SANDINISTA SUPPORT TO SALVADOR GUERRILLAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001500010003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 106
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 8, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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FOR: 4:4 I 8 May
VON..!14:
;c4s-ft-i-ea?bri'efing materials on El Salvador being
distributed to various agencietl'spokemen by Ambassado
Reich's office.
Date
FOIRI 4114 USE PREVIOUS
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STAT
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
MEMORANDUM FOR: DISTRIBUTION LIST
FROM: S/LPD - Otto J. Reich'
SUBJECT: Sandinista Support to Salvador
Fl3giztry
10-
Guerrillas
.Attached are various briefing materials for USG
spokespersons who are asked about Sandinista support to
guerrillas in El Salvador. The entire package is
unclassified. These include:
President Reagan's Radio Address of April 14, 1984
Joint Statement of April 10, 1984
Deputy Secretary Dam's Remarks to HFAC on April 11, 1984
Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Op-Ed in Washington Post, April
15, 1984
Ambassador Reich's article in USA Today, April 11, 1984
Assistant Secretary Motley's address before Foreign Policy
Association on January 19, 1984
Evidence of Cuban/Sandinista Support to Salvadoran
Guerrillas:
A. Summation of Nicaraguan "In-Houses Facilities to
Support the Salvadoran Insurgency
B. Summary of some Declassified Reports of
Nicaraguan/Cuban Support to the Salvadoran Guerrillas
C. Cuban/Sandinista Assistance to the Salvadoran
Guerrillas (evidence from open sources 1983-present)
D. Nicaraguan/Cuban Support to the Salvadoran Guerrillas
-- Questions and Answers
E. Appendix
Background Paper: Central America (May 27, 1983)
History of U.S. Policy on Talking to the Sandinistas
We would appreciate your bringing to our attention
additional material that would be useful. Please contact
Tim Stater of my office on 202/632-6751, Rm 6253.
(1
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Otfice of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release April 14, 1984
RADIO ADDRESS
OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION
The Oval Office
12:06 P.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, much has been made
of late regarding our proper role in Central America and, in particular,
toward Nicaragua. Unfortunately, much of the debate has ignored the
most relevant facts. Central America has become the stage for a bold
attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua to install communism,
by force, throughout this hemisphere.'
The struggling democracies of Costa Rica, Honduras, and
El Salvador are being threatened by a Soviet bloc and Cuban-supported
Sandinista army and security force in Nicaragua that has grown from
about 10,000 under the previous government, to more than 100,000 in
less than five years.
Last year alone the Soviet bloc delivered over $100 million
in military hardware. The Sandinistas have established a powerful
force of artillery, multiple rocket-launchers and tanks in an arsenal
that exceeds that of all the other countries in the region put together.
More than 40 new military bases and support facilities
have been constructed in Nicaragua -- all with Soviet bloc and Cuban
support -- and an investment of over $300 million. In addition to
money and guns, there are now more than 2,500 Cuban and Soviet military
personnel in Nicaragua, another 5,000 so-called "civilian advisors,"
as well as PLO, East-bloc*and Libyan assistance to the Sandinistas.
And that's not all. Our friends in the region must also
face the export of subversion across their borders that undermines
democratic development, polarizes institutions and wrecks their
economies. This terrorist violence has been felt by all of Nicaragua's
neighbors, not just El Salvador. There have been bombings in peaceful
Costa Rica, and numerous attempts to penetrate Honduras -- most
recently last summer, when the Sandinistas infiltrated an entire
guerrilla column*which had been trained and equipped in Cuba and
Nicaragua.
El Salvador, struggling to hold democratic elections and
improve the conditions of its people, has been the main target of
Nicaragua's covert aggression. Despite promises to stop, the
Sandinistas still train and direct terrorists in El Salvador and pro-
vide weapons and ammunitions they use against the Salvadoran people.
If it weren't for Nicaragua, El Salvador's problems would be manageable,
and we could concentrate on economic and social improvements.
Much of the Sandinista terror has been aimed at the
Nicaragua people themselves. The Sandinistas who govern Nicaragua
have savagely
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murdered, imprisoned and driven from their homeland tens of thousands
of Miskito, Rama and Suma Indians. Religious persecution against
Christians has increased and the Jewish community has fled the country.
The press is censored and activities of labor and business are re-
stricted.
The Sandinistas have announced elections for November,
but don't hold your breath. Will new parties be permitted? Will they
have full access to the press, TV and radio? Will there be unbiased
observers? Will every adult Nicaraguan be allowed to vote? Given
their record of repression, we should not wonder that the opposition,
denied other means of expression, has taken up arms.
We've maintained a consistent policy toward the Sandinista
regime, hoping they can be brought back from the brink peacefully
through negotiations. We're working through the Contadora process
for a verifiable multilateral agreement, one that insures the Sandinistas
terminate their export of subversion, reduce the size of their military
forces, implement their democratic commitments to the Organization of
American States and remove Soviet bloc and Cuban military personnel.
But the Sandinistas, uncomfortable with the scrutiny and
concern of their neighbors, have gone shopping for amore sympathetic
hearing. They took their case to the United Nations and now to the
International Court of Justice. This does little to advance a nego-
tiated solution. But it makes sense if you're trying to evade the
spotlight of responsibility.
What I've said today is not pleasant to hear. But it's
important that you know Central America is vital to our interests and
to our security. It not only contains the Panama Canal, it sits
astride some of the most important sea lanes in the world. Sea lanes
in which a Soviet-Cuban naval force held combat maneuvers just this
week.
The region also contains millions of people who want
and deserve to be free. We cannot turn our backs on this crisis at
our doorstep. Nearly 23 years ago, President Kennedy warned against
the threat of communist penetration in our hemisphere. He said,
"I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate
in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our
nation." We can do.no less today.
I have, therefore, after consultation with the Congress
decided to use one of my legal authorities to provide money to help
the government of El Salvador defend itself.
Until next week, thanks for listening. God bless you.
END 12:11 P.M. EST
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41.1.? 1"1.14-1,L.
N,?,? I
?
;i
Office of the Press Secretzry
For Immediate Release April )0, 1984
JOINT STATEMEHT
In recent days, a shrill and often confusing debate has developed
over our goals, plans, and activities in Central America.
Because this debate, much of it uninformed, unattributable, and
increasingly partisan, is obscuring the real situation. we
.believe it in the public interest.to set the record straight on
our objectives, cur policy, and our actions--on the record.
First, allegatiobs have-been made that we are planning for U.S.
combat troops to conduct an invasion in Central America. We
state emphatically that we have not considered, nor have we
developed plans to use U.S. military forces to invade Nicaragua
or any other Central American country. Secretary Weinberger made
this point in his television appearance on Sunday. Some have
chosen to disbelieve him--consciously or unconsciously confusing
what they call "invasion' plans with our longstanding oblications
under the 1947 Rio Treaty,, our treaty obligations to defend the
Panama Canal, or military contingency plans for disaster relief,
humanitarian assistance, or emergency evacuations. For over a
generation, as prudence would dictate, we have maintained and
updated plans for these continyeacies.--We have not, however,
planned to use our forces to invade any country in the region.
Second, some have indicated that we are planning to conduct a
post-election military enterprise in Central America. This quite
simply is not the case. As stated before, we are not planning
for such action now nor are we planning for it after our
election. What the Soviets, Cubans,. and Sandinistas are planning
. may well be something else again.
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1 ?
Third, it hasj been alleged by critics of the Administration that
certain activities in the Central American region have not been
adequately briefed to appropriate committees of the Congress. To
the contrary, all U.S. actIvities in the Central America region
have been fully briefed in detail to the committees.of the
? I congress which exercise jurisdiction in full compliance with the
law. Further, last week (April 4) the President sent a letter to
the Majority Leader of the Senate, Howard Baker, assuring him
that our objectives and goals in the region had not
changed--specifically, the United States does not seek to
destabilize or.overthrow the Government of Nicaragua."
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the current debate has
tc.nded to confuse the improvements that we have helped make in
El Salvador with what is really going on in Nicaragua:
Our policy toward Nicaragua has been consistent in that we
have supported the multi-lateral dialogue in what is known
as the Contadora process. We have endorsed the 21 Contadora
objectives which would require thit Nicaragua terminate the
export of subversion, reduce the size of its military
Apparatus, implement its democratic commitments to the OAS,
and remove Soviet Bloc and Cuban military personnel.
MORE
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Nicaragua's response throughout has been fraudulent and
cynical. They have tried to avoid a comprehensive solution
for the reginn by seeking to reduce all diplomacy to
bilateral auestions. They have tried to bypass regional and
hemispheric efforts by making propaganda at the United
Nations. Now they have cynically attempted to side-track
negotiations by going to the International Court of justice.
A government fanatically dedicated to intervention beyond
its borders thus seeks to use an honorable international
institution to protect it from its own citizens who are.
rising up asainst it. This Administration will not.be
deceived nor will it play that game. Following the example
of other nations, the U:S. has checked this maneuver by a
temporary and limited modification of our acceptance of the
court's jurisdiction.
Nicaragua continues to be the source of regional subversion .
and insurgency. In May 1983, the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, itself, concluded that the
Sandinista Government of Nicaragua is helping train
insurgents and is transferring arms and financial support
from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are also
providing the insurgents bases of operations in Nicaragua.
Cuban involvement?especially in providing arms?is also
evident.1
In El Salvador, on the other hand, we have witnessed an
inspiring display of courage and commitment to the
democratic process by the people of El Salvador.. 'At the end
of last month, these courageous people again braved
guerrillas vielence. and sabotage to vote for their next
president.
The courage and confidence in democracy that the Salvadoran
people are demonstrating deserve our admiration and full support.
Now more than ever, our backing for the democratic process must
go beyond mere words. Recent uninformed comment on these matters
h-s diverted attention from the central issue. The
Administration has proposed a long term program based on the
recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America. We have also presented our case for urgent military
assistance to El Salvador. That case is sound and the ongoing
Salvadoran election process about to enter a run-off requires our
support so tWat El Salvador can ensure its safe conduct.
It is critical that the American people understand %that is at
stake in the Central American region. Central America is
strategically important to the United States. It not only
contains the Panama Canal but sits astride some of the most
important sea lanes in the world. Most importantly, it contains
millions of people who want to be free and who crave democracy.
The recent elections in El Salvador prove that. The real issues
are whether we in the United .States want to stand by and let a
communist government in Nicaragua export violence and terrorism
in this hemisphere and whether we will allow the power of the
ballot box to be overcome by the power of the gun. There is no
doubt that the Soviet Union and Cuba want to see communism spread
further in Central America. The question is: Will the United
States support those countries that want democracy and are
willing to fight for their own freedom?
George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
william P. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs .
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OUTLINE OF OPENING REMARKS
BY THE
HONORABLE KENNETH W. DAM
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
April 11, 1984
[The Basic Messagej
By moving in timely fashion, the United States has
preempted a new Nicaraguan campaign to avoid serious
negotiations.
The many political, developmental and strategicissues
raised by the Central American situation, and in particular
by Nicaragua's actions, cannot be resolved in a piecemeal
fashion.
-- They must be addressed comprehensively, as is happening in
the Contadora process, of which Nicaragua is a full
participant, and which the United States firmly supports.
[Nicaragua's Record]
-- Regrettably the record proves beyond a doubt that Nicaragua
has repeatedly sought to avoid serious, comprehensive
dialogue with its neighbors:
Until mid-1983, Nicaragua insisted on dealing with key
Central American issues only bilaterally and then only
with certain countries (e.g., Honduras) and not others
(e.g., El Salvador).
In the fall of 1982 Nicaragua even refused to meet with
the Costa Rican Foreign Minister, who had been
designated by the 8-nation San Jose group to discuss the
San Jose principles with the Nicaraguans.
This past fall, after accepting Contadora, Nicaragua
suddenly attempted to shift the venue to the U.N.
General Assembly.
Nicaragua repeated this diversionary maneuver once again
earlier this month, at the U.N. Security Council.
-- In short, Nicaragua is forum-shopping. This is a familiar
tactic, but hardly one conducive ,to *serious negotiations.
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[The U.S. Action]
Learning that Nicaragua was again.atiempting to undermine
Contadora -- this time by filing a complaint against the
United States before the International Court of Justice --
we modified our accession to the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction to defer any litigation of issues involving
Central-America._
-- The Secretaty of Stat-e7=on April 6 so notified the
Secretary General of the United Nations.
We believe the Court is a capable and viable instrument for
resolving disputes that are susceptible to judicial
resolution.
-- But, in the specific circumstances of Central America
today, the Court is not the right venue.
---. Had we not acted as we did, Nicaragua's suit would
inevitably have split off certain issues from the
broader complex of interrelated issues at the Contadora
negotiating table.
Our action, then, was taken to keep Che search for peace
where it belongs, in the agreed Contadora process, which
addresses the legitimate concerns of all concerned.
[Legal Implications]
-- Our notice of modification
took effect upon delivery last Friday;
-- defers any litigation for two years, long enough for
the Contadora process to have a reasonable
opportunity to conclude successfully;
applies only to.matters involving Central America.
Similar actions have been taken by other countries in the
past, among them Australia, India and the United Kingdom.
-- In addition, a large number of countries have not accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ at all -- among them
France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain.
Neither the Soviet Union nor any Eastern Bloc country,
including Cuba, has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
?
The modification we have made is limited and temporary. It
.d.ops not alter our long-standing support for the Court.
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[What We Ask of Nicaragua]
The United States :and Nicaragua's.Central American
neighbors want Nicaragua to
sever military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet
bloc;--
end support, for _guerrilla groups in neighboring
countries;
fulfill the Sandinistas' commitments to the OAS to
support democracy; and
reduce Nicaragua's military strength to levels that
would restore military equilibrium in the area.
[The Contadora Process]
Contadora is the venue that offers the best prospects for a
political resolution of these issues.
-- as a regional process, Contadora engages all of the
countries in the area;
-- The 21 Contadora objectives meet our own pragmatic tests
for what is necessary to bring about a peace that protects
the Central American democracies and is consistent with our
;own interests:
the substance of the 21 objectives is practically
identical with the policy the President set forth just a
year ago to the Joint Session of Congress.
if the Contadora objectives were to be implemented on a
verifiable and enforceable basis, our objectives with
regard to Nicaragua would also be met.
[Two Final Comments]
Let me make two final comments.
First, Nicaragua's record of intransigence, repression, and
aggression has demonstrated its leaders will not keep their
promises unless they conclude they must.
.-- Steady pressure is necessary to interdict the aggressive
and repressive will of Nicaragua's leaders.
Second, there is .a critical difference between Ni-caragua'i-
tactics and the approach we have adopted.
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-- We are not shopping for a forum that excludes what we
don't want to talk about.
The Contadora objectives are genuinely comprehensive:
they take into account Nicaraguan complaints against the
U.S. and Honduras as well as Salvadoran, Costa Rican and
- other-complaints against Nicaragua.
-
While- the Sandinistas have cynically attempted to narrow
the subject fit- for discussion, we have just as
consistently sought to-ensure that all the issues were
dealt with.
That has been and remains our goal: a workable and
lasting peace built on a foundation.of democracy,
development and security for all concerned.
5085P
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,< text of the entire Charter. In particular; as stated ' , i ha' ve ..rthe'f.right;o' f.individual or .collectiveeself.-defense.04-...,4: Senate:Intelligence'Committee stated that it v`,._
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8 tense if an armed attack occurs'against a member 1 "the device 'of the puppeCstate and the set of ':', ?:.,governraentlnitiaWd., actiyities designed to, de..-1...1.
< ? !. lesser degree its other neighbors, continues." <
cr.. of the United Nations, until the Security Council ?? techniques: by which , states can be , converrld''.' r"stablilke and intimidate .the Costa Rican govern-i?;.,c. *
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a- has taken measures necessary to maintain in -..... %into puppets with no formal violation ,of., oro ment?On July 4;,1982,.Tor example, Nicaraguan arms-if they could participate in a peaceful pot g ,
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7i ,...... The structure of the U.N., Charter was ac-,,,., ...sovereignty and their independence.". , . . ...,....,,,the offices of a Cceti Riam airline in San JCS& . :-:,..cal Co mpetition, for power and help settle Nica 7) '
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? cepted by its member states.on the expectation ?fr.'', ? ... It is in this context that we must view?the .f:' . " ' ' ' ' ' * .- : ? ' ? ' ??.?'';'??1, . gua, s political-question through the ballot b (T.
(T'o, the effective functioning of collective peacekeep-, :. case of Nicaragua and its own' insistence today;?.'i,In *June ' 1983, the?Sandmistas infiltrated into .1'''
1.:' the government of Nicaragua announced ti
c? ing measures. However, this vision was never real- ::? ? in the world on protection under,Article 24, At?;,',..j;
cr.. onduras ?a 100Tman guerrilla force trained in...:such0000nents would not be permitted to p o' ,
na ized. Instead of a world order operating according' the :. the same time that it is engaged in the cOntinv... Cuba and Nicar ?agua as a .first step, toward dej . . ti ? ?
cipate under any circtunstances and would 0"
? to the principles and proCedures of .the U.N...,.. lag, determined, armed attack against its neigh'rl: t(stabilizing'!,he Honduran government.... ,: ..? .
'. ' t ? stead by tried in abstentia as criminals: The g
.71_ Charter, there emerged in the. aftermath of the , bon), the. government of Nicaragua has openly:. ;1 'In DeceMber 1983, a group of some 2,600 Mill.; .1', emment of El Salvador took exactly the oppot .0-
-.1 . ... ?, proclaimed its commitment to what is. called,i::::Idto Indians fled their concentration camps?and ...' **position and actually invited the armed opr?, -I'
? Second World War two contending orders: *
o The first was an order dominated by the the ,s 0.1revolutionary internationalism." :. . , ,. ,. ,_ ,,;,...oll_ it is not .toO much to call them that.,-at Francio- ?' ; tion to. participate in the election on condit
::"' Soviet Union, committed* to and engaged in a,',?,'"This revolution goes beyond our border" de., : c cerpei Nicaragua, and 'took refuge in Honduras at', ?? only that they lay down their?arms and egret ? ?
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0 ,process of continuing expansion through the '.. *dared Interior Minister Thomas Borge in I speech: ,1, the.Morocon refugee camp: The Nicaraguan' gov.',,...'. peaceful political competition.... - 0, '
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? use or violence. ? . . ? ? .????' ? delivered on the second anniversary of the revolu-?
.i , i errunent strafed the refugees fromairplanes.... -... '? It seems perfectly clear, therefore, that -F.
7) The second VMS a Western; democratic order, tion, Our revolution was always internationalist" .1. Ji ? ? A8 'Of this time, there is not a scintilla orevi: ? portray Nicaragua as a victim in the curri-17'
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O comprised of the Western, democratic states' ' .'' ,. ; By' late 1910 at a time when the Cartel': ' deice to auggestIllat any 'of the Nicaragurui ac; : situation is a complete Orwellian inversion --ij '
..? " ..? . , .
co and committed to the defense and the promo -i ,.;;1, administration was providing Nicaragua with'.',: 'tivities in., support of 'armed attack against its i '. what is actually happening in Central Amer SS
0 ? tion of democratic values...,-. ? ' ;.v: , large amounts Of economic assistance, the Sane : I., The stnPlies from Nicaragua for. the Salve-
neighbors; especially El Salvador, have ceased. ?'.
..? There can be no:question by reasonable pets
o The dilemma created by th 'clash of these ..;,,.dinistas had already initiated the build-up of a . ? ;? , i. ? A*bet Nicaragua is engaged in a continui 8
o two orders, ? these two ways of conceiving and ....
: militarymaeliine vastlY superior to that of any .". d, ioran nsurgent), arrive by air, .by sea and hy-; determined, armed attack against its neighb? 203,
co
oa ??? ? :!. land, They arrive by small planes, such is Cess- ,' and ,that under the charter of the United loa
a. acting in relationship to. law, . has occupied a ?'? "other cbuntry in the region.... ? ? ?
7) very great deal of intellectual and political at. ? In June .1980 the SandiniStas invited the Sal- ." nas, 'which land on dirt-roads and fields and off:.; "lions, if not according to the laws' of the c
, I I. , I
8 tendon ever since. .. , . ' . ? , .. vadoran guerrillas tO set up command and control load their arms. Small boats and dugout canoes' .' struggle, those neighbors have the right of ir (2,
cn The dilemma was incisively stated by George ,,i,t headquarters in the Managua area, and Nicara? ? ': are used.to ferry arms from Punta Cosinqina in vidual or collective self-defense.... o
_. cn
o Kerman in an early essay entitled, "Diplomacy:':, 'support
and Cuba began at that time their full-scale ?'. ' Nicaraguaacross the-Gulf of Fonseca to' El Sal- - ? As-we confront the clear and present ?den' o i
o
0 in the Modern World," in which he wrote: "Tho '. support of El Salvador's FMLN, including the .' ' ,vador andlurther up the coast. Larger quanti.:.? in. the contemporary world, we must recog 2 .
8 American concept of world law ignores those: 1 i: training and provision of arms and supplies.,..' ??:; ? ties ? of weapons' and ?supplies .load and leave' that the belief that the U.N. Charter's princi .8,
o means of international offense, those means of t In 1980 and 1981, Nicaragua and Cuba engaged '.: from Nicaragtia'i?novi famous west coast' ports or individual and collective self-defense reg o:
o
c/o the projection of power and coercion over other' ?' in massive airlifts of arms and supplies to El Sal- on ocean-going vessels.... ? ? ? . ' less than reciprocity is simply not tenable. (f)01 peoples which bypass ? institutional forms en- " vador's guerrillas from PaPalona Airfield in Nice- ' , Last May, 13, the House 'Permanent 'Select . .
. ragua, with the objective Of preparing the guerrillas :' Committee. on 'Intelligence issued a report, ? ? The writer is U.S. ambassador to th(?
for a large-scale January 1981 offensive.. , . , 1 . which ' concluded: "the Sandinista , have .. United Nations. The article is adapted
? In early 1981, the Sandinistas began aggres7 . stepped up their support for insurgence in Hon- from an address before the American
.. !lively to violate Costs Rica's treaty rights to use ,. duras, and the CubanNicaraguan aid for insur- ? Society of International Law. , ,
. ,
,..
? s .
tirely or even exploit thorn against themselves.
Such things as ideological attacks, intimidation,
penetration and disguised seizure of the institu-
tional paraphernalia of national sovereignty, It
?\,
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A. SUMMATION OF NICARAGUAN "IN-HOUSE" FACILITIES
TO SUPPORT THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY
Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran insurgency, which
could be classified win-house," i.e., within Nicaragua, falls
into three essential areas. These are training, logistical
support, and the use of Nicaraguan territory for command and
control of the guerrilla forces fighting in El Salvador. The
following are examples:
The FSLN has made available secret training sites where
combat training is given to Salvadoran guerrillas. The
training is known to include small unit tactics, weapons
firing and demolition. These training sites, which are
staffed by Cuban and Nicaraguan military personnel, have
been identified and located. There are at least four that
have operated since 1981 in Nicaragua.
Cuba transports large volumes of weapons and munitions to
Nicaragua by air and sea for break down and eventual
transfer into El Salvador. At least one warehouse has been
identified as being used as a storage area pending onward
shipment of the materiel to El Salvador.
The Nicaraguans have also established workshops for the
modification of vehicles that are used in smuggling
materiel (weapons, ammunition, and other supplies) from
Nicaragua into El Salvador. These workshops are located
near Managua.
Several separate Salvadoran guerrilla command centers and
their respective radio transmission facilities have been
identified in Nicaragua. These broadcast facilities send
orders to the guerrilla units operating in the Salvadoran
countryside.
As is known--and evidenced by the recent deaths of two
senior Salvadoran guerrilla leaders--the leaders of the
Salvadoran insurgency live in Managua. When there are
important decisions to be made, unit commanders are brought out
of El Salvador for meetings in Managua or Havana. Based on
intelligence and information supplied by guerrilla defectors,
Cubans and Nicaraguans play an important role in whatever
decision is reached.
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B. SUMMARY OF SOME DECLASSIFIED REPORTS OF
NICARAGUAN/CUBAN SUPPORT TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS
On May 13, 1983, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a
report which concluded that "the Sandinistas have stepped
up their support for insurgents in Honduras" and that Cuban
and Nicaraguan aid for insurgents constitutes "a clear
picture of active promotion" for 'revolution without
frontiers' throughout Central America by Cuba and
Nicaragua." The committee also reiterated its earlier
finding that the guerrillas in El Salvador "are well
trained, well equipped with modern weapons and supplies,
and rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and
control and for logistical support. The Intelligence
supporting these judgments provided to the committee is
convincing."
On May 27, 1983, the State and Defense Departments issued a
report entitled "Background Paper: Central America", which
provided further support for the conclusions of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Our Monitoring of the Central American situation continues
to support the conclusion that Nicaragua has become a focal
point for the use of politically motivated violence to
exploit the demands for more democracy, social justice, and
economic development in Central America in order to bring
extreme leftist groups to power.
In early October 1982, it is reported that Nicaraguan
Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto told a confidant that the
routes for supplying the Salvadoran insurgents by sea have
been compromised and that other supply routes must be
found. This same source reported that in most cases
Nicaragua is the focal point for all contacts between
Honduran leftists and the Cubans. He specifically stated
that the "Cinchoneros" maintain their Cuban contacts in
Nicaragua.
A report was received in mid-March 1983 from a Salvadoran
guerrilla source that arms, ammunition, and other supplies
destined for the Salvadoran insurgents continue to arrive
from Nicaragua, primarily by overland routes from Honduras.
On 26 March 1983, an 11 man squad of armed FMLN insurgents
was surprised by the Honduran National Police some
20 kilometers from the Honduran/E1 Salvadoran border. Two
guerrillas were killed and the remainder escaped; however,
the police captured a quantity of communications equipment
and a notebook describing an arms trafficking route from
Nicaragua through Honduras to El Sal?Tador. In addition to
the codebook, weapons and other materials, the guerrillas
were carrying Sandinista propaganda material and a
Sandinista flag.
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On 24 April 1983 a combined force of Salvadoran Navy
commandos and Salvadoran sailors made contact with
guerrilla troops at the Hacienda Las Pampas. The
engagement resulted in the death of four guerrillas and the
capture of guerrilla equipment. These weapons, as well as
the majority of weapons (M-16s) captured or turned over by
guerrillas, have been traced to Vietnam.
In early April 1983, there had been reports that members of
the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN) had made arrangements with the Libyans for weapons
and ammunition for the FMLN. These supplies were to be
delivered by air and sea by the Libyans to Nicaragua for
transfer to El Salvador. This information was proven
correct when the Brazilians impounded four Libyan planes
later that month.
The suspicious murder/suicide of the two top leaders of the
largest guerrilla force within the Salvadoran insurgency
movement in Managua in April 1983 provides additional
evidence of .Cuban and Nicaraguan control over that
insurgency movement. Beyond the legitimate questions of
Cuban/Nicaraguan complicity in the deaths of Cayetano
Carpio and Melida Anaya, the fact remains that these acts
took place in Managua. Moreover, guerrilla commanders were
recalled from the battlefield in El Salvador to Managua to
discuss the impact of the two deaths and to select a new
leadership. Previously classified information indicated
that the guerrilla commanders were flown to Cuba to
continue the discussions. Manuel Pineiro, head of the
Americas Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban
Communist Party, traveled to Managua to meet with the
Salvadoran guerrillas and later accompanied the guerrillas
to Cuba.
NOTE: Only a few of the literally thousands of intelligence
reports about Nicaraguan/Cuban support to the Salvadoran
guerrillas have been declassified. Thus, the activities
described above constitute only a small part of the evidence
reflected in intelligence reports of a broad sustained pattern
of Nicaraguan and Cuban promotion of violent revolution in
Central America.
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C. CUBAN/SANDINISTA ASSISTANCE TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS
(EVIDENCE FROM OPEN SOURCES 1983-PRESENT)
Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran insurgents within
Nicaragua falls into three essential categories: training,
logistical support, and the presence of the Salvadoran
guerrilla command and control headquarters. (Numbers at
the end of the items below correspond to articles and
reports in Appendix E.)
Following an intensive study, that included both classified
and unclassified sources, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives concluded on
May 13, 1983 that the Sandinistas have stepped up their
support for insurgents in Honduras" and that Cuban and
Nicaraguan aid for insurgents 'constitutes a clear picture
of active promotion 'for revolution without frontiers'
throughout Central America by Cuba and Nicaragua." The
committee also reiterated its earlier finding that the
guerrillas in El Salvador, are well trained, well equipped
with modern weapons and supplies, and rely on the use of
sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for
logistical support. The intelligence supporting these
judgments provided to the Committee is convincing."
A member of the committee, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
reiterated these findings as recently as March 29, 1984.
He stated that about 80 percent of the ammunition and the
greater portion of Salvadoran guerrilla weapons still
arrive via Nicaragua.1
Other public information concerning Sandinista support to
the Salvadoran guerrillas has come by way of defectors from
the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Miguel Bolanos Hunter, a Sandinista for five years and a
member of the Sandinista intelligence service, stated in
October 1983 to the Washington Times that, "I wouldn't
place them (the Sandinistas) as an agent of the Soviet
Union," although they are "exporting revolution every place
that they can."2
In an August 28 interview with the New York Times,
guerrilla commander Alejandro Montenegro, who defected
because of high Cuban and Nicaraguan influence in the
Salvadoran guerrilla movement, stated that Cuba has
"directed the activities" of the insurgency since 1980 and
that the guerrilla leadership is now operating from bases
in Nicaragua. He added that he had made his
dissatisfaction known 'that the process was being
transformed and manipulated by other interests, the Cubans
and Nicaraguans." 3
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D. NICARAGUAN/CUBAN SUPPORT TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION: What is the extent of Soviet and Cuban influence
over and support for the Sandinistas?
ANSWER: The Soviet Union and Cuba have both played a vital
role in the Sandinista military buildup, in assisting its
political consolidation, and in supporting it economically.
Most of the military weaponry for the Sandinista Army has
come from Soviet Bloc and Cuban inventories, although Moscow
has tried to hide its involvement through the use of such
intermediaries as Algeria and Libya. Furthermore, some 3,500
to 4,000 Cuban military and security advisors are in Nicaragua
assisting in everything from barracks and airfield construction
to tank training and maintenance. Total military aid
commitments have amounted to several hundred million.
In the economic field, there are another 4,500 to 6,500
Cuban teachers, health workers, construction personnel, and
technicians in Nicaragua. While much of their work is
humanitarian, the ultimate goal is to assist the Sandinista
regime in building up a solid economic infrastructure and
aiding political consolidation. The Soviets and other Bloc
countries are also heavily involved in economic assistance, and
they have provided some $400 million worth of aid commitments
since 1979. Furthermore, at least 300 Soviet and other Bloc
personnel are in Nicaragua providing political and economic
assistance.
Libyan involvement in Sandinista affairs has become more
and more evident. During 1983, numerous shipments of military
materiel have been delivered to the Sandinistas by a
Libyan-owned airline. A number of costly items of military
hardware, including four Sia-Marchetti aircraft, have been used
in close air support. Four major cargo flights involving three
IL-76s and one C-130 were slated to arrive in Managua on April
14, 1983. These aircraft were detained in Brazil en route to
Managua, when it was determined that they were carrying
military equipment, instead of the medical supplies that the
cargo manifests listed.
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QUESTION: Is it not true that the Soviet Union and Cuba have
denied providing arms to the Salvadoran insurgents, and that no
Soviet weapons have been captured in El Salvador?
ANSWER: The Soviets and Cubans can make such denials because
they are not sending Communist weapons to the guerrillas.
Rather, they are transporting U.S. weapons captured in Vietnam
to Nicaragua for eventual covert infiltration into
El Salvador. These weapons include M-16 rifles, M-79 grenade
launchers, and M-72 anti-tank rockets. Arms captured from
insurgents in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala
have serial numbers traceable back to weapons the U.S. provided
to Vietnam. There have been Soviet grenades captured from
Salvadoran guerrillas.
Another indication of Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran
insurgents was revealed in a document captured on March 26,
1983 from a Salvadoran guerrilla by the Honduran Public
Security Forces. The document lists a total of 125 locations
in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador along a 10 to 15
kilometer-wide infiltration corridor between Nicaragua and
El Salvador.
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QUESTION: Have the Cubans and Nicaraguans assisted the
Salvadoran insurgents in special sabotage operations?
ANSWER: The Cubans and Nicaraguans have trained and equipped
Salvadoran insurgents to conduct special operations. For
example, according to the captured insurgent leader responsible
for the raid on the Ilopango Airbase outside San Salvador in
early 1982, the sabotage team was specially trained in Cuba.
The leader visited Managua in late 1981 to meet with the Cubans
and to review his instructions to conduct the operation.
The destruction of the large Puente de Oro bridge in
October 1981 was another such operation. Cuba and Nicaragua
have provided almost all the explosives for the large-scale
sabotage campaign against the Salvadoran economy. There is a
special military base in Nicaragua where Salvadoran insurgents
are trained for special sabotage operations.
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Current
Policy No. 539
Is Peace Possible
in Central America?
January 19, 1984
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following is an address by Langhorne
A. Motley, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, before the
Foreign Policy Association, New York,
January 19, 1984.
The Events of 1983
There's nothing easy about the situation
in Central America. The issues are so
complex and the situation changing so
rapidly that everyone keeps looking for
"signals" of what is happening?and
what will happen next.
The signals today, as usual, are
mixed. I want to talk very specifically
today about one kind of signal coming
up from Central America: the signals
which tell us on the one hand that peace
is possible there and the ones that say
the opposite. But before I even begin,
remember that nations, like people, are
capable of sending false signals?of mak-
ing paper commitments that have no
meaning.
With that in mind, let's look at some
interesting signals.
? In January 1983, Colombia, Mex-
ico, Panama, and Venezuela met on the
island of Contadora to consider ways to
prevent a widening conflict. After a slow
beginning for what is now known as the
Contadora process, all five Central
American nations agreed in September
to a document of objectives-21 in
all?to serve as a basis for a compre-
hensive regional peace treaty. Just 10
days ago?on January 8?these govern-
ments agreed on specific procedures to
guide negotiations to implement these
objectives.
? In El Salvador, meanwhile, the
fighting continued. But last year a large-
scale amnesty was approved by the Con-
stituent Assembly and effectively and
humanely implemented. More than 1,000
guerrillas and camp followers came in
from the cold. Two meetings took place
between the Peace Commission and the
guerrilla representatives. That dialogue
was interrupted when the guerrillas
refused even to discuss participating in
the direct popular elections for president
now set for March 25. But the Salva-
doran Government has carefully left the
door open to renewed contacts.
? In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas
gradually softened the tone of their
statements. They agreed formally to the
21 objectives of the Contadora process?
objectives that include democratization,
arms control, an end to support for
subversion, and gradual withdrawal of
fcreign military and security advisers. In
November, the Sandinistas signaled they
were reducing their ties to Cuba and to
the Salvadoran guerrillas. They also
initiated a dialogue with some of their
internal opposition?although they have
not yet responded to a call from all ma-
jor anti-Sandinista forces to implement
their 1979 commitments to the
Organization of American States (OAS)
and allow all political elements to com-
pete for power in free and genuinely fair
elections.
What does all this mean? Is there
finally some reason to hope that Central
America is on a course toward peace? Or
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are all these signals examples of the
dashed hopes and propaganda that
plague Central America? What is the
evidence?
Where Does Nicaragua Really Stand?
Let me start by reviewing the record
with regard to Nicaragua. When in 1979
the Sandinistas formally pledged to the
OAS to establish a democratic, pluralis-
tic, and nonaligned regime, the United
States took a leading role in the interna-
tional effort to assist Nicaragua. In the
first 21 months after the fall of Somoza,
we authorized $117.2 million in economic
assistance. Despite many problems, the
Carter Administration suspended aid
disbursements only after it became clear
that the Sandinistas were supporting the
guerrillas in El Salvador.
In October 1980 under President
Carter, then again in August 1981 and
April 1982 under the Reagan Ad-
ministration, the United States sought
to persuade Nicaragua to renounce its
support of the guerrilla insurgency in El
Salvador. The Nicaraguans did not re-
spond to our concerns. In October 1982
in San Jose, Costa Rica, eight demo-
cratically elected governments made fair
and balanced proposals for a regional
peace. Nicaragua refused even to receive
the Costa Rican Foreign Minister as
emissary of this group.
The sources of Nicaragua's intran-
sigence were clear. Internally, the San-
dinista leaders had succeeded in remov-
ing from influence everyone who dis-
agreed with them. They had built an
army four times the size of Somoza's
notorious National Guard. And they had
developed close military ties to Cuba and
the Soviet Union, which included
thousands of advisers and a sophisti-
cated joint effort to destabilize El
Salvador and other neighboring govern-
ments.
The regime in Managua was so ar-
rogantly confident in its ability to im-
pose its will that it refused to listen to
either its internal opposition or its
neighbors. A former member of that
regime, Arturo Cruz, put Nicaragua's
situation in a nutshell in the summer
1983 issue of Foreign Affairs:
There is .. . an element of self-
destruction in the present conduct of the
Revolution. Certain Sandinista revolutionary
leaders' rejection of pragmatism is puzzling.
The allegiance to an internationalist ideology
. . at the expense of the basic interests of
the nation-state of Nicaragua, is unaccept-
able.
Then, last July, on the fourth an-
niversary of the Sandinista revolution,
Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega offered
a six-point peace proposal. The proposal
2
was one sided. It would, for example,
have cut off all assistance to the Govern-
ment of El Salvador while leaving
Cuban and Soviet assistance to the
Government of Nicaragua wholly un-
encumbered. It said nothing about democ-
ratization, foreign military advisers, or
verification. But for the first time the
Sandinistas accepted a multilateral dia-
logue and hinted at a willingness to sus-
pend their support for the Salvadoran
guerrillas. That much was encouraging,
and we said so.
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras quickly seized the initia-
tive. They put forward an eight-point
proposal?the "Bases for Peace." On
September 9, meeting in Panama under
Contadora auspices, Nicaragua joined
them in agreeing to the 21 objectives I
mentioned earlier. The "Document of
Objectives" called for the establishment
of democratic systems of government;
for the reduction of current inventories
of arms and military personnel; for the
proscription of foreign military bases;
for the reduction and eventual elimina-
tion of foreign military advisers and
troops; for an end to support for subver-
sion; and for adequate means of verifica-
tion and control. These were, and are,
objectives on which a single, comprehen-
sive, regional treaty could be based.
This agreement was important prog-
ress. But what was Nicaragua's next
step?
On October 20?that is, just weeks
after apparently accepting the 21 objec-
tives?Nicaragua presented four draft
treaties based on the July Ortega pro-
posals. These drafts:
? Disregarded the objective of re-
storing military balance among states of
the region;
? Sought again to delegitimize the
elected Government of El Salvador by
treating it as simply one of two
belligerent parties;
? Ignored the Contadora objective
to establish democratic institutions; and
? Made no serious proposal for
verification and control.
In reverting to its own partial agen-
da and presenting it at the United Na-
tions, Nicaragua undercut the 21 objec-
tives of Contadora, both procedurally
and substantively. Instead of acting to
build confidence that it was genuinely
seeking accommodation, Nicaragua
strengthened the arguments of those
who saw its proposals as a renewed
campaign of deception designed to avoid
real accommodation. I repeat: In the
guise of "negotiating," Nicaragua was
rejecting accommodation.
Then, in November. word began to
spread that Nicaragua was reducing the
Cuban presence; that it was asking the -
Salvadoran FMLN/FDR [Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front/Revo-
iutionary Democratic Front] to leave
Managua; and that a new dialogue with
the church and internal opposition was
beginning. In December, Nicaragua pro-
posed a freeze on arms imports and the
reciprocal withdrawal of foreign military
advisers.
These signals suggested that
Nicaragua recognized it would have to
respond to the concerns expressed by its
democratic opposition and by its neigh-
bors in Central America.
The United States welcomed these
signals. Secretary Shultz said so publicly
on December 5. And, you may be confi-
dent, we have been exploring them thor-
oughly in our private diplomacy.
But the Secretary also said that
what matters is the reality behind the
rhetoric. Look at the evidence:
? Nicaragua claimed it was reducing
the Cuban presence. But, as Interior
Minister Borge himself admitted public-
ly, only normal, year-end rotations of
teachers were involved. We have seen
no evidence that any of Cuba's 2,000
military and security advisers have left
Nicaragua. And while they, not
teachers, are the main source of con-
cern, we learned from Grenada that
even construction workers can beat their
shovels into AK-47s pretty quickly.
? Nicaragua had implied it was forc-
ing the Salvadoran FMLN/FDR out of
Managua. But although a few FDR
leaders did leave Nicaragua, the
FMLN's sophisticated command and
control headquarters and infrastructure
remain intact and operating in
Nicaragua.
? Nicaragua claimed it was offering
a generous amnesty to the Miskito In-
dians. Yet just before Christmas,
another 1,200 Miskito men, women, and
children chose to flee under hostile con-
ditions into Honduras rather than suffer
continued Sandinista repression.
Other Nicaraguan measures had a
little more substance. Censorship of La
Prensa has, at least temporarily, been
relaxed. And, after the extraordinary
crackdown on the church in October,
conversations with church leaders were
begun. But there has been no easing of
restrictions on independent radio sta-
tions and harassment of La Prensa's
advertisers, distributors, and journalists
continues.
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In short, despite the rhetoric, there
is still no evidence that the Sandinistas
are taking Any of the essential measures
which, if actually implemented, could
help bring about among the states of the
region a viable and lasting peace.
What the United States Seeks
From Nicaragua
To remove any possible ambiguity, let
me say again what those measures are:
? The establishment of a genuinely
democratic regime;
? A definitive end to Nicaragua's
support for guerrilla insurgencies and
terrorism;
? Severance of Nicaraguan military
and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet
bloc; and
? Reductions in Nicaraguan military
strength to levels that would restore
military balance between Nicaragua and
its neighbors.
Let me comment on these points.
First, none of these measures would
be inconsistent with the goals that the
Sandinistas publicly set for themselves
in 1979. The Sandinistas at that time
committed themselves to a policy of non-
alignment, nonintervention, and demo-
cratic pluralism. We ask only that they
respect the principles they themselves
proclaimed.
Second, Nicaragua agreed to
negotiate a treaty that would implement
these goals when it signed the Conta-
dora "Document of Objectives" last
September. I repeat, we are only asking
Nicaragua to do what it has formally
and publicly committed itself to do.
Third, eight other states of the
region, including the United States, have
signed a public document?the San Jose
Declaration of October 4, 1982?making
clear that they and we are committed to
corresponding actions. As the President
told the joint session of Congress last
April, the United States will support a
balanced and comprehensive regional
agreement in Central America that is
fully verifiable and reciprocal.
Fourth, Nicaraguan implementation
of these four points, whether unilaterally
or through negotiations, would remove
the causes of the deterioration in
Nicaragua's relationship with the United
States. A prompt return to a coopera-
tive relationship, including economic
assistance and CBI [Caribbean Basin In-
itiative] beneficiary status, would then
be possible.
Fifth, the effect of such measures
would be profoundly beneficial to the
people of Central America:
? In the absence of the support it
receives through Nicaragua, the FMLN
in El Salvador would have to reconsider
its refusal to consider participating in
national elections. Democratic means of
internal reconciliation?as opposed to
power-sharing contrivances stemming
from the barrel of a gun?would thus be
powerfully advanced.
? With an end to regional conflicts
and the implementation in Nicaragua of
genuinely democratic processes, those
who have taken up arms against the
Sandinistas would have no further cause
for fighting.
? With the restoration of regional
military balance, countries that
desperately need to devote all available
resources to economic recovery would be
spared the dangerous and debilitating
burden of procuring arms. The Central
American Common Market and other in-
stitutions vital to regional integration
and development would receive an
important boost.
? Finally, with the end of the
Cuban/Soviet military presence, the
region would cease being a battlefield in
the East-West conflict, a role the region
neither wants nor can afford.
U.S. Support for a
Verifiable Agreement
Let me repeat: The Central American
states?Nicaragua included?are formal-
ly and officially committed to
negotiating a regional peace treaty to
implement these points. The reasons I
have just outlined make clear that it is
in our interest to help the Central
Americans achieve the 21 objectives of
Contadora. Our support for regional dia-
logue is thus based on the most funda-
mental of foreign policy considerations:
enlightened self-interest.
Senator Richard Stone, President
Reagan's special envoy to Central
America, has made U.S. support for
regional negotiations unambiguous. He
played a key role in getting the dialogue
between the Salvadoran Peace Commis-
sion and the FMLN/FDR started. His
diplomatic efforts have played a major
facilitating role in the Contadora
process.
Regional negotiations are now in an
intermediate stage. Under the Conta-
dora agreement of January 8, the five
Central American governments are
creating three working commissions on
security, political, and socioeconomic af-
fairs. Working with the Contadora Vice
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, each corn-
mission will adopt a work plan to be
completed by the end of April.
The January 8 agreement also con-
tains norms to guide the work in each of
the three areas. The degree of specifici-
ty called for on security matters is en-
couraging. For example, they will
prepare a registry, or detailed inven-
tory, of military installations, weapons,
and troops from which to negotiate ceil-
ings to restore the military balance dis-
rupted by Nicaragua's military buildup
since 1979.
Our own experience in arms control
negotiations makes clear that such a
data exchange and registry are absolute-
ly necessary to a successfully negotiated
agreement. And our experience in
negotiation with communist govern-
ments underlines the need to carefully
verify the accuracy of such a registry,
using both technical means and tech-
nically qualified observation teams with
full authority to make on-site evalua-
tions.
Looking ahead, we believe it will
prove necessary to provide for verifica-
tion of compliance with the obligations
of an eventual treaty. Reliable mean,; of
enforcement of treaty obligations are
equally necessary.
Another element, implicit in th
principles agreement of January 8, is
balanced implementation. Nicaragua'';
October proposals deferred issues of in-
terest to the other Central American
states while calling for immediate imph,-
mentation of commitments to benefit
Nicaragua. By adopting identical tiro( -
tables for the three commissions, the
January 8 agreement rejects such pir
tiality in prioritizing the fundan;eilt_C
issues.
The Hard Road Ahead
It is certainly too soon to conclude that
an effective regional agreement can be
achieved. The mt,st difficult -egotiations
lie ahead. Substantive balance and effec-
tive verification and enforcenient will be
essential to move beyond a document of
exhortation and good intentions. But it
is encouraging that the Central Ameri-
cans are pursuing their dialogue with
persistence and realism.
As they move from conceptual to
practical problems, we will continue to
offer whatever assistance will facilitate
implementation of the 21 objectives.
That is the mission the President has
assigned to Senator Stone, a mission
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Dick Stone has worked tirelessly to
fulfill. It is also a mission that the Na-
tional Bipartisan Commission on Central
America has fully endorsed.
But no one should harbor any illu-
sions that a treaty alone will resolve the
crisis. Under the most optimistic of
scenarios, we are a long way from an
end to the crisis in Central America.
Nicaragua has disproportionate military
power controlled by a Marxist-Leninist
minority operating without democratic
checks.
Even if these issues were addressed,
there would still be a need to defend
against all those?on the right as well as
the left?who would exploit under-
development for antidemocratic ends.
There would still be a need to ensure
that political processes are opened to
wider and fairer participation. There
would still be a need for land and other
social and economic reforms. There
would still be a need to build effective
protection for human rights. There
would still be a need to strengthen
judicial processes against their ancient
enemies of corruption and intimidation.
In short, there would still be a need
for political reconstruction and economic
recovery. The National Bipartisan Com-
mission report?a remarkable consen-
sus?concluded that the overall crisis is
even more acute than they had believed.
Dr. Kissinger [commission chairman]
and the other commission members
describe a crisis too profound to be sub-
ject to quick or paper "fixes."
? Economic resources are essen-
tial?in sizable amounts and reliably
sustained. And these resources must be
put to prudent use.
? Reforms must continue. The Cen-
tral Americans must continue to attack
the local socioeconomic and political
sources of the conflict. Abuses of human
rights by the violent right and the
violent left must stop.
? Security assistance is vital. Guer-
rilla forces cannot be allowed to spread
poverty and destruction or to win a
military victory. The United States has
both moral and strategic interests in
preventing a communist Central
America.
? And this help must be in sufficient
quantity to get the job done. The bi-
partisan commission put it thi:1 way with
regard to El Salvador:
There might be an argument for doing
nothing to help the government of El
Salvador. There might be an argument for
doing a great deal more. There is, however,
no logical argument for giving some aid but
not enough. The worst possible policy for El
Salvador is to provide just enough aid to keep
the war going, but too little to wage it suc-
cessfully.
In concert with these measures, a
regional dialogue to implement the 21
objectives, and thereby reduce sources
of tension among states, can help to
bring a lasting and real peace to Central
America. But for that to happen, we
will, as Secretary Shultz said in
December, need to see actions to match
the signals. ?
Published by the United States Department
of State ? Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication ? Editorial
Division ? Washington, D.C. ? January 1984
Editor: Colleen Sussman ? This material is in
the public domain and may be reproduced
without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Official Business
If address is incorrect
please indicate change.
Do not cover or destroy
this address label
Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501
Third Class Bulk Rate
U.S. MAIL
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4e:02,
Defector Miguel Bolahos talks to reporters on Capitol Hill yesterday.
UPI
iredu;skvi
Octo4e r /943
Toss out Sandinistas,
defector says to U.S.
BY A WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF WRITER
A 24-year-old defector from Nicara-
gua yesterday called on the United
States to help overthrow the leftist San-
dinista regime because it cannot be
reformed.
Official United States policy supports
covert aid to guerrillas, who claim they
are trying to create a pluralistic society.
Miguel Bolanos, a Sandinista for five
years, said reform was impossible be-
cause of the government's totalitarian
trends.
"As a communist government, you
Must overthrow them," Bolanos said at
a Capitol Hill press conference. Bolanos
also said that Cuban President Fidel
Castro exercises control over Sandin-
ista projects. "They won't do anything
that doesn't have the OK of Fidel," he
said.
Bolanos added that Cuban or Soviet
advisers often would be called in to cor-
rect or approve Sandinista plans, but he
said that does not make the Nicaraguans
Soviet agents.
"I wouldn't place them as an agent of
the Soviet Union." he said, though the
Sandinistas are "exporting revolution
every place that they can,"
Bolanos said he was a Sandinista ?
intelligence official for three years, re-
sponsible for surveillance of the U.S.
Embassy and CIA activities. He also
said he fought in the final battles to over-
throw the government of Nicaraguan
dictator Anastasio Somoza.
In other comments, Bolanos said.
Nicaragua was prepared to fight a war,
with neighboring Honduras, that the
country now has 80 tanks whereas there,
were only five during the Somoza
regime, and that five Soviet generals
have been training top Sandinista offi-
cials since 1979.
The East Germans have provided a .
machine capable of tapping 500 to 700.
of the nation's 25,000 telephones, which
replaces the model used by Somoza that ?
had only a 50-phone capacity, he added.
The CIA and the State Department
have conducted extensive debriefings ?
of Bolanos. A previous Sandinista defec-
tor, Orlando Jose Tardencillas, embar-
rassed the Reagan administration in ? .
March 1982 by suddenly recanting his
previous attacks on the regime during a
press conference.
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9-?0001-00091-0n1988001A198dC11-V10 LO/LO/L LO eseeiej Jo; penoJddv Ado PezIllueS
A10
ur- Ogfis
Cuba Directs Salvador Insurgency,
Former Guerrilla Lieutenant Says
By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to 71to Ng. York Thais
WASHINGTON July 27 ? A f met I
ralvadoran guerrilla Who pIaye4 a itey,
roTe in antltoverninent raidsSan
Sarvador has told United States officials
tkia.t Cuba has "directed the activities"
of the insurgency since 1980 and that the
guegicifla leatleain Is now openigns
from bases in Nicarainut.
The former rebel, Arquimedes Cana-
das, also known as Corn andante Alejan-
dro Montenegro, said in an interview
here that before 1980 the guerrilla
movement was largely "nationalistic,"
made up of a multitude of political and
armed groups. But he said it gradually
moved under Havana's influence to the
point that Cuban military aides specifi-
cally advised Salvadoran guerrillas on
tactics to cripple Government forces.
Mr. Canadas, who has been sentenced
to death by guerrilla forces and is.under
United States Government protection
here, said he and four other leaders of
the People's Revolutionary Army met
four Cuban military officials, three men
and a woman, in Havana and Managua
in July and October 1981. At that point
Mr. Canadas, the 28-year-old son of a
civil servant, was an underground
leader in the "central front," which in-
cludes San Salvador, the capital.
"As far as the central front was con-
cerned," Mr. Canadas said, "they said
the principal activity should be the
sabotage of electric power and tele-
phone lines to prevent the national
ormy from using the telephone as a
Drincipal means of communication and
!orce them to use only radio."
Report Has 'Checked Out'
Two State Department officials said
Canadas's background and the de-
ills of his report had been checked in
vcent months by the State Department
.nd the Central Intelligence Agency.
His bona fides have been established,"
ein official said. "We have checked what
's said with other sources and it's
Checked out."
.,-V1..
concern in vAlidating the report, given
the embarrassment last March when a
Nicaraguan publicly recanted state-
ments given to the State Department
and the C.I.A. about Nicaraguan and
Cuban involvement in El Salvador.
Mr. Canadas was seized last Aug. 22
by Honduran security forces at a cafe in
Tegucigalpa while on his way to a meet-
ing of Salvadoran rebel leaders in
Managua. Since then he has told his
story to United States officials, ranging
from a teen-ager who abhorred what he
called the Salvadoran Government's
"military repression" to an under-
ground leader who directed one of the
guerrilla movement's major propa-
ganda triumphs, the destruction of
seven American-made helicopters and
eight planes at the Ilopango Air Base
near San Salvador in January 1982.
"The seven soldiers that ed out
Or lix
11/ o b October. rien I ut me xiajr- angttilt
Joaquin Villalobas leads the
People's Revolutionary Army.
Opposed Cuban Involvement
Although several other guerrilla lead-
ers have been seized and accepted am-
nesty ? and quietly fled to other Latin
American countries after privately
yielding intelligence information? Mr.
Canadas said he had decided to speak
publicly for several reasons. .
At the time that he drifted into the un-
derground in 1974, after 30 people died
when the military opened fire on &
peaceful demonstration by stulitnts,
anti-Government activity was "nation-
alistic," he said.
our homeland," tar. umaaas saw. ? - we
did not want Communists and Cubans."
Even before his arrest he d he
own satisfaction
"that the process was bein trine.
form r inter-
es Cubans and Nicaraguana,"
?w-ki the moment." he continued, "we
should fight for peaceful pottical alter-
'a that message
nett? . I want to take sp that the bloitshed will be
top
and direct it to my ex-companions."
The Salvadoran spoke in Spanish in
the interview, held at the Institute on
Religion and Democracy, a foundation
and church-supported group.
'People Closed Their Doors'
'? Canadas said he grew aware of
Cuba's bitolvement in mid-1980 when
the Farabundo Marti National Libera-
tion Front was set up as the umbrella
orgonization for Salvador's guerrilla
groups, including the People's Revolu-
tionary Army. kik t- 110). t WU_
a sunreme executive :';'; v. the Unified
Revolutionary Directorate. or D.R.0 ,
that waa fqrmed. he said at a secr_et
meetine in Havang.
"From the nolitical and military
int of view all the decisions that the
Mee,
Dili in
coo
w en a ea. ers met avana,
.Ciffen-
e rwi " Raid
Janvaiv '81 _was authorized by
That offensive, in which guerrilla
forces attacked key points in hopes of a
general uprising, fizzled. "There was
no popular backing for an insurrec-
tion, Mr. Canada., said, adding that
the umbrella guerrilla group had
"never agreed on a common strategy,
there were ideological differences."
He said he was in Soyapango, just
mit of San Salvador, on Jan. 10 and
"the people closed their doors on us."
According to Mr. Canadas, the guer-
rillas made a crucial mistake in March
1980 when the highly popular Arch-
bishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, who had
advocated social change, was mur-
dered. "There could have been the in-
surrection then and there," he said.
"The people were waiting for the call."
But "the Communists in the movement
said wait," he said, adding, "It was a
major political error."
_ By June 1980, Mr. Canada, said, after
guerrilla leaders, not including him,
went to Havana, "arms began coming
in and the commanders after that meet-
ing did not return to Salvador." Hc *Aid
that was when the leaders rot.:
00 .m e strate
.t na CM ?
"They never returned," he said,
"with the exception of Villalobes, who
was the last onto leave Salvador in
February '81." ?
"Before that we did not have much
arms coming in," he said. "After that
thg-MLWPOULMEOLEALAXWbY.-Viet-
nam, American M-18's. The arms came
from Vietnam to Havana. gamut_ IQ
Kanagua. Managua to Salvador."
Mr.-Canadas said that although the
guerrillas' umbrella group includes
several factions of either nationalist or
Communist grouping, it moved into
closer alignment with Cuba "because
they thought they were going to win
militarily; they felt with Cuban aid the
success would come more quickly."
Mr. Canadas, a hefty man with an en-
gaging smile, said he now lives in Costa
Rica and Panama. He is in Washington
for several days and declined to discuss
further details about his whereabouts.
On his first visit to Cuba in July 1081,
he recalled, he and three other People's
Revolutionary Army leaders ? Jorge
Melendez of the Morazin area, Juan
Ramon Medrano of the "southern
front" and Miguel Ramirez of the
"western front" ? met the four
Cubans.
The Cubans "told us what had to be
done in the interior of the country," Mr.
Canadas said. "They directed the ac-
tivities. In the case of Moravia, they
said the principal activities should be to
take the fight from the mountain to the
city because we had to get the city popu-
lation on our side." Moravia Province,
northeast of San Salvador on the Hondu-
ran border, is a key battleground.
Three months later, in October, he
said, the same group of Salvadorans
and Cubans met in Managua. "We ex-
arnined everything that had been done
since July," he said. "We analyzed the
taking of Villa el Rosario in Morazin. It
was a village occupied by the guerril-
las. It showed how much we had ad-
vanced. As far as the central front, they
indicated that the sabotage of theelec-
tric power and telephone lines was not
enough, not sufficient. We had to make
greater efforts in these activities."
Mr. Canadas said he hoped the United
States would back away from any mili-
tary solution in El Salvador and press
the Salvadoran Government for "a
political agreement among all sectors."
"You have to take into account the
guerrilla forces in any settlement," he
said.
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54F it
DEBRIEFING OF SALVADORAN INSURGENT LEADER MOISES LOPEZ-ARRIOLA
Salvadoran security forces captured Moises Lopez-Arriola, a
leader of the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), on or
about 29 August 1982, after Lopez-Arriola had been involved in a
bank robbery in Santa Ana, El Salvador. Lopez-Arriola's most
senior position within the insurgent movement had been Chief of
the Western Region of the FARN, as well as of the front groups
Unified Popular Action Front (FAPU) and National Resistance
(RN), a position he held from April 1980 to June 1982.
Lopez-Arriola has cooperated fully with his captors, and his
debriefing has so far resulted in the arrest of 31 other
insurgent leaders as well as abundant information on Cuban and
Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran insurgents; insurgent
organization, operations, and supply mechanisms; and political
infighting within and among the insurgent groups.
Lopez-Arriola is 22 years old. He became active in the
insurgency before he left secondary school, after completing the
11th grade. In 1977, at age 17, he became a paid functionary of
FAPU, responsible for picking up propaganda material at the
University of El Salvador Law School in San Salvador and
delivering it to FAPU elements in Santa Ana. Late that year he
was placed in charge of FAPU militias (unarmed propaganda and
support groups) in Santa Ana, and subsequently of the Western
Region militia as a whole. In early 1978 he joined a cell of
the FARN, moved up to the regional coordinating level by
mid-year, and was a delegate to the FARN Second National Council
in early 1979.1 He attended an.infantry platoon leader's course
in Cuba from 1979 until January 1980, and after his return to El
Salvador was.. appointed FARN Western Region chief.
Lopez-Arriola lost his command in June 1982 as a result of
loss of confidence in his leadership Abilities by the FARN
National Executive Directorate after a series of tactical
reverses beginning with his participation in the January 1981
guerrilla offensive. He was isolated from contact with FARN
members and turned to bank robberies to support himself. He was
captured by security forces after his third bank holdup, and is
currently being held on criminal rather than subversive charges.
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During his lengthy ebriefing, Lopez-Arriola tc!vealed that
in January 1981 Vietnam h..-A delivered 30 tons of weapons to
Nicaragua to be forwarded to the Farabundo Marti Uational
Liberation Movement (FMLN). The weapons included rifles,
automatic rifles, submachine guns and light machine guns.
The Nicaraguans controll the distribution of all wPapons
stockpiled in their country and Lopez-Arriola had been told by
a fellow FMLN leader that when the FMLN was in need of weapons,
the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) asked the
Nicaraguans for permission to draw from available supplies. In
addition to providing weapons, the Vietnamese offered to train
members of the FMLN and in June 1981 Lopez-Arriola was told
that five FARN members were in Cuba en route to Vietnam to
attend a general staff course.
Lopez-Arriola reported that the Government of Nicaragua
provided the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) and the
FMLN with an extensive base of operations in and around
Managua. Representatives to the DRU from the five Salvadoran
insurgent groups live in Managua and each of the- forces has a
command center there.. He knew that the FARN group had a
commander and deputy in Managua, as well as a representative
responsible for guerrilla activities outside of El Salvador, a
communications center staff and others. Lopez-Arriola also
stated that the other four insurgent groups had similar
complements of officials working in Managua. The Nicaraguans
provided buildings for the exclusive use of the FARN. In
addition, at least two of the FARN leaders were given houses of
their own and the Nicaraguans had even provided a school for
the children of FMLN officials.
Lopez-Arriola believed that the Nicaraguan help to the
FARN may have been especially generous because the FARN
contributed money to help insure the Sandinista victory. In
1980, Lopez-Arriola was told of a FARN contribution to the
Sandinistas of at least U.S. $2 million. This money was raised
by the FARN from kidnappings and robberies.
In discussing the participation of other radical groups in
the struggle in El Salvador, Lopez-Arriola stated that in May
1980 he planned simultaneous attacks against Acajutla and areas
of Sonsonate. He was assisted in his efforts and in training
the insurgets and militia by two member p of the Chilean
Independent Revolutionary Movement) (MIR).
-2--
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Lopez-Arriolo attended a meeting in Cuba in June 1981
which was attended by Fidel Castro, other Cuban leaders,
members of the Sandinista Liberation Front and representatives
of the FMLN. During the meeting Castro told the Salvadoran
insurgents that the FMLN did not seem able to plan
intelligently and was not truly a clandestine organization
since the Salvadoran and United States governments seemed to be
able to acquire much advance information about the insurgents'
plans. Castro said that although the FMLN had achieved a
propaganda victory and had gained sympathy in some countries,
it was on the defensive in El Salvador. Castro said that the
Salvadoran insurgents should develop armed conflict in
accordance with existing political situations, adding that the
FMLN should employ a variety of strategies and tactics. Of
major importance was the need for them to select techniques
suitable for prolonging the war.
? .---In-discussing Cuban-support to the ?insurgent groups,_?
Lopez-Arfriolo said that in the spring of. 1982-he. had been -told
-
t -soni0.36:0 -PA:RN-7:rire-mbers. -Iradff-tiecely61:,:tut?-ari, -trAtni-og by- march:
L..6-.1: ..7St? titFc.1-11Va..4c741dd147-71374:13:541--
- ? re ? ?
had bOri-:-t:rain-ext. Based _ on his conversations - with
1ea.de.e.J?51.:the Rewiriitionary ?At'mY'--(ERP) Lopez - -
calculated that the ERP had sent some 1,400 people to Cuba for
- training. Lopez-Arriola himself attended a platoon leaders' ?
ecitii-ke: from July _19-79 to. eaily:-JarlUary:1-980'.. The training .was
?thindUCEld -7at 'IAred -74w In fa-ry- installation near -
Guanabo and included map reading and drawing, tactics
(assault's, -ambushes; patrolling, encirclements), explosives
(theory and formulas_ for -the :use of explosives, and practical -
work witli:dynamite and "rocamonita" a Soviet explosive), .L.
weapons (theory, assembly and disassembly and range firing with
FAL, G-3 AR-I5 automatic -rifles, Uii -and M-3 -submachine .
guns - time was also devoted to mortars and small arms as well
as Soviet12.7mm heavy machineguns and RPG-2 Chinese rocket
launchers), politics (Cuban history, Marxism and political
economy), and "The Enemy Army"- a review of the organization
and tactics of the U.S. Army. Lopez and his fellow trainees
traveled to Cuba by way of Panama and returned via Managua.
Lopez used his true name passport departing and returning to El
Salvador but was given an alias passport to travel to and from
Cuba. His Salvadoran passport was taken from him in Panama by
a FARN representative and returned to him in Nicaragua.
?
-3-
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*r..5
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O Jr a
lic3 3ase for Ferrying Arms to El Salvador Found in Nicaragua!
0
By Sam Dillon
?
(r) ,F-STERO DE PADRE RAMOS. Nice-
agua?A radio-equipped warehouse and
(D7J .oat facility diskised as a fishing cooper-
(T) tive on an island in northwestern Nicara-
u) ? Au, has served for three years as a trans-
iitunent point fur smuggling arms to El
o ilvador. numerous residents here say.
_?
Although the Nicaraguan government
!enies the operation, fishermen and other*
-(-?3i several tiny coastal hamlets nearby say
soldiers in military vehicles yeeularly
.'uckecl wooden boxes to the water's edge
Fs rid loaded them in motor-Dowered
Junches bound for El Salvador's coast 40
? es to the north.
-0 Fishermen report occasionally finding
co
o).imilar wooden boxes containing foot-long
? bazookas"?presionably mortar shells or
omilar numitions?on shore north of the
co
co nouth of this estuary where the boats bat-
7j(3)le the surf to enter the Pacific Ocean.
8 A 14-boat fleet, including half a dozen
nrp filiewit minors that ran carry thou-
o 'Inds of pounds of cargo. has been involved
8 fl the operation, residents say, with render
- r
0 ,c rartures at two-week intervals.
00 fhe Reagan administration has con-
y) ended since soon after the inauguration in
01
1981 that Nicaragua's Sandinista govern-
ment was supplying arms to the Salvadoran
guerrillas. But U.S. officials have consis-
tently refused to provide evidence of the
Nicaragua-to-El Salvador arms flow, con-
tending it would compromise intelligence
sources. Without the proof. critics have
been skeptical of the U.S. allegations.
No U.S. officials were interviewed in con-
nection with this report.
Anti-Sandinista "counterrevolutionaries"
attacked the island Sept. 14. blowing UD
the warehouse and three small boats. A
communique from the Honduran-based,
U.S.-financed Nicaraguan Democratic
orce (PUN) claimed responsibility. calling
the site "an important. center of logistical
supply" for Salvadoran guerrillas.
Sandinista authorities claimed the FDN
had attacked the state-financed Mario Car.
rillo fishing cooperative. Barricada, the of-
ficial newspaper, condemned the attack as
Irrational criminality."
Defense Ministry officials, asked about
- the details in this account, insisted that no
military installation had existed on the is-
land.
Officials in the Fisheries Ministry and
the National Development Bank said Mon-
day,- however, that the. Mario Carrillo co-
operative is not on the island and that no
slate-recognized cooperative operates in
this region.
Indeed, in two visits to La Concha, the
swampy island base said by the government
to house the Mario Carrillo cooperative,
reporters found no evidence the facility was
ever used for fishing..
Instead, reporters found a Sandinista
Army banner, a makeshift target with dm-
ens of spent rifle shell casings, a radio an-
tenna and three long, empty wooden boxes
amid the ruins of the tin-roofed warehouse,
destroyed in the FDN attack.
Fishermen and other residents who live
in huts lining this tangled estuary, and also
small farmers and fishermen in Jiquilillo,
Padre Ramos, Venecia and other nearby
hamlets, said La Concha island was not a
fishing cooperative but a "military base.*
The island has been off limits to local
residents for three years, they said. Report-
ers were granted government permission to
visit the island last week to report the FDN
attack.
Some area residents were hesitant to dis-
cuss the La Concha activity, calling it a
*delicate ?situation, but others openly
talked with reporters.
"I don't get involved in politics, hut ev-
eryone around hero knows theY are carryir <
the arms to El Salvador." said the wife of a
Padre Ramos fishernlan.
Several residents said they had set
what they described as the arms traffickir
in La Concha, and had learned other detai (T)
through casual conversations with loca F;))
involved in the smuggling forays. n.)
To avert potential difficulty for ther o
names of residents who talked about tl
arms-trafficking have been omitted.
A shotgun-toting guard who lives 2( 6--
yards across from La Concha, Vicen
Perez Castellon, fired into the air to wai
off reporters landing on the island in
rented launch. When presented with a go, ?i
ernment letter of authorization, however, I _T)
consented to show reporters around tt co
destroyed facility. He maintained it was 2
fishing cooperative.
Perez Castellon said the facility's rad co
had been used to monitor Fisheries Mil SS
istry radio reports on fishing conditions. ,T)
Fisheries Ministry official in Managua sa
the ministry does not broadcast fishing r 8
ports and knew of no fishing ?cooperativ o
equipped with two-way radios. _?
Fishermen said departure of the arr 8
See NICARAGUA, All, Col. 1 8
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ce?, tr4tte.01)
-- ?
Nicaraguans in Fishing Villages
Tell of Arms Smuggling Efforts
NICARAGUA, From A29
shipments depended on weather and
surf conditions. as well as reports of
'vigilance- conditions in the Gulf of
Fonseca. which separates Nicaragua
from El Salvador. Salvadoran and
Honduran ;furiboats patrol the 20-
mile wide gulf.
Soviet-Bloc weapons used hy the
Sandinista Army have never ap-
peared in the hands of Salvadoran
rebels. and there was no indication
of where the arms delivered to La
Concha had originated.
Neither wir, there any indication
here of 'how high within the Sandi-
nista military hierarchy the involve-
ment extended. .
Nicaraguan officials have never
publicly admitted involvement in the
smuggling of arms to El Salvador.
The fisherman said that ?veeks
after the Sandinista-led ouster ot
president Anastasio Somoza in 1979,
military men came to the
lool:ing tor experienced smugglers,
beginning soon thereafter, Andres
Lopez, identified by several residents
as a smuggler who lived in Venecia
on the northern shore of the estuary,
emerged as the local leader of the
operation, the fishermen said.
Then La Concha's guard, Perez
Castellon, began to warn local res-
idents away from the island and sev-
eral unusually large launches ap-
peared for the first time at the fa-
cility, residents said.
f.
elsr.
? 'NILS ' ? .
1.4C?111 N1t-Crory -The Wjahingion Pod
---
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ivy/ IF 1,- r
Salvador Rebels.
Still Said to Get
Niediag. win- Aid
?
. By STEPHEN KINZER . .
;...: sp.dia t?Tbetie;rYterl'isms , ......
'MANAGUA, Nicaragua, .Aprii 16 ?
Western European and Latui Ameri- ?
can diplomats here say.the Nicaraguan
Government is continuing to send mili-
tary equipment to the Salvadoran in--
surgents and to operate trai nine camps
for them inside Nicaragua.
UnitedThe States has been making
such Charges since 1980.. Nicaragua,
while.* explicitly denying allOf the
charges, say its support is "moral and
political:'P- -;.-- -- -_ ? :, s i ????? ..--. ' ' : ' ? '?? _._ -- ?
The 'diplomats-, including some from
countries thiit liave-Crificivid 'tidied ?
States ixilicies ? in. Central ? America;.
said military support to the Salvadoran
rebels had dropped over-the list-year,
but remained substantial. ? - "7' -.'
.. _ . . ..
, . No Nicaraguan Comment .
At a news conference, last week,
Presidept Feagan said Nicai-agua was
"exporting revolution to El Salvador,
its neighbor, and is helping, supporting
and arming and. training the guerrillas
that are trying to Overthrow a duly
elected government.'.. , ' . - - ?_ 7 . ? -
Nicaraguan Foreign :Ministry .offi-:'
ciaLs.-declinedlO aim:bent-On the issue
to&y.....The head of the Miniiiry's Con-
tial '. America, Departpent, ? Damlo
Abaci, said he Wes not authorized to
spond to suchinqiiirietc-jk,?,:77, .'..- ;.-7;1;c-..? .
Western diplomats appear to be COn-.
Yi hoed of the -general nicarie'y - of
American intelligerkeiniciti.:tin the
ties between Nicaragua an the Saiva-.
doran rebels. : - - ' .-.4'...."';'..'1,-' .-r7 -.
"I believe summon t for tbirevOlUtion-
aries in El Salvador ii continuine and
that it is very important to the Sandia.
..
"The Sandinistas fear that if the guer-
rilla movement weakens in El Salva-
dor, their own regime will become
more isolated and more vulnerable .to
attack.r. ; _
Salvadoran rebel leaders have in-
_Continued on Page 'Al, Column 3 -
_
Diploksatq.SitySalvadorap,Rbls
Still Get Supplies from Nicaragua
?
Continued From Page Al
sisted that they receive only small
amounts of aid from Nicaragua,
mainly ? Communications equipment,
medicine and some ammunition. They
say most supplies -are bought on the
black market or captured from Salva-
doran Government troops.- . . ? -
A United States Embassy official in
San Salvador said today that, the
rebels' "pressing need is not for rifles
and small arms.' . r. ??
_ _ _
Two weeks ago, Fred C. Ilde, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, said
that roughly half of the arms used by
the rebels were United States-supplied
arms taken from Salvadoran Govern-
ment troops. Later the Pentagon said
the estimate was based on a limited
survey in a few rebel areas. Elsewhere,
the Pentagon said,. the figure is closer
to a third to a quarter.
' Sources of Most Rebel Supplies.
Mr. nde also said the United States
believed that 80 percent of the ammuni-
tion and explosives used by the rebels
are supplied from Cuba and the Soviet
Union through Nicaratua. ? , ?
Administration officials in Washing-
ton said today that small planes and
boats were transporting supplies from
Nicaragua at night. The officials said
that command and Control' of guerrilla
operations continued in Managua. In
Mexico City, a member of the rebel
movement said little of the command
structure remained in Nicaragua.
,"All the commanders are now living
The New York Times/April 11,1984
Nicaragua Is said to continue to
send arms to rebels in El Salvador.
?
?
In Moiazan," he said, referring to a
province in eastern El Salvador.
In Honduras, which lies between
Nicaragua and El Salvador, a Western
diplomat said last month that despite
United States training, Honduran Gov-
ernment troops had interdicted few
supply shipments: - ? - -
Administration officials said the size
of the Nicaraguan Army had nearly
doubled in the last year to 47,000 sol-
diers, with the number of Cuban mili-
tary and security advisers in Nicara-
gua reaching 2,500 to 3.000, from 2,000,
and the number of _ Cuban civilians
dropping to 5,500, from 6,000. -
"The Cubans are sending More com-
bat-capable people to Nicaragua," a
Pentagon official said, adding that
Gen. Arnaldo Oc.hott, who once led
Cuban forces in Ethiopia and Angola,
continued to serve as the Cuban mili-
tary leader in Nicaragua. .
At a meeting with foreign corre-
spondents last month, the United
States Ambassador here, Anthony C.E.
Quainton, said Salvadoran rebels were
being trainea in Nicaragua and arms
shipments were moving regularly to El
Salvador. He said the guerrillas' com-
mand center was in Nicaragua.....
Several months ago, at Nicaragua's
suggestion, a number of Salvadoran
civilians affiliated with the rebel cause
left Nicaragua in what was described
as an effort to remove a possible pre-
text for American-backed military in-
tervention. However, rebel leaders are
believed to visit Managua regularly.
,Visiting members of Congress have
'met here with guerrilla commanders,
Including Ana Guadalupe Martinez of
the People's Revolutionary Army.;
Western intelligence reports suggest
that aid no longer moves overland
through Honduras 'and but is flown
daily by light planes to makeshift air-
- strips in guerrilla-held areas of El Sal-
vador:. - _
Some suppoilers of the Nicaraguan
Government have expressed doubts
about these allegations and challenge
the United Stites to produce evidence.
Diplomats acknowledge that they have
seen no proof, but say they believe that
military ties between Nicaragua and
the rebels remain strong.
"Maybe not everything theAmeri-
cans say is true, but logic and common
sense support their case," said a His-
panic diplomat. "The Sandinistas'
ideology dictates that they help other
countries adopt political systems lilt',
their " ? - ? . ? -
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The Lo.. Angeles Times Sunday March 13, 1983
Salvadoran
Rebels Brag
of Cuba Ties
Insurgency Part of
Regional Conflict,
Guerrillas Declare
By DAVID WOOD,
Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON?El Salis
validotriI
leftist guerrilla movement li
launday of its close ties to Cuba and
us le against the U.S.-backed
ila:a metered tigit it sees
go t in San Salvador id Dart
a wiser regional
7711Telitiaicest al aagia
'Venceremas. the voice of the gee
insurgent organizations erten
erfinatuea fenunent
tiona of the antl-iniverialist strirg-?
?11141'he Reagan Administration is
not one to tell the FMLN (Pardus-
do Marti National Liberation Front)
who ought to be its friends and who
its enemies."
Enda Americas laierean
The Radio Vencsremos brqggeaS
went on to say "our war is and will
continue 19 be nationsL but . we
view our plans ie the framework et
r in which there
matiLerestlorthicte nevelt of Central
rouipen anot Latin
The broadcast. transmitted from a
secret location in neighborins Nica-
ragua?whose Marxist-led Sandi-
nista regime has allowed the Salva-
doran guerrillas to establish their
headquarters in Managua?also
bM that the rebels have im.
ported arms "through all routes that
we cougntra' and that "we have maid
all al America and other
wuntri pnos
The tat e tireup-
port charges made by the Reagan
Administration that the Insurgency
Is at least encouraged and armed, if
not directed, by the Soviet Union,
Cuba and Nicaragua and is aimed at
toppling one moderate government
after another throughout the re-
gion-
Eche of Demise Theory
The State Department's Latin
America analysts could not inunedi-
ately explain why the guerrilla
movement would suggest that the
Salvadoran conflict is part of a
regional conflict, thus subscribing,
In effect, to the "domino theory"
embraced by the White Howe. The
analysts indicated that the guerril-
las have not previously character-
ized the conflict as regional in
nature.
The broadcast also appeared to
undercut congressmen and others
critical of the Administration's poli-
cy who have argued that the guer-
rilla movement seeks only the es-
tablishment of social justice in El
Salvador.
One such critic, presidential as-
pirant Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.),
said on NBC-TV's "Meet the Pram"
Sunday that he is opposed to further
U.S military aid to El Salvador
because "we are not going to
achieve democracy out of the barrel
of a gun."
Hart said he favors negotiations
aimed at including guerrilla groups
in the government prior to national
elections?a position that the Ad-
ministration his stoutly resisted.
Defense Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger, speaking Sunday on
CBS-TV's "Face the Nation," said
the Soviet Union is seeking to
establish a Communist regime in
El Salvador, on the mainland, work-
lug its way closer ta the' United
States.
"Their purpose," Weinberger
mid, is to attack the United States
In this way from the south, knowing
that as they got closer, we'd be
under strong pressunis to pull our-
selves out of Europe and out at
Japan and Korea and establish some
sort al 'Fortress America,' which
would serve Soviet purposes very
well"
Reagan put it more succuictly in a
Watch March & "We believe that
the government of El Salvador is on
the front line in a battle that is
really aimed at the very heart of the
Western Hemisphere?and eventu-
ally at us."
Radio Vencerernos is the voice of
the Farabundo Marti Liberation
Front, an umbrella organization
comprising five Marxist-led guer-
rilla groups. The political arm of the
opposition to the government of El
Salvador, the Democratic Revolu-
tionary Front, is believed by many
analysts to be a less hard-line
organization. Officials of the front.
Both groups have demanded ne-
gotiations for a "comprehensive po-
litical settlement" before they
would participate I. elections in El
Salvador.
In defending the Administration's
emergency request for $110 million
In military aid to El Salvador,
Weinberger said Sunday: "I 2014
progress is being made in thwftiss
military, political side. But we are
not going to be able to do anything if
the country is being torn apart by a
guerrilla war.
"I don't think there is a crisis
down there, but the military situa-
tion is not going well atilt, and it is
vital that the government troops be
resupplied as the guerrillas are
being resupplied every night,"
Weinberger said. "What is essential
Is to solve this matter at the lowest
possible level of participation in
conflict by the United States."
In other Salvadoran develop-
ments Sunday:
?The country's Roman Catholic
Church backed the government's
decision to advance the presidential
election to December. Msgr. Grego-
rio Rosa Chavez, auxiliary bishop of
San Salvador, said during his homi-
ly at the Metropolitan Cathedral
that the church was pleased with
President Alvaro Magana's recent
political initiatives "in favor of
peace with justice . . namely, the
establishment of a peace commis-
sion and the announcement of elec-
tions."
?Salvadoran Defense Minister
Jose Guillermo Garcia said the army
Is "preparing an offenaive since the
terrorist groups the leftist guerrilla
commands engaged in thewar
against the government) have
threatened to continue attacking
public services, including electric
power, transport, water, bridges
and reeds."
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at 7
. POST
Leftist Gnetrillas
In El Salvador
Defend Cuba Ties
By Christopher Dickey
SAN SALVAIX)R. March I3?El Sal-
staaors guerrillas, in a defiant response to
rrestoent neagan s speech last week iirgint
an expansion of the LLS. commitment to thc
government they are Vhtint, have reaf-
firmed their determination to maintain ties.
Cad anu-Alcaragua.
alia a broadcast lust ni,,ht, they also threat-
ened "within that context" an -open region-
alization" of their war if the Reagan admin-
istration continued to broaden its support
for the faltering Salvadoran government. ?
In a broadcast over their clandestine
Radio Veneeremm, the rebels said: "We are
and will continue king friends of the people
and governments of Cuba and Nicaragua,
and it does not shame us. Completely to the
contrary, we are proud to maintain relations
with those people?bastions of the anti-im-
perialist struggle. The Reagan administration
is not one to tell the FMLN fFarabundo
Marti National Liberation Frontj who ought
to be its friends and who its enemies." The
statement made no effort to deny receiving
Caban and Nicaraguan support as the rebels
have in the past.
The broadcast came as the Reagan admin-
istration is planning $110 million in military
and .$168 million in economic assistance this
year to help launch some of the must ambi-
tious counterinsurgency training and oper-
ations programs of the 21'2-year-old war.
Despite major questions about the com-
petence and human rights records of the gov-
ernment here, Reagan justified the emergen-
cy support by pointing to the need to defeat
"extremists with Cuban-Soviet support" that
comes to them by way of "Marxist Nicara-
gua." He said the leftist forces would threat-
en U.S. security interests.
The rebels' broadcast defended their
"right" to get arms anywhere. While insisting
that their main headquarters are inside the
country, along with their radio transmitter
they admitted to having "important mis-
sions" outside El Salvador.
"We have carried out important logistical
operations of a clandestine character with
which we have armed and munitioned our
forces for a long time. We have carried out
these operations by all the courses we could,
and we have used all Central America and
other countries for them." the broadcast said.
As Washington has raised its commitment
in the region during the past month, the Ni-
caraguans also have reaffirmed their clime
ties, if not their concrete material support,
with the Salvadoran rebels.
Memi Momr-A II. PM
The Sandinista leaders in Managua feel
under mounting pressure from a rebellion
that reportedly receives covert funding from
Washington on the basis that such action
helps "interdict" arms supplies to the Salva-
doran guerrillas. Speaking March 3 at a
funeral for 17 adolescent Sandinistas killed
by counterrevolutionaries, Nicaraguan com-
mander Bayard? Arce warned that his par-
ty's "internationalism will not bend" and
that "while Salvadorans are fighting to win
their liberty Nicaragua will maintain its sol-
idarity."
The guerrillas here said in their broadcast
last night that their war Is and will continue
being national, but we are not so naive as not
to know that we cannot and ought not fail to
place our plans in the framework of a region-
al conflict" in which the future of Central
America is at stake.
They added that they are not closely tied
to the Soviet Union but said that is because
"unfortunately it is very far away."
The pace of the war here has stepped up
dramatically since the guerrillas began a sus-
tainecloffensive in October. The Salvadoran
government and the White House maintain
that the rebels use ammunition, if not guns,
smuggled in from Nicaragua
In a response that some military observers
here see as virtually a last-ditch effort to re-
verse rebel momentum, the United States
and the Salvadoran government are pushing
ahead with an ambitions, coordinated pro-
gram of military and civic action planned for
some of El Salvador's battered, guerrilla-do-
minated eastern provinces.
Modeled broadly on the program of Civil
Operations and Rural Development Support
WORDS/ created in Vietnam during the
1960s, but refined and scaled down for im-
plementation here, it is thief far referred to
only as "the plan" and is to be carried out in
four stages.
The number of U.S. military advisers re-
quired is not likely to remain below the ad-
ministration's self-imposed limit of 5.5 men,
according to a military ohserver. He added
that the American presence in the coun-
tryside probably will grow with the addition
of more U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment employes.
There is no set timetable as yet, but be-
cause of crop cycles in the San Vicente and
Usulutan areas where the new initiative is
expected to be launched, it should be under
way no later than mid-summer.
According to military sources, the first
stage, planning, is intended to integrate and
coordinate the American and Salvadoran
personnel working on the program as they
hammer out its details. The second stage is a
large-scale military sweep to clean out guer-
rilla concentrations. Salvadoran civilian as-
sistance agencies trained to deal with every-
thing from road repair to refugee assistance
and public health are supposed to follow the
Army's offensive. The plan calls for the mil
itary command staff to be advised by at len,
five American soldiers while another 10 tc
are devoted to the task of "upgrading the
training" of the troops in the operations area,
a military source said.
In the third phase, the military role is sup-
posed to subside while a renewed civilian
infrastructure takes hold in these areas long
dominated by the rebels. The fourth stage
sees the withdrawal of all but a small con-
tingent of soldiers while the main force
moves on to new target areas. The strategy is
designed to sidestep longstanding problems
with senior Salvadoran military tommanders
who are ill-trained and ill-disposed to adopt
the kind of political, social and ? military
counterinswztactica advocated by the
U.S. Embassy.
Military sources here anticipate problems
with the paramilitary forces needed to sup-
ply security in the latter phases of the pro-
gram. Such groups have been responsible for
many of the atrocities in the countryside
that give this government a notorious human
rights record.
There are also questions about how effec-
tively the guerrillas can be cleaned out in the
first place, since previous sweeps rarely have
pushed rebels out of their stronghold for
more than a few weeks.
Weinberger links
Salvadoran war
to global competition
terms, however, Weinberger ruled
out more direct U.S. participation in
the Salvadoran conflict "What is
essential is to solve this matter at
the lowest possible level of partici-
pation and conflict by the United
States," he said.
He said it is "vitar that Salvador-
an troops be resupplied by the Unit-
ed States to match supplies received
by guerrilla forces "every night" from
Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet
Union.
Weinberger said US, military aid
to El Salvador will end when "the
democratic effort that is going on in
El Salvador is allowed to continue
unimpeded and unhampered by ad-
verse, -communist-sponsored military
activity. Now, I can't give you the
hour or the day that's going to hap-
pen .... " But, he said, the admin-
istration "is trying to bring that day
closer."
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INCOMING
PAGE.111 2219E72
ACTION -If
Departnaerit of State
2195 AN11733
INFO. XF711 ARA-14 0A5-1111. IPP1-111 EC?-l1 PPC-11 MICA-Il DCEN-01
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41112-01 /122 Al KMX
INFO OCT-81 COPY-11 ARA-111 A11A0-11 PM-118 /036 V
051730 2211112 /44-38
P 2218962 AUG 83
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO CSA WASHINGTON DC
COO WASHINGTON DC '
CSAF VASNINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASNINGTON DC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
CMC WASHINGTON DC
SAFE
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FM CDR AMCCOM ROCK ISL IL //DRSMC-M11D-L11 1101/
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CDR 479TRMIGP COROZAL PANAMA //lAGFP-AS//
INFO USDA? SAN SALVADOR EL SALVADOR
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PAGE 03 ROCIATB3361 LOMAS
F. VSN 1509680, SlIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, AIR FREIGHT
TERMINAL, COVER AFD, DE, 11/1 220TH ORO SERVICE CENTER, BIN II ALC
M 61SXAP-A9AP151 ARRA/1111F OVSXAP-9671-1501,
F o ?,J4. COITFACT 0/11/93 11-C-0061, 11/1 L-817,076. ON A. MAY 1969.
,4
- TELEGRAM
22111872 2115 _A1A1733
G. VSN 1652392, SNIPPED TO 241ST ORD SUPPLY
CONTRACT DAAF113 -61 -C -71$21, 11/i 1-6,891,618, ON 16 OCT 1961.
N. USN 1111721, SNIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, MliITARY
OCEAN TERMINAL, FT MCCORMICK LINES, DAYONNE, NJ, M/F US ARMY,"
Y, CONTRACT DAA1B3 -7 -C -0001, E -6,117,063, ON
M
IPRIN 1101
II.11110
I.ISIS 1391211, 1634516, 1661411, AND 16711216, NO INFORMATION .
AVAILABLE.
5. THE FOLLOWING M-16 RIFLES WERE MANUFACTURED BY NYDRANATIC DIV,
GENERAL MOTORS CORP, AND ALL RECORDS WERE DESTROYED: 3118155
3E30346 3147113 3052165 3658132 3969395 3071131 3081145
31188804 31171111 3119728 3131904 3139515.
6. RESEARCH ON M-1 CARBINE WSN'S PRODUCED NEGATIVE RESULTS WITH
ONE EXCEPTION: WSN 114485, WAS SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER,
BROOKLYN ARMY TERMINAL, NY, M/F USARYIS ORD DEPOinalaidagalals,
FORCES AND RESERVE STOCK AND MAINTENANCE FLOAT, CONTRACT DA-11-11M-
PAGE B4 RUCIAFB3361 UNCLAS
AMC-508 01, 11/L C-0, 631,274, ON 28 SEP 1964. -
T. POC TNIS COMUU10, NO, AMCCON, ATTN: ORSMC-MMD-LW 111,
MR. CUNNINGHAM, AUTOVON 713-4671/6421.
ENT
UNCLASSIFIED
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BACKGROUND PAPER:
CENTRAL AMERICA
Preface
On May 13, 1983, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives issued a report which concluded that
"the Sandinistas have stepped up their support for insurgents in Hon-
duras" and that Cuban and Nicaraguan aid for insurgents constitutes "a
clear picture of active promotion 'for revolution without frontiers'
throughout Central America by Cuba and Nicaragua." The committee
also reiterated its earlier finding that the guerrillas in El Salvador "are
well trained, well equipped with modern weapons and supplies, and rely
on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical
support. The intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the Com-
mittee is convincing."
The summary of Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Soviet activities in Cen-
tral America included in this background paper supports the conclusions
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is being issued
in the interest of contributing to a better public understanding of the history
of developments in the region.
This background paper does not attempt to analyze social and economic
conditions in the Central American countries. Rather, it describes how
politically motivated violence is being used to exploit the demands for more
democracy, social justice, and economic development in Central America
in order to bring extreme leftist groups to power.
Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense
May 27, 1983
Washington, D.C.
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BACKGROUND PAPER:
CENTRAL AMERICA
1
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Mexico and Central America: A Global Perspective
39O2 (A01028) 3 83
MAP #1
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Introduction
Today, far more than at any time in the past, extreme leftist
forces in Central America are supported by an extensive foreign
intelligence and training apparatus, modern military equipment and
a large and sophisticated propaganda network. With Soviet bloc
support, Cuba is using contacts nurtured over more than 20 years to
provide political and military training, plus material and
propaganda support, to many violent groups in a number of Central
American countries. The immediate goals are to consolidate control
of the Sandinista Directorate in Nicaragua and to overthrow the
Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. Honduras and Costa Rica
also have been targeted (see Map #1).
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I. Nicaragua
When Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, he set the pattern
which, 20 years later, the Sandinistas are repeating in Nicaragua.
Castro established a dual government. An inner core of trusted
guerrillas controlled and built the instruments of power (the army,
the secret police, "revolutionary tribunals," and new mass
organizations), while his democratic allies were kept busy in
formal institutions such as the Council of State and government
ministries. This tactic helped him consolidate power and
neutralize his democratic allies until they could no longer unite
against him. Many of these allies later were executed or
imprisoned, or left the country.
In Nicaragua, the democratic opposition to Somoza established a
"broad opposition front" in coalition with the Sandinistas, who
assured their democratic allies (as Castro had done in 1957-59) of
their commitment to democratic elections "after Somoza." The
presence of noncommunist elements in the Sandinista-led "broad
coalition" served to deceive many Western governments about the
true character of the Sandinista Directorate. As in Cuba, two
decades earlier, this broad coalition provided a political network
that could be used by the extreme left to mislead Western opinion
and governments, while obtaining financial support from the West.
On June 23, 1979 the OAS gave provisional recognition to the
anti-Somoza forces, contingent upon the establishment of a
democractic political system including tree political parties, free
elections, free trade unions, religious freedom and an independent
media. On July 12, 1979, during the final bargaining leading to
Somoza's departure, the Sandinistas sent a written promise to the
OAS that they would hold free elections and guarantee democratic
freedoms. The Sandinistas have yet to implement this promise.
During this period, Cuba provided about 500 tons of weapons and
other military supplies directly to the Sandinista units. Cuba
also trained and deployed an "Internationalist Brigade," whose
personnel fought with the Sandinistas. And on July 18, 1979,
Julian Lopez Diaz, a leading Cuban covert action operative, flew to
Managua from Costa Rica, where he had been the Sandinistas' key
adviser. He became, and remains, the Cuban Ambassador.
After their victory, the Sandinistas followed Castro's example
and established a dual governing structure. The inner core was
headed by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a
nine-person Directorate, which immediately moved with Cuban help to
establish a new army, an internal security apparatus and a variety
of controlled organizations: neighborhood "defense committees,"
trade unions, professional organizations and media organs. The
Sandinistas also came to dominate the nominally independent
executive branch: the Junta, the quasi-legislative Council of
State, and most government ministries.
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3
The Sandinistas encouraged their democratic allies to
participate in these executive branch institutions, both to use the
skills of their allies and their international credibility. This
helped obtain more than $1.6 billion in Western aid from July 1979
to the end of 1982. The United States, along with other
democracies, immediately recognized the new government. During the
first 18 months of the regime, the United States provided more than
$118 million in direct aid and endorsed more than $220 million in
Inter-American Development Bank credits.
Repression of the democratic political parties, trade unions,
and media began within weeks of Somoza's departure. In August and
September 1979, the Sandinistas launched a campaign against the
social democratic and Christian Democratic trade unions and their
national federations, and tried to consolidate organized labor in
two Sandinista-controlled groupings. A conference of Sandinista
leaders in late September 1979 produced a specific plan for
consolidating power. It stated that the democratic groups were to
be "isolated" and brought under Sandinista control and that "while
political parties must be permitted to exist" because of "interna-
tional opinion," the Sandinistas would "work within them to get
them to support the revolution."
Finally, in August 1980, the Sandinistas declared publicly that
elections would not be held until 1985. Even then, these are not
to be "bourgeois elections" but rather will serve only to "ratify"
the revolution.
As a further measure of internal repression, in December 1981
the Sandinistas began destroying more than 40 villages of the
Protestant, English-speaking Indians in northeastern Nicaragua.
About 15,000 escaped into Honduras and the remainder were either
killed by the FSLN or forceably relocated to detention camps far
from their homes. The proof of this cruel activity is undeniable.
(Photos 1, 2, and 3 provide photographic evidence of the destruc-
tion of these villages.)
This campaign has served to consolidate power in the hands of
the Sandinistas; genuinely democratic groups and ethnic minorities
have been excluded from real political influence. Although some
are permitted to survive under surveillance and pressure, political
control is held only by the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista
directorate.
Within a week after the Sandinistas' takeover, Cuba had some 100
military and security personnel in Nicaragua. Three months later,
by October 1979, this figure had increased to 200. Today,
Nicaragua "hosts" 7,000 to 8,000 Cubans, including 1,500 to 2,000
military and security advisers, and many high-level Sandinistas
have counterpart Cuban advisers. Cubans have trained virtually all
Nicaraguan recruits in the General Directorate of Sandinista State
Security, the new State police organization responsible for
maintaining Sandinista control over the populace.
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The Sandinista military buildup also began immediately.
Somoza's National Guard numbered about 9,000 before 1977, and
15,000 at the height of the fighting. The Sandinistas have
increased their military forces to some 25,000 regular troops on
active duty, with another 50,000 in active reserve and militia
forces. In addition, they have added 36 new military bases and
Soviet bloc weaponry, including 45-50 tanks, armored personnel
carriers, mobile rocket-launchers and helicopters. Airfields are
being constructed or improved which could service military jet
aircraft.
For example, construction of a new dual runway airfield at Punta
Huete, near Managua, is proceeding at an extremely rapid pace.
About 800 meters of the estimated 3,600 meter main runway have been
completed and work has begun on a parallel runway-taxiway; large,
square area is being leveled for a probable parking apron. The
location of Punta Huete strongly suggests that the new airfield,
when completed, will be Nicaragua's main military airbase as well
as the largest military airfield in Central America. This
conclusion is based on: the relatively isolated location near Lake
Managua (7 miles northwest of Managua); the estimated length of the
runway, as well as the fact it will have a dual runway-taxiway
(which could support a volume of air traffic exceeding current
levels at Sandino International Airport); and the use of concrete
paving (see Photo #4).
Castro's Strategy
Fidel Castro brings to his renewed and expanded political-
military activism in Central America his own personal experience in
achieving power in Cuba, seeking to export revolution in the
Western Hemisphere, particularly during the 1960s, as well as
nearly two decades of highly effective collaboration with the
Soviet KGB and Soviet military. He also has cultivated close ties
with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Libya and
pro-Soviet factions in Africa and the Middle East in support of
terrorism and subversion. Castro has a method of operation with
the following principal components:
-- Unification of the extreme left;
Establishment of a "broad coalition"--led by the extreme
left but including some noncommunist opposition
elements--which makes direct or ambiguous promises of a
"broad based" government after victory;
Use of the "broad coalition" and systematic propaganda and
political action techniques in order to obtain noncommunist
international support and isolate the target governments
from Western political and material help;
Provision of Soviet bloc, Cuban, and other anti-Western
military support as an incentive for extreme left unity.
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5
This approach proved successful in Nicaragua. It was then
turned against El Salvador in late 1979. Similar efforts have been
made in Guatemala since 1980, accompanied by stepped-up covert
activities against Honduras and Costa Rica starting in 1981 and
1982. The rapid expansion of these violent techniques in Central
America is illustrated by the fact that while the total armed
strength of the extreme left in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
and Costa Rica was estimated at about 1,450 in 1978, by 1981 it was
nearly 8,000.
III. El Salvador
Soon after defeating Somoza, the Sandinistas began training
guerrillas from El Salvador and other Central American countries.
This was the beginning of a steadily expanding partnership between
Cuba and the Sandinistas in exporting subversion in the region--a
partnership that has included the establishment in Nicaragua of
numerous guerrilla training camps, the transportation of tons of
weapons and the establishment on Nicaraguan territory of guerrilla
command and control facilities along with a variety of propaganda
and covert activities.
In December 1979, to overcome differences over tactics Castro
hosted the leaders of the leftist terrorist groups and the
Salvadoran Communist Party in Havana. This meeting produced
agreement to form a coordinating committee as was announced
publicly in January 1980. It was also at this meeting that Castro
reportedly outlined his strategy: El Salvador and Guatemala would
be "next," with Honduras to be used as a corridor for the transit
of guerrillas and arms.
Three small noncommunist groups in El Salvador formed the
"Democratic Front" in April 1980. Shortly thereafter, the
Marxist-Leninist leaders and the noncommunist leaders of the
"Democratic Front" formed the "Revolutionary Democratic Front"
(FDR), thereby establishing the "broad coalition" which has been
used to give the impression that the guerrillas are democratic and
not Marxist-led. In June 1980, a meeting in Cuba united the
military and political components of the extreme left under a
"United Revolutionary Directorate" (DRU). In November 1980, a
military alliance of the five insurgent factions, the Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), was created. Chart #1 depicts the
evolution of this organizational framework.
The DRU became the command structure for the Marxist-Leninist
organizations and also the directing authority over the "Democratic
Front," for which representatives of three small noncomrunist
groups often act as spokesmen. The result was an unequal coalition
in which the Marxist-Leninist groups controlled the armed units,
weapons, intelligence, and covert support from the Soviet bloc/
Cuba, while the non-Marxist-Leninist element provided a useful
facade for maintaining international respectability.
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November 1980
June 1980
April 1980
DEVELOPMENT OF LEFTIST GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR
il*FMLNL
*DRU
F D R
January 1980
C
1977-1979
LP 281
*EARN
1974-1976
FAPU
1972
*ERP
1970
*FPL
1925-1970
RM
ALI
HBPRI.
*PRTC
UDN
* Armed guerrilla terrorist groups
CHART #1
MLP
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Having achieved the unified command for the extreme left, a
communist-led "broad coalition," and some noncommunist interna-
tional support, Cuba moved to increase the military strength of the
Salvadoran guerrillas with full but discreet support from the
Soviets. In April 1980, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders met in the
Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City with representatives of Cuba, the
USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland and Vietnam. In June and July
1980, the Salvadoran communist leaders went to Moscow and then with
Soviet endorsement visited East Germany, Bulgaria, Vietnam and
Ethiopia--all of which promised them military and other support.
The commitment of weapons was estimated at about 800 tons.
The Cuban/Soviet bloc military supply operation used Western
weapons (some from Vietnam) for "cover" and covertly shipped some
200 tons of weapons through Cuba and Nicaragua to arm the
Salvadoran guerrillas for their intense but unsuccessful "final
offensive" in January 1981.
Although the offensive failed, it led President Carter to
authorize U.S. military aid for arms, ammunition and equipment for
the first time since 1977 to "support the Salvadoran government in
its struggle against left-wing terrorism supported covertly with
arms, ammunition, training and political and military advice by
Cuba and other communist nations."
Throughout 1981, Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet bloc aided in
rebuilding, rearming and improving the Salvadoran guerrilla forces,
which expanded their operations in the fall. By 1982, the
Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas had about 4,000 to 6,000 full-time
fighters and an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 part-time activists who
provided logistical and political support as well as combat
services. The FMLN headquarters in Nicaragua evolved into an
extremely sophisticated command-and-control center--more elaborate
in fact, than that used by the Sandinistas against Somoza.
Guerrilla planning and operations are guided from this head-
quarters, where Cuban and Nicaraguan officers are involved in
command and control. The guidance flows to guerrilla units widely
spread throughout El Salvador. The FMLN headquarters in Nicaragua
also coordinates propaganda and logistical support for the
insurgents, including food, medicines, clothing, money and--most
importantly--weapons and ammunition.
Although some guerrilla actions take place as targets of
opportunity appear, the headquarters in Nicaragua decides on most
locations to be attacked and coordinates supply deliveries. The
guerrillas themselves have centralized their control procedures.
For example, on March 14, 1982, the FMLN clandestine Radio
Venceremos, then located near the Salvadoran border, broadcast a
message to guerrillas in El Salvador urging them "to maintain their
fighting spirit 24 hours a day to carry out the missions ordered by
the FMLN general command (emphasis supplied)." The murder and
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Major Central American Arms Routes
Mexico
( zy,
lIELMOPRM
Belize ?,
Ii-
Guatemala -
*GUATEMALA
Caribbean Sea
;AN SALVADOR,
El Salvador
Wake
Gulf of Mexico
thm":77?
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Pacific Ocean ccitts.
aribbean Sea
P?Kiimr?-),
, Colombia
Nicaragua
Pacific Ocean
OW* Seaborne arms route
M at Overland arms route
Jett Airborne arms route
100
Kilometers
MANAGUA
Costa Rica
SAN JOSE
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alleged suicide of leaders of El Salvador's largest guerrilla group
(the FPL) residing in Managua in April 1983 provided dramatic
evidence of the guerrillas' base in Nicaragua.
After El Salvador scheduled free elections for a Constituent
Assembly for March 28, 1982, the Salvadoran Government invited the
Social Democrats (MNR) and the Communist-front UDN, both of which
support the FMLN, to compete openly in those elections. This offer
was rejected and the top priority of the guerrillas became the
disruption or prevention of these elections. In December 1981,
after meetings in Havana with Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, Fidel
Castro directed that external supplies of arms to FMLN units be
stepped up to launch a offensive to disrupt the elections.
During the first 3 months of 1982, arms shipments into El
Salvador surged. Cuban-Nicaraguan arms flowed through Honduras
into El Salvador by sea, air, and overland routes. In February,
for example, Salvadoran guerrilla groups picked up a large shipment
on the Salvadoran coast, near Usulutan, after the shipment arrived
by sea from Nicaragua.
In addition to vitally needed ammunition, these supply
operations included greater quantities of more sophisticated heavy
weapons. Deliveries in 1982 included M-60 machineguns, M-79
grenade-launchers and M-72 antitank weapons, significantly
increasing the guerrillas' firepower. One guerrilla unit received
several thousand sticks of TNT and detonators from Nicaragua (only
five sticks are needed to blow up an electrical pylon). Individual
units also regularly received tens of thousands of dollars for
routine purchases of supplies on commercial markets and for
payments (including bribes) to enable the clandestine pipeline to
function. On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican Judicial Police
announced the discovery in San Jose of a sizable cache of arms,
explosives, uniforms, passports documents, false immigration stamps
from more than 30 countries, and vehicles with hidden
compartments--all connected with arms smuggling through Costa Rican
territory, and Nicaragua or via third countries, to the Salvadoran
guerrillas. Map #2 displays the known major infiltration routes
for arms being illicitly infiltrated into El Salvador.
With this support, thousands of Salvadoran guerrillas attempted
to prevent the March 1982 election by destroying public buses,
blocking highways and attacking villages, town, and voting places.
Nonetheless, with several hundred election observers from
democratic countries and about 700 foreign journalists as
witnesses, the people of El Salvador repudiated the extreme left by
voting in overwhelming numbers. More than 80% of the eligible
voters participated.
Following their obvious repudiation in the elections, the FMLN
leaders reacted as they had after their failed 1981 "final
offensive." They consulted the Nicaraguan and Cuban officials to
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plan strategy and to obtain more and better military and communica-
tions equipment for their forces. For the next 6 months, they
continued terrorist harrassment and economic sabotage. In
mid-October 1982, they used their expanded capabilities to begin a
new series of military attacks. By early 1983 the guerrillas had
controlled about a dozen towns for more than 2 months, and their
morale clearly had recovered--in part due to the continued Cuban,
Nicaraguan and Soviet bloc support, which enabled them to sustain
operations despite their rejection by the Salvadoran people.
During 1982, guerrilla operations resulted in about 2,500 govern-
ment forces wounded and 1,300 killed. These intensified attacks
have continued through the first 5 months of 1983.
Although Castro has often denied responsibility for shipping
weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas, German Social Democrat leader
Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski stated publicly in 1981 that Castro had
admitted the Cuban role. Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez confirmed Cuban training of Salvadoran guerrillas in
interviews given in the fall of 1981. In an article published in
the Toronto Globe and Mail on February 12, 1982, a reporter
interviewed a Salvadoran guerrilla trainee who described courses
for Salvadoran guerrillas in demolition and intelligence
operations, taught by Cubans, and attended by the Salvadorans at
that time.
A guerrilla leader told a San Diego Union reporter (March 1,
1981) in El Salvador that "the Salvadoran guerrillas have a
permanent commission in Nicaragua overseeing the smuggling of
weapons from that country to here." He also said there have been
Cuban advisers in the Province of Morazan, and that even Vietnamese
advisers had made trips to guerrilla camps in El Salvador.
The use of Papalonal airfield is an example of the smuggling of
weapons from Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador. Papalonal is
a commercially underdeveloped area 23 miles north of Managua. The
airfield is accessible only by dirt roads. In late July 1980, the
airfield was an argricultural dirt airstrip approximately 800
meters long, but by early 1981 the strip had been lengthened by 50
percent to approximately 1,200 meters. Hangars were constructed to
stockpile arms tor the Salvadoran guerrillas. C-47 flights from
the airbase were confirmed by photographic evidence and
unidentified aircraft were frequently sighted in El Salvador.
Several pilots who regularly flew the route into Fl Salvador have
been identified in Nicaragua. This particular route has been
closed down, hut air infiltration over new routes continues to this
day.
In addition to the air infiltration routes, the Salvadoran
guerrillas make extensive use of sea and overland infiltration
routes through Honduras and Guatemala from Nicaragua. Photo #5
taken in May 1983, in San Salvador, demonstrates that the
guerrillas use sophisticated vehicular concealment devices to
confound detection by local authorities.
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Details of Cuban/Nicaraguan support have been provided by two
high-level FMLN leaders captured in mid-1982. One of them, known
as "Alejandro Montenegro," was seized on August 22, 1982, in
conjunction with a raid on an FMLN safehouse in Honduras.
Montenegro's importance is underscored by the fact that the
September 1982 taking of 108 civilian hostages in San Pedro Sula,
Honduras, was essentially an attempt by a leftist Honduran
terrorist group (with close ties to the Salvadoran insurgents) to
secure his release. The hostage seizure failed because Montenegro
had already been transferred to Salvadoran military authorities.
Montenegro provided some significant information:
He said that the Cubans played a major role in training
those who conducted the successful January 27, 1982, raid
on the Salvadoran air base at Ilopango, which damaged or
destroyed a dozen aircraft.
Montenegro himself directed the attack, leading an
eight-man team that had received 5 months of special
infiltration and sabotage training in Cuba.
He said that he personally had attended two high-level
meetings with Cuban officials in 1981--one in Havana and
the other in Managua--to review the situation in El
Salvador and obtain strategic advice.
One of the guerrillas captured with Montenegro made five
trips to Managua in 1982 to pick up arms for the
insurgents, using a truck modified by the Sandinistas to
carry concealed weapons.
The Sandinistas have three repair shops for such vehicle
modifications under the direction of a special section at
the Nicaraguan Ministry of Defense. Vehicles similarly
modified are shown in Photo #5.
Montenegro also confirmed that Nicaragua remains the primary
source of insurgent weapons and ammunition, although he added that
the guerrillas do capture some weapons and ammunition from the
Salvadoran military.
The other captured Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Lopez Arriola,
admitted attending a platoon leaders' course in Cuba in July 1979.
He said that:
Hundreds of Salvadoran guerrillas have received military
training in Cuba;
Cubans give special courses for combatants, commanders,
staff officers, and intelligence officials;
He had attended an insurgent strategy meeting in Havana in
June 1981, at which Castro himself appeared.
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Lopez Arriola also revealed that the Sandinistas control weapons
delivered from Vietnam to Nicaragua for the Salvador insurgents and
that the guerrillas must ask for permission to draw on the
supplies. He added that the Sandinistas give the insurgents an
extensive base of operations in and around Managua and provide a
school for their children.
TV. Guatemala
In Guatemala, although there was increased guerrilla activity in
the months proceeding the elections, this violence failed to
disrupt the national elections of March 7, 1982. A widespread, but
unconfirmed, perception of extensive electoral fraud by the
government together with pervasive and excessive government
corruption and international isolation led to a junior officer coup
on March 23, 1982. The new President, General Efrain Rios Montt,
Who had been on inactive duty for four years, acted quickly.
He disbanded various semi-official groups that had taken part in
violence against opposition leaders and offered amnesty for
guerrillas who surrendered before the end of June 1982. (The
Guatemalan Government has since renewed this offer and it is
currently in force). From that point on, the Guatemalan Government
implemented an intensive counter-insurgency program. This included
the establishment and arming of village self-defense forces in the
Indian highlands, and the start of programs to provide medical,
food and economic assistance.
In April and July 1981, Guatemalan security forces captured
large caches of guerrilla weapons at safehouses in Guatemalan City.
Traces made on the serial numbers of U.S.-manufactured weapons
revealed that 17 of the M-16/AR-15 rifles found had been shipped to
American units in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Several vehicles captured at the safehouses bore recent customs
markings from Nicaragua.
During 1982, both Cuba and the Soviet Union increased their
efforts to bring about a firmly unified guerrilla command in
Guatemala. On February 9, 1982, a Guatemalan guerrilla leader
called a press conference in Havana to proclaim the unity of the
four principal Guatemalan guerrilla groups. The Cubans and the
Soviet bloc have continued to provide military training and support
to various factions of the Guatemalan insurgency.
V. Honduras
The new democratic government of Honduras--inaugurated in
January 1982--increased its cooperation with the United States and
neighbors in the region to neutralize the threat posed by the large
military buildup in Nicaragua as well as by the guerrillas in the
region. Having failed in 1981 to persuade Honduras to be neutral
by promising that Cuba and Nicaragua would "spare Honduras" from
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the terrorism affecting El Salvador and Guatemala, Cuba now seeks
to intimidate Honduras and its leaders into passivity through acts
of terrorism. By doing so, the Cubans hope to eliminate a major
obstacle to arms shipments to El Salvador and thus to increase the
chance that the Salvadoran guerrillas can succeed.
Cuba and Nicaragua have worked actively to keep the Honduran
Government from cooperating with El Salvador's efforts to prevent
the transit of guerrilla supplies. Increased Cuban/Nicaraguan
training and support have been provided to the Honduran extreme
left, and Havana has stepped up efforts to promote unity among the
Honduran leftist groups as part of a campaign to aestablize the
Honduran Government. Examples of extreme leftist actions in
Honduras during 1981 included the following:
In early January 1981, Honduran police caught six persons
unloading weapons from a truck enroute from Nicaragua. The
six identified themselves as members of the International
Support Commission of the Salvadoran Popular Liberation
Forces, a part of the FMLN. They had in their possession a
large number of altered and forged Honduran, Costa Rican,
and Salvadoran passports and other identity documents. One
truck contained more than 100 M-16/AR-15 automatic rifles,
50 81mm mortar rounds, about 100,000 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunition, machinegun belts, field packs, and first aid
kits. More than 50 of the M-16 rifles were traced to U.S
units assigned to Vietnam in 1968-69.
In April 1981, Honduran authorities intercepted a tractor-
trailer that had entered Honduras from Nicaragua at the
Guasule crossing. Ammunition and propaganda materials were
hidden inside the walls of the trailer. The same arms
traffickers operated a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, Honduras,
with a false floor and special basement for storing
weapons.
The link between Cuba/Nicaragua and the regional infrastructure
behind the expanded guerrilla activity is evident from information
obtained following a raid late in 1981 by the Honduran police on a
safehouse for the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras.
This organization was described in the pro-government Nicaraguan
newspaper El Nuevo Diario, by "Octavio," one of its founders, as a
political-military organization formed as part of the "increasing
regionalization of the Central American conflict." The raid
occurred on November 27, 1981, in Tegucilgalpa. Following a
gunfight the Honduran police captured several members of this
group. This cell included a Honduran, a Uruguayan, and several
Nicaraguans. The captured terrorists told Honduran authorities
that the Nicaraguan Government had provided them with funds for
travel expenses, as well as explosives.
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Captured documents and statements by detained guerrillas further
indicated that the group was termed in Nicaragua at the instigation
of high-level Sandinista leaders. The group's chief of operations
resided in Managua. Members of the group received military
training in Nicaragua and Cuba. The documents included classroom
notebooks from a 1-year training course held in Cuba in 1980.
Other captured documents revealed that guerrillas at one safehouse
were responsible tor transporting arms and ammunition into Honduras
from Esteli, Nicaragua.
Our information shows that Nicaraguan agents and Salvadoran
extreme left groups have played a leading role in the Honduran
operation:
The Salvadoran guerrillas have links with almost all
Honduran terrorist groups and assist them in subversive
planning, training, and operations.
The December 1982, kidnapping of Honduran President Suazo's
daughter in Guatemala was the work of a Guatemalan
Marxist-Leninist guerrilla faction.
Discussions reportedly were held in mid-1982 among the
Cubans, Sandinistas and Salvadoran insurgents about
terrorist activities against the Honduran Government.
Captured Salvadoran and Honduran terrorists have admitted
that explosives used in bombing attacks in the Honduran
capital were obtained in Nicaragua.
IV. Costa Rica
Costa Rica has a long democratic tradition and the highest
standard of living and social services in Central America. In 1978
and 1979, some Costa Rican government officials cooperated in the
supply of military equipment to the Sandinistas. In May 1982, Luis
Alberto Monge, a social democrat strongly opposed by both the
extreme right and left, was inaugurated as President.
Because his government has attempted to stop the continued use
of its territory for the supply of weapons to the region's Marxist-
Leninist guerrrillas, Cuba and Nicaragua also have made Costa Rica
a target for subversion. During 1982, for example:
Cuba funded a new leftist political party designed to unify
various leftist elements and attract broader popular
support;
The Cubans and Sandinistas provided weapons and training
for Costa Rican leftist terrorists;
Since the beginning of 1982, several guerrilla arms caches
and safehouses have been discovered in Costa Rica.
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In March 1982, the Costa Rican Judicial Police discovered a
large arms cache in a house in San Jose. Among the nine
people arrested there were Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, an
Argentine, a Chilean, and a Costa Rican. Costa Rican
police so far have seized 13 vehicles designed for arms
smuggling and more than 170 weapons, including machineguns,
TNT, fragmentation grenades, a grenade-launcher, ammunition
and 500 combat uniforms.
Nicaragua has instigated terrorist actions in Costa Rica,
leading to increased tensions between the two countries.
Although the Sandinistas denied complicity, the July 3,
1982, bombing of the Honduran airlines office in San Jose
took place at Nicaragua's direction, according to a
Colombian M-19 member arrested by Costa Rican authorities
on July 14, 1982.
The captured terrorist also stated that the July 3, bombing
was part of a broader Nicaraguan plan that included
sabotage, kidnappings, bank robberies, and other terrorist
acts designed to discredit Costa Rica internationally.
In November 1982, Salvadoran guerrillas attempted to kidnap
a Japanese businessman in San Jose. The attempt was
stopped by the Costa Rican authorities. More than 20 other
Salvadoran extreme leftist cells continue to work inside
Costa Rica to destabilize the government.
VII. Soviet and Cuban Propaganda Activities
Beginning in early 1980, the Soviet bloc and Cuba complemented
their subversive activities in Central America by launching a
worldwide propaganda and disinformation campaign. Initially the
campaign focused on U.S. policy toward El Salvador, in an effort to
block U.S. aid, although it also dealt with U.S. involvement in
Guatemala and Honduras. The campaign was intended to expose an
allegedly U.S.-sponsored plot, "discovered" by Cuban intelligence,
to invade El Salvador using the armies of Honduras and Guatemala
with assistance from Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia. This "plot"
was characterized as a last ditch effort by the U.S. President to
transform the situation in El Salvador in favor of government
forces prior to the U.S. elections in November 1980.
Captured documents indicate that the FMLN has coordinated the
FDR's international activities (in the United States, Canada, and
Europe) from Mexico City. The Soviets in Mexico City are also in
contact with the Salvadoran guerrillas. Logistics and interna-
tional relations policy, however, are handled in Havana. The Cuban
press agency, Prensa Latina, provides international communications
for the FDR and its representatives abroad.
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The Soviets and Cubans met in June 1980 with several Salvadoran
insurgent leaders in Havana to establish a strategy for an
international political campaign on El Salvador. Evidence from
captured guerrilla documents indicates that the strategy includes:
Propaganda: Spokesmen should emphasize that the Salvadoran
"revolution" represents the people and is fighting against
oppresssion and for freedom from outside intervention. The
United States seeks direct military intervention in El
Salvador to keep the "junta" in power.
International Support: Representatives should gain
recognition and support for the insurgents from a broad
range of international organizations and political and
regional groups.
U.S. Initiatives: Representatives should strengthen ties
with sympathetic American organizations and seek support
from American politicians.
Public Posture: From the outset, representatives should
call for a dialogue to seek resolution of the conflict.
"The policy of a dialogue is a tactical maneuver to broaden
our alliances, while at the same time splitting up and
isolating the enemy." Representatives should take up the
banner of peace, and maintain that they seek only lasting
peace and justice.
Humanitarian Organizations: The Salvadoran insurgents
should establish a front organization to funnel aid and
money from humanitarian organizations.
A comparison of the strategy laid out in guerrilla documents
with actual events, shows that the Soviets, the Cubans and the
Salvadoran guerrilla leadership in Nicaragua have followed it
closely. During the past three years, they have engaged in various
overt and covert activities designed to influence public opinion in
Western Europe, Latin America, Canada and the United States.
Soviet propaganda has been aimed at discrediting U.S. policy in
El Salvador, and widespread use has been made of disinformation to
substantiate the message. Moscow also has employed its interna-
tional fronts, such as the World Peace Council and the World
Federation of Trade Unions, in support of the propaganda campaign.
Communist parties in Europe, Latin America, Canada and Australia
have participated in the propaganda campaign and helped organize
demonstrations. Their publications have continuously printed
articles on El Salvador and contributed to disinformation circulat-
ing about the situation in that country. For instance, the
Communist Party of Spain, in its maganzine Mundo Oberro Semanal,
amid pictures of blood-covered bodies, accused the United States of
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encircling El Salvador with the aid of Honduras and Guatemala, of
sending tanks and helicopters "piloted by Yankees," of invading El
Salvador, and of murdering Salvadoran Archbishop Romero.
Meanwhile, the FDR-FMLN, with Soviet and Cuban support, has
directed the establishment of "Solidarity Committees" throughout
Europe and Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These serve as
propaganda outlets and conduits for contributions to the
guerrillas. These committees also have helped plan, in conjunction
with Communist parties and local leftist groups, many of the
demonstrations that have taken place in support of the Salvadoran
guerrillas. The timing and location of the demonstrations, such as
those held worldwide after the failure of the January 1981 FMLN
"final offensive" and those to protest the March 1982 Salvadoran
elections, show that they resulted from a well-coordinated effort.
Viii. Extent of Outside Support
Since the Sandinista victory in July 1979, both Cuba and
Nicaragua have steadily increased the size and quality of their
"Revolutionary" military forces. The Soviets have played a major
role in this militarization of the region.
Soviet military deliveries to Cuba increased dramatically in
1979 to an average of more than 65,000 tons by 1981. They
apparently remain at this level today.
The Soviet bloc, with Cuban support, has been assisting
Nicaragua's large military buildup which includes weapons, military
equipment, airfields, military bases and extensive military
training.
In February 1982, a Soviet ship delivered about 270
military trucks to the port of Corinto, bringing the total
Soviet bloc truck inventory in Nicaragua to mere than 800.
In April 1982, a communist bloc ship delivered four Soviet
heavy tank ferries, one small patrol boat, and 12 BM-21
mobile multiple-rocket-launchers.
The tank ferries provide the Sandinista army with an
offensive water-crossing capability, while the mobile
rocket-launchers gave them a mass firepower weapon
unmatched in the region.
In mid-1982, the Sandinistas completed a new garrison for
their Soviet T-54/55 tank battalion just outside of
Managua. They also completed two new infantry battalion
garrisons near Managua and have begun work on another -aor
military installation south of the capital.
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As is evident from photos #6-8, all of these military
installations have a common layout similar to Cuban
garrisons designed and constructed with Cuban assistance.
It is noteworthy that Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro
visited Nicaragua in mid-1982 with a high-level military
delegation, ostensibly to offer aid for flood damage. It
was announced later that 2,000 Cuban construction workers
were being sent to Nicaragua. Since then, we have detected
a spurt in military construction activity.
In November 1982, a Soviet bloc ship delivered an
additional group of 25 T-54/55 tanks, bringing the total to
about 50. The delivery followed a visit by Sandinista
Directorate member, Daniel Ortega, to Moscow earlier in the
year. To enhance the mobility of Sandinista ground forces,
the Soviets have delivered MI-8 helicopters. AN-2 aircraft
and armored personnel carriers also have been provided.
During early December 1982, eight new 122mm howitzers were
delivered, supplementing the twelve 152mm guns delivered in
1981.
Finally, in late December 1982, the first delivery was made
of sophisticated Soviet electronic gear--a high frequency/
direction-finder intercept facility of a type seen
previously in Cuba. This type of equipment is able to
intercept signals from throughout Central America and would
be especially useful in pinpointing Honduran military
communication sites.
The Cubans also have constructed a strategic road between
Puerto Cabezas and the interior. This road facilitates the
movement of troops and military supplies to the troubled
northeast border area.
In Nicaragua, in addition to the 1,500 to 2,000 Cuban military
and security advisors there are about 50 Soviet military and 100
economic advisors. About 25 of the Soviet personnel are assisting
the security services, and the others are attached to the
Nicaraguan general staff and the headquarters of various military
services. By mid-1982, they had concluded military agreements with
Nicaragua estimated to be worth at least $125 million.
There are also about 35 military and 200 economic advisors from
East European countries in Nicaragua. Most are East Germans, but
some Bulgarians, Czechoslovakians, Poles and Hungarians are also
present. The East Germans are most active in the Nicaraguan
internal security organizations.
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As many as 50 Libyan and PLO advisors have been active in
Nicaragua. The Libyan advisors have been engaged mostly in
servicing the Polish-built MI-2 light helicopters they provided the
Nicaraguans. Last May, the Libyans also provided the Sandinistas
with four small Italian aircraft useful in counter-insurgency
operations.
In April 1983, Brazil detained four Libyan aircraft transporting
large quantities of weapons to Nicaragua, including two jet
aircraft. This event, and a high-level delegation to Managua in
May, underscores Libyan leader Qadhafi's commitment to the Central
American struggle (see photos #9 and 10). (Salvadoran guerrilla
leader Cayetano Carpio returned to Nicaragua from Libya immediately
before his April 12 purported suicide in Managua.)
PLO leader Yasir Arafat agreed to provide military equipment to
Nicaragua, including arms and aircraft, when he was in Managua on
July 22, 1980. The PLO has trained selected Salvadorans in the
Near East and in Nicaragua. Arafat affirmed to a group of
Palestinian journalists in Beirut on January 11, 1982, that "there
are Palestinian revolutionaries with the revolutionaries in El
Salvador..." About 30 PLO personnel are providing pilot training
and aircraft maintenance in Nicaragua.
This level of outside support adds up to far more than merely
marginal assistance for essentially indigenous guerrilla activity.
It is large-scale intervention in the political affairs of the
nations directly concerned, for the clear purpose of bringing to
power governments on the Cuban model.
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HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY ON TALKING TO THE NICARAGUANS
The United States has been the target of repeated charges,
that it is uninterested in dialogue with the Nicaraguan
Government. In fact, the United States has been willing to
discuss issues of mutual concern with the Sandinistas since
before they came to power in July 1979. We have manifested
this willingness to talk with concrete action.
The United States, the Central American democracies, and
other members of the hemispheric community have made repeated
attempts to engage the Sandinista regime in a dialogue that
would address the concerns of every country in the region,
including those of Nicaragua.
The following are bilateral and multilateral approaches to
Nicaragua in which the United States has participated:
In 1978, the United States participated in a
three-nation mission to Nicaragua of "friendship and
reconciliation," under OAS auspices, in an effort to
find a peaceful solution to the conflict in
Nicaragua. This mission supported a dialogue between
then President Somoza and the Broad Opposition Front
(FAO), a moderate group that included FSLN member
Sergio Ramirez (now one of three members of the
Nicaraguan Junta of Government). This mission failed
because of Somoza's intrancifence.
Fighting between the National Guard and the FSLN
increased in 1979. During this time, the U.S.
maintained contact with Sandinista leaders, continuing
to pressure Somoza to step down in favor of a more
moderate coalition, and seeking Sandinista assurances
that they would support a democratic pluralist
government with respect for opposition political
parties, human rights, a free press, and the holding
of elections. The Sandinistas eventually made such
promises in its July 9, 1979 Basic Statue and in its
July 12, 1979 letter to the OAS; promises that have
not yet been kept.
After the fall of Somoza in 1979, the United States
for nearly two years used economic assistance and
diplomatic support to encourage the Sandinistas to
respect their commitments to political pluralism, free
elections, a mixed economy, and a non-aligned foreign
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policy; from July 1979 to January 1981, the U.S. had
offered $118 million in economic assistance, and had
voted in favor of more than $200 million in World Bank
and Inter-American Development Bank loans to
Nicaragua. The U.S. also encouraged other Western
nations to provide assistance, and urged U.S. and
foreign banks to reach a debt rescheduling agreement
with Nicaragua.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Congress had stipulated that
U.S. foreign assistance was conditioned upon the
absence of Sandinista support for foreign terrorist By
the close of 1980, there was incontrovertible evidence
that the Sandinistas were providing material support,
including arms, and training to the Salvadoran
guerrillas.
On August 11, 1981 Assistant Secretary Enders traveled
to Managua and offered the Sandinista leaders a
five-point peace plan to alleviate mutual tensions.
The plan, based upon an end to Sandinista support for
guerilla groups, called for public declarations of
non-intervention; a U.S. statement on the enforcement
of U.S. laws pertaining to the activities of
Nicaraguan exile groups in the U.S.; an end to the
Nicaraguan military build-up; the re-establishment of
U.S. economic assistance, and cultural ties between
the countries. The Sandinistas decided not to pursue
the U.S. offer.
On October 7, 1981 GRN Junta Coordinator blasted U.S.
policy worldwide in a speech at the United Nations
General Assembly.
In December 1981 Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister
D'Escoto talked during an OAS meeting in St. Lucia.
D'Escoto denied that Nicaragua was supporting
Salvadoran guerrillas or that there were any Cuban
military and security advisors in Nicaragua.
On April 8, 1982 Ambassador Quainton delivered an
eight-point peace proposal to the Nicaraguan
government in Managua. This plan called for: an end
to Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in other
countries; a U.S. pledge to enforce laws pertaining to
exile activities in the U.S.; a joint pledge of
non-interference in each other's affairs or in the
affairs of others in the region; a regional,
reciprocal ban on imports of heavy offensive weapons,
and a reciprocal reduction of foreign military
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advisors in the region; international verification of
the above point; the resumption of U.S. economic
assistance to Nicaragua; the exchange of cultural
groups; the reaffirmation of previous commitments by
the Sandinistas to pluralism, free elections, and a
mixed economy.
On April 14, 1982 the Sandinistas responded with a
number of allegations and demands. The response was
procedural rather than substantive, and suggested that
future negotiations were to be held in Mexico with the
Mexicans as "witnesses."
On April 29, 1982 the U.S. responded to Nicaragua's
April 14 note in Managua by addressing all of the
GRN's allegations and demands in its previous
response. The U.S. asked the GRN to address our
eight-point proposal.
On May 7, 1982 the GRN responded with a lengthy
document which discussed our eight points within a
framework of GRN rhetoric. The document included a
great deal of rhetoric, and made no attempt to
continue the dialogue in reaching a compromise. The
GRN insisted that negotiations be held in a third
country, with a third party as witness.
On July 3, 1982 taking
response, in which the
said that it wished to
obligations," the U.S.
command-control center
located in Nicaragua.
a cue from the May 7 GRN
Nicaraguan Government (GRN)
"fulfill its international
asked the GRN to close down the
of the Salvadoran guerrillas
If the GRN did so, this would
be an indication of its serious desire for peace, and
both countries could proceed to more serious talks.
The U.S. offered to send down a technical team to help
the GRN locate the command-control center.
On August 13, 1982 the GRN's reply ignored the U.S.
suggestion of July 3 regarding the closing down of the
Salvadoran guerilla command-control center. The GRN
repeated its call for high-level negotiations with a
third party present.
In October 1982, the United States, along with seven
other regional democracies signed the San Jose
Declaration; which, among other things, underscored
The signatories commitment to democracy and respect
for self-determination and national sovereignty. The
Sandinistas refused to receive the Costa Rican Foreign
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Minister to discuss the Declaration as a basis for
regional negotiations.
On June 10, 1983 Special Presidential Envoy Richard
Stone visited Nicaragua, where he met with political
party representatives, church, private sector and
Nicaraguan officials, including Junta Coordinator
Daniel Ortega and Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto.
Between June 10, 1983 and January 5, 1984 Ambassador
Stone met with the Sandinistas on at least four
occasions;
Since early 1983, the United States has also
encouraged the multilateral efforts of the Contadora
group to achieve a peaceful political resolution to
Central American conflicts.
Following reports in late 1983, that the Sandinistas
were considering more moderate policies, the U.S.
stated publicly and privately to the Sandinistas that
it welcomed such hints of moderation. The U.S. stated
that while it wished to see if there was any reality
behind Sandinista rhetoric, the U.S. was willing to
respond in kind to meaningful, concrete steps.
While the U.S. has awaited substantive Sandinista replies
to our attempts to dialogue, their response has been
consistently clear. The Sandinistas have:
Increased the number of Nicaraguans under arms to
about 75,000 (Somoza's National Guard numbered about
14,000 at its peak).
Received at least 3,000 Cuban military advisers, as
well as smaller numbers of Soviet and Eastern European
bloc security personnel.
Expanded their arms inventory with Soviet tanks,
rockets, artillery, helicopters and armored personnel
carriers and military trucks from Eastern Europe.
Repressed moderate opposition groups, maintained prior
censorship of the media, harassed religious groups,
persecuted indigenous indian groups, and initiated the
establishment of a state aligned with the Soviet Union
and Cuba.
In concert with Cuba, provided active military support
to guerrilla groups in El Salvador, as well as having
trained and infiltrated subversive groups into
Honduras.
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These four trends were begun during the regime's first 18
months, despite the U.S. policy to achieve an accommodation
with the new government. The only ones who pushed Nicaragua
into the arms of Cuba and the USSR were the Sandinista leaders
themselves.
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STAT
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11,?!
# Ilif
VO"
(be
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
May 3, 1984
Distribution List
S/LPD - Otto J. Reich
Resource Book: El Salvador's Runoff Election
1 Executive Registry
84- !9S
Due to the continuing interest in the El Salvador
elections, I am enclosing a Resource Book on the May 6
Presidential runoff election between Jose Napoleon Duarte of
the Christian Democratic Party and Roberto D'Aubuisson of the
National Republican Alliance.
The Resource Book consists of an overview of the election
procedure, biographies of the presidential candidates,
questions and answers on the election, a summary of AID support
for the election, and a background paper on El Salvador.
Enclosure:
Resource Book
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ReSoo.ree13..00k
El. .
Runoff Election
United States Department of State
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RESOURCE BOOK
EL SALVADOR'S RUNOFF ELECTION
CONTENTS
1. Presidential Elections in El Salvador
2. Biographies of Presidential Candidates
3. Questions and Answers on the Election
4. AID Project Support for Election
5. El Salvador: Revolution or Reform?
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El Progreso
Chiquimula
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Salvador
Presidential Elections
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SUMMARY OF KEY FACTS
The Candidates
Presidential candidates representing eight parties
contested the March 25 presidential election. Since no
candidate received an absolute majority, in accordance
with the Salvadoran constitution, the two leading
candidates will face each other in a runoff on May 6. The
slates are:
National Republican Alliance (ARENA)
President: Roberto D'Aubuisson
Vice President: Hugo Barrera
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
President: Jose Napoleon Duarte
Vice President: Rodolfo Antonio Castillo
Voting Procedure
1. The voter's hands and identification are checked
for traces of electoral ink indicating he has already
voted.
2. The identification is checked against the voting
list.
3. The identification is stamped and the name in the
registry checked off.
4. The identification is held by an official while the
voter takes his ballot to the ballot box, marks an "X"
across the symbol of the party of his Choice, and deposits
the vote in the box.
5. The voter's identification and his finger are
stained to show that he has voted, completing the process.
Transmission of Results
Official results will be based on the tallies compiled
at the voting place and signed by representatives of both
parties and the local election official. They will be
sent to the nearest municipality, then to the departmental
capital, and finally to the Central Elections Council in
San Salvador, a process of several days.
In a departure from the practice in the first round,
unofficial results also will be compiled by the Central
Elections Council based on telegrams sent from the polling
places to San Salvador. This unofficial tally should
begin arriving shortly after the polls close.
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Background
On October 15, 1979, a group of reformist military
officers overthrew the government of ex-General Romero.
The new Salvadoran political process began in 1979 with
the announcement of the goals of the coup:
"To create an environment favorable for the
carrying out of truly free elections within
a reasonable period of time," and
"To permit the organization of political
parties of every ideology, in such a way as
to strengthen the democratic system."
Several attempts to form a broadly representative
interim junta of government followed the coup. All were
shortlived. In January 1980, the Armed Forces combined
with the Christian Democratic Party to form a goverment
Which, with some reshuffling, held power until the 1982
elections for a Constituent Assembly.
This 1980-1982 period saw the implementation of
several major reforms, including a land reform, a banking
reform, nationalization of foreign marketing of coffee and
sugar, development of stronger peasant organizations in
farming areas and, most importantly, reactivation of
political parties and the holding of free and honest
elections.
During that same period, Cuban and Soviet bloc
assistance, channelled through Nicaragua, permitted the
guerrillas to escalate and intensify their war effort.
The capstone of this effort was the so-called "final
offensive" of January 1981, in Which the guerrillas
combined a major military operation with a call for a
popular uprising. This appeal for popular support was
generally ignored and the offensive collapsed. Since
then, the guerrillas increasingly have focused on the
tactics of attrition. Although they usually confine their
attacks to lightning strikes against static targets, they
more recently have employed heavier arms and larger bodies
of men in their strike forces. Guerrilla strength is now
estimated to be 9,000-11,000 armed combatants.
During 1980, violence against civilians crested. The
growing military strength of the guerrillas was expressed
in terrorism, which often provoked a violent reaction.
Implementation of the reforms of March 1980 also led some
formerly moderate conservatives to respond with violence.
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?3--
From that point, however, El Salvador began a new
consolidation of the political center. The hallmark of
this consolidation was the March 1982 elections.
On March 28, 1982, following four months of political
campaigning, some 1.5 million Salvadorans went to the
polls to elect deputies to the Constituent Assembly. Six
parties ranging from the center-left to the far-right
participated. The Central Elections Council, over 200
international observers and over 700 members of the
international press agreed that the elections were fair
and honest, the first such elections in over fifty years.
The political front of the guerrilla movement was invited
to field candidates but claimed that conditions were not
conducive. Instead, the political parties and groups
affiliated with the guerrillas attempted to violently
intimidate voters and disrupt the elections.
The 1982 voting was as follows:
Party
Votes
Percent of
Percent of
All Votes
Valid Votes
PDC
546,218
36
40
ARENA
402,304
26
29
PCN
261,153
17
19
AD
100,586
7
8
PPS
39,504
3
3
POP
12,574
1
1
Total Valid Votes
1,362,339
89
Invalid
131,498
8
Blank
51,438
3
Challenged
6,412
0
Total Votes
1,551,687
100
As a result of the elections, the 60 seats in the
Constituent Assembly were apportioned as follows:
Party Seats
PDC 24
ARENA 19
PCN 14
AD 2
PPS 1
POP 0
(Note: The PCN subsequently split into two groups: the PCN
with five seats and PAISA with nine.)
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?4?
Following the March elections, the Christian
Democrat-Armed Forces government peacefully transferred
authority to a provisional government named by the
Constituent Assembly.
The president of the provisional government, Alvaro
Magana, is a political independent selected as a consensus
candidate because no single party received a majority of
seats in the Assembly. There are also three
vice-presidents, representing the three largest parties.
Political debate in the Assembly and the provisional
government has often been divisive, but the parties have
shown themselves capable of reaching important compromises.
The land reform was extended three times past its
original termination date, and the ongoing phase of the
land reform has redistributed more land under the
provisional government than under the old one. More than
550,000 Salvadorans -- about 24 percent of the rural
population -- have benefitted from the land reform to date.
Under the provisional government, violence against
civilians has been reduced, although by no means
eliminated. Although precise statistics are not
available, figures taken from press reports and validated
by other sources indicate a clear trend. Following are
illustrative statistics for the month of December (since
data for all of 1980 is not available):
Period
Number of Civilian Deaths
December,
1980
575
December,
1981
349
December,
1982
157
December,
1983
99
In the first three months of 1984, the average monthly
number of civilian deaths attributable to political
violence is about 88.
The Assembly passed an amnesty, a concrete gesture of
national reconciliation, just as the Salvadoran Peace
Commission was beginning its efforts to bring the
guerrilla left into the 1984 elections.
Most impressively, the Assembly passed a new, liberal
constitution and the 1984 elections are taking place
within a strictly legal framework.
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The March 25 Presidential Elections: The First Round
Eight parties contested the first round elections.
After a prolonged and active period of campaigning,
elections were held on March 25.
On April 1, one week later, the Central Elections
Council (CCE) officially announced the results of the
first round of elections:
PDC (Duarte)
ARENA (D'Aubuisson)
PCN (Guerrero)
AD (Fortin)
Votes
Percent of
Percent of
549,727
376,917
244,556
43,929
All Votes
Valid Votes
38.7
26.6
17.2
3.1
43.4
29.8
19.3
3.5
Other Four Parties
51,147
3.6
4.0
Total Valid Votes
1,266,276
89.2
100.0
Blank Votes
41,736
2;9
Spoiled Votes
104,557
7.4
Challenged Votes
6,924
0.5
Total Votes Cast
1,419,493
100.0
(Note: Blank votes and ballots on which no party was
marked. Spoiled votes generally are ballots on which more
than one party has been marked. Challenged votes are
those to which one or more party poll watchers has raised
an objection.)
These results were accepted immediately by all parties
and candidates. No protests were filed.
The 1.4 million votes represent more than 75 percent
of the electorate of 1.8 million, estimated as follows:
2.5 million names on the electoral registry minus 500,000
persons living outside El Salvador, minus approximately
100,000 deceased persons whose death has not been entered
on national records due to guerrilla disruption of civil
procedures, and minus the military and others not
permitted or able to vote.
The low number of blank ballots and the high vote
count, in the face of guerrilla threats and sometimes
frustrating procedural impediments, demonstrated
Salvadoran enthusiasm for and commitment to a democratic
system of government. It is clear that the Salvadoran
people were ready for elections, that they viewed the
process as important, that they believed a genuine choice
was being offered, and that they were willing to put up
with inconvenience to participate.
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Administrative problems took four forms: problems with
the registry list, problems with delivery of elections
materials (ballots, registry list, etc.), ineffective
dissemination of information to the voters about the new,
more complicated system, and excessive rigidity which
prevented local officials from dealing effectively with
problems as they arose. The registry list was by far the
least significant source of problems.
There is no precise estimate of how many voters were
kept from voting by these problems. We believe, however,
that more Salvadorans turned out to vote in the March 25
elections than in 1982, suggesting that some 150,000
potential voters were prevented from casting their ballot
by these bottlenecks.
More than 240 international observers witnessed the
elections. In almost all cases, though noting the
administrative problems, the observers acknowledged that
these flaws were caused by the Salvadoran commitment to a
reliable electoral system in which errors and
manipulations could not occur. Observers were virtually
unanimous in praising .the efforts of the Salvadoran
Government to conduct free and fair elections, the
apolitical conduct of the Salvadoran Armed Forces in
protecting the integrity and the physical security of the
elections, and most especially the evident commitment of
the Salvadoran people to the democratic process. The
comments of the observers sent by the Organization of
American States were indicative:
"The people of El Salvador deserve the highest
praise for their responsible and civic spirit
in seeking a solution to their problems
through voting as an expression of faith in
democracy, thereby proving their rejection of
violence.... The Salvadoran Government
deserves praise for its efforts to make
possible this event at a time of national
anguish.... The Armed Forces deserve praise
for the correct manner in Which they provided
security to the voters and for their
cooperation with the citizenry in defending
their right to express their political
preference without undue influence."
Some SOO U.S. and foreign journalists monitored the
elections. In general, their reporting followed the same
themes as the comments of the observers.
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The Far Left
In the fall of 1983, the provisional government
initiated contact with the guerrillas and the political
parties associated with them to try to bring them into the
elections and incorporate them into the emerging
democratic system. This effort culminated in two meetings
between the Salvadoran Peace Commission and the FDR/FMLN,
the guerrilla umbrella organization.
The FDR/FMLN repeatedly rejected the government's
invitations to participate in elections, insisting on a
share of government power and other major reorganizations
in advance of any popular consultation.
The Peace Commission has stated its willingness to
renew discussions with the FDR/FMLN on its participation
in the 1985 local and national legislative elections.
On January 25, Mario Aguinada, an FDR/FMLN spokesman,
said in Bogota that the guerrillas would not target the
elections, but warned that the war would continue and that
"some bridges may fall, or some traffic may be stopped."
In 1982, the FDR/FMLN similarly denied that it would
target the Constituent Assembly elections but then staged
a major offensive to intimidate the populace, halt ground
transportation, and physically destroy the elections on
voting day.
During the period before and during the first round,
the far left intensified its attacks on civilians,
including the murder of Assembly deputies (a guerrilla
communique called the first murder a "response" to the
upcoming elections). The FMLN published a warning to the
populace of four towns in the departments of San Miguel
and Usulutan, prohibiting participation in campaign
activities. In other areas, they issued warnings that the
roads were mined and that vehicles could not use them on
election day. Nighttime bombings of businesses increased
dramatically in the last few weeks before the election.
Guerrilla actions were partly responsible for the
administrative difficulties encountered on March 25. They
successfully blocked delivery of electoral materials to
some voting locations, stole thousands of identity
documents to prevent citizens from voting, and destroyed
electrical switching stations on election eve so that, in
some cases, electoral materials had to be delivered in the
dark, resulting in missing registry pages and other
problems.
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The guerrillas also attempted to block voting on
election day. Regular voting could not take place in
about 55 of El Salvador's 261 municipalities. Because
these towns are small or underpopulated, this is not an
index of guerrilla strength. Only about two percent of
the electorate was prevented from voting by the guerrilla
effort.
The Electoral Law
The Transitory Electoral Law, passed on February 10,
defines the procedures for the campaign and the elections
and specifies the rights and duties of all participants.
It stipulates obligatory voting, the use of an electoral
register, and the use of indelible ink to mark voters'
fingers and national identity cards. The law also
requires that in the future the Central Elections Council
be elected by the Legislative Assembly.
There was extensive debate over Whether to amend the
electoral law to avoid the administrative difficulties
encountered during the March 25 election. On April 13, a
coalition of ARENA, PAISA and PCN deputies passed a bill
amending the electoral law to suspend use of the registry
and modifying other voting aspects. On April 24,
President Magana vetoed the bill, citing the following
reasons:
"The use of the electoral lists in the March 25
elections constituted an effective guarantee that
prevented practices Which in the past have made
Salvadorans lose confidence in the electoral
process.... The elimination of the lists would
obviously result in a larger number of votes, but
at the same time the ability to guarantee an
event free of irregularities would be greatly
reduced. The confidence of Salvadorans in the
honesty of the elections and the prestige of the
democratic process in our country won during the
last electoral event would be greatly
endangered.... Although the law that the
Legislative Branch wants to amend is transitory,
some stability in the judicial regulations that
govern such an important event should be
maintained.
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Monitoring by Political Parties
Under the electoral law, each political party
contesting the election can name one poll watcher for
each voting table and ballot box. Parties can also
name one representative to monitor the municipal and
departmental electoral commissions and the CCE.
Parties can also name one computer technician to
monitor activities involving the computer and parties
can also assign representatives to guard against
tampering with elections materials, wherever they are
stored.
Registration of Candidates and Coalitions
The electoral law provides that all candidates
had to be registered by February 29. Parties could
not change their slates between the first and
possible second round of elections, except for
reasons of physical or legal incapacity. Following
the March 25 elections there was talk of amending the
electoral law to permit parties to modify their
slates between the rounds. In the end, nothing came
of it.
The electoral law permits the formation of
coalitions. All coalitions between parties had to be
registered before midnight on February 26. No formal
coalitions were formed. It is still possible,
however, for one of the contending parties to agree
to share power at a level below that of president and
vice president in exchange for an endorsement. Their
alliance, however, could not be depicted on the
official ballot.
Only two small parties, POP and MERECEN have
formally endorsed any runoff candidate, Christian
Democrat Napoleon Duarte. PAISA and the PPS have
publicly indicated their support for ARENA.
Public Financing For Political Campaigns
Under the Public Financing Campaign Law, each of
the parties represented in the Legislative Assembly
can receive 500,000 colones ($200,000 at the official
rate) as a one time grant. In addition, for this
election and all future elections, parties receiving
more than 5 percent of the national vote will be
reimbursed for campaign expenses at the rate of 5
colones for each vote (less in non-presidential
elections). Parties that participated in the 1982
elections can receive an advance of up to 50 percent
of the amount they would have received if the law had
been in effect at that time.
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Access to Media
Under the electoral law, the communications
media, both private and public, must treat all
registered parties equally with regard to access,
time, space, and cost of services. Campaign
propaganda is prohibited in the three days preceding
and following election day, and on election day
itself.
Electoral Registry
The electoral law requires the use of an
electoral registry to establish voter eligibility.
The registry permits assignment of voters to specific
voting locations, thereby inhibiting double voting.
The registry will also be used in the legislative and
local elections scheduled for 1985 to establish voter
eligibility within each voting district.
Each voter will cast his ballot either where he
is assigned or at one of a number of special
locations where anyone on the national registry can
vote. These special locations allow citizens living
away from their home districts to vote without having
to travel long distances or pass through conflictive
areas.
The registry is based on the national identity
card system. The Central Elections Council inherited
data from that system containing over 2.4 million
entries. Data from municipalities was photocopied,
microfilmed and then entered into the CCE computer so
that the previous data could be checked. As a matter
of policy, priority was given to operations which
would incorporate more voters over those which would
reduce the electorate. When the computer found that
a person held more than one identification card, all
but the last card were nullified for voting
purposes. Elaborate quality controls and security
checks have been incorporated.
Since the March 25 elections, some 80,000
corrections and additions have been entered into the
system, largely catching up on citizens who have
changed districts.
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Obligatory Voting
Salvadoran law obliges each citizen to vote.
This practice is common throughout Latin America and
other parts of the world. Voting was obligatory in
the 1982 elections and the first round of the 1984
elections. Although the law stipulates a nominal
fine for failure to vote, this aspect of the law has
not been enforced. To our knowledge, no fines were
imposed in either 1982 or 1984.
Preparations for Voting Day
The Central Elections Council has met with the
departmental electoral commissions to instruct them
on electoral procedures. The departmental
commissions in turn will instruct the municipal
commissions and they the individual poll workers.
For the first time, officials at all levels are being
provided with written instructions which were
recently revised and changed from technical legal
language to everday Spanish.
The Central Elections Council plans to establish
about 5,700 ballot boxes and voting tables in some
450 locations. There will be national polling places
in most departments.
Registry lists (and ballots) have been printed
for distribution to the municipalities on May 3-5.
The political parties may have representatives at all
places where electoral materials are stored in order
to guard against tampering.
? Information on where and how to vote was
published in the newpapers beginning on May 2. In
addition, a 25-man telephone bank will be available
twelve hours a day to answer voters' inquiries.
Local officials, elections officals, and party
workers will help inform voters of their designated
voting places.
The Salvadorans have made every effort to
organize the elections to run smoothly and
effectively. Nevertheless, the complexity of the
system arising from their desire to ensure fraud-free
elections may lead to minor disorganization in
isolated locations. With each successive election,
organization has improved and popular confidence in
the results has increased.
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Voting Day
The polls will open at 7:00 a.m. and close at
6:00 p.m. where there is electricity and at 4:00 p.m.
where there is no electricity so poll workers can
tally the votes before sundown.
The procedure at the polls is as follows:
1. First, a voting official checks the voter's
hands and identity card for traces of
electoral ink to ensure that he has not
already cast his ballot.
2. If no traces are found, the identity card is
given to the poll secretary Who looks up the
voter's document number on the voting list
(either a municipal, departmental, regional or
national list, depending on the type of voting
place).
3. Once it is verified that the voter is
registered, the secretary stamps the identity
card and checks off the name in the registry.
4. The director of the polling place then takes
the card and gives the voter a ballot
displaying the party symbols -- a fish on a
green field for the Christian Democrats and
red, white, and blue horizontal bars with a
White cross for ARENA. (In their campaigning,
the parties emphasize these symbols.) The
director retains the identity card while the
voter casts his ballot.
5. The voter goes to the ballot box, marks his
ballot across the symbol of the party of his
choice, folds it, and deposits it in the
ballot box.
6. After casting his ballot, the voter returns to
the director to recover his identity card.
The card and the voter's hand are then stained
with indelible ink, completing the voting
process.
Except for the marking of the ballot before it is
folded, this process takes place in sight of all
party poll watchers, who verify that the voter
receives only one ballot, casts only one vote, and
that the vote is entered into the transparent,
plexiglass ballot box.
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Transmission of Results
After the polls close, the poll watchers will
physically break open the ballot boxes, count the
votes, and fill out and sign the official tallies and
standardized telegram forms.
In a departure from the procedures used on March
25, the telegram will immediately be sent to the
Central Elections Council, to provide early, though
unofficial, results.
The elections officials will then follow the same
procedure used in the first round to transmit the
official results: They will turn the official
tallies and the ballots over to the municipal
electoral commission. Once the municipal commission
has received all the ballots and documentation from
its jurisdiction, they are delivered to the
departmental electoral commissions within 16 hours of
the closing of the polls. The departmental
commission then must deliver them to the CCE within
one day.
The official vote count will be done by the CCE,
based on the documents completed by the poll workers
at each table. Documentation will be completed at
every stage in this process and electoral officials
will retain copies of the completed documentation.
Copies will also be given to the party poll
watchers. The actual ballots can be recounted by Che
CCE if necessary.
The CCE will make the final, official declaration
of the election results.
International Observers
The Salvadoran Government invited more than sixty
nations and international organizations to observe
the March 25 elections and verify their honesty.
In general, El Salvador has invited the
approximately thirty nations which sent observers to
the first round to observe the May 6 runoff. In
addition, El Salvador has issued more than one
hundred invitations to prominent individuals around
the world, with emphasis on those nations not sending
official observers.
The U.S. will send an official delegation, as it
did in 1982 and for the first round, composed of
Congressmen, Administration officials and prominent
private citizens.
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Role of the Military
The 1984 elections will determine which candidate
will become president and thus the military
Commander-in-Chief.
The Salvadoran Armed Forces have a two-fold task:
to support Che integrity of the elections and to
physically protect Che elections from guerrilla
attack.
On January 4, 1984, the Minister of Defense
ordered that the military be strictly apolitical and
non-partisan. Although permitted to vote by the
constitution, the Armed Forces High Command has
determined that the military will not vote in these
elections, in order to further preserve the
apolitical role of the military. Regional commanders
were ordered to offer "all (possible) support within
the framework of the law" to the Central Elections
Council to guarantee an electoral process which is
"free, legitimate and pure."
Although seriously short of materiel and
ammunition, the Salvadoran Armed Forces have made
extensive preparations to protect the elections.
Their ability to to defend the elections adequately,
with the concomitant high expenditure of ammunition
and risk to other military assets, was made possible
only by emergency provision of military articles and
services under section 21(d)of the Arms Export
Control Act. This section of law permits military
sales without payment in advance or interest charges
if payment is made within 60 days of delivery.
In defense of the first round of the elections,
Che Salvadoran Armed Forces conducted extensive
offensive operations to prevent the guerrillas from
massing for a major display of strength. Shortly
before election day, the military withdrew to
defensive positions to protect the voting places
themselves. A similar strategy is expected for the
runoff.
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Contadora Process
Elections are a key element of regional peace
negotiations under the Contadora Process All nine
nations participating in these negotiations -- El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala,
Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia -- signed a
21-point Document of Objectives on September 1983.
It identified as one of their principle goals the
"... establishment and improvement of democratic,
representative, and pluralistic systems that
guarantee effective political participation and
assure free access to honest and periodic
elections."
In January 1984, they agreed on guidelines for
implementing this objective, including:
the promulgation of electoral legislation,
including regulations to guarantee the
existence and equal participation in the
electoral process of political parties
representing a range of opinions;
the creation of independent electoral bodies
within each Central American country to
guarantee the integrity of elections; and
the establishment of electoral timetables.
The March 25 presidential elections fulfill the
democratization objective of the 21 points. The
electoral law prohibits no party, faction or
individual from participating and ensures equal
access to the media and to public financing for
electoral campaigns. The Central Elections Council
is an independent government agency responsible for
ensuring that the elections are fair and honest. El
Salvador's electoral timetable is being realized with
direct presidential elections in 1984 and, as
mandated by the National Constitution, direct
municipal and national legislative elections in 1985.
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Biographies of Presidential Candidates
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Jose. Napolecin DUARTE Fuentes EL SALVADOR
(phonetic: DWARTAY)
Presidential Candidate
Addressed as:
Mr. Duarte
Jose Napoleon Duarte, President of the Revolutionary
Governing Junta from December 1980 until March 1982,
will be the presidential candidate of the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) in the March 1984 election.
Duarte studied engineering at Notre Dame University
in Indiana during 1945-48 and later attended the
National University of El Salvador. He subsequently
worked as an engineer for several construction
companies, and he has said that he was involved in
erecting many of the buildings in downtown San
Salvador. In 1960 he became a member of the organizing
committee that established the PDC, and he has served as
the party's secretary general three times. He was mayor
of San Salvador during 1964-70. He ran for president in
1972, and it is widely believed in El Salvador that he
won the election but that the military subsequently
rigged the vote count in favor of his opponent. He was
then exiled by the ruling government. He went into
business in Venezuela and did not return home until
October 1979, when a coup brought a moderate coalition
of civilians and military officers to power in El
Salvador. He became a member of the ruling junta in
March 1980.
Duarte, 58, enjoys art and is himself an oil
painter. He has been,involved in various social service
projects and helped to establish the Salvadoran Boy
Scouts and the country's Antituberculosis League. He
has also served as a director of the Salvadoran Red
Cross. Married to the former Ins Durgh, he has six
children. He speaks English.
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Election
Questions and Answers on
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
EL SALVADOR'S RUNOFF ELECTION
Q. What has become of El Salvador's electoral law and voter
registration system?
A. President Magana vetoed an amendment to the electoral law
which proposed abolishing the use of the registry for the
May 6 runoff election. The voting process will therefore
be the same as on March 25; however, it is expected to be
less confusing and better organized.
Q. What changes have been made to prevent the confusion and
disorganization of the March 25th election?
A. Most difficulties experienced in last March's election were
due to logistical errors, not to deficiencies in the
registry list itself. Election materials (lists, ballots,
etc.) are being distributed to municipalities May 3-5. The
Central Elections Council (CCE) has met with the
departmental electoral commissions to instruct them further
on the electoral procedures. The municipal commissions and
the poll workers will have all received similar briefings
before the runoff election. Furthermore, written
instructions in Spanish have been simplified to reduce
confusion among all electoral officials and workers.
Starting on May 1, information on voting locations and
procedures will be published in local papers to ensure that
the voters know where to cast their ballots. Party workers
and election officials will assist the voters before and
during the election. The registry itself has been updated
with approximately 80,000 corrections and additions, and
the supplemental lists have been printed to complement the
lists employed on March 25.
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?2?
Q. Is it accurate to say that the guerrillas made only
sporadic efforts to disrupt the first round of El
Salvador's presidential elections?
A. Despite promises to the contrary, the guerrilla groups
launched a significant effort to disrupt the elections.
They:
--targeted the nation's electrical grid and succeeded in
causing power outages in two-thirds of the country;
--destroyed and confiscated national identity cards,
preventing several thousand people from voting;
--halted the electoral process in some 44 small, rural
towns but prevented only 2 percent of the electorate from
going to the polls.
In a post election communique, the guerrillas asserted that
"the elections have been a failure. While the political
parties mounted the electoral farce and began fighting each
other, the puppet army supported by yankee imperialism
tried to stop the FMLN forces and prevent the actions of
our glorious revolutionary people's army from obstructing
the elections. The combativeness of our people's army did
not allow normal elections."
In spite of their claims, the guerrillas had only limited
success largely because of the Armed Forces commitment to
protect the voting.
With respect to the second round, the FMLN has declared
that it will be "another farce," and has reiterated its
rejection of the electoral process. They have said that
the war will continue before, during and after the
elections. And, guerrilla leaders are not making idle
threats. Activity has continued in the hiatus between the
first and second rounds of El Salvador's presidential
elections. A number of towns have been attacked, and the
guerrillas have organized political propaganda meetings for
the purpose of urging the people to reject what they call
the electoral farce. Warnings that the guerrillas again
plan to interfere with election day travel and to steal
national identity cards have also been issued.
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Q. Why does the United States insist on elections in El
Salvador since they may not resolve anything?
A. Shortly after the coup of October 1979, the reformist
military-civilian junta pledged to carry out elections to
install democracy in El Salvador. The 1982 election of a
Constituent Assembly and the 1984 presidential elections
represent the fulfillment of that pledge. The elections
were not imposed by the U.S., but we welcomed them as key
steps in forging the institutions on which democracy can
rest. In both 1982 and 1984 the Armed Forces were neutral
guarantors of the electoral process in the face of armed
attacks, sabotage and intimidation of voters by the
guerrillas. Despite such attacks, the people voted in
overwhelming numbers, thus rejecting the pleas of the
guerrillas and demonstrating their faith in democratic
government.
While the election may not end war immediately, it does
several things: 1) it will give the country its first
popularly and freely elected president in more than a half
century; 2) it will reaffirm the commitment of the Armed
Forces to protect and respect democratic civilian rule; 3)
it provides valuable experience in democratic processes and
respect for democratic institutions; and 4) it demonstrates
that the overwhelming majority of the Salvadoran people
want peace and jobs -- not guerrilla war.
Q. How can the election be called free and democratic if the
left cannot participate?
A. In 1982 and 1984 the government invited the left to put
down its arms and join in the elections. Repeatedly, the
FDR/FMLN rejected all government offers to discuss their
participation in the electoral process. In 1983 the
Government of El Salvador offered an amnesty to guerrillas
who would lay down their arms. Hundreds did so and were
able to vote. This year guerrilla leaders pledged not to
disrupt the election. This pledge was not respected, and
political leaders were assassinated, the economic
infrastructure was sabotaged, electoral documents were
stolen, and voters were intimidated. These actions are
clear proof that the left fears the free expression of the
will of the people and does not want elections, even under
the watchful eyes of hundreds of foreign observers. With
the election of the new president, the hope is that
institutions can be strengthened and that representatives
of the left will gradually enter the democratic process in
local jurisdictions and eventually at the national level.
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Q. How can the election be considered democratic when the
people are required by law to vote?
A. Compulsory voting is common throughout Latin America. In
El Salvador, while the electorate was required to vote,
they could have cast blank ballots in secret and still be
certified as having voted. In 1982 and 1984 they were
encouraged to do just that by the armed opposition. But so
few did so that the impact was negligible. As it turns
out, voters had more to fear from the guerrillas by risking
their lives to vote. We have no knowledge of Salvadorans
being penalized for not voting. The hundreds of
international observers present at the elections have
reported no coercion, abuse, or reprisals of the electorate
by any officials.
Q. Which of the two candidates is the U.S. backing in the
May 6 runoff election?
A. We have made it unmistakably clear that we are neutral with
regard to the outcome of the election. Our strong support
is restricted to the democratic process itself, of which we
consider free and fair elections to be an essential part.
Q. Is it possible to hold elections given the growing power
and control of the FDR/FMLN?
A. The guerrilla forces have not improved their position
substantially since the 1982 elections, when the Salvadoran
armed forces demonstrated the capacity to protect
effectively and in which the Salvadoran people participated
in defiance of the guerrillas' "Vote and Die" threat. The
Salvadoran military and security forces have drawn up a
comprehensive security strategy for the May 6 election; the
guerrillas can be expected to try to interfere with and
disrupt the process, as they did during the March 25
election.
Q. How much did the U.S. contribute to the election program?
A. The U.S. contributed 0.4 million to the election program.
This includes support for the creation of an electoral
register, an international observer program, and related
logistical and administrative costs.
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Q. How will elections make a difference with regard to El
Salvador's problems?
A. Elections are an essential part of the democratic process
anywhere, but they also represent a key step in the
transition in El Salvador from provisional to fully
institutional government. Following the elections, El
Salvador will have a president who derives his mandate
directly from the will of the people. He will thus be able
to act with explicit rather than implicit authority,
providing a basis whereby a political solution can be
sought or, if a political solution remains impossible, the
military effort can be pursued with fully legitimate
civilian leadership. The elections cannot be viewed only
as a response to the immediate crisis. They are also a
necessary component in the longer term process of
developing a mature democracy that can respond to the
political and socio-economic aspirations of the Salvadoran
people.
Q. Will a civilian president have any real power? Isn't it
true that the Army will retain power?
A. The May 6 runoff election will enhance the democratic
process already underway in El Salvador. Elections
represent an effort to ensure the permanent transition of
ultimate authority to the citizens through their elected
representatives. Elections are necessary to move this
process forward, to enable the executive and legislative
branches to begin to accrue fundamental political
authority. The Salvadoran military has sworn to uphold the
new constitution, to refrain from influencing the vote, to
protect the elections from interference by left and right,
and to abide by the outcome of the vote. It has, in fact,
excluded itself completely from participation, as it did in
1982 and in the March 25, 1984 election. The military
accepts the framework of relations between civil and
military authority established by the 1983 constitution,
which clearly subordinates the military to the presidency
of the republic.
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?6?
Isn't it true that the Catholic Church of El Salvador and
most Central American leaders have stated that elections
won't resolve anything and that negotiations are what is
important?
A. The Salvadoran Catholic Church has made it clear that it
supports elections as part of a process of democratization
that can lead to a political solution in El Salvador. The
leaders of the Central America nations (excluding
Nicaragua) have never expressed opposition to elections in
El Salvador, nor do they advocate negotiations with the
guerrillas insofar as the latter implies power-sharing. In
fact, the essential issue is what the Salvadoran people
themselves think of elections: the massive participation
in 1982, the March 25, 1984 vote, and the anticipated
turn-out for the May 6 runoff election clearly indicate
their support.
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AID Project Support for Election
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AID Support for El Salvador Elections
The El Salvador Elections Project was initiated in FY 1983 to
provide financial and technical assistance to El Salvador's
Central Elections Council (CCE), for the design and
implementation of an electoral process permitting open and fair
participation by all citizens who wish to vote.
Total project cost is currently estimated at $10.5 million.
AID has provided a total of $3.4 million in ESF grant funding
for computer software and technical assistance for an electoral
registry and partial funding for the Salvadoran Government's
International Observer program. The GOES has provided a total
of 17.7 million colones (U.S. $7.1 million) in GOES local
currency resources of which 10.4 million colones are from its
own counterpart funds generated from ESF. Local currency
funding was used for the registry as well as for the observer
program.
The electoral mechanism for the March 25 election functioned as
follows:
Electoral Registry
The Central Elections Council (CCE) data base,
containing each registered citizen's identification
number, last name, first name, birth date, birth
place, profession, literacy, sex, and the date on
which the person registered was transferred into the
Council's new mini-computer system. This automated
data base permits rapid processing of registry data by
department and municipality as well as data
comparisons with other data bases.
Registered voter names and dates of birth were
compared to identify duplicate registrations.
Approximately 75,000 duplicate registrations were
eliminated.
MI=
Birth and death certificates in all municipalities
were microfilmed for transfer to the mini-computer.
All death certificates were entered into the mainframe
computer. In addition, the new data base was matched
against the CCE's old data base enabling extraction of
all duplicates and removal from the registry of names
of dead voters and those with false identification
cards.
Printed registeries have been provided to all
municipalities in preparation for election day.
International Observers
To enhance the credibility of the elections, invitations were
issued to Foreign Ministries in over 50 countries.
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Salvador:
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El Salvador:
Revolution or Reform?
February 1984
Current
Policy
No. 546
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
This publication is based on oral and written testimony
delivered by Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, before a joint hearing of the Subcom-
mittees on Human Rights and International Organizations
and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Af
fairs Committee on January 26, 1984.
The situation in El Salvador is frequently portrayed as a
clash between extremes of left and right?the forces of
oppression versus the forces of revolution. Examples in the
country's history of social injustice, governmental irrespon-
sibility, politicial repression, militarism, and brutal fanaticism
in the name of "order," "revolution," and sometimes plain
criminality, might even seem to support such analysis.
Yet this view omits a vital new element: the reformist
coup of October 1979 and subsequent coalition governments
have created an alternative which, if allowed to continue,
offers the prospect of genuinely democratic and progressive
reform.
The emergence of this new democratic alternative did
not eliminate the power of extremist factions of either left or
right. But El Salvador's history since 1979 is fundamentally
the story of efforts of change and reform. U.S. economic and
military assistance to El Salvador has been directed at
bolstering these reformist forces so that a just and
democratic society might emerge.
With our help, the Government of El Salvador is im-
plementing important economic, political, and judicial
reforms, including a far-reaching land reform. It is increas-
ing the professionalism of its armed forces and is reducing
?all forms of human rights abuse. The March 1982 Constit-
uent Assembly elections were acclaimed for their fairness
and large voter turnout. Direct presidential elections are
scheduled for March 25, 1984. These advances have occurred
,and continue to progress in the face of sustained and violent
opposition mounted by those on the right who stand to lose
power and those on the left who would be denied the oppor-
tunity to seize power.
El Salvador's democratic, reformist alternative has made
a steady advance since the coup in 1979, in spite of for-
midable obstacles: a sharply declining economy, opposition
from the recalcitrant and often violent far right, and a
El Salvador
400
Miles
Cuba
Jamaica
aqua
Cost*
Rica Panama)
Bahamas
Rep_
menacing and destructive guerrilla war waged by anti-
democratic forces of the far left, supported by Nicaragua,
Cuba, and the Soviet Union.
This report clearly shows the profound changes under-
way in this troubled country. By contrasting the starting
point of these reforms in 1979 with the present situation, it
becomes evident that demonstrable change is taking place in
El Salvador and that those seeking reform deserve our con-
tinued support. This is not the story of a completed effort
but of a dynamic movement toward a more democratic
society. The charts demonstrate that trend.
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Background
In 1979, El Salvador was a country on the eve of a social,
economic, and political explosion. The only question was
whether that explosion would impel El Salvador toward a
more democratic society or toward renewed minority rule,
perhaps even a communist dictatorship.
El Salvador's population in 1979 was roughly 4.5 million,
almost double the 2.5 million of 1960. El Salvador also is
one of the world's most densely populated countries. (See
Chart 1.)
El Salvador's economy is based largely on agriculture.
There is a critical shortage of farmland to provide for the
employment, production, and income needs of so dense a
population. Moreover, before the reforms, the distribution of
land had been highly skewed. Over 40% of the nation's
farmland was controlled by less than 1% of the population.
Eleven percent of the land was owned by absentee landlords
and worked by sharecroppers or tenant farmers. Fifteen per-
cent was organized into large plantations, worked by hired
laborers and, during peak seasons, migrant workers. This in-
equitable distribution caused rural poverty and sparked social
unrest.
At the same time, two decades of high economic growth
had cont ributed to the economic modernization of the coun-
t Ty. In fact, between 1960 and 1979, economic growth was so
high that, despite rapid population growth, real per capita in-
come rose by roughly 50%.
The manufacturing and service sectors both expanded
and were beginning to relieve some of the pressure on the
land. Agriculture and mining actually fell from more than
30% of national production in 1960 to some 25% in 1979.
(See Chart 2.)
A generation of economic expansion and growth pro-
foundly changed popular expectations, accelerated the ero-
sion of traditional relationships, and set the stage for major
social and political transformations.
? The traditional relationship between the economic elite
and the military hierarchy, weakening under the pressure of
increasing social unrest, was finally shattered by the re-
formist military coup of October 15, 1979.
? Leftist extremists with strongly Marxist-Leninist
leadership, emboldened by the Sandinista takeover in
Nicaragua and encouraged by Cuba, turned increasingly to
violence as the road to total power.
? Rightist extremists, faced with the prospect of losing
their privileged position, also began to reorganize for
sometimes violent political action.
? And the reformist junta?including representatives of
the military, political parties, the private sector, and the
left?was formed but broke apart within 6 weeks when the
extreme left withdrew to join forces with those who had
taken up arms.
In response, in January 1980 the Christian Democratic
Party?widely believed to have won the elections of 1972 and
1977 but blocked from taking office?joined with the military
leaders who staged the October coup to form a Revolu-
tionary Governing Junta. This coalition?opposed by the far
right as well as the far left?embarked upon a program of
major reform and restructuring. It decreed land, banking,
and foreign trade reforms and carried out political changes
leading to Constituent Assembly elections, while reducing
violence against civilians and countering the military threat
posed by the guerrillas.
2
INHABITANTS PER SQUARE MILE
1-Population Density, 1982
600 -
500 -
400 -
300 -
200 -
100 -
15821
121,
571:,
1831
El SALVADOR COSTA RICA INDIA FRANCE U.S.
2-Components of Gross Domestic Product,1979
COMMERCE
22%
UTILITIES, TRANSPORTATION
& COMMUNICATIONS
9%
AGRICULTURE & MINING
25%
MANUFACTURING
18%
BANKING, FINANCE,
CONSTRUCTION
AND HOUSING
7%
AND OTHER SERVICES
10%
PUBLIC ADMIN & DEFENSE
9%
Political Developments
Supported by a continuing flow of arms, training, and
assistance in command and control from Nicaragua, Cuba,
and the Soviet Union, the guerrillas shifted from political to
military action during 1980. The far right also stepped up
terrorist activities against both the left and the government's
reforms. Consequently, politically motivated violent deaths
peaked at over 800 a month in 1980.
The violence, however, did not prevent the reform of the
political system or the restoration of elections for a Constit-
uent Assembly in March 1982. Six parties, from the political,
right to the center-left, fielded candidates for the assembly'S
60 seats. In these elections, administered by an independent
Central Elections Council, some 1.5 million Salvadorans
voted (about 80% of the eligible electorate); only the extreme
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left refused to participate. According to eyewitness accounts
by invited observers and international journalists, the elec-
tions were fair, open, and representative.
The elections produced an assembly in which no party
held an absolute majority. A multiparty Government of Na-
tional Unity, headed by President Alvaro Magana, was
named by the Constituent Assembly. It has functioned slowly
but successfully by consensus.
In the summer of 1982, President Magana, a civilian in-
dependent, brought together the parties in the government
in a common program known as the Pact of Apaneca. This
program established a framework for progress on land
reform, human rights, and social and political dialogue.
Within this framework, more than 1,000 political prisoners,
guerrillas, and guerrilla supporters were granted amnesty in
1983. And the Salvadoran Peace Commission has met with
representatives of the guerrillas to try to arrive at conditions
for their participation in democratic elections.
The new constitution, which entered into force on
December 20, 1983, establishes a republican, pluralistic form
of government; strengthens the legislative and judicial
branches; improves safeguards for individual rights; protects
the legal bases of the land reform; and provides for presiden-
tial elections in March 1984 and legislative and municipal
elections in 1985.
The Salvadoran military has had a major role in protect-
ing and defending the reforms of the last 4 years. The land
reform would not have been physically or politically possible
without armed services support. Similarly, the military's firm
commitment to protect free elections this March will be a
key factor in ensuring that voters are able to cast their
ballots without coercion from either left or right.
Economic Developments
El Salvador's economy faces critical difficulties. The guer-
rillas have sought to topple the government by targeting the
economic infrastructure. In addition, the worldwide recession
has had a disastrous impact on the Salvadoran economy.
As a result, since 1978 gross domestic product (GDP) has
fallen by 23% in real terms and exports have dropped by
40%. Unemployment, which had been relatively low during
the 1960s and 1970s, suddenly began to shoot up in 1979 and
now reaches more than 30%. Real gross domestic product
per capita, one measure of a nation's economic well-being
because it measures the average earnings of each citizen, has
declined by about 30%. According to this measure, El
Salvador has lost 15 years of economic development in the
last four. (See Charts 3 and 4.)
One key element of this precipitous economic decline has
been El Salvador's shortage of hard currency to pay for im-
ports. Because of falling prices for its major export com-
modities?coffee, cotton, sugar, and some manufactured
goods?combined with the higher price of borrowed capital,
El Salvador was no longer capable of financing needed im-
ports. Even the drop in the price of oil after 1981?a poten-
tially helpful development?did not fully benefit El Salvador
because its major exports also were declining in value. It still
sakes too many bags of coffee to buy one barrel of oil.
The effect of this economic decline is both social and
political. Lower incomes and reduced employment mean that
many Salvadorans are having to make do with less than
before, in spite of the major economic reforms put in place in
the last 4 years. Reduced resources also inhibit the develop-
GDP BILLIONS Of COOKS 1983 PRIM
% OF WORK FORCE UNEMPLOYED
3-Real Gross Domestic Product, 1960-84
1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
.17 831 00=2 5 cWon88 (1983)
4-Estimated Unemployment, 1977-83
32 -
30 -
28 -
26 -
28.2
31.0
23.8
24 -
22 -
20 -
18 -
16 -
15.8
14 -
12 -
10 -
-
7.6
6 -
3.6
3.6
4
2=-
1
1
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
ment of a national political consensus by forcing factions
and sectors to fight harder for a share of a shrinking
economic pie.
By aggravating this situation, the guerrillas hope to set
citizen against government; laborer against manager; farmer
against manufacturer. In their effort to undermine the na-
tional economy, the guerrillas have destroyed buses, bridges,
electrical pylons, and places of work and production. The
cumulative economic cost of guerrilla destruction from 1979
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through 1983 has been estimated at more than $800 million,
an amount greater than the total of U.S. economic assistance
during the same period. It is impossible to estimate the
human cost. (See Chart 5.)
Human Rights
Continued abuse of human rights remains a central problem,
despite efforts to end violence from the terrorist right as
well as the guerrilla left.
The Department of State and U.S. human rights
organizations are in agreement that there are no fully
reliable statistics on the number of civilian deaths at-
tributable to political violence in El Salvador. However, since
the State Department began providing reports to the Con-
gress in 1981, it has been using statistics drawn from the
Salvadoran press in an effort to determine trends on political
violence. The press reports rely on such sources as the
Justices of the Peace located in municipalities throughout the
country. One of the primary tasks of the Justices of the
Peace is the identification and registration of bodies.
The Department's statistics exclude guerrillas killed in
battle and civilians killed either because they were with the
guerrillas during the fighting or were innocent victims
caught between two opposing forces in an ongoing military
conflict. When one reads figures such as 30,000 civilians
killed over the last few years, it is important to make a
distinction between civilian deaths at the hands of left- or
right-wing extremists and those casualties resulting from
battle; some estimates calculate the battle casualties to be as
high as 75% of all civilian victims of political violence.
All of the groups compiling such figures agree that there
has been a steady and measurable, if still insufficient, reduc-
tion in the levels of political violence. (See Chart 6.)
Major efforts are underway to ensure more effective
functioning of the criminal justice system. The United States
is assisting the Government of El Salvador in developing
programs to improve judicial protection and investigative
capacities; to increase the proficiency of jurists, lawyers, and
others involved in the legal process; and to modernize penal
and evidentiary codes.
There also has been movement in a number of cases in-
volving U.S. citizen victims. Judicial proceedings are under-
way as a result of investigations into the murders of Ita
Ford, Maura Clarke, Dorothy Kazel, Jean Donovan, Michael
Hammer, Mark Pearlman, and Michael Kline. The cases of
the churchwomen and Michael Kline are now in the final
stage of trial proceedings. Investigations continue without
result into the death of John Sullivan, the disappearance of
Patricia Cuellar, and the murder of Lt. Cdr. Albert
Schaufelberger. Chart 7 shows, in simplified form, how these
cases have developed.
The Government of El Salvador continues its efforts to
curb the violence of the far right and its sympathizers. The
armed forces high command has publicly broadcast its op-
position to violence by far-right death squads and has issued
strict new orders requiring, among other things, that
uniforms be worn when arrests are made, that relatives and
the Red Cross be notified, and that prisoners be turned over
to a judge expeditiously. Civilian and military officials
suspected of violent far-right activity have been removed
from their positions and, in several cases, stationed abroad.
MILLIONS $ U.S.
5-Cumulative U.S. Economic Assistance and
Guerrilla Cost to Economy, 1979-83
800 ?
700 ?
9260
U.S. economic assistance to
El Salvador from 1979 through 1983
totaled $607.1 Welton.
600 ?
607 1
500 ?
400 ?
363 4
300 ?
181 2
200 ?
100 ?
67.6
98
1979
1979-80 1179-81 1979-12 197943
I GUERRILLA COST TO
CUMULATIVE U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
I ECONOMY, 1979-83
6-Indicators of Civilian Deaths Attributable
to Political Violence, June 1981-December 1983
1100 ?
1,500
1,400 ?
1,300
2 1,200 -
E
1.000 ?
900 ?
BOO ?
TOO ?
800 ?
NO
406
300
2011
00 ?
1144160 SALVADORAN SOURCES'
514
ACCORDING TO REPORTS IN/
196 SALVADORAN PRESS
380
104
JUN 81 DEC 81
JUN 82
DEC 82
JUN 83
'Socorro Juridic. (Legal Aid), nongrarnmental Human Rights Commission of El
Salvador, Centre' American tIniverslly, and Tut* Legal (Legal Ald?oftleated
Ill Cornelia Archbishopric Al El Saluda)
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DEC 83
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7?U.S. Citizen Deaths and Disappearances, 1979-January 1984
1979 1980
Four churchwomen
killed:
Maura Clarke
Ita Ford
Jean Donovan
Dorothy Kazel
1981
? Investigation begins.
1982
1983
1984
? Five suspects arrested
and charged.
? Case elevated to trial.
? Case returned to in-
vestigative stage.
? Retired U.S. Judge
Tyler reviews case.
? Case re-elevated to
trial, defense appeals.
? Trial expected.
John Sullivan ? Investigation begins.
disappears.
? Body found.
? Body positively
identified.
Labor advisers killed:
Michael Hammer
Mark Pearlman
? Ricardo Sol Meza
? Charges against Lt.
Lopez Sibrian, Sol Meza
and Christ dismissed.
Prosecution appeals.
arrested. ? FBI assists investiga-
? El Salvador seeks ex-
tion.
tradiction of Hans Christ ? Two National Guards-
from United States, men arrested.
? Guardsmen ordered to ? Prosecution seeks addi-
trial. tional evidence against
Lopez Sibrian.
? Lopez Sibrian appeal
denied, Christ and Sol
Meza pending.
? Capt. Avila arrested.
Michael Kline killed.
? Three soldiers arrested.
? Trial expected.
Patricia Cuellar
disappears.
? Investigation with
FBI assistance.
The Land Reform
Overall, the land reform now has benefited more than
550,000 persons or almost 25% of the rural population.
Where 1% of the population once owned 40% of the land,
over one-third of the farmland is now in the hands of the
campesinos or farm workers, who worked as tenants and
sharecroppers on land they could not hope to own before the
reforms. These gains were achieved while the nation was
under attack by guerrillas supported by Nicaragua, Cuba,
and the Soviet Union.
Phase I was accomplished by decree of the Revolutionary
Junta in March 1980 and implemented immediately. The
armed forces removed former owners of large farms. Posses-
sion was transferred to cooperatives made up of persons
working the land. The creation of cooperatives from the
larger estates under Phase I has been completed. However,
some cooperatives have been abandoned because of guerrilla
violence.
Phase II, affecting medium-sized farms, was conceived in
March 1980 but was suspended for want of administrative
and financial resources. This phase has now been resurrected
with the adoption of the new national constitution in
December 1983.
Phase III, applicable to smaller farms tilled by tenants,
was started in April 1980. Unlike Phase I, beneficiaries must
file for title to the land, based on proof that they were work-
ing it. Thus, beneficiaries may be at the stage of initial ap-
plication, provisional title, or?after all surveys have been
made and compensation paid to the original owner?final
title. Although the period for filing applications was to have
ended in 1982, Phase III has been extended three times,
most recently by legislation in December 1983 which sets a
final filing deadline of June 30, 1984. (See Charts 8, 9,
and 10.)
Lt. Cdr. Albert
Schaufelberger killed.
? FPL guerrillas claim
credit.
? Investigation begins.
8-"Land-to-the-Tiller" Applications,
December 1980-December 1983
50%
40%
.1, 30%
20%
10%
? Investigation
continues.
DEC 80 JUN 81 DEC 81 JUN 82 DEC 82 JUN 83 DEC 83
Where the government is able to work peacefully to ad-
vance the reform, most eligible beneficiaries apply for title
under Phase III; where the guerrillas are active, filings are
sharply reduced. In some places, where guerrilla violence is
limited, almost everyone has filed who is believed to be eligi-
ble. But, where guerrilla activity has intimidated potential
beneficiaries and blocked government promotion efforts?as
in the departments of Chalatenango, San Vicente, Usulutan,
San Miguel, and Morazan?less than half of the estimated
beneficiaries have filed.
Productivity on reformed lands has reached levels com-
parable to the traditional sector. In almost all cases, dif-
ferences in productivity were relatively minor. Neverthe-
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less, there is still a need for better management of the
cooperatives, improved financing, and for increased technical
assistance to all beneficiaries. (See Chart 11.)
Final title to land reform beneficiaries can only be
transferred upon completion of payment to the former land-
owners; delays in payment have motivated some former
landowners to evict the new beneficiaries under land reform.
There is an urgent need to speed up the process of repaying
former owners and to end the violent eviction of the "land-to-
the-tiller" beneficiaries.
The Salvadoran Government and its Armed Forces have
taken the problem of evictions seriously. Of the some 5,000
illegal evictions reported to land reform authorities, more
than 3,900 have been resolved by reinstalling the beneficiary
on his land. So far, less than 2% of all Phase III beneficiaries
who report to the authorities that they have been evicted are
not yet reinstalled on their land. And the best available data
indicates that at least 85% and probably more than 90% of
applicants are working their land without interference.
Security
These economic, political, and social developments have all
occurred against a backdrop of intense guerrilla conflict.
Increased weaponry and better training have permitted
the guerrillas to transform a large number of their support
forces into active combatants. Guerrilla activities since 1980
do not indicate any expansion of their influence among the
general population. Indeed, the guerrilla strategy of
targeting the economy has hurt the poor the most and has
cost the guerrillas popular support. Nevertheless, the guer-
rillas' training, communications, and armament have im-
proved greatly. This and other evidence disputes recent
claims that Cuba and Nicaragua may be reducing direct sup-
port for the Salvadoran guerrillas or closing off their
command-and-control center in Managua.
An estimated 9,000-11,000 guerrillas are now actively
engaged in the field against the Salvadoran Armed Forces.
Over recent months, through continued training and access
to arms, the Salvadoran guerrillas have managed to provide
formerly noncombatant personnel with equipment for com-
bat. While this has increased the number of people with
arms, it is not a reflection of increased popular support, and
the overall number of people involved in the guerrilla move-
ment itself has not really grown. More of them are simply
armed. Their strategy is based on hit-and-run tactics.
They capitalize on the Salvadoran Armed Forces' need to
protect static positions (cities, bridges, dams, etc.) while
simultaneously waging an effective, mobile, offensive
campaign.
The Salvadoran military has prevented the guerrillas
from gaining and holding ground. Though the guerrillas can
stage raids, they cannot remain in any position from which
the Salvadoran military wishes to remove them. Nor have
they been able to disrupt such key events as the annual
harvest or national elections.
The Salvadoran military has significantly increased in
size. U.S. training has increased. Nevertheless, a number of
serious gaps exist. There are still too few U.S.-trained troops
and the size of the Salvadoran officer corps is insufficient to
6
9-"Land-to-the-Tiller" Cumulative Petitions and Titles,
December 1980-December 1983
75.967
70,000-
171 PETITIONS FILED
E PROVISIONAL TITLES GRANTED
? FINAL TITLES GRANTED
60,000-
55 287
50,000 ?
40,000 ?
7.77.77IPI!
30,000-
20,000 ?
10,000 ?
5.456
.66.86226228
1000 EBS PER ACRE
DEC BO JUNE Al
DEC 81 JUNE 82
DEC 82 JUNE 83 DEC 83
10-"Land-to-the-Tiller" Applications by
Department as of November 9, 1983
100
90
ti 10-
00 ?
60 ?
1T 50 ?
40 ?
30 ?
20 ?
10 ?
^
El PEACEFUL ZONES
Ei SPORADIC COMBAT ZONES
IIII COMBAT ZONES
1/4-;-, 4
4. N. cr 0 0 .. 1, 0 .1.
Sr 4'4. s''e AtCrVW V.
.... g.
?ct `t. .04' ....c., tr.' \ 4
..1.. 0 sr ,,
co csz, ,- c..., ...., .q. 4c.t Oc Is
`R. $ ,, c:". '', 0 Z R.'
0 0 'N^
* ca c, 'N.
,
vt
11-Comparative Yields of Reformed and
Nonreformed Land, 1981-82 Harvest
NONREFORMED
REFORMED
RICE COFFEE
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12?Government and Guerrilla Strengths,
1979-January 1984
13-Total Armed Forces per 1,000 People
1977
Government NICARAGUA
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
HONDURAS
12,000 16,000 17,000 28,000 32,000 39,000
GUATEMALA
Guerrilla EL SALVADOR
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1983
NICARAGUA
2,000 2,000 3,500- 4,000- 4,000- 9,000-
4,500 5,000 6,000 11,000
lead the rapidly expanding army in time of war. The latter
has been a particular problem for command and control,
military discipline, staff functions, and the general manage-
ment of the war. (See Chart 12.)
U.S. Assistance
The Administration's original request to Congress for fiscal
year (FY) 1984 for military and economic assistance totaled
$282 million, of which some $260 million was approved under
the Continuing Resolution. In the context of the global U.S.
assistance effort, this amount is moderate both in view of the
U.S. security interest in Central America and the turmoil
and human suffering which our aid helps alleviate. The Ad-
ministration's request for El Salvador is only about 3% of
total U.S. assistance worldwide. (See Chart 16.)
U.S. economic assistance has always far exceeded
military assistance. In all but 1 year, economic aid has been
at least three times the amount provided to assist the
Salvadorans defend against guerrilla destruction. (See
Chart 14.)
U.S. economic assistance grew from $57.8 million in
1980 to more than $240 million in 1983. It is divided into
three elements:
? Economic support funds (ESF) to assist the
Salvadorans to meet critical import needs, to finance their
government's budget, and to pay for priority projects such as
land reform and improved machinery for elections;
? Development assistance to finance employment-
generation projects and other social needs; and
? PL-480 food donations to supplement shortages in
basic dietary needs. (See Chart 15.)
U.S. military assistance has been an important element
in preventing a guerrilla victory. In addition to providing
arms, ammunition, and logistical support, we have helped
train more than 15,000 Salvadoran soldiers and officers in a
variety of military subjects, including respect for human
rights. By the end of 1983, 33% of U.S.-trained troops and
90% of eligible noncommissioned officers were reenlisting.
Congressionally approved assistance, however, has con-
sistently been below the Administration's requested levels.
For example, in FY 1984 the Administration requested $86.3
million; Congress, through its Continuing Resolution, pro-
vided $64.8 million for military assistance. And because 30%
of this amount is withheld by law until a verdict is reached in
HONDURAS
GUATEMALA
El SALVADOR
'?=1;i:A:': 3
2.3
? 1.6
4.3
,V."-=M:::::=003555500330033KWOM 1"
2.8
3
5.1
1 2 3 4 5 8 7 8 9 10 11 12 11 14 15 ifi I/ 18
SOURCE THE MILITARY BALANCE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (U K )
14-U.S. Military and Economic Assistance,
FY 1980-84
260 ?
240
220 ?
200
100
0, 160 ?
8 140
g 100-
A
100 ?
BO
60
40
20
IIII ECONOMIC
EMILITARY
510
385
1900 1901 1982
824
243
1903
15-U.S. Economic Assistance, FY 1978-84
ED PL 480
ED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
MESE
243 7
955
648
1984
CICOInuV
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
V4.1"jgg
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the churchwomen's case, only some $45 million is available to
address El Salvador's urgent security problems. Over $25
million of this $45 million has already been obligated, and re-
quests for an additional $13 million are currently being proc-
essed. Funds will run out soon, possibly on the eve of
elections.
Conclusion
The democratic alternative in El Salvador, though faced with
powerful opposition from terrorists and guerrillas, has made
steady progress since 1979 in building a new, more equitable
society and a more democratic and responsive government.
Our political support and our military and economic
assistance have helped.
In line with the recommendations of the President's Na-
tional Bipartisan Commission on Central America, we will
continue to support the Salvadoran Government. Our moral
and strategic interests coincide. In February 1984, we will
follow up on the recommendations of the commission to re-
quest additional funds from Congress to address the
economic, social, and security needs of El Salvador and the
other countries of Central America.
Presidential elections are scheduled in El Salvador for
March 1984. The Government of El Salvador, through its
Peace Commission, has sought direct talks to encourage the
guerrillas to participate in the balloting. The Peace Commis-
sion remains prepared to meet with the armed left and its
political associates to discuss their participation in free elec-
tions, including physical security for candidates and access to
the media. Elections for the Constituent Assembly and local
mayors will be held in 1985. The government is committed to
continuing to try to bring the left into participation in these
elections.
Nonetheless, there is every indication that the guerrillas
will attempt to disrupt these moves toward democracy. It is,
16-U.S. Military and Economic Assistance, FY 1984
EGYPT AND ISRAEL
$4,537 million
49%
EL SALVADOR
$260 million
3%
ALL OTHERS
$4,496 million
48%
therefore, imperative that Congress provide the needed
levels of military and economic aid. The commitment of
Salvadorans of the democratic center, who are defying both
the communist guerrillas and the violence of the reactionary
right, clearly justifies the continued support of the United
States. II
Published by the United States Department of State ? Bureau of
Public Affairs ? Office of Public Communication ? Editorial Divi-
sion ? Washington, D.C. ? February 1984 ? Editor: Colleen
Sussman ? This material is in the public domain and may be
reproduced without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Official Business
If address is incorrect
please indicate change.
Do not cover or destroy
this address label. Mail
change of address to:
PA/OAP, Rm. 5815A
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I NI IL I
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