AFGHANISTAN: GLIMMERINGS OF SOVIET DISCOMFORT - 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001300140002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 20, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Uttice of ear Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Directorate of I;ntellig e_ 2 (%
20 Iember 1984
For your information. No action
required.
Prompted by the recent interest in
the state of the insurgency in Afghanis-
tan, we pulled together information
collected over the past year on Soviet
perceptions of the war. I was surprised
to find how much reliable material we have
on the views of very senior Soviets.
The attached presents a vivid picture
of Soviet frustration. On the other hand,
the weight of all our information suggests
that Soviet determination remains unswayed
and they want to stay the course in
Afghanistan.
cc: DDCI, w/att
DDI, w/att
C/DDO/NE, w/att
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 20 December 1984
Afghanistan: Glimmerings of Soviet Discomfort--1984
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over the past year
provided us with a sizable num er o examples of Soviet
unhappiness with developments in Afghanistan. to 25X1
some extent reflect normal grumbling. They do not, in our view
suggest that the Soviets will not stay the course in
Afghanistan. But they show clearly Soviet concern about
insurgent effectiveness and frustration at the difficulties in
coping with an unconventional war. 25X1
Gloom in the Winter
a rea y poor morale
o Soviet forces was deteriorating, and, despite reports of
progress, no end of the fighting was in sight.
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In early January
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-- A working figure for the number of Soviet soldiers killed
in the war since the invasion had reached 10,000 to 12,000
men.
-- The Afghan Army was ineffective and untrustworthy.
-- Most soldiers had little idea of what they were fighting
briefing
also painted a vivid
picture of Soviet difficulties.
Some'150,000 insurgents had infiltrated from Pakistan and
Iran since 1979, and the number was increasing each year
by 30,000 to 40,000.
The insurgents' improved equipment and organization by
late 1983 were eroding the advantages the Soviets and
their allies enjoyed in firepower.
Desertion in the Afghan Army was high and served
frequently as a source of manpower supply for the
insurgents. There was no hope that the Army could meet
its planned strength of 200,000.
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-- Disunity within the Afghan party was so great that
Babrak's position would be untenable without Soviet
support--a fact- that- mama a .-" ; tical settlement even more
indicates that Marshal Soknlnv. who was
probably sent to Afghanistan to look into the eroding military
situation, leveled some tough criticism
-- Soviet operations were stereotyped and lacked surprise
resulting in unnecessary losses.
Division commanders and their subordinates were reluctant
to assume responsibility.
Military discipline was poor and attitudes regarding
hygiene and medical matters were irresponsible.
Springtime Gains and Disappointments
In April and May the Soviets were able to drive successfully
up the strategic Panjsher Valley, but the senior Soviet
commanders did not find the situation particularly rosy.
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indicated that Marshal Sokolov was
about his forces' slow progress up the valley.
were disappointed that so few insurgents were killed or
captured.
By the end of spring, the Soviet leaders were becoming
increasingly frustrated about the failure of their forces to find
Masood.
Chief of General Staff Ogarkov
"disasters" suffered by the Soviet and Afghan armies as
the result of inadequate or faulty intelligence. General
Ivashutin, Chief of the Intelligence Directorate (GRU),
was ordered to go to Afghanistan.
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h
e reverses su ere in t
e Panjsher offensive
resulted from poor coordination between units and poor
morale in the ranks.
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suggested a growing concern about troop morale. They point to
suicides, "accidents" resulting from improper use of firearms,
and absences without leave.
drugs and say several units were temporarily relieved and
sent to nearby garrisons for rest and recreation.
-- Poor morale has long concerned Soviet military authorities
in Afghanistan, but this is the first evidence the roblem
affected an important operation. 25X1
We do not know how the Soviet commanders reacted to these
criticisms and what they did to remedy their intelligence
failures. In any case, Masood remains at large his forces
continue to worry the Soviets. 25X1
The Soviet Summer
A spurt of aircraft losses apparently prompted Defense
Minister Ustinov to order an investigation.
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about half of the losses
occurred because air force personnel in Afghanistan were
under great strain or exhausted.
Sovi'et military officers in Moscow took a dim view of the
situation in Afghanistan. 99 percent
of the officerG were reluctant to go to Afghanistan.
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soviet officers' complaints.
-- He lamented that no one--officer or recruit--understands
why the Soviets are in Afghanistan.
-- The only safe places in Afghanistan are those which have a
high concentration of Soviet troops.
-- He complained that the war was useless because it is
impossible to fight against the entire Afghan nation, the
Babrak regime represents only a minority of Afghan
the Afghan party is factionalized.
(Soviet families residing in Kabul
were especially concerned abou the deterioration in security
there.
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