN EUROPE
Issue:
Given U.S.-Soviet tensions and the Soviet campaign to
reimpose more stringent controls on Eastern Europe, how
can we maintain and improve our relations with East
European countries?
Objectives:
o Differentiate our policies toward East European countries
to encourage domestic liberalization, diversity, and more
autonomous foreign policies.
o Promote security through enhanced trade, economic and
political cooperation.
o Stimulate and further develop the East-West dialogue
through cultural and scientific exchanges, international
meetings, high-level visits, bilateral councils, and
government-to-government contacts.
o Help foster genuine national reconciliation in Poland that
includes dialogue among the Government, Church, and the
people; restoration of free trade unions; implementation
of economic reform; and an enhanced role for the Church.
o Maintain our strong support for an independent, unified,
non-aligned, economically viable, and stable Yugoslavia.
Accomplishments:
o In spite of U.S.-Soviet tensions and tighter Soviet
controls in East Europe, we have succeeded in preventing
the deterioration of U.S. relations with several East
European countries and, in fact, have strengthened
bilateral ties with Hungary and Romania through a policy
of differentiation.
o We have improved U.S.-Hungarian relations significantly,
as manifested in a series of mutual high-level visits,
resolution of all family reunification cases, Hungary's
adherence to the conditions of MFN status, and our support
for their membership in the IMF in 1982.
o We have improved the special U.S.-Romanian relationship
through frequent exchanges and mutually beneficial
political and economic steps. Romania has continued its
independent foreign policy -- most visibly in its
criticism of Moscow's new nuclear deployments and its
decision to ignore the Soviet Olympic boycott. Also, by
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establishing the U.S.-Romanian Human Rights Roundtable, we
have been able to communicate successfully the importance
we attach to immigration and overall human rights issues.
o The Vice President's trip to Eastern Europe in September
1983 served as a visible manifestation of our
differentiation policy and furthered bilateral dialogue
with key East European leaders. His visits to Yugoslavia,
Romania, and Hungary provided a foundation for durable
improvement in U.S.-East European relations, and his
speech in Vienna during the trip was the first clear,
high-level articulation of our differentiation policy.
o Our sanctions policy toward Poland has contributed to the
recent moderation displayed by Warsaw (the declaration of
amnesty for all political prisoners); has served and will
continue to serve as an effective lever to encourage the
Polish Government toward more concrete progress (economic
reform, restoration of free trade unions, etc.); and has
also enabled us to respond to positive measures taken by
the Polish Government with equally significant steps.
o Over the last three years, we have provided over $100
million in humanitarian aid to Poland. Specifically, the
Administration has assisted voluntary agencies (CRS, CARE,
and Project Hope) by providing food, medicine and other
humanitarian aid to the Polish people through
non-governmental channels.
o We have bolstered our bilateral relations with Yugoslavia
through such steps as the multilateral "Friends of
Yugoslavia" economic assistance package in which the U.S.
played a key role; and hosting the visit of President
Spiljak to the U.S. in 1984 -- the first top-level
Yugoslav visit to the U.S. since 1978.
Talking Points:
o We have successfully maintained, through our policy of
differentiation, good bilateral relations with several
East European countries, despite overall East-West
tensions and persistent Soviet efforts to tighten
political controls.
o We have rejected any notion of there having been a
"lawful" division of Europe. There was no agreement at
Yalta to divide Europe into "spheres of influence."
Rather, the Soviet Union pledged itself to grant full
independence to Poland and other states in East Europe,
and to hold free elections. The Soviet violation of these
obligations is the root cause of East-West tensions today.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively expand and
strengthen our longstanding and deep political, economic,
and military ties with and interests in Western Europe?
Objectives:
o Strengthen the NATO Alliance and our political and
military relations with other Western European nations.
o Neutralize Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from its
West European Allies.
o Make effective and meaningful arms control an essential
element in strengthening peace and security.
o Stimulate further the economic recovery of our European
Allies and friends.
o Promote closer U.S.-West European coordination of trade
and financial policies.
o Ensure that we and our Allies have access to sufficient
energy supplies to meet Western security needs.
o Curb the flow of militarily significant technologies,
products, and resources from the West to the Soviet Union
and its Allies.
o Devise an effective U.S.-Allied policy to combat
international terrorism.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has put relations with our European
friends and Allies on a stronger and steadier course.
This was partly accomplished via frequent meetings between
the President and key European leaders, including two
Presidential trips to Europe.
o We have worked closely with our Allies to develop
coordinated policies for addressing problems beyond the
NATO area. This has included especially close
consultations with regard to the Middle East and the
Iran-Iraq war, where we have reached agreement within the
International Energy Agency on how to handle a major
reduction in oil supplies. This has helped to calm the
oil market and keep the price of oil down.
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o In the absence of an arms control agreement, we have begun
deploying INF missiles in Europe, thereby beginning to
restore the theater nuclear balance upset by Soviet
deployments of SS-20 missiles.
o INF deployment, begun after the closest and most intensive
consultations in NATO history, has helped neutralize
Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from Europe and has
sent Moscow a strong signal of Alliance resolve and
solidarity.
o At the same time, we and our Allies remain fully committed
toward achieving significant arms reduction. The Alliance
recently signaled its continuing interest in moving in
this direction by deciding unilaterally to withdraw an
additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Europe.
o we have played a major role in developing measures to
improve NATO's conventional defenses through better
utilization of emerging technologies and enhanced arms
cooperation, as in the U.S.-FRG Patriot program.
o The Administration has successfully renewed military
basing agreements with Spain, Portugal, and Greece that
are vital to our deterrence strategy.
o The U.S. economic recovery has helped stimulate robust
non-inflationary economic growth in West European
countries. (European economies grew 2.4% in 1983; the
forecast for 1984 is 4.5%.)
o Agreement has been reached to discuss GATT and a new round
of trade negotiations, including trade with and among
developing countries. These initiatives will strengthen
the economic expansion in the U.S. and Western Europe, and
help spread the recovery to the LDCs.
o Together with our Allies, we have begun to develop a
comprehensive approach to resolving the world debt
problem.
o we have agreed with our Allies not to subsidize the Soviet
economy or aid Soviet military expansion by offering
preferential trading terms or easy credits.
o We have agreed with our Allies to restrict the flow of
products, materials, and technology which would increase
Warsaw Pact military capabilities.
o We have helped to foster a more balanced and realistic
understanding among our Allies of the Soviet threat and
the means by which the Soviets seek to achieve their aims.
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o We have agreed with the Europeans on a strategy to reduce
European dependency on the Soviet Union as an energy
supplier.
o We have reached agreement with our Allies to explore the
possibility of a joint space station.
o We have agreed with our Allies on concrete steps to combat
international terrorism.
Talking Points:
o Our objectives in our relations with our Western European
Allies and friends have been to expand and strengthen our
political, economic, and military cooperation; to assist
in spurring their economic recovery; and to negate Soviet
efforts to sow discord among us.
o The Western Alliance system has become strong again. We
have excellent relations with all of our Allies, and
President Reagan has developed strong personal ties with
many European leaders.
o We are working closely with our Allies in a number of
areas of fundamental importance to us all. These include:
planning cooperative responses to a possible oil shortage;
resolving the world debt problem; restricting the flow of
sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and its Allies;
reducing European dependency on Soviet energy; exploring
the possibility of a joint space station; and combating
international terrorism.
o The Alliance is in fundamental agreement regarding the
nature of the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and its
Allies. Despite Soviet threats, NATO is deploying INF
missiles to counter the SS-20 deployments, has reached a
new consensus on preventing the flow of militarily
significant technologies to the East, and has undertaken a
program to enhance NATO's conventional defense capability.
o The U.S. economic expansion has provided the impetus for
robust non-inflationary growth in West Europe. Other
joint initiatives, designed to eliminate protectionist
tendencies and promote trade with developed as well as
less-developed nations, will continue to strengthen the
economic expansion in the U.S. and West Europe and help
spread the recovery to the LDCs.
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JAPAN
Issue:
How should the United States manage the increasingly
complex relationship with Japan?
Objectives:
o Maintain and strengthen our excellent bilateral relations.
o Encourage Tokyo to meet its declared commitments for
self-defense.
o Continue to manage our economic and trade relations in a
careful and sustained manner.
o Enhance our ability to compete openly with the Japanese in
high-technology.
o Seek Japanese support for our key security and other
policies in other parts of the world.
o Urge Japan to import more U.S. energy.
Accomplishments:
o The President and Prime Minister Nakasone have established
a close personal working relationship which has led to
increased U.S.-Japanese cooperation in economic and
security areas.
o In the trade area, Japan has liberalized its market to
enable greater import of U.S. goods, including beef and
citrus.
o The Japanese have faithfully abided by the voluntary auto
restraint agreement, limiting their export of automobiles
to the U.S.
o The President and Prime Minister Nakasone have agreed to a
long term energy cooperation program which will mean
thousands of newly created U.S. jobs and greater security
for both nations.
o The Finance Ministers of each country have endorsed a plan
to further open Japanese financial markets, which, by
"internationalizing" the yen, should improve the
yen-dollar relationship over the longer term.
o In the defense area, Japan has agreed to an expanded
budgetary commitment which will enable them to keep their
regional defense commitments.
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Talking Points:
o The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the foundation of U.S.
policy in the Pacific.
o The President's trip to Japan in November 1983 and the
Vice President's follow-up in May 1984 strengthened U.S.-
Japanese ties and the partnership for peace existing
between our two countries.
o Japan has opened further its trading and financial
markets, has committed itself to importing more energy
from the United States over the longer-term, and has
agreed to increase its regional defense expenditures.
o We are pleased that the Japanese have allocated more funds
to improve their defense establishment, and that they have
committed themselves to pursue more market-opening
measures. Nonetheless, Japan has an obligation to take on
even greater responsibility in both the military and
international economic areas.
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PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Issue:
How can the United States facilitate continued, steady
improvement in a long-term relationship with China?
Objectives:
o Provide conditions conducive to continued growth in our
cultural, economic, and trade relations.
o Increase our dialogue with Beijing on political and
strategic matters of joint concern.
o Demonstrate to the Chinese the similarity of our global
objectives.
o Enhance our mutually beneficial relationship with China
without compromising our moral and legal commitments to
the people of Taiwan.
Accomplishments:
o The highly successful visits of Premier Zhao to the U.S.
and President Reagan to China reflect both countries'
strong determination to improve their ties.
o Over the past three years, we have signed a number of
agreements which will lead to expanded commercial and
cultural ties, including most recently a tax treaty, which
will avoid double taxation and facilitate joint commercial
ventures, and a protocol on cooperation management,
industrial science, and technology.
o The U.S. has liberalized controls over exporting high-
technology products such as computers and laboratory
instruments to China.
o The U.S. and China have begun a limited but important
cooperative relationship designed to strengthen Chinese
military defensive capability.
o The U.S. welcomed the Chinese to the 1984 Olympics after a
hiatus of 32 years, along with a team representing the
People of Taiwan.
Talking Points:
o With Premier Zhao's visit to the U.S. last January and the
President's return visit to China in April, we have shown
the world how important the relationship is to both
countries and how determined Washington and Beijing are to
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strengthen it. Under President Reagan's leadership, our
ties with China have become closer than they have been at
any time since our re-establishment of relations in 1972.
o We are realistic about our relationship, frankly
acknowledging the fundamental differences in ideology and
institutions between our two societies. We do not
minimize our differences, but neither are we dominated by
them.
o We seek to enhance our mutually beneficial relationship
with China in the areas of cultural, economic and trade
relations, without compromising our moral and legal
commitments to the people of Taiwan.
o U.S.-Chinese cooperation and understanding contribute to
peace and stability in Asia and in the world. We share
many of the same foreign policy objectives. We have begun
a limited but important cooperative arrangement designed
to strengthen Chinese defensive capability.
o President Reagan feels that bilateral progress in five
areas -- trade, technology, investment, student exchanges,
and exchanges of scientific and managerial expertise is
particularly promising in assisting China's modernization
efforts.
o our trade with each other shows great promise for the
future, particularly in areas such as machinery,
technology, oil equipment, petroleum, agricultural, and
manufacturing products.
o Americans have invested almost $700 million in joint
ventures and offshore oil exploration in China, making the
U.S. China's largest foreign investor. Some 50 Chinese
firms have established offices or branches in the United
States, and China has invested in several joint ventures
in the U.S.
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EAST ASIA/PACIFIC BASIN
Issue:
What should the United States do to facilitate the growth
of secure, prosperous, and politically stable nations,
closely associated with U.S. principles and goals, in
Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Basin?
Objectives:
o Continue developing a comprehensive Pacific Basin
development strategy that will enhance regional
cooperation with the U.S. throughout the area.
o Support the continued strengthening of U.S. economic,
political, and security ties with the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
o Deter North Korean aggression by continuing to provide
adequate security assistance to the Republic of Korea.
o Encourage direct talks between North and South Korea while
discouraging efforts to involve the U.S. in them.
o Resolve satisfactorily the POW/MIA issue with Vietnam.
o Maintain our historically close ties with Australia and
New Zealand and enhance regional security cooperation
under the ANZUS treaty organization.
o Encourage the development of friendly, democratic Pacific
Island nations with foreign policies supportive of U.S.
interests.
Accomplishments:
o The President's trips to Asia in 1983 and 1984, the Vice
President's trip last May, and Secretary Shultz's visit
this summer clearly affirmed our commitment to a policy of
close cooperation with the countries of the region.
o We have moved well along with our friends and Allies in
the region in the process of forging a Pacific Basin
development strategy. The endeavor was discussed
regionally for the first time at ASEAN's July meeting in
Jakarta, where the members agreed to concentrate first on
human resources development throughout the area.
o We have actively supported the economic development of the
ASEAN countries and have established excellent bilateral
relations with each of them.
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o U.S.-Korean relations are excellent, security ties have
never been stronger, and our expanding economic
relationship is taking on increasing significance.
o This Administration has established close personal ties at
all levels with Australian and New Zealand officials.
o Bilateral treaties of friendship with four Pacific nations
-- the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and New Zealand
(for Tokelan) -- were signed by the President and ratified
by the Senate. The treaties resolve long-standing
conflicting territorial claims and preserve U.S. fishing
rights and other interests.
Talking Points:
o The nations of the Pacific Basin represent the most
dynamic and fastest-growing economies in the Free World.
The President has noted that: "I see America and our
Pacific neighbors as nations of the future going forward
together in a mighty enterprise to build dynamic growth
economies and a safer world."
o We have strongly supported ASEAN's economic and political
activities and have simultaneously increased our security
cooperation with the individual member states. We have
encouraged the ASEAN countries to continue their forward-
looking economic policies based on free trade. We are
encouraging increased U.S. trade and investment in the
region.
o We are supporting ASEAN nations in forging a Pacific Basin
development concept.
o The U.S. strongly backs ASEAN's quest for a negotiated
settlement in Kampuchea. At the same time we have made it
clear that the POW/MIA matter remains the most important
bilateral issue between ourselves and Vietnam. This issue
must be fully resolved to our satisfaction before there
can be any discussion of normalizing our relations with
Hanoi.
o The United States will maintain its security commitments
to the Republic of Korea. We will continue, however, to
urge North and South Korea to ease tensions through
bilateral negotiations.
o We conducted a major review of the ANZUS Treaty in 1983
when a new government came to power in Australia. The
review reaffirmed the organization's relevance and
importance to the security of all three partners. That
relevance and importance is unaffected, we believe, by
changes in the political parties exercising power in any
of the member countries.
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ISRAEL/ARAB STATES/LEBANON
Issue:
How can the United States effectively improve prospects
for a lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors
and assist Lebanon in attaining unity and stability?
Objectives:
o Resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict through a just and
lasting settlement, achieved by direct negotiations among
the parties to the conflict.
o Facilitate the improvement of relations between Egypt and
Israel and their adherence to the Camp David accords.
o Ensure the security of Israel within defensible and
recognized international borders.
o Support the development of a strong, independent central
government in Lebanon.
o Obtain the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
Accomplishments:
o The United States took the lead in setting up the
Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. The
success of this venture made it possible to return the
Sinai to Egypt.
o The President's peace initiative of September 1, 1982 set
forth a balanced set of positions which the parties to the
Arab-Israeli conflict know the U.S. will stand by as soon
as negotiations are resumed.
o The agreement of May 17, 1983 providing for the withdrawal
of Israeli troops from Lebanon, although since abrogated
by Lebanon under Syrian pressure, was achieved as the
result of strenuous efforts by the United States.
o We did the right thing by pursuing our peacekeeping effort
in Lebanon which helped preserve a relative peace for
almost fifteen months andistopped the daily slaughter of
innocent civilians. rcdt
o The presence of our Marines and the Multinational Force in
Beirut also gave the government of President Amin Gemayel
a sorely needed opportunity to organize and reduce the
fighting in his country.
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o We reached agreement with Israel late last year to set up
a Joint Political Military Group to plan and coordinate
strategic cooperation against the Soviet threat and to
begin negotiations leading to the establishment of a free
trade area. We continue to make progress on both fronts.
Talking Points:
o Israel and her Arab neighbors have been in conflict since
the State of Israel was founded in 1948. Ever since that
time, it has been our policy both to help Israel survive
and defend itself and to work with Israel and the Arab
States to help them resolve their differences peacefully.
This Administration has reaffirmed and re-emphasized these
two key aspects of our overall Middle East policy. This
can best be achieved through direct negotiations.
o As a nation, we have invested a great deal in working for
peace in the Middle East. Although not all these
investments have yet paid tangible dividends, they serve
to demonstrate our deep interest in helping bring peace,
freedom, and prosperity to all the peoples of the region
-- goals we intend to continue supporting to the best of
our ability.
o American-Israeli relations have been on the upswing since
early last year. Cooperation between us reached a new
high level when we agreed at the time of Prime Minister
Shamir's visit here last November to work closely together
against Soviet intrusion into the region and to establish
a free trade area.
o We support Lebanese efforts to obtain the withdrawal of
all foreign forces from their country. We believe that
any settlement between Lebanon and Israel should be
reached through direct negotiations and should ensure the
security of Israel's northern border while respecting
Lebanese sovereignty.
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IRAN-IRAQ WAR
Issue:
How can the United States contribute to international
efforts to improve the security of the Persian Gulf
region?
Objectives:
o Support efforts aimed at bringing an early end to the
Iran-Iraq war and at preventing the spread of the war to
the Persian Gulf and other countries.
o Assist our friends in the Gulf to meet their legitimate
self-defense needs in the face of the threatening Gulf
War.
o Prevent Soviet efforts to exploit the conflict and further
destabilize the region.
o Ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to
international shipping.
o Prepare for further escalation of the war into the Gulf in
order to minimize its impact should it occur and to lessen
the attractiveness to either belligerent of striking
Western oil and shipping interests.
o Urge our Allies to cooperate in the event of a crisis to
avoid panic oil-buying and subsequent oil price increases
and shortages.
Accomplishments:
o By providing U.S. AWACS aircraft and surface-to-air
missile systems, we have demonstrated to our friends in
the Gulf that we are committed to helping them meet their
legitimate self-defense needs.
o We have encouraged restraint by both combatants and helped
prevent a widening of the war.
o In response to instability in the Persian Gulf, the U.S.
has led a process within the International Energy Agency
to improve international energy emergency preparedness.
An IEA decision (July, 1984) calls for a coordinated stock
draw in the event of a crisis coupled with other measures
(demand restraint, increases in indigenous production) to
avoid a rush to the spot market. In addition, all nations
which do not have adequate stocks have agreed to make best
efforts to increase them.
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o The Soviets have not yet improved their position in this
important region.
Talking Points:
o The United States is and has been concerned about this
four-year-old conflict because it threatens the security
of the other states in the Persian Gulf and the flow of
Gulf oil to the West.
o We support efforts to prevent a widening of the Gulf War
and to bring about a negotiated settlement. We have
worked closely with our Allies in efforts to contain the
conflict and to prepare for any temporary disruption of
the flow of oil from the region.
o We are committed to helping our friends in the Gulf meet
their legitimate self-defense needs and to help keep the
Gulf open to the shipping of non-belligerents.
o We are attempting -- so far successfully -- to avoid
direct Soviet or other external involvement that would
further destabilize the region.
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AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH ASIA
Issue:
What should the United States do to help end the Soviet
military occupation of Afghanistan, enhance Pakistani
security against external aggression, and encourage
peaceful relations among all South Asian nations?
Objectives:
o Support U.N. resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
o Assist in obtaining the restoration of Afghanistan's
neutral and non-aligned status, self-determination for the
Afghan people, and the opportunity for Afghan refugees to
return home in peace, freedom, and honor.
o Improve bilateral relations with all South Asian
countries.
o Promote regional understanding and cooperation in order to
reduce the possibility of an all-out arms buildup,
especially in nuclear weaponry, in the area.
o Assist Pakistan to remain free and secure despite the
threats posed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Accomplishments:
o We have helped keep the issue of Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan before world public opinion; there is
overwhelming international condemnation of Soviet behavior
there.
o The United States has contributed heavily to the support
of the 3.4 million Afghan refugees who have fled their
homeland; we are the largest contributor to the refugee
relief effort in Pakistan.
o We have been in the forefront of those nations encouraging
a political settlement that would allow the Soviets to
withdraw from Afghanistan.
o Thanks largely to the provision of $3.2 billion in
American aid, Pakistan's security has been enhanced.
o We have enhanced our commercial relationship with India
and have generally improved bilateral relations with all
South Asian countries.
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Talking Points:
o U.S. policy on South Asia has focused on seeking an end to
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, strengthening
Pakistan's security against potential Soviet aggression
and, promoting regional South Asian peace and
understanding.
o our position on Afghanistan has been shared by 117 nations
which have consistently voted with us on UN General
Assembly resolutions regarding Afghanistan. We have also
helped promote the search for peace by supporting
Pakistan's efforts to seek a political solution to the
Afghan dilemma through the good offices of the UN
Secretary General.
o Our observance of Afghanistan Day has helped international
efforts to keep the Afghan issue in the spotlight.
o We have made a strong commitment to help Pakistan protect
itself, providing it with $3.2 billion over the next
several years in economic and military assistance.
o We have worked through the International Atomic Energy
Agency and other organizations to reduce chances of a
rapid escalation in nuclear weapons development in the
region.
o We have conducted a dialogue at the Head of State level
with India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh in
the last three years. Our contacts have also continued at
other levels.
o We have encouraged South Asian countries in general, and
India and Pakistan in particular, to develop strong and
peaceful relations.
o We have supported efforts to improve regional ties such as
the South Asia Regional Cooperation forum. We see these
efforts as being the best way to build future stability in
the area.
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NORTH AFRICA
Issue:
What can the United States do to help curb Libyan
aggression and terrorism in North Africa and facilitate
the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict?
Objectives:
o Pressure Libya, through cooperative measures with our
friends and allies, to stop using terrorist tactics and
military aggression abroad.
o Support negotiations aimed at resolving the Western Sahara
dispute.
o Develop further our commercial ties with Morocco and
Tunisia to help these two states economically.
o Foster improved relations with Algeria.
o Support efforts at rapprochement by the Maghreb states.
Accomplishments:
o Measures have already been agreed upon with our Allies to
contain Libyan terrorism and aggression. U.S. and Allied
assistance to Chad and Sudan has helped blunt Libyan
destabilization efforts in the region.
o Relations with Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria have never
been better.
Talking Points:
o Libyan-sponsored terrorism poses a direct threat to
Libya's North African neighbors as well as to many other
states. We vigorously oppose such acts and are joining
with our friends and Allies in doing everything we can to
curtail these activities.
o The long struggle between Morocco and the Polisario over
control of the Western Sahara remains unresolved. We
support efforts to get the contending parties to negotiate
an end to the conflict and endorse the resolutions of the
Nairobi OAU summits of 1981 and 1982 which specify that
the solution to the conflict should include a cease-fire
preceding a referendum as an expression of
self-determination.
o We have improved our relations with Morocco, Tunisia, and
Algeria and stand ready to assist them in meeting the
problems that they face.
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AFRICA: SECURITY
Issue:
How can the United States respond most effectively to
requests from friendly African states for help in
resisting outside aggression and promoting peaceful
solutions to local conflicts?
Objectives:
o Increase security assistance on a selective basis to those
countries under threat of external aggression.
o Promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional
conflicts through diplomatic means.
o Continue working for the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from the southern African region as part of our
multifaceted initiative to create a security framework
under which all states of the region can live in peace.
Accomplishments:
o We have blunted the Soviet projection of power in Africa.
No sizable new influx of Soviet or surrogate forces has
occurred, and Moscow has gained no new African allies
since 1981. Mozambique and other African governments
allied with the Soviets in the 1970's have begun dialogues
with us and have moved away from Soviet influence toward
genuine non-alignmeet. /. 6r
o We have been a catalyst acilitati}t4 the peaceful
resolution 6f local disputes Specific examples include
the improvement in relati0 s between Kenya and Somalia,
the F.h e.xy 1984 non-aggression pact between South Africa
and Mozambique, and the hpri~ 1984 agreement providing for
disengagement and withdrawal of South African forces from
Angola.
o Timely U.S. security assistance helped counter Libyan
aggression in Chad and Sudan in 1983 and helped Somalia
stop an armed incursion from Soviet-dominated Ethiopia in
1982.
o We have obtained agreement by all parties on
implementation of the UN plan for Namibia, pending only
Angolan agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal. We have
established a reputation as an honest broker in our
diplomatic work on this most difficult of Africa's
problems.
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o We have played a quiet but vital part in bringing about
general diminution of cross-border violence in southern
Africa.
o We have been encouraging South Africa to take constructive
steps away from apartheid toward true democracy. We have
begun programs of support to black trade unions, begun an
important effort to provide scholarships to black South
African students, and have undertaken a program of
financial support to human rights organizations in South
Africa.
Talking Points:
o The United States has a significant geopolitical and
strategic stake in the security of the African continent
and the seas around it. Our interests are seriously
affected when Soviets, Cubans, and Libyans seek to expand
their influence in the region by force and by exploitation
of instability.
o The late 1970's saw Africa become increasingly exploited
by the Soviet Union and its allies. Violence in southern
Africa and the Horn of Africa was escalating, insurgencies
were growing in eight African countries, and cross-border
armed raids by opposition groups were occurring elsewhere
on the continent. Feeding on these conflicts, the Soviet
Union poured almost $5 billion in arms into Ethiopia,
Angola, and Mozambique and fielded almost 5,000 military
"advisors" in Africa. Two Cuban expeditionary forces,
totaling over 40,000 combat troops, were garrisoned in
Africa. Libyan-sponsored subversion against neighboring
African states was on the increase and a Libyan military
force of 8,000 occupied Chad.
o Thanks in large part to U.S. policies and efforts in the
area, the Soviets have added no new national converts in
Africa since 1981 nor have they dispatched new surrogate
troop contingents to Africa. Several African governments
which were counted as Soviet allies in 1980 have moved
toward a real non-alignment.
o U.S. military assistance to Africa has increased from
$94.7 million (FY 81 actual) to $211.6 million (FY 85
request). The bulk of the program has been converted to
grant aid in recognition of the difficult economic
situations of the recipients. We nonetheless have
maintained a 4:1 ratio of economic assistance to security
assistance in Africa in recognition of the fundamental
security role economic stability and progress plays.
o There has been a significant increase in dialogue among
neighboring states in southern Africa. This process has
led, with the U.S. acting as a catalyst, to a
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non-aggression pact between South African and Mozambique
in Fa y 1984 and a landmark force disengagement
agreement between South Africa and Angola formalized in
Lusaka in . p r-l 1984.
o We have undertakin a special regional security initiative
for southern Africa. Specific components include a
complex diplomatic initiative to lead to an
internationally recognized settlement of the Namibia
problem and Namibian independence; support for regional
economic development; withdrawal of foreign forces from
the area; and support for peaceful progress in ending
apartheid in South Africa. This initiative is often
referred to as "constructive engagement."
o There is a growing dynamic for change in South Africa and
the last few years have seen important, fundamental
changes: institutionalization of black trade unions,
legitimization of black residence in urban areas, the
enfranchisement of coloreds and Asians, major increases in
expenditures for black education, and the beginning of
black municipal and local self-government. We have played
a quiet but real part in encouraging and facilitating such
constructive forces for peaceful, positive change and
movement away from racial segregation, separation, and
discrimination.
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AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT
Issue:
What should the United States do to help African countries
come to grips with their critical economic and
developmental problems?
Objectives:
o Work with other nations and organizations to combat famine
by providing food relief assistance.
o Induce African governments to make serious and sustained
efforts to help themselves by undertaking substantial
structural reforms.
o Persuade African governments that economic development
goals can best be pursued through mechanisms and
incentives which incorporate the principles of private
enterprise and free trade.
Accomplishments:
o In three years we have doubled the quantity of emergency
foodstuffs shipped to meet specific life-threatening
famine problems in Africa, and we have led the world in
providing humanitarian aid to African refugees.
o In three years we have increased our non-emergency food
and developmental aid to Africa by 20 percent, tying this
assistance to structural reform and increasing local
agricultural productivity.
o We have submitted to Congress a new Economic Policy
Initiative which calls .for $500 million in funds to
support those African governments making the hard reforms
and policy changes necessary for recovery.
o We have joined the African Development Bank and increased
our support to the African Development Fund.
o We have placed major stress on the need for private sector
development in Africa, recognizing that the unleashing of
the indigenous private sector holds the key to long-term
economic development.
o We have seen major economic reforms take hold in Zaire and
Liberia where recovery is beginning.
o we have seen agricultural production raised dramatically
in Somalia when centralized controls were lifted.
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o We have seen every self-described Marxist and
Marxist-Leninist government in Africa (except Ethiopia and
Angola) approach Western donors for increased aid in
return for fundamental reversals in economic policy,
including decontrol of the economy and freeing of the
private sector.
Talking Points:
o Virtually all 45 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa, with a
rapidly growing population that now totals 400 million,
face an economic crisis of stark proportions. Per capita
food production has fallen by 20 percent in the last 20
years; real per capita income has decreased 2-3 percent
per year over the past three years. A tenacious drought
continues to ravage the continent from the Sahel area to
South Africa. Refugees number over two million. A
recession that has touched every African nation began with
the 1979 oil crisis and has not yet ended.
o The economic crisis has many causes -- drought, the
flow-through effect of recession in the developed world,
effects of the 1979 oil price increase, civil wars -- but
the World Bank identifies the prime cause as the failure
of inappropriate domestic price incentives. Too many
African governments have held too long to failed policies
which stifle domestic production, chief among them being
the rigid hewing to central planning and control precepts
and practices.
o The unprecedented economic crisis in Africa threatens U.S.
interests on several levels. Unless alleviated, African
leaders may increasingly look to authoritarian political
strategies. The African debt problem, though small
compared to other areas, puts strain on the international
financial system and defaults could increase that strain.
Unchecked crisis will lead to greater famine and civil
strife. A weak performance in Africa reduces trade with
the West, inhibiting worldwide recovery.
o We remain committed to private sector development in
Africa, including Western private investment and trade, as
the long-term answer to the continent's development needs.
We see agricultural self-sufficiency as the first order of
economic recovery and development there. We fully support
the international financial organizations in requiring
structural reforms in return for renewed financial
assistance.
o The efficiency and success of our efforts so far may be
measured by the fact that nearly all the centrally-planned
economies in Africa have undertaken positive change in the
direction of freeing the private sector. (Only Ethiopia
and Angola have not.)
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LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively assist Latin
American and Caribbean democracy, economic improvement,
and ability to resist outside aggression and subversion?
Objectives:
o Encourage, as much as possible, the current trend toward
democratic government in the region.
o Improve the economic well-being of the free peoples of
Latin America and the Caribbean.
o Assist friendly, democratic governments and peoples in the
region to defend themselves against externally-supported
Communist subversion and aggression.
o Ensure that the historically close U.S.-Latin American
relationship continues.
Accomplishments:
to 13411 via,
o We have provided consistent support and encouragement for
democratic institution building: today 26 of 33 countries
with 90% of the population are democratic or in
transition. Since November 1980 there have been 33 free
elections in 24 countries, virtually all with very high
voter participation, including 1 Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, andjthe Dominican Republic.
ave been"~
inistration has provided tangible support for
democratic labor unions and democratic
institution-building through programs, such as the new
National Endowment for Democracy proposed by President
Reagan in 1982 and passed by the Congress in 1983.
o Under the leadership of this Administration, U.S. economic
assistance to the Latin America-Caribbean region has more
than doubled. 70 percent of the U.S. foreign assistance
to Central America is economic.
o This Administration has taken the lead in formulating two
major, comprehensive regional assistance and development
programs for the area: the innovative Caribbean Basin
Initiative, which offers increased access to the U.S.
market for 12 years and can create many jobs; and the
President's Initiative for Democracy, Peace, and
Development in Central America, implementing the
recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America in January 1984, now awaiting
Congressional action.
the
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o We have been working with the area's public and private
sectors and the International Monetary Fund to encourage
involved parties to work responsibly to resolve the $380
billion Latin American debt problem.
o The U.S. has worked diligently through regular and special
diplomatic channels to pursue realistic solutions to
Central America's problems. Our efforts have included
several trips to the region by the President, Vice
President, and Secretary of State, and the consecutive
appointments of two Presidential Special Envoys to Central
America who made a total of 16 trips to the region in the
last year. We also have continuously supported the
peace-seeking process initiated by the Contadora countries
(Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela).
o Our most dramatic Caribbean accomplishment was to join, in
October 1983, with the East Caribbean democracies at their
request to rescue their and our citizens in Grenada,
remove the Soviet bloc/Cuban presence from Grenada, and
facilitate the process leading to the restoration of
democratic institutions in Grenada. Since that time, the
U.S. has helped the Caribbean democracies maintain a small
multinational peacekeeping force on the island to provide
security.
o Our defense assistance to El Salvador has been modest
(about $269 million over the past four years) but has been
vitally important to that country's efforts to strengthen
its armed forces enough to withstand repeated guerrilla
attacks and give democracy a chance to take root.
o U.S. military exercises in Honduras and provision of U.S.
military training and assistance to Honduran forces have
helped deter aggression by Nicaraguan forces, which number
100,000 persons.
Talking Points: C
o The United States is linked by history, proximity, and
special ties of friendship with the 33 independent
countries and 380 million people of Latin America and the
Caribbean. Objectives of this Administration have been to
encourage democracy, support economic improvement, use
active diplomacy to solve disputes, and provide security
assistance so that governments threatened by Soviet bloc,
Cuban, and Nicaraguan subversion could defend their
people.
o For the region as a whole, a highly encouraging recent
trend has been the return of several countries to
democratic government. Today, 26 of 33 countries are
democratic or in a defined process of democratization.
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These account for 90% of the area's population. The
Administration has consistently encouraged the process of
democratic institution-building in the area.
o In Grenada, the United States and the Caribbean
democracies rescued a nation from Soviet bloc and Cuban
control and internal repression.
o Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan-assisted subversion and
Communist aggression have created a crisis in Central
America, particularly in El Salvador. Continued Communist
success would pose the threat, as the President has
stated, that "100 million people from Panama to the open
border on our south would come under the control of
pro-Soviet regimes." We are countering this threat by
helping those people to defend themselves.
o While our military assistance to the region has been
modest, our contribution in economic and developmental
help has been substantial. Through the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and the President's Initiative for Democracy,
Peace, and Development in Central America, our commitment
to help speed up the process of economic growth in those
areas will become even larger and, we believe, more
effective.
o we are continuing to work with friendly governments in the
region to help them cope with their severe debt problems.
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37
Global Issues
International Economics
Issue:
What should the United States do to help sustain and
extend world economic recovery, help debtor nations help
themselves, and assist the developing countries to begin
to realize substantial, lasting economic growth?
Objectives:
o Formulate and implement sensible economic policies at home
aimed at stemming inflation and government spending.
o Develop a Free World consensus on policies designed to
achieve enduring, non-inflationary economic recovery,
financial stability, and liberalized trade.
o Encourage an effective IMF-based economic adjustment
process for debtor nations including sufficient private
and public financing and selective reschedulings to ease
the debt burden on LDC's and to restore conditions for
sustainable economic growth.
o Heighten Allied attention to the security dimensions of
East-West economic relations including the forging of
common objectives in NATO, OECD, IEA and COCOM.
Accomplishments:
o This Administration has succeeded in rebuilding a strong
domestic economy which has pulled much of the world out of
recession and into recovery: average growth rose from
around 1% in 1981 to above 4% for 1984; average inflation
of 10% in 1981 was cut to an expected 4.5% this year; 6
million American jobs were created in the past 18 months
alone.
o A consensus among the Allies has developed which reaffirms
the economic policies espoused by President Reagan:
market-oriented adjustment in our domestic economies;
strengthened management of the LDC debt problem; and trade,
liberalization and open markets.
o we have begun implementing a sensible five-part strategy
to handle the debt problem that was developed at the
Williamsburg Summit and embodied in the Williamsburg
Declaration and was later reaffirmed at the London Summit.
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o Substantial progress has been made in domestic and
international energy emergency preparedness through the
accelerated build-up of our Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(SPR) and an IEA agreement among the Allies for early use
of petroleum stocks and demand restraint to avoid
unnecessary volatility in the spot market.
o An historic Allied consensus on East-West economic
relations has been achieved which has led to elimination
of preferential terms on credits to the USSR; reduction of
the political/economic risk of Western European dependence
on Soviet energy resources; and strengthened measures in
COCOM to reduce illegal acquisition of Western technology.
Talking Points:
o The President inherited a fractious and deteriorating
international economic order characterized by record
inflation, high unemployment and severe recession.
o From the outset, the President emphasized the importance
of sensible domestic economic policies designed to halt
inflation, increase employment, and stem the tide of
increased government spending.
o The President has repeatedly demonstrated his strong and
visionary leadership in advancing a common Allied approach
to key economic, trade, financial and security objectives
through bilateral meetings in Washington and abroad,
annual economic Summit meetings and in international fora
such as OECD, IEA, NATO and COCOM.
o The President first put forward his economic policies at
the Ottawa Economic Summit in 1981. By the time President
Reagan hosted the Williamsburg Summit two years later, it
was clear that his policies were leading the U.S. and the
free world on the path to full economic recovery. Under
the President's leadership the Summit leaders agreed to
coordinate policies to promote sustainable,
non-inflationary growth and to forge a consensus on the
security dimensions of East-West economic relations which
had proved elusive in the past.
o This was followed up a year later by the successes of the
London Economic Summit which reinforced the importance of
free market economics, open markets, and management of the
debt problem. Agreement was also reached on important
political statements on East-West relations, terrorism,
democratic values and the volatile Persian Gulf situation.
o Working closely with our NATO Allies and Japan, we have
made major gains in correcting the serious imbalance of
the past between the advantages of trading with the USSR
and our common security requirements. We have reached
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agreement with the Allies on eliminating preferential
terms on credits to the USSR and reducing the substantial
risk of Western European dependence on Soviet energy
resources.
o In working closely with the COCOM countries, we have met
head-on the challenge of stopping the flow of
militarily-relevant Western technology to the USSR through
the upgrading of the COCOM review process, the
harmonization and tightening of national licensing and
enforcement procedures, and the monitoring of the
potential military application of emerging technologies.
o The President has taken important steps to assure that we
can manage the impact of any temporary energy disruption.
Our Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) has been increased
fourfold and our efforts through the IEA to coordinate an
coordinated response to an energy emergency have been
highly successful.
o The five-part debt strategy adopted by the Summit leaders
at Williamsburg, and reaffirmed in London, has
successfully contained the debt crisis. The
Administration has also encouraged modification of the
strategy, to include such measures as multi-year
reschedulings for those responsible debtor countries who
have performed well under IMF programs. We have also
supported an increased flow of long-term direct investment
to debtor nations and endorsed closer cooperation between
the IMF and World Bank.
o Through the leadership of President Reagan in the Summit
process, the Allies have dedicated themselves to the
expansion of international trade by the reduction of trade
barriers.
o The President has given major new impetus to American
economic ties with Asia by reaching out to the
economically dynamic Pacific Basin nations, including a
significant improvement in bilateral relations with Japan,
and strengthening relations with China, South Korea, and
other countries of this vital region.
o The improvement of the world economy, led by the U.S., and
Allied agreement to resist protectionist trade policies
and to assist struggling, developing nations through
encouraging IMF-based economic adjustment, government and
private sector financing and increased investment have
begun to restore economic and financial stability to a
number of Third World countries.
o In our own hemisphere, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and
the Central American Peace Initiative have helped open up
markets for the exports of our neighbors and Allies. Our
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efforts to help Grenada rebuild its economy, as
illustrated by our commitment to complete the airport at
Point Salines, and our active support of U.S. private
sector initiatives to expand Grenadian investment and
trading potential are demonstrating the benefits of a
return to democracy.
o The President has also initiated a major Administration
effort to increase the effectiveness of resource
allocations to meet the urgent problem of world hunger by
providing help to build new infrastructure where needed,
and by taking other measures to speed up the impact of
relief measures.
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41
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
Issue:
How can the United States best guarantee a reliable and
adequate supply of the energy resources needed for
national and international security and economic
well-being?
Objectives:
o Reduce government intervention in the energy sector
through increased reliance on the market mechanism.
o Improve the energy security of the U.S. and its Allies by
action to reduce both the probability of future
disruptions and the impact such supply interruptions might
have on our economics.
o Promote U.S. energy exports to Pacific Basin and European
nations.
o Urge key Allies to diversify their energy resources so
that they are not dependent on single supplier nations,
particularly in the case of energy imports from the Soviet
Union.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration's decision to deregulate oil prices has
stimulated domestic production and cut oil imports
dramatically.
o The size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve has quadrupled
to over 400 million barrels of oil, giving the U.S. an
enormous oil buffer against future oil disruptions.
o The U.S. has led an initiative within the International
Energy Agency to reduce reliance on Soviet energy. Studies
indicate that European nations could become highly
dependent on Soviet energy in the 1990's and that such
dependency could make them highly vulnerable to
disruptions for technical and/or political reasons. In
May 1983, Ministers from IEA countries agreed that their
countries would not become overly dependent on Soviet gas
and that they will give preference to OECD energy resource
development, particularly to Norwegian gas fields.
o President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone agreed in
November of 1983 to a program to increase energy trade
between the United States and Japan. Over the long run,
this will create thousands of new jobs for Americans and
greater energy security for both our nations.
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Talking Points:
o U.S. Administrations since the time of the 1973/1974 oil
embargo have seen energy as a constraint on economic
systems. The present Administration sees energy as an
opportunity.
o Our action to deregulate oil prices has already brought
about a significant drop in our import dependence by
spurring domestic production.
o Studies show that with continued energy deregulation the
U.S. can achieve almost complete sufficiency in energy
supplies by the next decade and at the same time provide
ample supplies of energy to our Allies.
o We have urged our Allies in Europe and the Pacific to
consider increasing their reliance on U.S. exports of
energy, particularly coal. This can provide them an
important source of stable supply for many future decades,
thereby reducing their dependency on more uncertain
supplies. Prime Minister Nakasone and President Reagan
have endorsed principles for energy trade between the
United States and Japan, which will mean jobs for citizens
and greater security for both nations.
o In addition, we have led a process in the International
Energy Agency to improve emergency preparedness of key
industrialized countries to ensure that we do not have
another wave of price increases and physical oil shortages
as occurred in 1973/74 and 1979.
o To do our share, we have quadrupled the Strategic Oil
Reserve which now holds over 400 million barrels -- or
about 80 days of our imports. At the initiative of the
U.S., twenty-one member nations of the International
Energy Agency agreed in July 1984 to coordinate their
stocks in the event of a crisis to minimize the impacts a
disruption would have on their economies. Those countries
without stocks have agreed to make best efforts to
increase them.
o In addition to improving our ability to cope with a
Persian Gulf oil disruption, we have successfully urged
the Allies to reduce dependence on Soviet energy. The May
1983 IEA agreement confirms that the Europeans will look
to indigenous sources, particularly Norway, instead of
relying further on the Soviet Union for critical gas.
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43
TERRORISM
Issue:
How can the United States improve its deterrence of,
protection against, and response to terrorist attacks?
Objectives:
o Improve the effectiveness of legal instruments under which
persons involved in terrorist activity can be prosecuted.
o Improve international cooperation in combating terrorism.
o Develop and build enhanced security and operational
capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist acts.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has submitted four bills to Congress
which are designed to strengthen the legal instruments for
dealing with terrorists.
I
o Western leaders at the London Economic Summit in June 1984
issued a declaration on international terrorism which
includes a seven-point agreement on cooperative steps to
be taken against terrorism.
o The President has issued a directive which, among other
things, calls for: Improved intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination; better security protection
and awareness; legal action to thwart terrorist attacks
before they occur; and improved capability to respond to
attacks, based on a cogent analysis of what responses are
most likely to deter future attacks. (The directive
explicitly rules out responding in kind, recognizing that
this would hurt an open society far more than it would
Talking Points:
2~0 -ca, .mac r- ~~. Twd~lr~ ~e~
o During 1983, inte~tr ational, terrorism took an appalling ",
_ 1 1
L _ _- - _ 1 ! l _
in
393 separate incident In the U.S. six people died in 31
terrorist incidents. Terrorism poses an increasing dangers a.d
to democratic societies, and to our way of life. It is an a-
indiscriminate form of warfare being waged against the
%"rrr,.a, SA
U.S. and its Western Allies.
glowsn
o In recent years we have seen a r} l phenomenon: The direct
use of terror by foreign states. State terrorism accounts
for Te majority of terrorist murders and assassinations.
0L-'A t a c t .a.Q S i n~ o f r
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44
Some states are providing training, financing, and
logistical support to terrorists and terrorist groups.
These activities are a growing source of danger to us and
are a severe challenge to America's foreign policy.
o We seek to improve the ability of all the democracies to
combat terrorism, to coordinate their actions, and to
share information.
o Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, every sovereign nation
has the right of self-defense. When we have credible
evidence of an impending terrorist attack, the U.S. has
the right and responsibility to confuse, disrupt, and
prevent that attack.
o Terrorists are criminals. We expect our law enforcement
agencies to protect us against terrorists and other
criminals. American citizens, including diplomats and
military personnel, have been the victims of (f a/r
of the terrorist incidents over the past deca e. The fact 5~!0-~~
R,'- that most attacks against Americans are occurring overseas -
y~ does not reduce our responsibility to protect Americans the duty is no less clear, only more difficult.
o We will meet the challenge of terrorism head on. But in
so doing, we must remain faithful to our democratic
values, institutions, and laws.
o Two bills now pending before Congress would enable us to
adhere fully to provisions of the Montreal Convention
against aircraft sabotage and the UN Convention against
taking hostages; another bill would provide the authority
to pay rewards for information on international terrorist
activities; a fourth bill would allow prosecution of those
who assist states or groups to engage in terrorism.
o On July 23, 1983, the President issued a public statement
urging international cooperation against terrorism, a
subject he addressed again on September 17, 1983, in a
message to European Chiefs of State and Heads of
Government.
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45
ARMS CONTROL
Issue:
What should the United States do to facilitate progress in
negotiating meaningful, verifiable arms control agreements
with the Soviet Union that truly enhance global security?
Objectives:
o Reduce the risks ' of war between East and West,
particularly nuclear war.
o Negotiate meaningful arms control agreements involving
militarily significant arms reductions and constraints,
based on the principle of equality of rights and limits.
o Include effective verification measures and procedures in
all negotiated arms control agreements.
o Ensure that arms control remains a component of, not a
substitute for, a comprehensive, coherent security policy
that includes the maintenance of credible deterrent
forces.
o Support expanded membership in the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and seek to prevent the spread of nuclear
explosives to additional countries.
Accomplishments:
o Besides seeking resumption of nuclear arms reduction talks
suspended by the Soviet Union, we informed the Soviets
that we are prepared to meet with them without
preconditions in Vienna in September to seek agreement on
feasible negotiating approaches that could lead to
verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite
weapons, as well as to discuss other issues of mutual
interest (assuming the Soviet Union also avoids
preconditions).
o Before the Soviets refused in December 1983 to set a date
for the next round of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START), we had proposed that both sides reduce their
nuclear weapons stocks to equal levels: A cut of up to
one-half in U.S. and Soviet land and sea-based strategic
ballistic missiles; a one-third cut in warheads for such
missiles; and tradeoffs in U.S. and Soviet advantages and
a number of "build-down" approaches.
o By the time the Soviets walked out of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in
November 1983, they had rejected all U.S. initiatives to
eliminate or reduce the entire class of INF missiles
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considered most threatening by both sides. The U.S.
initiatives included: The "zero-zero option" we
introduced when talks began in November 1981 (this option
would eliminate some 600 Soviet INF missiles currently
armed with 1,400 warheads as well as all of the up to 572
U.S. Pershing II's and cruise missiles planned for
deployment by NATO.) Our 1983 proposal for an equal
interim level of such missiles by the two sides while work
continued to produce agreement on zero missiles for both
nations.
o In 1982 and again this past spring, the U.S. and NATO
proposed in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)
talks in Vienna major new initiatives to resolve
disagreements over the size of conventional forces in
Central Europe. Our proposals envisage major troop
reductions to equal NATO and Warsaw Pact levels and
effective verification procedures.
o At the Conference on Confidence - and Security-Building
Measures in Europe (CDE) that opened in Stockholm last
January, the U.S. and other Western nations proposed
measures that would make military activities in Europe
more open and would make it far more difficult to launch a
surprise attack or intimidate others using military
forces. The President announced in June 1984 that we
would consider a Soviet proposal on non-use of force in
Europe if Moscow would begin serious negotiations with us
on the Western package of confidence-building measures.
o The U.S. has been in the forefront of diplomatic efforts
to bring to a halt the use of Chemical Weapons anywhere in
the world and ban their use forever. Vice President Bush
has personally gone twice in the last two years to the
40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to press
this issue. In April 1984, he presented a major new U.S.
initiative proposing a comprehensive treaty banning
development, production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of
these weapons, as well as sophisticated verification
procedures.
o In the Nuclear Testing area, the U.S. has sought to work
with the Soviet Union in strengthening verification
provisions of the signed but unratified Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (prohibiting nuclear tests exceeding 150 kilotons)
and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The Soviets have
rejected such efforts, even as we have received evidence
of probable Soviet noncompliance with these agreements and
with the Limited Test Ban Treaty that restricts all
nuclear testing to underground facilities.
o The U.S. has also supported discussion of a Comprehensive
Test Ban in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
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o The U.S. has also supported discussion, at the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva, of verification and compliance
issues related to a comprehensive test ban. Such a ban is
a long-term U.S. objective in the context of major nuclear
arms reductions, much reduced reliance on nuclear
deterrence, and the assurance of effective verification.
o The U.S. in July 1984 signed a new agreement with the
Soviet Union to improve the Direct Communications Link or
"hotline" and in June 1984 renewed the U.S.-Soviet
agreement to prevent incidents at sea.
Talking Points:
o Nuclear War: The President and his Administration have no
higher priority than reducing the risks of war. Nuclear
war in particular, as the President has said repeatedly,
cannot be won and must never be fought. We seek arms
control agreements that truly enhance stability and
security.
o Arms Control: The Administration has a broad arms control
agenda involving far-reaching proposals for arms
reductions, constraints, and confidence-building measures.
We are seeking agreements that are militarily significant,
equitable, and verifiable. In each of our efforts,
including a number of major negotiations, the U.S. and our
Western Allies have made forthcoming new proposals in an
effort to achieve progress.
o ASAT/Space: We offered to meet with the Soviet Union in
Vienna this fall without preconditions to discuss feasible
negotiation approaches on limiting anti-satellite (ASAT)
systems.
o START/INF: Late last year the Soviet Union broke off the
two nuclear arms reductions negotiations in Geneva, the
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and those on
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). The President
has made clear his strong desire to resume these talks in
order to agree on major cuts in the nuclear arsenals of
both countries.
o Negotiations: In addition, we are actively involved in a
number of other serious arms control efforts. These
include the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions (MBFR), the Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe
(CDE), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) negotiations
in Geneva on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, as well
as discussions at the CD on limits on nuclear testing,
anti-satellite systems, and other areas of concern.
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o Compliance: The U.S. is seriously concerned about Soviet
noncompliance with existing agreements. As indicated in
the President's January, 1984, Report to the Congress on
seven compliance issues, we have determined that the
Soviet Union has violated the Geneva Protocol on Chemical
Weapons, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, the
Helsinki Final Act, and at least two provisions of SALT
II: telemetry encryption and a rule concerning ICBM
modernization. The Report also indicated that the Soviet
Union has almost certainly violated the ABM Treaty,
probably violated the SALT II limit on new types of
missiles, probably violated the SS-16 deployment
prohibition of SALT II, and is likely to have violated the
nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty. We must insist that the Soviets rectify those
areas where they are in violation. For our part, we are
continuing to carry out our own obligations and
commitments, and will continue to seek effective
verification and compliance measures in all arms control
efforts we undertake.
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DETERRENCE
Issue:
What can the United States do to convince potential
aggressors not to use force in challenging U.S. vital
interests?
Objectives:
o Reduce the risk of war or coercion by the threat to use
force.
o Ensure that our national security forces are capable of
implementing our deterrence strategy.
Accomplishments:
o Through our strategic and intermediate nuclear forces
modernization programs, we have begun to remedy the
significant vulnerabilities in those forces which were
inherited in 1981.
o The strong U.S. leadership and Alliance unity existing
today have greatly strengthened deterrence. As a result,
we have decreased the risk of Soviet miscalculation and
increased the security of both ourselves and our Allies.
Talking Points:
o Deterrence is the cornerstone of U.S. national security
policy. We deter by ensuring that the leadership of all
potential aggressors is aware that our policy and our
forces will deny an aggressor his basic war aims and,
through retaliation, make the costs of aggression far
outweigh any potential benefits.
o The President has emphasized that a nuclear war cannot be
won and must never be fought. Our recognition of this
fact is not sufficient to prevent nuclear war: we must be
certain that the Soviet leadership understands it as well.
o Deterrence is not and cannot be based on bluff. We must
have a credible retaliatory capability sufficient to deter
the wide variety of attacks the Soviets are capable of
making. The Soviet leadership must understand that,
should they attack us or our Allies, our forces will
retaliate against key elements of Soviet power and will
thereby make the costs of aggression outweigh any possible
gains.
o Our nuclear modernization programs remove vulnerabilities
in our deterrent forces and, as a result, enhance our
ability to deter attack and prevent war.
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STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION
I ssue:
How can the United States close the gap between its
strategic capabilities and those of the Soviet Union?
Objectives:
o Redress the most serious weaknesses in our current
strategic posture.
o Provide incentive to the Soviets to negotiate meaningful
arms reductions that promote strategic stability.
Accomplishments:
o The President early-on recognized the need for strategic
modernization and as a result proposed a five-element
mutually reinforcing program to restore the strategic
balance.
o The five-point program directed the Department of Defense
to: design and produce a cost-effective Peacekeeper
intercontinental ballistic missile; refine and improve the
basic design of the B-1 strategic bomber and place it into
series production; select a design and develop an Advanced
Technology Bomber (ATB) to complete the basic
modernization requirements of the strategic bomber force
of the 1990s and beyond; develop an improved Trident
II/D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile system and a
nuclear-armed SLCM; and design and deploy improvements to
our command-and-control system to ensure positive control
to further reduce the risk of war.
o Two major changes to the President's program were
incorporated after its initiation: at the recommendation
of the Scowcroft Commission, work was initiated on a Small
ICBM for deployment in the 1990s; and an intensive
research program aimed at elimination of the threat of
ballistic missiles was begun.
o Significant progress has been made on all five of the
Strategic Initiatives.
o Improvements to the Strategic Command-and-Control system
are being implemented.
o The first production B-lB will be rolled-out in September,
months ahead of schedule and below cost. Research on the
ATB is on or ahead of schedule.
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o The first 21 Peacekeeper missiles are under construction,
and the Peacekeeper missile has had five perfect test
launches.
o Research on the D-5 missile is on schedule and the
nuclear-armed SLCM has been deployed.
o Improvements to our strategic defenses are being
implemented, and the President's Strategic Defense
Initiative is now underway.
Talking Points:
o Strategic modernization is required to redress the the
serious weaknesses in our strategic posture caused by the
massive Soviet build-up of strategic forces over the past
10-15 years, a period of U.S. restraint in deployment of
strategic systems. It is also needed to restore our
deterrent strength and to provide strong incentives to the
Soviets to negotiate genuine arms reductions.
o Under President Reagan's leadership, a multi-element,
mutually reinforcing strategic modernization program has
been initiated. Significant progress has already been
made in a number of areas.
o Strategic communications-and-control systems are being
improved to ensure that we could employ our nuclear forces
effectively, which is essential to a credible deterrent.
o Bomber modernization is underway to reduce the risks
associated with the aging and potentially vulnerable B-52
force.
o modernized sea-based forces, currently the most survivable
leg of our strategic Triad, are being created, as
represented by the new Trident II/D-5 missile.
o Our land-based missile force is being modernized to remedy
an important part of the strategic imbalance.
Contributions of the ICBM include: prompt hard target
capability; secure command-control-and-communications;
rapid re-targeting; high alert rate; and low operations
and support costs -- 12 percent of the total for the
entire Triad. (The current Soviet missile site-hardening
program has created a sanctuary from retaliation because
U.S. ICBMs lack the ability to hold this class of target
at risk.)
o The President's strategic modernization program is an
essential element in helping us meet our arms control
objectives. We have stated that we are willing to
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negotiate trade-offs in each side's advantages and a
build-down of strategic systems leading to significantly
lower and more stable strategic forces. We seek to reach
an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement.
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ICBM MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States maximize the effectiveness of
the ground-based portion of the strategic Triad in support
of credible deterrence?
Objectives:
o modernize the aging ICBM force through the deployment of
100 Peacekeeper missiles and the development of a new
small mobile ICBM.
Accomplishments:
o The Peacekeeper test program has been an outstanding
success: all test objectives have been met or exceeded,
and accuracy/reliability results have been excellent.
o Production has been approved and initiated on the first 21
Peacekeeper missiles, and basing work at F.E. Warren Air
Force Base, Wyoming, is progressing on schedule. All
other requirements for an operational deployment of
Peacekeeper in 1986 are on schedule.
o Development of the small ICBM has begun and is on schedule
for a possible deployment in the early 1990's.
Talking Points:
o ICBM modernization is essential to the viability of the
strategic Triad of bombers, submarine missiles, and ICBMs
that has kept the peace for well over two decades.
o The President has endorsed the recommendations of the
Bipartisan Scowcroft Commission to deploy as soon as
possible 100 Peacekeeper missiles and develop a small
ICBM, while vigorously pursuing arms control.
o The Reagan Administration proposal of 100 missiles is half
the size of the Carter program, but is part of a balanced
strategic modernization program.
o Peacekeeper is the only near-term ICBM that can help
restore the strategic imbalance that developed as the
Soviets modernized during a period of U.S. restraint.
o Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have modernized their
ICBM force through the addition of 308 SS-18 missiles and
360 SS-19 missiles. The U.S. made no new deployments
during this period.
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o Peacekeeper deployment is needed to demonstrate U.S.
resolve and to encourage the Soviets to resume arms
control negotiations. Failure to deploy Peacekeeper
would: undercut NATO's decision to modernize its
long-range nuclear force through deployment of GLCM and
Pershing II missiles; reward the Soviets for failing to
resume START negotiations; provide no incentive for the
Soviets to begin serious negotiations aimed at limiting
and reducing strategic systems; and undercut
cost-effective options for re-establishing survivability
of our land-based missile force.
o Peacekeeper deployment is a vital first step in a logical,
comprehensive, and progressive approach toward permitting
us and encouraging the Soviets to move toward smaller,
survivable, and more stable systems at lower levels of
forces. Without Peacekeeper, the Soviets have no
incentive to move in this direction in the near term.
With ICBM modernization, stability and deterrence will be
enhanced well into the Twenty-First Century.
o A new single warhead small ICBM is also required. Each
ICBM represents low-target value from a Soviet attack-plan
perspective. A flexible and survivable basing mode is
being developed as a complement to a small ICBM. (Current
emphasis is on a hard mobile concept capable of
withstanding a blast in excess of 25 psi; other basing
modes are also under consideration--soft mobile and
super-hard silos.)
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NUCLEAR-ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively modernize the
Navy's deterrent capability?
Objectives:
o Offset the threat posed by the Soviet Union's development
and deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).
o Enhance the U.S. deterrent posture.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration announced the decision to deploy
nuclear SLCM as part of its October 1981 Strategic
Modernization Program. The nuclear-armed SLCM contributes
to our strategic reserve force and the modernization of
our worldwide naval deterrent capability.
o Funding of the SLCM program first was approved by the
Congress in FY 1981 and has continued without interruption
ever since, enabling the program to meet its scheduled
initial deployment date of July 1984.
Talking Points:
o In the early 1970's the U.S. decided to develop
conventional and nuclear-armed SLCMs to improve our
deterrent posture and to offset the threat imposed by the
development and deployment of Soviet nuclear SLCMs.
o The nuclear-armed SLCM provides badly-needed modernization
of our Navy's deterrent capability. When deployed on
surface ships or submarines, it is a highly survivable
system, even in the event of surprise attack. It is a
highly accurate weapon, and its procurement costs are
relatively low.
o The SLCM program actually offsets a Soviet capability that
has existed since the early 1960's, when their first
sea-launched cruise missiles were deployed. Moscow now
has seven operational SLCM systems, six of which are
dual-capable -- i.e., are currently deployed in both
conventional and nuclear-armed configurations. At least
two of these systems feature weapons with ranges in excess
of 400 kilometers that can threaten many strategically
important U.S. land targets.
o The unilateral ban on nuclear-armed SLCMs proposed by the
House of Representatives thus would allow the Soviets to
hold a monopoly in such systems, giving Moscow even less
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reason to negotiate genuine arms reductions. Unilateral
U.S. restraint will soon become even more ill-advised,
since the Soviets are preparing to deploy a new weapon
system similar to the U.S. Tomahawk.
o At the same time, such a ban, by precluding the deployment
of the U.S. counterpart, impairs a needed modernization of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability and a significant
enhancement of our nuclear reserve force.
o In fact, rather than being stabilizing, a ban would add to
instability by continuing to force the U.S. Navy to
concentrate its deterrent capabilities aboard a small
number of platforms. By contrast, the deployment of
SLCM's would result in the dispersal of our deterrent
capability across the fleet, thereby both assuring
increased force survivability and reducing the
attractiveness of a first-strike to potential aggressors.
o A ban would constitute unilateral arms control by
restricting only the U.S. SLCM Program. Such a move is
all the more ill-advised since the Soviets are preparing
to deploy in addition to their existing SLCM force a
Tomahowk-look-alike: the SS-NX-21. As a result of our
unilateral restraint, the Soviet Union would have even
less reason to negotiate seriously to realize real nuclear
arms reductions being sought by the Administration.
o In spite of the known difficulties in negotiating an arms
control agreement which includes SLCM's, the U.S. has
stated its desire to resume negotiations at the START and
INF talks with no preconditions and with all forces open
for discussion.
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STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
Issue:
How can the United States attain its long-range goal of
ultimately making ballistic missiles impotent and
obsolete?
Objective:
o Explore the potential of advanced technologies to enable
the U.S. to develop and deploy an effective defense
against ballistic missiles.
Accomplishments:
o on March 23, 1983, the President directed that research
within the limits prescribed by the ABM Treaty go forward
on neutralizing the ballistic missile threat as a prudent
hedge against a possible breakout by Moscow from the ABM
Treaty.
o Government and outside experts conducted two studies
between June and October 1983 to determine whether
advanced technologies could support development of an
effective anti-ballistic missile defense and whether such
defenses could enhance deterrence, stability, and
prospects for arms reductions. The results of both were a
qualified "yes" -- qualified because the studies
recognized some uncertainties that could only be resolved
through further research. As a result, these experts
recommended a vigorous research program designed to answer
the remaining questions as to whether an effective defense
is feasible.
o After consulting Congressional leaders and our Allies, the
President directed that the additionally needed research
get underway under a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
an effort to be conducted over approximately the next five
years. Work will be restricted to research on a broad
range of defensive technologies consistent with our treaty
obligations. The objective is to provide answers that
will permit us to make an informal decision in the future
on whether to proceed with developing such defensive
systems.
Talking Points:
o The President's Strategic Defense Initiative seeks to
explore the potential of emerging defensive technologies
to enhance deterrence by significantly reducing the
military effectiveness of ballistic missiles.
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o It does not constitute a decision to develop and deploy
such a dTnsive systems. Rather, it is a research
program that is designed to answer a number of
technological questions that must be answered before the
promise of defensive systems can be properly assessed.
o The Soviet Union is also pursuing a defensive technologies
research program that includes upgrading the world's only
active ballistic missile defense system, seeking a
rapidly-deployable ASM system, and actively investigating
advanced defensive technologies. The U.S. program is,
therefore, a prudent hedge against possible Soviet gains
that would adversely affect U.S. and Allied security.
o Taken together with balanced offensive forces and
effective arms control measures, advanced defenses against
ballistic missiles could increase deterrence and stability
by: making aggressors less certain about the outcome of
an attack; making pre-emptive attacks on retaliatory
forces less attractive; and reducing or eliminating, when
combined with effective air defenses, the military utility
of these nuclear weapons.
o The initiative in no way signals a shift in priority away
from the modernization of strategic and intermediate-range
nuclear assets and conventional forces that is essential
to the maintenance of deterrence in the decades ahead.
o Advanced defenses have the potential of reducing the value
of ballistic missiles, and thus increasing the likelihood
of negotiated reductions.
o The U.S. intends to continue to work closely with the
Alliance to ensure that, in the event of a future decision
to deploy defensive systems, Allied, as well as U.S.,
security against aggression would be enhanced. Any future
decisions concerning potential deployment of defensive
systems would be made in full consultation with our
Allies.
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ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT) DEVELOPMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
Issue:
How can the United States best protect its interests in
space and strengthen deterrence?
Objectives:
o Ensure that we have a full range of options for protecting
our military and civil systems deployed in space.
o Develop anti-satellite and space weapons systems as well
as negotiate agreements that maintain and strengthen
deterrence in these areas.
Accomplishments:
o The U.S. supports formation of a committee to discuss
space arms control, including ASAT, in the forty-nation
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
o In March 1984, the Administration submitted a
comprehensive report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on
ASAT Arms Control which pointed out that there are several
factors that impede the identification of effective ASAT
arms control measures. These include significant
difficulties of verification, diverse sources of threats
to U.S. and Allied satellites, and threats posed by Soviet
targeting and reconnaissance satellites that undermine
conventional and nuclear deterrence. The report also
indicated that the U.S. would continue to seek selected
limits on specific types of systems or activities.
o In June 1984, the Soviets, who since 1972 have had the
world's only deployed ASAT system, offered to discuss
space-related arms control issues in Vienna, this fall.
o The U.S. has announced its readiness to meet with the
Soviet Union in Vienna this fall without preconditions to
discuss feasible negotiation approaches on limiting ASAT
systems, even as we also seek a resumption of the nuclear
arms reduction negotiations.
o The U.S. ASAT Program under development has made
significant technical progress: the ASAT Boost System has
been tested; tests will soon be made involving the booster
and its miniature homing vehicle; and tests against a
target in space are scheduled.
o Research continues on technologies with potential for ASAT
use, including directed energy weapons and space tracking
technology.
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o Survivability of U.S. space assets is being upgraded
through the development of measures which reduce or
eliminate the effectiveness of Soviet ASAT systems.
Talking Points:
o Current Soviet ASAT capabilities include an operational
orbital interceptor system; ground-based test lasers with
probable ASAT capabilities; possibly the nuclear-armed
Galosh ABM interceptors; and an electronic warfare
(jamming) capability against space systems.
o The operational Soviet ASAT system threatens all key U.S.
low-altitude satellites.
o The 1978-1979 ASAT arms control talks revealed major
U.S.-Soviet differences, and subsequent study has brought
space arms control issues into sharper focus. Problems in
space arms control include: verification difficulties;
high risk of Soviet break-out due to existing Soviet ASAT
capabilities and research; difficulties in defining space
weapons, since many ground-based systems have space
capability and manned space systems have extreme
flexibility; and the fact the Soviets have existing
systems whereas we do not (moratoriums on testing are
therefore asymmetric in their effect).
o The Soviets' proposal for an ASAT arms control treaty
lacks provisions for effective verification, is unclear
with regard to Soviet targeting satellites, and does not
deal with residual ASAT capabilities. The moratorium
proposal seems clearly designed to block tests of the U.S.
ASAT while allowing the USSR to maintain its monopoly with
the world's only operational ASAT interceptor system.
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SPACE
Issue:
How can the United States capitalize on the full potential
of the medium of space in satisfying overall national
interests?
Objectives:
o Strengthen the security of the United States.
o Maintain U.S. space leadership.
o Benefit economically and scientifically by exploiting
space.
o Expand U.S. private sector investment and involvement in
civil space-related activities.
o Promote international cooperative activities in space that
are in the national interest.
o Work with other nations to preserve the freedom of space
for all activities that enhance the security and welfare
of mankind.
Accomplishments:
o on July 4, 1982, President Reagan signed the National
Space Policy to guide the conduct of our space program.
The policy states that our space program will be conducted
according to several principles.
o We are committed to the exploration and use of space by
all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of
mankind.
o We reject any claims to sovereignty by any nation over
outer space, celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and
reject any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire
data from space.
o We consider the space systems of any nation to be national
property with the right of passage through and operations
in space without interference.
o We encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space
capabilities, technology, and systems for national
economic benefit.
o We will conduct international cooperative space-related
activities that achieve sufficient scientific, political,
economic, or national security benefits for the nation.
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o Our space program will be comprised of two separate,
distinct, and strongly interacting programs-- national
security and civil.
o The Space Transportation System (STS) is the primary space
launch system for both national security and civil
government missions.
o We will pursue activities in space in support of our right
of self-defense.
o We will continue to study space arms control options.
o Our Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy, which was
issued on August 6, 1982, promulgates broad U.S.
objectives in international space cooperation and provides
policy on space launch and technology assistance.
o The President has directed the maintenance of orbiter
production through manufacturing structural and component
spares.
o In May 1983, the President established a policy to
facilitate the commercialization of expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs). A Senior Interdepartmental Group (Space)
study subsequently led to establishing procedures for
licensing commercial space launches and giving lead-agency
responsibility to the Department of Transportation.
o Following the completion of an interdepartmental study,
the President announced in his State of the Union Address
on January 25, 1984, that developing the frontier of space
would be one of the four major goals for the U.S. in the
1980s. In this context he announced that: the U.S. will
develop a permanently-manned space station and place it in
orbit within a decade; our friends and Allies are invited
to join us in the program; and we would implement a number
of initiatives designed to promote private sector
investment in space.
o At the London Economic Summit in June 1984, the Summit
partners welcomed the U.S. invitation to participate in
the Space Station program and agreed to review
international participation at the next summit.
o On July 20, 1984, the President announced 13 initiatives
to encourage commercial activity in space.
o On August 15, 1984 the President approved a National Space
Strategy. The Strategy implements the National Space
Policy by providing 17 priorities for the U.S. Space
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Program in the STS, Civil Space, Commercial Space, and
National Security Space areas. Seven follow-on efforts to
further implement the policy are directed.
Talking Points:
o A vigorous and forward-looking space program is one of the
most highly visible and tangible demonstrations of world
leadership.
o Few other national endeavors have equaled the potential of
the U.S. Space Program to: perform functions in the
national security, domestic and private sectors that
either cannot be performed any other way or cannot be
performed as economically or as well; advance the
state-of-the-art in high technology; and elevate the human
spirit, capture our imaginations, demonstrate our
pioneering initiative, and hold out hope for a progressive
future for our nation and all mankind.
o No other President has taken a more personal interest in
U.S. space policy, attached higher priority to it, or
promulgated more policy decisions dealing with it than
President Reagan. Since announcement of his National
Space Policy on July 4, 1982, the President has issued
approximately eight directives and made numerous decisions
that will help implement this broad policy. The Senior
Interdepartmental Group (SIG) for Space was established to
coordinate the implementation.
o Much remains to be done to set the U.S. Space Program on a
course that ensures U.S. leadership in the decades ahead.
By the President's direction, a National Space Strategy
has been completed which establishes broad priorities for
the U.S. Space Program and identifies potential issues to
be
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MILITARY CAPABILITY/READINESS
Issue:
Are our armed forces more "ready" than in 1980?
Objectives:
o Continue to improve training and skill levels of U.S.
forces.
o Reduce longstanding defects in combat sustainability,
including stock levels of critical consumables.
o Provide modern and sophisticated conventional equipment to
enhance combat effectiveness and survivability.
o Blend equipment, stock level, and manpower improvements
into more combat capable armed forces.
o Provide better capability to deploy forces to combat
requirements and sustain them once deployed.
Accomplishments:
o In force readiness (i.e., the ability of forces, weapons
systems, etc. to deliver outputs--without unacceptable
delay--for which they were designed), substantial progress
has been made in the past three years and steady
improvement is projected for the future.
o Since FY 1980 there has been an almost 20 percent increase
in the number of enlisted personnel with four or more
years of service, and the percentage of recruits with high
school diplomas has increased from 68 percent to 92
percent.
o While trends in average training hours/flying
days/steaming days have been steady or have improved
slightly since 1980, the quality of training has improved
considerably, and the number of units rated "substantially
ready" has increased by about 25 percent.
o Trends in the material condition (i.e., mission-capable
rates) of most major weapons categories have been steady
or slightly improving since FY 1980. Now, however, we are
supporting larger numbers of more sophisticated and
complex weapons, operating them for longer periods, and
still realizing readiness improvements in some areas.
o In force sustainability (the staying power of our forces
in combat), because of the long lead times involved in
procurement, our increased funding from FY 1982-84 for
sustainability has not yet been fully translated into
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significantly increased inventories. However, we have
increased the budget allocation by 100 percent over the
1980 level, which will result, for example, in an increase
in munitions sustainability of 14 percent for the Army, 62
percent for the Air Force, 58 percent for the Navy and 24
percent for the Marine Corps.
o In force structure (i.e., the numbers, size, and
composition of our defense forces units), we have provided
for significant increases in the numbers of some units
(divisions, battalions, tactical fighter wings, Navy
aircraft squadrons, and ship battle groups) over the past
four years. The need to provide balance among the
components of military capability within finite resources
has required, however, that revisions in force structure
receive a somewhat lower priority than modernization,
readiness, and sustainability,
o In Strategic Mobility, we can deliver 25 percent more
tonnage to Europe by air. We have done more to improve
sealift since 1981 than in all the years since WW II.
o In Force Modernization, we have obtained appropriations of
over 27 billion for construction of 34 new major combat
ships. We have funded a substantial increase for
procurement of modern weapons systems for the Army and
Marine Corps, e.g., for some 2,929 M-1 Abrams tanks; 2,200
Bradley Fighting Vehicles; 171 AG-64 Apache attack
helicopters; 430 Light Armored Vehicles; over 1,000
Armored Amphibious Vehicles; and 3,000 Stinger missiles.
We can provide 62 percent more air sorties in Europe,
sorties whose individual effectiveness is improved because
they are newer aircraft carrying more accurate weapons.
o The introduction of more modern, capable, and effective
weapons systems has in some cases been accompanied by a
period of lower apparent readiness, in terms of equipment
fill, during the period of transition when not all of the
ancillary support equipment has been delivered and there
are no suitable substitutes to offset the shortage. This
apparent reduction in readiness, however, is only
temporary and is more than offset by modernization
improvements that enhance overall capability.
o The Bottom Line: In the professional judgment of each
U.S. Unified and Specified Commander-in-Chief, his command
is indeed far more ready "by every measure of common
sense" than it was four years ago.
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Talking Points:
o This Administration inherited several acute defense
problems which required immediate attention: There was no
comprehensive plan for strategic modernization; production
rates for many important procurement programs were grossly
inefficient; war reserves were extremely low; and there
was an ongoing "hemorrhage" of skilled manpower. The
commitment to address and resolve these problems appeared
to have been woefully inadequate.
o This Administration's primary objectives have thus been to
improve near-term training, readiness, and manpower
problems; integrate the modernization of strategic forces;
increase conventional force modernization; and make
inroads in the longstanding deficiencies in combat
sustainability.
o Overall, substantial progress has been made in many
aspects of these problems in the past three years, and
gradual but steady improvement is projected in the future.
We have more and better people; they are better trained;
and our men and materiel are better supported.
o It has never been our view that all the problems we
inherited could be solved within four years. But we have
shown that it is possible to set defense priorities and to
make balanced progress in improving overall military
capabilities.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN NATO.
Issue:
How can the United States best advance the process of
modernizing NATO's weapons to provide an effective and
credible deterrent which supports NATO strategy while
preserving the Alliance's unified approach to
modernization?
Objectives
o Continue, in the absence of an arms control agreement, to
deploy long-range intermediate nuclear weapons (LRINF) in
accord with the 1979 NATO Decision.
o Maintain an effective and credible nuclear deterrent in
NATO which supports NATO strength at the lowest reasonable
inventory level.
o Enhance the utility, survivability, and safety of nuclear
weapons in NATO.
Accomplishments
o The NATO nuclear weapons inventory has been reduced to its
lowest level in twenty years. Following a withdrawal of
1,000 warheads in 1980 as part of the 1979 Dual-Track
Decision, we reached further agreement in 1983 to withdraw
1,400 additional weapons.
o Alliance unity has been maintained through extensive
consultations throughout INF negotiations. We agree on
negotiating positions and on adherence to measured
deployment of 572 LRINF weapons in the absence of a
verifiable, equitable arms control agreement.
o We continue to explore ways to reach the lowest inventory
level and weapons mix consistent with a credible and
effective nuclear deterrent.
o We have obtained Allied recognition of and support for
improvements in conventional defense capabilities to
permit less reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.
U.S. defense improvements have led the way in reducing the
need for early resort to nuclear weapons.
o A limited but effective modernization program for
shorter-range systems has been developed, to provide
needed capabilities at reduced inventory levels.
Modernization also enhances the accuracy and flexibility
of stockpile warheads.
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Talking Points
o Over the last four years, progress in NATO nuclear weapons
modernization has been substantial. We have reduced the
overall weapons inventory to the lowest level in twenty
years, and in 1983 we reached agreement in the Alliance to
withdraw another 1,400 warheads, plus an additional
warhead for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise
Missile deployed.
o We have maintained Alliance unity in pursuit of both
tracks of the 1979 Dual-Track Decision. We have
negotiated constructively and flexibly on INF, with full
Alliance accord on our position, until the Soviets broke
off the talks; we have adhered to a measured and limited
deployment of Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise
Missiles in the absence of an equitable and verifiable INF
arms control agreement.
o We have pursued a limited modernization program for other
short-range nuclear warheads, which will allow us and NATO
to maintain a credible, effective theater nuclear
deterrent at the lowest possible inventory level.
o We have led the way in conventional defense improvements
in NATO, and have convinced the Allies of the wisdom of
our efforts to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons if
deterrence fails.
o During the last four years, the United States has
undertaken a sustained, expanded, and in some cases
unprecedented, level of consultations with its NATO
Allies.
o The NATO Special Consultative Group (SCG), chaired by the
U.S., met regularly and often to review and coordinate our
INF negotiating efforts.
o The NATO High-Level Group (HLG), also chaired by the U.S.,
has also met frequently to examine critical nuclear issues
facing the Alliance, providing the analysis on which NATO
decisions on these issues have been based.
o The U.S. has participated in semi-annual meetings of the
Ministerial-level Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to discuss
nuclear issues in the Alliance.
o The U.S. also has participated in a series of bilateral
High Level Defense Group meetings with various NATO
partners which have resulted in improved understanding of
defense matters.
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NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Issue:
How should the United States respond to pressures to
renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict?
Objectives:
o Support NATO strategy of not being the first to use force
of any kind.
o Protect our ability to deter attack by avoiding
categorical assurances that we will never be the first to
use nuclear weapons.
o Deflate the charge that a policy of forswearing the
first-use of nuclear weapons enhances stability and
security.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has reaffirmed U.S. adherence to the
principle, embodied in both the UN Charter and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Charter, that we will not be
the first to resort to force of any kind.
o In consultation with our NATO Allies, we also have
revalidated the strategy of flexible response as first and
foremost a deterrence strategy, not an aggressive
strategy.
o The U.S. has offered to discuss, in CDE, a proposal for a
formal agreement on non-use of force if the Soviets will
enter serious negotiations about substantive and
verifiable confidence-building measures which enhance
security and lessen the possibility of an outbreak of war.
Talking Points:
o America's policy on how to promote world peace has
consistently been more inclusive--and thus potentially
more productive -- than any one declaration on a specific
kind of weapon: we are pledged not to be the first to use
force "of any kind."
o Our policy on this issue has been developed in close
consultation with our Allies, especially the other NATO
members. We approach this issue in concert.
o A declaration about non-first-use of a specific weapons
type, such as nuclear weapons, would send confusing
signals about our sincerity and credibility in carrying
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out a deterrent strategy designed to prevent any
aggression, nuclear or conventional, against the Western
democracies.
o Over the last four years, we have devoted considerable
energy and resources to improving conventional defense
capabilities. This will allow us to reduce our reliance
on nuclear weapons to make deterrence credible and thus
achieve the same effect as adopting a non-first use
policy--but from a posture which enhances overall security
rather than placing it at risk.
o Signaling in advance to a potential aggressor how we might
respond to his aggression would undercut NATO's
longstanding deterrence strategy, thereby actually
increasing the chances of nuclear war.
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Issue:
How can the United States and its Allies resolve their own
disparate views and devise a comprehensive means of
preventing the Soviet Union and its Allies from acquiring
sensitive technology?
Objectives:
o Recognize and explain, both to ourselves and our Allies,
the nature of the threat posed by technology transfer.
o Reach agreement on the extent of the threat.
o Introduce new countermeasures and constraints to impede if
not prevent such losses.
o Continue to improve our intelligence on technology
transfer matters.
o Curb the loss of sensitive technology without working
undue hardship on U.S. and Allied economic interests.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
o The Reagan Administration is the first to fully recognize
the security risk posed by technology transfer. It has
made many statements both publicly and in private to
Allies and U.S. business on the threat and our intention
to defeat it.
o The flow of information on technology transfer available
to us has increased dramatically. The results are being
seen in court cases and convictions for both diversion and
espionage in technology loss.
o Both U.S. Customs and the Commerce Department have
significantly increased their enforcement work, and since
1980, technology transfer has become an area of priority
in our intelligence effort.
o The security services of our Allies have expelled many
Soviet intelligence collectors, a result partially
attributable to U.S. efforts to highlight this issue.
Additionally, the U.S. has closed down many means
previously used by the Soviets to acquire technical
information.
o In COCOM the U.S. has made great progress in convincing
our Allies that the threat is serious. The recent COCOM
agreement is evidence of that achievement.
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Talking Points:
o The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Allies have sustained a
large-scale effort for some time to obtain Western
technical information and to adopt it to their military
and civil requirements. The Soviets are well behind the
U.S. in many technologies having military use, e.g.,
computers and microprocessor technology, and thus require
Western, and especially U.S., information to meet weapons
requirements.
o Europe and Japan are, like ourselves, innovative and
scientifically advanced. Our Allies have a vested common
concern in stemming technology loss, as this loss leads to
higher defense budgets for all, while concurrently
weakening deterrence. On the other hand, each ally has
its own view of its economic relationship with Bloc
countries; there is, therefore, a tension of competing
interests among our Allies over economic gain versus the
provision of technology to the Bloc. At issue is how to
resolve these disparate views.
o Despite progress, a problem so complex as the loss of
technology cannot quickly be remedied. The Soviets are
very skilled in their collection techniques and know
specifically what they must have. Since the collection of
technical information has been a long-standing campaign,
with numerous avenues of collection, impeding this effort
is not quickly done.
o The U.S. is an open society with a heritage of free
expression. This freedom of expression is exploited by
the Soviets in their collection program; the U.S.
Government must ensure proper protection of sensitive
information while not impeding the rights and traditions
of free expression.
o The effort to slow or stop the loss of strategic
technology must be a persistent, long term undertaking.
It is essential both for ourselves and our Allies that the
threat continue to be highlighted and exposed for the
danger that it poses, and that countermeasures, both
unilateral and bilateral, be kept in place and supported,
and backed by the highest levels in the Administration. A
great deal of progress has been made and this progress
must be sustained and enhanced by organizational, legal
and technical means.
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