SOVIET STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: September 28, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86MOO886ROO1200330027-7
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #05586-84
28 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Soviet Strategy In Latin America and the Caribbean
Attached is a first cut at a memo covering the topic. I have to
apologize again for delays occasioned by other developments and, in this
case, my own lack of background on the region. Also included is the NIE
from 1982, much, of which is still valid, and SOVA's monthly from April 1984
which concentrated on the region. Jay said you wanted something to mull
over while traveling; I hope this package serves the purpose. On your
return, Bob Vickers and I would like to meet with you to get. your further
thoughts and decide how best to focus the final product for the purpose you
intend.
CL BY SIGNER-
DECL OADR
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86MOO886ROO1200330027-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
SECRET
SOVIET STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A FIRST CUT
Until the late 1970s, Latin America as a whole tended to be a less important
theater of Soviet Third World activity than those regions closer to home,
the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. In the latter regions, the
Soviets had a Russian legacy of involvement or easier strategic access or
both, and involvement in them has been more directly relevant to Soviet
strategic interests in the East-West and the Sino-Soviet power struggles.
This continued to be the case even after the consolidation of Castro's
revolution in Cuba and the establishment of a firm Soviet position there.
In the mid-1960s, Castro pressed for a joint strategy of guerrilla-based
revolution throughout Latin America, which the Soviets rejected as too risky
and unpromising. In the Soviet view, conditions were not ripe; their power
in the region too limited; their strategic goals elsewhere overriding.
Even today, Latin America and the Caribbean have a lower strategic priority
to Moscow than the Third World regions on the Eurasian periphery in terms of
the strategic gains the Soviets can expect to pocket and the long-term value
of those gains.
In the last decade, however, the importance of Latin America and the
Caribbean has clearly increased in absolute terms and perhap relative to the
other areas because of the remarkable opportunities afforded by developments
in the region to challenge American power, and to do so at relatively low
risk to Soviet core interests. This has occurred basically for three
reasons:
Cuba has not only consolidated as a Marxist-Leninist state, it has
become an established member of the Soviet power bloc.
Nicaragua has shown the Soviets the practical possibility for new
Marxist-Leninist client-allies in the region.
Both developments represent a powerful challenge to US political and, in
some contingencies, military resources which is particularly vexing to a
US administration bent on reversing, or at least containing, the
outreach of Soviet global power.
The Soviets really have two strategies in the Western Hemisphere at present,
working simultaneously toward the long-term goals of extending Soviet
influence and reducing that of the United States. The first and most active
is on the axis Cuba-Nicaragua-El Salvador. The second, quieter and
steadier, but of longer standing, is the official effort -- diplomatic,
economic, and military -- to cultivate closer relations with the major
states of South America and Mexico. The two strategies conflict to the
SECRET
1
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
SECRET
extent Soviet support of revolutionary activities in Central American
frightens governments with which the USSR wishes amicable relations. They
are mutually supportive to the extent they create conditions which activate
anti-Americanism throughout the region and provide new bases for subversive
operations against non-communist governments.
Throughout the region, the Soviets seek:
To undermine US influence with established governments and in public
opinion;
To establish political, economic, and where possible, military supply
relationships that comport with the USSR's image as a global power.
To promote the revolutionary ideas, cadres, and organizations conducive
to the eventual appearance of Marxist-Leninist regimes -- prospects for
which the Soviets see as promising in Central America, not so promising
in South America.
The very proximity and historic involvement of the United States in the
region, which makes it correspondingly difficult for the USSR to penetrate,
gives the Soviets an added incentive to work the region today: The prospect
of leftist revolution and the advance of Soviet-Cuban influence constitutes
a challenge which the US cannot ignore, but which taxes its political and,
to some extent, military capital. The Soviets believe this can make the US
a less effective opponent in other regions where the Soviets also seek to
advance.
Central America
Soviet ultimate intentions or desires in Central America are easily stated:
They want the Marxist-Leninist regime to consolidate itself in Nicaragua
and to become a base additional to Cuba for expanding revolutionary
activities in nearby Central America and elsewhere in the Hemisphere.
They want this pattern to be repeated throughout the region.
And they want the costs to their economic and military resource base to
remain tolerable; which means they want somehow to avoid a situation in
which the US counterattacks with sufficient force, skill, or tenacity to
bring the enterprise down.
These desires do not constitute a strategy or a strategic plan, however. It
is obvious that the Soviets face a number of contradictory pressures in
Central America, and that it is not easy to pick the right policy balance
for managing them. The essential dilemma is that to advance their goals and
SECRET
2
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
SECRET
to support their Cuban, Nicaraguan and other clients they have to pose
challenges which may trigger effective countervailing action from the US
which the USSR will not be able to match. How to manage this dilemma has
been at the core of the Soviet-Cuban relationship for two decades, and it
now appears to dominate in Soviet interactions with Cuba, the Sandinistas,
and other leftist movements in the region.
The Cubans and the Sandinistas are feeling exposed and potentially
expendible in the larger US-Soviet struggle. They appreciate the necessity
of avoiding gratuitous provocations to the US, and are willing to try
various negotiating and compromising tactics to delay or deflect US
threats. But they are exceedingly doubtful of their ability to survive by
these tactics alone. They want more robust and credible Soviet support.
And they have a tendency to believe that, with such Soviet support, they
will be safer in a united confrontational posture.
This is a familiar syndrome for Moscow. Over the past generation a series
of new revolutionary regimes -- Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, Vietnam,
Cuba -- have pressed for aggressive strategies: "Support and arm us; we'll
expand the revolution; the Americans will back down.' Moscow has generally
been obliged to urge caution, pleading military and economic realities, and
silently harboring doubts about its ability to control events through the
hands of enthusiastic front-line revolutionaries.
It is worth noting that of the above countries, all but Cuba developed their
internal and in some cases external revolution with a great deal of
political autonomy. Cuba developed in heavy dependence on Soviet political,
economic, and military support, and became the nearest thing to a Soviet
satellite outside Eastern Europe. The causes of this pattern deserve more
examination. It strongly suggests, however, that a consolidated Sandinista
regime will be an extension of Soviet power, not some "Titoist" type
regime. It also suggests that, while Castro and the Sandinistas have some
practical freedom to pursue their own tactics, their actions in pressing the
Central American revolution are highly influenced by Soviet direction.
At present, there are two gambits in play on Nicaragua, both having Soviet
support and probably both responsive to Soviet direction, or at least
encouragement.
On the political level, Nicaragua is attempting to make itself
acceptable by proceeding with elections that have a tolerable appearance
to the outside world without risking internal control, and by accepting
the Contadora process. The latter would have the effect of eliminating
US power from the immediate environment while not verifiably preventing
Nicaragua or Cuba from supporting nearby insurgency movements. The cost
would be some limit -- to be negotiated later -- on Nicaragua's level of
armament, and the withdrawal, probably temporary, of Cuban and other
advisory support.
SECRET
3
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
On the military level, the Soviets are arranging for the emplacement in
Nicaragua of military capabilities which will enable that country to
deal from strength with regional governments and to inflict substantial
-- they would hope, deterrent -- costs on any US military intervention.
The Soviets have authoritatively declared their support for the Contadora
process. Ideally they would hope it to drag out and present a continuing
constraint on US pressure without capping their military deliveries to
Nicaragua in the immediate future. Even if the latter occurs, however, it
will produce a major gain for the Soviets by internationalizing and
legitimizing the security of Nicaragua, in the manner the outcome.of the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962 gave guarantees to Cuba.
The Soviets probably share Castro's view that the early months of a second
Reagan administration will be a period of maximum danger. How exactly they
plan to steer through the rapids is unknown to us. They may not be sure
themselves. It is quite possible that they see hints of a US-Soviet warming
trend, which could follow Gromyko's visit, as a means of inhibiting US
action in Central America.
Soviet investments in Central America have put the USSR in a position to win
much while risking comparatively little. If the Soviet-supported
revolutionary process moves ahead, the US will lose a great deal in terms of
global credibility and self-confidence. The Soviets will gain new bases of
operation. If the US acts to suppress that process by force, this too will
cost the US in Latin American, allied, and domestic opinion, on which the
Soviets would hope to capitalize.
A defeat for Soviet strategy in Central America as a consequence of US
military or para-military actions would not pose intolerable costs to the
Soviets. By declaring repeatedly to their clients the limits of Soviet
ability to protect them in extremis, the Soviets have preemptively limited
the costs of failing to do so. Yet those costs would still be significant.
The overthrow of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua and, even more so, a
major change in the status of Cuba as a consequence of US action in the
region would be a blow to the USSR's image as a superpower, to its
ideological pretension to be on the side of inexorable historical forces,
and to the operational confidence of its leadership.
For these reasons, the Soviets cannot be expected to "stand idly by" should
the US decide to move dramatically or through a series of escalatory steps
against the Central Americans threat.
There is a a non-trivial chance that the Soviets would respond by some
form of "horizontal escalation" in an area of relative Soviet strength.
As always, the most obvious target of such Soviet moves is West Berlin.
Soviet intent would be to internationalize the crisis and to mobilize
European pressure against the US. They would hope either to gain a
quick, face-saving solution in Central America or to create new fissures
in US-German relations and NATO on which they could later capitalize.
SECRET
4
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
SECRET
Another form of linkage which the Soviets might at some point try to
establish would connect Central America with a roughly comparable Soviet
interest nearby, e.g., Afghanistan. In the face of a major East-West
crisis arising out of US and Soviet actions in Central America, one can
imagine a Soviet proposal to trade termination of insurgency support and
neutralization of clients in both regions. If the US bought it, such an
outcome would be of net advantage.to the-USSR because of the greater
strategic importance to both sides of the South Asian-Persian Gulf
region. But the USSR is in a relatively weak position to impose such an
outcome unless it is willing credibly to threaten a theater-wide war
against the Persian Gulf region and Pakistan.
The Rest of the Hemisphere
Short of a country-by-country assessment, which I am not yet in a position
to write (beyond the analysis offered in the attached finished products),
Soviet strategy toward the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean has to be
covered in broad generalities.
Over the region as a whole, one perceives to one degree or another the
three-tiered pattern characteristic of Soviet policy throughout the Third
World, except where client regimes or a cherished ally (India) are in
power. The Soviets tend to work simultaneously at cultivating multifaceted
relations with the government, seeking influence, commercial benefit, and
respectability; at developing ties with oppositionists who may come to power
one day; and at plugging into revolutionary or separatist movements who can
put pressure on the regime or prove useful at some time in the future.
Peru is usually cited as a case where the first level of Soviet action is
applied. Soviet official diplomatic, economic, and military-supply
relations with Peru are more firmly established than in any other South
American country. The Soviet presence there is larger than that in the rest
of South America combined. With elections impending in 1985, the Soviets
have newly emphasized their attention to the partisan political level
seeking overt and covert inroads into the leftist APRA party likely to win
if elections take place, but also maintaining support to far-left and
communist groups.
The Soviets are now making a great effort to expand their ties in Bolivia at
the official level. Their hand in supporting subversive groups, via Cuban
influence, may be evident as well.
Brazil and Argentina are major targets of Soviet political and commercial
diplomacy. Their size and internal politics will keep them such for the
indefinite future. Soviet influence in Chile could score a major comeback
if the Pinochet regime were overthrown by a popular upheaval. Soviet
posture in the Southern Cone would be vastly different today had Allende
survived in power. His fall was a major lesson to the Soviets in the
requirement of revolutionaries to be disciplined, patient, armed, and
utterly intolerant of internal opposition.
SECRET
5
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7
Mexico is a major long-term target for Soviet policy because of its size and
importance to the US. Currently Soviet policy stresses the first level of.
action, with some attention to subversive forces having future potential.
Developments in Central America will clearly have a substantial impact on
Soviet options in Mexico downstream.
The small, politically volatile countries of the Caribbean offer the Soviets
numerous potential targets for overt and covert influence which could open
up fairly suddenly. The experience of Grenada suggests, however, that it
may be difficult for the Soviets to consolidate influence there unless they
establish greater regional military presence or the US faces sharp
constraints in using its local power.
In the next iteration of this memo, I hope to give a more fine-grained
analysis of Soviet activities by country and a more informed picture of
Soviet assessments of political trends in them (derived from contract
research on Soviet specialized area literature). I suspect the overall
picture presented here will not be substantially altered, however. Much
will depend on the future of the Soviet-sponsored revolutionary process in
Central America. If it succeeds and consolidates, it will be a new base for
Cuban and Soviet penetration operations. If it fails, the Soviets will
still work to expand their influence in the region. Their prospects will be
considerably influenced by the relationship that development leaves between
the United States and its southern neighbors.
SECRET
6
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330027-7