KAMPUCHEA: INCREASED ACTIVITY BRINGS FEW RESULTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001100220016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 10, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
16 pc 1984
AAT
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washingon. Q C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 April 1984
Kampuchea: Increased Activity Brings Few Results
Summary
Over the past year, there has been a sharp
increase in both.military and diplomatic activity
related to Kampuchea--Communist Democratic
Kampuchean (DK) guerrilla attacks have been at the
highest level in the five-year conflict; Hanoi has
vigorously pursued diplomatic initiatives aimed at
developing a "dialogue" with ASEAN; and Chinese
troops along the Sino-Vietnamese border have
recently responded sharply to Vietnamese military
operations along the Thai border. Despite the high
level of activity, we see no fundamental shift in
the military balance in Kampuchea nor any
significant movement toward diplomatic compromise.
The Resistance: Uncharacteristically Active
For the first time since the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea
in 1978, the Communist resistance has dictated the pace of dry
season (November-May) combat. Communist guerrillas followed up
last year's vigorous rainy season campaign with stepped up
attacks in the interior. From late January onward, guerrillas
directed to Chief Southeast Asia Division
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian
Analysis. Information available as of April 1984 was used in
its presentation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
EA M 84-10085C
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attacked government seats, fuel and transportation facilities,
market areas, and military installations at widespread locations
deep in the interior.
Several thousand of the DK's 35,000 troops participated in
an attempt to draw Vietnamese forces away'f rom resistance bases
on the Thai border. Although damage to Vietnamese facilities was
heavy on only two occasions, the activity forced the Vietnamese
to devote more resources to maintaining security in the
interior.
Non-Communist forces under Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk also
dispatched several hundred guerrillas to the interior, but weak
leadership, internal dissension, and material and ammunition
shortages continue to inhibit their effectiveness.
o The Thai have been encouraged by the overall progress of
the resistance, but share misgivings with their ASEAN
partners that Communist capabilities are outpacing those
of the ASEAN-backed non-Communists.
o We believe, however, that the DK's improved performance
is a result primarily of qualitative improvements in such
areas as logistics and training, and increased support
from Kampuchean civilians in some areas of the
interior. We have not detected significant numerical
growth of DK forces.
The Vietnamese Approach: Carrot and Stick
Hanoi, meanwhile, assigned priority to diplomatic
initiatives through most of the current dry season, forgoing
military operations until last month.
Vietnamese Foreign Minister ac vise e
Jakarta and Canberra in hopes of fostering a "dialogue" on
Kampuchea.
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Hanoi perceives Indon
trying to draw Jakart
esia as ASEAN's
a away from the
"soft
ASEAN
spot" and
consensus
is
on
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Kampuchea.
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But Hanoi increased its emphasis on the necessity to
eliminate Chinese and Thai-supported DK forces and also stepped
up its public criticism of Thailand. As a result, the visits
achieved little, and "diplomatic illness" led Thach to cancel
scheduled talks with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi.
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25X1
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t
they have been politically less provoca ive
Communist guerrillas, rather than non-Communist camps
L. t ets
r
o Vietnamese attacks since early March approach the scale
of their aggressive dry season operations last year. But
' because
Thailand responded firmly to Vietnamese encroachment into
its territory. Thai Air Force planes struck suspected Vietnamese
positions in Thailand, and artillery forces responded in kind to
Vietnamese barrages. As of last week, Thai forces were still
clearing out pockets of Vietnamese forces remaining on Thai
territory. Bangkok also quickly mobilized international and
g
with thousands of refugees, nave been t e a
Thailand and China Respond
o The threat posed by Vietnamese troops opposite Thailand's
border is at the heart of Bangkok's Kampuchean policy,
i
h
domestic support for its position.
asize
and Prime Minister Prem will probably emp
ekF_
hi
s we
concerns during his visit to Washington t
The Chinese reaction has been more measured.
o The Chinese have continually indicated that their actions
would be calibrated to the severit of Vietnamese actions
alon the Thai border
The Vietnamese appear confident they can contain all but the
largest Chinese attacks. Vietnamese forces hold advantages in
troops, armor, and artillery in the border region, and Vietnamese
arp
Vietnam's forces
i
or.
aircraft are qualitatively super
ridors
i
.
on cor
deployed in depth along all likely invas
o But the Chinese pressure ties down 60 percent of
Vietnam's army, including its elite troops, denying Hanoi
the option of significantly reinforcing its units in
Kampuchea.
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-3 - 25X1
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Advantage Vietnam--But at a Higher Cost
Despite the increased guerrilla activity in Kampuchea, the
apparent failure of Hanoi's diplomatic initiatives, and the
increased pressure along the Sino-Vietnamese border, Vietnam's
position in Kampuchea is in no imminent peril. Hanoi's forces
still control the populated areas and transportation arteries,
and the guerrillas are still too few in number to cut
substantially into those advantages.
o Nevertheless, the gains made by the resistance have made
Vietnam's occupation more costly and painful, and more
importantly, ,they have prevented Hanoi from consolidating
its control.
Because a military victory appears unlikely, Hanoi will
continue to seek a diplomatic solution that ratifies its dominant
position in Kampuchea. It has not wavered in its fundamental
objectives of dominating Kampuchea and eliminating any vestige of
Chinese influence. We do n t look for significant concessions
from Hanoi any time soon.
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