STIC TUTORIAL DOE'S ROLE IN MCTL PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001800090005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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DOE review completed.
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SE^RET
National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Crimina~ Sanctions
critical technologies newsletter
March 1984
Inside:
STIC tutorial
DOE's role in MCTL process
DOE review completed.
Declassify on: OADR. \ REp
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This document consists of 8 pages.
This is copy 3Q .2 of 392 copies. Series A.
Department of Energy/
Office of International Security Affairs
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contents
technology transfer
2 STIC: mission, functions, and
products (U)
4 DOE MCTL team continues work on
Sec. 17 (U)
credits
Published by:
Politico-Military Security Affairs Division of the
Office of International Security Affairs,
US Department of Energy
DOE Project Manager:
J. Robert Cutter, 202-252-2155
Editor:
Jill Warren
Managing editor:
Barbara Canavan
Design and production:
Kathi Geoffrion Parker
Composition and printing:
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Information Services Division
Correspondence:
Editors
Critical Technologies Newsletter
P.O. Box 503
Los Alamos NM 87544
Phone:
FTS 843-6922 or 1-505-667-6922
Notice: Reproduction of this document requires
the written consent of the originator, his/her
successor, or higher authority. This report was
prepared as an account of work sponsored by
the United States Government. Neither the
United States nor the United States Department
of Energy, nor any of their employees, nor any of
their contractors, subcontractors, or their em-
ployees makes any warranty, express or implied,
or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of
any information, apparatus, product or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not
infringe privately owned rights.
L~e~;hnology trar~sfe.r
STIC: mission, functions,
and products (U)
STIC (the Scientific and Technical In-
telligence Committee), one of the key
organizations in the technology transfer
arena, was born from a recognition of the
importance of making continual assess-
ments of foreign scientific and technical
strengths and weaknesses, particularly
in the Soviet Union, to support national
security policy.
Under guidance from the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI), a committee
structure was designed to focus and task
Intelligence Community collection assets
against scientific and technical in-
telligence issues and to provide for tech-
nical assessments of foreign
technologies.
This early intelligence committee struc-
ture was subordinated to the US In-
telligence Board (USIB), which has since
evolved into the National Foreign In-
telligence Board (NFIB) and the present
DCI committee structure (Fig. 1).
Through this structure, the Intelligence
Community can better direct intelligence
collection through SIGINT, COMIREX,
and HUMINT and produce finished in-
telligence and assessments for national
level consumers through its production
committees, of which STIC is one (the
others being EIC, WSSIC, JAEIC, and
TTIC).
Glossary
Though STIC has been inexistence for
20 years, its mission was updated and
redescribed in DCI Directive for Foreign
Scientific and Technical Intelligence (18
June 1982) as follows: "The Committee
will advise and assist the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence in the discharge of his
duties and responsibilities with respect
to production, coordination, and evalua-
tion of intelligence on foreign scientific
and technical developments and will
promote the effective use of Intelligence
Community resources for this purpose."
To fulfill this mission, STIC draws its
primary membership from the NFIB
community and supplements this exper-
tise with associate members from other
governmental departments that have
overlapping interests with the In-
telligence Community (Fig. 2).
STIC is functionally organized into an
Executive Planning Group, the parent
committee, a Scientific and Technical
Collection Subcommittee (STIC-C), and
19 Working Groups (Fig. 3), 4 of which
directly support the Collection Subcom-
m ittee.
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
COMIREX Commitee on Imagery, Requirements, and Exploitation
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
EIC Economic Intelligence Committee
EW Electronic Warfare
HUMINT Human Intelligence Committee
IC Intelligence Community
JAEIC Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
LASINT Laser Intelligence
NFIB National Foreign Intelligence Board
OUSDRE Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
PRC People's Republic of China
S&T Science and Technology
SIGINT Signals Intelligence Committee
STIC Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee
TTIC Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee
WSSIC Weapons & Space Systems Intelligence Committee
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technology transfer
Membership
Primary
Members
? Air Force
. Army 8TIC
. clA
? DIA
? Energy
? Navy
? NSA
? St8te
DCI Committee Relationship
a
8ubcarttrrlittee
sad Worki~
Gronps
a
NFIB
Secratuiat
a
Associate
Members
? ACDA
? Commerce
? DARPA
? DoD-OUSDRE
? (F81)
r
Organization
i
ScientNic 8 Tedmicai
Cogec~on $
Watci~ Groin
Permanent
Working Groupa
Ad hoc
? Computers
? Signal Processing
? Particle Beam
Permanent Ad hoc
?- Electro Optics
? Solid Stata
Weapons
? Advanced Radar ? Electroni
c
? Life Sciences
Electronics
? Radio Frequency
Exploitation Warfare
? Low Observabies
? Soviet R&D
Weapons
Methodologies Cotlectio
n
Technology
Process & Resources
? S8T Information
? Millimeter Wave
? Soviet S&T Enigmas
Processin
? ScientNic
& ? S&T HU
MIN
T
? PRC Science 8
? Structural Materials
g
? Technology
Technica
l Thermal
Technology
Forecasting
Appticati
ons
The working groups address those
S&T issues generally described by their
titles to produce technical assess-
ments on their respective technologies,
collection and requirements guides, in-
puts to national estimates, and special
studies in support of requests stemming
from national level consumers or the In-
telligence Community.
STIC focuses on 2 key functions:
? preventing technological surprise
and
? assessing current sciences and
technologies.
Technological surprise
Technological surprise refers to the
concern that the USSR or any adversary
may make a sudden S&T breakthrough
that could strongly disadvantage the US
strategically or tactically and thereby
threaten our national security.
Central to preventing technological
surprise is an understanding of Soviet
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technology, which depends on
1. access to technology information in
the closed Soviet society that has
adopted seemingly leak-proof
security measures and
2. understanding the leading edge of US
scientific and technical achievement.
[Though this understanding will assist
in evaluating the level of achievement
in the Soviet Union in science and
technology (S&T) areas where the
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technology transfer
DOE MCTL team continues work on Sec.17 (U)
Because the expertise for nuclear- and
other energy-related technology rests
within the Department of Energy and its
National Laboratories, the Department of
Defense, which has primary responsi-
bilityfor the Militarily Critical Tech-
nologies List (MCTL), has made DOE
responsible for MCTL Sec.17, the
the nuclear energy section.
DOE's MCTL team is composed of a
DOE program monitor (in the Office of
International Security Affairs), a technical
coordinator from Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and technical resource peo-
plefrom Los Alamos, Lawrence Liver-
more National Laboratory (LLNL), Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Pa-
cific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), Sandia
National Laboratories-Albuquerque
(SNLA), and Savannah River Laboratory
(SRL). In addition, support for specific
technical areas is sought from other DOE
facilities as needed.
The DOE team meets 3 to 4 times a
year at DOE sites or in Washington DC.
Between meetings, members revise
Sec.17, write and revise Supporting
Documentation for Sec. 17, and review
other MCTL sections (for example, 1-3
and 6) relevant to DOE concerns.
Last year, the DOE team completely
reorganized Sec. 17, ordering the
subsections more logically and adding
sections on magnetic flux compression
generators and lithium isotope separa-
tion technologies. The team has also ex-
tensively rewritten some sections of
Sec. 17 to ensure that it encompasses
the very latest technology.
In addition, the team reviews its own
work, so that team members with pri-
mary responsibility for a particular sec-
tion benefit from the knowledge of other
DOE experts.
DOE added cross references to all
relevant control lists such as the Depart-
ment of Commerce Commodity Control
List (CCL), the Department of State Muni-
tions List, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) license list. DOE will
continue to reference actual control
documents where possible and is en-
couraging incorporating MCTL items into
the CCL where appropriate.
At the team's meeting at LLNL in early
November 1983, the group established
the following tasks for the next MCTL
review cycle.
1. Indicate for each critical element of
each technology whether that ele-
ment is recommended for control
and the legal basis for its control.
(In addition to the national security
concerns that are addressed by
DoD, one of DOE's major goals for
its MCTL work is to augment gov-
ernment-wide efforts to prevent nu-
clearweapon proliferation.) Alter-
natively, acritical element may be
listed for information purposes and
because knowledge of its purchase
could be a useful indicator of
proliferation activities, but the ele-
ment may not be recommended for
control because of wide com-
mercial use, wide foreign avail-
ability, or other reasons that make
control unfeasible.
2. Refine and expand the Sec.17 in-
dex. Because the best and clearest
key words for indexing can
probably be provided by the
Technologies covered by the MCTL
Arvid Lundy, DOE MCTL technical
coordinator.
Sec. 1 Computer System and Network Technology
Sec. 2 Computer Hardware Technology
Sec. 3 Computer Software Technology
Sec. 4 Automated Industrial Process Control Technology
Sec. 5 Materials Technology
Sec. 6 Directed Energy Technology
Sec. 7 Semiconductor and Electronic Component Technology
Sec. 8 Instrumentation Technology
Sec. 9 Telecommunications Technology
Sec. 10 Communication, Navigation, Guidance, Control, and Identification
Technology
Sec. 11 Microwave Technology
Sec. 12 Vehicular Technology
Sec. 13 Optical and Low Energy Laser Technology
Sec. 14 Sensor Technology
Sec. 15 Undersea Systems Technology
Sec. 16 Chemical Technology
Sec. 17 Nuclear- and Energy-Related Technology
Sec. 18 Cryptologic Technology
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technology transfer
authors and reviewers of individual
sections, the DOE team is adding
that activity to this year's tasking.
3. Encourage, with DoD, use of
the MCTL in a data base format for
user convenience and to allow
rapid updating. The MCTL exists on
DoD's FORDTIS system to which, at
present, no one in DOE has access.
Ultimately, putting the MCTL on a
system using artificial intelligence
(expert systems) concepts is de-
sirable. DOE has discussed putting
MCTL Sec. 17 on such a system but
does not have the funds to do so.
4. Recommend restructuring the non-
nuclearenergy subsections (12.7,
17.7, and 17.8) into a single section.
5. Try to expand use of the MCTL
within DOE.
Because DOE has a strong desire to
coordinate its activities with other gov-
ernment agencies that work on the
MCTL, the team invites input from DoD
and DOC at its meetings. For example,
last July at a meeting in Washington DC,
the team invited all interested parties to
an open hearing on its latest Sec. 17
revision and incorporated suggestions
from that meeting into the final draft sub-
mitted to DoD.
Last fall, John Boidock, Director of
DOC's Office of Export Administration;
Paul Ho ler, Do D's MCTL coordinator;
and Defense Intelligence
Agency, made valuable contributions to
the DOE document.
If you have questions, comments, or
suggestions for the DOE MCTL team, call
Arvid Lundy, DOE MCTL Technical
Coordinator, 505-667-6922 (FTS
843-6922) or Bob Cutter, acting DOE
MCTL Program Monitor, 202-252-2155
(FTS 252-2155).
-Roz Newmyer 25X1
International Technology Division
Criteria for judgment of criticality
SECRE _-
The following criteria are adapted from a list drawn up for Air Force Systems
Command by BK Dynamics.
Technology impact in mission
Pervasiveness
Leverage
Lead/lag
Soviet targeting
Cast/simplicity
Maturity of technology
Foreign availability
Technologies that support critical
missions are strong candidates for ex-
portcontrols.
Technologies that are crucial for certain
missions and for which no viable alterna-
tive exists are very strong candidates for
export controls.
Technologies that Contribute some value
to a wide variety of systems or missions
are strong candidates for export con-
trols.
Success in warfare results from exploit-
ing an adversary's weakness or capitaliz-
ing on one's own strength. Technologies
that create or exploit asymmetries in this
balance will be of high value to a potential
adversary and are strong candidates for
export controls.
Technologies in which US industry
possesses a demonstrable lead over
Warsaw Pact industries are strong can-
didates for export controls.
Of the many technologies that are strong
candidates for export control, high
priority should be given to those the Sov-
iets have targeted for acquisition.
Technologies that radically lower cost or
simplify operation are of great military
value and should be considered for ex-
port controls.
Emerging technologies that have poten-
tial for a high payoff must be carefully
guarded until their potential is fully
understood.
If a technology is critical but available
from noncontrolled sources, it is a weak
candidate for control.
Controlsfor a technology must be both
desirable and feasible before they can be
implemented.
The following criterion reflects DOE's special concern in the area of criticality (and
is an addition to BK's original list).
Technologies that would allow a nation to
develop a nuclear weapon program must
not be exported.
March 1984/Critical Technologies Newsletter
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technology transfer
What's an MCTL ?
Beginning in 1976 with the publication
of the Bucy Report, which called atten-
tion tothe national security problem
posed by the export of some critical and
dual use technologies, DoD has been
compiling a critical technologies list.
In 1979, a formal mechanism for that
list was mandated by the Export Ad-
ministration Act (EAA), which gave DoD
lead responsibility for assembling a Mili-
tarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL)
and Commerce responsibility for imple-
mentationand enforcement.
The EAA was up for renewal in 1983,
but the Senate could not agree on a new
version, so the President imposed an
Executive Order that is expected to re-
main in effect until final passage of the
new Bill. The new EAA, when enacted,
almost certainly will continue to mandate
an MCTL. (The Newsletter will describe
provisions of the new Act as soon as
possible).
The MCTL was mandated by the EAA
to emphasize for each critical tech-
nology,the "arrays of design and manu-
facturing know-how; keystone manufac-
turing, inspection, and test equipment;
and goods accompanied by
sophisticated operation, application, or
maintenance know-how which are not
possessed by countries to which exports
are controlled...andtyhich, if exported,
would permit a significant advance in a
military system" of any such country.
The EAA further states that the MCTL
should be "sufficiently specific to guide
the determination of any official exercis-
ing export licensing responsibilites
under this Act ...." Although efforts are
Bob Cutter Rrvid Lundy
Dan Janney
Bert Hetmicic
JasperJacksan
Tam McDonatd
Roz Newmyer
Jim Ramsbotham,
consultant
continually being made to make it more
specific, the existing MCTL does not
meet this criterion; furthermore, those
who have been working closely with the
MCTL have found this directive in the Act
to be extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to implement.
As DoD has developed the MCTL, the
principal focus has been on controlling
technology transfer to the Soviet Bloc,
but DOE has alsoemphasized nuclear
nonproliferation concerns in its input to
the MCTL.
Calling the MCTL a "list" is somewhat
misleading because it consists of en-
cyclopedia-like prose sections that de-
scribetechnologies aswell asconcise
statements of the critical elements
needed to implement each technology.
MCTL contributors strive to write
clear, simple, readable, and accurate de-
scriptions of each technology and sub-
division of that technology and to
characterize succinctly the rationale for
that technology being considered mili-
tarilycritical. These description and ra-
tionale sections can be useful to policy
makers who need to familiarize them-
selveswith technologies outside their
background areas.
Though the MCTL is not in itself a
control document, it is a useful reference
for developing control lists. For example,
the MCTL is being used to establish a US
position for international export control
regulations by the Coordinating Commit-
tee (COCOM), which consists of NATO
members plus Japan less Iceland and
Spain, and has been used in developing
~tL c~IN ~~
alist ofgas-centrifuge-related compo-
nentsthat have been incorporated into
the internationally recognized Zangger
trigger list.
In addition to the main text, Support-
ing Documentation is being developed to
provide further technical notes and to
describe foreign capabilities for each
technology.
With its Supporting Documentation,
the MCTL is becoming recognized as a
useful technology reference for any form
of technology transfer control, such as
trade shows, technical data transfer, and
foreign visits and exchanges. For secur-
ity review purposes, the MCTL can serve
as a flag to identify material that may
require wider review as well as an in-
dicatorfor intelligence targeting.
The MCTL has been revised, refined,
reorganized, and reedited annually since
1979. DoD has a contract with the In-
stitute for Defense Analysis (IDA) for
coordinating work on the MCTL and for
producing the finished document after
each revision. The mechanism used by
IDA for MCTL review and revision is the
Technical Working Group (TWG), which
comprises representatives from ex-
ecutivedepartments and industry.
Because technology transfer control
can have a strong impact on industry,
IDA and DoD got industry input in 1982
by submitting the MCTL for review by the
Multi-Association Policy Advisory Group
(MAPAG), composed entirely of industry
representation.
John Iitige S, A. Lenin Jfm Davidson Roger Hagengruber
Jahn Sherahman Jerry Malting- Ran Melton Jim Corey
George Anzetan Shen Jacobs Marvin Erikson Bob Hughen
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technology transfer
STIC, cont.
Problems associated with un-
derstanding Soviet technology and the
resultant difficulty in arriving at accurate
and current comparative US-Soviet
technology assessments have forced the
Intelligence-R&D-Industrial communities
into polarized spheres of technology in-
terests, each with varying degrees of ex-
pertise. As a result, technological sur-
prise for a given technology becomes
difficult to define, and, if construed as
supporting a parochial interest, difficult
to defend to policy and decision makers.
Unfortunately, this difficulty tends to
weaken efforts to prevent such surprise.
To assess current S&T, STIC enlists the
aid of qualified scientists and engineers
in the S&T centers, the various national
level intelligence agencies and govern-
mentdepartments, and, most important-
ly, national laboratories.
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,
Pacific Northwest, and Sandia National
Laboratories, through DOE, provide an
understanding of the leading edge in
many S8T areas of interest through their
effective participation in ST'S ???^~king
~GV~
By producing timely and accurate
assessments, collection guides, and
other finished intelligence products,
STIC is ensuring that US policy and deci-
sion makers have for their consideration
those intelligence tools necessary to the
prevention of technological surprise and,
hence, the promotion of national
security.
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Department of Energy, Washington, DC 1-37
The Secretary. Donald Paul Hodel. S-1
Deputy Secretary. Danny J. Boggs, S-2
The Under Secretary. Pat Collins, S-3
P. Coyle Department of Treasury 201-209
D. Emmert Assistant Secretary for Enforcement
J. Hadley and Operations
D. Eddy Commissioner of Customs
Bertram Smith
R. G. Priddy. DAMI
Lawrence Mounter
Commander, US Army Missile
280
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs,
DP-1
D^ector of Energy Research,
J. Ilhge Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement
I. Morrison Director of Investigations
Ken Street Director, Strategic Investigation Division
Command. DRSMI-XO
Aberdeen Proving Ground.
DRSTE-CM-F
281
Alvin W. Trivelpiece. ER-1
John Ranelletti Chief, Field Operations Branch
John Otto. ITAC
282
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
Sandia National Laboratories, 138-145 Chief, Technical Branch
Commander, Security Support
283
and Energy Emergencies, Helmut A.
Albuquerque, NM Chief, Munitions Control Branch
D
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Detachment
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Merklein
IE-1
on
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President, G. C. Dacey Director, Intelligence Technology
Edward Brown, Harry Diamond
184
,
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy,
Gerold Vonas Los Angeles Customs
210-211
Laboratories
Shelby T. Brewer, NE-1
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212-215
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Department of the Navy
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285
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A. Morgan, CP-20
M. E. Whdley, DP-3
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James Corey Joseph J. Tate (ISS)
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Sandia National Laboratories 146 Gerald Schroeder (OIPR)
Livermore, CA Rick Cinquegrana (OIPR)
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Director, Herman Postma Gerald B. Brown (Feq
M. W. Rosenthal Department of Defense
Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant 1~'9-150 (Office of Secretary of Defense)
218
219-228
(4 copies)
Col. Darwin Lundberg
John Du nlavey, MAT-081,
297-299
J. L. Torres. DP-33
G. F Dickerson. DP-33.1
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S. A. Levin Talbot S. Lindstrom
(3 copies)
George Lindsteadt.
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Naval Weapons Center
Richard Mark,
301
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Richard Bowen. DP-332.2
R
Cutter
DP-332
2
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Gordon G. Fee Leo Young
Brookhaven National Laboratory 153 Paris Genalis 25X1
Samios Oles Lomacky
Director
N
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Pacific Missile Test Center
Central Intelligence Agency,
D it r hn McMah n
302-346
.
.
.
.
W. Henoch DP-332.2
Harvey B. Jones. DP-333
R. E Caudle. DP-34
M. J. Dowd. DP-35
Charles Boykin. DP-40
L. C. Ritchie. DP-353
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,
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Savannah River Laboratory 154 Frank Kapper
Director Paul Hopler
Pacific Northwest Laboratory 155-156 Capt. Albert J. Perella
James M. Davidson Capt. James B. Sell
R. 8. Melton Gen. Donald L. Lamberson.
Department of Energy Area Offices Deputy DCS R&D
Amarillo Area Office 157 Paul Berenson, OSD(AE)
229
R. H. Kropschot. ER-10
Kansas City Area Office 158 Stephen D. Bryen. ISP
230-233
J. E Levis. ER-20
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Dayton Area Office 160 Mark R. Hake
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Office of Intelligence Liaison.
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Administration
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234-242
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Assistant Secretary for Productivity,
National Security Agency, T532
347-372
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Technology, and Innovation,
National Security Council
373-376
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Bruce Merrifield
Director
Savannah River Operations Office 44
Chicago Operations Office 45
San Francisco Operations Office 46
Idaho Operations Office 47
Director, Office of
Export AdminisVation, 2G V 1
John Boidock JJ/~
Anatoli Welihozkiy
Department of the Air Force
Director, FTD
Jerry Roberts. FTD
James Bartley. FTD/TOTA
243-244
245
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Art Manfredi
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Office of Science Technology Policy
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National Laboratories
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246-247
248
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249
250-251
z5Z-
459-256
Michael Havey
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
C. Norman Wood
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, OC
Director
380
381
Robert W. Selden
Department of State 177-200 1Lt Efren V. Fornoles, YH
Director. Jet Propulsion Laboratory
382-383
Warren F. Miller. Jr.
Chnstopher Adams. Jr.
Judith M. Liersch
James M. Williams
The Under Secretary. William Schneider, Jr. ~~~
Director, PM/STN (2 copies) John McMann, AFSC
David Wilson, EBI A. Chruscicki, RADC/COEE
Robert Upchurch. INR/PMA AI Young. AFATL/DLXP
257
258
259
Victoria Melikan
Langley Research Center
M. Leroy Spearman
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
364
365
Steven A. Maaranen
Darleane C. Hoffman
Teresa C. Jones. INR/PMA HO USAF/CVAIP
Dean Howells. INR/PMA Barry Tell
260-262
Joseph Loftus
Director. Greenbelt Laboratory
386
Keith Taggert
William Robinson, Director, Maj. James Engel HO USAF/XOXIP
John F. Kennedy Space Center
387
O'Dean P. Judd
Lara H. Baker, Jr.
Jay Norman
John F. Barnes
David Watkins
Donald Wolkerstorfer
John McDonald
Report Library, Dan Baca
Jill Warren I50 copies)
Lawrence Livermore 122-137
NaUOnal Laboratory
Dvector. Roger Batzel
PM/MC-SA-6 Capt. R. Lyons. ESD/XRVT
Samuel Tomsen.OESISCT M. L. Laster. AEDC/DOT
Michael Marks. T Sherman Chan, HO AFLC/At]
Edward Herwitz, EUR/SOV Maj. Kevin Yelmgren, BMO/SYMS
Michael G. Anderson. EUR/EE Noreen Dimond. AFGL/XOP
Richard Boucher D. Pierce. RADC/DOT
EA/C Matt Kerper, AFOSR/XOT
Ron Kirkpatrick. EB/EWT John Jones. HO AFCMD/SP
Victor Comras. EUR/RPE H. J. Stachowski, ASD/XR
John Danylyk. INR/EC LL Col. James Turner, AMD/XRX
Martin Prochnik. OES/NTC Roberl L Wisewell, AFRPL/XRX
James Devine, OESN Capt. Kevin E. Peterson.
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
Kenneth E. Lopez
Lewis Research Center
Andrew F. Corcoran
Harold D. Wharton
National Space Technology
Laboratories
Henry Speir
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Marvin Peterson
Raymond Brady
388-389
390
391-392
John D. Anderson
Carlton Stoiber, OES/NEC HO AFOSI/IVOAB
274
John L. Emmett
Allan Sessoms. OES/NTS Maj. Dennis Zack, HO AFSC/INA
275
T Kenneth Fowler
Michael M. May
Fred McGoldrick, OES/NEP Department of the Army
Richard Kennedy, INR/SEE Commander, Foreign Science
276-279
A. Carl Hausmann
Robert Andrews
G Staehle
8
Louis Dunn, ACDA Technology Center
Dean Rust. ACDA IFSTC). Charlottesville, vA
SECRET Critical Technologies Newsletter/March 1984
Approved For Release 2008/10/08 :CIA-RDP86M00886R001800090005-2