SANDINISTA VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001400140033-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: May 31, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ccnhrf In..lihy.ncc gcncy
ER 84-445/7
31 May 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert M. Kimnitt
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
SUBJECT: Sandinista Violations of Human Rights
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 29 May 1984, Subject: Sandinista
Violations of Human Rights.
1. Page three, the third paragraph on Edgard Macias Gomez. The second
sentence should read "He represented a threat to the FSLN because he could
become an influential critic as a former member of the governing coalition.
2. Page four, fifth paragraph should read, "The Catholic Church into an
agent".
3. Page nine, third paragraph, the words "up to" should be deleted from
the last sentence.,
4. Page eleven, the last sentence of the third paragraph should read,
"this is dominated by the Sandinistas".
cc: Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Col. John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
Distribution:
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 29, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
COL (P) JOHN STANFORD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
Executive Registry
84.
25X1
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: White House Digest re Sandinista
Violations of Human Rights
The attached White House Digest is submitted for final
review/clearance. Please submit comments by May 31.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
White House Digest
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9E 7
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SANDINISTA VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Miskitos and many other refugees-turned-guerrillas
say that while Somoza was interested only in
.controlling Nicaragua's wealth, the Sandinistas
want to control the minds of the people. (1)
When the Sandinistas marched triumphantly into Managua on
July 19, 1979, they promised the cheering masses that the Nicar-
agua of tomorrow would enjoy unfettered political pluralism, a
free, mixed economy, and true non-alignment.
But in the more than four-years of Sandinista rule, the
self-appointed guardians of Sandino's revolution have not only
ignored their victory promises, but have systematically trampled
on every aspect of human rights -- from the censorship of the
press and the postponement of elections to the indefinite suspen-
sion of constitutional guarantees.
Individuals as well as institutions are targets of the
ruling party, the FSLN (Sandinista Front for the Liberation of
Nicaragua). The following incidents are not isolated events buf
reveal an official policy based on a true disregard for the
rights of the individual, especially those considered threats to
the revolution.
"Ajusticimientos"
In July 1979, under the guise of "ajusticimientos," or "acts
of justice," the FSLN carried out a deliberate campaign of
murder and revenge on individuals they had determined to be
"informers and assassins" of the ousted regime of Anastasio
Somoza.
Nicaraguan officials admitted to the summary executions of
several hundred prisoners in the early days of the Revolution.(2)
According to Jose Esteban Gonzalez, head of the Permanent Commis-
sion on Human Rights of Nicaragua, 2,000 Nicaraguans were executed
in the first months of the new regime. (3)
"Shot While Attempting to Escape"
Franklin Montenegro and another man called Aguilera were
junior National Guard officers who had been a part of Somoza's
security apparatus. During the July 1979 bloodbath, Aguilera and
Montenegro were imprisoned but not killed.
Later, the FSLN Directorate decided that the two should
indeed be killed, even though the period of "ajusticimientos" had
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passed. The Directorate arranged for Aguilera andMtenagrfeto
be shot "while attempting to escape" during a supposed
from one prison to another.
The Attack on Private Enterprise
The murder of Jorge Salazar in November 198.0 was the FSLN
Directorate's first major act of repression mdirected oagainst a
representative of the private sector.
ting in Salazar's death were designed to goad the private sector
into actively opposing the Sandinistas.
The FSLN wanted to keep them from forming an effective type arm ofd
resistance, but at the same time, provoke them
armed action which would justify Sandinista reprisals. This
action, and the anticipated Sandinista responsseitocit,would
m to
prevent the private sector from formuralist polront being prepared
interfere with FSLN plans for the p
for the 1985 elections.
Jose Maria Lau, aide to the Chief of State Security Lenin
In addition to Lau,..-
Cerna, was chosen to run this operation.
Security selected several others to be placed in COSEP (Higher
Council for Private Enterprise) and the democratic parties to act
ani-
as provocateurs. Once infiltrated into ftheitheirr
zations, Lau and his collaborators opposition.
really interested in armed oppo
The democratic parties and the COSEP did, however, begin to
aggressively speak out the FSLN.
give
decided it was time
"burgesia" remained dangerous and could well take up arms against
the revolution.
Salazar, president of the agro-industrialists and a very
prominent man, was chosen as victim. A false arms transfer was
staged by State Security and Salazar was killed in cold blood.
for
Salazar's widow, LucsFonow rcethone rights taken
the Nicaraguan Democratic
up arms against the Sandinistas.
Mrs. Salazar, who lost a brother in Somoza's prisons before
had this to say about
her husband was killed by the Sandinistas,
the Sandinistas and human rights:
"I would say that all human rights are violated in
Nicaragua every single day and every single hour." (4)
The decision to kill Salazar was made by Cerna and Juan Jose
Ubeda, Deputy Chief of State Security. According to the official
version, Salazar was planning armed resistance to the FSLN. The
net effect of his murder was to intimidate the private sector.
On October 20, 1981, COSEP published an open letter
criticizing Humberto Ortega's statement that the Sandinista
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government could "in a matter of hours," take over everything
that "the bourgeoisie still possesses." The letter accused the
government of egregious economic.mismanagement, and the Sandin-
ista doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, for the country's deepening
economic crisis. (5)
The Sandinista government quickly reacted to this letter.
By midnight the same day, state security forces arrested four
COSEP leaders in their homes for "violation of the economic and
social emergency law." ?
Three of those arrested were sentenced to seven months in.
jail on October 30. They were Enrique Dreyfus, President of
COSEP, Benjamin Lanzas, President of the Chamber of Construction,
and Gilberto Cuadra, President of the Federation of Nicaraguan
Professionals..
Similar sentences were handed down to three other businessmen
who fled into exile in Venezuela and the U.S. This left the
private sector in Nicaragua leaderless, and with few anti-
Sandinistas willing to assume such a risky role. Under continued
international pressure, the Sandinistas finally released the??-
COSEP leaders on 14 February, 1982.
Edgard Macias Gomez
The case of former Vice-Minister of Labor under the new FS124
regime, Edgard Macias Gomez, demonstrates the extreme pressure
and propaganda methods used by the Nicaraguan State Security
Service (SDGSE) in their efforts to denigrate the character of an
individual.
When appointed Vice Minister of Labor, Macias was already
President of the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC), one of
the political parties which formed the coalition known as Frente
Patriotico (FP). The FP follows the Sandinista line. Macias saw
his party losing more and more of its independence to the FSLN
party.
To devote his full efforts to countering this influence,
Macias resigned his official position as Vice Minister of Labor
in the spring of 1982. He now represented a threat to FSLN
dominance of the FP'and consequently to the assurance that the
FSLN party would prevail in the 1985 "election process."
To destroy Macias, his character and credibility, using
controlled media, the FSLN mounted an intense defamation campaign
against both him and his wife. The pressure became so great that
the Macias' had to leave Nicaragua.
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Religious Persecution
The Sandinistas have also targeted Nicaragua's Catholic
Church. Their intention is-to neutralize growing opposition both
from the Catholic hierarchy and from rank and file Catholics by
splitting the-Church.
The Sandinistas have tried to create a so-called Popular
Church and portray it'as the friend of the people, casting the
legitimate Church in the role of enemy, especially of toe poor.(6)
The Sandinista policy toward the Catholic Church was set in
September 1979 and is summarized in the 72 Hour Document, which
resulted from an extraordinary meeting held from 21-23 September,
1979. The FSLN Directorate and top level cadre participated.
According to the Document, the Catholic Church is to be
treated cordially, "following a cautious policy designed to
neutralize-conservative elements, develop close ties with sympa-
thetic elements and stimulate the revolutionary sectors."(7)
Nicaraguan priests and bishops have opposed the transforma-
tion of the Catholic Church into a branch of the Sandinista
government. They have been subjected to threats, mob violence,
and physical abuse. In one particularly appalling incident,
Father Bismark Carballo, spokesman for Archbishop Obando y Bravo,
was forced to strip and paraded in front of government televisidi
cameras.
These acts of intimidation against'priests and faithful
loyal to the Pope and their Bishops not only violate international
standards of behavior, but the Sandinistas own law as well.
Article 19 of the Statute on the Rights and Guarantees of
Nicaraguans provides that "even in cases of emergency," freedom
of thought, conscience and religion cannot be suspended.(8)
The Sandinistas also succeeded in disrupting the Pope's Mass
in Managua last March. The front seats in the square where Mass
was held were reserved for Sandinistas armed with microphones who
repeatedly interrupted the Pontiff.
While the Pope was blessing the Consecrated Host, Sandinista
activists began to make speeches from the altar. When a group of
five or six Catholics tried to climb the stairs to help the Pope,
Lenin Cerna, head of State Security, threatened them with a
machine gun. (9)
The Pope's Mass and the Sandinistas' attempt to portray John
Paul as the enemy of the revolution was the turning point in
European support for the Sandinista regime, according to some
observers. Heavily Catholic countries such as Spain and Italy
began to rethink their diplomatic support for Sandinismo.(10)
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This persecution has not been limited to Catholics. Members
of the Moravian Church of the Atlantic Coast have had their
religion and culture systematically attacked. Clergy and civic
and church leaders have been jailed, exiled or otherwise har-
assed. Protestant churches have been burned or seized for use as
Sandinista military barracks.
At the general triennial synod of the Nicaraguan Moravian
Church in 1983, two Sandinista military commanders attended and
interfered with the business of the church.. They warned against
the election of certain pastors to high church office. They had
already closed down the Moravian Biblical Institute, adversely
affecting the education and training of Moravian clergy.
Nicaragua's small Jewish community has also been the subject
of persecution, Disguised as attacks on former Somoza suppor-
ters, the efforts are more likely related to the FSLN's long
relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Anti-Semitic rhetoric, the attempt to set fire to the main,
door of the Managua synagogue (while the faithful were inside)
and the subsequent confiscation of this synagogue (the only one
in the city) indicate that the actions that drove most of the
Jewish community into exile were not mere anti-capitalism.
Rather, it was an attack on a small, and therefore vulnerable,
community that represented opposition to Sandinista
totalitarianism.
Torture
According to Miguel Bolanos Hunter, a former State Security
agent who defected last summer, Sandinista Security officials
make use of KGB methods of psychological torture. Jails where
interrogations are carried on are constructed for this type of
human rights violation. Their layouts have been brought from
Cuba and are based on KGB models. Bolanos also charges that the
interrogators are Cuban-trained. (11)
The relatively sophisticated methods of torture used to
extract information are used in addition to more traditional
forms of physical mistreatment used to intimidate or simply
eliminate enemies.
For example, prisoners reportedly were kept in cramped dark
cells and fed at irregular intervals to disorient them. They are
also ordered to use only their prison number and not their name,
and are subjected to threats.
These methods are sometimes used against the regime's
political opponents. There is no shortage of political prisoners
in Sandinista Nicaragua. A March 1981 New York Times article
charged that the Sandinistas were holding 4,170 political prison-
ers. (12)
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Torture is n6t merely psychological. During 1983, the
Permanent Commission on Human. Rights compiled data on 102
instances of physical abuse and torture. One detained Nicaraguan
stated that security forces-kept him naked in a cold cell with a
ceiling so low that he could not stand upright. He said he was
pressured into signing a document obliging him to inform on his
friends and neighbors.
Reportedly, security forces physically abused and threatened
alleged guerrillas, subversives and political suspects., Nicar-
aguans who fled to Costa Rica and Honduras reported incidents of
rape, torture, and the murder of children by the Sandinista
Popular Army and security forces.
Interior Minister Tomas Borge, head of the regime's secret
police, admitted that many cases of physical abuse and a few of
killing of detained persons by security forces occurred, but he
claimed that the Government was working to resolve the problem.
Prudencio Baltodano
One of the most shocking stories to come out of Sandinista
Nicaragua in recent weeks'is that of Prudencio Baltodano, a
Pentacostal preacher and a victim of Sandinista torture. In
February 1984, Baltodano, with one other man and about 40 women
and children, fled the scene of a battle between Sandinista
troops and anti-government forces of ARDE.
The group was captured by Sandinista soldiers. Baltodano
and the other man were separated from the others and beaten.
Upon learning the names of their captives, the soldiers accused
Baltodano of recruiting people to fight against the government.
They tied him to a tree and told him: "You still don't know what
we do to evangelical pastors. We are Communists and don't
believe in God."
While tied up, Baltodano was hit in the forehead with a
rifle butt, had his throat cut with a bayonet and had both ears
cut off. The Sandinista soldiers left him to bleed to death.
Baltodano survived, however, and is now in the U.S. bearing
witness to what happened to him. He asserts that his experience
is by,.no means unique and he has seen the bodies of other people
mutilated even more brutally. (13)
Tipitapa
Recent reporting from a variety of sources indicates that
the FSLN has violated the human rights of political prisoners.
In the early morning hours of 11 October 1983, violence broke out
at the Modelo prison called Tipitapa, a "model" prison approxi-
mately 24 kilometers (15 miles) from Managua.
The confrontation resulted in the deaths of several political
prisoners (only political prisoners are incarcerated at Modelo).
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Accounts differ as to what caused the prison guards to open fire
on the prisoners and how many were killed.
The fact that neither the Sandinistas nor the government
Human Rights Commission in Managua was willing to make a clarifying
statement indicates the whole affair was being covered up. Four
days after the event, and after denying both foreign journalists
and independent human.rights agencies access to the prison, the
Sandinistas announced that nothing at all happened at Tipitapa.
Persecutions of the Indians
Some of the most severe examples of Sandinista repression
have been committed against Managua's large Indian population,
especially the Miskito, Rama and Sumo Indian groups that inhabit
the steamy Atlantic Coast. The-recent flight of over 1,000
Indians, led by a Roman Catholic Bishop, highlights their plight.
Just this past April, hundreds more Miskito Indians escaped into
Honduras.
These Indians have been subjected to religious persecution,
destruction of their crops, and forced relocation, causing many
thousands to flee across the border into Honduras. (14) Those
unable or unwilling to leave their ancient homelands are sub-
jected to heavy-handed attempts, occasionally including rape and
murder, to bring Sandinista totalitarianism to the traditionally
autonomous Indian population.
Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence
The Nicaraguan government has developed an elaborate and
effective security/intelligence network employing both government
security service organs and a variety of Sandinista organiza-
tions, such as the Sandinista Defense Committees, modeled on the
notorious Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, to
ferret out dissidents and real or alleged subversives.
These organizations tolerate everyday grumbling about
inflation, commodity scarcities, and non-sensitive government
policies. However, individuals who openly criticize the
"revolutionary process" or its leadership are frequently sub-
jected to pressure ranging from public ridicule and defacement of
his home by Sandinista mobs to loss of employment and even
detention.
The Sandinista Defense Committees, or CDSs, organized in
most neighborhoods throughout the country, serve as a network of
informers and as an instrument of political intimidation.
Members are exhorted to be alert for signs of subversive ideas
and to seek out dissidents to convert them into Sandinista
supporters.
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Participation is supposed to be voluntary in the Defense
Committees and in committee activities such as political education
meetings and "Revolutionary Vigilance," a program in which
Committee members stand watch over their neighborhood during
hours of darkness.
However, the Sandinistas employ many methods to entice or
pressure individuals into joining the Defense Committees, including
Committee control over the distribution of ration cards.for the
purchase of subsidized basic products such as rice, beaps and
soap. A Nicaraguan citizen reported the following in March 1983:
"We all have to join [the CDSs], If you don't, they.
call you a contra, their term for a counterevolutionary, and
you don't get an identification card to buy basic foods at
cheap prices." (15)
This constitutes not only a method of inflicting punishment
without trial, but an attack on freedom of speech and freedom of
association. The system also invites abuse, since the accusation
of "counterrevolutionary" can be used to settle private scores
having nothing to do with politics.
Linked to the Defense Committees are the "turbas divinas"
(literally, "divine mobs"). Sometimes "turbas" composed of
scores of Sandinista supporters demonstrated in front of the
homes or offices of opposition figures, chanting slogans and
threats and defacing buildings with pro-government graffiti. The
mobs rarely resorted to violence against persons, but in some
instances scuffles occurred and minor injuries resulted.
While the government takes no responsibility for the actions
of the mobs, it regards them as "legitimate expressions of the
popular will" and does not interfere to protect the rights of
those against whom they are demonstrating. There is little doubt
that the government targets those persons against whom it wants
the mobs to demonstrate.
The State of Emergency suspended the legal requirement for a
search warrant. Police and State Security officials regularly
enter and search private residences. The government opens
private mail, and officials meticulously inspect the baggage and
personal effects of both arriving and departing international
travelers and confiscate any items or literature, including
newspapers from neighboring countries, alleged to be subversive.
Nicaraguans are also being urged to spy on one another. One
Sandinista leader publicly urged the Defense Committees to take
action against anyone heard listening to a foreign radio news
broadcast. There have been some reports that teachers in public
schools have asked children to spy on their parents and report
suspicious activity. (16)
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Trade Union Freedoms
The Sandinistas have been working steadily since they took
power in 1979 to bring all independent trade unions under their
control. Both the Christian Democratic oriented National Workers
Central (CTN).and the independent Confederation of Labor Unity
(CUS) have been subject to repeated harassment,-.arrests, and
threats.
In June the government packed the convention of the Steve-
dores' Union in Corinto to prevent it from switching its affilia-
tion from the Sandinista Workers Central (SWC) to the CUS.
Leaders of this union, which supported the 1979 revolution, have
been forced to flee the country and others have been arrested.
Other members of the union have been fired because of their
desire to disafiliate from the SWC.
Freedom of the Press
Although the Sandinista regime's capricious censors relaxed
their censorship of La Prensa for a short period beginning in
August, all mechanisms of censorship remain in place for both.the
print and broadcast media. This means that even stricter censor-
ship can be reimposed at any time. In fact, since the beginning
of this year La Prensa has refused to publish five times because
up to so many of its articles have been censored.
Until recently, news items on arrests of opposition figures,
expropriations, and any criticism of government policy have not
been permitted, and editorial commentary is rarely approved. In
late October a Church communique on the mob attacks against the
Church was censored.
According to the Inter-American Press Association, which
includes newspapers in Canada, the United States and Latin
America, the most serious case of press censorship in the
hemisphere "continues to be Nicaragua, where the independent
newspaper La Prensa is the chief victim." (17)
La Prensa is now the only independent source of print news
in Nicaragua. Every line of type in La Prensa must be submitted
to government censors before it can be published. The editors of
the paper report that between January and October 1983 the
government censored over 50% of their stories on current national
and international events.
Since the rescue mission in Grenada and the fall of the
Marxist-Leninist regime there, censorship has been relaxed
somewhat, but is still severe. Censorship is capricious and
unpredictable.
During 1983, the government censored articles about an
attack on the house of a former government junta member, a letter
from the Catholic Bishops criticizing the proposed military draft
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law, a letter to the government from 12 U.S. Congressmen, and
items on Afghanistan, Managua firemen, and street repairs.
Among items frequently-censored are not only political
commentary, but also straightforward reports of Nicaragua's bad
economic situation. This kind-of censorship seems to reflect the
totalitarian assumption that everything that takes place in the
country is (or ought to be) the responsibility of the government.
Therefore, criticism of anything that happens is a criticism of
the government. ?
Even without censorship, La Prensa's readership is largely
confined to Managua. The people who live in much of the rest of
Nicaragua depend on radio for information.
Since March 1982 the Sandinistas have enforced censorship of
independent radio stations by demanding the contents of daily
programs before transmission, and in June government censors
prohibited-Radio Mundial, one of Nicaragua's oldest and most
respected radio stations, from carrying any news from the Voice
of America.
The station responded by stopping all news broadcasts,
leaving pro-FSLN Radio Noticias as the last "independent" news
station in Nicaragua. Radio Mundial has suffered continuing
harassment since them. The relaxation of censorship in recent
weeks has not reached Radio Mundial or any of the other radio
stations.
The 1985 "Electoral Process"
The numerous human rights violations of the Sandinistas
since their ascension to power in 1979 might be somewhat more
tolerable if the people of Nicaragua could look forward to
ousting those guilty through the electoral process. Sadly, they
will probably not have this opportunity.
As Eduardo Rivas, legal counsel for the independent Human
Rights Commission in Nicaragua, put it recently: "The Sandinistas
take two steps closer to complete Marxist dictatorship, and then
they ease up one step for publicity purposes." (18)
The Sandinista record has been one of consistently trying to
eliminate, intimidate or co-opt any potential source of opposi-
tion. The examples of Sandinista behavior toward labor unions,
COSEP, the Churches, the press, and the Indians demonstrate this
clearly.
Given this record, it is not surprising that Sandinista
leaders have said the purpose of elections is to ratify the
"revolution."
There are many obstacles to free and fair elections: media
access, the exclusion of the leadership of the armed opposition
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from-participation' the continuation of press censorship, the
State of Emergency, the special tribunals, continued Sandinista
intimidation of the opposition, and Sandinista access to state
institutions and resources for partisan political purposes.
A Sandinista victory would convey greater international
legitimacy to the Sandinistas. Therefore, it is important for
the FSLN that the process itself and the victory the Sandinistas
hope for be perceived'as truly democratic.
The political parties law, promulgated on September 16,
1983, requires that all parties competing for power support and
defend the Sandinista revolution in consolidating its "political,
economic and social conquests." The legal status of opposition
parties can be revoked if this restriction is not met.
The body that will make such a decision, and in fact will
have the greatest say in the implementation of the political
parties law, is called the National Council of Political Parties.
This will be dominated by the Sandinistas.
Against this stacked deck, the Sandinistas treat their
belated recognition that, perhaps in theory, another political
party may dislodge the FSLN, as a major concession.
The law also commits the government to allowing outdoor
meetings and rallies by political parties. These activities,
however, are allowed "in accordance with legislation in effect at
the time." (19) This means that if the current State of Emergency
is not lifted, meetings and rallies can still be restricted, as
they are now.
Conclusion
The revolution that toppled the Somoza regime and brought
the Sandinistas to power reflected the hopes of the Nicaraguan
people that democracy would come to their country.
An essential part of any regime wishing to call itself
democratic is respect for fundamental human rights. For the
Communist leadership of Nicaragua, such respect is incompatible
with their Marxist-Leninist principles. Consequently, they have
succeeded in surpassing even the Somoza regime in the flagrant
disregard for fundamental human rights.
The Permanent Commission on Human Rights in Nicaragua has
been reporting on the human rights situation in Nicaragua since
1977 but its leaders find international human rights organi-
zations much less interested in their reports of abuses under the
Sandinistas than those under Somoza.
Few Americans would be willing to live under a government
that:
- restricted their practice of religion,
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12
encouraged their friends and neighbors to spy on them,
impeded the formation of free labor unions,
rationed all basic food items.regardless of availability
required internal passports to move about the country
banned short wave radios
and censored the news they would read and hear.
Yet over four years after promising free elections and
political pluralism, this is the type of government the-Sandin-
istas have inflicted on the people of Nicaragua.
Footnotes
1. Ted Thomas, Nicaraguans fight for freedom gets
John Paul II's.firm support." Washington Times April 13, 1983 p.
7A
2. New York Times March 5, 1981 p. A2
3. Address to the Outreach Working Group on Central
America, 2 May 1984. This estimate covers the period from July
1979 to February 1980 and is based on his own physical inspec-
tions of mass grave sites. The Permanent Commission was and
remains extremely critical of both the Somoza and Sandinista
regimes.
4. Washington Times 20 October, 1983 p. 3C
5. The Permanent Committee for Nicaraguan Human Rights:
"A Union Report on Nicaragua."
6. Radio Sandino, Managua June 10, 1981
7. Analysis of the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinista
Peoples' Revolution Section 3 "The Problem of the Character of
Our Revolution."
8. Nicaragua's Human Rights Record: Comments, Analysis
and Background Information on the Report of the Government of
Nicaragua to the Human Rights Committee The International League
for Human Rights, New York, N.Y. March-1983
9. "The Subversion of the Church in Nicaragua," Brief-
ing Paper The Institute on Religion and Democracy, December,
1983
10. Stephen Kinzer, "Disillusion With Nicaragua Grows
in Europe," New York Times November 16, 1983 p. A6
11. "Inside Communist Nicaragua: the Miguel Bolanos
Transcripts," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no. 294 Septem-
ber 30, 1983
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13?
12. New-York Times, March 5,?1981 p. A2
13. Sworn statement of.Prudencio Baltodano before the
Nicaragua Council for Human-Rights. 14 March, 1984.
14.-Miskito Indian Council of Ancients of Misurasata.
Testimony presented to the Organization of American States, May,
1981 - October, 1982
15. Carl J. Migdail, "Nicaragua's Leftist Rulers -
Defiant as Ever," U.S. News and World Report, 14 March, 1983 p.
29
16. Robert S. Greenberger and Sonia L. Nazario,
"Sandinistas Stiffen their hold on Nicaragua," The Wall Street
Journal, 15 March, 1984 p. 34
17. "Press-freedom panel faults Nicaragua," The Wash-
ington Times, March 28, 1983 p. 7A
18. David Asman, "Are Sandinist Changes for Real?" The
Wall Street Journal December 9, 1983 p. 30
19. The Political Parties Law was published in Barricada,
the Sandinista official newspaper, on 15 September, 1983. A
translation appears in Foreign Broadcast Information Service 22
September, 1983. The provision cited is Article 6b.
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 I
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f'lcnG.Jl Inii~"i4ct c .n~cncy
Executive Registry
84-_
A%. ER$3-5c8q
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
SUBJECT: Review of White House Digest Drafts
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum dated 29 February 1984,
Subject as Above
We have reviewed the White House. Digest Drafts
forwarded by reference - again from an intelligence
point of view only - and have noted that our comments
forwarded on 9 February have been incorporated and have
no further comments.
xecu ive ecre ary
T13C: kacl 12 March 84)
Original - Addressee
ER
1 - ES Chrono
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Executive F ri`rv !
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
S4 445/4
1492
February 29, 1984
MEMORANDUM. FOR Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Col. (P) John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Review of White House Digest Drafts
The attached three drafts have been informally reviewed by
your agencies and those comments/changes have been incorporated
into the attached drafts. We are now requesting formal
review. The three White House Digests are:
-- "The Strategic and Economic Importance of the
Caribbean Sea Lanes;"
-- "Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin America;"
-- "Nicaraguan Repression of Miskito Indians."
Please provide comments or clearance by Wednesday, March 7,
1984. Thank you.
Robert Ki itt
Executive Secretary
Attachments
White House Digest Drafts
cc: Faith Ryan Whittlesey, White House
25X1
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The Strategic and Economic Importance of the
Carib can Sea Lanes
The Caribbean Basin includes Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and
some two dozen small developing nations in Central America, the
Caribbean and northern South America.(1) These countries are
our close neighbors -- Washington, D.C., for example, is closer
to Costa Rica than to San Francisco -- and form, in a very real
sense, our "third border."
The major shipping lanes crisscrossing the region make it
one of our major lifelines to the outside world, and, as a
result, an area of crucial importance to the continued prosperity
and security of the United States. The defense of the Caribbean,
however, is complicated by hostile forces in Cuba and Nicaragua
within easy reach of these shipping lanes.
Economic Importance
Nearly half our total exports and imports, representing over
two-thirds of our seaborne foreign trade, pass through the vital
commercial arteries of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean, or the
Gulf of Mexico. Of the 11,000 ships that pass through the Panama
Canal each year, over 60 percent are carrying cargo to and from
U.S. ports, providing one-quarter of our nation's total seaborne
imports.
Last year, the four principal U.S. Gulf ports -- Houston,
Galveston, New Orleans and Mobile -- alone accounted for over
one-third of our seaborne exports and one-quarter of our seaborne
imports. The port of Miami, situated on the strategic Straits of
Florida, handled about an eighth of our seaborne exports and a
tenth of our seaborne imports.
In addition to these southern ports bordering the Caribbean
Basin waterways, every other significant U.S. port is connected
to the network formed by the major Caribbean shipping lanes. The
port of New York, for instance, not only relies on the Basin's
waterways for its trade with the region itself, but also depends
on these same Caribbean sea lanes, including the Panama Canal, as
the vital links for its extensive commerce with Asia.
1. The group of Caribbean Basin countries is not the same as the
group included in the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI).
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The Caribbean trade routes are of particular importance to
the U.S. economy since they carry three-fourths of our imported
oil. While some of this imported oil comes from the Caribbean
9aeju area tt"19, wont notably from Mex.co and Veuezaela, much
is shipped from the Persian Gulf and other producing areas to the
approximately dozen Caribbean ports that serve as transshipment
points for supertankers bringing petroleum destined for U.S.
refineries.
The supertankers must offload oil at these transshipment
points to smaller tankers since the U.S. eastern seaboard has no
deep water port which can handle the very large tankers. Other
supertankers deliver crude oil to the numerous refineries located
within the Caribbean itself. Facilities such as those in Curacao
and Aruba can process approximately five million barrels of crude
oil per day.
The refined products are then transported by smaller tankers
to East and Gulf Coast ports in the U.S. In addition, almost one
half of Alaskan crude oil shipments pass through either the
Panama Canal in small tankers or the newly constructed pipeline
across Panama to be loaded onto smaller tankers in the Caribbean.
This pipeline provides an easy target for terrorists.
Apart from our oil lifeline passing through the Caribbean,
over half our imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama
Canal or the Basin's sea lanes. Virtually all (over 90 percent)
of the U.S. supply of cobalt, manganese, titanium and chromium,
all vital for industrial or military use, comes either directly.
from Basin countries or from Africa, with the normal trade route
passing through the Caribbean.. The Caribbean states also provide
three-fourths of our nation's aluminum requirements.
The Basin's shipping lanes also provide a vital sea link to
the significant U.S. economic interests found in the region.
U.S. direct investment in the Caribbean Basin countries accounts
for over 8 percent of the total U.S. direct investment abroad --
some $19 billion at the end of 1982.
In addition, U.S. trade with Basin countries is about
one-eighth of the total U.S. world trade (exports plus imports),
and again the dollar amounts are substantial -- almost $68
billion of exports and imports in 1982.
U.S. imports from the region include significant amounts cf
oil, sugar, coffee, bauxite and meat while our major exports
include transport equipment, industrial machinery, chemicals and
grain.
Finally, the economic importance of the Caribbean Basin to
this country has increased dramatically over the past decade as
the U.S. has shifted its dependence on imported petroleum from
the Middle East to Latin America.
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For the first quarter of 1983, only 30 percent of U.S. oil
imports came from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), down from 70 percent in 1977. As imports from OPEC
biV_4 d ed. tjWgq AM -at-iJ ierc4 and the Caribbman have
risen. Excluding OPEC member Venezuela, the share of U.S. gross
imports of crude oil and refined products from Latin America and
the Caribbean increased from 17 to 38 percent between 1977 and
1983.
When Venezuela is included, the total jumps to 45 percent.
Oil imports from Mexico, in particular, have assumed greater
importance, rising from 2 percent of the total in 1977 to 20
percent now.
Strategic Importance
World attention has recently focused on the possibility of a
closure of the Straits of Hormuz, the vital choke point of the
Persian Gulf. Less well known, but of at least equal importance
to the security of the U.S., is the possibility of a disruption
by our adversaries of the strategically and economically crucial
Caribbean shipping lanes.
Both the strategic importance and the vulnerability of the
Basin's sea lanes have long been recognized. Thomas Jefferson,
for instance, understood the strategic value of the Caribbean
area when he observed that whoever controlled the island of Cuba
could exercise effective control over all shipping bound for, or
leaving, the port of New Orleans.
We as a nation are not accustomed to thinking of security
threats in our own neighborhood, but examples from the past
suggest that such threats could appear. During World War II our
defenses in the Caribbean were so weak, our lifeline so exposed,
that during the first six months of U.S. involvement, a handful
of Nazi submarines, without a naval base in the area, sank more
tonnage in the Caribbean (114 allied ships) than the entire
German fleet did in the North Atlantic.
These German submarines acted with such impunity that they
shelled refineries in Aruba and lay in wait for ships to transit
the Panama Canal and enter the Caribbean. The logistical impor-
tance of the Caribbean soon became evident as over 50 percent of
the supplies and reinforcements bound for the European and
African theaters passed through ports in the Gulf of Mexico.
Today, in the event of a European crisis, a significant
number of NATO reinforcements and half of the resupply material
needed to reinforce the NATO allies would originate at these same
Gulf ports.
It is not a coincidence that the Soviet Union is increasing
dramatically its military support for Cuba. In both 1981 and
1982, deliveries of military equipment to Cuba were triple the
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yearly average of the previous twenty years and were higher than
any year since the 1962 missile crisis. Deliveries in 1983 have
fallen off some but are still well above pre-1981 levels.
Cuba, which sits astride the vital sea lanes of communica-
tion, has become the most significant military power in the
region after the U.S. Within its military arsenal are modern MIG
jets and missile and torpedo patrol boats. Additionally, Cuba
has three attack submarines in its Navy. Soviet combat ships
regularly make port calls to Cuba. Cuban ground forces include
950 tanks.
In short, Cuba has become a significant military force with
the potential for delaying the reinforcement of NATO in time of
general war. Given the conventional imbalance that exists
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, such a delay could be decisive.
The USSR sees the southern flank of the U.S. as NATO's
"strategic rear" and consistent with its military doctrine, is
attempting to exploit what Soviet planners correctly see as a
highly vulnerable area, affecting U.S. force projection and
economic well-being.
Like the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea is, in a strate-
gic sense, virtually an inland sea that can be bottled up by
hostile air and naval power deployed in or near the strategic sea
lines of communication.
The 53 mile wide Windward Passage, for instance, passes
between the eastern tip of Cuba and Haiti and is by far the most
important shipping lane between the Panama Canal and U.S. East
Coast ports. Similarly, the narrow St. Vincent Passage in the
Eastern Caribbean, only 27 miles wide, provides one of our most
valuable lifelines to the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, the
Indian Ocean and South America -- all areas of crucial economic
and strategic importance to the United States.
The crucial strategic and logistic link provided by the
Panama Canal, which can be used by virtually all U.S. naval
vessels except the large attack carriers, is similarly vulner-
able, especially with Nicaraguan airfields only 400 miles away.
Some of these airfields are being upgraded to accommodate sophis-
ticated jet fighters, such as Soviet MIGs.
The 52 mile long Canal, with its numerous mechanical locks,
could be effectively and fairly easily closed by a terrorist
group or hostile air power by destroying a single lock or sinking
a ship in transit. The vital trans-Panama oil pipeline provides
an even easier target.
The vulnerability of our southern flank is a matter of
serious concern since our ability to effectively project power to
Europe, the Middle East and the Far East has always been depen-
dent upon having a secure southern flank.
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 New
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adelo",
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Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin America
The .immediate Soviet objective in Latin America is to
enhance the USSR's influence at the expense of the U.S. To that
end, Moscow seeks correct surface relations on the state level
with most Latin American governments while working covertly with
communist parties and front groups to promote causes compatible
with Soviet interests.
At the same time, the USSR works directly and through its
Cuban client to strengthen radical regimes and revolutionary
movements, particularly in the Caribbean region.
Recent events in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, Suriname,
and elsewhere clearly attest to active Soviet involvement in
supporting revolutionary currents in the region. Expanded trade
relationships with major South American countries have meanwhile
provided Moscow with new footholds and prospects for expanding
influence.
Yet distance from the USSR, awareness of traditional US
-sensitivity to developments in the Western Hemisphere, and the
desire to avoid provoking a confrontation with the US have acted,
and may continue to act, as constraints on Soviet behavior.
The Soviets may also be constrained by a lack of receptivity
to their overtures by Latin Americans. Any impression of US
weakness or vacillation, however, could cause small, defenseless
states to seek accommodation with the Soviets.
Background: Paths to Power
Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Moscow concentrated
on strengthening the regime of Fidel Castro through massive
injections of military and economic aid, to the point where Cuba
became completely dependent on Soviet largesse and eventually a
willing accomplice in Soviet political objectives.
Nonetheless, during the 1960's, Moscow apparently opposed
supplying arms to the many small untested Latin American revolu-
tionary groups which took their cue from the Cuban revolution.
The Soviets also refused to support Cuban adventures in the area,
arguing that the various leftist groups were not ready or able to
achieve the success the Cubans had.
Moscow opted instead to emphasize the so-called via pacifica
or parliamentary path to power, citing as prototype the emerging
Marxist-leftist alliance in Chile. With Salvador Allende's
overthrow in 1973, however, Moscow reassessed its doctrine and
tactics, and gradually began giving greater emphasis to "armed
struggle" as the means for turning the tide in favor of revolu-
tion, if circumstances were propitious.
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Soviet/Cuban military collaboration in bringing Marxists to
power in Angola in 1975-1976, and in providing direct military
assistance to the Marxist regime in Ethiopia in 1977-1978, set
the stage for a revival of the pursuit of revolution by violence
in the Western Hemisphere.
With the success of the Sandinistas (who had relied heavily
on Cuban arms and training) in Nicaragua in 1979, Moscow evident-
ly became convinced that a new revolutionary tide was emerging in
Latin America. Soviet media began openly advocating the violent
overthrow of regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, as
well as of the Pinochet regime in Chile. (Examples of such
statements may be found in the Supplement)
Cuba as Surrogate
An important, if not crucial ingredient in Soviet calcula-
tions pertaining to the Western Hemisphere has always been to
weigh US reactions carefully at each step along the path. Since
the missile confrontation in 1962, the Soviets have proceeded,
albeit cautiously, in transforming Cuba into a viable base of
operations and in allowing Havana to take the lead in dealing
with revolutionary groups in third countries.
Meanwhile, the Soviet presence and stake in the Caribbean,
anchored in Cuba, has grown incrementally. Soviet economic aid
to Cuba in 1982 amounted to roughly $4.6 billion, the equivalent
to one-fourth of Cuba's GNP.
Aid to Cuba, some of which may be intended for other coun-
tries, accounts for over 60% of the USSR's global economic
assistance program. An additional $0.6 to $1 billion in military
aid was also provided last year. (Deliveries in 1982 exceeded
those in 1981 by 2,000 metric tons; annual totals of the last two
years have been the highest since 1962.)
Some 2,000-2,500 Soviet military and 6,000-8,000 civilian
advisers are currently in Cuba, in addition to the Soviet brigade
of 2,600-3,000 men. (The number of military advisers increased
by 500 last year.)
The Soviet intelligence monitoring/telecommunications
facility in Cuba is the largest such Soviet installation outside
the USSR and monitors a wide spectrum of US civilian and military
telecommunications.
Long range "Bear" reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft
are deployed on a regular basis to Cuba. Soviet naval combatants
regularly stage joint training exercises with the Cubans.
Nicaragua: Wave of the Future in Central America?
With Cuba serving as a base for operations in all the
Caribbean, Moscow sees Nicaragua as a possible door to Central
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America and clearly hopes to fashion in Managua an instrument
with some of the impact, but not the cost, of its Havana surro-
gate.
To avoid alienating Mexico, Panama, and others in the
region, and particularly to avert any US retaliatory actions, the
bulk of Soviet assistance to Nicaragua has been channelled mainly
through Cuba. (Libya, some members of the communist bloc, and
other countries, however, provide some of the Soviet arms arriv-
ing in the country.)
Some 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers are in Nicaragua to
administer economic and technical aid programs; another 2,000
Cuban security advisers supervise the transfer of arms, and the
development, modernization and expansion of military forces and
facilities. They are also actively engaged in support of guer-
rillas operating against governments elsewhere in the region.
The USSR itself has so far sent about 50 advisers overtly
and $125 million in military equipment and supplies to Nicaragua.
In addition there are currently 35 East German, 50 Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) members, and some Libyan personnel
in the country.
Nicaraguan military pilots and crews meanwhile have trained
in Bulgaria and other East European locations. Any transfer of
MiGs from Cuba, however, would presumably necessitate Soviet and
Cuban agreement that the situation warranted such a move despite
the risk of US counteraction.
Grenada: Escalation of the Stakes
The US and Caribbean joint action in Grenada brought the
Soviets and Cubans a serious setback in the Caribbean. Moscow's
decision to back the Maurice Bishop regime soon after it came to
power reflected the then-optimistic communist estimate of revolu-
tionary prospects in the region.
Soviet willingness to supplement political support for the
new regime with military assistance over a five-year period
attested also to a confidence that the risks involved were few.
Nonetheless, Soviet insistence on channeling arms and aid through
Cuba demonstrated continuing caution on Moscow's part.
The three secret Soviet-Grenadian treaties recovered in
Grenada reveal Soviet willingness, even an eagerness, to be
generous with military aid. The agreements, covering the period
1980-1985, provided for delivery of some $25.8 million in weapons,
ammunition, uniforms, trucks, and other logistical equipment --
so long as the regime worked to consolidate its Marxist revolu-
tionary credentials. The treaty stipulated that all arms be
shipped through Cuba.
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Also in keeping with Soviet practice elsewhere, economic aid
was less generous. During Bishop's tenure, the USSR was known to
have provided to Grenada some $10 million in trade credits and
er r 444 technical ate. TRc4 ju the Jr=WZ ;rc4rems were
promises for a satellite earth station and for conducting a
feasibility study for a deep-water port.
Moscow may also have helped finance the some 700 Cubans on
the island, the majority of whom were working on the Point
Salines Airport (scaled to accommodate even the largest jet
aircraft and which could have been used to facilitate Cuban troop
flights to Africa) and constructing a battalion-sized military
camp at Calvigny.
Other Cubans were attached to almost every Grenadian minis-
try, handling political indoctrination and economic projects.
Despite the relative newness of their presence in the
country, the Soviets had by the end of the Bishop regime made a
substantial investment while keeping their involvement with
Grenada largely indirect.
Nevertheless, the rescue mission was more important to
Moscow's position in Nicaragua and Cuba given the much larger
Soviet investment there, than merely the loss of prestige in-
volved in the demise of the leftist regime in Grenada. The
inability (or unwillingness) of the USSR to come to-the aid of
the pro-Soviet government was only too apparent.
The Soviets thus have tried to exploit what international
and domestic US criticism there was of the invasion in part to
deter similar actions against Nicaragua, but more broadly to try
to undercut American and international support for what the USSR
sees as an increasingly determined US administration.
The Caribbean: Future Prospects
Since the Grenadian operation, both Cuba and Nicaragua,
presumably at Soviet urging, have been showing extreme caution in
their dealings with revolutionary groups lest they provoke the
US. Presumably there have also been new debates about revolu-
tionary doctrine and possible recrimination between Moscow and
Havana.
Moscow nonetheless will continue to be on the lookout for
opportunities to generate and exploit differences between the US
and the countries of the region but is meeting little receptivity.
Suriname, for example, has decided to scale back its Cuban
connections. The day after the US/Caribbean action in Grenada,
Oscar Osvaldo Cardenas, Cuba's Ambassador to Suriname, was
expelled.
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7 a
South America: Trade, Aid and Covert Activity
While the USSR is interested in access to needed South
American goods, such as foodstuffs and raw materials, the pene-
tration of regional, markets which have historically been depen-
dent on Western suppliers remains an important objective.
The January, 1979 US partial grain embargo stimulated Moscow
to greater activity here; trade with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
grew dramatically. Large Latin American trade surpluses, a
result of the USSR's inability to provide durable export goods,
limit the effectiveness of trade as a tool of influence, however,
as do the regional suspicions of Soviet motives.
While, for example, fishing port rights granted in return
for technical aid to Ecuador and Peru have led to some increase
of Soviet prestige in these countries, evidence that Soviet
vessels have engaged in intelligence collection and complaints of
overfishing prevent translation of that presence into political
leverage.
In Argentina, one of the USSR's major grain suppliers, the
Soviets are pressing Buenos Aires to buy more to reduce the $1.7
billion 1982 trade deficit. Hopes that they could sell military
equipment in the aftermath of the South Atlantic conflict have
not come to fruition. The Soviets are, however, seeking to
expand their planning and construction role in Argentine energy
development with more sales of hydropower and other equipment.
Peru purchased aircraft and other military equipment from
the USSR during an earlier period of leftist military rule and
still hosts between 100-125 Soviet military trainers and techni-
cians. The Soviets would like to make further military sales and
are pushing for greater participation in major civilian construc-
tion projects involving Soviet goods. Lima has just succeeded in
rescheduling its over $1 billion military debt with Moscow.
The Soviets have not followed the same policy of promoting
state-to-state and trade relations with Chile. Since 1981 Moscow
has overtly backed the Chilean Communist Party's (PCCH) dual
policy of "armed struggle" coupled with attempts to work together
with the non-violent opposition to the Pinochet regime. (See
Supplement)
A new party line of unity and violence (in fact, a unity
molded by combat) was enunciated in December, 1980. In January,
1981, the communists signed a unification agreement with seven
other Chilean leftist political organizations. Within two weeks,
Moscow began broadcasting PCCH explanations of the new policy and
calls for armed insurgency.
Recently, Moscow underscored its endorsement of this tactic
by publishing in the Soviet press a new PCCH "Manifesto" which
called for Pinochet's violent overthrow.
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Long-Term Investment
Perhaps the Soviet program in Latin America with the great-
est long term potential is that of educational exchange, i.e.
scholarships to third world students to study in the USSR.
The number of Soviet Bloc academic grants offered annually
to Latin American students jumped from 400 in the 1960's to over
6,000 today. Seven thousand Cubans were studying in the Soviet
Union in 1979. Last year, 700 Nicaraguans were reported to be
enrolled there and an additional 300 scholarships were being
provided to Managua. There are also smaller groups from many
other Latin American countries.
Soviet scholarships include free room, board, tuition,
transportation, medical care and a small stipend. Since the
programs began in the mid-1960's, some 6,800 Latin American
students have utilized them.
About 3,000 Latin American students, including 1,600 Nicar-
aguans, are also studying in Cuba. Cuba has constructed 17
schools for foreigners, (each reportedly costing about $2
million) and spends $600,000 annually to operate them.
Conclusion
The Soviets view Latin America as the "strategic rear" of
the U.S. Effective projection of American power to Western
Europe, the Middle East or the Far East is dependent on a secure
southern flank. In the event of a European crisis, a significant
number of NATO reinforcements and half the NATO resupply material
would originate at Gulf Coast ports.
The Soviets, therefore, can be expected to try to turn Latin
America, and especially Central America and the Caribbean, into
an area of insecurity for the US. They hope to do this by
supporting anti-American revolutionary movements and then using
their support as leverage to turn revolutionary currents in a
pro-Soviet direction.
It is a strategy of opportunism. Working with Fidel Castro,
the Soviets strive to exacerbate existing problems in the Western
Hemisphere. In general terms, Moscow seeks to reduce US options
incrementally and increase the amount of men, attention, and
materiel the US must commit to the Caribbean region. By focusing
on the Caribbean, Moscow hopes to bring pressure on the U.S. to
change its traditional policy of concentrating on European
security.
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SUPPLEMENT: SOVIET STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF
REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA
Nicaragua
3/17/82 Soviet Ambassador to Mexico Rostislav Sergeyev warned
that if the situation in Nicaragua gets worse, his
government will help the Central American nation
politically and diplomatically. (Cited by Mexico City
NOTIMEX)
3/25/83 TASS on Andropov/Ortega Meeting:
"Yuriy Andropov noted that the Soviet Union regarded
with great sympathies the effort of the friendly
Nicaraguan people to ensure economic and social
transformation of their country, and rendered to them
political support and material assistance in that."
Yuriy Andropov expressed the conviction that Nicaragua
will be able to uphold its freedom and independence and
declared the sincere solidarity of the Soviet Union, of
all Soviet people with the Nicaraguan people in their
just cause."
10/25/83 Government Statement on Nicaragua:
"The Government of the USSR resolutely condemns the
aggressive US course with respect to Nicaragua and
declares invariable solidarity of the Soviet people
with the just struggle of the Nicaraguan people for
independent and free development at their own choice.
Interference in the affairs of Nicaragua must be
stopped."
11/29/83 Soviet Ambassador to Nicaragua German Shlyapnikov
(Cited by Panama City ACAN):
Shlyapnikov explained that the USSR maintains a policy
of solidarity with the Sandinist revolution, and that
it supports the peace efforts that the Nicaraguan
Government and the Contadora Group are engaging in to
prevent a war in Central America."
Guatemala
6/26/83 Moscow Selskaya Zhiszn on Guatemalan Solidarity Day:
"No repressions can stifle the Guatemalan people's
struggle for freedom. The insurgents' detachments are
being reinforced increasingly with new fighters who
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dream of seeing their motherland free. For the sake of
this bright goal and the happiness of their people,
they are fully determined to fight on to complete
victory."
6/16/81 Radio Moscow, (in Spanish to Chile):
"Against the entrenched fascism which plans to continue
oppressing the people until the end of the twentieth
century, the Communist Party advocates the so-called
people's holy right to rebellion."
"The rebellion will be woven with violent and
nonviolent actions and its main characteristic will be
the refusal to accept the legitimacy of fascism and to
deny it any right to existence."
6/7/82 Radio Moscow in Spanish to Chile, broadcasting text of
Chilean Communist Party Communique:
"The Political Committee of the Communist Party of
Chile, PCCH, made a study of the current situation in
the country and considered the urgent need to develop a
mass struggle and common actions by all the forces who
are against Pinochet's tyranny."
9/13/82 Radio Moscow in Spanish to Chile, quoting the
Proclamation issued by the Chilean Communist Party on
September 11:
"Everybody is expecting something to happen. Chileans:
We, the Communists, tell you: Don't wait; get
organized and fight. Nothing will be achieved without
fighting."
1983/No.2lNew Times: A Baryshev: "Pinochet on a Volcano"
"The recent events (May riots in Chile) testify to a
new upsurge of the resistance movement against the
fascist dictatorship." "All this confirms the
conclusion drawn in the Communist Party document
circulated in Santiago in April that the conditions
have emerged for 1983 to become a year of decisive
struggle for the Pinochet."
1983/No.29New Times: "Igor Rybalkin: "Democracy Nowl"
"The Communists are in the vanguard of the fighters for
the restoration of democracy in their country. The
Communist Party is consistenly encouraging the mass
struggle against the fascist regime and is working to
bring about the unity of the Left forces and of the
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opposition as a whole for the sake of the common goal
-- the overthrow of the dictatorship."
2/26/81 Brezhnev-Castro bilateral in Moscow:
"In present conditions, when the United States
imperialists launched another anti-Cuban campaign, the
USSR, as before, is siding with socialist Cuba and
expressing full support for its principled policy of
peace and friendship between peoples."
2/27/81 The Soviet Ambassador to Mexico:
"We will always support our friends and will never
abandon them."
4/7/81 Brezhnev speech to the Czech Party Congress:
Cuba is an "inseparable part" of the socialist
community.
9/15/81 Brezhnev in Moscow:
"The Cuban revolutionaries have traversed a long and
difficult path. They have encountered and continue to
encounter all sorts of challenges and provocations on
the part of imperialism. But Cuba has proved that it
is able to stand firm in the defense of its interests.
Using this occasion, I would like to stress that the
Soviet Union has been, is, and will be in solidarity
with socialist Cuba."
11/6/81 Marshal Ustinov at the annual revolution ceremony:
"The United States must consider the consequences of
its actions against Cuba."
2/9/82 Brezhnev greeting to 10th World Federation of Trade
Unions Congress in Havana:
"The people of Cuba know that they have on their side
the Soviet Union and the entire international working
class, and they have on their side the Soviet Union and
other countries of the socialist community... This
solidarity is a reliable guarantee that no imperialist
power will be able to throw it (Cuba) from its chosen
path."
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El Salvador
7/83 International Affairs, V. Krestyaninov: "Quiet
Aggression against El Salvador"
"The Soviet Union and the other countries of the
socialist community, all the forces of peace and
progress the world over, side with the people of El
Salvador in the struggle and strongly denounce the
actions by the imperialists seeking to destabilize the
situation and build up tensions in Central America."
Grenada
4/9/82 TASS on Tikhonov message to Bishop on Grenadan national
day:
"The Soviet people solidarise (sic) with the people of
Grenada waging the struggle for social progress, for
the ensurance of independence and sovereignty of their
country."
8/1/82 Pravda on USSR-Grenada Communique issued during Prime
Minister Bishop's visit to Moscow:
"The.Soviet side expressed solidarity with the Grenadan
people in their efforts to overcome the grim colonial
legacy and develop the country on a free, democratic
basis. Support was expressed for the Grenadan people's
inalienable right to build their own lives without any
outside pressure or interference."
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Heightened repression of Miskito Indians in Nicaragua by the
Nicaraguan government has once again gained outside attention.
Since 1979, Sandinista practices of confiscation of private
property and the forced export of local agricultural products has
left the population facing severe shortages. The east coast
Indian population has also had to face shortages of other food
items, medical and school supplies, and clothing.
Despite Sandinista assertions concerning the releases of
many Miskito political prisoners in the fall of 1983, and the
Nicaraguan government's promotion of a limited amnesty, Miskito
Indians continue to flee the country due to the lack of freedom.
The Christmas exodus of over one thousand Miskitos who fled
to Honduras on foot and at times under attack by government
troops took place against a background of Sandinista repression
and cruelty. Because the Sandinistas have prohibited domestic
and international press from traveling to the region without
first obtaining a special permit, news from the east coast is
difficult to obtain.
The Miskitos
The East Coast region of Nicaragua has long been physically,
historically, and culturally isolated from the country's main-
stream. The population is primarily Indian, mostly Miskito
Indians, and black.
They are traditionally religious (Moravian, Roman Catholic
and Church of God), conservative in manner and keenly proud of
their ethnic uniqueness. They were allowed relative autonomy,
even under former Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza.
What Has Been Happening
Despite Miskito support for the Sandinistas against Somoza,
the Nicaraguan government in 1979 embarked on a program to
"rescue" the Atlantic Coast. Cuban and Nicaraguan personnel
began to flood into the area.
The net effect of this program, according to the human
rights group, Freedom House, "is to deprive them of their socic-
cultural identity, an identity based on a communal lifestyle, a
democratically based selection of leadership and a passable way
of life centered on their churches."
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Almost immediately, the Indians' long-cherished autonomy
began to fade away. Their traditional and freely elected leaders
were replaced with Sandinista-appointed authorities. Many were
Cuban; most were strangers. The lives of the Indians wig
redrawn along Marxist lines.
From the outset, the triumphant Sandinistas experienced
difficulties bringing the Indians under their dominion. Demon-
strations, some turning violent, broke out along the east coast
as Indians and blacks protested the presence of Cuban security
force advisors and teachers in 1980.
Beginning in 1981, thousands of Indians were evacuated from
communities in the Rio Coco area and the northeastern coastal
area in an attempt to move the entire population to areas under
close government control.
The reason given for this was the danger of attacks by
anti-Sandinista forces. However, the evacuations began before
contra activity along the border with Honduras began in earnest.
Even afterwards, the Sandinistas overreacted.
According to the Freedom House report: "The government's
claim to be reacting to a security threat ... would be a gross
over-reaction even if the charge of some guerrilla activity is
verifiable. Eleven raids by small bands of guerrillas cannot
justify one of the largest military operations in Nicaraguan
history." (Emphasis added)
Nicaraguan troops attacked Miskito refugee camps in Hon-
duras, where they had fled to escape Nicaraguan internal depor-
tation; some Indians were buried alive, clergy and leaders were
imprisoned; women and children were executed during the evacu-
ation process; and whole villages were burned, along with their
churches.
An American professor at the University of California at
Berkeley, who has lived with and studied the Indians for the last
fifteen years, found that Indian peoples have been subjected to a
brutal systematic policy to force them into the Sandinista
revolution stripped of Indian culture, identity, rights, lands,
resources or freedom to influence their own destiny or to deter-
mine their own choices of how to live.
Briefly stated, the Sandinistas have implemented a policy of
Indian ethnocide that is generated internally from their own
Marxist ideology and racist attitudes. When the Indians resis-
ted, the FSLN began an escalated program of counterinsurgency
that continues unabated.
These are but a few of the FSLN violations of the Indian
peoples: One-fourth of the coast's 165,000 Indians are either in
"relocation camps" or refugee camps. One-half of Miskito and
Sumo villages have been destroyed. One thousand Indian civilians
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are in prison, missing, or dead. Indian rights to self-
government, land, resources have been abolished.
Subsistence cultivation, fishing and hunting are strictly
controlled to the point of non-existence in many areas and access
to staple foods is so limited that hunger is an everyday problem
and starvation a real possibility. Many villages have had no
medicine or doctors for over two years. Freedom of movement is
denied or severely restricted and in many areas canoes -- the
people's major means of transport -- have been confiscated or
their use prohibited.
More than 35 communities have suffered massive Sandinista
military invasions during which innocent civilians are subjected
to arbitrary arrests, killings, interrogations, torture, rapes,
theft and destruction of property.
The Sandinistas try to force the people to divulge the
location of the Indians' secret base camps and to terrorize the
villagers so that they will not support or join the military
resistance.
The Sandinista ruling council has banned all Miskito radio
stations and publishing, prevented the teaching of indigenous
languages, and has required clergy in areas under their control
to submit sermons for Sandinista censorship prior to delivery.
Indians must carry Sandinista-approved travel documents in order
to move outside of their respective villages and towns. Children
are recruited into the militia. Failure to report for guard duty
results in imprisonment.
Miskito Objections
The Miskitos have not accepted this situation. In the words
of one noted authority on Miskito Indians, contained in an
article in the New York Times December 12, 1983:
"From the Indians' perspective, their war is a response
to Sandinista military, economic and political oppression of
their people and expropriation of their land under the guise
of agrarian reform. The Indians say that the land is all
they have to provide a living and to give to their children.
Without it, they say, they would die as a people. They
insist that their rebellion is more potent than those of the
other major anti-Sandinista guerrilla factions because it
has wider popular support, its goal is solely to push the
Sandinistas from Indian land and villages, and it is being
fought on home ground."
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The Refugees
Since the forced internal deportations began and other
Sandinista violations of human rights intensified, thousands of
Miskito Indians have sought a better way of life.
They have "voted with their feet," with most of them going
to Honduras. They are accustomed to basic individual liberties
and object to harsh Sandinista controls imposed under the guise
of "the revolution."
In Honduras,'the Indians have been able to engage in farming
of private plots, although most have been forced by economic
circumstances to remain in refugee camps assisted by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) until they are
able to return to Nicaragua.
The Christmas Exodus
The story of the latest group of Miskito Indians to flee
shows only too well the seriousness of Sandinista repression. It
illustrates not only the dangers of attempting to evade a harsh,
Marxist-Leninist government, but also the cynicism and deception
of that government in the face of international public criticism.
On December 19, 1983, the residents of the resettlement town
of Francia Sirpe in northeastern Nicaragua attended Mass in a
festive mood, knowing that plans had been made to depart to
Honduras on the following day. According to the Indians, the
Sandinistas were preparing to transplant the whole Indian popula-
tion of Francia Sirpe to the mountainous region north of Managua.
Two Roman Catholic priests, both American citizens, who had
long worked with the Miskito Indians, were told of their inten-
tions and decided to accompany them. The villagers had voted on
the question of leaving, with the majority deciding to leave,
according to Father Wendelin Shafer, one of the priests, because
they "lacked the freedom to live their own culture" as they want
to live it and have always lived it.
It was a matter of escaping the control of a government that
was oppressing them. As Bishop Salvador Schlaefer put it: "The
Miskito people had the idea that the government tended toward
Marxism and Communism and ... they wanted respect for the temples
of God and for their religion."
Bishop Schlaefer was the other priest who accompanied the
Indians, continuing a career of spiritual service to the Indians
that has spanned over 30 years.
Other refugees reported later in Honduras that many villa-
gers had been convinced to go when they heard the experiences of
Miskito political prisoners who had been released by the
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government, relaying experiences of torture and beatings while
being held in Sandinista prisons.
One of the former prisoners who made the trek to Honduras
bore bayonet marks on his neck. He reported that he had been
jailed because he tried to get-medicine for his sick brother in a
nearby town.
He said the Sandinistas arrested him because he did not have
the appropriate travel documentation. When he did not return,
his ill brother inquired as to his whereabouts to authorities and
was also thrown into jail.
Government Attacks
During the second day of their exodus from Nicaragua,
Sandinista troops attempted to intercept them, but were prevented
from doing so by a group of armed Indians from whom the village
leaders had requested protection.
Father Shafer reported in Honduras that he thought the
Sandinistas were trying to attack the column. According to
villagers, Nicaraguan government planes flew overhead on two
different days, apparently trying to spot the marchers.
At the same time, the Nicaraguan government had circulated
false reports to the press regarding the villagers' departure,
alleging that they were coerced into leaving by an armed anti-
Sandinista force and that they-had kidnapped Bishop Schlaefer and
an American priest.
Apparently the Sandinistas were confident that they could
prevent the fleeing Indians from reaching the Honduran border.
Sandinistas repeatedly attacked points where the villagers were
expected to be planning to cross the river from Nicaragua into
Honduras, but all Miskito Indians were able to slip across on
December 23.
Having been alerted by the Nicaraguan government attempt to
use the media to avert a propaganda disaster created by a thous-
and Miskito Indians fleeing their repression, the Honduran Army,
along with the UNHCR, was able to assure the Indians' safety
once they reached the other side of the river.
Both Bishop Schlaefer and Father Shafer arrived safely,
despite genuine worries for their safety after the Sandinistas
had announced to the world press that the Bishop had been killed.
Nicaragua and other governments which operate with totalitarian
methods often will claim someone has died even before they are
actually able to accomplish the killing.
The statements of these men, as well as the testimony of the
Miskitos themselves, cast new light on the deplorable record of
human rights violations perpetrated by the Sandinistas.
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Current Situation
The continuation of forced internal deportation, harassment,
suppression of freedom of religion, freedom of movement, freedom
to choose one's political leaders, freedom to choose one's place
of residence, and other violations of human rights are the
reality for Miskito Indians in Nicaragua.
The recent limited amnesty has been loudly proclaimed by the
Sandinistas but the Miskitos as well as the international commun-
ity appear justified in their skepticism. In fact, recent
reports indicate that the Indians have been so unresponsive to
the amnesty proposal that Sandinista soldiers have crossed the
border into Honduras and attempted to force some of the Indians
to return, presumably to demonstrate the amnesty's
attractiveness.
This view was underscored by the use of Sandinista troops to
attack innocent Miskito villagers trying to leave their homelands
and by the clumsy attempts of the Sandinistas to lay the ground
work for the murder of the American citizen priests who had
accompanied the Indians.
As a Miskito leader recently told the visiting Berkeley
professor: "I may die, but that's not important because the boys
will carry on our struggle. I'm going to stay here and fight to
free my people and our land. Please give fraternal revolutionary
greetings from an Indian warrior to your people and tell them
that we are not coming out of the bush until we get our land
back."
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