ADPA SPEECH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001800010008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 27, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451
April 27, 1984
Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State
Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
Executive Secretary, central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: ADPA Speech
A draft copy of the Director's speech to be given on May 2,
1984, before the ADPA in Seattle, Washington, is attached.
Any comments you may have should be phoned to me (632-8478)
not later than 3:00 p.m., Monday, April 30.
William B. Staples(;
Executive Secretary
Attachment
As stated
STAT
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TECHNOLOGY: FRIEND OR FOE OF ARMS CONTROL?
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here with you
this evening. I want to thank the American Defense Preparedness
Association for inviting me to talk about arms control,
technology and our national security.
In reflecting on this subject, a story I once heard about
Winston Churchill's 1946 visit to the United States came to mind.
You will recall that that visit was the occasion for his famous
and prophetic "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. During
that same visit, it has been reported that Churchill received a
briefing on the future of some new technologies--including the
future ability to alter man's thinking and behavior. When asked
what he thought about those horizons, he reportedly responded
that his only consolation was the knowledge that he would not be
around.
This should remind us of the dual-edged nature of
technological development. It offers both promise and problems.
We can ignore either only at great risk or great loss.
I want today to discuss briefly how technology and arms
control go hand-in-hand--as a friend, not a foe--in our efforts
to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Surely we all agree that
reducing that risk is among the most critical--if not the most
critical--issue of our time. President Reagan has, I can assure
you, no higher priority.
I am also sure that we all agree that arms control
agreements by themselves cannot prevent nuclear war. To keep the
peace, we must first be militarily and economically strong. As a
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great and free nation, we have great responsibilities for taking
the lead in maintaining peace, while simultaneously preserving
democracy, freedom and other cherished values.
For forty years we have deterred major Soviet aggression. We
have done this by the threat of a nuclear response to large-scale
conventional attacks on NATO and by guaranteed nuclear
retaliation in response to a Soviet nuclear strike against the
United States or any nation vital to US interests.
Our policy of assured retaliation--even though its object is
deterrence--raises for some the specter of nuclear holocaust.
There are those, including some leading religious leaders, who
react to this policy--sometimes called mutual assured
destruction--with moral outrage.
I can assure you that the President, and those of us who
serve under him, are no less aware, no less concerned about the
potential horror of nuclear devastation. Moreover, we are keenly
aware that no nation can win a nuclear war. A major nuclear war
would leave only losers with long-term global effects that would
know no boundaries between attacker and those attacked, or
between combatants and innocent peoples.
So far our long-standing policy of deterrence has worked.
We have experienced no nuclear war. We have succeeded in
deterring conventional aggression where our greatest economic and
security interests lie. The absence of a major conflict in
Europe since World War II represents a period of peace unmatched
on the Continent in the preceding two centuries.
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As we look down the road, technological advancement will
remain central to effective deterrence and to effective arms
control in several ways.
First, one of the great ironies of security policy is that
to preserve peace--and to establish a realistic basis for arms
control--we must continually improve our deterrent posture.
Technology can provide the modernization we need to keep the
peace.
Second, history has shown us that arms control agreements
thare are not effectively verifiable become a source of tension
and mistrust, rather than reinforcing the prospects for peace.
Technology can provide the assurances and capabilities we need to
construct effective, enduring agreements.
Finally, emerging technologies are permitting us to now
begin to contemplate replacing some nuclear weapons with
conventional weapons which can perform the same tasks. By
reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, technology could provide
new incentives for nuclear arms reductions at the negotiating
table and raise the nuclear threshhold. Let me briefly touch on
each of these areas, before welcoming your questions.
Technology and Modernization
For Americans the most fundamental principle of our security
policy is that our purpose is to prevent war, and especially
nuclear war1from occurring. To prevent war, we must maintain
forces which make clear to any potential aggressor that the cost
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to him of starting a war would be far greater than anything he
could hope to gain. This has been the core of our deterrent
policy since World War II.
To be sure, we must also continuously try to negotiate
controls on these weapons, and particularly those that most
threaten peace and stability; this includes the large land-based
systems that represent the greater threat of a first strike. We
must also continuously seek other measures that reduce tension
and uncertainties in East-West relations.
But we cannot--indeed dare not--ignore the need to respond
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in a measured way to the challenges posed by the expanding Soviet
nuclear arsenal with improvements in our own strategic forces.
Arms control is not an alternative to modernizing our armed
forces. Rather maintaining effective armed forces--including
survivable nuclear forces--is essential for arms control to have
a chance. Achieving sound arms control agreements and force
modernization are mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing
policies.
The Soviets are not different in this respect from any other
tough negotiator. If they can realize their goals without giving
up anything in return, they will surely prefer that deal. Who
wouldn't? If we hand them strategic superiority by neglecting
our force modernization, we cannot hope to attain strategic
parity by pursuing arms control. On the other hand, if we pursue
programs to redress the imbalances that have developed through
the unparalled Soviet military buildup over the past decade, the
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Soviets will have strong incentives to negotiate genuine arms
reductions. And negotiate, I believe, they will.
Arms control will simply not survive in conditions of US-
Soviet military inequality, real or perceived. The relentless
buildup of Soviet nuclear forces over the past decade and the
growing vulnerabilities of elements of the US strategic forces
has forced us to design new weapons systems to counter the
resulting imbalances and instability. Once again we are relying
on technology to give us new weapons that are less vulnerable to
enemy attack, will maintain our deterrent capability, improve
stability and, thus, reduce the risk of war.
For example, the President announced last year that we would
follow the recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission and develop
a new small missile--called Midgetman--that could be based in a
number of ways, such as mobile launchers, that would be better
able to survive a Soviet attack and thus increase crisis
stability. The conclusion of that program will represent a major
technological advance and contribute significantly to deterrence.
Efforts are also underway to modernize our submarine
launched missiles and our bombers. And we are continuing to
implement NATO's 1979 decision to modernize the Alliance's
intermediate-range nuclear forces to balance Moscow's massive,
unprovoked--and profoundly destabilizing--buildup of new triple-
warheaded SS-20s. In the long term, we also are trying to reduce
reliance on nuclear weapons in the strategic area by seeking
viable new technologf of missile defense.
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As we improve our conventional, theater and strategic
nuclear forces in an effort to maintain the balance, we are also
intensively seeking arms control solutions to our security
problems. We have been negotiating with the Soviet Union, in
Geneva, to substantially reduce the strategic arsenals of both
sides. Particularly, we have concentrated on-reducing the two
most destabilizing elements of those forces, MIRVed missile
warheads and total missile throw-weight. In INF we have been
seeking to eliminate the entire class of longer-range INF
missiles which include the Soviet SS-20 missiles and our ongoing
and planned deployments of Pershing II ballistic missiles and
ground-launched cruise missiles.
But, as you know, the START and INF negotiations have been
put on hold by the Soviet union for an indefinite period. This
Soviet action was totally unjustified. For our part we remain
prepared to return to the negotiating table without preconditions
at the earliest possible time.
Technology and Verification
A second area where technology has a major role to play in
arms control is in verifying compliance with agreements and in
providing monitoring capabilities for new limitations. .
The President's recent findings of Soviet violations or
probable violations of a number of arms control obligations
underline the importance of effective verification. You cannot
have sound arms control without compliance;' and yot.cannothave
6
compliance unless you have knowledge. Technology jq~ help us
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Yet verification becomes more difficult and complicated as
nuclear weapons grow more complex. With the eventual
introduction of mobile ICBMs like Midgetman here and in the
Soviet Union, for example we will be presented with new arms
control challenges--how to monitor he number of mobile weapons
deployed throughout the vast Soviet land mass? The problems will
be even tougher as we focus on qualitative aspects of the arms
competition. Acceptable solutions to verification problems will
require innovative thinking, a partnership between our engineers
and our diplomats, and--but not least--a good deal of cooperation
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
However difficult this problem, we have no reason to
despair. We have faced such problems in the past; we can do so
again, under vastly more complicated conditions. Indeed, it is
probably fair to say that the SALT I treaty limiting US and
Soviet strategic forces was made possible back in the last 196oS
by the development of a number of technological marvels-the
advent of surveillance satellites) euphemistically called
national technical means
There is some debate about how effective our national
technical means have been in monitoring compliance with arms
control treaties. But you are all aware that it was this
American technology that has enabled us to uncover Soviet
violations of existing arms control treaties. This is a clear
demonstration of how technology and diplomacy work hand-in-hand,
and it offers hope for crafting workable arms control treaties in
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the future. One thing is certain, if verifiable arms control
treaties are to be a reality, our ability to monitor compliance
will have to keep pace with changing weapons technologies.
Future Horizons
Looking back, we have done reasonably well in both the
modernization and verification areas in maintaining our security.
Our technical and industrial capabilities have improved and we
continue to build on and learn from past arms control experience.
Solutions to our near-term security problems, while not
completed, seem close at hand. It is less clear, though, just
what our nuclear strategy and policy will be around the turn of
the century.
This brings me to the third area where technology can play a
major role in arms control--the development of emerging weapons
technology which, while enhancing deterrence, will reduce our
reliance on nuclear weapons.
The nuclear genie will not be put back in the bottle in the
foreseeable future, if ever. We must, therefore, look to the
horizon and beyond for new policies and strategies that can serve
us and our Allies in the future. Here, again, we might look for
answers along the dual-track of technology and diplomacy--new
weapons systems, new arms control measures.
Developments in conventional weapons systems offer us future
opportunities to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and to
significantly raise the threshold for using. nuclear weapons in
Europe and elsewhere. The distinct possibility exists that
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improved conventional weapons can replace some nuclear weapons in
accomplishing many military missions.
For example, with more accurate targeting and more effective
conventional munitions, we could expect that conventional weapons
could be used to destroy targets deep behind enemy lines which
previously could be effectively attacked only with nuclear
weapons. Progress in missile guidance means that our new
surface-to-air missile defense systems could rely on
conventional, rather than nuclear warheads. Conventional weapons
might also be preferable for anti-submarine warfare. And there
are numerous other areas where emerging conventional technologies
provide potential replacements for nuclear weapons.
But I hasten to introduce a cautionary note. For as far as
we can see into the future, nuclear weapons will continue to
undergird the West's deterrent strategy.
In the President's speech of March 23, 1983 he called upon
the scientific and technical community to determine how we might
use future technologies, technologies that have yet to emerge
from the laboratory to defend our nation and our Allies against
ballistic missile attacks. We may discover that defense systems
even if not totally effective, will change the strategic
reltionship between the superpowers in ways that will be
beneficial to both. We will need to pursue research that will
lead us down this road.
There are no assurances that these approaches will work even
if they are technically and economically feasible. What is
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clear, though, is that, if either of these ideas--or some
combination of the two--is to succeed, a necessary condition will
be verifiable arms control agreements--agreements that limit the
dimensions of the US-Soviet military competition. Without such
limitations, we are likely to endlessly skitter from one kind of
arms competition to another. We will have failed.
I am confident that our technical and scientific community,
along with the political and diplomatic communities, will
continue to work together to solve these difficult problems.
J. Robert Oppenheimer said, at the explosion of the first
atomic bomb: "In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no
humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have
known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose".
Perhaps some future Oppenheimer will say that technology equally
opened the path to redemption. There is a chance, of course,
that we may not succeed. But is certain that if we do not try,
we will fail.
Thank you.
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
April 27, 1984
84- 1912
Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State
Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: World Affairs Council of Orange County Speech
A draft copy of the Director's speech to be given on May 4, 1984,
before the world Affairs Council of Orange County, California
is attached. Any comments you may have on this speech should
be phoned to me (632-8478) not later than 3:00 p.m., Monday,
April 30, 1984.
16CC AC A_ r~,LL
William B. Staple
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
As stated
STAT
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Ladies and Gentlemen,
It's a pleasure for me to be here to address the World
Affairs Council of Orange County.
As some of you may know, before I was appointed to my
present job as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, I served a two-year stint at the United Nations as the
United States Deputy Representative. As you might imagine,
it was not without some skepticism about the efficacy of
multilateral diplomacy, and more specifically of the United
Nations, that I agreed to serve. But the opportunity to work
with Jeane Kirkpatrick was too good to turn down, and the UN
experience proved invaluable.
Months later, I got a call from Judge Clark asking me
to come to Washington to take over the Arms Control Agency,
It came at a time when I was becoming increasingly frustrated
by the amount of puerile rhetoric that goes on in New York. But
I had also seen some faint glimmerings that a multilateral
approach to arms control issues could be useful. Of course,
the most important factor in my decision to accept was the
challenge of the idea of coming to grips with some of the
most intellectually demanding and emotionally charged
issues of our times: how to reduce the risk of war while
preserving our cherished values, our freedoms.
When I joined ACDA, we were actively and energetically
engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on
strategic nuclear arms and on intermediate or long-range
nuclear arms reductions in Europe, as well as the multi-
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lateral talks in Vienna, in Geneva, and a conference about
ready to convene in Stockholm. I want to talk about those
multilateral efforts tonight. They are where the action is
these days in arms control because the Soviets have put the
bilateral nuclear arms talks on ice for an indefinite period.
Multilateral negotiations have had an important, and
often overlooked, impact. Negotiations at the Geneva Disarmament
Committee (the predecessor of the present CD) produced the 1963
treaty that bans the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere,
in space, and underwater. That was, in effect, the first inter-
national nuclear arms control treaty, and it continues to
exercise an important influence today.
Another major product of the Geneva talks was the 1968
treaty banning the further spread of nuclear weapons to other
countries and establishing a system for safeguarding peaceful
nuclear activities so they cannot be used for military or any
nuclear explosive purposes. That treaty, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, is today adhered to by more than 120 nations--more
countries than have adhered to any other arms control agreement.
That treaty has been recognized by every U.S. Administration
since President Johnson as a critical cornerstone of our interest
in preventing nuclear weapons spread.
Just two weeks ago, Vice President Bush presented the
United States draft treaty for a total global ban on chemical
weapons to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. It signifies
both the continuing importance of multilateral arms control
issues and the intensity of the Reagan Administration's efforts
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to embrace security through arms control.
Of the three multilateral fora in which the East and
West are involved in discussions on various arms control issues,
the Geneva Conference is the oldest. It evolved over the
years from an 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, which began
meeting in 1962 and just this year has been renamed for the
fourth or fifth time. It is now the Conference on Disarmament,
a forty member group, representing the East, West, and the non-
aligned. The next oldest multilateral area is the negotiations
in Vienna on mutual and balanced conventional force reductions
in Europe. These have been going on for 11 years, but have
yet to achieve any significant agreement. The youngest, the
Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe, began meeting this January in Stockholm.
Let's begin with the Conference on Disarmament and our
draft treaty to ban chemical weapons totally.
President Reagan announced early last month that he would
slend the Vice President to Geneva to present a draft treaty
that would ban the development, production, stockpiling, acquis-
ition, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons. On
April 18 the Vice President tabled the text and called upon the
Soviet Ambassador seated two seats to his right--to work with
us and the other 38 members of the CD to achieve agreement
promptly.
The Soviet news agency Tass, responded almost immediately
and predictably to this announcement by referring to the treaty
as a propaganda trick deliberately rigged with unacceptable
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conditions. The conditions to which Tass referred are prop
provisions for on-site challenge inspections on very short
What the United States has proposed is indeed unusual. It is
far-reaching, it is intrusive] In arms control it is unique.
We have suggested an "open invitation" to inspect any military
or government-owned or controlled facility, on twenty-four hours
notice, in order to resolve compliance questions. This provision
is in the draft because the United States wants to achieve an
effective ban on chemical weapons, the world's oldest means of
mass destruction of human beings. In 1915, clouds of chlorine
gas called mustard gas rolled across the battlefields at Ypres,
Belgium. That was'the beginning of World War I. Over 1 million
casualties and 90,000 deaths came from chemical weapons. In
the 1930's they were used in Ethiopia by the Italians. Then,
for 30 years, no nation used them.
In the late 60's, however, there was evidence of their
reappearance on an obscure battlefield in Yemen, almost
certainly supplied by the Soviets. In the mid-1970's, the
Hmong people in Laos became the next victims of chemical warfare.
In 1979 we received reliable reports of chemical weapons being
used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, a practice that has
apparently continued into the 80's. And Vietnamese and Lao
troops, Soviet surrogate forces, continued at least until very
recently to use chemical weapons against the Among resistance.
Then, in 1983 the world has witnessed Iraq using chemical weapons
in its war against Iran.
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All this despite the two international agreements that
restrict use the use of chemical weapons.
The first is the Geneva Protocal, which prohibits the use
in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. That treaty
was completed in 1925 with the grim lessons of World War I
fresh in mind. The Soviets joined it in 1928, Iran in 1929,
and Iraq in 1931. It has been a major bulwark against chemical
weapons use, more than 100 countries are parties, but it is now
in danger of crumbling by two parties' disregard for their own
obligations.
The second treaty is the 1972 Convention on Biological and
Toxin Weapons. It prohibits development, production, transfer
and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Toxins
are chemical weapons, which can be produced by biological
processes or chemically synthesized. The Soviets have been
parties to the Convention since 1975 and Laos since 1973. Both
have violated it.
Two years ago, in his speech to the United Nations' Second
Special Session on Disarmament, President Reagan said that,
The use of chemical and biological weapons has long been viewed
with revulsion by civilized nations. No peacemaking institution
can ignore the use of these dread weapons and still live up to
its mission."
Nine months later, in February 1983, Vice President Bush
announced at the CD that the United States would support
negotiations for a complete and verifiable ban on chemical
weapons. The same month the United States provided to the
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Conference a detailed paper outline of what would need to be
included in an effective, comprehensive chemical weapons ban.
Our draft treaty takes a futher step in that directon.
The next question, of course, is predictable: why are we
asking Congress for money to build binary chemical weapons when
we are ready to negotiate to ban these weapons?
The United States unilaterally decided to stop producing
chemical weapons in 1969, while retaining a limited deterrent
capability. Unfortunately, the Soviets did not stop. They
have a variety of chemical agents and delivery vehicles, a
substantial production capacity, large numbers of chemical
warfare troops, and extensive chemical protective equipment and
training.
The United States is absolutely committed to negotiation
of a verifiable ban on chemical weapons. At the same time, the
United States must have have a credible way of deterring the
Soviet Union from using its capability. Binary weapons can
provide that deterrent, and in our view, promote successful
negotiations as well. The modernization program would not mean
that our stockpile would grow--it would only become more dependable
and modern. For every binary round produced, an aging, less
safe chemical munition would be destroyed. Of course, when
agreement is reached on a chemical weapons ban, all chemical
weapons, binaries included, would be destroyed.
The total elimination of chemical weapons is our goal and
we need to try to move the Soviets in that direction. We
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believe our willingness to go ahead with a modernization
program, unless they agree to a ban, is an important incentive.
Now let's turn to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
talks, or MBFR. This eleven-year negotiation, important as it
is, generally receives much less public attention. And, as
noted, it has yet to produce any concrete agreement after
eleven years. MBFR involves 19 countries of the NATO and
Warsaw Pact alliances. It seeks ways to reduce the massive
concentration of troops on both sides of the dividing line in
Central Europe. It deals exclusively with conventional forces.
You need no long memory to recall that this is the area
that kindled two world wars. It is also the potential cockpit
of future conflict between the superpowers.
Neither side is oblivious to the danger, and they have
been meeting since 1973 to try to reduce and balance these
troop levels. Unfortunately, so far success has eluded our
best efforts.
Now, I am sure that some of you are wondering if a
negotiation that goes on for 11 years without a tangible result
is worth the candle. You are not alone. Some of MBFR's more
cynical critics, impatient with the lack of progress, have
observed that keeping track of the talks is like watching a car
rust. Others are critical of the whole nature of the effort.
They contend that the "M. B. F. R." really stands for "Much
Better For Pe Russians."
Before I tell you why MBFR--Mutual and Bala
Reductions--are worth pursuing, let me say that if there is
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-8-
anything I have learned while working on arms control, it is
that impatience has no place whatsoever. Impatience can give
rise to unnecessary and perhaps damaging concessions and less
than well-founded positions. In MBFR, as in other arms control
talks, the issues are highly complex and involve very important
questions of national security. That kind of negotiation
requires extraordinary patience. History shows us nothing
worthwhile comes easily or quickly.
The devastating potential for nuclear destruction creates
a sense of urgency in the public mind. This could be dangerous.
Of course the matter is urgent, and we deeply regret that the
Soviets have broken off negotiations. But at the same time
it would be a mistake to let a sense of urgency blur our vision,
or to put all our arms control eggs in the nuclear basket. In
formulating arms control policies, we have to consider the
entire spectrum of modern warfighting capability, both nuclear
and conventional forces.
In fact, since a nuclear conflict would very likely be
preceded by conventional hositilies, it is essential that arms
control policy complement the nuclear weapons talks with strong
efforts to reduce the chances of conventional war. That's why
the MBFR negotiations have formed an important part of this
U.S. arms control agenda.
Another significant benefit of MBFR, that is often overlooked
by its critics, is the involvement of most of our NATO partners
in the negotiations. The experience gained by negotiating
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together for common goals, promotes a cohesiveness among Alliance
members that can only strengthen NATO as a political force.
Finally, the talks are the only bloc-to-bloc negotiation
in existence today. This direct channel of communication
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has, if nothing else, increased
understanding between the two opposing alliances. That, in
itself is a confidence-building measure.
While it it true, as noted, that success has eluded us
in MBFR, some progress has been made.
Last year the Eastern side offered a new proposal that
moved a considerable distance toward the Western position on
the critical issue of verification. Specifically, the East
agreed in principle to the long-standing Western insistence on
the establishment of observers and troop entry-exit points
through which all forces entering or leaving an area would pass;
to an exchange of information on forces remaining in the area;
and to on-site inspection. These moves stopped well short of
what we actually need in the way of verification, but they are
a step in the right direction.
To elicit further Eastern movement, the West has prepared
a new proposal designed to get around what has been the major
stumbling block for years: the inability of the two sides to
agree on the size of the present Eastern force. In short, the
Eastern numbers simply do not jibe at all with Western estimates.
This has been commonly called the "data" issue.
Our new approach would offer flexibility on the data issue
in return for flexibility from the East in meeting our verification
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concerns. The approach offers the Eastern countries an
opportunity, if they want it, to show that they are seriously
interested in MBFR progress. The next round of talks begins
later this month. We do not know if we can succeed, but we do
know that we have very sound proposals if the Soviets and the
other Warsaw Pact members are willing.
The third multilateral arms control forum just got underway
in Stockholm. It is the Conference on Confidence and Security
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe--usually referred
to as the CDE. You'll recall particular attention was focussed
on the opening last January, as it represented a key multilateral
arms control from beginning after Soviet walkouts from START, INF,
and MBFR. Most of the 35 states participating sent their foreign
ministers--we were represented by Secretary Shultz, and the
Soviets by Mr. Gromyko. Its first session concluded in March, and
on May 8, the second of four meetings scheduled for this year
will begin.
This form stems from, and is an integral part of, a larger
overall effort. It is an outgrowth of another conference--the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--or CSCE. The
CSCE began in Helsinki in 1975, and has subsequently met in
Belgrade and Madrid. It meets next in 1986 in Vienna--and this is
when the CDE must report its progress on security issues to the
larger body of CSCE. CSCE is concerned with a broad spectrum
of fundamental human values--such as human rights, economics,
cultural cooperation--and security. Now that we have covered
this somewhat complex relationship, let's look at CDE a bit
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closer. The Stockholm conference is focussed on confidence and
security building measures. These are measures designed to
increase openness in the military sphere and thus reduce the
chances of surprise attacks or miscalculation. Prior notification
of military exercises and subsequent verification of their
,nonthreatening nature, for example, enable all parties to have
a better understanding of what their European neighbors are
doing militarily.
We are working together with our NATO allies in this
Conference to accomplish measures that are militarily significant,
politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of
Europe. We have, early in the process, introduced a Western
package, which meets these standards. Our proposals would
enhance trust and security by requiring each State to:
o Provide information on the structure of its military
units.
o Submit an annual review of all important military
activities it has planned in Europe during a coming year.
o Give advanced notice of important military activities
at least 45 days in advance.
o Invite other parties to send observers to all important
military activities.
The Soviet Union has not introduced any specific proposals
at Stockholm; but rather has concentrated on promoting general
declarations for non-use-of-force and no-first-use of nuclear
weapons, reduction of military budgets, a chemical-weapon-free-
zone in Europe, and nuclear-free zones in Europe. These either
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merely reiterate existing commitments, or seek to undermine
NATO strategy, or advance unverifiable limitations that would
do little but harm to our basic objective of increasing stability.
Obviously the Soviet Union is not yet serious about negotiating
in Stockholm. For our part, we will keep working.
Conclusion:
These multilateral negotiations are frequently overlooked,
for the very simple reason that by their nature they move slowly,
and public attention is rivetted on nuclear weapons and the
need to reduce them as fast as possible. That is only natural.
So is the public concern about the Soviet walk-out from the
intermediate-range nuclear force talks and the Soviet's
indefinitely suspending the strategic arms talks.
When the Soviets took those steps late last year, evey my
father asked if I was in need of a job to keep busy. He was
quite surprised to learn of all the behind-the-scenes work in which
we at the Arms Control Agency--and in the Reagan Administration--
are heavily engaged, even when the bilateral Geneva talks are on
ice.
In the first place, we are actively reviewing issues in
the nuclear negotiations with a view to being ready and flexible
when the Soviets return to those talks. We cannot forecast
when they will come back, but it is clear that nuclear arms
control is in their interests as well. It is fair to assume,
therefore, that these talks will resume later, if not sooner.
In the second place, as I have outlined, we are actively
participating in a number of multillteral arms control
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negotiations. The seemingly endless negotiating rounds and
the weary rhetoric we hear in the UN fora, and in the Geneva,
Vienna, and Stockholm talks can be frustrating. But we must
not be overly critical. That is, regrettably, part of
multilateral diplomacy.
For despite this irritating aspect, our active participation
is essential if we are to advance our arms control interests and
Alliance unity. The issues themselves--quite apart from the
rhetoric--are thorny and contentious. But they all involve
important goals for our security and foreign policy.
We have not reached our goals but we are staying the course
and steadily working to achieve them. One of the important
achievements of President Reagan's search for greater international
stability is that this quest has gathered more momentum under
his leadership than, I venture to say, under any Administration
in recent history. He is leaving no stone unturned and activating
all fronts.
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
April 27, 1984
Executi~",i 6
84-
1913
M. Kimmitt,
Robert
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State
Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
STAT
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Mid-America Committee Speech
A draft copy of the Director's speech to be given on May 2, 1984,
before the Mid-America Committee in Chicago is attached. Any
comments you may have on this speech should be phoned to me
(632-8478) not later than 3:00 p.m., Monday, April 30, 1984.
&Qy v,a Q
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
As stated
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 uKAr"1 4/27/84
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ARRESTING THE NUCLEAR GENIE
It is a pleasure to be with the Mid-America Committee to
discuss one of the most critical arms control issues before
us: stopping the spread of nuclear weapons or, if you will,
arresting the nuclear genie.
I would ask you to pause for just a moment and ponder
the following:
o What if Iran or Iraq had the nuclear bomb?
o What if a leader like Qaddafi got a hold of
that capability?
o What if the PLO or another terrorist group
acquired nuclear-weapons? =
Frightening thoughts, I am sure we all agree. But live
issues still. Constant vigilance and active policies will
be necessary to avoid having these thoughts become realities.
Even today, talk about the spread of nuclear weapons to
Iran is in the news. A British defense journal recently
alleged that Ayatolah Khomeini's Iran is only two years away
from acquiring the bomb. Our own assessment is that it would
take many more years for either Iran or Iraq to develop
nuclear weapons if they decided to do so.
But even the possibility -- howsoever slim -- clearly
is frightening. For well over three years now, these two
countries have been engaged in a bloody war of attrition.
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that have grown up over the years. Iran has used young boys
as shock troops; Iraq has used deadly chemical weapons.
If either of these two warring nations possessed a
nuclear weapon, does anyone doubt that it probably would
have been used? Does anyone doubt that such use would have
greatly increased the already terrible destruction and loss
of life? Does anyone doubt that the use of nuclear weapons,
or even only its prospect, would have risked drawing in
still other nations, raising the danger of wider conflict?
Look at another hypothetical example. Past Argentine
governments have stressed that Argentina does not intend to
acquire nuclear weapons. The new civilian government has
reiterated that pledge and taken steps to ensure more
civilian control-over Argentina's advanced nuclear program.
But as you recall, a few years ago Argentina and Britain
went to war over some small barren islands in the South
Atlantic -- the Falklands or, as Argentina calls them, the
Malvinas. What if the military government at the time had
nuclear weapons? The stakes and dangers of that conflict
could have gone up dramatically.
Look even further at the dangers of nuclear terrorism.
Imagine the devastating impact upon the Western economies if
one of the key Middle East oil production or distribution
facilities were struck by a terrorist attack using a nuclear
weapon. Or, a terrorist group might seek to smuggle a nuclear
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weapon into a Western European capital or into the United
States. The group's objective might be to demand political
concessions, to extort financial compensation, even simply
to inflict terror and devastation. The chances or
opportunites for a terrorist group to acquire a nuclear
weapon increase if the number of nuclear powers increase.
Imagine, if you will, a Qaddafi with the bomb. And, I
might add, he has stated his ambition to try to get one.
There are more examples, but the point is clear:
efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are
absolutely critical to our attempts to create a more stable
and peaceful world, to strengthen the already frayed fabric
of-world order.
The bomb's spread around the globe would threaten not
only its new owners' neighbors but also its new owners. It
would threaten the security and well-being of the United
States and our close friends and Allies. Indeed, the
possible spread of nuclear weapons to any of the many
regions of the world characterized by continuing crises and
periodic military conflict poses the greatest danger of
nuclear weapons actually being used.
How can we meet this challenge, or control this threat?
We wrestle with that question daily.
As a start, we need a defense in depth:' that is, a
broad range of measures and institutions that will reduce
the chances that these terrifying weapons will spread still
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further around the globe. Or, if you will pardon the metaphor
with the baseball season getting underway, this is a field in
which we can hit singles and perhaps a few doubles but very
rarely a home run.
A first part of that defense are a range of security
relationships, guarantees and other policies that are often
overlooked in discussions of proliferation problems because
they have nothing directly to do with nuclear weapons spread.
By contributing to regional political stability, however,
they reduce any incentives countries might otherwise have to
"go nuclear." Thus, these tools of our broad security and
foreign policies are also indispensable to our efforts to
prevent nuclear spread.
Another essential element in this defense are measures
to slow and impede the technical progress of any country
that sets out on the road to the bomb. The United States,
has, with some other countries' support, pursued such measures
to rather good effect.
Over the past several years, we have led an international
effort to upgrade and strengthen controls for nuclear exports
applied by the major nuclear suppliers. Just last January,
all these suppliers agreed on steps to tighten controls on
technology for enriching uranium. "Enriching" sounds
innocent, but that process is one of the two paths by which
a country could acquire "bomb-grade" material. We cannot
rest as technology marches on. Today, work is underway to
deal with the threat posed by other sensitive technologies.
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Your government is, I can assure you, not asleep on these
issues. We have a system for "nuclear export alerts" that
plays an important part in trying to impede countries' pursuit
of a nuclear explosives capability. Intelligence, for
example, often alerts us to attempted or pending purchases of
items or technology that can help a country on a road to
nuclear explosives. With early warning of such sensitive
transactions, the United States can take action itself, or
urge other governments to prevent their going through. In
1983, we had we had more than 100 of these alerts. Many had
good results.
Nonetheless, nearly four decades have passed since the j
first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico in July
1945. That is another way of saying that nuclear weapons
are, in some respects, an old technology -- much like
television. The leaders of every country that might be
contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons knows the most
important technical fact about them: they work.
Thus, important as our efforts are to reinforce the -
technical barricades against nuclear weapons spread, they
can only buy time. In some cases, of course, we can buy a
great deal of time. In others, the time may be short. But,
whatever time we buy can be valuable in itself. A later
political change may bring to power leaders not committed to
developing nuclear explosives.
One of our most important problems is how to use wisely
the time that has been bought. How do we take advantage of
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whatever breathing space we gain? The defense in depth can
fall apart if that time is not put to good and sometimes hard
use.
One way to use that time productively is to work on
reducing the motivations, either real or imagined, that can
lead countries to seek nuclear weapons in the first place.
This leads me back to the strong and credible alliances and
security ties around the world that I mentioned earlier.
They are vital for our non-proliferation goals. This is one
reason why the Reagan Administration has sought to buttress
our alliances and other ties in northeast Asia and to estab-
lish a new security relationship with Pakistan.
Fielding a defense in depth also requires that whatever
time is available be used to strengthen the international
insitutions that help prevent the bomb's spread. While we
justifiably question the net value of some international
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the
IAEA as the jargon would have it, is one that is very much
in our interest. Created in 1957, largely as a result of
of the Eisenhower Administration's initiative, this Agency
today administers a system of safeguards on civilian nuclear
facilities -- including on-site inspection, checking of
records and actual physical measurements and checks.
Countries accepting safeguards on all their nuclear activi-
ties demonstrate their peaceful intentions and reduce
suspicions on the part of their neighbors. An effective
safeguards system can detect possible misuse of peaceful
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nuclear technology, thereby ringing the alarm bell. That
risk can serve as an important deterrent.
That leaves a question, of course, of how the countries
of the world will respond, if the alarm bell rings?
President Reagan has made clear that any violation of IAEA
safeguards or of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or a nuclear
explosion by a non-nuclear power, would be of grave concern
for the United States. Specific sanctions also are provided
by U.S. legislation and international agreements in the
nuclear field.
But, to be honest, we need to strengthen the prospect
of strong sanctions. Those warnings are necessary for an
effective preventive system. We need to remind potential
proliferators that the response of the United States and
others will come down hard if the alarm sounds. That
warning can help tip the balance against a country's seeking
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons also demands
that we use the time available to enhance the growing inter-
national norm against acquiring these weapons. Past
experience here is quite illuminating.
In 1960, France detonated its first nuclear weapon in
an Algerian desert. French President de Gaulle immediately
sent a congratulatory telegram to his scientists at the
site, lauding their great feat and stressing that France,
too, now had the access due it as a great power with the
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most advanced weaponry. Little more than a decade later,
in 1974 India detonated a nuclear explosive in the Rajasthan
desert. Rather than stressing India's acquisition of
advanced weaponry, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi called that
blast a "peaceful nuclear explosion" -- needed to build
harbors and dig canals. That is a distinction that we all
know has no practical difference. India sought, so to speak,
to sneak into the "nuclear club" through a back door.
What these two stories reflect, to my mind, are the
changed international mood and expected standard of behavior.
Put simply, it is no longer thought legitimate to acquire
nuclear explosives. -
- This changed international norm is best evidenced by
the readiness of more than 120 countries to adhere to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and thereby renounce any
acquisition of nuclear weapons. We continually seek to
strengthen this barrier by encouraging the relatively few
hold-outs to join the treaty. In this Administration 10 new
parties have been added. Regrettably, several countries of-
most proliferation concern continue to hold out -- for a
variety of reasons.
We will experience next year a large international
conference to review the implementation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. We will work long and hard to ensure
its success but -- as in so many other areas -- success may
be measured to a considerable degree by the avoidance of
failure or disaster. The world at large can ill afford to
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allow this stalwart to be eroded.
Many of you may not be aware of the fact that we have
another key part of our defense in depth in a treaty pro-
moted and culminated by our neighbors in Latin America that
creates a nuclear weapons-free-zone there. All but a few
Latin American countries have joined but regrettably not
all. Early in this Administration, President Reagan sought
and obtained Senate ratification of an important non-
proliferation protocol to this treaty, thereby removing one
obstacle to its complete success. That success will depend
principally on-the hold-outs-in the region itself. -The-new
Alfonsin government in Argentina, for example, could con-
tribute greatly to this goal and to stability in the region
by acceding to this nuclear-weapon-free-zone.
Those countries outside these-systems and not accepting
these norms are, to be sure, a major concern. We need to
use the time we buy to bring them closer if not completely
into accord with the international non-proliferation norms
and responsible behavior-of most nations. We need to use
"sticks" and "carrots."
In this regard, you have no doubt read recently about
the new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with
China. A lot of the "news" announced by President Reagan
in Beijing has focused on the prospects of nuclear sales to
China. An extremely important result of this recent opening
to China has been frequently overlooked.
Within the past months, China has moved to accept
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international non-proliferation practices and norms. It
has joined the International Atomic Energy Agency. It has
stated that it will require international safeguards on its
nuclear exports. It has stressed that it will not assist or
encourage other countries to acquire the bomb.
These are most welcome steps. United States discussions
on nuclear cooperation with China over the past year -- as
well as those of other countries -- contributed to this
beneficial result. That affect may be difficult to calculate,
but should not be-ignored.
Finally, our defense in depth against nuclear prolifera-
tion requires the cooperation of other countries. In the
non-proliferation area, like so many others, we simply cannot
do it alone -- or go it-alone.
Cooperation with our allies and other nuclear suppliers
is essential if we are to continue to press the technical
barriers against proliferation. The cooperation of many
neutral and non-aligned countries as well is necessary if we
are to ensure that the international norm against prolifera-
tion remains strong.
Cooperation with the Soviet Union is also important.
Indeed, in the past few years this cooperation has been
expanded and established on a more regular basis. Our two
countries have continued to work together in this area
for a rather simple reason: The Soviets do not want to see
other countries join the nuclear weapons club any more than
we do. They know that it will threaten their security.
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I would be remiss this afternoon if I left you without
the reminder that cooperation at home is also necessary.
Of course, we in the Executive Branch do not always agree
with the Congress on particular proposals to deal with the
threat of nuclear weapons spread. And, of course, Members
of Congress do not always share our approach. Despite
differences of view, the two branches need to work effec-
tively together to achieve our country's abiding non-
proliferation goals.
What about the future? -- Should we be optimistic or
pessimistic about the prospects for avoiding the further
spread of these devastating nuclear weapons around the
world. It strikes me in thinking about those questions
that, throughout the past decades, the very gloomy forecasts
of a world of more and more nuclear weapons states have not
held true.
For example, in 1958 a special committee of the National
Planning Association predicted in a monograph 1970 Without
Arms Control that "by 1970, most nations with appreciable
military strength will have in their arsenals nuclear weapons
-- strategic, tactical or both." Similarly, in a 1962 press
conference, President Kennedy warned of a world in which by
1970 or 1975 nuclear weapons would be "in the hands of a
good many nations."
Five countries are, as you know, nuclear-weapon states.
Also - India has demonstrated a nuclear capabililty. Still
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the pessimistic predictions have not come to pass.
Instead, the United States and many other countries
have put those past decades to good use. Through those
efforts we have many building blocks against nuclear weapons'
spread.
Now most countries around the world have come to
recognize that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is
very much in their interest and that if they are not part of
the solution, then they are part of the problem.
But we cannot -- dare not -- rest on past efforts and
established building blocks. Preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons "into the hands of countries large and small, stable
and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered
throughout the world," to quote another gloomy prophecy by
President Kennedy, is a continuing challenge. With patient
effort, and high-level attention and public support, I
believe that we can meet that challenge successfully. The
nuclear genie is out of the bottle but we can -- and must --
arrest its travels.
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
April 27, 1984
84_ 1910
Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State
Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Bilderberg Speech
A draft copy of the Director's speech before the Bilderberg
meeting at Saltsjobaden, Sweden is attached. Any comments
you may have on this speech should be phoned to me (632-8478)
not later than noon, Tuesday, May 1, 1984.
William B. Staple
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
As stated
STAT
X66
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A standard saying in Washington runs something like this:
"Negotiating with the Soviets is not really all that bad
compared to the ordeal of negotiating, and a sometimes battling,
within the United States Government to get a position in the
first place."
It is uttered only half in jest and reminds one of
Winston Churchill's now famous characterization of democracy
as "the worst system ever invented -- except for all the rest".
In truth, the disagreements that take place over the bargaining
table in Geneva can pale compared to some of the debates over
arms control purposes and policies that take place in Washington.
The Executive Branch, the Congress, the press, the bureaucracy and
the public all partake to varying degrees, depending on the issue.
Having a general understanding of how systems work in the West,
the Soviets frequently assume that if they sit back and hang
tough, they can count on the West to negotiate with itself and
come up with new proposals to try to move them. It is an age-old
strategy. Unfortunately, experience has shown the Soviets
that it is not an unwise strategy for them to pursue.
This underlines the need for some constancy and consensus,
or at least sufficient support, if our arms control efforts are
to be successful. The Reagan Administration has put great effort
into building bipartisan support at home and greater commonality
and consultation with our Allies. This also underlines the need to
try to look ahead, farther down the road, to see how we can
strengthen our basic arms control objectives and the public con-
fidence in them.
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I am assuming -- and, I trust, fairly -- that all of us here
have a good grasp of exactly where the different arms control
negotiations stand today:
o The Soviets have walked out of the INF talks. It is uncertain
whether and when they will come back to separate negotiations
on these weapon systems.
o The Soviets have indefinitely suspended the START talks but are
likely to return, if not later this year then next.
o The US is actively reviewing issues in these areas to insure
that when the Soviets do come back, we will be ready and
flexible.
o Multilateral arms control negotiations will be where much of
the action is this year.
o The Conference on Disarmament will have a lot to focus on in
working toward a total global ban on chemical weapons as re-
cently proposed by the US.
o The MBFR negotiations are again underway. The West looks
forward to showing some flexibility on the data question
if the East is ready to be flexible on verification issues.
o In the CDE in Stockholm, we look forward to trying to get
down to serious negotiations, but Soviet willingness remains
a question mark.
Rather than rehash in greater detail specific issues in these
negotiations, I would like to focus today on two longer-term approaches
-- somewhat "new tracks", if you will -- toward achieving our arms
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control objectives. The first is the need to seek ways by which
we can, over time, reduce the role and perceived importance of
nuclear weapons in our defense posture. The second is the desir-
ability of giving further consideration to how we might advance
arms control objectives through less formal and probably less
comprehensive arrangements. Both of these tracks have potential
promise if we are willing and able to pursue them.
De-Emphasizing Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear deterrence will, for as far as we can see into
the future, be a central element in US security policy. The
US commitment of that deterrent for the protection of US
Allies is at the heart of NATO. Whatever else we do, we
must not cast doubt on the viability of that deterrent strategy,
as doubt only increases instabilty and the chances of miscal-
culation.
But a number of factors argue for beginning to examine
some possible steps toward reducing the extent to which we
rely on nuclear weapons in US and Western security strategy.
For one, the US no longer has the clear nuclear superiority
that it enjoyed up until the late 1960's. For another, the
prospect that nuclear war could have drastic, long-term,
global effects is being driven home by new research. The
idea of a "nuclear winter" knows no boundaries between attacker
and the attacked, or between combatants and innocent peoples.
Finally, there is great concern among Western publics
over nuclear weapons. This is understandable. Public confidence
in our deterrent strategy will be undermined if we are perceived
as relying too heavily on the threat of nuclear annihilation.
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It is both reasonable and possible to provide decision-makers
with capabilities that will present options other than the
Hobson choice of early initiation of nuclear weapons use or
inaction. New conventional weapons technologies offer one
way to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms
control can also help.
Significant opportunities are opening up in conventional
weapons systems that could provide ways of de-emphasizing
nuclear weapons on both the strategic and theater levels.
Conventional weapons that could effectively assume military
roles that up until now have been achievable only by nuclear
weapons are on the horizon. These systems are based on
technologies for improved ways of finding and distinguishing
targets on the battlefield and in the rear; on more sophisticated
command, control and communications systems; and on more
effective conventional munitions -- the so-called smart
weapons.
Our arms control efforts are designed to affect significant
reductions in forces. START and INF would directly reduce nuclear
weapons. All our proposals in these talks are consistent with
our nuclear deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, they reflect a
willingness to reduce the emphasis that has been placed to
date on nuclear weapons.
In addition, the West has taken several unilateral steps
to reduce nuclear weapons. The US nuclear stockpile today is
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a third below its 1967 peak, yet still more effective. Alliance
decisions over the last four years will result in a net decrease
of 2,400 weapons in the nuclear stockpile in Europe.
These arms control efforts, combined with improvements
in our conventional capabilities can set the stage for a security
policy that places less emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons.
Some of these conventional opportunities and programs are,
admittedly, still in the early stages of development. But we
need to look at them now in terms of how they can enhance our
deterrent posture and public confidence in it.
A look at the late 1950's and, particularly, the 1960's
shows us that efforts to significantly strengthen conventional
capabilities have run up against two major concerns. The first
relates to the effect generally on the US nuclear commitment
to NATO; the second relates to cost.
Past efforts by the US to strengthen conventional capabilities
-- and thereby to de-emphasize nuclear weapons -- run the risk
of seeming to Europeans as a weakening of the basic American
commitment to its Allies. It seems to me, however, that
strengthened conventional capabilities would actually enhance
that commitment by supplementing, not replacing, the nuclear
component.
Conventional forces are, generally speaking, more expensive
than nuclear defense. On the other hand, the real cost of
significantly strengthened conventional defense is not clear.
More effective ways of managing the collective defense resources
of the Alliance offer the possibility of deploying more capable
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conventional forces without having to make great increases in
our defense expenditures. Finally, cost issues also have to be
weighed against the prospect of not having a military response
when it is really wanted or needed.
This does not argue for a change in NATO's strategy of
deterrence and flexible response. That doctrine, carefully
crafted in the 1960's, has served the Alliance well and
remains valid today.
But the concept of flexible response was intended to be
based on, and should be based on, a balanced mix of conventional
and nuclear forces. What I am suggesting is that we need to
give greater attention to steps to strengthen the conventional
leg of that mix.
A conventional build-up should, of course, not be entertained
as a way to make possible a policy of "no first-use" of nuclear
weapons. Even if such a major build-up were attainable, which
is highly questionable, that policy would be both unwise and
dangerous. To qualify the US commitment to its own defense or to
the defense of Europe with a "no first-use" posture would lower
the Soviet calculation of the risks and potential costs of aggres-
sion against NATO. That would not serve our fundamental policy
objective of deterrence.
Escalation to nuclear weapons would be a grave step, one which
the Alliance would want to take only after deliberate and careful
consideration. It is not a decision that we would want to be rushed
into by the press of events if we did not need to be rushed.
Flexible response -- supplemented by a integrated policy
for conventional force development that would offer a choice of
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"no early first-use" -- would preserve an effective deterrent
and go a long way to reassuring our publics. And, as Professor
Michael Howard has noted, "reassurance" of Western publics
and political structures has been as important in maintaining
our freedom and security as has "deterrence" in its narrower
sense.
De Facto And De Jure Arms Control
Generally speaking, in arms control efforts to date we have
sought formal agreements as the means of imposing limits. These,
of course, establish mutual and specific legal obligations binding
on the parties. We should, where possible, continue to seek such
legally binding arrangements to reduce and otherwise limit arms.
At the same time, we should be alert to possibilities for en-
gaging in arms control by mutual restraint. This could be comprised,
for example, of statements of national policy -- unilateral under-
takings by the sides -- which could be negotiated and confirmed in
exchanges of declarations or letters. The outcome would be de facto
arrangement which, in some instances, could be both easier to
achieve and simpler to carry out.
These kind of arrangements would not, obviously, apply to all
situations. In weighing the relative merits of a de jure or
de facto arrangement in any given case, certain considerations come
to mind.
Comprehensiveness is one of them. This is both a virtue and a
problem. It is a virtue in the sense that it is best to limit all
critical categories of arms and forces. Otherwise, systems that
are not limited have a tendency to be built up and exploited. This
can, effect, undercut the constraints on systems limited. It
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is a lot like a balloon that is squeezed in one area only to bulge
out in areas that are not so constrained.
The first strategic arms limitation agreement, for example,
froze the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile launchers, but placed no limitations on
the number of warheads and only indirect limits on throwweight --
important measures of the overall destructive capability of missiles.
We have witnessed, during the 1970's, significant increases in the
number of warheads on these missiles and, particularly, a tremendous
increase in the destructive capability of the Soviet missile forces.
While a more comprehensive agreement is more likely to limit
real military capability, they are by definition more complex and
difficult to negotiate. They are also, in many respects, much more
difficult to verify. In fact, achieving comprehensive agreements in
some areas are today, just as they have been throughout the history
of arms control, virtually impossible because of the verification
difficulties. Hence, we establish priorities and seek to be as
comprehensive as possible.
De facto arrangements would have a tendency to be less compre-
hensive, and to focus on areas or systems where verification
presents fewer rather than more problems. They would, in theory,
be easier to negotiate and possibly quicker. By being less formal,
de facto arrangements would also be more easily modified if circum-
stances changed than would legally-binding treaties or agreements.
That, as well, can cut both ways depending on the circumstances.
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In going down a more limited path in any given area, however, we
would need to consider the impact or effect on our broader objec-
tives.
In the United States, not to mention other countries, law
requires that any obligation undertaken with regard to arms control
or disarmament must be approved by the Senate as a treaty or
authorized by special enabling legislation passed by both Houses
of Congress. The SALT I Interim Agreement was approved in the
latter manner. Alternatively, restraint as a national policy --
such as our policy on not undercutting SALT I or SALT II as long
as the Soviets exercise similar restraint -- would not necessarily
require that kind of approval. Nevertheless, working closely with
Congress will always be necessary to avoid any appearance of trying
to "end-run the system".
I am not suggesting that we should turn our attention away
from the long and arduous negotiations on arms control agreements
to more simple approaches outside of agreements. That would not
serve Western interests or likely be successful.
But I am suggesting that, as we look down the road at arms
control, it may be possible to advance our objectives in certain
areas by establishing mutual restraint through de facto, reciprocal
undertakings. Given the obvious problems of negotiating and then
achieving approval for full-fledged arms control accords, we should
not ignore those possibilities.
Nor am I suggesting that this restraint should be unilateral.
Unilateral examples can be important. We should, I think we will
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all agree, try to lead the way toward more stabilizing and survivable
systems. That is critical to reducing the risks of war.
But unilateral action does not usually get us very far and is
not sufficient. While the West exercised restraint in developing
strategic capabilities in the 1970's, we witnessed a massive and
unsurpassed Soviet buildup. So, I am focusing on reciprocal, not
unilateral, undertakings.
Barbara Tuchman once observed that "a problem that strikes one
in the study of history, regardless of period, is why man makes a
poorer performance of government than of almost any other human
activity". That, too, is reminiscent of Winston Churchill.
But, in the advanced nuclear age, we cannot afford poor perform-
ance in our security and arms control strategies. Nor can we afford
not to try to look down the road to possible new, or at least
different, horizons. I have tried to outline a couple of those
today. More obviously exist and will warrant our attention.
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