LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM JAMES A. WILLIAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001800080019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2009
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 6, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Executive Registry
84- 763
6 February 1984
Mr. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.
20305
Dear Mr. Casey:
The following items of intelligence are provided for your
25X1
use this week:
1. The Angolan Air Force is about to receive its first squadron of MIG-23
FLOGGERS from the Soviet Union.
FLOGGERS are probably air interceptors intended to improve Luanda's
capability to respond to South African air operations over southern
Angola. Even if the FLOGGERS are quickly assembled and assimilated
into the Air Force, their deployment to Southern Angola is unlikely
to deter continued South African Air Force reconnaissance activity or
bombing runs against presumed South West Africa People's Organization
guerrilla bases. In fact, in the past, Angola's FISHBED pilots have
been reluctant or refused to engage South African aircraft because in
at least two encounters Luanda has lost two FISHBEDS without damaging
Pretoria's aircraft. Thus, unless the proficiency of Angolan or Cuban
pilots improves dramatically in coming months, the acquisition of FLOGGERS
will be only a potential rather than an actual improvement in Angola's air
power.
Although The Ghandi government stresses its
present leaders ip in the Nonaligned Movement it has been notably re-
strained on the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. At the
same time, the Kremlin is seeking to steadily improve its special relation-
ship with India. In this vein, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov's scheduled
February visit to India (recently cancelled) was seen as an effort to
further strengthen Indian dependence on Soviet military equipment by
validating the various service deals negotiated in 1983.
~ r v w
25X1
a~x'
REG
SECRET
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3. Iraq's daylight missions over 20 Iranian cities and seaports on 26 January
were the first in more than a year. Sirens sounded in Iran cities and
broadcasts were interrupted with warnings to seek shelter. Iraqi's news
media added to the pressure by announcing the receipt of SS-12/SCALEBOARD
surface-to-surface missiles. These actions are another facet of the broad
Iraqi campaign to pressure Iran into a negotiated resolution while pre-
paring for escalation if peace efforts fail. Baghdad has also increased
threats against Iran by citing its ability to destroy the latter's key
oil export facility at Kharg Island by using its new Super Etendard air-
craft. Iran knows well the effect of Iraqi surface to surface missiles,
having suffered numerous FROG and SCUD attacks on its border cities
throughout the war. Nevertheless, we have yet to receive confirmation
on the receipt of SS-126 and it is highly unlikely Iraq's claim is true.
In addition, an Iraqi strike on Kharg Island is probably not imminent
because Arab acquiescence, a necessary ingredient, is still lacking.
JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, US Army
Director
SECRET
2
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