AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001100170004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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SUSPENSE
Executive Secretary
1 Oct 84
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Executive Registry
84- 9319
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence
id a good piece of work here on the state of play
in Africa. would be interesting to see a comparable piece done on
Latin America. I don't know where it ought to be done, probably NSC.
William J. Casey
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SUBJECT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ADMINISTRATION STRATEGIES IN AFRICA,
This paper attempts to delineate the strategies formulated
for advancing the national security interest in Africa from
1981-1984 and give some assessment as to their effectiveness.
Since the author was a participant, it is necessarily biased in
interpretatio,lbut at the same time each accomplishment can be
documented. a 25X1
The paper will look at vital US interests, the setting in
Africa inherited in 1981, ambient factors, the policy
development process, the six strategies developed, and a brief
notation of accomplishments and non-accomplishments. 25X1
US Interests: US geostrategic interests in Africa can be said
to be four: access to the West African oil pool, access to
output from the strategic minerals ridge running from Central to
South Africa, the denial of strategic ports and airfields to our
enemies, and the protection of our interests in the African
portion of Southwest Asia which shield the Middle East oil pool
and related strategic lines of communication and transport. n 25X1
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Setting: The period 1975-1980 saw an accelerated erosion of
vital US and Western interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and
concomitant gains by the Soviet Bloc and other radical forces
hostile to our interests. By 1980, the Soviets counted, in
their own terminology, 18 African states as "socialist-oriented"
or better (in their terms), with five African states (Angola,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Congo, Benin) regularly listed as the most
"progressive" (revolutionary democratic states with vanguard
parties, in their terms). The Soviets had fielded almost 5,000
military advisors, over 40,000 Cuban combat troops, garrisoned
two pro-Soviet regimes with surrogate troops (Angola and
Ethiopia), and had penetrated the vital defense sectors of 18
African states through the supply of Soviet arms and advisors.
"Revolutionary," pro-Soviet or radical anti-US regimes had taken
power in the Seychelles, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape
Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Congo. 0 25X1
Libya also had developed successful momentum, having put
into power a client in Chad and maintained him with a garrison
of 10,000 troops in Chad. Libya began training insurgents and
terrorists for operations into Mali, Niger, Sudan, and Somalia
US policy during this period was one of confusion, mixed
signals, and disengagement. A few examples of outstanding
follies of the Carter Administration included repeated efforts
by Assistant Secretary Dick Moose to get President Carter to
unilaterally recognize the MPLA regime in Angola without
conditions, (Moose was blocked by Brzezinski twice but succeeded
on his third try - only to have his effort undone by the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan), the provision of tens of millions in
grant assistance to a hostile Mozambique regime which declined
to even offer thanks; the serious damage to bilateral relations
with Zaire by Pat Derian who chose to hold President Mobutu to a
unique standard of "human rights" - and who disregarded heinous
violations elsewhere. This latter folly undid the positive
support we gave to President Mobutu when he faced Soviet-
surrogate sponsored invasions of Zaire in 1977 and 1978 from
Angola. The facilities agreement with Somalia, a positive move,
was delayed for two years by NSC staffer Paul Henze who
distrusted Somalis. UN Ambassador Don McHenry threatened the
South African Government with economic sanctions in order to get
them to the Geneva Conference, and then was astounded to find
the South Africans resentful and uncooperative. UN Ambassador
Andy Young referred to the Cuban combat forces in Angola as a
force for stability in Africa. F-1
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Economic and Environmental Factors: 1981 saw the continuing
reverberations of the 1979 oil shock, the impact of the
worldwide recession of 1979, the effects of overborrowing during
easy credit years in the early 1970s, the negative effects of
nationalization, bureaucratization, and overstaffing of economic
and agricultural sectors; the impact of a persistent drought in
Africa; the destruction of native agricultural producers due to
controls and disincentives; the subsidization of urban masses at
the expense of rural peoples --- in short, almost every African
nation was in severe difficulties and some faced desperate
circumstances.
Indigenous Political Factors: The general breakdown of central
order of heterogenous populations in Africa states played a
major part in disputes, insurgencies, and civil wars. Some
insurgent groups had demonstrated a persistence and
sophistication that posed serious challenges to pro-Soviet or
pro-Libyan regimes - UNITA in Angola, EPLF and TPLF in Ethiopia,
CCFAN in Chad as examples. The increasing frequency of military
coups, particularly by unsophisticated, idealistic junior
officers and nco's was a growing phenomenon. South Africa
played a unique role in developments in the southern third of
Africa, and posed a significant problem to Soviet interests in
southern Africa.
Policy Background:: In 1981, there was a pressing need to move
in five separate but related policy theaters. The momentum of
Soviet gains must not only be broken but it must be visibly
broken in the eyes of the Third World leaderships.. The
unconstrained imperialism and terrorism of Libya had to be
contained and countered. Several points of interstate conflict
were providing real and potential access to the Soviets to
exploit and deepen its involvement and influence, and these
conflicts needed to be defused. The proliferation of hostile,
Marxist-Leninist orientations of African governing elites had to
be reversed while our remaining friends needed to be succoured.
A large number of African governments needed to be stimulated
into making tough economic reforms and restructurings to break
out of the downward spiral of African economies, and needed to
be supported when they undertook these difficult reforms. Along
with this, the effects of a multi-year drought on suffering
African peoples called for a greater and more timely response. A
series of policies were developed - some by State, some by NSC,
often appearing ad hoc but in fact consistent with the overall
policy design - were developed utilizing US strengths and
exploiting Communist and radical weaknesses. F-1
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The strengths we used were obvious, but nonetheless heretofore
not used in a consistent pattern. They included: the patent
superiority of private agriculture to produce foodstuffs, and
private enterprise to stimulate and sustain commerce and
industry; the ability and generosity of the US to provide
massive amounts of bilateral economic and humanitarian
assistance, much on soft loan or grant terms; our potential
(albeit frequently unused) influence in the major international
financial institutions, especially the IMF and World Bank; the
ability of the US military to supply superior training and,
selectively, superior equipment, again on soft loan or grant
terms; and the societal differences between us and the Soviets
which enables us to be comfortable with genuine nonalignment in
the Third World while the Soviets cannot. The Soviet weaknesses
which we exploited were equally obvious, but never brought home
to Africa in a comprehensive manner. They included: the
Soviets' almost absolute unwillingness to extend economic or
humanitarian aid due to Soviet economic distress; the
counterproductive Soviet insistence on repayment for massive
Soviet arms shipments in previous years, much of which had
turned to junk, and Soviet dunning of clients; Soviet
unwillingness to supply spare parts or make in-country repairs
on equipment supplied; Soviet racism which favors
lighter-skinned Africans and alienates black Africans; and
Soviet apparent i ity to comprehend in policy terms African
tribal realities. -25X1
Bureaucratic Difficulties: Our policies had to encompass some
institutional orientations deeply ingrained in the USG in its
several agencies,-- specifically, State opposition to military
assistance or covert action, or indeed any action outside
"traditional" diplomacy; JCS aversion to committing any
resources to Africa-period; AID aversion to establishing
political criteria for any aid program; Treasury opposition to
using our influence in the IFIs'on behalf of any African
government or making exceptions to textbook solutions; Commerce
and USTR opposition to any constraints on US exports; CIA fear
of leaks and consequent reluctance to engage in covert action
activities; and the universal bureaucratic fear of and
resistance to White House/NSC direction or orchestration of
policies. It is a sad truism that even Presidentially-appointed
secretaries, deputy, under, and assistant secretaries of
agencies shortly become coopted into the institutional view.
Specific Strategies: The most serious Soviet gains had taken
place in Southern and Lusophone Africa, and there we needed to
counterattack. The Libyans had made significant gains in Chad
and posed a threat to friendly states in the Horn and West
,Africa, and this had to be contained. The expansion of radical,
Marxist-Leninist ideology had spread to virtually half of the 47
African states, and this had to be halted and reversed. 0
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To accomplish this we developed six interrelated strategies:
A. To stop the spread of Marxism-Leninism and to
increase frictions between Soviet clients and their patrons, we
developed a strategy which might be termed reduction to cutoff.
Egregious acts of hostility against our interests by African
governments would be met by a sliding scale of responses ranging
from freezing existing US assistance, to reductions, to total
cutoff, depending on the pattern of hostility presented to us.
This strategy has two major attractions: it allows African
states to define what sort of relationship they want with the US
by their conduct; and it requires that we not necessarily do
anything against hostile-behaving states, but merely stop doing
things for them. Repetitive patterns of hostile actions would
be met by total cutoff, including termination of bilateral
assistance, no favorable votes in the IFIs, pressure on our
allies to slow or stop their assistance, all these steps when
combined with the ambient circumstances of economic,
environmental, and domestic political problems of African states
were judged to probably produce positive results. They have.
The initial test case was Mozambique, which in March 1981
expelled US embassy officers after a particularly nasty outrage
against them and then followed this by outspoken hostility
towards us. At NSC direction, all aid immediately ceased - for
the first time in history a wheat shipment was turned around on
the high seas, an aid survey team was withdrawn, and a clear --.
signal was given. A year later, Mozambique initiated a dialogue
which led to major policy and conduct reversals on its part.
This strategy was also pursued with positive effect in Cape
Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo, Guinea,
Benin, and Madagascar. There was significant bureaucratic
resistance to this strategy, which prevented its wider
application or in some cases its full application. 0
B. The second important strategy follows from the first
and may be called reciprocal improvements. This called for
responding to positive reversals of negative policies by African
governments in a firm, controlled but constructive manner.
Clear conditions for improvement were to be agreed upon and once
agreed, assistance could be resumed and, if the positive
improvements by the African governments continued, increased.
As African governments yielded to the realities of their circum-
stances and discovered that the United States was no longer
providing free lunches, they began in increasing numbers to
discreetly approach us and the IFIs offering fundamental changes
in policies in return for a resumption/increase in assistance.
It was important that we not succumb to the temptations of
either gloating or holding out for overnight, revolutionary
change (a course, unfortunately, still argued by some
conservatives, which would ask many of the governments to commit
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suicide). It was also important to keep the IFIs out in front
in terms of posing the conditions of fundamental restructuring
of the government and economy, which they have performed.
Sixteen of the eighteen principal Soviet clients in Africa have
made such approaches to us, the French, or the IFIs, or a
combination thereof. Twenty-four Afric tates have accepted
restructuring away from Marxist models. 7 25X1
C. The third important strategy called for some
recognition to "old friends", that handful of African states
which continued to support Western interests and policies and
which had been so devastated by previous Administration
policies. Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Senegal, Liberia, Zaire,
Botswana were given priorities in assistance which demonstrated
our appreciation of their support and shared interests.) 25X1
D. The fourth strategy called for increased security
assistance to states threatened by external aggression.
Subsumed under this was our effort to contain both Libyan direct
aggression and Libyan subversion and terrorism. Timely and
increased assistance to Sudan, Somalia, Chad, directly
frustrated several Libyan and Ethiopian destabilization efforts.
Our deployment of US assets to Sudan and our emergency security
assistance to Chad and Somalia has, according to intelligence,
had a constructive impact on the Soviets, the Ethiopians, and
the Libyans, and while it has not stopped more subtler forms of
subversion it has inhibited direct, cross-border aggression.
Also subsumed under this strategy was our successful effort to
get the French socialist government to meet its security
commitments in Africa.) 25X1
E. The fifth strategy applied was to increase the costs to
the Soviet Bloc for its adventures and aggressions in Africa
where feasible, and at least not to take actions which would
reduce their costs. The costs to the Soviets of sustaining its
African client regimes both economically and militarily have
increased significantly. The Soviet reluctance to bear economic
assistance costs has played a large part in alienating seriously
some of these erstwhile clients. In the last two years the
Soviets have had to commit over $1 billion in both Ethiopia and
Angola in military aid to sustain the local regimes from growing
insurgencies. We tried to at minimum not take actions to
discourage the agencies which were increasing Soviet costs,
whether it be freedom fighter movements attacking Soviet client
governments, or economic pressures due to reduced assistance
from the West.
F. The sixth strategy employed was to work to defuse
conflicts and potential conflicts which offered the Soviets an
opportunity to increase its influence through its one effective
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means - quick and massive military aid. The major target of
this effort was along the periphery of South Africa, where both
direct conflicts and paramilitary cross-border warfare were on
the increase. Our major Southern Africa initiative was designed
with this in mind, and has borne real fruits in this regard. F
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
-- We have dealt the Soviets a stunning political/psycho-
logical reverse in the Third World, with a majority of former
clients visibly beginning the dismantling of Moscow-approved
structures and policies. Several former Soviet clients have
openly complained of Soviet niggardliness in aid and
unresponsiveness. The Soviets have been unable to project their
power further in Africa since 1981.
-- We have blocked Soviet attempts to expand their foothold
in Zambia and Botswana through military assistance.
-- We have partially removed and blocked the Libyans in Chad,
got Qadhafi enmeshed in a no-win situation which is costing him
both financially and politically, and placed him in
confrontation with French military forces.
-- We blocked serious Libyan/Ethiopian aggressions in Sudan
and Somalia.
-- We have strengthened our access to the governments and
states possessing the strategic minerals ridge.
-- With the exception of Luanda and Dahlak Island, (which
predate 1981), we have continued to deny Soviet efforts to gain
new strategic ports and airfields.
-- With some considerable effort, we continue to protect our
equities in Southwest Asia/Horn of Africa against Soviet and
Libyan efforts to expand their influence.
-- The Soviets and Cubans remain enmeshed in no-win
insurgency situations in Ethiopia and Angola, where, despite
massive investments in treasure and men, their clients'
circumstances continue to deteriorate.
-- In Southern Africa, we have devastated the Soviet position
of influence in Mozambique, sustained the anti-Soviet attitude
in Zimbabwe, ousted Soviet influence in Botswana, defused
several regional points of conflict between South Africa and
neighboring states (which gave the Soviets new opportunities to
meddle), damaged the Soviet. position in Angola, and kept them
extraneous to serious regional negotiations. This all developed
from our southern Africa.policy inititiave.
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-- We have also seen the severe damaging of a major and
long-term Soviet agency for action in Southern Africa, the
African National Congress (ANC), which has lost its access to
Mozambique, Swaziland, and to a degree Botswana, Lesotho, and
Zimbabwe.
-- We have developed a successful dialogue with the senior
echelons of the South African Government, and through this have
been able to influence and support elements thereof which are
promoting regional detente and reform away from apartheid
domestically. This new relationship has also permitted us to
intervene - albeit selectively - to overturn or ameliorate human
rights violations and mount discreet funding programs for black
trade unions, black students, and human rights organizations
inside South Africa.
-- At NSC initiative, we were able to facilitate a US visit
by UNITA leader Savimbi in December, 1981. Also at NSC
initiative, we were able to undertake, using the ICRC and PVOs,
programs supplying medicines and foodstuffs to peoples under the
control of UNITA in Angola and TPLF and EPLF in Ethiopia,
offsetting similar "humanitarian" aid sent through the regimes
controlling the capitals. The Ethiopian program was
precedent-setting in that for the first time it opened PL 480
funds for use in cross-border food supply operations into
rebel-controlled areas, and of course has application elsewhere
in the world. (S)
-- We have converted almost all military assistance to Africa
to grant assistance rather than loans (FMS), reflected the
reality of their inability to pay and that loans exacerbated
their economic crises, and we have increased the amounts of
military assistance, primarily to old friends.
-- We have maintained in a time of budget stringency a steady
improvement in overall assistance levels to Africa, and have
succeeded in getting a dramatic doubling of emergency
humanitarian assistance to combat drought effects. We have also
proposed a new $500 million, five year Economic Policy
initiative to Congress, which will enable us to better support
those governments making difficult but necessary economic
reforms and restructurings. We have also proposed to Congress
new measures designed to expedite the delivery of emergency food
assistance. (S)
NON-ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
-- We have been unable to sway our allies from continuing to
lend significant assistance to the Mengistu Soviet client regime
in Ethiopia, thus not maximizing the possible pressure.
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-- We have been unable to get Congress to approve any
meaningful security assistance to Zaire despite President
Mobutu's exemplary record of support to the US.
-- We have been unable to completely cut off trade and even
EXIM Bank assistance to the regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, due
primarily to the "unrestricted export" school of thought
prevalent in the higher reaches of Commerce and the across-the
board bureaucratic resistance to the Presidential use of the
authority granted by the Chaffee Amendment.
-- We were unable to obtain Congressional repeal of the Clark
Amendment, and our 1981 effort was less than total. Similarly,
we were unable to drum up interest for a constructive
interpretation of Clark to preclude licensing or EXIM loans to
the MPLA regime, despite the apparent logic of the position.
-- Despite the successes in altering economic/political
policies within African states, we have been less successful in
altering their foreign policies in line with our interests, and
there remains considerable reluctance by State, AID and others
to use this as a strategic guideline or condition on our
bilateral relationships, despite good missionar work by USUN,
NSC, and indeed Congress (Moynihan Amendment). "
-- The Soviets have strengthened their ties to and control -..--
over Ethiopia, have deepened their relationship with President
Rene's regime in the Seychelles (which came to power in 1977).
On our watch, there are two new regimes - Ghana and Burkina Faso
(Upper Volta) hich could move to a closer relationship with
the Soviets. 25X1
CONCLUSION: Over the past 3 1/2 years we have developed a
coherent, six-part strategy to Africa, have made a sincere
effort to implement it, and have seen it bear positive results.
The strategy remains valid, but needs to be more tightly and
more comprehensively applied, and daily vigilance is required to
counter regular efforts at backsliding from various agencies.
While the strategy is not comprehensively articulated as I have
tried to do above in any policy document, each aspect or .
sne-~ific strategy is contained in the several NSDD's applicable.
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