IRAN/IRAQ WAR: THE WORST PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001300180027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 24, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

~,. Approved For Release 2008/11/21 :CIA-RDP86M00886R001300180027-3
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 01282-84
National Intelligence Council 24 February 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Iran/Iraq War: The Worst Prospects
1. The most immediate concern of the US government over the
escalating Gulf war situation relates to the danger of massive disruption
of oil flow to the West. I must defer to oil and economic specialist in
this area (NIO/ECON is preparing a separate memo) but the Community
consensus is that while limited disruption could occur, significant
disruption with major economic impact is rather unlikely. Even if oil
facilities are attacked they are unlikely to be extensive enough in nature
to cause meaningful long-term decrease in the oil flow.
2. The great danger in my estimation is that of major instability in
the Gulf region as a whole. I am inclined to give significant weight to
Iran's stated determination to visit the war upon all moderate Gulf regimes
if Iraq strikes at vital Iranian facilities. As we have noted before, the
Iranians are likely to employ an increasing degree of terrorism against
Gulf regimes in an effort to destabilize and intimidate them. While we
doubt the Iranians have the capability of sparking instant coups which
would lead to the establishment of Islamic Republics in these countries, a
terrorist campaign and growing Gulf regime jitters could be a serious
source of mid-term instability in the region. We cannot predict with
certainty that, faced with a major terrorist campaign, many Gulf regimes
might not turn to accommodation with Iran rather than closer ties with the
West. The collapse of Baghdad, of course, would have an extremely negative
impact on the entire Middle East.
3. I am even more concerned at what I believe to be a small but
constant growth of anti-American feeling--Shia or Sunni--which perceives
the US as irrevocably linked to Israel strategically in an anti-Muslim
policy. This gradual shift of sentiment throughout most of the Arab world
does not spring from any single incident but reflects a growing feeling
that the US is increasingly antipathetic to Islamic culture and aspirations
in the region.
~~
25X1
This Memo is Classified
SECRET in its entirety.
Approved For Release 2008/11/21 :CIA-RDP86M00886R001300180027-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/21 :CIA-RDP86M00886R001300180027-3
SECRET
4. We cannot predict at what point this growing shift of sentiment
will turn the corner sufficiently to lead to the overthrow of regimes
friendly to the US. It will depend very much on local factors in
individual countries. It can probably be contained in many countries by
local rulers who will simply distance themselves from the US out of a
concern for self-protection. Rising Islamic sentiment in the Gulf will be
in part affected by US actions elsewhere; it will almost certainly not
explode in the very near term in several countries at once. It is Iran's
ability to stimulate and crystalize a sentiment which is develo in
independently of Iran which is the greatest long-term t rest to the
stability of the Gulf, and to the perpetuation of regimes relatively well
disposed to the US. The threat of an escalating Gulf war is greatest of
all in this area.
~~
.~~ ~
Graham E. Fuller
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/21 :CIA-RDP86M00886R001300180027-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/21 :CIA-RDP86M00886R001300180027-3
Approved For Release 2008/11/21 :CIA-RDP86M00886R001300180027-3