COMMENTS ON THE 18 JUNE 1984 WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001300140014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Executive Registry
84 -
SUBJECT: Comments on the 18 June 1984 "Wall Street Journal"
Editorial on Afghanistan
1. The 18 June 1984 edition of "The Wall Street
Journal" has an editorial on Afghanistan entitled "Boiling
the Ocean." The main thrust of the editorial is that the
Soviets are about to induce a famine ir. Afghanistan. The
editorial cites a British research group, Afghan Aid, which
released a survey in May, 1984 by Frances D'Souza of the Food.
Emergencies Research Unit of London University which alleges
that Afghanistan is under the threat of famine.
2. Our analysts have reviewed the British researchers
report and well publicized call for urgent measures "to save
a half million people facing starvation" in Afghanistan. The
conclusion is that t;,ere is no famine crisis at hand, and
that shortaaes of food are no worse now than in past years.
The British researchers cite food shortages only in Parvan
and Badakhshan Provinces, which French doctors also have
identified as problem areas. Parvan has been subjected to
repeated military operations, and Badakhshan traditionally
suffers from poverty and malnutrition. However, our sources
report that with the exception of Farah Province, most areas
of Afghanistan have adequate food. --_
3. The threat of food shortages may grow this fall and
winter because of drought due to the low runoff from light
winter snows. Should widespread shortages occur, the
Soviets will probably increase food aid and try to exploit it
by forcing the populace to depend on the Kabul regime for
food supplies. Nevertheless, food supplies funneled through
Pakistan and crops in several northern provinces should
probably suffice for insurgents and their civilian
supporters in most areas except western Afghanistan and tree
Hazarajat.
4. The editorial also notes that a 900-man unit of
Afghans, ir.cuding an Afghan general and a number of Soviet
officers, surrendered in a side valley (of the Panjsher}. H?e
have no intelligence to confirm or deny this report, but we
believe this is based on exaggerated insurgent press releases
frog" Peshawar on their success in fighting Soviet forces in
the Panjsher.
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5. Mention in the editorial that the Soviets suffered
400 to 500 serious injuries from insurgent use of mines is
true except that the casualty figure is more accurately 200
injured.
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~o~zng the Ocean - ..--
?~ev,?s from Afghanistan is both ex-
;:ilarating and tragic. The Soviets
I;2ve failed to crush the Afghan resis-
tance in their largest offensive to
date. But they may take their ven?
seance on the Afghan population with
an induced famine that competent
~t'estern observers think may rank
a,Tnong the more spectacular disasters
of the last few years. ?
The Soviet invaders staged a mas=
slue march this spring into the strate-
aren't decided by the ~'4-estern strat-
egy of vznning over the population,
Dr. 1`ialhuret concludes glumly, .but
by "making terror reign." Over the
years his group has seen this Soviet
approach firsthand several times. In
the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, the
populations of villages and tovTrts were
driven into Somalia. In Cambodia af-
ter the Vietnamese invasion; grain
was bottled up in Kompong Som until
o
ulatibn that might su
ort the
the
p
pp
p
gic Panjshir Valley stronghold of the
mujahedeen, the Afghan freedom resistance had starved or fled. Now
fighters, nor*~heast of the capital city its Afghanistan sturn, -
of Kabul. military observers have -More than :four million .Afghans,
marveled at the Russians' coordi- , ' maybe half the population under inu-.
noted use of ground troops, .lielicop- . j~-edeen control, have fled to-Paki-
ters, paratroops and saturation high- stan and Iran, helped along by indis-
altitude bombing (as well as poison criminate Soviet bombing, massa-
gas) .Yet the guerrillas have bounced cring and, sowing of mines. (These
back. Afghan exile headquarters in mines are designed to maim rather
Peshawar, P.~.stan, claim that Soviet _ than kill, French doctors from several
troops have withdrawn from the tipper groups report, and .some--have been
half of the Panjshir under increasing .disguised as toys.} A miIlion'more Af=
harassment. One Russian outpost is gha.ns.niay have been driven to pities
currently-- cut off. ?A 900-man unit of under ,Soviet control .The Soviet in-
Afghans, including an Afghan general Faders are working hard to ;centralize.
and a number of Soviet officers, . sur- the food-distribution system, -and they
rendered in a side valley and is being ? are now trying to destroy crops they
brought back to Pakistan.-The Soviet _ can't buy up. Afghans Yeport Prussian
farces, 16,000 strong, have .now con- bombing of-the irrigation system in
centrated in the towns of Bazared and the rich Shomali plain. and napalming
Rukha, ,famous for an ice cream par- ~ of storage bins to destroy -the-wheat
for made by Afghans out of a downed' harvest: ~ '. - -
So4~ei supply ;helicopter. ,' - The parallel often cited is Stalin's
It remains to be seen whether this man-made famine in the Ukraine. in
u~itz~idrawal is a classic anti-guerrilla 1932-33, when communist confiscation
tactic, designed to draw the mujahe- of the harvest caused at least five mil-.
Been out in the open, par`s of a Soviet 'lion to seven million deaths and wiped
plan to hold only the lower valley, or out the entire nationalist`strata of that
si.~rply a retreat. But there`is growing society:~5o far, Afghans have escaped
agreement that Soviet hopes,of ~ mill- the worst;' but danger.' signs are' a1-
tary victory have been.#ntstrated; and ready. up. The ,British group Afghan
possibly at higher cost to the Russians . ~- Azd recently ..released a ~ nutritional
that To the mujahedeen. Ahmad Shah- -and economic survey by 'F'rances I
itiiassoud, the Panjsr~ir Valley com- . D'Souza of the FoodEmergencies Re-_
mander who is deservedly beconung a search:Unit of London University:'To :!
legend, evacuated troops and.civilians .: its` shoGk,~ field examinations ui::re-
before the :assault ? and left'~iis--aban- _mote Badakshan revealedsevere mal-.'
doped strongholds heavily :mined. Af-. nutsitign ainbng more. tt%an 20% ~f'the.-:
_. .
ghan sources {think ;this. ta,ctte"alone' `children, worse results~.thali..in Sla-,
caused 400 . to 500 serious -injuries fro: "Not by'accident, Badakshan sits
among -elite Soviet ,paratroops. ~ " . :. on important Soviet supply lines; mu-
In short, the Afghans .appear: to jahedeen attacks :have been "intense,.
have kept pace ~zth the improved So- and earlier. reports say :the Russians
r:et military: In.spite.of scandaloushy have tried to terrorize and drive out
inadequate Western aid, a network of its inhabitants by dropping. "yellow
toc2l commanders, some of whom rain."
eoual Massoud in ability if not fame, The mujahedeen are deeply aware
has brought the resistance to its high- that their most important battle now
est level yet of coordination and or- may be to feed their population. Some
ganization. In turn, the Soviets appear commanders have delegated units to
o have iieci~ed-that if"they"can't-win help with`the harvest and-repair the
a military ~dctory, they azlh have a irrigation system. E!rissaries to the
demographic: one by elimina'~irtg the West now plead for food aid as ur-
population that gives the resistance its , gently as they ask Erin' antiaircraft
base.
? '. ' :. missiles.'They deserve both. But if the
E'Yarnings of this strategy came
last year from Claude Malhuret, exec-
utive director of the Paris-based Me-
decins sans Frontieres (Doctors with-
out Borders), a volunteer group that
maintains six hospitals in mujahe-
deen-controlled parts of Afghanistan.
If guerrillas move.amang the popula-
tion. in :Mao's words "like fish in the
;voter," t en the Soviet response is to
West lacks the nerve to send them
SAMs (or Stingers),~it has,no excuse
to stint in shipping htunanitarian aid.
The Soviet famine strategy can be
frustrated if sufficient grain supplies
are made available in Pakistan to the
mujahedeen distribution network.
Perhaps even more so than the fight
ir. the Panjshir Va1}ey, the economic
battle will be critically important.
boil the oce2n. Anti-guerrilla wars Will the ~i'est sit this one out too'. i : "
There is a widely Shared feeling that
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