WAYS TO EXAMINE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001200340012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 18, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 02972-84
18 May 1984
At4 . MIC o 19WO34
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director, Office of African and Latin American Analysis
SUBJECT: Ways to Examine Alternative Strategies in
Central America
REFERENCE: My memorandum of 28 March 1984, Questions
About Current Strategy in Central America
1. While I thought I had said the last on this, the footnote on
Page 3 of the memorandum referred to above hangs in my mind, and I should
like to be rid of it. You need not refer back to that paper. The point
concerns future moves on the part of the United States, or by the
Sandinistas, the Cubans, or the FDR/FMLN, and the need for us to do the
best possible analysis of the results of moves open to us or to
anticipate and consider replies to moves made by our opponents.
2. Insufficient discussion in government circles of the options
available to the United States means that we have a weak appreciation of
opportunities open to us or perils in our path. On the other hand, we
are paying insufficient attention to moves the others can come up with
that might influence the outcome in Central America.
? We may be paralyzed by our own assumptions--an historian spoke
to us recently of false options and false alternatives.
? Conventional wisdom holds that a US invasion of Nicaragua would
be costly to the United States in terms of lives and of Latin
American public opinion and would result in a long drawn-out
struggle against Sandinista guerrillas in the hills. Should we
accept this?
? Negotiations with the Sandinistas, held by dominant opinion in
the Administration to be equivalent to surrender in Central
America, is a forbidden topic. Should it continue not to be
discussed?
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3. These are the two most stark examples of choices available to the
United States. Neither one is discussed openly--openly in discreet
government meetings, that is--the first for fear of a leak suggesting
invasion is being considered, on the one hand, and the other from fear of
retribution by those who would forbid thoughts about negotiations.
4. The serious enterprise on which we are embarked in Central
America deserves a full exploration of the alternatives open to us
without the ideological bars to rational discussion that seem so far to
have prevented examination of the full range of options. Such
considerations go beyond the proper sphere of the Intelligence Community
but that does not mean that the Intelligence Community cannot participate
in the process.
? Two different games on Central America were run in the past year
at Harry Rowen's and Fred Ikle's initiative. Both intelligence
and policy people participated, and the latter in particular
benefitted from the experience,suggesting a follow-up. It would
be helpful if the policymakers were to frame the scenario for a
third game on invasion or on negotiations.
? Analysts can contribute importantly to the question of options
open to our opponents in Central America through intelligence
assessments of Cuban or FDR/FMLN intentions and capabilities.
The threat of losing the useful pressure on the Sandinistas that the
insurgency in Nicaragua has provided--and this would be an important loss
that would need to be put into any calculations of the future--makes it
all the more urgent that we widen our vision. It would be more than sad
should we look back to see that we lost the initiative in Central America
because of needless restraints we had imposed on ourselves.
STAT
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC 01986-84
28 March 1984
FROM: John Horton
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Questions about Current United States Strategy in
Central America
1. The current aims of the United States in Central America are to
encourage the government of El Salvador to survive, preventing the FDR/FMLN
from taking power, and to furnish sufficient services to its people to draw
their loyalty and support. With Nicaragua, we want the Sandinista regime to
stop supporting the guerrillas in El Salvador, to sever or modify its ties to
the Soviet Union and Cuba, to cut back on the level of its arms and armed
forces so as lessen the threat to its neighbors, and to maintain pluralism--as
is sometimes stated--or to provide a free rein for the opposition--somewhat
different--to compete in a democratic framework. We hope thus to control
insurgency in the region and to prevent its spread. An unexpressed objective
is to force the Sandinistas to dissolve their government, to step down. Being
unexpressed, it is little discussed and therefore not critically examined in
our government.
2. Current strategy is to persuade the Salvadorans to form a government
respectable enough to allow the United States--the Congress--to support it,
one effective enough to prosecute the counterinsurgency by political and by
military means, satisfying the people in the meantime by providing them a
sufficient livelihood and the promise of security. In Nicaragua, we are using
military and economic pressure, principally, to persuade the Sandinistas to
move toward meeting our aims. (The one step they have taken so far--that of
elections--may have been taken more at the behest of the Europeans than as a
direct result of our pressure and this step, once taken, may prove to benefit
the Sandinistas' image, in the short run. If the society stays as open as it
is now, we shall have lost little ground.)
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3. El Salvador is more important to the United States than is Nicaragua.
That is, keeping the FDR/FMLN from taking power in El Salvador is more
important to the United States than is forcing the Sandinistas to change their
ways. The two situations are closely connected, of course, especially by the
safehaven for the FDR/FMLN in Nicaragua and the support thft flows from there
to the guerrillas in El Salvador. That support is crucial to the survival of
the guerrillas and thus crucial to the success of the counterinsurgency in
El Salvador. And the crucial question is: When will this privilege be denied
the guerrillas? The question of time is important because an indefinitely
extended struggle in El Salvador would probably exhaust the patience of the
United States which seems to be incapable of giving consistent support to
military endeavors of any duration. A wave of political righteousness demands
that our clients be deserving of our help; cultural differences lead us to
challenge their values. Overselling of the cause breeds skepticism and any
suggestion of protracted struggle causes dismay. Just as delicate a weight in
the balance is the morale of the government and armed forces and people of
El Salvador. Continued hardship with no hint of an eventual settlement may
erode their will. They--and the Hondurans, too--may increasingly desire an
accommodation with Nicaragua. Resentment may follow if they suspect that the
United States is playing its own ideological contest over their heads while
using Central Americans as pawns.
3. There are reasons to question, then, whether United States support
and instruction of the armed forces in El Salvador can be continued and
whether it will lead to victory over the guerrillas and whether it can be
useful enough soon enough to prevent a critical sagging of morale in El
Salvador.
1. The assumption that this support is crucial either to the guerrillas or to the
ability of the government of El Salvador to put down the insurgency needs to be
examined. For instance, some may say that the insurgency can be defeated
without stopping this support from Nicaragua. Others may say that the
government of El Salvador will not be able to defeat the guerrillas even if
this haven is denied the FMLN. Time is a consideration here, as discussed
above.
2. Peace--whatever that means--is attractive. Those who suspect the Christian
Democrats of being "soft" on the FMLN are aware that there is a desire among
them to reach an understanding at least with the more flexible elements of the
guerrilla factions, probably representing a widespread yearning for an end to
the fighting.
3. A current assessment of the Salvadoran armed forces suggests the need to
question their ability to improve in time--faster than the opposition--
to defeat the FMLN.
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4. Support flows to the guerrillas from Nicaragua and from behind the
Sandinistas., Cuba. "Going to the source" whether it be Cuba or Nicaragua
once was an attractive thought that proved to be beyond our political reach.
The inability to bring the full military or materiel power of the United
States to bear on the problem is intensely frustrating apd tempts us
constantly to consider how force can be used decisively.
5. Short of cutting the Gordian Knot the United States is left with
considering how to bring the power it does have to bear on the situation. If
it is correct to say that saving El Salvador is our first concern, and that
the support to the FMLN from Nicaragua is crucial, it follows that we should
concentrate on stopping that support and closing that haven, forcing the
guerrillas to exist on their own in El Salvador. If supplies continue to be
sent from outside, at least they would be kept from the present comparatively
easy routes.
6. Our pressure on Nicaragua, particularly from the insurgency and from
the spectacular attacks on economic targets, has been effective to a degree
but not to the point of forcing the Sandinistas to agree to stop supporting
the guerrillas--despite some moves in this direction for propaganda purposes--
let alone gaining our other aims with Nicaragua. The Nicaraguans have endured
years of .hardship since the earthquake, followed by the war against the Somoza
government: mismanagment and the insurgency have made living even harder.
The government and the people are probably capable of living this way
indefinitely, getting just enough support from others to survive at a low
level. Both in our expressions of policy and in our private estimates of
Nicaraguan vulnerability we have said and found that the results of our
pressures are limited in what they can accomplish. We must ask also how long
the pressures can be kept up, what we shall have to bargain with when their
effects fade, what we shall have to show for the effort if no verifiable and
tangible concessions are exacted from the Sandinistas.
7. The Grenada syndrome--let's call it, although it started in July
before the October invasion and continues still--has caused the Sandinistas to
fear invasion by the United States even if some, such as Tomas Borge, might
welcome it as the final searing experience needed to set Nicaragua on a pure
revolutionary path. Here again we need to ask how long the fear can last and
how long the United States can wait to take advantage of it. My answer is
that we can reach a time when fear is slight and pressures have relaxed, and
we shall be in a poor position to bargain.
4. The Soviet position in Central America is an enviable one. The Soviets are
doing nothing in or for Nicaragua that they cannot readily abandon at low cost
to the Soviet Union. Their stepping back from Central America would not change
the problem for the United States. The United States, on the other hand, is in
no position to abandon El Salvador or to turn its back on Central America.
5. To the extent that the commitment of the United States armed forces to
either El Salvador or Nicaragua is an appealing course, a study of the gains
and consequences should precede serious consideration, both through gaming
and through intelligence assessments. If these processes do not give clear
answers, they do throw light on opportunities as well as difficulties.
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8. At-this time, both pressures and the Grenada syndrome provide
opportunities to the United States to exact concessions from Nicaragua, if not
from the FDR/FMLN (the latter might be susceptible to defections in a
different climate). The concessions that can be expected are as limited as
the pressures that can force these concessions. The Sandinistas will not step
down--they do not hold their own positions to be negotiable--nor will they
metamorphose into a friendly bunch.
9. Having spoken before of ways to approach agreements with the
Sandinistas, I shall not go over that ground again, but rather simply say that
our present course seems to me to lead to loss or an insupportable long
stalemate--perhaps that is the same thing--in El Salvador with the Sandinistas
getting off scot free--a failure of policy, in short. The alternative is a
chance to win in El Salvador, buying the time needed by pursuing a course
which would quiet influential critics in the United States and our current
political stalemate. Negotiating a cutting of support to the guerrillas would
cause distrust between the FDR/FMLN and the Sandinistas, the former fearing
the latter will desert them in their own interest. Negotiations themselves
would heighten the differences within the Sandinista Directorate if some in
the Nicaraguan government see opportunities for another future than their
current isolation and subservience to the Cubans. We might get the
Sandinistas and the Cubans arguing about Central America if the FDR/FMLN is
abandoned by the Sandinistas.
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STAT
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SUBJECT: QUESTIONS ABOUT CURRENT UNITED STATES STRATEGY NIC 01986-84
IN CENTRAL AMERICA
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