LETTER TO WILLIAM J.CASEY FROM GERALD P. CARMEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001900010009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 134
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 27, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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p
,Executive Registry
84 - Iw
February 27, 1984
Honorable William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
When I was on the West Coast visiting with
Guil Glazer, we had a most interesting dis-
cussion aboutU.S. and Israeli relationships.
Guil suggested that I drop this pamphlet
off to you.
With my career closing down very rapidly
at GSA - three more days - it does not
appear that we will be seeing each other
in the near future. Therefore, I am mailing
you the pamphlet and hope that you will take
the time to read it.
I am neither agreeing nor disagreeing with
its contents, but merely forwarding the
information on to you as requested.
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-
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The Strategic Value of Israel
Steven J. Rosen
AIPAC Papers On U.S.-Israel Relations
Research for this paper completed under
the sponsorship of Guilford Glazer
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The AIPAC Papers on U.S. - Israel Relations
Editor: Steven J. Rosen
Managing Editor: Fay Randall
Subscription price for ten issues:
$25 for members
$30 for nonmembers
Not available on a single issue basis
Inquire for bulk purchase rates
? Copyright 1982 by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.
Second Printing.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface .......................................................v
Strategic Value of Israel .........................................1
Israel as a Prepositioning Site ................................. 4
Comparing Deployment Times ............................... 6
Comparison in Terms of Cost ................................ 8
Conclusions ..............................................11
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PREFACE
This study marks a new departure for AIPAC-the publication of a
monograph series on issues concerning U.S.-Israel relations. This will enable
us to provide greater depth of background and more detailed information on
such issues as the potential for U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation, the military
balance in the Middle East, economic issues of aid and trade, and media
coverage of Arab-Israeli issues, in a format that will permit publication of
current material on a schedule of weeks rather than months.
Publications in this series will be of two types: First, we will produce an-
nuals on subjects of continuing interest, such as the military balance, Israel's
aid requirements, and directories of key actors in American policy toward the
Middle East. Second, we will publish individual studies on subjects of par-
ticular interest, such as major developments in Middle Eastern diplomacy,
security problems of the West Bank and Gaza, and the potential for U.S.
government procurement from Israel.
The editor of this enterprise is Steven Rosen, AIPAC's Director of
Research and Information. Dr. Rosen recently joined this organization after
four years as a Senior Analyst at the Rand Corporation where he served as
Associate Director of the National Security Strategies Program. Previously,
he was a professor in the Political Science faculties of Brandeis University,
the University of Pittsburgh, and the Australian National University. Dr.
Rosen will draw upon a larger and more experienced research staff to support
the development of this unique series.
Thomas A. Dine
Executive Director
October, 1982
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Israel's strategic value derives primarily from four advantages:
(1) Geostrategic position. Israel is located midway between Europe and the Persian Gulf.
From the point of view of U.S. defense planning, it has the potential to contribute in
three theaters: the Gulf, the Mediterranean, and NATO's Southern and Central fronts.
Compared to the continental United States, Israel is one-seventh the distance to the Gulf
and one-half the distance to Germany.
(2) Political stability. While virtually every other friendly country of the region is subject to
overthrow by coup or revolution or a drastic change of political orientation, Israel's
stability is deeply rooted in sound democratic institutions.
(3) Political reliability. While policy orientations of other friendly states of the region could
revert to hostility in the future, Israel's strategic interests and the values of its people are
permanently aligned with those of the Free World. Deals made with certain Arab govern-
ments over the heads of their people can come unstuck if these people arise against their
rulers, while our alliance with Israel is an alliance with the people of that country
themselves.
(4) Advanced society. Israel is the one politically and technologically advanced country of
the region.
Yet, these advantages, which have taken on particular importance since the loss of bases in Iran,
have not been sufficient to prevent the systematic exclusion of Israel from U.S. defense planning
for the Middle East and the Mediterranean, even while such less promising "allies" as Somalia
and Oman are fawningly courted.
As a result, an undue reliance is being placed on basing U.S. "Rapid Deployment Forces" in the
continental U.S., and to a lesser extent in "access arrangements" with unstable regional allies,
simply to avoid Israel.
This paper quantitatively compares U.S. basing and these other allies with the currently ex-
cluded option of Israel in meeting one particular requirement of current defense planning: the
need to move huge quantities of war materiel to the Persian Gulf region rapidly in the event of
Soviet aggression there. "Prepositioning" of materiel in Israel is shown to have substantial objec-
tive advantages over the alternatives in terms of both force effectiveness and cost including the
following:
? Force Effectiveness. Using half of America's airlift fleet, materiel for a mechanized divi-
sion prepositioned in Israel could be redeployed to the Persian Gulf 66 days sooner than
from the continental United States. Similarly, the time required to airlift to Germany
would be reduced from 24 to II days.
? Cost. It would cost the U.S. over $9 billion in additional C-5 aircraft to achieve the same
effect from bases in the U.S.-in terms of time required to deploy such a force-as
compared to prepositioning in Israel.
? Swing Force. In terms of prepositioning a "swing force" for use either in the Gulf or
Europe, Israel compares favorably with the other major prepositioning sites available to
the U.S. Considerable savings in time and/or money could be achieved by prepositioning
in Israel rather than in sites presently planned for the RDF.
Overall, in an honest comparison, Israel offers substantial strategic advantages. Yet the United
States has chosen to bypass Israel in favor of an excessive reliance on strategic airlift from the con-
tinental U.S., which is slow and expensive, and alliances with unstable local governments of
dubious reliability. This virtual exclusion of Israel from U.S. defense planning is, implicitly, a
sacrifice of the objective American national interest to appease rejectionist Arab opinion. It is a
sacrifice with a substantial hidden cost to the U.S. taxpayer, and it results in a less effective system
of defense at a higher cost.
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Strategic Value of Israel
The debate over how best to defend the Persian Gulf and its oil against the
possibility of Soviet aggression is warming up and, as it does, it becomes in-
creasingly clear that an issue as simple as geography is at the heart of the
problem. The Soviet Union borders on Iran and is within 1,000 miles of the
main oilfields of the Middle East, while the distance from the United States is
about 9,000 miles by air and considerably longer by sea. Moreover, unlike
Europe, the Far East, and Southeast Asia, there is no intact U.S. military
basing structure to provide support in the event of a conflict. However, since
the fall of the Shah, no nation of the Gulf region is prepared to extend to the
United States full-scale basing privileges. The closest U.S. base, on the Indian
Ocean island of Diego Garcia, is still 3,000 miles from the assumed locus of
conflict, and this base is in any case limited in scale by the smallness of the
island.
These simple facts create quite a problem for U.S. planners. A Soviet
standing army of perhaps fourteen divisions sits astride the region across the
border with Iran, in addition to the force of nearly a hundred thousand sta-
tioned in Afghanistan, while a single American division of about 25,000
would, if airlifted from the United States with its 70,000 tons of equipment,
take about four weeks to get there using all U.S. airlift resources (and over
twice as long using half the available airlift). It might well be a case of "too
little too late," and if the Soviets perceived this in advance, they might be
tempted to exploit their advantage.
Both the defense of the region and deterrence of a Soviet attack therefore
require energetic remedial measures to enhance our "projection" capability.
In part, this may take the form of expanding our small fleet of airlift and sea-
lift vessels, procuring such items as additional C-5s or CXs. But at a $60 mil-
lion program unit cost, there are severe limits on the number of strategic air
transporters that can be procured. A second solution is to "lighten the load"
to be lifted by developing lighter armored forces, thereby reducing the
number of flights ("sorties") and transporters needed. But this would, at
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best, result in a saving of perhaps 20 percent in terms of time or the required
size of the lift fleet. While there is much to be said for both measures, addi-
tional solutions clearly are required.
The most obvious solution is to have the equipment in the theater of conflict,
or at least near it, when you need it, rather than moving it only after an ag-
gression begins. By moving the heavy equipment to "prepositioning sites" in
peacetime, and flying in just the men to "marry up" with the equipment if a
conflict contingency develops, considerable time can be saved. The preposi-
tioned equipment poses no threat in peacetime, but serves as a notice to the
Soviets that a rapid response to aggression is possible, and thereby enhances
the deterrent threat to promote the stability of the region.
With this in mind, the Carter Administration negotiated a set of "access
arrangements" to permit prepositioning in Oman, Somalia, Egypt, and
Kenya on a limited scale, and the Reagan Administration has submitted to
Congress appropriation requests for funding to flesh out these arrangements.
There are, however, several problems with the prepositioning sites negotiated
to date. Kenya is over 2,500 miles from assumed conflict areas by the most
direct route, and Somalia is about 1,600. Somalia is demanding a king's ran-
som in aid in exchange for access, and has problems of political stability.
Neighboring Ethiopia is a virtual colony of the Soviet Union, and has openly
threatened to employ its air force against U.S. facilities in Somalia (with
which Ethiopia is at war). As if this weren't enough, Somalia and Kenya are
antagonists, and Kenya is informally allied with Ethiopia against Somalia.
Kenya objects to U.S. cooperation with Somalia. Neither Kenya nor Somalia
is in a position to provide an air defense umbrella for the security of
American equipment and personnel against air attack, so anything preposi-
tioned at these locations will be vulnerable unless the scarce air defense assets
of the United States are devoted to the task and permitted by the host govern-
ment to operate.
Oman is the best site of all in terms of distance, lying at the mouth of the
Persian Gulf, but as an access opportunity it suffers from some of the prob-
lems already mentioned. It is within strike range of Soviet aircraft stationed
in Afghanistan as well as the increasingly sophisticated air force of South
Yemen (another Soviet colony), yet the host government cannot provide air
defense. This alone will limit the amount of materiel the United States can
put at risk in a vulnerable environment. In addition, the Omani government,
not wishing to be seen as a "cat's paw" of a superpower in the region, intends
to limit the conditions under which facilities can be used by United States
forces. For example, the Sultan Qaboos was so outraged by the reported use
of Omani facilities on Masirah Island in support of the (failed) Iran hostage
rescue mission that he threatened to withdraw all American privileges. While
the latter did not happen, it is clear that American access in Oman will be less
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than 100 percent reliable over time under the present government. Nor is the
survival of the Omani regime a foregone conclusion, although there are few
signs of instability at the moment. In addition, Masirah Island and the other
Omani sites reported in the press are among the hottest and most inhospitable
places on the planet Earth, and the effects on U.S. armed forces personnel
retention could be a real problem.
It is also worth noting that Oman, while it is close to the Gulf, is quite dis-
tant from Europe (as are Somalia, Kenya, and Diego Garcia). This means
that equipment stationed there is dedicated to Persian Gulf contingencies but
poorly located for NATO. Ideally, prepositioning sites would be suited to a
"swing force" that could be deployed either to Europe or the Gulf, to limit
the adverse impact of Persian Gulf security arrangements on the already pre-
carious NATO alliance capability.
In these terms, Egypt has a considerable advantage over Kenya, Somalia,
Oman, and Diego Garcia. For example, the distance from Ras Banas, Egypt,
to Munich is about half that of Masirah, Oman. Egypt can also provide
general air defense against any adversary but Israel, and can provide security
against other forms of attack on the facilities that have been discussed.
Moreover, Egypt is forthright in its support for a strengthening of U.S. capa-
bility in the region, and clearly intends to cooperate in plans to build the Rap-
id Deployment Force.
Yet, even the sites in Egypt raise problems. Cairo's isolation in the Arab
world is unnatural, and should the current or a future Egyptian government
seek to rejoin its historic allies, the price might include a weakening of the
alliance with Washington. This might come, for example, now that Egypt has
repossessed the Sinai in April 1982, under the terms of the peace treaty with
Israel. Moreover, the evolution of the domestic political situation in Egypt could
lead to a change of policy or even a change of government. After the bitter
experience with Britain and then the USSR, Egyptians have a considerable
antipathy to foreign troops and equipment on their soil. Egypt was one of the
founders of the nonaligned movement, and foreign installations by whatever
name are bound to become a target for Arab nationalist "Third Worldist"
criticism of the regime. While, at the present time, the Egyptian/American
alliance seems secure, Egyptian policy five and ten years hence is unpredict-
able.
Given this array of problems and reasons to worry, American planners are
obligated to "spread the risk" by distributing American commitments
among the access sites. Of the sites discussed, Egypt emerges as the "domi-
nant solution," but conditions there too will limit the scale of American
military investment. Basically, something more is needed.
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Israel as a Prepositioning Site
Given the problems of each of the sites already explored, attention is begin-
ning to turn to Israel. Israel offers several distinct advantages as a "stepping-
stone" access site, which, taken together, comprise an attractive package:
1. Location. The distance from Israel to the Gulf is less than one-seventh
that from the U.S. It is also half the distance of Diego Garcia, and closer than
Kenya, Somalia, or Turkey (assuming, in the last case, that overflight of
Syria, Iraq, and Iran is excluded). At the same time, it is half the distance to
Europe (Munich) compared to the East Coast of the United States, and also
about half the distance to Europe compared to Diego Garcia, Oman,
Somalia, and Kenya. Of states willing to provide regional access for the RDF,
only Egypt is competitive as a location for a "swing force" that could be sent
either to Europe or the Gulf.
2. Political Stability. While the future political structures and policy orien-
tations of Oman, Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, and Turkey are subject to radical
change, the basic political structure and policy of Israel are stable and pre-
dictable as they affect that country's policy toward regional security. Virtual-
ly all Israeli leaders in the major parties support a strengthening of the United
States role in the region, an enhancement of U.S. capability to deter and, if
need be, defeat Soviet aggression, and an enhancement of U.S. force projec-
tion capabilities to support these objectives. The leadership of both major
Israeli parties has forthrightly endorsed the provision of strategic access ar-
rangements to the United States under appropriate conditions. Sites in Israel
would be intrinsically less vulnerable to revolutions, coups, and domestic
disorders.
3. Political Reliability. No sovereign nation in the modern world will ex-
tend basing privileges to a foreign power completely without restriction. But
the political limitations that would be imposed in the Israeli case probably
would be less severe than those on which Oman, Egypt, Somalia, and Kenya
will insist, for the simple reason that there is a closer congruence between
Israel's own interests and those of the United States as regards force projec-
tion contingencies. If, for example, an Iraqi threat to Kuwait or Iran called
for an American response, the policies of Oman and Egypt could be limited
by inter-Arab politics, while Israel would, in almost all scenarios, find its in-
terests aligned with those of the U.S. The contrast might be still more pro-
nounced in a European scenario, from which the Arab states might wish to
divorce themselves while Israel, given its strategic position, could not. While
there are differences between the Israeli and American policies in the local
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diplomatic arena, their postures in regional strategic military affairs are
generally in agreement.
4. Air Defense. U.S. materiel prepositioned in many states of the region
could be subject to conventional and guerilla attacks, yet few of the host na-
tions have the capability to provide a secure defense umbrella. Israelis a clear
exception. The primary mission of the Israeli Air Force is to defend that na-
tion's own air space, and the IAF's mastery of the skies is almost un-
contested. While the United States might have to provide its own air defense
in such locations as Masirah or Berbera, allocating scarce F-15 wings or
I-Hawk SAM batteries, security of "prepo" against air attack in Israel would
be provided implicitly by the host government. The same applies to security
against large-scale guerilla operations, which the Israelis have brought almost
completely under control.
While these differences between Israel and other sites, taken together,
might be regarded as a considerable, even commanding advantage, there has
been comparatively little American interest in strategic cooperation with
Israel until recently. The notion of Israel as a strategic asset has been a subject
of considerable interest in American Jewish and Israeli circles, but until
recently it has been regarded with official indifference if not contempt, par-
ticularly by the Carter Administration. Indeed, it is said that the name
"Israel" was not, until recently, permitted even to appear in official ex-
ploratory discussions of prospective access sites, and that, having been re-
jected from the start as a serious candidate for the regional security system,
Israel's potential contribution was not studied by Carter Administration offi-
cials in any systematic way.
The Reagan Administration brings to the issue a different perspective.
Repeatedly during the 1980 presidential campaign, the Republican candidate
called attention to Israel as a concrete strategic asset and ally, and the Admin-
istration is reported to have a serious interest in exploring potential forms of
strategic cooperation with the government of Israel.
Reagan is of course aware that the Arabs (with the possible exception of
Egypt) do not look kindly upon U.S.-Israel cooperation, but, unlike his
predecessor, he does not take this as an absolute limit to U.S. freedom of ac-
tion. Since the very founding of the Jewish state, the U.S. has played both
sides of the street successfully (in spite of heckling from certain elements in
the Washington bureaucracy who endlessly warned that it couldn't be done).
It is probably even the case that the U.S. has had more rather than less in-
fluence with the Arabs exactly because it also has had (most of the time) in-
fluence with Israel too. Ironically, Arab opinion already takes it as given that
the U.S. is in cahoots with Israel, which Washington supports with con-
siderable economic and military aid. The incremental diplomatic cost of ex-
panded strategic cooperation could, for this very reason, be minimal if the
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problem were managed intelligently during the transitional period.
Still, there will be political costs to be measured against strategic benefits.
It is worthwhile, therefore, to assess in closer detail the strategic value of
Israel, to quantify the military advantages that should be compared to any
political disadvantages. What follows, then, is a more detailed statistical ex-
cursion to compare Israel with other prepositioning sites in military and
economic terms, to quantify the value of cooperation or the "opportunity
cost" of non-cooperation, in the expectation that this may provide a criterion
by which to assess future policy.
Comparing Deployment Times
For the military planner, the central consideration of any prospective ar-
rangement affecting the Rapid Deployment Force is its impact on force effec-
tiveness. In the case of a prospective access site, this means that the central
measure of effectiveness is the contribution that a "steppingstone" can make
to shorten the time that it takes to deliver and deploy forces to assumed con-
flict locations, by comparison with sending forces from the continental
United States (CONUS) or from other regional access sites.
The methodology by which such comparisons are made is complex, and in-
cludes the following factors:
1. distance;
2. the number and types of transport aircraft available;
3. the portion of this lift fleet assumed to be available for a given contin-
gency;
4. lift capacity in terms of weight and bulk;
5. utilization factors, sortie rates, speed, and productivity; and
6. the weight and bulk of the materiel to be lifted.
These factors can be estimated from such public sources as the Defense
Marketing Service databook, Rapid Deployment Force (Greenwich, Connec-
ticut, DMS, 1980), on the basis given in the appendix to this paper. Assuming
that the equipment for a mechanized infantry division is to be lifted from
prepositioning sites to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (from which they would move
overland to participate in a Persian Gulf conflict), and that half of the
available U.S. transporters were used for a Persian Gulf scenario (the other
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half being held in reserve for European contingencies), prepositioning in
Israel compares to prepositioning at other sites or lift from the continental
U.S. as follows:
Table I
Airlift to the Persian Gulf (Dhahran)
(using half of strategic lift)
From
United States
Israel (Tel Aviv)
Diego Garcia
Somalia (Berbera)
Kenya (Mombasa)
Oman (Masirah)
Egypt (Ras Banas)
Turkey (Izmir)
(No overflight of Iraq, Syria, or Iran)
Days to Transport
One Mechanized Division
77 days
11 days
27 days
14 days
22 days
8 days
10 days
17 days
The advantage of prepositioning in Israel is substantial compared to send-
ing forces from the U.S.; the first whole division would get to the Gulf 2-1/2
months earlier! Forces from Diego Garcia or Kenya would take twice as long
to arrive, and forces from Turkey 50 percent more time (assuming that
overflight of radical countries is excluded). Only Oman and Egypt offer
shorter deployment times, and in both cases the advantage is marginal.
If a war erupted in Europe instead of the Gulf, major U.S. reinforcement
would be required for NATO to hold the line against the vastly larger War-
saw Pact armies. It could, in such a contingency, be necessary to lift materiel
prepositioned for Persian Gulf contingencies to Europe instead of Dhahran.
Assuming that the equipment for a mechanized infantry division were to be
lifted from these prepositioning sites to Munich, Germany, and that all the
available U.S. transporters were used, Israel compares to the other sites as
follows:
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Table 2
Airlift to Europe (Munich)
(using all of strategic lift)
From
United States
Israel (Tel Aviv)
Diego Garcia
Somalia
Kenya
Oman
Egypt
Turkey
Days to Transport
One Mechanized Division
24 days
11 days
29 days
20 days
23 days
20 days
12 days
8 days
Forces prepositioned in Israel could be in Europe in half the time it would
take those from the continental United States to arrive, and Israel is closer
than any of the other regional prepositioning sites except Turkey (which is, of
course, a member of NATO). It is also worth noting that Diego Garcia,
which is the anchor of the RDF prepositioning system, is even further from
Europe than the continental United States. Forces prepositioned in Diego
Garcia, Somalia, Kenya or Oman are in effect dedicated to Persian Gulf con-
tingencies, while Israel, Egypt, and Turkey are superior as sites for a "swing
force" suited to either Gulf or European scenarios.
In addition to the swing force concept, Egypt, Israel, and Turkey also have
importance for Mediterranean contingencies, from which Diego Garcia,
Oman, Somalia, and Kenya are remote. The "beefing up" of our navy in the
Indian Ocean has been accomplished partly at the expense of the Sixth Fleet
in the Mediterranean, and any comparison of allocation of U.S. forces to
alternative access sites should also take Mediterranean conflict into account.
This comparison will be developed in greater detail in a subsequent study.
Comparisons in Terms of Cost
So far we have compared prepositioning sites exclusively in terms of
military effectiveness and deployment time. But in the real world of force
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planning, choices are constrained by budgetary impact as well. For example,
if the cost of deploying a given unit to a particular location within a required
time can be reduced, the budgetary resources "liberated" can be used to
strengthen other elements of the overall force structure. Conversely, spend-
ing more to achieve a given objective implicitly weakens other elements of the
force structure.
How, then, would Israel compare to other access sites in terms of cost,
holding military effectiveness constant? One way to make such a comparison
is to compare the direct costs of the airlifts of equipment for one mechanized
infantry division to Dhahran or Munich, as above, on the simple principle
that miles translate into airfleet sorties which cost money (see Appendix).
Table 3 gives the direct costs for the airlifts enumerated in Tables 1 and 2:
Table 3
Direct Costs of Airlifting One Mechanized Division
(as in Tables 1 and 2)
From
To Dhahran
To Munich
United States
$391 million
$247 million
Israel
63
125
Diego Garcia
138
294
Somalia
76
198
Kenya
124
232
Oman
43
208
Egypt
54
140
Turkey
99
87
Combining these comparisons (i.e., using the imaginary case in which one
division was lifted to Dhahran and a second division to Munich), a "swing
force" would cost a half billion dollars less to lift from Israel compared to the
U.S.; $350 million less than Diego Garcia; $170 million less than Kenya; $90
million less than Somalia; and $60 million less than Oman. Again, only Egypt
and Turkey are competitive in terms of cost, both being essentially identical
to Israel.
But comparison of cost on this basis ignores a critical dimension of effec-
tiveness, which is the time required to deploy. The very purpose of an airlift is
to reduce the time that otherwise would be required to move forces at less ex-
pense but more slowly by sea. Indeed, even airlift deployment times like those
given in Tables 1 and 2 are considered much too slow by officials responsible
for U.S. national security planning, and procurement of additional C-5s or
CXs is considered essential to the RDF.
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One way to correct for deployment time in our comparisons, then, is to
take into account the number of aircraft that would have to be procured to
meet a given lift time requirement from the various prepositioning sites. To
permit such a comparison, let us take as our deployment time standard the
times required to lift the equipment for a mechanized division from Israel to
Dhahran (11 days) and Munich (also 11 days), and take as the unit of cost the
number of additional (or fewer) C-5As that would need to be procured to
match this time from the other sites. The number of aircraft derived from the
calculations in the appendix, is as follows:
Table 4
Number of C-5As Required to Match Deployment Time
from Israel
To Dhahran
from United States 168.37 more
Diego Garcia 39.00
Berbera 6.68
Mombasa 30.67
Izmir 17.84
Masirah 10.06 fewer
Ras Banas 4.48 fewer
To Munich
from United States 69.28 more
Diego Garcia 89.88
Berbera 40.66
Mombasa 57.82
Masirah 45.81
Ras Banas 7.44
Izmir 20.05 fewer
Using the $56,000,000 program unit cost of the C-5A as a standard,
equalization of deployment times will reveal considerable "hidden" cost dif-
ferences between the access sites, differences much greater than the direct
costs of the lifts ignoring time (Table 3) or the costs of facilities on the ground
in the host countries (see Appendix). Table 5 compares the C-5A procure-
ment costs to make it possible to lift one mechanized division to Dhahran in
11 days from the various sites.
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Table 5
Additional Cost (Savings) of Capability to Deploy
Mechanized Division to Dhahran in 11 Days
(as in Table 4)
From
$ Millions
United States
$9,429 million
Israel
-0-
Diego Garcia
2,185
Somalia
374
Kenya
1,718
Turkey
999
Oman
(563) savings
Egypt
(251) savings
By this measure, prepositioning in Israel is the equivalent of 168 C-5As or
almost ten billion dollars compared to sending forces to the Gulf in the same
time from the continental United States. Diego Garcia, Somalia, Kenya, and
Turkey would also cost substantially more.
Only Oman and Egypt are superior to Israel for prepositioning in terms of
cost to deploy to Dhahran in 11 days. If we add the comparison to Munich,
on the other hand (see Table 4 and Appendix), Turkey is superior but Egypt
would require 7 additional C-5s ($417 million) and Oman 46 ($2.6 billion).
Finally, on a combined cost basis, Israel emerges as the least expensive alter-
native for a "swing force" if the cost of C-5 s for both Munich and Dahran is
taken as the criterion, since in the three cases where there is an additional ex-
pense to one location and a saving to the other, the additional expense is
greater.
Conclusions
Israel offers clear and substantial advantages as a prepositioning site
for U.S. projection forces, in terms of both force effectiveness and cost.
Many of these advantages derive from its geographic position at the
crossroads of the Mediterranean and Southwest Asian strategic zones.
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There is more political support for an American presence among the
Israeli public than in any other state of the region, and more support
among the competing political elites. A U.S. decision to preposition
materiel in Israel could be taken with a higher degree of confidence that
access would in fact be available in a conflict contingency some years
down the road than in most of the other host nations now under discus-
sion. In addition, Israel is in a position to provide a security umbrella for
prepositioned materiel, while in some of the other sites such security
would have to be provided by U.S. forces. Overall, prepositioning in
Israel would be a useful complement to other access arrangements, and
would strengthen overall force effectiveness at substantially lower cost
than other alternatives.
It is true that prepositioning in Israel also will entail political costs, in
that certain of the Arab states will be strongly opposed. But these costs
are containable if handled firmly, particularly during the transitional
period. From the Arab point of view, the principal objection is surely to
United States military and economic aid to the government of Israel, aid
which will continue regardless of the degree to which Israel is developed
as a regional strategic asset. Moreover, Arab publics already assume that
the United States is engaged in a strategic alliance with Israel; the concept
is more novel to Americans than to the peoples of the region.
In any case, the possibility of prepositioning in Israel should not be re-
jected a priori, without a careful accounting of costs and benefits. If, on
balance, a decision is taken not to develop the strategic benefits of
cooperation with Israel, it should, at the minimum, be taken with a clear-
eyed awareness of the strategic and economic advantages that are being
foregone.
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Appendix
Basis of calculations, additional data, and sources
1. The following inventory of primary aircraft available was used:
70 C5A
234 C 141
234 C130
Any airlift under 3,000 miles is assumed to utilize Cl 30 aircraft as well as
C5A and C141 aircraft.
2. A down factor of 15% was applied to the above numbers and then: (1)
all available aircraft were employed in the Munich lift; (2) 50% of all
available aircraft were employed in the Persian Gulf lift. The number of
aircraft employed in any actual airlift would be highly scenario depen-
dent, the above usage rate was chosen to provide a means for com-
parison.
3. All figures assume transport of all cargo from the on-loading point
stipulated. The U.S. figures do not allow for a possible mix of CONUS
and POMCUS locations, nor do any others.
4. After transporting all outsize cargo, C5As are assumed to continue to
transport bulk and oversize cargo until the lift is completed.
5. No limitations have been placed on run-through capability of either the
on-loading or off-loading point. It is assumed that any location chosen
to serve as a future site will be built up as necessary to permit operations.
It is also assumed that no limitation has been placed for national security
reasons. In the 1973 lift to Israel, the Secretary of Defense limited the
number of aircraft permitted on the ground at Tel Aviv at any given time
for security reasons. These figures do not allow for such a limitation.
6. Mileage has been calculated as the most direct flight with overflight
restrictions as follows: no overflight of the Soviet Union or any Soviet
bloc state; no overflight of a Soviet controlled or allied state; no
overflight of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, or Yemen.
7. Overflight of Jordan and Saudi Arabia is permitted on the assumption
that regardless of the originating point, if Saudi Arabia is permitting
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off-loading in Dhahran, overflight will also be permitted.
8. Non-U.S. prepositioning sites assume the first leg of the airlift originates
on the U.S. East Coast, and that airlift aircraft are based in the U.S.
9. The divisional tonnage figures represent a division and support as
follows:
Airborne
Outsize
13,775
Bulk and Oversize
48,300
62,075 tons
Mechanized
Outsize
34,655
Bulk and Oversize
60,948
95,603 tons
Infantry
Outsize
20,942
Bulk and Oversize
56,399
77,341 tons
The figures for an armored division were not calculated. It is assumed
(1) this division would be transported by sea due to its extreme weight;
and (2) this division would be the last division transported.
The source for these tonnage figures is Defense Marketing Service,
Rapid Deployment Force, 1980.
10. The cost figures given are based on the peace-time operating cost per
flying hour for each aircraft. The following figures were used:
C5A $6,793/hour
C 141 2,087/hour
C130 763/hour
It is acknowledged that in an actual lift scenario there would be addi-
tional ground support expenditures which are not included in the given
figures.
The source for these figures is Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 96th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, Part 8, Department of Defense Appropriations
for 1981, p. 418.
The following formula was used to compute airlift capability in short
tons/day*:
L_NxUxSxRxP
D
where:
L = lift capacity for a particular force, for a particular aircraft
N = the number of aircraft utilized
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U = utilization rate of aircraft; utilization rate is determined by
maintenance requirements, aircrew availability, and the fleet-
wide average of the number of hours per day that each type of
aircraft can fly
S = block-in speed of the aircraft; averaging the cruising speed with
the slower take-off and landing speeds
R = productivity factor for the aircraft, allowing for empty return
D = distance travelled in airlift
P = payload of aircraft in cargo of specified force
The following factors were used for the specific aircraft and specified
divisions.
C5A U = 12.5
S = 428 mi/hour
R=.445
P = 54.6 Airborne
68.5 Mechanized and Infantry
C141 U=12.5
S =407
R=.445
P = 18.07 Airborne
27.04 Mechanized
23.14 Infantry
NOTE: the calculations assumed the C 141 B aircraft was used. This craft
has been stretched to permit greater capacity before "cubing out". Ac-
tual figures for the C141 B are not yet available; the Air Force estimate of
a 30% increase cited in Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 96th Congress,
2nd Session, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 6,
p. 413, was used. Unofficial reports indicate the C141 capacity has in-
creased by more than 30%.
C130 U=8.0
S = 260 mi/hour
R=.445
P = 13.8 all divisions
*source for the formula and factors is Defense Marketing Service,
Rapid Deployment Force, 1980.
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Table 1
Airlift to the Persian Gulf (Dhahran)
From
Miles
Days to
Transport
Cost (M$)
United States (East Coast)
8,739
Airborne Division
69.38
350.0
Mechanized Division
77.44
390.7
Infantry Division
68.17
343.9
Israel (Tel Aviv)
1,284
Airborne Division
9.77
55.2
Mechanized Division
11.18
63.2
Infantry Division
9.88
55.8
Diego Garcia
3,012
Airborne Division
24.52
123.7
Mechanized Division
27.30
137.7
Infantry Division
24.11
121.6
Somalia (Berbera)
1,580
Airborne Division
11.79
66.6
Mechanized Division
13.52
76.4
Infantry Division
11.92
67.3
Kenya (Mombasa)
2,642
Airborne Division
19.05
107.6
Mechanized Division
21.95
124.0
Infantry Division
19.27
108.9
Oman (Masirah)
839
Airborne Division
6.73
38.0
Mechanized Division
7.65
43.2
Infantry Division
6.80
38.4
Egypt (Ras Banas)
1,086
Airborne Division
8.41
47.5
Mechanized Division
9.61
54.3
Infantry Division
8.50
48.0
Turkey (Izmir)
2,074
Airborne Division
15.17
85.7
Mechanized Division
17.45
98.6
Infantry Division
14.30
80.8
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Table 2
Airlift to Munich
From
Miles
Days to
Transport
Cost (M$)
United States (East Coast)
5,530
Airborne Division
21.76
221.4
Mechanized Division
24.31
247.4
Infantry Division
21.38
217.5
Israel (Tel Aviv)
2,543
Airborne Division
9.62
109.5
Mechanized Division
11.01
125.3
Infantry Division
9.73
110.8
Diego Garcia
6,418
Airborne Division
25.88
263.3
Mechanized Division
28.84
293.5
Infantry Division
25.44
258.9
Somalia (Berbera)
4,296
Airborne Division
17.52
178.3
Mechanized Division
19.50
198.4
Infantry Division
17.23
175.3
Kenya (Mombasa)
5,036
Airborne Division
20.44
208.0
Mechanized Division
22.75
231.5
Infantry Division
20.09
204.4
Oman (Masirah)
4,518
Airborne Division
18.40
187.2
Mechanized Division
20.48
208.4
Infantry Division
18.09
184.1
Egypt (Ras Banas)
2,864
Airborne Division
10.71
121.9
Mechanized Division
12.27
139.7
Infantry Division
10.83
123.3
Turkey (Izmir)
1,679
Airborne Division
6.69
76.2
Mechanized Division
7.61
86.6
Infantry Division
6.76
77.0
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Appendix
Table 3
Cost of Equalizing All Options
from United States
Diego Garcia
Berbera
Mombasa
Izmir
Masirah
Ras Banas
$9,428.72 M cost
2,185.12
374.08
1,717.52
999.04
$ 563.36 M savings
250.88
from United States
$3,879.68 M cost
Diego Garcia
5,033.28
Berbera
2,276.96
Mombasa
3,237.92
Masirah
2,565.36
Ras Banas
416.64
Izmir $1,122.80 M savings
The program unit cost of $56M for the C5A aircraft is used. The unit fly-
away cost cited in the same source is $29.7 M. Source: Defense Marketing
Service.
The cost for the C5A was used on the assumption that any actual procure-
ment in any number, would be C5A aircraft. The CX was not used
because it is still in the developmental stage.
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Appendix
Table 4
Construction Costs for Basing Options
Site
FY 81
FY 82
FY 83
Program Total
Diego Garcia
317.6
317.6
Somalia
.4
24.0
24.4
Kenya
19.1
26.0
45.1
Oman
85.5
81.5
44.6
211.6
Egypt
148.5
148.5
Turkey: no figures available
Israel: no figures available
Source: DD 1391, Military Construction Project Data
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
A publication of
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee
444 North Capitol Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
[phone]
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
Mai-tin Indyk
Charles Kupchan
Steven J. Rosen
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886R001900010009-5
Israel and the U.S. Air
Force
Martin Indyk
Charles Kupchan and
Steven J. Rosen
AIPAC Papers On U.S.-Israel Relations
This paper is based in part on research sponsored by Guilford Glazer
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
The AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations
Editor: Steven J. Rosen
Managing Editor: Fay Randall
No. 1 The Strategic Value of Israel
No. 2 Israel and the U.S. Air Force
Subscription price for ten issues:
$25 for members
$30 for nonmembers
Not available on a single issue basis
Inquire for bulk purchase rates
? Copyright 1983 by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.
Second Printing
Cover design by Jill Indyk
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886R001900010009-5
PREFACE
This is the second publication of AIPAC's new monograph series on
U.S.-Israel relations, and also the second part of a thematic six-volume
"series within the series" on the specific issue of the potential for enhanced
strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel. The first volume
on this theme, The Strategic Value of Israel, was devoted largely to the
advantages of prepositioning U.S. Army materiel at Israeli facilities for pos-
sible use in a Middle Eastern crisis. The current volume deals with various
forms of cooperation between Israel and the U.S. Air Force, and it will be
followed shortly by a parallel third study on the value of Israeli assistance to
the U.S. Navy. The fourth volume will deal with the potential use of Israeli
medical facilities to treat U.S. casualties in the event that it is necessary to
involve the Rapid Deployment Force in a Persian Gulf conflict. The fifth will
deal with the potential of Israeli defense and aerospace contractors to provide
overhaul and maintenance services for U.S. armed forces equipment. The
sixth and final paper on the theme of strategic cooperation will deal with the
political and diplomatic aspects of managing Middle East policy to derive the
maximum strategic advantage for the United States.
AIPAC's series of studies ranges beyond the theme of strategic cooper-
ation. Other papers soon to be published include topics such as anti-Israel
propaganda in the United States, media coverage in Lebanon, and the impact
of territorial issues on Israeli security. But we believe that the strategic
importance of Israel to the United States is not well understood, and the series
of which this paper is a part is intended to build the foundation for a clearer
appreciation of this central issue in U.S. Middle East policy.
Publications in this series draw upon the expertise of scholars and pro-
fessional analysts. Dr. Martin Indyk is a Senior Lecturer at Macquarie Uni-
versity, Australia, specializing in the Middle East, and is a consultant to Near
East Research, Inc. He formerly served as a senior Middle East analyst in the
Office of National Assessments of the Government of Australia. Charles
Kupchan is a graduate student in political sciences at Oxford University doing
advanced research on the Rapid Deployment Force; he is a graduate of
Harvard University. Dr. Steven J. Rosen is AIPAC's Director of Research
and Information, and previously served as a senior analyst of Middle Eastern
political/military affairs at the Rand Corporation after a decade of teaching at
Brandeis University, the University of Pittsburgh, and the Australian National
University.
Thomas A. Dine
Executive Director
February 1983
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Executive Summary
While the U.S. Air Force has not been permitted, for political reasons, to exploit fully the
potential for strategic-cooperation with Israel, Israeli assistance has been significant in a number
of areas, including:
? providing combat data on the performance of American and Sovietequipment:in 1973, and in
other wars, which significantly affects USAF expenditures of $2 billion per year on con-
ventional forces research and development and $20 billion on nonnuclear procurement
? demonstrating the vulnerability of Soviet SAMs and interceptors in Lebanon, which may
force the USSR to divert large sums from force expansion to force renovation and replace-
ment
? contracting to overhaul and maintain engines and components for USAF aircraft in some of
the world's most advanced facilities, helping to raise USAF operational readiness
? exchanging intelligence about Soviet and Soviet-allied forces in the Middle East and the
Mediterranean
However, the potential for future cooperation is considerably greater, including:
? use of Israeli ports and airfields as offered by Prime Minister Begin, access to which is much
less likely to be denied abruptly than facilities in countries like Oman and Somalia
? providing deep cover for USAF military transport aircraft, which could be vulnerable to
attack while moving vital equipment and supplies through the Mediterranean and the Middle
East in a crisis
? providing secure and reliable storage facilities for USAF fuel and supplies which must be
prepositioned in peacetime to support rapid deployment of large numbers of tactical aircraft
in a crisis
? substantially greater use of Israeli contract maintenance to improve readiness at reduced
costs.
Use of Israeli facilities could be particularly important to USAF as part of an overall Middle
Eastern basing mix, for which prudent planning requires at least one facility as a reliable and
secure "fall-back" position in the event that access to other, less reliable sites is denied.
Curiously, the failure of the Air Force to exploit these opportunities seems to have more to do
with political objections than with defense effectiveness issues per se. Specifically, some fear that
closer relations with Israel would impair ties with Arab countries, and would be inappropriate
because some of the policies of Israel differ from those of the United States. But these objections,
which seem to have great intuitive appeal in some quarters, have not been subjected to careful
analysis. For example,
? close relations with Israel has not in the past prevented increased American influence in the
Arab world, and may have enhanced that influence;
? our relationship with Israel is based on an enduring affinity between the peoples of the two
countries, and any agreement between the two countries is likely to be respected by any
future Israeli government;
? American arrangements with other countries in the region are often made with unpopular
elites, who may not remain in power or who may feel forced to abrogate agreements with
the United States during periods of crisis;
? while there may be differences between the United States and Israel, the two countries have
much more in common than exists between the U.S. and Oman, Somalia, or Saudi Arabia,
not to mention Korea, Pakistan, and the Philippines. It is not necessary for a reliable ally to
agree on every point.
At a minimum, the potential costs and benefits of enhanced strategic cooperation with Israel
need to be systematically compared with other policy options available to the United States,
before arriving at a final judgment. This has not been done.
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Table of Contents
Page
SECTION I:
Areas of Israeli Assistance to the U.S. Air Force ..................
SECTION II:
An Example: Logistical Support for RDF Tactical Airpower ......... 7
SECTION III:
Why Exclude Israel? ......................................... 21
APPENDIX:
Cost Comparison ............................................ 25
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Section I
Areas of Israeli Assistance to the U.S.
Air Force
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential contribution of Israel
to the missions and requirements of the United States Air Force (USAF).
Defending American interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf has not
been a major concern of USAF since World War II. However, recent events
in the region-particularly the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan-have caused a reordering of priorities and USAF must now
plan for Middle Eastern contingencies. Yet in its recent analysis and planning,
USAF has not taken full account of the potential contribution of Israel and the
benefits of such cooperation, as well as the implicit costs of non-cooperation,
are neither well-studied nor well-understood.
In fact, Israel has already developed a cooperative military relationship
with the United States from which USAF has derived considerable benefit. In
recent years, this has included Israel's provision of combat data on the
performance of American and Soviet systems in the 1967 Six Day War, the
War of Attrition, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Some data gleaned from the
1982 Lebanon campaign has already been provided by Israel and it has
offered to do more. This data is worth a great deal to USAF because the
operation of weapons under battle conditions often differs importantly from
the assessments of military intelligence and from the results of tests and
simulations conducted "on the village green". Israel has provided USAF
with captured Soviet equipment, post-combat damage assessments, perform-
ance data, electronic intelligence and other war evaluation information and all
of these have had an important, though often indirect, impact on USAF expen-
ditures of billions of dollars for research and development and acquisition.'
Beyond this, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has indirectly assisted USAF by
proving the superiority of American aircraft over both Soviet fighters and
Soviet air-defenses. The IAF's successes against the Syrians during the 1982
Lebanon war, in which over 80 Syrian MIGs and 30 surface-to-air missile
sites in the Bekaa Valley were destroyed at the cost of a single Israeli aircraft,
dramatically exceeded the expectations of American experts (and probably
Soviet observers as well). USAF gains from this because Israel has demon-
strated the vulnerability of the Soviet air-defense system. In the European
theater, the Soviets depend on a MIG-21, -23, SAM-2, -3, -6, -8, -9, ZSU-23
air defense combination only marginally different from the Syrian air defense
array that the Israelis defeated. The Soviet Union will therefore now have to
devote large financial resources to replacement and renovation of the systems
which have proven vulnerable.
This, in turn, diverts Soviet military expenditures from force expansion to
force replacement, from offensive systems to defensive ones. It is worth
noting that the Soviet Union spends more on surface-based air defense alone
than it does on its entire "Strategic Rocket Forces" (land-based nuclear
weapons). If expenditures on interceptors are added, Moscow spends more on
combined air defense than on its entire Navy,2 so renovation will be costly.
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The military result of Lebanon is thus a huge implicit gain for USAF, in
undermining the value of tens of billions of rubles in Soviet air defense
expenditure.
However, these examples of the past value of Israel to USAF, while
significant, are limited in comparison with the potential contribution that
Israel could make to the missions and requirements of the Air Force in the
Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the eastern Mediterranean. Until now,
however, these opportunities have not been recognized. Indeed, Israel has
been virtually excluded from USAF planning for access arrangements and
defense cooperation in the Middle East because of a belief in the minds of
many responsible officials that the political costs of cooperation with Israel
would outweigh the strategic gains and economic savings which could be
achieved. This consensus against cooperation with Israel, however, is based
more on intuitive impressions and casual discussion than hard analysis. In
fact, no systematic effort has been made to draw up a balance sheet of the
costs and benefits of cooperation with Israel compared to alternative means
for achieving USAF objectives, nor have the intuitive political objections to
cooperation with Israel been subject to close scrutiny.
In a recent publication, we presented a cost/benefit analysis and com-
parison of alternatives on the subject of prepositioning materiel in Israel for
the U.S. Army.' In what follows, we will present such comparisons for the
requirements of the U.S. Air Force in the Middle East, examining the poten-
tial for utilizing Israeli air bases and airpower, Israeli aircraft maintenance
facilities and-in a more detailed case study jet fuel prepositioned in Israel.
In the concluding section we deal with the political objections to cooperation
with Israel and argue that they provide insufficient reason for overlooking the
one reliable strategic asset available to the United States in the Middle East.
POTENTIAL ISRAELI CONTRIBUTIONS TO USAF
The current Defense Guidance instructs the Services to make maximum use
of Host Nation Support,' in their efforts to project American power abroad.
Israel is particularly well-suited to assist USAF in this way because of its ideal
geo-strategic location at the Middle Eastern crossroads, its sophisticated
basing infrastructure, its advanced maintenance facilities and-in the last
resort-its powerful Air Force. The "menu" of potential forms of Israeli
support to USAF is therefore substantial, covering areas of need for the
Military Aircraft Command, the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air
Command.
i) Air Bases and Air Forces
A Persian Gulf or Middle Eastern contingency requiring the prompt intro-
duction of the ground force component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force (RDF),5 would place a heavy responsibility on the Military Airlift
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Command to mount an enormous airlift over intercontinental ranges. Under
present arrangements, the strategic airlifters operating out of the Continental
United States-C-5s and C-141s-would have to refuel over the Atlantic,
transit the Mediterranean and off-load the troops and equipment at staging
areas in the Middle East. As they reach the eastern Mediterranean, these
transport aircraft, upon which the viability of any RDF operations so crucially
depends, would be potentially vulnerable to interdictory attacks by Soviet-
allied or Soviet-manned interceptors operating out of Syria and Libya. Since
USAF lacks a strategic escort capability, it will have to deploy its tactical
fighters to provide deep air cover over the eastern Mediterranean and secure
the air lines of communication. For this purpose, USAF will need access to an
air base on the eastern Mediterranean littoral.
Moreover, in the contingency of a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf via
Iran, which is the canonical scenario for Middle East defense planning, USAF
will also be required to sustain heavy air-to-ground interdictory raids against
Soviet armored columns moving through northern Iran and the Zagros moun-
tains. This effort to slow the Soviet advance, pending the arrival of U.S.
ground forces in the region, and to drive up the cost of a Soviet offensive, will
require the use of the Strategic Air Command's B-52Hs, carrying con-
ventional munitions, as the main "workhorses".6 These aircraft require run-
ways which are unusually wide, long and capable of supporting heavy loads,
such that relatively few of the world's airfields can be employed for take-off
and landing. In addition, as General Richard Ellis, former Commander in
Chief of SAC, has noted, "B-52s seem to have a stigma" and many countries
are reluctant to provide basing for them.7 According to the press, airfields in
Diego Garcia and Morocco will be available for RDF B-52 use. However, the
distances separating these sites from the presumed target area in northern Iran
are quite substantial, and reliance on them would severely limit the number of
sorties that could be flown, while placing considerable stress on "strategic
projection force" operations.
Israel and Egypt possess air bases which are both closer to the theater than
Diego Garcia and Morocco for B-52 operations, and well-located for escort
duties and combat air patrols over the eastern Mediterranean. However,
between the two alternatives, arrangements in Israel could more reliably be
counted upon for availability in a wide range of crisis contengencies. More-
over, there is a significant threat of sabotage to B-52s and tactical fighters
based in Egypt emanating from fanatical Muslim fundamentalists-a threat
not present in Israel. Prime Minister Begin has announced his country's
willingness to host such a USAF presence and has even indicated a readiness
to build a special runway at one of the new Israeli air bases strictly for
American use.s
Such access arrangements could also be imporant for a number of other
contingencies in the Mediterranean, southern European and Southwest Asian
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theaters. Tactical fighters could operate out of Israel in defense of the Suez
Canal (whose availability to the U.S. Navy and the sealift lines of commu-
nication might be crucial) and against Syrian and Libyan bases to deny them
to Soviet air and airborne forces. Reconnaissance aircraft could use Israeli
bases 'for their assignments in the eastern Mediterranean. These bases could
also act as a fall-back should the Military Airlift Command discover that its
other access and staging arrangements had suddenly become unavailable in a
crisis. Nevertheless, the American response to Israel's several offers to nego-
tiate USAF use of the new air bases in the Negev has been negative.
In addition to basing privileges, USAF could also gain from closer cooper-
ation with the Israeli Air Force (IAF). The IAF could play a role in fulfilling
USAF requirements by flying deep air cover and reconnaissance missions
over the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, given USAF's limited resources,
coordination with the IAF would probably be essential to defend the airlift
routes, regardless of political considerations. Prime Minister Begin made
such an offer in a meeting with journalists in Washington in September 1981,9
but it was not accepted by American officials. Nevertheless, Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense, Francis "Bing" West, has since stated that he considers
insuring a secure line of communication in the eastern Mediterranean the
principal area where Israel might play a role in defense of the Persian Gulf.10
Closer coordination of this kind, manifested in. joint exercises, would also
strengthen the West's ability to deter Soviet military action in the region
because Soviet planners would then have to factor in their calculations the
considerable power and effectiveness of the IAF.
ii) Aircraft Maintenance Facilities
One area of cooperation between USAF and Israel which holds great
potential is Israeli depot-level maintenance of tactical fighters and attack
aircraft. Both USAF and the IAF operate F-15s, F-16s and F-4s, and Israel
already possesses sophisticated overhaul and repair capabilities for the air-
frames, engines and myriad subsystems and components that are critical to the
operational readiness of these aircraft.
USAF has already begun to tap Israel's existing capability in this regard
through contracts awarded to several Israeli firms for the maintenance of
transport aircraft and the overhaul of fighter components.'' These contracts
were awarded solely on the basis of commercial considerations-Israel's
costs were competitive and its quality standards and delivery schedules met
USAF's requirements. However, USAF has so far avoided overhauling entire
fighter aircraft in Israel, although it has awarded such contracts to Spanish and
Greek firms.
It would nevertheless be a relatively simply matter for USAF to draw on the
existing infrastructure in Israel to do this work on its fighter and attack
aircraft. The overhaul and maintenance lines for Israeli F-4s, F-15s,and F-16s
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are already operational and conform to U.S. Department of Defense military
specifications. The personnel working on these lines have been trained to
DoD quality standards. USAF has a contracting office in Israel and, under an
agreement signed in 1979, Israel has been granted the right to compete with
American companies for USAF overhaul and maintenance contracts.
Contract maintenance of USAF fighter and attack aircraft by Israel in
peacetime would have several advantages for USAF's wartime Middle East-
ern requirements. No such capability exists elsewhere in the Middle East so,
by expanding Israel's existing system, USAF would be able to establish its
only feasible regional maintenance infrastructure. It would also gain from
Israel's expertise as the country with the finest record for combat repair during
conflict. In addition, arrangements could be made to boost the maintenance
capability in a crisis by drawing on the IAF's matching capability and its
inventories of spare parts.
Most importantly, USAF's operational readiness could only benefit from
access to Israeli maintenance facilities. The availability of these additional
facilities could help raise USAF operational readiness rates. 12 Although
USAF and IAF definitions of operational readiness differ, some idea of the
capabilities of the Israeli facilities can be gained by a consideration of IAF
operational readiness rates: usually above 90 per cent, and in the case of the
F-16s flown in Lebanon, almost 100 per cent. 13 The "down time" of U.S.
fighters and attack aircraft represents a tremendous "hidden cost" because,
hypothetically, to have available 100 operationally ready aircraft at today's
readiness rate, USAF would have to deploy in theater an additional 54 aircraft
costing about $11.4 billion.
Thus additional contract overhaul and maintenance by Israel could increase
the effectiveness and reduce the cost of USAF missions where large numbers
of aircraft are required. It could also provide USAF with a highly reliable and
efficient regional support infrastructure for wartime contingencies in the
Persian Gulf and Middle East. Such contracts would represent a relatively
low-level form of cooperation to which it would be difficult for others to
object. They could also be instituted for a trial period and cancelled if the
result was not satisfactory. Israel's maintenance facilities, however, would
need to be expanded to meet USAF's requirements and this is something
which could not be implemented if we wait until the crisis is upon us.
Another area of possible cooperation with great potential, but about which
almost nothing has been written elsewhere, would be Israeli help to correct
the severe fuel supply shortages the Tactical Air Command would face if
called upon to support the Rapid Deployment Force in a Persian Gulf war.
Using this example as a case study, the next section provides a detailed
illustration of one of the current planning challenges before the United States
Air Force and how cooperation with Israel can provide a better solution than
other arrangements.
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Section II
An Example: Logistical Support
for RDF Tactical Airpower
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The Rapid Deployment Force is being designed to counter the basic con-
tengency of a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf littoral from the Tran-
scaucasian and Turkamen regions of the U.S.S.R. According to current
Department of Defense Guidance, the tactical Air Force component required
to meet this threat would be considerable, comprising five to ten Tactical
Fighter Wings (TFWs), or from 360 to 720 fighters.14 The role of tactical
airpower will be particularly important during the opening phase of the war,
because most of the ground forces will take a considerable time to arrive from
distant locations, and the Air Force, which is more rapidly deployable, will
have the principal burden of slowing the Soviet advance.
A force of five to ten TFW's will require prodigious quantities of JP-4
aviation fuel, without which it simply will not be able to operate. Fighter
aircraft are high energy consumers typically requiring one gallon per mile on
average. A reasonable estimate of USAF's requirements for the RDF would
be three million gallons per day just for tactical aircraft.
The bulk of this requirement must be prepositioned in the region to supply
these aircraft for the first thirty days after they are deployed. The alternative
of airlifting fuel from the continental United States (CONUS) would vastly
exceed the current and planned capabilities of the aerial refueling fleet; fuel
transported from CONUS by sea would not be available for the first month of
fighting.
USAF prepositioned fuel storage facilities currently planned for the region,
however, will satisfy no more than 15-30% of the requirement for the first
thirty days. Host Nation Support, out of "domestic" stocks, if available at
all, could supply no more than an additional 20%. There is thus a shortfall of
at least 50% of the fuel requirement for the Tactical Air Command in the first
30 days of the canonical planning scenario for conflict in the Persian Gulf.
Correcting this deficiency by procuring strategic airlifters to transport fuel
from CONUS would be prohibitively expensive. The only practical solution is
the construction of additional storage on land bases in the region. Obviously,
such bases must be secure from air and commando attacks. And because fuel
is the sine qua non of USAF operations, such bases must be reliably available
to the United States in the event of a crisis.
While some additional storage in Oman, Egypt and other currently planned
prepositioning sites is possible, considerations of physical security and politi-
cal reliability, as well as the limitations imposed by host governments, point
to the need for additional locations in this most volatile and unstable region of
the world.
Israel is the only country in the region which can be relied upon to be there
when USAF needs it. Israel's formidable air defense capability makes fuel
sites there far more secure than most other potential sites. And Israel's
geographic location gives it a substantial cost advantage over most other
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sites. In the more detailed analysis which follows we show just how critical
the shortage of prepositioned fuel is and why prudent planning would point to
Israel for expanding fuel storage facilities.
THE IMPORTANCE OF AIRPOWER
There are presently some twenty-two Soviet divisions on the northern
border of Iran, within 900 miles of the Persian Gulf and the West's oil
supplies.15 Most of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, by contrast, is based
over 8,000 miles from the Persian Gulf in the United States. In the time that it
would take the Soviet Union to occupy strategic locations in the Gulf with
three armored divisions, the United States could deploy about one marine
battalion and one airborne brigade to the front. Put simply, the ground force
component of the RDF cannot hope to match the forces of the Soviet Union in
the early stages of a Persian Gulf conflict.
This places a heavy burden on the U.S. Air Force which, by contrast, can
deploy its fighters and bombers to the Persian Gulf theater in a matter of hours
and days. These aircraft will have the crucial responsibility of interdicting and
impeding the movement of Soviet forces as they advance through the narrow
passes in northern Iran and through the Zagros mountains. They will have to
compensate in the air for the absence of artillery and armor on the ground.
They will also constitute an indispensable element in the defense of beach-
heads and forward positions to which the U.S. ground forces can deploy, and
in protecting forward air bases and other initial staging areas from enemy
interdiction. 16 In qualitative terms, dependence on air power makes good
sense because American technical superiority over the Soviet Union is most
pronounced in the field of fighter bombers." Moreover, from a terrain per-
spective, dependence upon air power takes greatest advantage of the par-
ticular conditions in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula which assist
air-to-ground interdiction. 'g
Thus, in attempting to counter the natural advantages of Moscow's geo-
strategic position in a Gulf conflict, the RDF will have to depend upon air
power as both its only available opening response, and as its most effective
response. For these reasons the Carter Administration assigned five Tactical
Fighter Wings (TFWs) to the RDF and the Reagan Administration, in its 1982
guidance, ordered USAF to assign an additional five TFWs. In all then, some
720 aircraft are considered by defense planners to be required for tactical
operations in the Persian Gulf.19
USAF's Fuel Problem in a Gulf War
Although the aircraft and crews can be moved to the region in short order,
ensuring that the fuel required by the aircraft for high-intensity operations is
available when needed will be a daunting endeavour. Even though the Middle
East is the source of much of the world's crude oil, refined jet fuel is not likely
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to be available in such large quantities from indigenous regional sources and
the fuel must therefore either be transported to the region at the time of need
or prepositioned before a crisis.
The normal means of moving large quantities of fuel is by sea, but even
assuming that the Suez Canal can be used, fuel sealifted from CONUS will
not be available in the theater for the first thirty days of combat.20 During this
period, operation of five tactical fighter wings will consume about 54 million
gallons of JP-4 jet fuel; ten TFWs will require 108 million gallons, not to
mention the requirements of SAC B-52s and other aircraft.21 USAF recog-
nizes that it faces "major inadequacies in the area of fuel facilities require-
ments. "22 and has decided to construct prepositioned storage sites at airbases
in Oman and Egypt which, when completed, will provide 18 million gallons
for Tacair purposes, as in Table I. But these facilities will satisfy only a third
of the requirement, for a five TFW force and less than a fifth of that for a ten
TFW force.
TABLE I
The Tactical Air Fuel Deficit23
(,000 gallons) (,000 gallons)
FIVE TFWs TEN TFWs
FUEL REQUIREMENT (first 30 days)
54,000
108,000
TOTAL PLANNED STORAGE:
Oman
12,108
Egypt
5,460
17,640
17,640
If five to ten tactical fighter wings are to be available for Persian Gulf
contingencies, major additional steps will be required to correct this fuel
deficit. The range of possible solutions theoretically includes sealift, airlift,
prepositioning on ships,24 and prepositioning on land, but a comparison of
these alternatives has led the Air Force to conclude that the only satisfactory
option for the first month of the war is to preposition fuel on land in the
Middle East.25
Sealift-as already noted-would take approximately thirty days with ac-
cess through the Suez Canal and much longer without it; this would impact
only after the crucial first month of fighting. Airlift of fuel from CONUS
would be impossible26 because the airlifters themselves would require more
fuel than they could carry to traverse the great distance from the U.S. to the
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Persian Gulf. Even if it were possible, it would require up to 332 KC-IO's at a
procurement cost of about $25 billion.27 Fuel prepositioned at sea would be
vulnerable to enemy strikes as it moved through the Straits of Hormuz and the
confined waters of the Persian Gulf; targeting tankers would be the best way
to ground the U.S. Air Force early in a war. For these reasons, among others,
USAF doctrine requires that fuel be prepositioned on land .28 For Persian Gulf
contingencies, these prepositioning sites would need to be located in the
Middle East region itself because ferrying the fuel from more distant sites,
such as the Azores, Diego Garcia or Kenya, would be prohibitively expensive
(see Appendix).
A BASING STRATEGY FOR RDF TACAIR FUEL
If fuel is to be prepositioned on land, where should the sites be located? In
confronting the task of securing fuel storage locations in the Middle East,
defense planners now have the opportunity to build a basing system for
Persian Gulf contingencies from the ground up, since very little by way of
access arrangements has been inherited from the past. This situation is quite
different from Europe and the Far East, where today's basing system evolved
largely from the results of the Second World War and earlier arrangements.
The fact that the region is almost a blank slate as regards access ar-
rangements should be regarded as an opportunity as well as a burden, since
the absence of past commitments leaves open the possibility of an integrated
strategic approach to the problem, unfettered by tradition and vested interests.
It is possible, at least in theory, to develop a coherent basing strategy to guide
diplomatic negotiation and military construction activities, laying the foun-
dations according to a rational plan. Choosing the right basing strategy for
fuel is not an issue that grips the imagination as much as, say, speculating on
what form a Soviet move might take. But fuel is the lifeblood of a tactical
fighter force, without which it cannot operate, and a fuel basing strategy is, in
fact, one of the most important challenges facing the RDF.
A strategic plan begins with an operational requirement: in the current case
the necessity to preposition fuel for USAF tactical air missions in the region.
It then compares systematically the options available to meet the require-
ments, including considerations of cost, effectiveness, and risk, to arrive at a
preferred option or mix of options.
The concepts of risk and a mix of options have particular importance in a
basing strategy for RDF tactical air fuel. The volatility and unpredictability of
the Middle East emphasizes the risk factor; two of the four countries in which
we have "access arrangements" today-Somalia and Egypt-were Soviet
allies ten years ago, while two of the Soviet Union's main bases-Ethiopia
and Afghanistan-were pro-Western or neutral at that time. It usually takes
five to seven years to produce a completed basing facility, from inception of
planning to full operational capability,29 but the political orientations of many
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states in this region are not visible over so long a planning time horizon. Of
the 49 major USAF installations which existed on foreign soil in 1972, only
27 remained under Air Force control a decade later.30 In deciding the appro-
priate locations for fuel storage facilities, therefore, the USAF Logistics
Command must plan against the major political uncertainty that bases under
construction today might not be available when we actually need them.
In addition, a basing strategy must contend with the physical vulnerability
of fuel storage facilities to hostile action by the Soviet Union, its allies or
dissidents adopting violent measures. Many of the sites contemplated at
present are within striking range of enemy bases, or could be targets of
commando or terrorist actions. The high flammability and bulkiness of fuel
makes tank farms excellent targets for bombers, and the Allied experience in
World War II demonstrates the drastic effect that fuel deprivation can have on
enemy fighter capability.31
These risk factors also impact on cost, in two ways. First, a vulnerable site
that must be protected by dedicated U.S. fighters and SAMs is considerably
more expensive than one which is beyond the range of the enemy threat or can
be defended by the host nation. Second, a site at a politically insecure location
is implicitly more expensive than one in a reliable country, since the entire
investment would be worthless if use of the facility were denied when it was
needed. The principle that a low risk site is a less costly site is, as we will see,
one of the major advantages of Israel in comparison with other prepositioning
opportunities available to USAF in the region.
In deciding upon the most appropriate locations for fuel storage facilities
today, a basing strategy must plan against political and site security risks over
an extended time horizon. The NATO logistics system, which evolved largely
from the conditions that existed after the Second World War rather than a
coherent basing plan built from the ground up, today suffers from a mal-
distribution of fuel.32 We have, in the Middle East, the opportunity to build a
rational basing system that will last for many years according to a more
rational plan.
A key element of this plan should be a strategy to hedge against the political
and site security risks by distributing critical logistic support facilities at a
number of locations in different countries, i.e., a mix of options rather than
putting all our eggs in one basket. This will reduce the likelihood that un-
favorable political changes or successful enemy strikes can deprive the tact-
ical fighter force of fuel. The heart of a basing strategy, then, is to choose
from among the access sites available today a basing mix that puts fuel where
we will need it while hedging against risk.33
Hedging Against Risk-Israel as a Fuel Site:
In pursuing this basic mix, defense planners have a range of prepositioning
locations in the Middle East to choose among: air bases in eastern Turkey and
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northeastern Saudi Arabia provide possible close-in alternatives, while Som-
alia, Egypt, Oman, Jordan and Israel are possible regional locations. In
choosing a mix of these sites, a strategy which sought to hedge against risk
would require at least one location which provided USAF with the certain
knowledge that prepositioned fuel would be available when needed, regard-
less of the circumstances. In the reasonable worst case, when other sites
became unavailable (due either to enemy interdiction or political con-
tingencies) this "fall-back" site would be capable of providing the essential
requirements for keeping USAF's tactical air power operational. In the best
case, fuel from this site would be available to complement stocks prep-
ositioned elsewhere, giving USAF a valuable margin of flexibility.
Israel is the ideal location for such a strategic reserve because it offers the
crucial combination of physical security, political reliability and cost-
competitiveness.
Jet fuel stored in Israel would enjoy the protection of Israel's formidable air
and ground defenses. Israel's Air Force is recognized as one of the most
capable in the world and its primary task is to ensure that the country's
airspace is impenetrable. The IAF has repeatedly demonstrated its superiority
over neighboring Soviet-equipped air forces, and even over Soviet-piloted
aircraft.34 Israel's thirty-year experience in combatting guerrilla operations
makes it equally capable of ensuring perimeter security. In short, Israel is
eminently qualified to provide a secure defense umbrella over the fuel site and
it would do so as a natural extension of its own defense effort.
Israel also provides a politically secure fuel site. Israeli governments harbor
no sensitivities toward overt strategic cooperation with the U.S. because such
policies enjoy the overwhelming support of the people of Israel. Israelis share
with Americans a common culture, common values and common democratic
institutions. A strong alliance with the U.S. is also the central tenet of Israel's
foreign policy-regardless of the coalition in power. This stems from the
basic convergence of American and Israeli strategic interests which has cre-
ated an "organic" alliance: one based on the innate values of the two peoples
rather than a temporary convergence of interests. Accordingly, USAF can
have confidence that any arrangement made with one Israeli government
regarding prepositioning of fuel will be kept by its democratic successors.
This combination of political and physical security is particularly important
when compared to the combinations offered by the other Middle Eastern
states prepared to offer their facilities to the U.S. All of these countries are
physically vulnerable to enemy attack or internal sabotage. None of their
regimes can be said to have strong popular support, and in no Arab country
does public opinion endorse a military alliance with the United States. Most
of the Arab states profess nonalignment as the foundation of their foreign
policies. All are extremely sensitive to the charge of cooperating with Ameri-
can "imperialism," and most seek to limit their involvement accordingly.
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While some are more stable than others, none can be relied on in all cir-
cumstances to make facilities on their soil available to USAF. In these
circumstances, as we shall see, none of the alternatives to Israel can qualify as
a high-confidence "fall-back" option for storing jet fuel.
COMPARING OTHER SITES TO ISRAEL
i. Turkey
Turkish authorities have consistently refused to provide basing and access
arrangements for Persian Gulf contingencies in which the United States might
become engaged, in spite of repeated entreaties from American officials. In
the words of Defense Minister Haluk Bayulken, "It is out of the question for
Turkey to take part in a rapid deployment force being established by the
U.S.' '35
As the only Moslem member of NATO, Turkey is particularly sensitive to
domestic and regional opposition to American military intervention in the
Persian Gulf. Ankara is depending on Arab states, including Libya, to support
its economic recovery; the regime is sensitive to domestic opposition from
Islamic fringe groups, the strong Turkish left, and Kurdish dissidents; and it is
attempting to pursue a policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, with
which it shares a long border.
Turkish sites are also vulnerable to air strikes from the numerous bases in
the southern U.S.S.R.,36 against which Turkish air defenses could provide
only token resistance. In addition, while Turkish access arrangements would
be useful for contingencies in northern Iran and the Soviet Transcaucasus,
contingencies elsewhere in the Gulf would require flying through potentially
hostile airspace over Iraq, Iran, or Syria, across distances which are in any
case beyond the combat radius of tactical aircraft. Aerial refuelling from
Turkish bases would be still more vulnerable.
This is not to argue that fuel stored in Turkey would not be valuable for
certain contingencies. If Turkey lifted its opposition, fuel at bases in the
eastern part of the country could be particularly important in a northern
Iranian contingency. But the political uncertainties, site vulnerabilities, and
contingency limitations rule out principal reliance on Turkish bases for fu-
eling RDF tactical airpower.
ii. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia's Dhahran air base is, in theory, an ideal location for fuel
prepositioning. From here, tactical fighters working in conjunction with aerial
refuellers could fly missions across the Persian Gulf and Iran to the borders of
the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. However, Saudi Arabia has consistently
rejected American efforts to acquire basing privileges and has opposed the
concept of an American presence in the Gulf, arguing that such a presence
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could provoke the Soviet intervention it is designed to prevent. The Saudi
regime is particularly sensitive in this regard because it must contend with the
anti-American hostility of all its important neighbors.37 These pressures serve
to heighten an already profound sense of insecurity generated by the com-
bination of vast oil wealth and a grossly inadequate defense capability. The
result is a deeply ingrained policy of placating the bear by keeping the
bear-keeper at bay.38
For the Saudis, therefore, American intervention is an option of last resort.
They want an American "over the horizon" capability to be there when
needed, but they will not host an overt presence beforehand. USAF planners
could surmount this problem-and indeed may already have done so 39 by
entering into a covert arrangement for Saudi Arabia to "overbuild" jet fuel
storage facilities at some of its eastern air bases. But given the political
crosspressures on Saudi Arabia, these cannot be considered high-confidence
arrangements.40
They could be further jeopardized if the Saudi regime itself becomes
destabilized over time, as the full impact of the contradiction between rapid
modernization and rising Islamic fundamentalism begins to be felt. An in-
creasingly threatened regime cannot be expected to risk criticism by cooper-
ating with the U.S.; indeed, it might dramatically reduce such cooperation
exactly to placate and appease growing opposition. The tacit alliance with the
United States, though it may reduce the risk of invasion, increases the more
visible threat of subversion, and too close a relationship with the U.S. may
raise the specter of an upheaval like that which occurred in Iran. Politically,
Saudi Arabia cannot afford to be, or be seen to be, the linchpin of U.S.
military capabilities in the Persian Gulf.
Finally, facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia are vulnerable to Soviet or Soviet-
allied air strikes from bases in South Yemen (PDRY) and from bombers
operating out of the six new Soviet airbases constructed in southern Af-
ghanistan,41 against which Saudi Arabia's own air defenses are not likely to
be effective. Sites elsewhere in Saudi Arabia could be vulnerable to com-
mando operations.
W. Oman
On the face of it, Oman appears to be another attractive prepositioning site.
Although its air bases are some distance from the primary theater of oper-
ations, aerial tankers could operate out of them in support of Tacair mission in
the Persian Gulf. Sultan Qaboos is more willing than Saudi Arabia to be
overtly involved with RDF force projection planning. For this reason, USAF
has already decided to preposition some jet fuel in Oman. But facilities in the
Sultanate face problems of physical vulnerability and political reliability and
while they are an important component of a basing mix, they cannot substitute
for a "fall-back" arrangement.
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The storage tanks at Masirah, Seeb and Thumrait are all within strike-range
of Soviet medium-range bombers operating out of southern Afghanistan.
They could also be hit by aircraft operating out of Soviet-built air bases across
Oman's western border in the PDRY (South Yemen). The facilities at Thum-
rait, in particular, are less than ninety miles from the PDRY border. The
Omani air force is incapable of providing an adequate air defense, and the
Sultan is not prepared to have USAF deployed on Omani soil in peacetime.42
Thumrait would also be accessible to commandos or guerrillas operating out
of Aden.43
The stability of the Sultan's regime also raises questions about the wisdom
of over-dependence on storage facilities in his country. Qaboos has no son
and there is no clear hierarchy which would provide for orderly succession.
Like other producers in the Gulf, Qaboos faces the problem of meeting the
rising expectations of a people only recently reconciled to his rule. Unlike the
other oil producers, however, Oman's oil reserves are limited and, at a time of
falling oil prices, his lavish expenditures and ambitious development plans
cannot be sustained for long. In this context, the Sultan's reliability might also
become questionable. His overt cooperation with the U.S. has placed Oman
in an exposed position among the Gulf states. He has already come under
heavy pressure from the Gulf Cooperation Council to deny Oman's facilities
to the U.S.44 Kuwait, in particular, has mounted a campaign to change the
Sultan's mind.45 Meanwhile the overt hostility to the United States expressed
by neighboring PDRY and Iran provides a constant reminder of the dangers
involved in his present course. The Sultan has resisted these pressures so far,
but in more dire circumstances he might well be persuaded to change his
orientation.
On balance, Oman cannot be considered a high-confidence, secure and
reliable location for the prepositioning of jet fuel. A basing strategy which
sought to spread the risks would include Oman but avoid too great a de-
pendence on it.
iv. Egypt
Prepositioning sites in Egypt will be less vulnerable to enemy air strikes
than those in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Oman. The RDF facilities in Ras
Banas are beyond the range of Soviet aircraft operating out of anywhere but
Libya, and Egypt's own refurbished air force would probably be capable of
dealing with any threat from that quarter. However, given Ras Banas' loca-
tion on the Red Sea, facilities there do face a serious threat from naval
commando operations. Moreover, sabotage operations by internal dissidents
also presents a formidable problem-a fact which must have been driven
home to the then Commander of the RDF, Lt. General Robert Kingston, as he
watched from the reviewing stand the assassination of President Sadat by
Muslim fanatics. Nevertheless, USAF planners have already decided to store
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some fuel at Ras Banas for Tacair use.
Yet, to make up the considerable shortfall that USAF faces in its tactical
fuel requirements by extending facilities at Ras Banas would increase both the
physical and political risks involved in prepositioning in the Middle East. This
is particularly the case because of the new uncertainties emerging in Cairo.
Under President Sadat, Egypt was careful to place a strict ceiling on the
level of strategic cooperation with the U.S., refusing to grant basing privi-
leges or to sign a formal agreement. This reflected Sadat's understanding of
popular Egyptian opposition to a foreign presence. The former British and
Soviet bases in Egypt produced bitter memories for most Egyptians and the
occasions of their removal are still celebrated as national triumphs.
In the wake of Sadat's assassination by Moslem dissidents opposed-
among other things-to his association with the United States, the Mubarak
regime must act even more cautiously. It now faces a serious challenge from
Islamic fundamentalists whose anti-American message strikes a sympahetic
chord in the hearts of the Egyptian masses.46 This message is reinforced by
Egypt's intellectuals and leftist opposition parties who argue that the U.S. is
an imperialist power intent on dominating Egypt.47 The sense of frustration
felt by all Egyptians as they come to terms with the reality of Egypt's
economic plight makes them increasingly receptive to opposition arguments
that they should blame and turn on their latest great power patron in the same
way as they have turned against all previous ones.
In these circumstances, Mubarak and the Reagan Administration have
apparently reached agreement that an enhancement of the strategic relation-
ship would not serve the interests of stability in Egypt at this juncture. The
United States is instead seeking to lower its profile in the country. Accord-
ingly, the second round of joint maneuvers between the Egyptian armed
forces and the RDF, which were scheduled for late 1982, have been can-
celled.
Just how reliable access arrangements with Egypt remain will therefore
depend on circumstances beyond Washington's control. For example, in
deference to the mounting criticism of Egypt's association with the United
States, a cautious Mubarak might consider it wise to deny access to USAF.
Similarly, the regime in Cairo might be unwilling to jeopardize its chances for
rapprochement with other Arab states by supporting American military ac-
tions which were controversial in the Arab world. In the worst case, the
Mubarak regime might itself be overthrown be a coalition of fundamentalist
and leftist forces united in their opposition to his economic and foreign
policies.
In short, the jet fuel already prepositioned in Egypt is at risk. Expanding the
fuel facilities at Ras Banas will only increase that risk. Thus while Egypt is a
necessary component in any USAF basing strategy it is not a sufficient
component since it cannot meet the requirements of a "fall-back" facility.
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v. Somalia
Situated some 1,600 miles from the Persian Gulf, Somalia is the least
attractive of all the regional prepositioning alternatives. Not only is it poorly
located for USAF's purposes, but its facilities at Berbera are also vulnerable
to attack by aircraft operating out of neighboring Ethiopia or the PDRY across
the Gulf of Aden-both Soviet allies. Indeed, Ethiopia has already threat-
ened to employ its own air force against the existing U.S. facilities at Berbera.
Somalia is incapable of providing an air defense umbrella for such highly
vulnerable sites nor perimeter security against infiltrators operating out of the
strife-torn Ogaden.4s
Beyond these physical problems, Somalia's President Siad Barre is the
least reliable of America's Middle East clients. He turned to the United States
in the expectation of financial gain and demanded a "king's ransom" for
access to Berbera. He is engaged in a war of his own making with Ethiopia
and presides over a bankrupt economy. His revolutionary socialist regime is
both corrupt and unpopular. Accordingly, Somalia could only be regarded as
a site of last-resort for jet fuel prepositioning.
A. Jordan
While in theory Jordan might appear to be a possible prepositioning alterna-
tive, King Hussein has rejected the idea of hosting RDF facilities in peace-
time. USAF cannot resort to covert "overbuilding" of Jordan's own fuel
facilities because its air bases are too small to camouflage such large scale
construction. Moreover, King Hussein has already apparently agreed to a
controversial proposal for American training of his elite troops as a rapid
intervention force49 and it would therefore be unwise to jeopardise his ex-
posed position in the Arab world by further raising the profile of his cooper-
ation with the RDF. Accordingly, Jordan should not be included in the
fuel-basing mix.
COMPARISON IN TERMS OF COST
Thus a comparison of the political reliability and site security of the major
land prepositioning options available to USAF for fuel storage facilities in this
region points clearly to Israel as the one high-confidence option for a "fall-
back" supply that will be there when needed. Some might argue, never-
theless, that the costs involved in airlifting fuel from Tel Aviv to air bases in
the Gulf make closer sites more attractive. As Table II shows, however,
airlifting fuel from Israel is as cheap as Egypt, where USAF has already
decided to construct storage facilities, and one-third cheaper than Somalia.
This simple comparison, however, overlooks the other costs involved in
prepositioning.50 First, there is the cost of protecting the fuel site. In the case
of both Israel and Egypt, the savings which result from their locations beyond
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Costs of Airlifting Fuel to Dhahran (Saudi Arabia) for one
Tactical Fighter Wing
PREPOSITIONING SITE:
($ Millions)
Somalia
454
Israel
302
Egypt
302
Oman
227
Source: See Appendix.
the range of Soviet aircraft together with their possession of indigenous
capabilities to defend the fuel sites from air attacks, more than balances the
transport costs incurred. Conversely, the vulnerability of sites in Turkey,
Saudi Arabia and Oman to Soviet bombers and the inability of these countries
to mount an effective defense, cancel the savings'involved in their proximity
to the area of Tacair operations.
Second, there is the implicit cost involved in the risk that a site might not be
available when needed, rendering the entire investment worthless. According
to this criterion, a site which has a 100 per cent probability of being available
is half as expensive as a site which has a 50 per cent probability. These
implicit costs are highest in Turkey and Saudi Arabia because of their reluc-
tance to be involved in RDF planning and their acute sensitivity to hostile
pressure. In Oman and Egypt the implicit costs are slightly less-as we have
argued-though they remain high. Israel, however, incurs negligible implicit
costs because of its inherent stability and reliability. The comparative savings
which result from Israel's low-risk, low-vulnerability profile thus more than
outweigh the transport costs involved in prepositioning jet fuel there.
CONCLUSION-THE IDEAL BASING MIX
Clearly, the United States cannot protect its interests in the Persian Gulf
without depending heavily on the tactical power of USAF. And USAF cannot
project its power into the Persian Gulf without access to huge quantities of jet
fuel prepositioned in the Middle East. At best, fuel storage facilities already
planned can cover only one-third of the requirement, and USAF must now
decide on a basing strategy for additional facilities to meet the shortfall. In
making its decisions, USAF must come to terms with the political uncer-
tainties and physical vulnerabilities inherent in the Middle East region. Its
only recourse is to a basing mix which hedges against risk both by pre-
positioning in a number of countries and by building a "fall back" strategic
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reserve in one dependable location. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Egypt
have advantages as prepositioning sites because of their proximity to USAF's
likely theater of operations. But all of these sites are burdened with problems
of political uncertainty and/or physical vulnerability. Only Israel is both
well-located and offers the essential combination of reliability and site secu-
rity. Thus, while it makes sense to preposition some fuel in Oman, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, the ideal basing mix would seek to compensate for
the risks involved by storing a good deal of USAF's fuel requirements in
Israel.
Building this strategic reserve in Israel would also serve other USAF
purposes beyond its role in RDF tactical air operations in the Persian Gulf.
Under present arrangements, the Military Airlift Command depends upon
en-route refuelling facilities for C5As transporting military equipment from
CONUS to the Gulf. KC 10s operating out of Israel could refuel the transport
aircraft using the jet fuel stored there. Similarly, USAF might have a need in
some contingencies for refueling facilities for Tacair or Strategic Projection
Force operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Again, jet fuel prepositioned
in Israel would be available for such purposes. In short, tank farms in Israel
would give USAF both a "fall-back" facility for Persian Gulf operations and
a "swing" facility for Mediterranean contingencies. Prepositioning in Israel
can give USAF confidence that its fuel requirements for operations in the
Middle East will be available regardless of whether other countries decide to
cooperate. A basing mix that excludes Israel will not provide this assurance.
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Section III
Why Exclude Israel?
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Enhanced strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel could
result in some very tangible gains for the United States Air Force, in such
areas as intelligence sharing, bases, air defense for military airlifts, improved
maintenance to raise operational readiness rates, and reliable fuel facilities for
tactical fighter operations. Yet the Air Force has not strongly supported
efforts to improve strategic cooperation with Israel, neither during the 1981
negotiations over the Memorandum of Understanding for strategic cooper-
ation ,51 nor since that time in efforts to bring cooperation back to life fol-
lowing the suspension of the MOU. Indeed, USAF has virtually excluded
Israel from the access sites under consideration in this region.
What accounts for the lack of interest of the Air Force in exploring ar-
rangements that could have a substantial positive impact on its ability to
perform its mission? Curiously, the answer seems to have more to do with
political objections than with defense effectiveness issues per se. Indeed, the
perceived political problems are considered to pose such an obstacle that,
according to reliable sources, no serious effort has been made within the Air
Staff even to compare political considerations with the value of the military
advantages that are being foregone. The result is that the military/strategic
potential of cooperation with Israel has been neglected.
The political objections themselves boil down to two central arguments:
first, that closer relations with Israel would impair ties between the United
States and the Arab countries; and second, that closer cooperation with Israel
would be inappropriate because the policies of Israel differ from those of the
United States.
The belief that closer relations with Israel would impair U.S. ties with the
Arabs in not a new one; in fact, it has been the main theme of a minority with-
in the U.S. government since 1949. What is new is the spread of this con-
ception from a few limited agencies, such as the State Department's Bureau of
Near East Affairs, to new quarters.
The main attraction of this conception is its simple logic: as the Arabs say,
the friend of my enemy is my enemy. But this Arabist formula is also almost
completely at odds with the history and experience of the United States in this
region for over thirty years, where a deepening relationship with Israel has not
hindered a steadily improving friendship with a widening circle of Arab
countries. This has been particularly true since 1973, when the U.S. has given
unprecedented levels of arms and aid to Israel while substantially improving
relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the states of the Arabian Peninsula.
Indeed, even Syria and the PLO now recognize Washington as the most
important outside actor in the Middle East, exactly because the United States
has an intimate relationship with Israel. The simple truth is that, at a time
when the United States enjoys a strong and close relationship with Israel, it
has achieved an unparalleled position of influence in the Arab world.
In some critical cases, the close relationship with Israel has even been a
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direct asset in building closer U.S. ties with Arab states. The most recent
example is Lebanon, where Israeli action has severely reduced the influence
of two Soviet allies (Syria and the PLO) and brought about the installation of a
pro-American government there. Earlier examples include Jordan, where
Israeli action in 1970 helped to save the government of King Hussein from a
challenge by the PLO, and Egypt, whose new relationship with the United
States was fostered by Israel's willingness to surrender the Sinai. In short, it is
neither self-evident nor true that close cooperation between the United States
and Israel hinders the improvement of relations with Arab countries.
Indeed, to the extent that there is tension between America's ties to Israel
and its relationship with the Arabs, the principal Arab objections are to the
things that the U.S. does for Israel, such as arms supplies and aid, rather than
the things Israel does-and could do-for the United States to promote the
stability of the region. In any case, the Arabs assume that we are already
engaged in strategic cooperation with Israel. In effect, we are paying the cost
of the alliance while depriving ourselves of much of the benefit.
Moreover, the areas of strategic cooperation proposed in this paper-bases,
maintenance facilities, fuel prepositioning and deep air cover-could not
reasonably be regarded by the Arabs as threatening to them. Their very
purpose is to bolster USAF's "over the horizon" capability to defend the
Arab states.
Beyond this, sacrificing the objective American national interest to satisfy
the prejudices of some Arab states against Israel, even if it did earn praise in
some quarters, would be a form of appeasement. The conservative Arabs are
saying, in effect, that they want us to defend them, but not from bases on their
territory, and not from facilities provided by Israel either. A responsible
power cannot let its policy be dictated by this kind of logic.
The second class of political objections standing in the way of USAF
cooperation with Israel is the perception that closer ties would be inap-
propriate because the policies of Israel differ from those of the United States.
This reflects the fact that, in recent days, greater attention has been paid to the
points of disagreement between Israel and the United States than the wider
underlying areas of agreement. While there are, inevitably, some differences
between the two countries on the complex issues of the region, Israel remains
the one country of the Middle East which does not profess neutrality but
considers its fate inextricably bound up with that of the Western world. It is
also the country with the most democratic institutions, the country with the
most advanced economy and most capable armed forces in the region, the
country most willing to engage in strategic cooperation with the United
States, and the country most likely to remain an ally of the United States over
an extended period of. time. The United States has more in common with
Israel than, say, Somalia or Oman, and fewer areas of policy difference than
with, for example, the Philippines or Pakistan, but an image is being created
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that these countries are better allies than Israel. Even major allies like Ger-
many and Japan pursue policies with which we do not agree, but there is no
suggestion that these differences should stand in the way of strategic cooper-
ation.
Those who have had long experience with alliance politics recognize that
we cannot expect every policy of our allies to reflect our wishes. Strategic
cooperation with a particular country is not meant as an endorsement of each
and every action it may take, but rather is a means of coping with national
security challenges within the limited means that are available to the United
States.
Some who recognize that Israel can make a substantial contribution to the
extension of these limited means but are cowed by the perceived political
objectives, seek to resolve the tension by arguing that since Israel will be there
when needed, it is unnecessary to take any action beforehand. The problem
with this argument, however, is that access arrangements and facilities need
to be established well in advance of a conflict. In the case of prepositioned
fuel it could take as long as five years to construct the facilities.
Finally, the Air Staff cannot be expected to devise an entire diplomatic
strategy for all aspects of a problem. Its responsibility is to advise the Presi-
dent on the specific needs of the Air Force in fulfilling its missions and
assignments. Once the potential costs and benefits of strategic cooperation
with Israel are systematically tabulated and compared with other policy op-
tions within the framework of the military requirements of the United States,
it will be possible to broaden the agenda to take account of political factors.
We should at least know what we are giving up. As yet, this tabulation has not
been undertaken.
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Appendix
Cost Comparisons
COMPARING THE COST OF STORAGE SITES
Although the construction costs of fuel storage sites in different countries may vary mar-
ginally, the major difference in the direct costs of the available locations is likely to be the size of
the aerial tanker fleet that is necessary to move the fuel from the prepositioning sites to forward
operating bases or "marry-up" points with the fighter aircraft that the fuel is intended to support.
In general, a more distant site will require a larger number of aerial tankers to deliver a given
volume of fuel to a particular marry-up point than a closer site.
To devise a common unit of measure for such a comparison, the following analysis uses these
assumptions:
transport aircraft: KC-10 aerial tanker
forward operating air base: Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
fuel volume: the amount required to keep one Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) of 72 F-15s
operational on a two-sortie per day basis for 30 days.
1.
KC-10 data:
Cargo fuel capacity
Average Speed
Utilization Rate
Unit Flyaway Cost
Unit Operating Cost per flying hour
30,854 gallons
480 knots
12.5 hours per day
$74 million (FY'82 dollars)
$4,232 (FY'82 dollars)
2.
Fuel volume was calculated as follows:
F-15 consumption per sortie = 2,500 gallons (to and from northern Iran)
TFW consumption per day = 2,500 x 2 sorties x 72 aircraft
= 360,000 gallons per day.
3.
The number of KC- 10s required was estimated by determining the number of cycles per day
that one KC- 10 could complete, including loading fuel at the prepositioning location, flying
to Dhahran, unloading the fuel and then returning to the original site for reloading. Cycles
per day were determined using the following formulae:
FH1 = Distance One-Way + LT
Average Speed
FH2 = 2 x FH1
CD = UTE
FH2
where
FH = Flight Hours
CD = Cycles per Day
LT = Loading Time (25 minutes)
UTE = Utilization Rate (12.5 hours per day)
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4. The number of KC-IOs required to transport enough fuel to keep one Tactical Fighter Wing
operational was calculated using the following formula:
KC = TFW fuel consumption/day= 360,000 11.67
KC-10 cargo fuel x CD 30,854 x CD CD
where
KC = number of KC-10s required
CD = Cycles per day
5. Operating costs were determined by the following method:
Oc = Uc x UTE x 30 = $1.59 million per KC-10
where
Oc = Total operating costs for the supply period (30 days)
Uc = Unit operating cost per flying hour ($4,232)
UTE = Utilization rate (12.5 hours per day)
Table III
TRANSPORT COSTS FROM PREPOSITIONING SITE TO DHAHRAN, SAUDI
ARABIA
($ million) ($ million)
(n. miles) Procurement Operational
Site
Distance Cycles/day- KC10s/T
FW Cost
Cost
Total
United States
9,000
0.32
36
2,664
57
2,721
Azores
(Lajes)
3,674
0.77
15
1,110
24
1,134
Diego
Garcia
2,566
1.08
II
814
17
831
Kenya
(Mombasa)
2,080
1.32
9
666
14
680
Somalia
(Berbera)
1,244
2.08
6
444
10
454
Israel
(Tel Aviv)
894
2.75
4
296
6
302
Egypt
(Ras Banas)
795
3.01
4
296
6
302
Oman
(Masirah)
660
3.49
3
222
5
227
SOURCES:
Jane's All the World's Aircraft, New York, Franklin Watts Inc., 1978-1979.
Department of the Air Force, USAF Cost and Planning Factors, AF Regulation 173-13,
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, February I. 1982.
Defense Marketing Service, Rapid Deployment Force, Greenwich, CT, 1980.
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FOOTNOTES
I. In fiscal year 1983, for example, the Air Force will spend $2.2 billion on research and
development for tactical programs, and $20.6 billion on general purpose (nonnuclear) forces
procurement, operation and maintenance. If Israel's combat experience-the major
"testbed" of state-of-the-art systems in the world-affected 10% of this activity on the
average, the "saving" to USAF, in the form of replacing ineffective programs and systems
with proven alternatives, would be about $200 million per year in R & D and a larger amount
in procurement operation and maintenance costs.
2. In 1977, the most recent year for which an unclassified breakdown is available the Soviet
Union spend 12% of its defense budget for National Air Defense (SAM's, anti-aircraft
artillery and related systems) compared to 8% for the Strategic Rocket Forces (ICBM's,
IRBM's, and MRBM's-i.e., land-based nuclear weapons). Adding in the MiG-21s and
-23s, which comprise perhaps a third of Soviet Air Force expenditures (22% of the budget),
the air and ground systems that Israel defeated in Lebanon corresponds to about 20% of
Soviet military investment. This is equal to the entire expenditure on the Soviet Navy. Data
from Central Intelligence Agency, Estimating Soviet Defense Expenditures: Trends and
Prospects, June 1978, p. 3.
3. Steven J. Rosen, The Strategic Value of Israel, AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations # 1,
October 1982.
4. The current Defense Guidance instructs the Services that,
The U.S. will rely, to the extent feasible, on assured host nation logistics support
in . . . Southwest Asia. Assured host nation support is the preferred means for meeting
logistics support requirements. Where HNS is judged to be inadequate . . . Services
should identify U.S. Reserve Component units . . . Additional active combat service
support manpower should not be planned and programmed where HNS or RC alternatives
are feasible.
(Quoted in DoD Appropriations for 1983, Part 6, House Appropriations Committee, pp.
49-50).
5. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was reconstituted as the Central Command (Cent-
com) in January 1983. Throughout this paper, however, we will use the more familiar
terminology of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).
6. The B-52Hs would be supplemented by other attack aircraft which carry smaller payloads
and operate over shorter ranges. DoD Appropriations for 1982, Part 2, Senate Armed
Services Committee, p. 1064.
7. DoD Appropriations for 1982, Part 5, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 2466.
8. Wolf Blitzer, "No AWACS, No Strategic Deal with Israel-Pentagon," Jerusalem Post,
September 13, 1981, p. I.
9. "Begin Offers Services," Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew, September 11, 1981.
10. Testimony in DoD Appropriations for 1983, Part 6, Senate Armed Services Committee,
p. 3744.
11. Israel currently is one of the world's leading sources of 707 maintenance and recently has
been awarded a contract to perform component maintenance on USAF F-4s and U.S. Army
helicopters.
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12. The average "mission capable rates" of U.S. Air Force first-line tactical aircraft were 63%
in FY 1980 and 60% in FY 1979. (DoD Appropriations for /982, Part I, Senate Armed
Services Committee, p. 335). Mission capable rates by aircraft type in FY 1980 were as
follows:
F- 15 59%
F-4E 66%
F-IIID 39%
A-7 64%
A-10 72%
(/bid, Part 5, p. 2523)
Secretary of Defense Weinberger expects Reagan Administration initiatives to raise the
Air Force tactical aircraft mission capable rate to "68 per cent, as opposed to the 64 percent
projected by the previous Administration." DoD Appropriations for /983, Part I, House
Appropriations Committee, p. 139.
13. According to the General W. L. Creech, head of the U.S. Tactical Air Command, the
Israelis reported that all 72 of their F-16s were ready to fly every morning. Richard Halloran,
"U.S. General Says American Jets Have Proved Reliable in Lebanon," New York Times,
August 7, 1982.
14. Richard Halloran, "Special U.S. Force for Persian Gulf is Growing Swiftly," New York
Times, October 25, 1982, p. 1.
15. Using the worst case scenario, DoD Appropriations for 1983, Part 8, House Appropriations
Committee, p. 311.
16. TAC would also be responsible for air-to-air interception, air-defense suppression,
achievement of air superiority, close air support for ground forces, and possible strikes
against Soviet air bases. See DoD Appropriations for 1982, Part 3, Senate Armed Services
Committee, pp. 1247-53.
17. For example, the typical "exchange rates" in engagements between U.S. and Soviet aircraft
in the Middle Eastern wars have been considerably more favorable than the kill ratios of U.S.
vs. Soviet tanks.
18. Soviet movements through the northern and central Iranian mountains would be channeled
into a relatively small number of narrow highways marked by ideal interdiction zones where
off-road movement is difficult or impossible, thus presenting lucrative targets for air-to-
ground blocking and impeding operations. The large desert tracts in the south deny con-
cealment to ground forces moving over open terrain. Similarly, the prevailing weather
conditions provide clear visibility for target acquisition and effective employment of
precision-guided munitions.
19. One USAF TFW consists of three squadrons of 24 aircraft. The five original AF TFW's
assigned to the RDF were the 27th (F-I I Is), the 49th (F-I5s), the 347th (F-4s), the 354th
(A-IOs), and the 23rd (A-7s). See DoD Appropriations for 1982, Part 4, Senate Armed
Services Committee, p. 1708. According to Halloran, the Reagan administration has
expanded this to include 10 USAF TFWs (of which some would presumably be "attrition
fillers" to replace losses), three aircraft carriers with 258 aircraft (of which no more than half
would be available for offensive overland missions), the air wings of two Marine Corps
divisions, and a number of B-52 strategic-range bombers carrying conventional munitions.
See Halloran, op. cit. For typical composition of tactical fighter wings in the different
services, see DoD Appropriations for 1982, Part I. Senate Armed Services Committee,
p. 255.
20. If the Suez Canal was closed by hostile action, or if the Military Sealift Command considered
the sea line of communication through the Canal insecure and therefore preferred the Cape
route around southern Africa, it would take about 40 days to sealift fuel from CONUS and
the prepositioning requirement would increase to 72 million gallons for 5 USAF TFWs and
144 million gallons for 10 TFWs.
21. This calculation assumes: (a) fuel consumption of one gallon per mile: (b) two sorties per day
average; (c) all aircraft operational. This totals 360,000 gallons per tactical fighter wing per
day, or 10,800,000 gallons per wing for thirty days.
22. DoD Appropriations for 1983, Part 6, House Appropriations Committee, p. 57.
23. Source: Military Construction Hearings, FY'82 and '83, (various).
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24. By contrast to the small payload of aerial tankers (the KC-10, for example, carries 30,000
gallons), maritime supertankers carry millions of gallons, and are currently available in
surplus due to the worldwide oil glut. However, thin-skinned vessels could be vulnerable to a
single missle hit, and would be a lucrative target difficult to protect against enemy action.
25. DoD Appropriations for 1983, Part 6, House Appropriations Committee, pp. 59-60.
26. According to General Lew Allen, USAF Chief of Staff, "Our current refuelling assets are
unable to support a major contingency deployment without degrading tanker support for our
strategic bomber forces. The increased refuelling requirements associated with the
B52G/ALCM will further strain our limited tanker force." DoD Appropriations for 1982,
Part 2, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 1076. The Air Force, which already faces a
severe shortage of aerial refuelers for other purposes, clearly has no intention of pursuing the
impractical course of airlifting fuel to the Persian Gulf from CONUS to supply theater
tactical requirements. The strategic bomber force alone requires 765 KC-135A tankers for
optimum bomber tactics, compared to a current fleet of only 615, and in addition 75 to 265
are believed necessary for tactical air refueling within the theater in a Persian Gulf con-
tingency. In other words, a considerable expansion and upgrading of the current aerial
refueler inventory is required to meet these and other priorities, and airlifting fuel to the Gulf
in quantity is and will remain beyond the capability of the fleet. See DoD Appropriations for
1983, Part 6, House Appropriations Committee, pp. 56-57.
27. Each KC-10 carries 30,000 gallons of fuel, and could complete a CONUS/Gulf/CONUS
cycle in 3.3 days, averaging 272,000 gallons per KC-10 over the month of an airlift. Flying
fuel to make up the deficit for five tactical fighter wings (as in Table 1) would require 133
KC-10s costing $9.8 billion, while ten fighter wings would require 332 KC-10s costing
$24.6 billion.
28. According to General Bryce Poe, Commander of the Air Force Logistics Command, "Ade-
quate stocks of properly prepositioned fuels are becoming increasingly more critical to our
ability to project and sustain a credible force throughout the world. We have a two fold
problem-storage capacity and storage location. The heightened tensions in the Persian
Gulf and dwindling reserves in the geographic areas covered by our major war scenarios
have increased our dependence on prepositioned fuel stocks." DoD Appropriations for
1982, Part 5, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 2485. Emphasis added.
29. Military Construction Appropriations for 1983, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 185.
30. DoD Appropriations for 1982, Part 5, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 3052.
31. During the closing stages of World War II, the Allies carried out extensive bombing raids
against petroleum reserves in both Germany and Japan. Although the accuracy of the
bombings was poor by contemporary standards, the results of these raids were devastating,
largely because of the secondary damage caused by fires and explosions. In Germany,
production of avaiation fuel dropped to ten per cent of its previous level; in Japan, output
capacity was cut by 85 per cent and more than half the storage tanks were destroyed. The
devastation was achieved without the use of incendiary bombs and against fuel storage tanks
which were smaller and more hardened than those currently being constructed. In the battle
field of the 1980s, fighter-bombers will be able to utilize an array of weapons-including
Precision Guided Munitions and improved incendiary bombs-to ensure a high degree of
effectiveness against fuel depots. Target acquisition will also be much easier than in World
War II, both because of the terrain in Southwest Asia and the switch to low-level bombing
tactics. See Edmund Dews, POL Storage as a Target for Air Attack: Evidence from the
World War 1! Allied Air Campaigns Against Enemy Oil Installations, Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, California, June 1980, N-1523-PA&E.
32. DoD Appropriations for 1982, Part 5, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 2845.
33. As Senator William Cohen, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Sea
Power and Force Projection, has noted:
"One can question the utility of an RDF that is composed largely of air transported US
Army and US Air Force units . . . critically dependent upon prehostilities access to bases
and airfields ashore and whose ability to sustain combat would require the creation ashore
of a huge support infrastructure. The question we have to raise is, are we to stake the RDF's
success or failure in a crisis on the momentary political calculation of host regimes in an
area that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has aptly called the most volatile,
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Appropriations for 1982, Part 4, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 1700.
34. The following table gives the ratios of Israeli to enemy aircraft losses in air-to-air en-
gagements. The 1967-1973 figures include the IAF's shooting down of four Soviet-piloted
Mig-21s over the Suez Canal in July 1970 for no Israeli loss.
KILL RATIOS IN AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT
Enemy
Losses
Israeli
Losses
Kill
Ratio
1967 Six Day War
60
3
20:1
1967-1973
138
2
69:1
1973 Yom Kippur War
334
6
55:1
1982 Lebanon War
80
-
80:0
Source: Armed Forces Journal International, October 1973, p. 61 and April 1974, p. 32,
and press accounts of the Lebanon engagements.
35. Xinhua News Service, 4/28/82. When Bayulken visited Washington in June 1981 he de-
clared that Turkey was not involved in contingency planning with the U.S. for intervention
in the Gulf and that American access to Turkish bases would be permitted only in the context
of "a need to protect the vital interests of NATO" (Associated Press, 6/12/81). In October
1982, the Reagan Administration signed an agreement with Ankara to build one new air base
and modernize two others in eastern Turkey. In the process of negotiations, U.S. officials
sought permission to use these bases for a Persian Gulf emergency. Consistent with its earlier
pronouncements, Turkey refused. (Washington Post, 11/7/82, Associated Press, 11/6/82).
36. According to Turkish sources, the Soviet Union possesses some 150 air bases which pose a
threat to Turkey and it has constructed new air bases in the south, in close proximity to the
three Turkish air bases being refurbished or built by the U.S. From its bases the Soviet Union
would be able to deploy large numbers of MIG-27s, Su-17s and Su-24s to destroy such
vulnerable and high priority targets as fuel sites. (Washington Post, November 7, 1982).
37. Henry Kissinger succinctly summarized the pressures on the Saudi regime in a recent
interview: "Saudi Arabia faces simultaneously the uncertainties of rapid modernization and
the challenges of Islamic fundamentalism. It has a secular, radical neighbor to the south in
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; a perhaps reformed but always potentially
radical neighbor in Iraq to the north. Across the Gulf it faces traditional Iranian expansionism
allied to religious fanaticism; across the Red Sea there is a Soviet and Cuban base in
Ethiopia." The Economist, November 13, 1982. See also William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia
in the 1980s, Foreign Policy, Security and Oil, The Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C., 1981.
38. For a summary of Saudi attitudes to the Rapid Deployment Force see, Saudi Arabia and the
United States: The New Context in an Evolving Special Relationship, Report to the Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle East, House Committee, on Foreign Affairs, by the
Congressional Research Service, 97th Congress, 1st Session, August 1981.
39. One newspaper report suggests that "overbuilding" of Saudi facilities is already underway.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is under contract to build a large number of facilities
which conform to American specifications and are compatible with American systems.
Among these projects are five air bases, in each corner of the country, which-according to
the report-are being built on a scale that exceeds Saudi needs, perhaps to meet RDF
requirements. There is no indication, however, that the construction plans include large-
scale jet-fuel storage facilities. See Scott Armstrong, "Saudis' AWACS Just the beginning
of a New Strategy", Washington Post, November 1, 1981.
40. As the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force
Projection has argued:
... back in 1973 when we had the October War suddenly our closest friends said, no,
you can't have overflight rights and no, you can't use our bases for this purpose. If you
can't count on your allies in a time of crisis it ought to raise a very serious doubt in our
minds as to whether you can count on people who are not actually allies, who have to
remain for domestic political reasons as neutral as possible, and who don't want to see a
presence on the part of the United States in that part of the world. I think the same kind of
political pressures which say stay out of here, we want to feel you but not see you, will be
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political pressures which say stay out of here, we want to feel you but not see you, will be
the same kind of pressures that would be exacerbated in a time of crisis or conflict.
DoD Appropriations for 1982, Part 4, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 1834.
41. Pentagon officials admit that these airfields represent a new threat to U.S. air, sea and
ground operations in the Persian Gulf-a threat which cannot easily be countered because of
the reluctance of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to make their air bases available to USAF.
Richard Halloran, "New Soviet Afghan Bases Seen as Peril to Gulf", New York Times,
November 14, 1982.
42. U.S. concern for the vulnerability of Omani air bases was reflected in the 1982 joint
exercises of the RDF and Omani forces-code-named 'Jade Tiger'. The maneuvers re-
portedly included a simulated attack by two B-52 bombers and six F- 15s on an Omani air
base defended by the Sultanate's small air force. Associated Press, December 5, 1982.
43. Dhofari rebels, supported by South Yemen, waged a prolonged war against Sultan Qaboos in
precisely this area. Although they were eventually suppressed, this was achieved by Iranian
and Jordanian forces. Oman's army remains incapable of dealing even with this low-level
threat.
44. In 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council was reported to have offered the Sultan over $1
billion to cancel his agreement with the U.S. Although the report was subsequently denied
by the Saudi Information Minister, there can be little doubt that Oman's actions are at odds
with the policy of non-cooperation with the U.S. pursued by the majority of GCC members.
See David Ottaway, "Saudis Wary of U.S. Role", Washington Post, December 2, 1981.
45. In October 1982, for example, Kuwait succeeded in negotiating a normalization agreement
between Oman and South Yemen, after which the foreign ministers of both Kuwait and
South Yemen argued publicly that Sultan Qaboos could now "refrain from depending on
'world powers' for protection". The actual text of the agreement provides that neither side
shall "allow any foreign forces to use their territories for aggression or provocation against
the other country". See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Middle East
and North Africa, 3 November, 1982, C2; 16 November, 1982, C3; 24 November, 1982,
C8.
46. In the wake of Sadat's assassination and he attempt by militants to promote an insurrection
in Upper Egypt, the Mubarak regime arrested thousands of Islamic fundamentalists. Many
more are believed to have gone underground where they continue to threaten the regime.
Thus in October 1982, Mubarak extended the emergency police powers, proclaimed after
Sadat's assassination, for another year. See William E. Schmidt, "For Mubarak, a Year of
Turmoil and a Year of Survival", New York Times, October 7, 1982.
47. In a recent series of articles, the semi-official Al Ahram lktisadi, a Cairo economic weekly,
accused the U.S. Agency for International Development of seeking "to dominate every field
of Egyptian life", and claimed that American researchers were stealthily collecting intelli-
gence for this purpose. The fact that such articles could appear in a government-controlled
magazine is an indication of the disillusionment and- suspicion now permeating the Cairo
elite. New York Times, October 21, 1982.
48. Libya's Colonel Khaddaffi has publicly pledged to overthrow Somalia's President Siad Barre
and is training and equipping members of the 3,000 strong Somali Salvation Democratic
Front who operate out of Ethiopia. These guerillas are reported to be better armed than the
Somali army. Baltimore Sun, March 12, 1982.
49. See Jack Anderson, "Secret U.S. Plan Would Establish RDF in Jordan", Washington Post,
January 13, 1983.
50. The cost of constructing tank farms and filling them with jet fuel will be essentially constant
wherever the fuel is prepositioned. Military Construction costs for tank farms now being
built in Oman and Egypt amount to $2.00 per gallon of fuel. The FY'83 price of jet fuel is
$1.18 per gallon. If 10% is added for land costs, the total cost of constructing facilities to
store an additional 90 million gallons of fuel would be $304 million.
5 I . Middle East Policy Survey, December 4 and December 18, 1981; Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak, "A Near-Bankrupt Mideast Policy," Washington Post, December 7, 1981, p. 15.
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Glossary
CONUS Continental United States
IAF Israeli Air Force
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PDRY People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)
RDF Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
SAC Strategic Air Command
SAM Surface-to-Air Missle
Tacair Tactical Airpower-the use of aircraft against ground forces
TFW Tactical Fighter Wing
USAF United States Air Force
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A Publication of:
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
[phone]
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-CAMISUOUR
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
Israel and the
U,-S. Navy
W -,-Seth Carus
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886R001900010009-5
Israel and the U.S. Navy
W. Seth Carus
AIPAC Papers On U.S.-Israel Relations
This paper continues research initiated by Guilford Glazer
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The AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations
Editor: Steven J. Rosen
Managing Editor: Fay Randall
No. I The Strategic Value of Israel
No. 2 Israel and the U.S. Air Force
No. 3 The Campaign to Discredit Israel
No. 4 Israel and the U.S. Navy
Subscription price for ten issues:
$25 for members
$30 for nonmembers
Not available on a single issue basis
Inquire for bulk purchase rates
?Copyright 1983 by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
First Printing
Cover design,by Jill Indyk
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886R001900010009-5
PREFACE
This is the third part of a thematic series of AIPAC Papers on the specific
issue of the potential for enhanced strategic cooperation between the United
States and Israel. The first volume on this theme, The Strategic Value of
Israel, was devoted largely to the advantages of prepositioning U.S. Army
material at Israeli facilities for possible use in a Middle Eastern crisis. The
second volume dealt with various forms of cooperation between Israel and the
U.S. Air Force. The current study examines the value of Israeli assistance to
the U.S. Navy. The fourth volume will deal with the potential use of Israeli
hospital facilities to treat U.S. casualties in the event that it is necessary to
involve the Rapid Deployment Force in a Persian Gulf conflict. The fifth will
deal with the potential of Israeli defense and aerospace contractors to provide
overhaul and maintenance services for U.S. armed forces equipment.
AIPAC's series of studies range beyond the theme of strategic cooperation.
Other papers soon to be published include topics such as the way in which aid
to Israel serves the U.S. national interest, anti-Israel activity on the college
campuses and the impact of territorial issues on Israeli security. But we
believe that the strategic importance of Israel to the United States is not well
understood, and the series of which this paper is part is intended to build the
foundation for a clearer appreciation of this central issue in U.S. Middle East
policy.
Publications in this series draw upon the expertise of scholars and pro-
fessional analysts. W. Seth Carus is AIPAC's advisor on military affairs.
Thomas A. Dine
Executive Director
June 1983
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The strength of the Israeli Air Force and Navy is an important but often
neglected element of the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. At a
time when Soviet capabilities in the region have grown while the ability of the
United States to commit resources to the Mediterranean has declined, Israel
has emerged as the most capable power in the basin. Moreover, Israel has an
inherent interest in ensuring that the eastern Mediterranean does not fall under
the control of Soviet-allied forces.
Israeli air and naval forces have impressive capabilities to challenge Soviet
and Soviet-allied ships and aircraft operating in the zone east of the Turkish
Straits. The Israeli Air Force can generate twelve times as many combat
sorties as a U.S. carrier air wing, and twenty times as many attack sorties.
Even if only 20% of its resources were dedicated to missions against Soviet
targets in a Mediterranean crisis, the Israeli Air Force would still be able to fly
more sorties than a two-carrier U.S. task force (twice what we have there
now) operating a maximum surge rate, enough to sink the entire Soviet
surface fleet in the Mediterranean in less than four days. The Israeli Navy,
although comprised mainly of small missile boats, has impressive capabilities
against surface combatants, carrying almost three times as many anti-ship
missiles as the Soviet fleet typically operating in the Mediterranean. Acting in
combination, these Israeli forces are, surprisingly, capable of dominating the
eastern Mediterranean and defeating any likely fleet of Soviet surface com-
batants deployed in those waters.
Even in the absence of a formal strategic cooperation agreement between
the U.S. and Israel, Israeli air and naval forces are an important element in the
balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. The Soviet Union, aware of
Israel's strength, cannot act in the region without taking into account possible
Israeli counter-action. Accordingly, Israel has become an important deterrent
to Soviet aggression and contributes daily to the security of the United States
and NATO.
There are, however, steps that could be taken that would further enhance
Israel's strategic value to the United States, many of which would have little
cost to the U.S. And the benefits would accrue, not just to Israel and the U.S.,
but to all countries which would be adversely affected by Soviet domination
of the Mediterranean-even including some hostile to Israel. As we look for
allies to carry a greater share of the burden of the common defense, Israel
stands out as a country able and willing to do more.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Israel and the U.S. Navy ..................................... I
Soviet Naval Strength ...................................... 2
Problems Facing the U.S. Navy .............................. 5
Israel as a Mediterranean Power .............................. 8
Israeli Air Power .......................................... 8
The Israeli Navy .......................................... 14
U.S.-Israel Cooperation in the Mediterranean ................... 21
Conclusion ............................................... 24
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Israel and the U.S. Navy
Israeli air and naval forces are an important but often neglected element of
the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. It is the purpose of this
study to look at Israel as a Mediterranean power, and to examine ways in
which enhanced cooperation between Israel and the United States could
benefit the United States.
The eastern Mediterranean is an area of particular historic, current and
future concern for American naval strategists. It is a strategically important
body of water, more so today than in the past. Yet, the ability of the U.S.
Navy to operate in the eastern Mediterranean under wartime conditions is
under greater challenge today than it has been in many years. Threats to
American naval forces have proliferated, including both the expanding Soviet
naval and air forces and the growing capability of Soviet allies, including
Syria and Libya, to act as a threat themselves, or to provide needed bases and
support to Soviet forces. At the same time, the United States has accepted a
greater role in maintaining the security of the Persian Gulf and the Indian
Ocean, compelling the U.S. Navy repeatedly to divert naval resources from
the Mediterranean. Even with planned additions, past reductions in the overall
number of American naval ships will make it difficult for the U.S. Navy to
return to past levels of strength. There has also been a decline in the political
reliability and/or naval combat capability of our NATO allies in the eastern
Mediterranean-Greece and Turkey. In combination, these factors have pro-
duced a situation in the Mediterranean more favorable to the Soviet Union and
more challenging for the West than has ever been the case.
Because the United States needs additional support in the eastern Medi-
terranean, this is a particularly appropriate time to consider the potential
contribution that could be made by Israel. Israel shares the basic strategic
objectives of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean, and has become
a more important potential contributor to the common defense. Israel has a
vital interest in making sure that the Soviet Navy does not dominate the
eastern Mediterranean, and in ensuring that the United States, not the Soviet
Union, is the dominant power in the region. Indeed, Israel might be able and
willing to support American efforts under conditions where other American
allies in the region might not.
The purpose of this study, then, is to examine the problems facing the
United States in the eastern Mediterranean, and to consider ways in which
cooperation with Israel could contribute to solving those problems, thus
furthering American interests.
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Soviet Naval Strength
The primary military threat to American interests in the Mediterranean is
the combined forces of the Soviet Navy (surface, submarine and air). This
threat has grown in the past decade. Soviet aircraft, surface ships, and sub-
marines are more capable today than in the past, and the weapons and
electronics carried by these platforms have grown in sophistication. Com-
pared to the types previously used, newer Soviet anti-ship and anti-submarine
missiles are more accurate, longer ranged, and harder to defend against.
The Soviet Mediterranean squadron is usually `their' most powerful fleet
deployed outside their peripheral waters. About a third of all Soviet ships at
distant stations are assigned to the Mediterranean. The fighting power of this
force can vary considerably, depending on the exact classes of the ships
stationed there at any given time, but the U.S. Navy must anticipate that in
time of crisis the Soviets would quickly reinforce their Mediterranean fleet to
levels far above the normal peacetime strength.'
The ability of the Soviets to reinforce their Mediterranean squadron was
demonstrated during the confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. On October 4, just before the
start of the conflict, the Soviets had 52 naval vessels in the Mediterranean,
including 25 combatants. Ten days later, reinforcements had increased the
total number of vessels to 69. By October 24, there were 80 Soviet warships
present, including 38 combatants. One week later, on October 31, there were
95 ships, of which 51 were combatants. Equally impressive was the increase
in weaponry. According to U.S. Navy estimates, on October 24 the Soviets
had a "first-launch" capability of 250 torpedoes, 28 surface-to-air missiles,
and 40 anti-ship missiles. A week later they had 348 torpedoes, 46 surface-to-
air missiles, and 88 anti-ship missiles.2
The Soviets can reinforce their Mediterranean forces so quickly because
they have a large fleet in the Black Sea. Soviet actions in 1973 indicate the
ease with which these ships can be moved into the Mediterranean in time of
crisis. To prevent such reinforcements, the U.S. Navy anticipates closing the
Turkish Straits linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. As the 1973 crisis
indicated, however, the Soviets may have sufficient warning of an impending
crisis to reinforce their Mediterranean fleet before hostilities erupt. In addi-
tion, should Turkey not be directly involved in hostilities, the U.S. may be
unable to deny the Soviets passage through the Turkish Straits.
The U.S. Navy also has to anticipate that it will be attacked by Soviet naval
aircraft during a conflict in the Mediterranean. Attached to the Soviet Black
Sea Fleet is a considerable air force, including about 100 Tu-16 Badger,
Tu-22 Blinder, and Tu-26 Backfire bombers.3 Equipped with long-range
anti-ship missiles, all these bombers have sufficient range to attack American
vessels in the eastern Mediterranean, even when operating from air bases in
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Soviet Naval Strength in the Mediterranean
8-10 torpedo attack submarines
2-3 cruise missile submarines
2-4 cruisers and carriers
9-12 destroyers and patrol ships
1-3 minesweepers
1-3 amphibious ships
15-20 auxiliary ships
5-6 survey ships
Source: Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, Fourth Edition, pp. 16-17.
Soviet Naval Strength in the Black Sea
I aircraft carrier
2 helicopter carriers
7 guided missile cruisers
15 guided missile destroyers
7 guided missile frigates
3 light cruisers
9 destroyers
40 frigates
30 missile boats and missile corvettes
Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, /982-83, p. 460. Submarines are excluded from the table, since
they are prohibited by treaty from transiting the Turkish Straits.
the Soviet Union.4
In time of crisis the Soviets might operate bombers from Mediterranean air
bases as well. Since 1981 both Syria and Libya have allowed the Soviets to fly
naval reconnaissance aircraft from their countries,5 and the U.S. Navy must
assume that bombers may be rapidly transferred to the Mediterranean in a
time of crisis. Of less danger is the threat currently posed by Soviet carrier
aviation. Even when a Kiev-class carrier is stationed in the Mediterranean, it
can only contribute its dozen Forger attack aircraft. However, the capabilities
posed by Soviet carrier aircraft are certain to increase as time passes, adding
further to the threat posed by Soviet naval aviation to the U.S. Sixth Fleet,
which operates in the Mediterranean. By 1990, the USSR is expected to have
acquired at least one attack carrier like those employed by the U.S. Navy.
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The Soviet naval threat is particularly acute in the eastern half of the
Mediterranean.. For strategic and operational reasons, the Soviet Medi-
terranean fleet usually operates in this sector. Soviet forces in the eastern
Mediterranean can be used in time of war to interdict Western shipping
transiting the Suez Canal, isolate Greece and Turkey from the rest of NATO,
and destroy American carriers and submarines using the eastern Medi-
terranean as a base of operations to support NATO's southern flank.
In time of peace, Soviet forces in the eastern Mediterranean are a visible
reminder of Moscow's growing military might, putting pressure on Greece
and Turkey to adopt conciliatory policies towards the Soviet Union and
demonstrating support for countries aligned with the Eastern bloc (Syria and
Libya).
The importance of the eastern Mediterranean is reflected in the distribution
of Soviet naval anchorages, which are conveniently located sites in inter-
national waters at which Soviet ships congregate when not on patrol. Of the
six most important Soviet naval anchorages in the Mediterranean, five are in
the eastern Mediterranean and four are in the eastern half of the eastern
Mediterranean. In addition, there are Soviet naval facilities located in ports of
the eastern Mediterranean. At present, the Syrian port of Tartus is the single
Soviet Anchorages in the Eastern Mediterranean
MEo/TERRANEAN SEA
4
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most important Soviet naval base in the region, in large part because of the
strength of the defenses protecting that facility (and especially recently in-
stalled air defenses, including Soviet-manned SA-5 antiaircraft missiles). The
importance of Tartus has been increased by its transformation into a base to
support Soviet submarines.'
In addition, Soviet naval aviation poses a more dangerous threat in the
eastern Mediterranean than in the western Mediterranean, for three main
reasons. First, the eastern sector is relatively close to naval air bases on Soviet
territory. Second, Soviet naval aircraft may be able to operate from air bases
located in Syria and Libya. Third, NATO land-based air forces in this area are
comparatively weak.
These factors combine to make the eastern Mediterranean an especially
dangerous theater of operations for the U.S. Navy. According to one as-
sessment, it is one of three zones (along with the northern Atlantic and the
northwest Pacific) that
are considered by the Navy to be high-threat areas because of the capability
of the USSR to coordinate air-, surface-, and subsurface-launched weapons
attack.'
These capabilities could enable the Soviets to deny the West use of the eastern
Mediterranean in time of conflict. While not having the resources to actually
control those waters, Soviet naval and air forces are sufficiently strong to
make Western efforts to control that region excessively expensive.
Problems Facing the U.S. Navy
The principal mission of the U.S. Sixth Fleet is to protect Western interests
threatened by the presence of Soviet and Soviet-allied forces in the Medi-
terranean, and to support the southern flank of NATO in time of war. This
requires that the fleet support NATO's land and naval operations in the
Mediterranean, protect lines of communication, deter attacks on friendly
countries (not necessarily belonging to NATO), and aid American diplomatic
endeavors. To accomplish its missions, the Sixth Fleet must have a credible
warfighting capability. This requires that it simultaneously defend itself,
project power ashore in support of NATO ground forces and protect vital
NATO lines of communications and facilities, while also launching attacks
against enemy ships, aircraft, and support facilities. In practical terms, the
U.S. Navy has to be able to defend itself from anti-ship missiles, prevent
Soviet anti-submarine attacks, deny Soviet and Soviet-allied forces use of air
bases and ports in the region, and interdict their lines of communications.
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In short, the United States must control the Mediterranean. Unlike the
Soviet Navy, which can achieve most of its objectives merely by denying the
West use of the Mediterranean, the U.S. Navy has to be able to operate on,
above and below the sea, as well as against the shore. Given the strength of
Soviet naval and naval air forces, the Sixth Fleet could have considerable
difficulty achieving its objectives.
Even when the Soviets were much less powerful, the U.S. Navy considered
that at least two aircraft carriers were needed to control the Mediterranean.
Often, one or two additional carriers reinforced the Sixth Fleet in times of
crisis. The decision to deploy carriers in the Indian Ocean has made it
virtually impossible to routinely deploy two carriers in the Mediterranean on a
continuing basis. Since the U.S. Navy has only enough carriers to operate
four at forward stations continuously in peacetime, those sent to the Indian
Ocean had to come from the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. Accord-
ingly, today there is usually only one aircraft carrier present with the Sixth
Fleet. The Sixth Fleet has thus become weaker at a time when its tasks have
become more difficult.'
The Sixth Fleet relies heavily on carrier-based aircraft. The planes assigned
to carrier air wings provide the diverse capabilities needed to deal with a
variety of tasks. For example, fighters protect merchant ships and surface
combatants from air attack, escort attack aircraft, and defend the aircraft
carrier battle group itself. Attack aircraft strike naval vessels or targets on
land. In addition, the aircraft carrier has anti-submarine planes and airborne
early warning aircraft which complement the Navy's land-based anti-
submarine warfare aircraft stationed in the region. A carrier air wing is in fact
a powerful force armed with modern stand-off precision guided weapons,
supported by sophisticated electronic warfare equipment, and manned by
superbly trained personnel.
Most carriers have a single carrier air wing with about 85 aircraft, including
24 F-14 fighters for air superiority missions and 38 attack planes for strike
U.S. Naval Strength in the Mediterranean
1-2 aircraft carriers (with about 85 aircraft each)
18-19*surface combatants (cruisers/destroyers/frigates)
4-7 amphibious ships
5-7 replenishment ships
nuclear attack submarines
"The number of surface combatants is reduced when there is only one carrier.
Source: Based on Desmond P. Wilson, "The U.S. Sixth Fleet and The Conventional Defense of
Europe," Professional Paper No. 160, Center for Naval Analyses. September 1976, p. 4.
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missions.' It is the attack aircraft that constitute the U.S. Navy's main strike
capability against surface ships, though the introduction of the Harpoon
anti-ship missile gives many surface combatants a surface warfare capability
as well. Under normal circumstances, a carrrier air wing can probably gener-
ate about 45 air superiority and 70 attack sorties per day. Calculated opti-
mistically, it might be possible to achieve a surge rate of double those figures.
It would be possible to sustain the surge rate for only a few days, after which
the carrier air wing would be able to maintain only normal sortie rates.10
These small numbers mean that a single carrier air wing can accomplish
only so much. In comparison to the tasks assigned to the Sixth Fleet a single
carrier is insufficient. Even two carriers may not be enough. According to an
assessment made in the late 1970s when there were still two carriers stationed
in the Mediterranean, the ability of the U.S. Navy to gain superiority in the
eastern Mediterranean was minimal without the presence of one or two
additional carriers.'' Today the situation is probably even more precarious,
since the United States cannot be assured that the lone American carrier in the
Mediterranean will be free to move into the eastern Mediterranean. Nor can
the U.S. anticipate easy reinforcement of the Sixth Fleet, because in the event
of a conflict there it is quite likely that available carriers would also be needed
elsewhere.
Nor can our two NATO allies in the eastern Mediterranean, Greece and
Turkey, be counted on to provide significant levels of support for the Sixth
Fleet. Neither country has particularly powerful naval or air forces, relying as
they do on often obsolescent equipment, and in the event of a conflict
involving all of NATO it is likely that they would be fully occupied by attacks
from the north. Political problems may limit the ability of these nations to
fulfill their NATO commitments, especially in Greece where the current
government has adopted policies that fall just short of a withdrawal from
NATO. 12
There are also diplomatic problems making reliance on Greece and Turkey
uncertain in a non-NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. Not only are the two coun-
tries intensely hostile towards each other, so that close cooperation between
them is unlikely, but both have some regional interests that diverge from those
of the United States. In the past each has indicated an unwillingness to allow
use of American bases in support of actions taken outside the European
theater. There is reason to believe that restrictions will remain as strict in the
future. Given the variety of circumstances in which conflict can emerge in the
eastern Mediterranean, prudent defense planning cannot anticipate automatic
access to U.S. bases in the area.'3
Overall, the United States is faced on an increasingly difficult situation in
the Mediterranean, and especially in its eastern half. The strength of the
potential opposition has grown in the recent years, and the forces of the U.S.
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have declined. Yet, the Sixth Fleet still has important military and political
missions, making it necessary to find practical solutions to the problems that
hamper its effectiveness.
It is unusual to think of Israel in a Mediterranean rather than a Middle
Eastern context, because focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict has so thoroughly
molded our perceptions of Israel's place in the world. Israel is in fact,
however, a Mediterranean country, just like Greece, Turkey, and Italy, and
can be substantially influenced by what happens in those waters. In particular,
the East/West balance of naval power in the Mediterranean has a direct impact
on Israel's security, since it would face a severe security threat if the Soviet
Union came to dominate that sea. Conversely, Israeli actions can significantly
influence the strategic situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and its large air
force and small but potent navy must be taken into account by assessments of
the East/West balance in that region.
Israel's Mediterranean role could be important for the United States. It is
widely agreed in the American national security community that U.S. cannot
do it all alone. We must look to our allies to do more, with regard to their own
forces and with regard to providing host nation support to the United States'
forces. Israel, as a long-term ally of the United States, as a recipient of
substantial amounts of U.S. aid, and as a country with a strong commitment
to enhance the strategic position of the West, is a logical place to look. Israel
is also one of the few countries of the world which has stepped forward and
said, in effect, "We are willing and able to do more."
How, then, do the Israeli air force and navy impact on the balance of forces
in the Eastern Mediterranean? And what, if anything, can and should be done
to enhance cooperation between U.S. and Israeli forces in this area?
Because Israel is opposed by adversaries with more than 1900 combat
aircraft and because it relies heavily on its air force to compensate for weak-
nesses in other areas, the Israeli Air Force has acquired an inventory of about
600 modern combat aircraft. While intended primarily to protect Israel from
air attack and to support its ground forces, these aircraft are also an important
factor in the naval balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. The
flexibility of air power is such that a plane used to defend against Syrian air
.attacks over the Golan Heights in the morning could that same afternoon fly a
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mission over the Mediterranean.
The Israeli Air Force has an impressive array of combat aircraft. It has 240
fighters which can be employed in either air superiority or attack missions (40
F-15, 70 F-16, and 130 F-4E). In addition, there are another 350 attack
aircraft (170 Kfir and 180 A-4), though the Kfirs also have air combat
capabilities. 14 Among these aircraft are some originally developed for the
U.S. Navy, including the F-4s (which are still in front-line service with the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps), the A-4s (which are still used by the Marine
Corps), and the very impressive E-2Cs. In comparison, a U.S. Navy aircraft
carrier usually operates only about 60 combat aircraft.
Israel has a deserved reputation for making good use of its combat aircraft.
On a sustained basis, Israeli aircraft can generate an average of about 2.5
sorties per day. 15 For brief periods, the Israeli Air Force has doubled this rate,
but for analytic purposes the more conservative figure is used here. This
means that the Israeli Air Force can generate on a sustained basis an average
of either up to 600 air superiority and 875 attack sorties or 1475 attack sorties
per day. The U.S. Navy can generate nearly the same number of sorties per
airplane, but because of the smaller number of available aircraft it is estimated
that a U.S. carrier air wing can generate only about 115 combat sorties per
day, or up to 230 sorties for a few days running.
Thus, on a sustained basis, Israel can generate twelve times the number of
combat sorties as a carrier air wing. Significantly, it can produce more than
twenty times as many attack sorties. Even under ideal circumstances with two
U.S. carriers in the eastern Mediterranean, the Israeli Air Force can generate
five times as many air superiority missions and up to ten times as many attack
missions. Thus, while Israeli air power is no direct substitute for American
naval air power, it is quite evident that Israel could significantly supplement
Air superiority
Air superiority or
attack
Attack
Total
Israeli Air
Force
Sixth Fleet
(I Carrier)
Sixth Fleet
(2 Carriers)
Aircraft
Sorties
Aircraft
Sorties
Aircraft
Sorties
240
600
-
-
-
-
350
875
34
70-140*
68
140-280*
590
1475
58
115-230*
116
230-460*
*The first figure is sustained, the second surge. Surge effort can be maintained for only about
three days.
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U.S. aircraft carriers.
These figures assume that Israel is able to devote its entire air effort to
operations in the eastern Mediterranean. This is not likely, since Israel could
not devote all its resources to this mission under any but the most extreme
circumstances. Yet, even if only I of every 5 sorties were dedicated to
Mediterranean operations, the Israeli Air Force would still be able to fly more
sorties than a two carrier American force operating at maximum surge rate.
In actuality, however, it is doubtful that Israel would have to devote such a
large percentage of its resources to naval operations over an extended period
of time. Tactics vary according to circumstances, but typically the U.S. Navy
might allocate six strike aircraft to attack a single naval vessel. Thus, assum-
ing that the Soviets had 50 surface vessels to be attacked in the eastern
Mediterranean, that the Israelis used six-plane strike groups to attack each
ship, and that only one-quarter of the groups successfully locate and sink their
targets, Israel would still require no more than 1200 combat sorties to destroy
the entire Soviet surface fleet in the region. Realistically, however, it is likely
that far fewer sorties would be needed. If Israel had no other concerns, this
could be accomplished in a single day. If Israel were also at war with an Arab
foe or foes, this would probably require three or four days (depending on how
much effort was initially devoted to attacking Soviet vessels.) In short, the
Israeli Air Force could have an enormous impact on the naval balance of
power in the Mediterranean basin.
In the event of an American-Soviet conflict, it is probable that certain Arab
facilities would be used by the Soviets. The Syrians provide the Soviets with
port facilities protected by air defenses at Latakia and especially at Tartus, and
with air bases from which Soviet naval aircraft operate. In the event of a
confrontation involving Israel, Syria, the United States and the Soviet Union,
the Israelis would undoubtedly attack such facilities to keep the Syrians from
using them. This would have the added benefit of also reducing their avail-
ability for the Soviets. In fact, Israel could deter the Soviets from exposing
their forces at these locations.
The significance of the Israeli Air Force is not merely a function of its
quantitative strength or of the quality of its aircraft. There are other factors
which contribute to making Israeli air power a potent anti-naval strike force.
The Israeli Air Force has considerable ability to conduct operations against
distant targets. It has numerous aircraft with extremely long ranges, and the
radius of action of these aircraft can be extended by in-flight refueling using
some of Israel's tanker aircraft (KC-130 and converted Boeing 707). Israel
also can provide command and control for distant operations using E-2C
airborne early warning aircraft or possibly Boeing 707 aircraft converted into
flying command posts. Israel also has aircraft specifically configured to target
ships at sea.'6
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The Israeli Air Force has demonstrated an ability to attack targets as much
as 550 nautical miles (nm) from Israel. F-15 fighters carrying a substantial
payload and equipped with conformal fuel tanks have a combat radius of over
700 nm." While as a practical matter it is doubtful that Israeli strike aircraft
could locate and attack ships at such distances, they could rely upon possible
support from E-2Cs and other aircraft in locating targets at considerable
distances. The E-2C can track on radar small naval vessels at distances of over
100 nm. Larger vessels can be detected at longer ranges. In addition, the E-2C
has sophisticated passive detection equipment that can track targets at much
greater ranges, provided that they are emitting electronic signals. Since a
typical E-2C mission involves the aircraft flying about 200 nm from its base,
and remaining at that point for up to 4 hours, it is reasonable to believe that
the E-2C could support strike missions at distances of at least 300 nm from an
Israeli air base. This would be sufficient to cover a zone of the Mediterranean
extending to the west of Cyprus. '8
Israel also has three I124N Sea Scan maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
Equipped with a search radar, passive electronic detection gear, and (prob-
ably) forward looking infra-red sensors, the Sea Scan has considerable detec-
tion capabilities. As currently configured, however, the Sea Scan cannot carry
weaponry, though there is some talk of fitting it with the new air-launched
version of the Gabriel III (with a 37.5-60 nm range). On a typical low altitude
mission (flying at 3000 feet), the Sea Scan has a 60 nm wide search path and a
range of 1300 nm. At higher altitudes, range increases to 2500 nm. It is thus
plausible that the Sea Scan could be used to support strike missions at
distances well in excess of 650 nm from Israeli air bases, or to the west of
Crete.'9
In addition to its long reach, the effectiveness of the Israeli Air Forces is
greatly enhanced by a large inventory of air-launched guided munitions. Most
were procured from the United States, so Israel employs many of the same
weapons used by the U.S. Navy. Like the Sixth Fleet, Israel has Maverick
television-guided missiles, Shrike and Standard ARM anti-radiation missiles,
laser-guided bombs, and television-guided bombs. Included in the Israeli
inventory are two advanced design television-guided weapons, the Extended
Range/Data Link Walleye II and the GBU-15.20 As a consequence, Israeli
aircraft have available a range of sophisticated weapons that can be employed
against Soviet surface ships with potent air defense capabilities.
Using advanced weapons, the Israelis should be able to attack warships
while avoiding or suppressing most anti-aircraft defenses. For example, the
GBU-15 can be released at altitudes of under 100 meters, yet still attack
targets 5-6 nm away. At that altitude and distance, the launching aircraft
cannot be attacked by most Soviet air defense weapons. Similarly, the Ex-
tended Range/Data Link Walleye II has an estimated range of about 25 nm.21
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This allows weapons release outside the maximum range of most Soviet air
defense weapons. Such attacks would undoubtedly be coordinated with simul-
taneous use of anti-radiation missiles and possibly even bombs delivered
using conventional means.
The Israeli Air Force also has extensive electronic warfare capabilities,
which could be of decisive importance when fighting the Soviet Navy. While
the Israelis have never faced the Soviet Navy, they have on many occasions
fought Soviet-built land-based air defenses. At times those defenses were
manned by Soviet air defense troops. This has given Israel considerable
expertise in the techniques of electronic warfare, and has forced the Israeli Air
Force to procure and develop a formidable array of electronic warfare equip-
ment. The effectiveness of this arsenal was decisively demonstrated in the
summer of 1982 when Israeli aircraft destroyed Syria's Soviet-supplied air
defenses in Lebanon without taking any losses. 22
Much of Israel's experience against Soviet land-based air defenses will be
directly applicable to use against the Soviet Navy, which often uses air
defense missiles similar to those employed by the Soviet Army. Israeli expe-
rience against the SA-2, SA-3, SA-7, and SA-8 missiles should be applicable
to the roughly similar SA-N-2, SA-N-1, SA-N-5, and SA-N-4 naval air
defense systems. Only two new naval missiles, the SA-N-6 based on the
SA-10 and the SA-N-7 based on the SA-I I now appearing on new Soviet
naval combatants, should pose unfamiliar problems in the near term. Against
the SA- 10 and SA- I I the Israelis have no experience, so it is probable that the
SA-N-6 and SA-N-7, now deployed on only a few ships (with others under
construction), would be entirely new challenges. Obviously, the same would
also be true for the U.S. Navy.23
The Israelis are believed to have modified some of their F-4E fighters into
specialized electronic warfare planes similar to the American F-4G "Wild
Israeli Experience Against Soviet Antiaircraft Missiles
Naval
Land
Israeli Experience Against
Missile
Equivalent
Land Equivalent
SA-N-I
SA-3
Considerable since 1970
SA-N-2
SA-2
Considerable since 1967
SA-N-3
None
-
SA-N-4
SA-8
Some since 1982
SA-N-5
SA-7
Considerable since 1970
SA-N-6
SA-10
None
SA-N-7
SA- I I
None
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Weasels. "24 If true, these aircraft would be armed with Shrike and Standard
ARM missiles designed to attack radars. They would also be equipped with an
array of jamming and electronic deception systems to support air strikes by
other aircraft. While certainly not in the same class as the EA-6 electronic
warfare aircraft available to the U.S. Navy, the Israeli-modified F-4s are
potent machines giving the Israelis a capability not matched by most of our
other allies.
Furthermore, unlike most air forces, the Israeli Air Force has extensive
experience in operating over water. Air missions at sea are different from
those conducted over land and acclimatization is necessary. The Israeli Air
Force, however, lacking extensive land areas, has been forced to conduct
much of its training over the Mediterranean. The Israelis also have some
experience in air combat over water, though admittedly little by the standards
of the U.S. Navy. They have used their air force on several occasions to
attack Arab naval vessels. The best-known incident took place on May 1970,
when Israeli aircraft sank an Egyptian destroyer and a missile boat at Ras
Banas, some 200 nm from the nearest Israeli air base.25 In all, it is believed
that from 1967 through 1973, Israeli aircraft destroyed seven Arab warships,
mostly small combatants. The Israelis have also done considerable aerial
fighting over water. To cite but one example, albeit a, spectacular one, in
September 1973 Israeli aircraft fought Syrian aircraft over the Mediterranean
off the coast of Syria between Latakia and Tartus. In this battle, more than
150 nm from the nearest Israeli air base, some thirteen Syrian MiG-2Is were
shot down against the loss of a single Israeli aircraft .21
Admittedly, the Israelis cannot do everything that American naval aircraft
operating from aircraft carriers can do. Aircraft carriers are mobile and can
concentrate air power at a particular point, providing a flexibility that cannot
be equalled when operating from land bases. Equally important, the Israeli
Air Force lacks expertise in attacking heavily defended surface ships, while
the U.S. Navy is without equal in this area.
At the same time, however, the Israeli Air Force possesses advantages of
its own. Its air bases are considerably less vulnerable than aircraft carriers,
however well-defended those carriers may be. The Israelis have extensive
aircraft repair facilities readily accessible, unlike the Sixth Fleet, which has
no depot-level maintenance facilities closer than the United States. As a
result, heavily damaged Israeli aircraft can be put back into service relatively
quickly, while heavily damaged American aircraft may remain out of service
for the duration of the fighting. Finally, the operational readiness rates of
Israeli aircraft are higher than those for U.S. Navy aircraft, in part because of
the intrinsic difficulties of keeping highly sophisticated weaponry operational
when remote from extensive repair facilities and spare-parts depots.21
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The Israeli Navy
Israel has a powerful surface fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, a simple
fact that has gone largely unnoticed. The Navy is the least important branch of
the Israeli Defense Forces. It receives the smallest portion of the Israeli
defense budget, and is allocated relatively little manpower. It is insignificant
in size by American standards. In fact, the total tonnage of all Israeli warships
is only slightly greater than the tonnage of one new American guided-missile
destroyer. Even when compared with the navies of America's two NATO
allies in the eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey, the Israeli Navy
seems insignificant in tonnage and personnel.28
Such comparisons, however, are misleading. Though it operates no surface
ships of more than 500 tons, the Israeli Navy (acting in coordination with its
associated support aircraft) has the resources to successfully combat any fleet
of Soviet surface combatants likely to be deployed in the eastern Medi-
terranean. This effectiveness has resulted from Israel's ability to develop a
navy tailored to meet the particular problems of naval warfare in the region.
Certain conditions have enabled Israel to develop such a specialized naval
force.
First, the Israeli Navy is intended primarily to fight surface combatants.
Because the Israeli Air Force can provide air cover, Israeli warships need only
limited air defense capabilities. Because Israel's traditional opponents in the
past have had only limited submarine warfare capabilities, it was never
necessary to develop extensive anti-submarine capabilities. Thus, the Israeli
Navy has been able to concentrate largely on the problem of fighting hostile
surface ships.
Second, the Israeli Navy is optimized to fight relatively near its bases. This
means that large ships with great endurance are unnecessary. It also means
that Israel does not require the logistics ships needed to support naval oper-
ations in distant waters. In addition, because the Israeli Navy now operates
almost exclusively in the eastern Mediterranean, it does not require large
ships able to survive the rigors of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This
favorable situation is accentuated by the way in which the Israelis use their
fleet. In a sense, they operate their missile boats almost as if they were
aircraft, generally keeping them at sea for only a few days at a time and rarely
operating more than a day's cruising time from Israel.
Third, the Israeli Navy relies almost exclusively on anti-ship missiles for
fighting surface combatants, and probably has as much experience in the use
of such weapons as any other navy in the world. Israel was one of the first
countries in the Western world to consider adoption of anti-ship missiles, and
was one of the very first to introduce an operational anti-ship missile into
service. In the early 1960s Israel began development of the Gabriel anti-ship
missile, which entered service in 1968. Improved versions of that weapon
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remain in service with the Israeli Navy to this day. The Israelis also have the
American Harpoon anti-ship missile, a weapon with a considerably longer
range than the Gabriel.
The Gabriel and Harpoon anti-ship missiles are the main batteries on
Israel's fleet of missile boats. Relying on these weapons, an Israeli missile
boat can effectively challenge ships of much greater size. Typically, an Israeli
missile boat carries more anti-ship missiles than the destroyers and cruisers of
other navies. For example, an Israeli Reshef-class missile boat carries nine
anti-ship missiles. By contrast, many Soviet destroyers and cruisers carry no
dedicated anti-ship missiles, and those that do usually have only four or eight
launching tubes.
Fourth, the Israeli Navy is one of the few naval forces in the world to
develop working defenses against anti-ship missiles. Israeli awareness of the
dangers posed by anti-ship missiles was accentuated by the destruction of the
Eilat by Egyptian-fired Styx missiles. After the Gabriel entered service, the
Israeli Navy discovered that it had a range about 15 nm less than that of the
Soviet-built Styx missiles used by the Egyptian and Syrian navies. This meant
that in order to be able to fire Gabriel missiles at Arab missile boats, Israeli
vessels first had to survive attacks from Styx anti-ship missiles. As a conse-
quence, the Israeli Navy proceeded to develop defenses against anti-ship
missiles. The effectiveness of these defenses was demonstrated in 1973, when
some 52 Styx missiles were fired at Israeli missile boats without achieving a
single hit.
The emphasis on anti-ship missile defenses continues to this day. Unlike
other navies, which invest only reluctantly in defenses against anti-ship mis-
siles, the Israeli Navy devotes considerable resources to this matter. They
have detection equipment (both radars and radar-detecting devices), elec-
tronic countermeasures equipment (passive measures, including chaff launch-
ers, and active measures, including jamming and deception gear), and guns
able to shoot down anti-ship missiles (soon to include the Phalanx gun system
developed for the U.S. Navy).
As a result of this equipment, a typical Israel missile boat currently has
better defenses against anti-ship missiles than do warships ten to twenty times
that size operated by NATO navies. Israeli missile boats are, for example,
better protected than many of the larger and more expensive frigates and
destroyers that the Royal Navy used to fight in the Falklands in the spring of
1982. In fact, in some respects the Israeli Navy is even better prepared to fight
missile wars than the U.S. Navy. Unlike the Americans, who until recently
concentrated on defenses against just Soviet anti-ship missiles, Israel has had
to devise defenses against anti-ship missiles made in France, Italy, and the
Soviet Union.
In these efforts, the small size of their vessels makes the Israeli missile
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O Wn
O O
O O
O r1
N
O ~n
O O
O O
O v~
O O
O O
- O
O O O
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boats hard to hit. A small warship is harder to detect, having a proportionally
smaller radar profile, and is also harder to hit once detected. It is also easier
and less expensive to provide electronic defenses for a small ship than a larger
one. Since an Israeli missile boat often carries the same anti-ship missile
defenses as ships many times larger, it should be evident that the Israelis have
managed to achieve a level of defense unrivaled by any other navy. While a
missile boat cannot survive once hit by an anti-ship missile, the same is often
true for larger vessels as well, as the British recently discovered against
Argentina.
In addition, the Israeli Navy has three small submarines to supplement its
missile boats. These Gal-class submarines were built in England to West
German specifications and are similar to boats currently operated by several
NATO navies. Acting in conjunction with Israel's surface fleet, these sub-
marines can further complicate the tactical situation for the Soviet Navy.
Reportedly, Israel has purchased submarine-launched versions of the Ameri-
can Harpoon anti-ship missile, which can be fired when the submarines are
submerged. Given the known limitations of Soviet anti-submarine warfare
capabilities, Harpoon-armed submarines might be able to launch attacks
before being detected.
The Israeli navy possesses a sophisticated battle management system nec-
essary to effectively fight modern naval wars. This command, control, com-
munications and intelligence (C3!) system integrates all the information ob-
tained from a variety of sensors. Especially important are search aircraft,
including the Sea Scan and (on occasion) E-2C Hawkeye patrol aircraft as
well as helicopters mounted on the new Aliyah-class missile boats. Sup-
plementing these planes is a chain of surveillance radars along Israel's Medi-
terranean coast. In addition, land-based passive sensors monitor electronic
traffic at sea. Combat vessels are equipped with surveillance radars, but
unlike most other small navies, the Israeli navy does not rely heavily upon
such active detection methods. Instead, considerable use is made of passive
detection devices that can detect radars far beyond the range at which the
radar itself can detect objects. All this information is combined at a central,
computerized command and control center to provide Israel's senior naval
commanders with an integrated picture of the naval arena.
This system makes it possible for Israeli missile boats to attack targets too
distant to be detected by search radars mounted on the combatants them-
selves. The impact of this on the potential effectiveness of Israeli naval
warships is demonstrated by examining the distances at which targets can be
attacked. In 1973, Israeli missile boats could engage targets no more than
about 12 nm away using the version of the Gabriel then in service. Today,
those same ships can attack targets at distances of up to 60 nm using over-the-
horizon targeting techniques and American-supplied Harpoon missiles, or out
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Anti-Ship Missiles on Israeli Naval Vessels
Aliyah 4
Reshef 8
Saar /// 6
Shimrit 2
Dvora 2
16
16
32
32
32
64
12
18
30
8
4
12
0
4
4
to 25 nm using the latest version of the Gabriel. Similarly, this system should
make it possible for Israeli submarines to fire submarine-launched Harpoons
against targets too distant to be detected by sensors on those submarines.
A comparison of the Israeli Navy with the Soviet Mediterranean squadron
vividly illustrates the striking power of the Israeli missile boats. Israel's 22
missile boats carry a total of 142 anti-ship missiles. In contrast, the Soviet
Mediterranean squadron's peak strength during the 1973 crisis was only 28
surface combatants carrying (it was thought at the time) 88 anti-ship missile
launchers. Today, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron usually has no more
than 16 surface combatants, rarely with more than about 50 anti-ship missiles.
Many Soviet naval combatants are in fact poorly configured to fight war-
ships like Israel's missile boats. Soviet ships often rely on weapons primarily
intended for use against targets other than ships. For example, it is believed
that the Soviets plan to use surface-to-air missiles against surface ships. Such
weapons, however, lose accuracy when fired at small targets like Israel's
missile boats. Equally important, anti-aircraft missiles have shorter ranges
against surface targets than the anti-ship missiles now employed by the Israeli
Navy. It is also believed that the Soviets intend to use their SS-N-14 anti-
submarine missile against surface ships. This missile, which is widely used by
the Soviets, carries a torpedo that is released when near the target. While this
weapon might be useful against large surface ships, it is doubtful that this will
enable the SS-N-14 to attack small, shallow draft, high speed missile boats.
Even many of the anti-ship missiles that the Soviets do have may beunsuitable
for use against Israeli missile boats. Some Soviet anti-ship missiles, like the
SS-N-3 or its replacement the SS-N- 12, are intended for attacks on large surface
combatants, like 95,000-ton aircraft carriers and 10,000-ton cruisers, not
450-ton missile boats. They lack the agility to hit small, maneuvering missile
boats, and their guidance systems are designed to concentrate on large targets and
in some cases may even have been designed to ignore small targets.
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Despite these weaknesses, the Soviet Navy does possess ships that can
effectively fight the Israel Navy. Specifically, there are three main combatant
types that the Soviet Navy might choose to employ against Israel. First, there
are the 900-ton Nanuchka-class missile corvettes armed with the highly capa-
ble SS-N-9 anti-ship missile. While only occasionally deployed in the Medi-
terranean, these warships would probably be a match for Israeli missile boats.
It is less clear, however, that these missile corvettes could survive against the
combined effort of Israeli naval and air forces. Thus, while useful, the
Nanuchkas cannot successfully operate by themselves.
Second, the Soviet Navy could divert against Israel some of their newest
surface combatants, like the Kirov-class battle cruisers, the Krasina-class
cruisers, or the Sovremenny-class destroyers. All these warships are armed
with new generation anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles that could cause the
Israelis great difficulty. However, that the Soviets would in fact be willing to
send these warships against Israel is unlikely. At present the Soviet Navy has
only a handful of these new ships, and it is probable that they would be
needed elsewhere against higher priority targets, like the U.S. Navy. Even if
the Soviets did send a small number of these warships to oppose the Israelis, it
is doubtful that such a force'could dramatically change the naval balance in
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the Mediterranean. Israeli air and naval forces are sufficiently capable that
eventually they could sink even these new warships, albeit with higher losses
than would be expected from engagements with older Soviet combatants. To
the extent that the Soviets to decide to send such combatants into the Medi-
terranean to strengthen their forces, however, Israeli naval and air power will
be aiding the U.S. by diverting these highly capable warships from other areas
of the world.
Third, the Soviets could send submarines to attack the Israeli surface fleet.
Israel has very limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities. While it now
operates four ships equipped with the EDO 780 variable depth sonar, an
excellent system of modern design, the Israeli Navy has no effective capa-
bility against a fleet with as many submarines as the Soviets operate in the
Mediterranean. In essence, the only damage that Israel could do to the Soviet
submarine force probably would be destruction of submarine tenders.
There is, however, a reverse side to this, in that Soviet submarines could do
little directly against Israeli naval combatants. Most are equipped with tor-
pedoes, and missile boats are less than ideal targets for torpedoes. The only
submarines likely to be effective against Israeli missile boats are those armed
with anti-ship missiles, and especially Charlie-class nuclear-powered cruise
missile submarines.
But these are also the most serious threat to American surface ships, and the
Soviets might not be able to attack both sets of targets. Should the Soviets be
forced to use their Charlie-class submarines against the Israelis, the strategic
benefit to the United States would be considerable since it would mean that
the Soviets would be using these high value assets to attack 450-ton missile
boats instead of 10,000-ton cruisers or 95,000-ton aircraft carriers.
The Israeli Navy is thus in the surprising position of being able to con-
tribute to Western efforts to secure the Mediterranean. The quality and quan-
tity of surface combatants, the sophistication of the weapons and electronics
used by those warships, and the advanced state of command and control
systems have made the Israeli Navy an effective fighting force, one capable of
influencing the East/West naval balance of power in the eastern Medi-
terranean.
Of greatest importance, however, is the combined effect of Israel's Navy
and Air Force. When operating together, these two forces are sufficiently
powerful to defeat any likely fleet of Soviet surface combatants deployed in
the eastern Mediterranean. It is this capability that makes Israel important to
the U.S. Navy, and that has made possible U.S.-Israel naval cooperation of
great potential benefit to America. Working together, primarily by linking
their respective command, control, and communications systems, and by
exploiting their comparative advantages, these forces should be able to totally
dominate any possible Soviet Mediterranean naval force.
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U.S.-Israel Cooperation in the Mediterranean
Israeli naval and air forces are permanent factors in the Mediterranean
balance of power. There is no possibility that these ships and aircraft will be
redeployed to some other part of the world. Thus, both the United States and
the Soviet Union know that even in the absence of an American presence in
the region, there will exist a potential anti-Soviet force of considerable
strength. At a time when the U.S Navy is stretched thinly across the globe,
and may be unable to maintain a large fleet in the eastern Mediterranean in
times of crisis, the presence of the Israelis becomes a strategic asset for the
United States, and thus for NATO, of no small importance.
Israel has a vital stake in the success of the U.S. Navy. Should the shipping
lanes to Israel be interdicted for any reason, the very lifeline of the state which
is already denied normal overland commerce with most of its neighbors,
would be jeopardized. Virtually all of Israel's imports and exports are shipped
by sea, generally across the Mediterranean, and this foreign trade is crucial to
the Israeli economy. The shipping lanes are also important for military rea-
sons. Israel's imported weaponry is normally transported by ship. If free
access to sea routes was denied Israel, its basic security would be seriously
impaired.
For Israel, the situation is further complicated in that the main American
adversary, the Soviet Union, is also hostile to Israel. The Israelis know that
they cannot afford to permit a situation where their security and economy are
subject to Soviet decisions. Israel has a great inherent interest in the outcome
of any struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Even in the absence of formal strategic cooperation agreements between the
United States and Israel, Israeli naval power is of value to the American navy.
The Soviet Union recognizes the potential threat posed to them by the Israelis.
For this reason, Soviet naval planners cannot afford to consider plans of
operation for the eastern Mediterranean without taking into account the poten-
tial threat from the Israelis. This considerably complicates the naval situation
for the Soviets, since they will still have to worry about a serious Israeli air
and naval threat even if the Sixth Fleet has no carriers in the eastern Medi-
terranean. Equally important, the Soviets also know that even if they suc-
cessfully put out of action any American aircraft carriers there will still remain
a potent pro-U.S. air force in the region.
Accordingly, any net assessment of the current U.S.-Soviet balance of
power in the eastern Mediterranean should include Israel's air and naval
forces as a potential source of assistance to the Sixth Fleet. To ignore the
impact of the Israeli military would be like doing a study of the balance of
naval power in the northern Atlantic without including a consideration of
Britain's naval and air forces as a NATO asset.
The potential value of naval cooperation with Israel has not gone un-
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noticed. For example, it is reported that a U.S. Navy study conducted in the
late 1970s concluded that Israel's Air Force could destroy the entire Soviet
Mediterranean fleet.29 It is thus not surprising that Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger recently indicated that "Israel's military strength and
enormous national ingenuity help to deter Soviet aggression in the Eastern
Mediterranean and throughout the region.""0 Similarly, Senator John Glenn
(D, Ohio), has declared that Israel
is an ally on whom we can count in the Eastern Mediterranean, where we
face formidable problems of maintaining a military balance with the grow-
ing Soviet Navy which in wartime could be supported by Syria and Libya. In
this regard, the strength of the Israeli Air Force and Navy is a factor that the
Soviet Union must take into account should it contemplate aggressive action
in this region."
Increasingly, Israel is becoming recognized as an important deterrent to
Soviet aggression, and as an important strategic asset to both the United States
and NATO.
According to press accounts, the U.S. Navy has already taken some steps
to promote naval cooperation with Israel. In May 1982, during a visit to Israel
by the then American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hay-
ward, it was indicated that American and Israeli naval personnel were being
trained together, and that steps were being taken to ensure that in the event of
hostilities in the eastern Mediterranean the Israelis would be able to dis-
tinguish between American and Soviet naval vessels. The Commander of the
Israeli Navy told reporters at that time that cooperation between the two
navies included "visits, exchanges of views, discussions of battle experience,
and development and purchase of various systems." In more mundane areas,
the Sixth Fleet now uses Haifa as a resupply point for fresh food supplies and
as a port of call to give crews shore leave.32
At present, however, U.S.-Israel naval cooperation does not extend to
precisely those areas of greatest potential benefit to the United States. There
are measures that could be taken that would enhance the value to the United
States of Israeli air and naval forces that often involve little or no cost to the
U.S. In other cases the costs might be larger, but the benefits of cooperation
are sufficiently great that implementation of such programs would provide
immediate advantages. Initially, a formal naval cooperation program could
concentrate on measures involving little visibility that would cause few politi-
cal or diplomatic problems. As the relationship matured, measures with
greater visibility could be implemented. Such an incremental approach would
minimize the risk of potential problems and still ensure that the United States
received the benefits of naval cooperation with Israel.
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First, steps need to be taken to ensure that Israeli air and naval operations
against Soviet naval forces can be effectively coordinated with the activities
of the Sixth Fleet. Unless basic procedures are developed in peacetime, the
United States may sacrifice many of the advantages of naval cooperation in
the event a conflict does occur. Proper coordination requires that Israeli forces
and the Sixth Fleet conduct joint naval exercises in time of peace. Such
exercises would familiarize the two navies with the radically different charac-
teristics of their respective warships, and would permit creation of standard
procedures needed to permit properly coordinated joint operations in time of
war. They should also make possible the development of means to com-
municate between the different data link systems used by the two countries. A
basis for joint exercises was provided by the Memorandum of Understanding
between Israel and the United States signed in November 1981 but suspended
one month later. Had that agreement been implemented, it is likely that naval
cooperation between the two countries would be much greater today than is
actually the case. The Memorandum of Understanding twice mentioned the
need for joint American-Israeli training exercises in the eastern Medi-
terranean, a clear indication of the importance of such activities.
Second, there are certain types of equipment that the United States could
supply to Israel that would enhance the capabilities of the Israeli Navy against
Soviet submarines. Given Israel's relatively sparse resources, it is doubtful
that it could ever acquire anti-submarine capabilities equal to its surface and
air warfare capabilities. On the other hand, through careful provision of
modern anti-submarine warfare equipment, it should be possible to signifi-
cantly upgrade the quality of Israeli anti-submarine equipment, thus allowing
Israel to contribute to Western anti-submarine efforts in the Mediterranean.
Equipment that might be appropriate could include some kind of modern
towed array sonar system and possibly some kinds of modern airborne anti-
submarine warfare gear. In particular, it would be sensible for the U.S. to
provide Israel with P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. This would increase the
number of such aircraft in the Mediterranean, and would create support
facilities needed to operate U.S. Navy P-3Cs from Israeli airbases.
Third, the U.S. Navy could probably help improve the quality of Israeli
tactics through a joint training program. Unlike the U.S. Navy, the Israeli
Navy and Air Force do not routinely plan and train to fight the Soviet Navy,
and are not familiar with the nuances of conducting operations against Soviet
naval forces. At the same time, the U.S. Navy could provide Israel with other
equipment not already possessed by Israel needed to fight the Soviets, such as
countermeasures to Soviet naval electronics. Alternately, the U.S. Navy
could provide technical assistance to the Israelis to develop such equipment
should security considerations make it impossible to transfer American de-
vices.
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Fourth, the United States should develop plans to resupply Israel in the
event of a conflict against the Soviets. To the extent that Israeli weapons
destroy targets that the United States would otherwise have to attack, resupply
of Israel need not be a net loss to America. To the extent that such a guarantee
encourages vigorous Israeli activity, the United States would be a net ben-
eficiary.
Fifth, Israel could provide the U.S. Navy facilities to support operations of
the Sixth Fleet. Besides the use of Israeli air bases for American P-3C
anti-submarine aircraft to patrol the eastern Mediterranean, Israel's aircraft
maintenance facilities could be used to repair and support other naval aircraft.
Israel's largest port, Haifa, could be used as a base for American vessels
operating in the eastern Mediterranean. Such facilities would offer important
advantages. They would be protected from attack by Israeli air and naval
forces. They could provide a secure alternative to other American bases in the
eastern Mediterranean should circumstances make those other bases un-
available. In addition, Israeli facilities would be ideally located to provide
logistics support, especially for operation of C-2 Greyhound carrier on-board
delivery aircraft, for American carrier task forces operating in the eastern
Mediterranean.
The United States faces a formidable strategic challenge in the eastern
Mediterranean, where Soviet capabilities have grown while the U.S. Navy
has been forced to draw down its fleet. Israel has the capability to make a
significant contribution to maintaining the strategic balance in the region, and
it has a clear interest to prevent the region from becoming an area of Soviet
predominance. But to realize the full potential of this congruence of interests
between the United States and its long-term ally, measures to enhance strate-
gic cooperation will be required. The required measures, however, are not
dramatic, but rather are simple and discreet actions that can measureably
enhance the potential effectiveness of both sides in the event of a conflict with
the U.S.S.R.
Some people are bound to object to enhanced strategic cooperation on the
grounds that it would impair our relations with Arab countries. But the
Mediterranean is not in itself part of the principal Arab zone of interest. The
kinds of enhancements of Israeli naval capability that would be desirable to
increase its effectiveness against the Soviet Navy would have little impact on
the Arab-Israeli balance of power. And Arab countries friendly to the U.S in
the Mediterranean, such as Morocco, Egypt, and Lebanon, would find their
own security enhanced if closer cooperation between the U.S. Navy and
Israeli forces came into effect.
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Strengthening the Western position in the eastern Mediterranean, and re-
ducing the Soviet advantage, is a common interest of all members of the
Western alliance and countries strategically linked to the United States in the
region. Enhanced cooperation between the United States and Israel in this
zone would therefore be advantageous, not only to Israel and the United
States, but to the common interest of all countries that would be affected if the
Soviet Union became the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean.
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FOOTNOTES
I. The strength of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron is discussed in some detail in Bruce W.
Watson, Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, /956-1980 (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 73-130. See also Office of the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, Fourth Edition (Washington: Government
Printing Office for the Department of Navy, January 1981), pp. 16-19. More recent data is
provided by Donald C. Daniel, and Theodore A Neely, Jr., "Their Navy in 1981," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, 108 (October 1982). p. 112.
2. Watson, Red Navy at Sea, pp. 101-119, outlines the growth in strength of the Soviets in the
Mediterranean during the 1973 crisis. Note that in 1973 the U.S. Navy incorrectly identified
the SS-N-14 anti-submarine missile as the SS-N-10 anti-ship missile. Accordingly, the actual
number of anti-ship missiles was considerably lower than the contemporary estimates given
here.
3. Captain John Moore, editor, Jane's Fighting Ships, /982-83, Eighty-fifth edition (London:
Jane's Publishing Co., 1982), p. 460, estimates 110, but includes short-range attack aircraft in
its total. Jean Labayle Couhat, editor, Combat Fleets of'the World, 1982/83, translated by
A.D. Baker Ill (Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Navy Institute Press, 1982), p. 596, estimates
100 bombers and 15 attack aircraft.
4. The Tu-22 has a high altitude unrefueled radius of 1500 nm. The comparable figure for the
Tu-16 is 1200 nm, and for the Backfire is about 3000 nm. Even the Tu-16s can easily reach
the eastern Mediterranean from bases in the Soviet Union. See Figure 43 in Paul J. Murphy,
editor, Naval Power in Soviet Policy, Studies in Communist Affairs, Volume 2, published
under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1978, p. 195.
5. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, part 1, p. 737. According to
this report, in mid-1981 the Soviets temporarily deployed in Syria Badger reconnaisance and
May anti-submarine aircraft, and two additional May aircraft were sent to Libya. This was the
first deployment of Soviet land-based naval aircraft to the Mediterranean since 1972.
6. Soviet operating patterns in the Mediterranean are examined by Watson, Red Navy at Sea.
Especially useful are the tables on pp. 183, 200-209. On recent developments, see New York
Times, April 29, 1983, pp. Al, A4.
7. Clarence A. Robinson, "USSR Submarines Pose Heavy Threat," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 106 (January 24, 1977), p. 76
8. The deployment of aircraft carriers in 1982 was given in the Annual Report of the Secretary of
Defense reproduced in Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States
Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, part 1,
p. 230. There is a fuller discussion of carrier deployment by then Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, in the same hearings, part 2, pp. 1073-1074, 1078. During
most of 1982 there were two carriers in the Mediterranean, according to Daniel and Neely,
"Their Navy in 1981," p. 112, but in early 1983 there was again only one. See the AP Wire
Report, February 3, 1983, by Fred S. Hofman.
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9. A typical carrier air wing consists of the following:
Aircraft Type
Function
Squadrons
Aircraft
F-4/F-14
Fighter
(Reconnaissance)
2
24
A-7
Light Attack
2
24
A-6/KA-6
Medium Attack, Tanker
I
14
S-3A
Anti-submarine
I
10
SH-3D
Anti-submarine
I
6
EA-6B
Electronic Warfare
I
4
E-2C
Airborne Early
Warning
I
4
9
86
Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY1984
Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY /984-88 Defense Programs, February I.
1983, p. 162. The 4 KA-6 tanker aircraft can be used in strike missions, but normally are
needed to refuel other aircraft.
10. Actual sortie rates are classified, and these are estimates based on open sources. Particularly
useful in this regard was the data provided in Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the
United States, Costs of Expanding and Modernizing the Nave's Carrier-Based Air Forces,
May 1982, pp. 20-23, 43-46. By combining the statistics in the text with the graph on p. 23,
it is possible to calculate that the Congressional Budget Office estimates that a wing could
generate about 23 A-6 and about 55 A-7 sorties a day. This assumes full strength air
squadrons. According to Clarence A. Robinson, "U.S. Retains Edge in Mediterranean
Sea," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 106 (January 17, 1977), p. 48, the aircraft of
one air wing were normally in the air for 100-150 hours a day. This could be increased to 300
hours, but for only three days. Usually each A-7 squadron had available only 9-10 of 12
aircraft, and the A-6 squadron had only 8 of 12 aircraft. In Clarence A. Robinson, "F-14
Demonstrates Agile Aerial Combat," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 107 (November
29, 1976), p. 55, it is reported that one F-14 squadron averaged 16 daily two hour sorties,
but had flown up to 22. Generally, only 8 of 12 aircraft were operational.
It. Clarence A. Robinson, "U.S. Retains Edge in Mediterranean Sea," Aviation Week and
Space Technology, 106 (January 17, 1977), p. 48.
12. For discussions of Greece's increasingly independent line under Prime Minister Andreas
Papandreou see Van Coufoudakis, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Greek Foreign Policy,"
Current History, December 1982, pp. 426-431. Many of these issues can be followed in the
press coverage of Greek negotiations with the U.S. over base rights and aid. For typical
articles, see John Rigos, Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 1983, p. 7, and Andiriana
lerodiaconou, Washington Post, May 21, 1983, p. I.
13. While cooperating fully with the United States within a NATO context, Turkey has been
more reluctant to support actions that do not involve NATO. For example, during the 1970
Jordan Crisis the Turkish government indicated that they would not allow American trans-
port aircraft to stage from American air bases in Turkey, according to Sam Cohen, Washing-
ton Post, September 22, 1970, p. A 16. Similarly, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict,
Turkey (and Greece) refused transit to American transport aircraft involved in the airlift to
Israel, but allowed Soviet transport aircraft to overfly without protest. On this episode, see
Leslie Gelb, New York Times, October 25, 1973, p. I. There is no reason to believe that
Turkey has changed its attitudes. See for example the comments in Martin Indyk, Charles
Kupchan and Steven J. Rosen, Israel and the U.S. Air Force, AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel
Relations #2, p. 14. On the other hand, Turkey cooperates fully with American efforts to
stengthen NATO, and is one of our stronger NATO allies. These issues are discussed in Sam
Cohen, Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1983, p. 12; New York Times, October 16,
1982, p. 5; and, Metin Demirsar, Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1983, p. 32.
14. Aircraft inventory adapted from figures given by Aviation Week and Space Technology, 118
(February 14, 1983), p. 17.
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15. This is an average sortie rate used solely for analytic purposes. Actual sortie rates differ
greatly depending on circumstances, and can be much higher for short periods but would be
lower over an extended stretch of time. If the Israelis were to fly long-range missions, the
sortie rate would decline.
16. Military Balance 1982-1983 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p.
57.
17. Exact range of the F-15 remains classified, and this figure is an estimate based on data given
in State of Israel, Ministry of Defense, National Security Issues, pp. 29-31.
18. J. Phillip Geddes, "Airborne Early Warning for the U.S. Navy," International Defense
Review, 8 (No. 5, 1975), pp. 679-682; "Hawkeye," Aviation and Marine International,
(June 1980), pp. 53-62; Grumman literature.
19. Irvine Cohen, "Nautical Westwind," Flight International, 109 (3 April 1976), p. 824; John
W.R. Taylor, Jane's A// the World's Aircraft, 1981-82, New York: Jane's Publishing Co.,
1981), p. 116. According to Jane's, when armed with the Gabriel /// anti-ship missile, the
Sea Scan can conduct attack missions at ranges of greater than 1000 nm, which is the
distance from Israel to Italy. On the air-launched Gabriel 1/I, see Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 118 (February 14, 1983), p. 103, and Aviation Week and Space Technology,
117 (December 20, 1982), pp. 21-22.
20. Military Balance 1982-1983, p. 57, and Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for
1983, part 7, p. 495.
21. Aviation Week and Space Technology, III (October 13, 1980), p. 68, and Aviation Week
and Space Technology, 105 (November 15, 1976), p. 23.
22. Israeli tactics are discussed in Carus, "The Bekaa Valley Campaign," The Washington
Quarterly, 5 (Autumn 1982), pp. 37-41, but this should be supplemented by Clarence A.
Robinson, "Surveillance Integration Pivotal in Israeli Successes, Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 117 (July 5, 1982), pp. 16-17, and John V. Cignatta, "A U.S. Pilot Looks at
the Order of Battle, Bekaa Valley Operations," Military ElectronicslCountertneasures,
(February 1983), pp. 107-110.
23. Couhat, Combat Fleets of the World, 1982-83, pp. 584-585; Jane's Weapons Systems,
1981-82, pp. 106-108.
24. "Lebanon Proved Effectiveness of Israeli EW Innovations," Defense Electronics, 14 (Oc-
tober 1982), p. 42.
25. Edgar O'Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East, /968-70 (Hamden, Conn.;
Archon Book, 1974), p. 119.
26. Chaim Herzog, The Arab Israeli Wars (New York: Random House. 1982), p. 308.
27. Aircraft readiness rates for the Israeli Air Force typically exceed 90%. All of Israel's 72
F-16s were mission capable at the time of the Lebanon fighting in June 1982, according to
General W.L. Creech, commander of the U.S. Tactical Air Command, as quoted in Richard
Halloran, New York Times, October 25, 1982, p. 1.
28. Sources used in the following account of the Israeli Navy include Jane's Fighting Ships
1982-83; Couhat, Combat Fleets of the World; W. Gerhard Albrecht, Weyers Flot-
tentaschenbuch 1982/83 (Munchen, Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1982); Military Balance
1982-1983; Edward H. Kolcum, "Arabs Seen Challenging Israel at Sea," Aviation Week
and Space Technology, 105 (August 30, 1976), pp. 20-21; Reuben Porath, "The Israeli
Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 97 (September 1971), pp. 34-39; Martin J.
Miller, "The Israeli Navy: 26 Years of Non-Peace," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 101
(February 1975), pp. 49-54; Norman Friedman, "Protecting the Coast Requires Revamping
Israel's Navy," Military Electronics/Countermeasures, (February 1983). pp. 88, 90-92 (this
article is particularly good on command and control); Shlomo Erell, "Israeli Saar FPBs Pass
Combat Test in Yom Kippur War," U.S. Naval Institute proceedings, 100 (September
1974), pp. 115-118. The relatively comprehensive article by Clyde Owan, "The Arab-Israel
Naval Imbalance," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 109 (March 1983), pp. 101-109, was
received after this section was completed.
29. Near East Report, XXII (March 14, 1979), p, p. 50, based on a news item reported by Ted
Koppel on ABC News.
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30. Quoted from a letter sent by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to a private citizen,
March 19, 1983.
31. Near East Report, XXVII (May 20, 1983), p. 82.
32. William L. Dowty III, "Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian Navies," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, 109 (March 1983), p. 51; Hearings before the Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983,
part 2, pp. 1143-1144, in which Admiral Hayward briefly discusses port calls to Haifa;
Joshua Brilliant, Jerusalem Post, May 12, 1982; Ya'acov Friedler, Jerusalem Post, January
28, 1983, p. 3; Jerusalem Post, February 2, 1983, p. 2.
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
The AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations
No. 1 The Strategic Value of Israel
No. 2 Israel and the U.S. Air Force
No. 3 The Campaign to Discredit Israel
No. 4 Israel and the U.S. Navy
How Does Aid to Israel Serve the U.S. National Interest?
Secure Borders Between Israel and Jordon
Israeli Hospital Care for American Casualties
U.S. Government Procurement from Israeli Suppliers
The AIPAC College Guide: A Survey of Political Activism
To: AIPAC Monograph Series
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A Publication of:
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
Israel American Public Affairs Committee
Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
Israeli Medical Support
for the U.S. Armed Forces
Stephen P. Glick
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886R001900010009-5
Israeli Medical Support
for the
U.S. Armed Forces
Stephen P. Glick
AIPAC Papers On U.S.-Israel Relations
This paper continues research initiated by Guilford Glaz
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900010009-5
The AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations
Editor: Steven J. Rosen
Managing Editor: Fay Randall
No. 1 The Strategic Value of Israel
No. 2 Israel and the U.S. Air Force
No. 3 The Campaign to Discredit Israel
No. 4 Israel and the U.S. Navy
No. 5 Israeli Medical Support For the U.S. Armed Forces
Subscriptions price for ten issues:
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?Copyright 1983 by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
First Printing
Cover design by Jill Indyk
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP86M00886R001900010009-5
PREFACE
Publication of this study, after many months of research, happens to
coincide with a major discussion between President Reagan and Prime
Minister Shamir on enhancing U.S.-Israel strategic and defense cooperation.
The agenda of this summit includes the issue of medical cooperation, which
became a matter of national attention after the brutal bombing of the U.S.
Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23.
But this study was not initiated in response to this tragedy, nor is it
concerned primarily with Lebanon. Rather, it looks at the medical support
requirements of the U.S. armed forces in the wider context of Middle Eastern
crises in which the U.S. might find it necessary to act. The author, Stephen P.
Glick, is a military analyst and regular contributor on defense issues for
various periodicals.
The study continues a series on the potential for enhanced cooperation
between the two countries, past publications of which include The Strategic
Value of Israel, Israel and the U.S. Air Force, and Israel and the U.S. Navy.
The overall purpose of this thematic series is to enhance public understanding
of the ways in which the security of the United States, Israel and the non-
communist world would be increased by strategic cooperation between the
United States and its most enduring, reliable, and effective Middle East ally.
We are encouraged by the fact that, after a period of neglect, this issue is
beginning to receive attention in the higher councils of our government.
Thomas A. Dine
Executive Director
November 28, 1983
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
American military planners encounter serious difficulties in trying to ar-
range adequate medical care for American servicemen in foreseeable wartime
situations, particularly in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The medical
requirements for a large-scale conflict in the region could excede the pro-
vision of over 17,000 beds. Currently, the United States armed forces are
capable of providing only about half that number, under optimum conditions.
The resulting shortfall could cause many otherwise unnecessary deaths among
American casualties.
A shortage of deployable medical facilities is not the only problem afflict-
ing American military medical planners when considering a Middle East
scenario. There are desperate shortages of skilled medical and support per-
sonnel, which would need to be addressed if deployed hospitals were to be
operational. In addition, the American military is short of aeromedical eva-
cuation capacity needed to move casualties within and out of the theater.
To deal with these problems, the armed services have begun a number of
programs. However, it will be at least the end of the decade before enough of
the deployable facilities and evacuation aircraft will be ready. The services do
not expect to make up the staffing shortages without resort to a possibly
infeasible draft of health care professionals.
Until and unless all of the desired programs are completed, and perhaps
even then, America's military planners must seek other solutions. One such
solution might be to use the medical facilities that exist in Europe. However,
those facilities are several thousand miles away, requiring large amounts of
aeromedical evacuation capacity and involving long delays until the casualties
receive proper treatment. Also, these European facilities might not be avail-
able due to military or political factors. Another solution might be to have the
Arab states of the Persian Gulf make the necessary peacetime arrangements to
place portions of their hospital systems at the disposal of the American armed
forces during war. Unfortunately, most of these nations possess systems that
are inadequate for their own needs, let alone for handling large numbers of
American casualties. And none of these states has been willing to make the
necessary peacetime preparations for such an arrangement.
However, there is one nation in the Middle East that not only possesses a
large, modern medical system, but has explicitly offered such assistance to
the United States. Israel could, through a combination of its own existing
hospitals and prepositioned American `folding hospitals', provide about
4,000 beds-tripling the ready medical capacity of American forces in the
Middle East. Furthermore, the geographic position of Israel would allow such
facilities to support American forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and sup-
plement the American medical system in Europe.
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The major objection to such an arrangement with Israel is the assertion that
it would antagonize Arab nations with which the United States wishes to be on
friendly terms. This argument fails to note that the United States has been able
to improve its relations with Arab nations while growing closer to Israel. In
the case of Israeli medical support for American forces, it is clear that such a
humanitarian move cannot be interpreted as hostile to the Arab world. In fact,
by enhancing America's ability to defend the region against outside aggres-
sion, such an arrangement would serve the interests of the moderate Arab
states.
By exploiting medical facilities in Israel, the United States can demonstrate
the strength of its resolve to defend its interests in the Middle East. This
demonstration in turn will deter potential aggressors, thus lessening the
chances of a conflict. Most importantly, these arrangements with Israel would
help to ensure that, should a conflict occur, everything possible will be done
to protect the lives of American soldiers.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface ..................................................... iii
Executive Summary .......................................... v
Israeli Medical Support for the U.S. Armed Forces ................ 1
Introduction ............................................... 1
The Problem .............................................. 2
Effects of the Shortfall ...................................... 4
Programmed Solutions ...................................... 4
Alternate Solutions ......................................... 6
The Israeli Option .......................................... 8
Arab Objections ........................................... 11
Conclusion ................................................ 12
Appendix A The Hospital Bed Shortage ......................... 13
Appendix B Sizes of Some Hospital Systems ..................... 14
Footnotes ................................................... 15
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Israeli Medical Support
for the
U.S. Armed Forces
American military planners have encountered serious difficulties in trying
to arrange adequate medical care for American servicemen in future wartime
scenarios. Major shortages exist in physical facilities (hospitals), personnel,
and aeromedical evacuation capabilities. To quote the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Health Affairs), "The harsh reality is that if the United States
entered combat today, whether in the Far East, in Southwest Asia, or in
Europe, we could not care for our casualties."'
The United States military would find it particularly difficult to provide
reasonable levels of medical care for forces deployed in the Middle East/
Persian Gulf, because we do not have large-scale bases in the area. It is
openly recognized that a medical support problem exists, though the exact
dimensions of the shortage have never been made public. It is possible,
however, to estimate the size of the medical facilities that would be required
and available to support a large-scale deployment of forces to the Persian Gulf
from Congressional testimony and other sources (see Appendix A). These
indicate that the United States may now be able to provide only about half of
the medical facilities needed in-theater to care for its sick and wounded during
a conflict in this region.
The nearest out-of-theater facilities, attached to our NATO forces in
Europe, are a considerable distance from the Persian Gulf. In addition, the
medical resources in Europe may not be available to the Middle East com-
mand (now known as Central Command, which is chiefly a planning staff)
either because of urgent need in the NATO theater or because of possible
political circumstances.
Another choice might be to obtain support from one or more of the Arab
states surrounding the Persian Gulf (the anticipated center of operations for
the region). However, these nations, including those already cooperating in
other arrangements with the United States, have not provided this type of
support on a substantial scale. Even if these nations should decide to assist
with medical support, the size and character of their medical systems would
render their contribution of limited use.
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A major alternative now being explored is to employ the medical support
offered by Israel and to preposition U.S. equipment in Israel. In a crisis,
Israel's hospital system is large enough to cover much of the anticipated
shortage of hospital facilities. The quality of Israeli medical care is on a par
with that of the United States. Moreover, the expertise of Israel's medical
professionals in the field of battlefield medicine as well as in the diseases of
the Middle East is unequalled. Furthermore, Israel's location makes its facili-
ties available for contingencies involving American forces in the eastern
Mediterranean and Europe as well as the Middle East.
In order to properly understand the importance of Israeli medical care for
American forces, it is necessary first to examine what medical resources the
United States military can provide for its troops in the Middle East. Currently,
according to the Pentagon, the United States armed forces "... do not have
even enough deployable hospitals of any kind to provide even the emergency
surgical treatment required to prepare the predicted numbers of patients for
evacuation."2
A large-scale American deployment to the Middle East could involve as
many as 300,000 troops, including six combat divisions, fourteen wings of
tactical aircraft, three carrier battle groups, and supporting forces.' While the
anticipated hospital needs of a force that size have not been released, it is
likely that at least 17,000 hospital beds would be needed for a major conflict
in the Persian Gulf (see Appendix A for a discussion of how this figure was
calculated). A smaller force would probably require fewer beds, as would be
the case during the early stages when a larger force was being transported to
the region. Despite this, it is reasonable to project a need for 17,000 beds,
since military planners must count on being able to provide a reasonable level
of support for a 300,000 man force.
The armed services can provide at most half of the rapidly deployable
medical facilities that would be needed to sustain a speedy, large-scale Cen-
tral Command force buildup-8,000 beds out of the anticipated requirement
of 17,000 or more beds.
To achieve this figure alone would require all of the Navy's amphibious
assault helicopter carriers (LPHs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs)
(carrying a total of 3,600 beds), the Marine Rapidly Deployable Medical
Facility stored on a cargo vessel off the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean (1,000 beds), its Army predecessor now stored in California (1,000
beds), all of the Air Force's Air Transportable Hospitals (576 beds), and
another 1,800 beds prepositioned in Europe and the United States.
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Actually it is unlikely that all 8,000 hospital beds could be deployed to the
Middle East. Many of the shipboard hospitals will be unavailable, since about
one-third of all ships of each type will be undergoing maintenance and
overhaul at any one time in the United States. In any case, it is uncertain that
the U.S. Navy would be able to gather together all these ships in time of
crisis. Nor could the Air Force send all its Air Transportable Hospitals to
Central Command, since to do so would leave the remaining air wings bereft
of mobile hospital facilities. Many of the deployable hospitals in Europe and
the United States have been in storage for a long time and are considered to be
both unready and unsuitable for rapid deployment to the Middle East. Many
of them require that the sites at which they are to be set up be provided with
pre-existing shelters and the complete range of utility services. These condi-
tions are present in Europe where it was originally envisioned that many of
these hospitals would be used. Such pre-existing amenities simply do not exist
in the Middle East. Thus it will be necessary to construct shelters and provide
support services for those hospitals which are not wholly self-contained. This
will increase the time needed to make these hospitals fully operational. Even
the fully deployable hospitals (those possessing their own shelters, water
purifiers, power sources, etc.) might still require weeks to become fully
operational after arrival at their sites.'
In Vietnam, for example, the establishment of medical systems was lei-
surely and largely unopposed. Nevertheless, it often took much longer than
expected to get new hospitals into use because of the many problems associ-
ated with the new environment.5 The circumstances accompanying a Central
Command deployment in the Middle East would be considerably more urgent
than in Vietnam. The consequent dangers, confusion and problems of adap-
tions would therefore make both the deployment and achievement of full
operational status even slower.
The U.S. military also anticipates difficulties in transporting the hospitals
to the theater. The larger hospitals, such as the Army's general hospital, could
require 100 C-141 and 30 C-5A sorties. At this time the American armed
services have only 254 C-141s and 73 C-5As. Airlift in such quantities might
be unavailable because of the other heavy demands on America's limited
transport capabilities at the time. The combination of these and other factors
could reduce the number of available beds by 2,000 or more.6 This would
leave a shortfall of over 10,000 beds.
Even if the hospitals were available, the U.S. military faces a serious
shortage of medical and medical support personnel. The shortages are greatest
in certain critical skill areas, such as surgeons. At this time all active, reserve,
and national guard personnel and units together, are only able to provide 32
per cent of the surgeons needed during wartime.' According to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), "An inadequate surgical capability is a
`war-stopper . '..'. "8 The shortage of nurses is estimated at over 30,000 and
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the overall medical personnel shortage is close to 200,000.9 These estimates
envisage American involvement in a major war in Central Europe as well as in
the Middle East. However, they indicate that the shortages of medical per-
sonnel are so great that they would seriously hamper a deployment in the
Middle East while maintaining necessary levels of medical support elsewhere.
The consequences of this shortfall of medical facilities could be devas-
tating. If a conflict should occur, the shortage of properly functioning hos-
pitals could mean many more deaths among American casualties than would
otherwise be the case. According to one estimate, one of every four soldiers
wounded in combat could die as a result of the shortage of medical care.10
Losses on this scale could reduce morale of American soldiers, lowering their
combat effectiveness. This shortage of adequate medical care could even
increase the likelihood of a conflict by reducing the credibility of our deter-
rent. In a statement calling for additional procurement of deployable medical
facilities, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps General Barrow stated, "I
am confident that hospital ships and fleet hospitals in their own way can do as
much to foster deterrence as do other higher visibility weapons systems.""
The scarcity of deployable hospitals will also aggravate the already acute
shortage of aeromedical evacuation transport. The comparatively limited
facilities of the forward deployable hospitals will force the evacuation, to
fully equipped hospitals outside the theater, of most patients needing serious
care. When large numbers of casualties are involved, even more aeromedical
transport aircraft will be needed. Currently, the U.S. has only about 35
dedicated aeromedical evacuation aircraft.12 Other transport aircraft can be
used for this role, and in fact this was done in October 1983, when wounded
Marines were flown from Beirut. However, the U.S. has a serious shortage of
strategic and tactical airlift and using those planes for aeromedical transport
would divert them from other important missions.
Programmed Solutions
The U.S. armed forces have adopted a number of programs to solve these
problems. Providing adequate quantities of in-theater hospitals has received
the most attention, reflected in a multi-service, multi-year acquisition pro-
gram. The Navy has begun to acquire hospital ships (2,000 beds in two
ships), and Fleet Hospitals (with 2,500 beds). The Air Force is procuring
several Rapid Deployment Force hospitals (250 beds apiece), as well as
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additional aeromedical staging facilities to support longer distance aero-
medical evacuations. The Army has initiated procurement of 500 and 1,000
bed Mobile Army Surgical, Combat Zone, and Communications Zone Hos-
pitals.
However, the procurement of these facilities will not solve the military
medical problem. All these planned facilities will not be ready until almost the
end of this decade, if then. That completion date assumes that the programs
continue to be funded according to schedule and that no major problems arise.
These hospital systems are also expensive. The cost of procuring these hos-
pitals is about $49,000 per bed. 13 Some of the planned hospital facilities will
be even more costly. For example, the hospital ships have a predicted
acquisition/modification cost of $580 million ($290,000/bed).14 There are
also disagreements over specific acquisitions. For example, purchase of the
hospital ships has been delayed for well over a year by debates over the type
to be procured.15 Finally, there is a constant and inevitable competition
between the concrete, definable peacetime demands upon the military medical
system and the uncertain, debatable, and costly wartime requirements that
hopefully will never be needed.16 Yet another difficulty is the competition for
scarce medical resources from other theaters.
Another important problem is where the deployable hospitals will be prep-
ositioned. Optimally, the hospitals would be stored near anticipated battle
areas, but not so close to the frontlines as to risk their capture during an enemy
advance. Unfortunately, none of the `first-line' nations in Southwest Asia,
which the United States has approached to assist in the preparations for
Central Command, seems willing to preposition medical facilities on its
territory. This means that hospitals will have to be stored outside the theater
and that it will take days or even weeks to transport to the area of need. Only
if combat forces are given a lower priority than hospitals could these medical
facilities arrive earlier.
To relieve the shortage of aeromedical evacuation, the American military is
depending upon a mix of solutions. It appears that the greatest increase in
aeromedical transport will come from the wartime conversion of other trans-
port aircraft. The military is also planning to procure additional dedicated
aeromedical evacuation aircraft. Military planners, however, seem to be
counting on increased in-theater hospital capacity to hold down the demand
for aeromedical evacuation.
To provide adequate numbers of hospital personnel, three solutions have
been adopted. The first, already well underway, has been an intense recruit-
ment campaign to raise medical strength to authorized levels of qualified
individuals, particularly for the reserves. Second, non-medical personnel are
being retrained to fill needed slots. Third, preparations are being made for a
draft of trained health care personnel, including women. Although this draft
has been in the planning stages for some time, it has not yet been presented to
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the Congress. It is unclear whether this draft would ever be enacted into law,
or if it could survive anticipated legal challenges."
Until all of the planned military medical programs are completed, and
perhaps even then, American military planners will have to seek additional
solutions in order to provide adequate medical care for American servicemen
in case of a conflict in the Middle East. One possible solution is to employ
already existing American and European medical facilities in NATO to com-
pensate in part for shortages in-theater. The use of such facilities, however,
would depend upon their actually being available. For any of several reasons,
that might not be the case. First, should a conflict spread to Europe, the
facilities there would be fully utilized. Even if it only appeared that the
conflict might spread to Europe, it would certainly be preferrable to keep most
of the hospitals there free for a NATO contingency. Moreover, in some
circumstances, America's NATO allies might be reluctant to allow use of
facilities in their countries for fear of adverse reactions in the Middle East or
Eastern Europe.
Even if these problems did not arise, the military medical facilities in
Europe are roughly three thousand miles from the most likely areas of conflict
in the Middle East (around the Persian Gulf). Flying casualties to Europe
would increase the strain on the already limited aeromedical evacuation
capacity. It could also mean a long, exhausting evacuation trip (lasting seven
or more hours) that could further increase the mortality rate of the wounded
evacuees. Finally, at that distance, aeromedical evacuation aircraft are at the
limit of their range. This will require them to refuel enroute at a friendly
airbase. This would further increase the evacuation time. It would also require
the cooperation of one or more conveniently situated nations. This cooper-
ation can no longer be taken for granted. For example, in September 1983,
Greece and Turkey, American NATO allies, refused to allow American
aircraft supporting the American deployment in Lebanon to land in their
countries.'8 Put simply, the use of medical facilities in Europe does not
provide an adequate solution.
Optimally, the United States should try to arrange for the nations of the
Middle East to reserve portions of their medical systems for the use of Central
Command. In fact, American forces are directed to use local facilities when-
ever possible by the current U.S. Defense Guidance, the policy document of
the Department of Defense. It states "Host nation support is to be used to the
maximum practical extent. " 19
However, few nations in the region possess adequate medical facilities for
the United States armed forces. Most of them have fairly small medical
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systems (see Appendix B), and many of their hospitals are antiquated. In any
case, most of the systems can barely care for the needs of their own popu-
lations. Even Saudi Arabia, which has invested great sums of money in
health care since 1973, possesses less than 7,000 hospital beds, only .72 per
1,000 people.
Although Iran and Iraq each have hospital systems with over 15,000 beds
(.52 and 1.23 beds respectively per 1,000 people), their systems were already
fully occupied tending to the needs of their populations even before the war
between them broke out. Since then, their hospitals have been pushed to the
limit of their capabilities. Moreover, Iraq is a formal ally of the Soviet Union
and Iran has declared the United States to be one of its foremost enemies.
Egypt, which possesses by far the largest health care system in the Arab
world (over 24,000 hospital beds) has to care for a population of over 38
million people with only .64 beds per 1,000 people. Although Egypt's medi-
cal system is considered to be one of the best in the Arab world, only two of
its hospitals are regarded as adequate even for American tourists.20
In any case, none of the nations in Central Command's region of respon-
sibility in the Middle East (which excludes Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and
Turkey) have been willing to make the necessary peacetime preparations to
provide wartime medical support. Many of the nations within the region are
actively hostile to the United States (such as Afghanistan, Iran, and South
Yemen), while others have not been willing to support the existence and
purpose of Central Command (such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United
Arab Emirates).
Other nations, (Egypt, Sudan, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya) are assisting
the United States in preparing for Central Command's possible deployment by
providing certain types of conditional assistance in exchange for American
aid. However, they have not made the necessary arrangements to provide
medical assistance to the United States. Such arrangements cannot easily be
established in the midst of a conflict. To be effective, they must be negotiated
in detail during peacetime. These arrangements affect the standard operating
procedures of the services and require a firm commitment from the host
country to assist the United States in time of war. This type of commitment
has not been forthcoming from any of the nations currently assisting Central
Command.
The unpopularity of ties to the United States plagues Central Command's
operational planning. In many cases, governments of the area friendly to the
United States lack a popular base and are unstable. Often, a friendly regime's
very association with the United States undermines its domestic support.
Should such governments be overthrown, they are all too likely to be replaced
by anti-American regimes. During a crisis requiring American intervention,
even regimes wishing to remain close to the United States might be forced to
repudiate promised assistance in order to remain in power. Thus, even if the
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medical facilities were adequate and were actually offered, the reliability of
such arrangements would be doubtful.
The Israeli Option
Israel is the one country of the Middle East which has repeatedly expressed
a willingness to assist the United States by providing medical support to
American armed forces. It formally agreed to such an undertaking in the 1981
Memorandum of Understanding on strategic cooperation (which, un-
fortunately, was later suspended by the United States). Israel has offered to
perform such services several times since, most recently after the terrorist
bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983. The concept of
such cooperation is supported by a wide spectrum of political leaders and by
the Israeli public, so practical arrangements could be built on a solid political
foundation (unlike many Arab countries, where there is strong opposition to
defense cooperation with the United States).
Israel is also the only country in the Middle East capable of providing
medical support on a substantial scale. It has 18,000 beds in 106 hos-
pitals21-more than all the `friendly' Persian Gulf Arab states combined.
Relative to population, Israel has roughly six times the capabilities of the
Arab countries (4.72 beds per 1,000 people versus .64 in Egypt and .72 in
Saudi Arabia, for example).22 Its medical system is, of necessity, designed
for wartime expansion. This capability was demonstrated in October 1973,
when up to 9,000 hospital beds were readied for military use within eight
hours of mobilization. Possibly Israel can mobilize an even larger number
today.23
Of course, it cannot be assumed that all of the theoretically available beds
could be provided to the American armed forces. A complete mobilization
could be achieved only by imposing a considerable strain on the facilities, the
civilian population of Israel, and particularly on the medical personnel in-
volved. Nor could the possibility that Israel might be attacked while providing
such support be excluded. Israel would have to reserve a portion of its medical
capacity for its own use.
Despite these difficulties, it should be possible to provide and preposition
medical facilities in Israel that would approximately triple the medical re-
sources currently available to Central Command in the region. This could be
accomplished through a series of measures using existing Israeli facilities,
supplemented by American resources, resulting in a considerable capability in
place in a relatively short period of time. First, the Israeli hospital system has,
on the average, 1,000 vacant beds which could be made available immedi-
ately. Second, Israel might agree to provide a fraction (e.g. 25%) of its
sustained mobilization capability, for an additional 1,500 beds. Third, to
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reduce reliance on some of the austere measures Israel uses to expand wartime
capacity for its own casualties (such as the placement of temporary beds in
large rooms), currently vacant hospital buildings, such as the former Tel-
Hashomer facility, could be outfitted with perhaps 500 beds as facilities
exclusively for American use. Fourth, the United States could preposition in
Israel a "folding" deployable hospital with 1,000 beds, like that currently
stored at Diego Garcia. The combination of such near-term, cost-effective
solutions would provide Central Command with 4,000 extra beds in the
region, going a long way to correct the shortfall of current capabilities.
Beyond its size, Israel's medical system is also modern. Over 80 per cent of
the system has been constructed in the last 35 years.25 Hospital care is on a par
with that provided in the United States (not the case in other Middle Eastern
states). Most of the health care personnel speak English. In addition, many of
the physicians have trained, studied, or practiced in the United States, and are
familiar with the latest procedures and treatments in their respective fields.
Also, because of Israel's unfortunate war experiences, virtually all Israeli
health personnel are familiar with the problems and procedures encountered in
modern military medicine. This experience represents an invaluable asset.
Israeli hospitals possess special units to treat virtually every type of wound to
be found on the modern battlefield.
The Israeli medical system would be particularly useful in treating troops
stricken with disease. Israeli doctors are familiar with almost every disease to
be found in the Middle East. This familiarity stems from the need to deal with
the wide variety of illnesses brought to Israel by two generations of immi-
grants from Middle Eastern countries. Experience in past wars has shown that
a majority of American troops admitted to hospitals were suffering from
exposure to indigenous diseases. In fact, during some years of the Korean
War about two-thirds of the hospital admissions were for disease. In Vietnam
the disease admissions never dropped below 60% of the total. Since Israeli
doctors are likely to be more familiar with the local diseases than their
American counterparts, the sick soldiers would get superior treatment in
Israel. Also, since the troops stricken by disease would most likely be capable
of returning to their units in a comparatively short time, it would be better to
keep them within the theater. If they are evacuated out of the theater it would
be far more difficult to return them to their units. It was for this reason that the
U.S. expanded its hospital facilities for disease victims during the Vietnam
war. By removing them from front-line hospitals to Israel, more of those
facilities would be available for combat casualties needing more urgent and
timely care.
The Israeli health care system also has sophisticated rehabilitation facilities
for the severely wounded. Though the American military will probably prefer
to fly such casualties back to the United States, cooperation between the two
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countries would enable both of them to improve their rehabilitation pro-
cedures and facilities.
Israel's geographical position also enables her facilities to directly support
American forces operating in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to treat casualties
from a conflict in Europe. Since Israel is only about five to six hours flight
time from Central Europe, as opposed to the 11 hour flight from Central
Europe to the eastern United States, its hospitals could be a useful supplement
to the American hospitals in Europe. This would be most valuable when
caring for casualties who could be returned to duty after a few weeks of
treatment. In addition, the shorter distance to hospitals in Israel would dra-
matically reduce the demand for aeromedical evacuation aircraft.
Israel is also well-placed to serve as a prepositioning site for hospitals
intended for use in forward areas, either in Europe or in the Middle East.
Israel is only about two hours flight time from the Persian Gulf, as compared
to seven hours from Diego Garcia to the Persian Gulf. The security that
Israel's military prowess brings to its territory can protect prepositioned
equipment from guerrilla or terrorist attacks. In other countries in the region,
a comparable level of security might require the peacetime stationing of
American combat units, a possibility that is anathema to all of America's
other supporters in the region. This same security can guarantee the safety of
American soldiers convalescing in Israeli hospitals during wartime against
attacks from guerrilla forces or terrorists. As a result the United States would
not have to use scarce combat units to protect hospitals from those who might
not respect the sanctity of those hospitals.
The greatest advantage to the United States of using the Israeli health care
system for Central Command is that it is already in place and fully opera-
tional. It would not be necessary to wait weeks for hospitals to arrive and be
established. The whole system could be ready to operate in a matter of hours.
Nor would it require the diversion from other tasks of precious mobility
assets. The problems to be expected when systems are taken out of storage
and sent into the field would be minimized. Because the medicines would be
part of a constantly rotated stock, needing only augmentation, there would be
no worry about shelf life. The shortage of personnel that could severely
hamper American military medicine would be less of a problem if Israel's
medical system were used, since there would be less need to worry about
staffing hospitals.
For the United States to take full advantage of Israeli medical facilities,
arrangements must be worked out in peacetime. Adoption of standard oper-
ating procedures that will make possible such medical cooperation must be
done before a crisis takes place. It is not possible to rely on ad hoc agreements
made at the last moment. This is the lesson to be drawn from the failure of the
United States to use Israeli medical facilities after the terrorist bombing of the
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Marine headquarters in Beirut. Unless American medical personnel are famil-
iar with Israeli facilities, and have developed procedures to take advantage of
Israeli medicine, the United States military cannot expect that American
doctors will send wounded and sick troops to unknown facilities with un-
familiar capabilities.
But, it will not be possible to get maximum benefit from available Israeli
facilities without some effort on the part of the United States. For the Ameri-
can military to take advantage of Israel's mobilization hospital capacity, even
in part, the United States would have to ensure that proper equipment and
adequate quarters would be available for incoming casualties. In addition, the
United States should anticipate that American medical personnel would work
side by side with Israelis to staff these facilities. Further, the United States
should make Israel responsible for setting up any prepositioned hospitals
stored in that country. Since such hospitals could be erected at their storage
sites, or very near, they could be equipped with amenities not available to
more austerely equipped stored hospitals elsewhere. Such hospitals stored in
Israel would still be deployable to other theaters should the need arise.
Arab Objections
The major objection to an arrangement allowing the United States military
to use Israeli medical facilities is the belief that such an accord might antago-
nize the Arab nations friendly to the United States. This objection fails to
acknowledge, however, that while the United States has grown closer to Israel
since 1967, and especially so since 1973, it has at the same time managed to
build much closer relationships with Arab nations like Egypt, Oman, Som-
alia, and Sudan. In fact, in some cases the Israeli-American tie has played an
important part in making closer relations with certain Arab countries possible.
It was Israel's decision to relinquish the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, with its
airfields, strategic depth, and valuable oil fields, that enabled America to
cement ties with Egypt. It was an Israeli threat to attack Syria that enabled the
United States to halt the Syrian invasion of Jordan in 1970, thus preventing
Jordan from falling into the hands of anti-American forces.
An arrangement to use Israeli medical support could not possibly be inter-
preted as a threat to any Arab country. Its clear humanitarian intent and its
multi-theater positioning remove it from the realm of Arab-Israeli issues. In
fact, such an agreement will help the United States defend the Arab world
without having to increase its profile there, a phenomenon that should be
welcomed by many Arab supporters of America. Ironically, Arabs from
countries hostile to Israel sometimes choose to be treated in Israeli hospitals,
so Arab objections to such arrangements between Israel and the United States
can be given less weight.
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Central Command will certainly be able to deploy its forces in the Middle
East even if Israeli medical facilities are not utilized. Nor is it likely that an
American victory in battle will depend on having such an arrangement. But at
the same time, a failure to use Israel's hospitals will certainly ensure that in
the event of a conflict in the region, American lives will be lost which
otherwise could have been saved. Also, international perceptions of real
American intentions and capabilities will be affected. By exploiting Israel's
medical facilities, America helps make it clear that it is serious about defend-
ing the Middle East. This will make potential aggressors less likely to test
American resolve. In this sense, arranging to use Israeli medical facilities has
benefits far beyond caring for the American soldiers sent to the region. But
should deterrence fail, at least America's soldiers, their families, and their
countrymen will know that their government is taking all possible steps to
ensure that they will return home alive and well.
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Appendix A
The Hospital Bed Shortage
According to testimony presented to Congress by John Beary III, M.D., Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (in Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, De-
partment of Defense Appropriations for 1983, part 9, pp. 434-435), the Navy (includ-
ing the Marines) and the Air Force were to procure deployable hospitals totaling 2,000
beds (the Air Force was to procure 500 beds, the Navy and Marines the rest) during
Fiscal Year 1983 for the primary use of Central Command in the Middle East. The
Army was also procuring a certain number of beds for the same purposes, but the
figure was not given. The total procurement of beds for Central Command for that
Fiscal Year (1,500 Navy/Marine beds, 500 Air Force beds, and an unknown number
of Army beds) amounted to 11.8 percent of the number believed required. Assuming
that the Army bought no beds for use in the Middle East, using this data a need for
17,000 beds is established to support in-theater operations in the Middle East. If the
Army's hospital purchases for Central Command had been 1,000 beds, the anticipated
total hospital bed need would be over 25,000 beds.
A requirement of 17,000 beds is consistent with experience of hospital admissions
in previous conflicts. Expected daily hospital admissions rates can be calculated using
United States Army data given in its staff officers planning manual, FM 101-10-1
(Department of the Army, 1977; Chapter 5). According to this source (pp. 5-24 to
5-28, Table 5-28g), hospitalization rates for defensive operations in hot plains are
11.24 men per 1,000 for infantry, 9.88 men per 1,000 for mechanized units, and 4.70
men per 1,000 for non-divisional forces. It is expected that a 300,000 man Central
Command force would include 91,000 men in infantry divisions (three Army divisions
with 15,000 men apiece and two Marine divisions with 23,000 men apiece), 15,000
men in one Army mechanized division, and 194,000 men in non-divisional units of the
Army or with the Navy or Air Force contingents. Using these figures, hospital
admissions should total about 2,100 per day.
These calculations are based on admissions rates for a conflict fought thirty years
ago, the Korean War. This was the last war involving large numbers of American
soldiers fighting conventionally against a non-guerrilla enemy. Recent experience
suggests, however, that increases in firepower, resulting in part from the appearance
of new weapons, will cause greater numbers of casualties on today's battlefield than
on those of the past.
Should the United States send a force smaller than 300,000 to the Middle East, the
size of the hospital facilities needed to treat the casualties might be fewer than the
17,000 estimated above. According to one press account, even a smaller force might
still require a fairly large number of hospital beds to treat the sick and wounded.
According to this story ("RDF predicted to Have High Casualty Rate," The Washing-
ton Post, August 7, 1981, p. C-15), a 100,000 man deployment might need 10,000
beds in-theater and a 130,000 man force might need more than 15,000 beds.
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Appendix B
Sizes of Some Hospital Systems
Country
# Hospital Beds
# Hospital Beds per
1,000 people
Bahrain
572
2.16
Egypt
24,429
.64
Iran
16,705
.52
Iraq
15,159
1.23
Israel
18,804
4.72
Jordan
2,446
1.22
Kenya
17,896
1.29
Kuwait
1,873
1.66
North Yemen
2,799
.05
Oman
805
.99
Qatar
661
7.69
Saudi Arabia
6,888
.72
Somalia
5,163
1.76
South Yemen
1,858
1.06
Sudan
8,381
.49
Syria
4,798
.61
UAE
682
2.84
United States
1,365,626
6.30
Source: Adapted from World Health Organization Statistic 1980, Hospital Establishments, and Statistical
Abstract of Israel 1981.
The information given in this table should be treated with caution.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Testimony of John H. Moxley III, M.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs),
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States House
of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1982, part 4, p. 596.
2. Ibid.
3. Figures from Defense Marketing Service, Rapid Deployment Force, 1980, extracts from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff RDJTF Capability Study, January 1981, assorted volumes of testimony
before Congress, and articles in a variety of periodicals.
4. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States House
of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983, part 9, pp. 613-616.
5. Major-General Spurgeon Neel, Medical Support 1965-1970, Department of the Army, 1973.
6. This assumes four out of twelve LPHs and LPAs out of service (for a loss of 4 x 300 =
1,200 beds) and presumed undeployability of one of the 500 bed hospitals either in Europe or
the United States due to one unforeseen event or another (missing sections, etc.) and the
availability of only half of the Air Force's Air Transportable Hospitals (a loss of 288 beds).
The total loss would be just under 2,000 beds.
7. Calculated from the testimony of John Beaty III, M.D., in Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1983, part 9, p. 437.
8. Ibid.
9. United States General Accounting Office, Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel
In Case Of War?, June 24, 1981, p. 55.
10. Captain Michael B. Parini, "Air Force Medicine on the Move," Air Force Magazine,
October 1983, p. 67.
11. Letter from General Barrow to Senator Denton as quoted by John Beaty III, M.D., Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), in testimony in Hearings Before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives,
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983, part 9, p. 439.
12. Calculated from Mark Hewish, Bill Sweetman, Joseph C. Wheeler, and Bill Gunston, Air
Forces of the World, Simon and Schuster, 1979, pp. 25-41, and Bill Gunston, editor, The
Encyclopedia of World Air Power, Crescent Press, 1981, p. 243.
13. This is for the Navy's fully deployable Fleet Hospitals. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1983, part 9, pp. 539-540.
14. Ibid., p. 573.
15. The debate centered on whether or not the World War II era hospital ship Sanctuary could be
modernized, and if not, whether the liner United States or some other ship(s) should be
converted to the role. It was eventually decided to acquire and modify two cargo ships.
16. Although the declared primary mission of the military medical system is to prepare for and
perform the care of wartime casualties (see Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1982, part 4, p. 595), an examination of budget expenditures shows that
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the peacetime care of military personnel, their dependents, and the retired military com-
munity commands the lion's share of the resources (ibid., pp. 589-594). For example, 69 per
cent of those cared for by the Air Force's medical system are dependents and retired
personnel (Captain Michael D. Parini, "Air Force Medicine on the Move," Air Force
Magazine, October 1983, p. 67). This is not necessarily wrong, as the United States has been
essentially at peace throughout the greater part of its existence and hopes to remain so in the
future. If peace is maintained, and the deterrent value of medical preparations is ignored,
then expenditures on preparations for war might be perceived as having been wasteful. Such
a perception, while plausible, is incorrect.
17. Henry David Rosen, "Pentagon seeking to Register Health Care Women for Draft," The
Washington Post, September 1, 1983, p. A2.
18. U.S. News and World Report, October 2, 1983; Jerusalem Post, September 28, 1983, p. 1;
Reuters news reports of September 20 and September 27, 1983.
19. The 1984-1988 Defense Guidance, as quoted in testimony Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1983, part 6, p. 50.
20. For instance, see David Lamb, "Egypt Lifts Veil on U.S. Maneuvers," Los Angeles Times,
August 10, 1983, p. A7.
21. Figures calculated from the Statistical Abstract of Israel 1981, p. 675.
22. World Health Organization Statistic 1980, pp. 61-63, 123.
23. These calculations were made using the figures given in Lechaim Naggan, "Medical plan-
ning for disaster in Israel," Injury: the British Journal of Accident Surgery, vol. 7, no. 4, p.
281 together with the figure for hospital beds given in the Statistical Abstract of Israel 1981,
p. 675. According to Naggan, "8 hours after the alert and 4 hours after the war started, most
hospitals had increased their regular bed capacity by 40-60 per cent, and 60-80 per cent of
these beds were vacant, ready to admit battle casualties. " For the purposes of this study, it is
assumed that it will only be possible to expand capacity by 40 percent, and that only 60
percent of the total capacity will be vacant. This means that the total number of general
hospital beds will be expanded from about 11,000 to about 15,400, and that roughly 9,240 of
these beds would be vacant within hours of a crisis. The actual number of beds made
available probably would be much higher given the conservative nature of these calculations.
24. Statistical Abstract of Israel 1982, p. 686.
25. Calculated from the Statistical Abstract of Israel 1981, p. 675.
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