PROSPECTS FOR A MAJOR INSURGENT OFFENSIVE IN EL SALVADOR AND AN ASSOCIATED MILITARY BUILDUP IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001500010018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: June 11, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
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National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Chief, National Intelligence Council
11 June 1984
Acting National Intelligence Officer, Latin America
SUBJECT: Prospects for a Major Insurgent Offensive in El Salvador and
an Associated Military Buildup in Nicaragua.
1. Selected Intelligence Community analysts from CIA, State/INR, DIA and
NSA met on 8 June to review recent intelligence
of a major Salvadoran insurgent offensive and a
possibly related m- itary buildup in Nicaragua. We were able to reach a
general consensus on the likely prospects for each as well as some areas of
particular concern.
2. First, it was agreed that Cuban perceptions and tactics in Central
America in the short term do not necessarily coincide with those
Sandinistas or the Salvadoran insurgents, and that while the may
have been talking of a large-scale insurgent offensive aimed at defeating the
Salvadoran Army, this was not necessarily the goal or the tactics of the
guerrillas themselves. Instead, there was general consensus that the
insurgents are preparing an offensive with more limited goals, aimed primarily
at regaining the military initiative, strengthening their domestic and
international credibility, and influencing US Congressional aid decisions.
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3. The analysts agreed that the insurgent offensive may begin as early
as mid-June, although guerrilla timetables often slip because of Army actions
and poor coordination between factions. Rather than an all-out short term
offensive, it was likely to be a slowly developing but sustained one. It may
kick off with a spectacular action like attempting to seize an isolated
departmental capital or sabotage a major dam site. The guerrillas also may
attempt to give the impression of greater strength by attacks in San Salvador
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4. The analysts agreed that despite forced recruitment efforts and the
receipt of additional small arms and ammunition, insurgent capabilities have
not increased greatly over the past six months. In fact, their morale may be
somewhat lower because of Army successes and Duarte's election victory. Thus,
while the insurgents may be able to achieve some temporary successes, they are
not likely to greatly expand their territorial control, even in the east.
There is some danger, however, that once effective Army commanders like Col.
Cruz in Morazan are removed, the guerrillas may be able to score some
spectacular tactical victories. In summary, the analysts were agreed that
while we should not overestimate the insurgent's capabilities and intentions,
neither should we underestimate their ability to achieve some of their more
limited goals.
5. The Community analysts could see little direct relationship between
the expected Salvadoran offensive and the increased Nicaraguan military
buildup. They see almost no prospect that Nicaraguan forces will attempt to
intervene directly in El Salvador or attack Honduras for fear of provoking a
US response. Rather they believe that the Sandinistas are concerned about a
US-supported attack and are arming themselves accordingly. They did note that
Managua may believe that its support for the Salvador insurgency may provoke a
strong US reaction should the guerrilla offensive be successful.
6. There was considerable concern that the military buildup in Nicaraqua
may be taking place in conjunction with a substantial increase in Cuban forces
there. Most analysts were not prepared to discoun
that there are some 7,000 to 8,000 Cuban regular troops in
Nicaragua in addition to some 3,000 to 4,000 civilians. There was even
speculation that the recent armor deliveries to El Bluff could represent
7. Finally, the analysts took note of the increased pace of construction
at a number of Nicaraguan airfields and generally agreed that it may represent
further preparations for military deliveries. Another possibility is that the
construction may be related to a further potential increase in the Cuban force
presence. In summary, there was agreement that we need to continue to monitor
the Nicaraguan military buildup and the Cuban force presence there closely.
Acting National Intelligence officer
for Latin America
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